Government debt and social security in a life-cycle economy*

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Abstract

This paper develops a tractable overlapping generations model that is useful for analyzing both the short- and long-run impact of fiscal policy and social security. It modifies the Blanchard (1985)/Weil (1987) framework to allow for life-cycle behavior. This is accomplished by introducing random transition from work to retirement, and then from retirement to death. The transition probabilities may be picked to allow for realistic average lengths of life, work, and retirement. The resulting framework is not appreciably more difficult to analyze than the standard Cass/Koopmans one-sector growth model: besides the capital stock, there is only one additional state variable: the distribution of wealth between workers and retirees. The model also allows for variable labor supply. Under reasonable parameter values government debt and social security have significant effects on capital intensity.

1 Introduction

This paper develops a new kind of overlapping generations growth model and then uses the framework to analyze the economic impact of government debt and social security. Individuals within the framework exhibit life-cycle

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behavior. Further, they can have realistic average lengths of life, work, and retirement. The framework is useful for analyzing both the short-run and long-run effects of policy. At the same time, however, it is very tractable. It is not appreciably more complex to analyze than either the conventional Diamond (1965) two-period overlapping generations growth model or the widely-used Cass/Koppmans (1965) representative agent paradigm.

The obstacle to overcome in working with overlapping generations models is the heterogeneity implied by the age structure of the population. Individuals of different ages vary both in the level of wealth and in the composition of wealth between human and nonhuman sources. Because they have different horizons, they also have different marginal propensities to consume. In general, therefore, it is not possible to derive simple aggregate consumption and savings functions [Modigliani (1966)]. The standard two-period overlapping generations model avoids the aggregation problem by imposing extreme restrictions on demographic structure.

Blanchard (1985) makes substantial progress toward developing a tractable overlapping generations framework with a reasonable demographic structure by assuming that individuals face a constant probability of death each period. This restriction, also employed by Yaari (1965), makes individual horizons finite in a way that permits simple aggregation of consumption behavior. In a similar spirit, Weil (1987) proposes a manageable overlapping generations setup where individuals live forever, but a new cohort of infinitely-lived people is born each period. With either framework it is possible to study the impact of policies that redistribute wealth between generations. In both setups, the demographic structure makes government bonds net wealth for the current population, as in the classic Diamond (1965) framework.

Neither the Blanchard framework nor the Weil framework, however, captures life-cycle behavior. Within both frameworks individuals currently alive are identical except for their respective levels of nonhuman wealth. They all have identical marginal propensities to consume. There is no “saving for retirement.” It is therefore not possible to use these frameworks to study the impact of policies that redistribute between workers and retirees, such as social security and medicare. Nor is it possible to study the impact of demographic changes, such as the aging of the population. Finally, omitting life-cycle considerations may lead to understating the impact of government debt and deficits. For example, Romer (1989) presents some numerical simulations that suggest that government debt has only minor effects on real activity in the Blanchard/Weil framework.\textsuperscript{1} Adding life-cycle factors is likely to enhance the impact, for two reasons. First, having a retirement period raises the fraction of government bonds that are net wealth to those currently

\footnote{Romer (1989) argues that the welfare effects of a rise in government debt may be large, even if the impact on aggregate activity is small.}
alive, since it shortens the horizon over which the current work force is liable for future taxes. Second, having retirees as well as workers implies that a rise in government debt will redistribute wealth from a low propensity to consume group (workers) to a high propensity to consume one (retirees). ²

To introduce life-cycle factors but maintain tractability, I make two kinds of modifications of the Blanchard/Weil framework. ³ First, I introduce two stages of life: work and retirement. I then impose a constant transition probability per period for a worker into retirement, as well as a constant probability per period of death for a retiree. Second, I employ a class of nonexpected utility preferences proposed by Farmer (1990) that generate certainty-equivalent decision rules in the presence of income risk. With these two modifications it is possible to derive aggregate consumption/savings relations for workers and for retirees. It is also possible to express the current equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables as functions of just two predetermined variables: the capital stock and the distribution of nonhuman wealth between retirees and workers. In effect, the model captures life-cycle behavior by having only one more predetermined variable than in conventional one-sector growth frameworks [see e.g., Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995)].

In the baseline model labor supply is inelastic. I subsequently extend the model to allow for variable labor supply, so that it is possible to study the impact of fiscal policy and social security on labor supply.

Overall, the framework is not meant as a substitute for large-scale numerical overlapping generations models that are employed for policy analysis [e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Hubbard and Judd (1987), De Nardi, İmrohoroglu, and Sargent (1998)]. On the other hand, because it permits realistic average periods of work and retirement, the model is useful for quantitative policy analysis in a way that complements the use of large-scale models. The advantage of this framework is its parsimonious representation, which helps make clear the factors that underlie the results. In particular, it is possible to obtain an analytical solution for aggregate consumption behavior, conditional on the paths of wages and interest rates. In the case with variable work effort, it is also possible to find an analytical solution for aggregate labor supply. Since the effects of government and social security on the economy in this framework work their way through consumption and labor supply, these (partial) analytical solutions help clarify the nature and strength of the policy transmission mechanisms. Further, because of its parsimony, it is straightforward to integrate this life-cycle setup into existing growth and business-cycle models in order to study a much broader set of issues than are discussed here.

²Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) illustrate how government deficits may redistribute wealth between workers and retirees in a two-period overlapping generations model.
³For an early attempt to embed life-cycle behavior in a growth model, see Tobin (1967.)
One issue from which the paper abstracts is the possibility that intergenerational caring, as formalized by Barro (1974), could effectively transform the life-cycle individuals of the model economy into infinitely-lived households. When individuals have infinite horizons (and there are no other frictions), the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem applies, implying that both government debt and social security are neutral. The recent behavior of the U.S. economy, however, suggests that it is still worth studying the life-cycle approach. Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in both the ratio of government debt to GDP and the ratio of social security and medicare to GDP that occurred in the last fifteen years or so. Accompanying this expansive fiscal policy was a sharp decline in the net private saving rate and a secular rise in the ex post real interest rate (measured as the difference between the one-year government bond rate and the ex post inflation rate). While it may be possible to reconcile these phenomena with a representative agent paradigm, a life-cycle setup seems the natural place to start.

Section 2 introduces the key assumptions and then derives an aggregate consumption function for an economy with no government policy. Section 3 embeds the consumption function in a one-sector growth model, and then illustrates how life-cycle factors affect the equilibrium, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Section 4 adds government policy. It then explores the impact of shifts in government debt, social security, and government consumption, again both qualitatively and quantitatively. Section 5 considers two extensions of the model: first, allowing for openness; second, allowing for variable labor supply within the closed economy. Finally, concluding remarks are in Section 6.

2 The aggregate consumption function

In this model, individuals have finite lives and they evolve through two distinct stages of life: work and retirement. To derive a tractable aggregate consumption function and at the same time permit realistic (average) lengths of work and retirement, I make three kinds of assumptions. These assumptions involve: (1) population dynamics; (2) insurance arrangements; and (3) preferences.

Population dynamics are as follows: each individual is born a worker. Conditional on being a worker in the current period, the probability of remaining one in the next period is \( \omega \). Conversely, the probability of retiring is \( 1 - \omega \). To facilitate aggregation, I assume that the transition probability \( \omega \) is independent of the worker's employment tenure. The average time in the labor force for an individual is thus \( \frac{1}{1-\omega} \).

\[^{4}\text{See Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996) for an analysis of the declining saving rate. These authors emphasize the role of transfers to the elderly, particularly Medicare.}\]
Figure 1: Debt, Social Security, Savings, and Interest
Once an individual retires the death clock begins to tick. Conditional on being retired in the current period, the probability of surviving to the next is $\gamma$ and, conversely, the probability of death next period is $1 - \gamma$. The survival probability $\gamma$ is independent of age, again to facilitate aggregation. The average retirement period is thus $rac{1}{1-\gamma}$.

Let $N_t$ denote the stock of workers at time $t$. I assume that $(1 - \omega + n)N_t$ new workers are born in $t + 1$, implying that the workforce grows at the gross rate $1 + n$:

$$N_{t+1} = (1 - \omega + n)N_t + \omega N_t = (1 + n)N_t.$$  \hfill (2.1)

Given that the number of people in each cohort is large, in the stationary equilibrium the number of retirees is $(1 - \omega - \gamma)N_t$. The ratio of retirees to workers, $\psi$, is thus

$$\psi = 1 - \frac{\omega}{1 + n - \gamma}.$$  \hfill (2.2)

Since this ratio is fixed, both the work force and the number of retirees grow at the gross rate $1 + n$.

For simplicity there is no aggregate risk. The only risks individuals face throughout their lifetimes are idiosyncratic: A worker faces a potential loss of wage income. A retiree faces an uncertain time of death. These risks, however, may complicate both the derivation and aggregation of individual decision rules. It is for this reason that I make assumptions about availability of insurance markets and about preferences.

To eliminate the impact of uncertainty about time of death, I introduce a perfect annuities market, following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). The annuities market provides perfect insurance against this kind of risk. Under the arrangement each retiree effectively turns over his wealth to a mutual fund that invests the proceeds. The fraction $\gamma$ of those that survive to the next period receive all the returns, while the (estates of) the fraction $1 - \gamma$ who die receive nothing. Each surviving retiree receives a return that is

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5Note that the framework nests the standard two-period overlapping generations model. The standard model emerges in the special case with $\omega = 0$ and $\gamma = 0$. (I thank Chris Phelan for this observation.) In this instance, an individual works in the first period of life, retires with certainty in the next, and then dies with certainty at the end of the second period.

6Let $N_t^r$ denote the stock of retirees at time. My demographic assumptions imply $N_{t+1}^r = (1 - \omega)N_t + \gamma N_t^r$. Manipulate this expression to obtain $(1 + n)N_{t+1}^r/N_{t+1} = (1 - \omega) + \gamma N_t^r/N_t$. In the stationary equilibrium $N_{t+1}^r/N_{t+1} = N_t^r/N_t \equiv \psi$, which implies $\psi = (1 - \omega)/(1 + n - \gamma)$.

7Though in this paper I assume a stationary demographic structure, it is easy to extend the model to allow for nonstationary demographics.

8It is not hard to extend the model to allow for aggregate risk, given the small state space. Doing so with a standard large-scale overlapping generations model, on the other hand, is a formidable task.
proportionate to his initial contribution of wealth to the mutual fund. Thus, for example, if \( R \) is the gross return per dollar invested by the mutual fund, the gross return on wealth for a surviving retiree is \( R/\gamma \).

To address the risk of uncertainty of retirement, I restrict preferences. In principle, I could also introduce an insurance market that mitigates the idiosyncratic risk of loss of income from retirement. I refrain from doing so, however, because my objective is to have a framework that captures life-cycle behavior. A perfect insurance market against loss of labor income would smooth income perfectly across work and retirement. In the absence of such a market, all wage income accrues to workers. This latter scenario is clearly a better approximation of the life cycle. Thus, I do not permit an insurance market for wage income.

I address the problem of retirement risk by assuming that individuals have preferences that separate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution. In particular, I employ a special class of CES nonexpected utility functions proposed by Farmer (1990) that restrict individuals to be risk neutral with respect to income risk, but allow for an arbitrary intertemporal elasticity of substitution.\(^9\) Since the degree of income risk here is artificial in the sense that it is generated by the assumption of constant probability of transition into retirement, it seems reasonable to mitigate the impact of this income variation by assuming risk neutrality.

Let \( V^z_t \) be an individual’s value function, where the superscript \( z = w, r \) indicates whether the individual is a worker (\( w \)) or a retiree (\( r \)); let \( C_t \) be consumption; and let \( \beta \) be a subjective discount factor. Then, preferences are given by:

\[
V^z_t = [(C_t)^\rho + \beta^z E_t[V_{t+1}^z]^{\rho}]^{1/\rho}
\]  

(2.3)

with

\[
\beta^w = \beta; \\
\beta^r = \beta \cdot \gamma
\]

and where \( E_t[V_{t+1}^z] \) is the expectation of the value function next period, conditional on the person being type \( z \) at time \( t \) and being alive at \( t+1 \); i.e.,

\[
E_t[V_{t+1}^w] = \omega V^w_{t+1} + (1-\omega)V^r_{t+1} \\
E_t[V_{t+1}^r] = V^r_{t+1}.
\]

The retiree’s effective discount factor is \( \beta \gamma \) and not \( \beta \) since his probability of surviving until the next period is \( \gamma \).

These preferences generate certainty-equivalent decisions rules in the face of idiosyncratic income risk, in contrast to standard Von-Neumann/

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\(^9\)For a generalization of the preferences described by equation (2.3) to a broad family of CES nonexpected utility functions, see Weil (1990).
Morgenstern utility functions. Roughly speaking, because preferences are over the mean of next period’s value function, individuals only care about the first moment of expected income in deriving their decision rules. On the other hand, they do care about smoothing consumption over time. The curvature parameter \( \rho \) introduces a smooth trade-off for individuals between consuming today versus consuming tomorrow. In analogy to the standard case, the desire to smooth consumption implies a finite intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( \sigma \), given by \( \sigma = \frac{1}{1-\rho} \). Thus a virtue of the preference structure is that it permits flexibility over the choice of \( \sigma \), which is a key parameter in determining the quantitative effects of debt and social security.

2.1 Consumption by retirees

Retirees consume only out of asset income. They have no labor income, though later I allow for social security. In general, one can index each retiree by the time he was born \( j \) and the time he left the labor force \( k \). Ultimately, it will not be necessary to keep track of how assets and consumption are distributed among retirees over \( j \) and \( k \). Under my assumptions one can simply aggregate across different cohorts.

Let \( A_{t}^{jk} \) and \( C_{t}^{jk} \) be (nonhuman) assets at the beginning of time \( t \) and consumption at \( t \), respectively, of a retired person who was born at time \( j \) and left the labor force at time \( k \); and let \( R_{t} \) be the gross return on assets from period \( t-1 \) to \( t \). For a retiree at \( t \) who participates in a perfect annuities market and survives until at least \( t + 1 \), assets evolve according to:

\[
A_{t+1}^{jk} = (R_{t}/\gamma)A_{t}^{jk} - C_{t}^{jk}.
\]

(2.4)

The retiree chooses consumption and asset accumulation to maximize (2.3) subject to (2.4) and a terminal condition that requires him to pay off all debts. The consumption Euler equation for the retiree yields (see the Appendix):

\[
C_{t+1}^{jk} = (R_{t+1}\beta)^{\sigma}C_{t}^{jk}.
\]

(2.5)

Consumption at \( t + 1 \) for a surviving retiree is certain since there is no aggregate risk.

Let \( \epsilon_{t}\pi_{t} \) be the retiree’s marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (mpcw), where \( \pi_{t} \) is the MPCW for a worker. (I choose this notation since the ratio of the two mpcw’s, \( \epsilon_{t} \), has an important role in the model.) The retiree’s decision rule for consumption is given by

\[
C_{t}^{jk} = \epsilon_{t}\pi_{t}(R_{t}/\gamma)A_{t}^{jk}
\]

(2.6)

\(^{10}\)Since retirees do not face any income risk, they behave as if they had standard Von-Neumann/Morgenstern preferences. In other words, the solution to their decision problem is the same as if they had standard preferences.

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where \( \epsilon_t \pi_t \) obeys the following nonlinear first-order difference equation:

\[
\epsilon_t \pi_t = 1 - (R_{t+1}^\sigma \beta^\gamma) \frac{\epsilon_t \pi_t}{\epsilon_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}}
\]

\[
= 1 - \beta \gamma, \quad \text{if } \sigma = 1.
\]

Because the retiree does not face any income uncertainty (thanks to the annuity market), the solution for \( \epsilon_t \pi_t \) is similar to the case with standard CES preferences. The retiree's mpcw varies only with the interest rate, and is constant when \( \sigma = 1 \) (which corresponds to logarithmic preferences). Further, as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), the likelihood of death raises the marginal propensity to consume. In this respect, the finite expected horizon influences the retiree's consumption decision.

An exact solution to the nonlinear difference equation for \( \epsilon_t \pi_t \) is not feasible. However, using the methods of Campbell and Shiller (1988), one can find an approximate solution via loglinearization. Eventually I will follow this course.

\[2.2\] Consumption by workers

Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically. (In Section 5.2 I allow for elastic labor supply.) Workers consume and save out of assets and wage income, \( W_t \). Let the superscript \( w_j \) denote a worker born in period \( j \). As with retirees, my assumptions will permit aggregation over different cohorts.

For a cohort \( j \) worker, assets evolve according to

\[
A_{t+1}^{wj} = R_t A_t^{wj} + W_t - C_t^{wj}.
\]

The worker chooses consumption and asset accumulation to maximize (2.3), subject to (2.8) and to the constraints that become operative once he retires, described in the previous section. The first-order necessary condition for the worker's consumption/saving choice yields (see the Appendix)

\[
\omega C_{t+1}^{wj} + (1 - \omega) \Lambda_{t+1} C_{t+1}^{wj} = (R_{t+1} \gamma t+1) \sigma C_t^{wj}
\]

where \( \Lambda_{t+1} \equiv \frac{\partial C_t^{wj}/\partial C_{t+1}^{wj}}{\partial C_{t+1}^{wj}/\partial C_{t+1}^{wj}} \) is the marginal rate of substitution of consumption across work and retirement, and where \( \gamma t+1 \) is a factor that weights the gross return \( R_{t+1} \) and is given by

\[
\gamma t+1 = \omega + (1 - \omega) \frac{1}{e_t^{1-\gamma}}.
\]

In calculating the net marginal gain utility from saving, \( R_{t+1} \gamma t+1 \beta [\omega C_{t+1}^{wj} + (1 - \omega) \Lambda_{t+1} C_{t+1}^{wj}]^{\sigma-1} \), the worker takes into account the likelihood he may retire in the next period. Because he is risk neutral, only the mean of the
distribution of next period’s (utility-weighted) consumption influences this
calculation.

As with a retiree, the worker’s consumption depends upon his wealth. Wealth for a worker, however, includes his discounted stream of labor income, i.e., his human wealth \( H_t^\dagger \), in addition to current nonhuman assets \( R_t A_t^w \). Accordingly, the worker’s decision rule for consumption is

\[
C_t^w = \pi_t(R_t A_t^w + H_t^\dagger)
\]  

(2.11)

where the mpcw, \( \pi_t \), is given by

\[
\pi_t = 1 - (R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1})^{\sigma-1} \beta^\sigma \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t+1}}
\]  

(2.12)

\[
= 1 - \beta, \text{ if } \sigma = 1.
\]

Further,

\[
H_t^\dagger = \sum_{v=0}^{\infty} \frac{W_{t+v}}{\prod_{z=1}^{v} R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z}} / \omega
\]  

(2.13)

where \( R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z} / \omega \) is the effective (gross) discount rate that a worker in period \( t + z - 1 \) applies to wage income received in \( t + z \).

The solution for the worker’s consumption decision differs from the outcome in the conventional infinite horizon case in two main ways. First, the finite expected period of work induces a “saving-for-retirement” effect, consistent with life-cycle analysis. In particular, the likelihood that the worker may lose his labor income due to retirement induces him to discount the future wage stream he faces at a higher rate than otherwise. This effect is mirrored by the presence of the per period survival probability in work, \( \omega \), in the denominator of the effective discount rate, \( R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z} / \omega \). The enlarged discount rate reduces the value of human wealth relative to the infinite horizon case, thus reducing consumption and increasing saving. In this respect there is saving for retirement.

Second, the expected finiteness of life makes the worker value the future less relative to the present, as compared to the infinite horizon case. This effect is mirrored by the presence of the variable \( \Omega_{t+1} \) that augments the interest rate \( R_{t+1} \) in the worker’s decision rule for consumption. Note that \( \Omega_{t+1} \) varies positively with the ratio of a retiree’s mpcw to a worker’s mpcw, \( \epsilon_{t+1} \), and with the retirement probability, \( 1 - \omega \) (see equation (2.10)). Further, since \( \epsilon_{t+1} > 1 \), it follows that \( \Omega_{t+1} > 1 \). In turn, \( \Omega_{t+1} > 1 \), implies that a worker effectively discounts the future at a higher rate relative to the infinite case, since \( \Omega_{t+1} \) enters the worker’s consumption function multiplicatively.

\footnote{It is straightforward to show analytically that, in the steady state, \( \epsilon_t > 1 \) (see footnote 11 in the next sub-section). Numerical simulations show that this inequality also holds outside the steady state for reasonable parameter values.}
with the interest rate $R_{t+1}$. Intuitively, everything else equal, the marginal utility gain from a unit of wealth for a retired person is less than for a worker, since the former consumes out of wealth at a faster pace than does the latter (i.e., consumption out of a dollar of wealth received early in life can be smoothed over more periods than consumption out of a dollar received (unexpectedly) late in life). Since there is some chance the worker could flip into retirement the next period, the utility gain at the margin from carrying over another unit of wealth is lower than if he were infinitely lived with certainty.\footnote{In the Appendix I show that the marginal utility of wealth is inversely related to the marginal propensity to consume. Since retirees have a higher mpcw, they also have a lower marginal utility of wealth.} The net effect is to cause the worker to discount the future at a higher rate than otherwise. In this way, the expected finiteness of life influences the worker's decision problem.

As with the retiree, an exact solution for the consumption decision is not possible, except in the case of a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution, where $\pi_t$ is constant. Thus, I will also have to find an approximate solution via loglinearization for the worker's decision rule.

### 2.3 Aggregate consumption and the distribution of wealth

I now aggregate across individual retirees to obtain a consumption function for retirees, and do the same across individual workers to obtain a consumption function for this group. Combining the two relations then yields an aggregate consumption function. Because aggregate consumption will depend on the distribution of nonhuman wealth between the two groups, I also characterize how this distribution evolves.

Since the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, $\epsilon_t \pi_t$, is the same for all retirees, one can simply sum (2.6) across individual retirees to obtain an aggregate relation. Let $A^r_t$ be the total nonhuman assets that retirees carry from period $t - 1$ into period $t$. The aggregate gross return on this wealth is $R_t$ since each retiree at $t - 1$ earns a return $R_t/\gamma$, but only the fraction $\gamma$ of these individuals survive. Thus, total wealth available to retirees at $t$ is $R_t A^r_t$, implying that aggregate retiree consumption, $C^r_t$, is given by

$$C^r_t = \epsilon_t \pi_t R_t A^r_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.14)

Though it differs from that of retirees', individual workers also have an identical marginal propensity to consume out wealth, $\pi_t$, implying that one can similarly aggregate consumption across workers. Let $A^w_t$ be the total nonhuman assets that workers carry from period $t - 1$ into period $t$ and let $H_t$ be the total human wealth of the current work force. Summing (2.11)
over individual workers, therefore, implies that total worker consumption at $t$, $C^w_t$, is given by

$$C^w_t = \pi_t(R_t A^w_t + H_t)$$

(2.15)

with

$$H_t = \sum_{v=0}^{\infty} \frac{N_{t+v} W_{t+v}}{\Pi_{z=1}^{v}(1 + n) R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z}/\omega}$$

(2.16)

$$= N_t W_t + \frac{H_{t+1}}{(1 + n)} R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}/\omega.$$  

Equation (2.16) indicates that $H_t$ is a discounted sum of the economy-wide wage bill at each point in time, $N_{t+r} W_{t+r}$. Note that the discount rate that is applied to the aggregate wage bill is the product of the gross population growth rate $1 + n$ and the rate at which individual workers discount their labor income, $R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z}/\omega$. The factor $1 + n$ augments the discount rate because, with finite lives, the share of the total wage bill of those currently alive declines over time as the labor force grows. In total, therefore, three distinct factors arise in the life-cycle setting presented here that raise the discount rate on future labor income relative to the infinite horizon case. They are: (1) finite expected time in the labor force (reflected by the presence of $\omega$ in the discount rate); (2) greater discounting of the future owing to expected finiteness of life (reflected by the presence of $\Omega_{t+1}$); and (3) growth of the labor force (reflected by the presence of $(1 + n)$).

Let $A_t$ denote aggregate assets and $\lambda_t$ denote the share of assets held by retirees, i.e., $\lambda_t \equiv A^r_t/A_t$ and $(1 - \lambda_t) = A^w_t/A_t$. Then, to obtain an aggregate consumption function, simply add (2.14) and (2.15):

$$C_t = \pi_t\{(1 + (\epsilon_t - 1)\lambda_t) R_t A_t + H_t\}.$$  

(2.17)

Clearly, a novel feature of equation (2.17) is the presence of the share of nonhuman wealth held by retirees, $\lambda_t$. Since $\epsilon_t$ exceeds unity (i.e., retirees have a higher marginal propensity to consume than workers), a rise in $\lambda_t$ raises aggregate consumption demand. An implication is that social security will influence aggregate consumption and saving. Also, because the effective discount rate used to measure aggregate human wealth exceeds the market interest rate, government debt and deficits will influence consumption demand. I defer a comprehensive discussion of fiscal policy and social security until Section 4, however.

To characterize how $\lambda_t$ evolves over time, note first that total assets accumulated by retirees from period $t$ to $t + 1$ depends both on the saving of

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\[^{13}\]Because of the life-cycle effects present, equation (2.17) does not impose the counterfactual relation between aggregate consumption growth and real interest rates that arises in a representative agent economy. For discussion of the implications for aggregate consumption of life-cycle behavior, see Clarida (1991) and Gali (1990).
current retirees at \( t \) and the assets of workers at \( t \) who switch into retirement at \( t + 1 \). That is,

\[
\lambda_{t+1} A_{t+1} = \lambda_t R_t A_t - C_t + (1 - \omega)(1 - \lambda_t) R_t A_t + W_t - C_t^w.
\]

The last term in brackets is assets accumulated by workers at \( t \) for \( t + 1 \). The fraction \( 1 - \omega \) of these assets accrues to retirees at \( t + 1 \), reflecting the fraction of time \( t \) workers that leave the labor force in the subsequent period. Given that total assets held by workers at \( t + 1 \), \((1 - \lambda_{t+1}) A_{t+1}\), equal assets carried by workers at \( t \) into \( t + 1 \) times the fraction \( \omega \) that remain in the work force:

\[
\lambda_{t+1} = \omega(1 - \epsilon_t \pi_t) \lambda_t R_t \frac{A_t}{A_{t+1}} + (1 - \omega).
\]

(2.18)

Up to this point I have determined aggregate consumption and the distribution of nonhuman wealth between workers and retirees, taking as given the paths of aggregate assets \( A_t \), the interest rate \( R_t \), and the wage rate \( W_t \). The next section closes the model by adding production.

3 Dynamic equilibrium and steady state

I now embed the life-cycle framework of the previous section within a one-sector growth economy. The economy is closed and growth is exogenous. Also, there is no government policy. Sections 4 and 5 relax these assumptions.

3.1 Production, resource constraints and equilibrium

The economy is competitive. Firms employ capital and labor to produce output using a constant returns-to-scale technology. There are no adjustment costs. Think of individuals as renting their capital to firms. Let \( Y_t \) be output, \( X_t \) be the state of technology, and \( K_t \) be capital. Then aggregate output is given by the following Cobb-Douglas technology

\[
Y_t = (X_t N_t)^\alpha K_t^{1-\alpha}
\]

(3.1)

where the parameter \( \alpha \) is the labor share. Technology is labor-augmenting and grows exogenously, as follows:

\[
X_{t+1} = (1 + x)X_t.
\]

(3.2)

Capital depreciates at the rate \( \delta \).

I can now characterize the behavior of wages, rents, and asset supplies (nonhuman wealth). Equation (3.1) implies that \( W_t \) and \( R_t \) are given by

\[
W_t = \alpha \frac{Y_t}{N_t}
\]

(3.3)
\[ R_t = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{K_t} + (1 - \delta). \]  

(3.4)

Capital is the only vehicle for saving. (In the next section I add government debt). Therefore, the net supply of assets in this case equals the capital stock:

\[ A_t = K_t. \]  

(3.5)

Since the economy is closed, and since there is no government, the capital stock evolves according to

\[ K_{t+1} = Y_t - C_t + (1 - \delta)K_t. \]  

(3.6)

Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium): A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous predetermined variables \( \{K_{t+1}, \lambda_{t+1}\} \) and a sequence of endogenous variables \( \{\pi_t, \epsilon_t, \Omega_t, H_t, C_t, W_t, R_t, A_t\} \) that satisfy equations (3.6), (2.18), (2.12), (2.7), (2.10), (2.16), (2.17), (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5), given the sequence of the exogenous predetermined variables \( \{N_{t+1}, X_{t+1}\} \) specified by (2.1) and (3.2), and given the initial values of all the predetermined variables, \( K_t, \lambda_t, N_t, \) and \( X_t \).

In the conventional one-sector growth model the capital stock, \( K_t \), is the only endogenous variable. In the life-cycle economy here, the share of non-human wealth accruing to retirees, \( \lambda_t \), is also an endogenous state variable. The distribution of wealth matters here because the mpcw differs between retirees and workers. In general, it is possible to express all the endogenous variables as functions of the two predetermined variables \( K_t \) and \( \lambda_t \). As a matter of practice it is possible to reduce the model to a system of five simultaneous difference equations in the two predetermined variables, \( K_t \) and \( \lambda_t \), and three “forward-looking jump variables,” \( H_t, \pi_t, \) and \( \epsilon_t \). While this system is too cumbersome to solve analytically, it is very easy to solve numerically. We do so in the next section, after including fiscal policy and social security. It is also very easy to solve for the steady state, which we do in the next sub-section.

### 3.2 Steady state

Analysis of the steady state provides some flavor for how the life-cycle aspects of the model affect behavior. In the steady state, all quantity variables grow at the exogenously-given rate of growth of the effective labor force, \( X_t N_t \), which is equal to \( (1 + x)(1 + n) \approx 1 + x + n \). Because there is growth in the steady state, it is convenient to normalize certain variables relative to output. We use lower-case variables to denote the value of a variable relative to output. In particular \( k = \frac{K}{Y} \) is the steady-state capital output ratio and \( h = \frac{H}{Y} \) is the ratio of human wealth to current output.
Let $\Gamma(R, \Omega)$ be steady-state human wealth, $H_t^{ss}$, divided by its value that would arise for an infinitely-lived representative agent economy, $H_t^{ss}$, holding constant the path of future labor income. Thus, for example, $(1 - \Gamma(R, \Omega)) \times 100$, is the percent decline in human wealth that arises from using the discount rate on labor income that applies in the life-cycle economy instead of the rate that is relevant for the representative agent economy. $\Gamma(R, \Omega)$ is given by

$$
\Gamma(R, \Omega) \equiv \frac{H_t^{ss}}{H_t^{ss}} = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} W_i N_t \{(1 + x)(1 + n)/[(1 + n)R \Omega/\omega]\}}{\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} W_i N_t \{(1 + x)(1 + n)/R\}} \approx \frac{1 - (1 + n + x)/R}{1 - (1 + x)\omega/R \Omega}.
$$

(3.7)

Then, it is convenient to express the steady state as a system of seven nonlinear equations that determine seven variables: $k, \gamma, h, R, \pi, \epsilon$, and $\Omega$. The equations for $k, \lambda, \text{and } h$ hold for a pure laissez-faire economy (and thus require some modification when fiscal policy and social security become operative):

$$(x + n + \gamma)k = 1 - \pi\{[1 + (\epsilon - 1)\gamma]Rk + h\},
$$

(3.8)

$$
\lambda = \frac{1 + n - \gamma}{1 - \gamma \omega (R \beta)^{\sigma}/(1 + x + n)},
$$

$$
h = \Gamma(R, \Omega) \cdot \frac{\alpha}{1 - (1 + x + n)/R}
$$

where $\psi$ is the ratio of workers to retirees, defined by equation (2.2). The relations for $R, \pi, \epsilon$, and $\Omega$ hold across policy regimes:

$$
R = (1 - \alpha)k^{-1} + 1 - \delta,
$$

(3.9)

$$
\pi = 1 - (R \Omega)^{\sigma - 1} \beta^\sigma,
$$

$$
\epsilon \pi = 1 - R^{\sigma - 1} \beta^\sigma \gamma,
$$

$$
\Omega = \omega + (1 - \omega)\epsilon^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma}}.
$$

The relation for $k$ in (3.8) is the steady-state version of the resource constraint (3.6), after using (2.17) to eliminate consumption and after normalizing by output. The left side is steady-state investment per unit of output. The right is steady-state saving per unit of output. The other relations in (3.8) are the steady-state counterparts of (2.18), and (2.16) (divided by $Y$). The relations in (3.9) are the steady-state counterparts of (3.4), (2.12), (2.7), and (2.10).

Life-cycle factors are present in two main ways. First, $k$ depends inversely on $\lambda$, which in turn depends on the age structure of the population implied
by the retiree to worker ratio, \( \psi \). Since \( \epsilon > 1 \), a rise in the share of nonhuman wealth held by the retirees raises consumption demand, and thus lowers steady-state saving and investment.\(^\text{14}\) Second, \( h \) is only the fraction \( \Gamma(R, \Omega) \) of its value that would arise in the representative agent case, \( (R - \frac{\rho a}{1 + (1 + \delta) - \rho a}) \), due to the higher discount rate that applies in the life-cycle economy. While the first factor works to reduce \( k \), the second instead works to raise \( k \), since it lowers consumption demand by workers.

If follows that the equilibrium need not correspond to the case with infinitely-lived households. Instead, aggregate consumption and saving depend on labor force and population dynamics, as they do in a conventional life-cycle setting. Also transfers between workers and retirees will matter since the two groups have different marginal propensities to consume. Finally, debt and deficits will matter since workers discount (net) future wage income at a rate greater than the market interest rate. In the next section we will illustrate these propositions with quantitative examples.

### 3.3 Quantitative properties

To illustrate how the model captures life-cycle behavior, this section reports the results from some simple numerical examples. I choose the following values for the exogenous parameters: \( \beta = .96, \delta = .1, \sigma = .25, \alpha = .667, \omega = .977, \gamma = .9, x = .01, n = .01 \). To select the demographic parameters I used Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for guidance. These authors assumed that individuals work from age 21 to 65, and then live in retirement from 66 to 75. Therefore, I chose values of \( \omega \) and \( \gamma \) which imply that individuals work on average for 45 years and are in retirement for 10 years. Since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( \sigma \) is a key parameter for evaluating the effects of fiscal policy, I also followed Auerbach and Kotlikoff in order to maintain comparability with other life-cycle studies. Since there is no firm agreement over what this parameter should be, I subsequently perform some sensitivity tests. The rest of the parameters are reasonably standard within the business-cycle literature (see, e.g. Cooley (1995)).

Table 1 reports the values of the steady-state variables, along with the value of \( \Gamma(R, \Omega) \), the ratio of human wealth in the life-cycle economy to human wealth in the representative agent economy (see equation (3.7)). Since the net interest rate (3.1 percent) exceeds the net growth rate (2 percent), the economy is dynamically efficient.

Figure 2 illustrates how varying the demographic structure affects the steady-state outcome. Specifically, it considers the impact of the capital

\(^{14}\)One can prove \( \epsilon > 1 \) by contradiction: suppose that \( \epsilon \leq 1 \). Then equation (3.9) implies \( \gamma \geq \Omega_{\sigma}^{-1} = [\omega + (1 - \omega)\epsilon^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma}}]^{\sigma - 1} \). But since \( \gamma < 1 \), this condition can only hold if \( \epsilon > 1 \), which gives rise to a contradiction.
stock per unit of effective labor, \( \frac{K}{XN} = (k)^{\frac{1}{2}} \), and on \( R \) of increasing the retiree/worker ratio, \( \psi \), by raising the average length of retirement, \( \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \) [see equation (2.2)]. As \( \psi \) increases, \( \frac{K}{XN} \) rises and \( R \) falls: raising the average length of retirement induces individuals to save. Raising \( \psi \), further, eventually pushes the economy into an inefficient steady state.

Figure 3 illustrates how life-cycle factors may influence the dynamic behavior of the model by showing the impact of a redistribution of wealth from workers to retirees.\(^{15}\) Suppose at time 0, the share of nonhuman wealth held by retirees, \( \lambda_t \), doubles (e.g., due to a lump sum tax and transfer scheme). This redistribution produces a rise in consumption and a decline in saving that comes about because retirees have a higher mpcw than workers (see Table 1). As a consequence, \( \frac{K}{XN} \) initially declines, reaching a trough about 3 percent below the steady state. The decline in capital, however, produces a rise in \( R \) that stimulates saving, which moves the economy back to its long-run equilibrium.

4 Fiscal policy and social security

In this section we introduce fiscal policy and social security.\(^{16}\) We then use the model to perform a variety of policy experiments.

The government consumes \( G_t \) each period. It also pays retirees a total of \( E_t \) in social security benefits.\(^{17}\) To finance its expenditures, the government

---

\(^{15}\)To compute dynamics, I loglinearize the model described in Definition 1 around its steady state to generate a system of linear difference equations. Then to solve the system I simply use the formulas in Blanchard and Kahn (1981). This approach is similar in spirit to King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).

---

\(^{16}\)Throughout I treat fiscal policy and social security as given exogenously. For an attempt to endogenize social security, see Cooley and Soares (1996).

---

\(^{17}\)I model social security payments simply as lump-sum transfers and do not link them to individual earnings histories as occurs in practice. Allowing idiosyncratic history dependence in social security payments would mean sacrificing considerable tractability. It is however possible to extend the model to link benefits to earnings in two ways. First benefits could be linked to aggregate wages. Though this is not entirely realistic, it does link earnings and benefits. Second, if we restrict attention to a steady analysis, then it is
Figure 2: Steady-State Impact of Retiree-Worker Ratio
Figure 3: Adjustment to Wealth Redistribution
levies a total of \( T_t \) in lump-sum taxes on workers and it also issues one period government bonds, \( B_{t+1} \). Each period, therefore, the government satisfies,

\[
B_{t+1} = R_t B_t + G_t + E_t - T_t.  \tag{4.1}
\]

Assuming that the government eventually must pay its debt, iterating equation (4.1) forward yields the following intertemporal budget constraint:\(^{18}\)

\[
R_t B_t = \sum_{\nu=0}^{\infty} \frac{T_{t+\nu}}{\Pi_{z=1}^{\nu} R_{t+z}} - \sum_{\nu=0}^{\infty} \frac{G_{t+\nu}}{\Pi_{z=1}^{\nu} R_{t+z}} - \sum_{\nu=0}^{\infty} \frac{E_{t+\nu}}{\Pi_{z=1}^{\nu} R_{t+z}}.  \tag{4.2}
\]

Equation (4.2) states simply that the discounted stream of taxes must equal the current value of outstanding government debt plus the discounted stream of government expenditures. A key feature of this constraint is that the per-period discount rate the government uses is the riskless rate \( R_{t+r} \), which in general is below the discount rate that individual workers apply to future net earnings streams.

### 4.1 Effects of fiscal policy and social security on the consumption function

Every retiree still consumes the fraction \( \epsilon_t \pi_t \) of his wealth each period. However, his wealth now includes a discounted stream of social security benefits. Let \( S_t \) be the sum across retirees alive at \( t \) of the capitalized value of social security benefits. Then it is straightforward to show that, with social security, total consumption by retirees becomes

\[
C_t = \epsilon_t \pi_t [R_t A_t^{\gamma} + S_t]  \tag{4.3}
\]

where equation (2.7) still governs \( \epsilon_t \pi_t \). \( S_t \) is given by

\[
S_t = \sum_{\nu=0}^{\infty} \frac{E_{t+\nu}}{\Pi_{z=1}^{\nu} (1 + n) R_{t+z}/\gamma}
= E_t + \frac{S_{t+1}}{(1 + n) R_{t+1}/\gamma}.  \tag{4.4}
\]

Since total social security payments are distributed among a retiree population that grows at the net rate \( n \), the gross retiree growth rate \( 1 + n \) enters the discount factor.

possible to link benefits to individual earnings' histories and maintain tractability. It is only the analysis of the transition dynamics that becomes complicated.

\(^{18}\)The intertemporal budget constraint holds when the economy is dynamically efficient, i.e., when the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy, making it infeasible to simply roll over the debt. Since the parameter values I employ imply dynamic efficiency (see Table 3), equation (4.2) applies for this analysis.
Every worker still consumes the fraction $\pi_t$ of his wealth. There are two adjustments to a worker’s wealth, however. First, wealth now includes the value of social security payments that the worker can expect once he retires. Second, the measure of human wealth is now net of a discounted stream of taxes. Let $S^w_t$ be the sum across workers alive at $t$ of the capitalized future social security benefits they can expect during retirement. Then, it is straightforward to show that, with taxes and social security, total consumption by workers becomes

$$C^w_t = \pi_t[R_t A^w_t + H_t + S^w_t]$$

(4.5)

where equation (2.12) still governs $\pi_t$.

The new relation for $H_t$ is obtained simply by amending equation (2.16) to allow for taxes:

$$H_t = \sum_{v=0}^{\infty} \frac{N_{t+v}W_{t+v} - T_{t+v}}{\Pi_{z=1}^{v}(1+n)R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z}/\omega}$$

$$= N_t W_t - T_t + \frac{H_{t+1}}{(1+n)R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}/\omega}.$$  

(4.6)

In turn, let $\hat{S}_t \equiv \frac{S_t}{\psi N_t}$, be the value of social security at $t$ per beneficiary (recall that $\psi N_t$ is the number of retirees at $t$.) Then, $S^w_t$ is given by

$$S^w_t = \sum_{v=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1-\omega)\omega^v N_t (\frac{\epsilon_{t+1+v}\hat{S}_{t+1}^{t+1+v}}{R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}})}{\Pi_{z=1}^{v} R_{t+z} \Omega_{t+z}}$$

$$= (1-\omega) N_t (\frac{\epsilon_{t+1} \hat{S}_{t+1}^{t+1}}{R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}}) + \frac{S^w_{t+1}}{(1+n)R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}/\omega}.$$  

(4.7)

Equation (4.7) requires some interpretation. The expression $((1-\omega)\omega^v N_t (\frac{\epsilon_{t+1+v}\hat{S}_{t+1}^{t+1+v}}{R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}}))$ is the capitalized value at $t+v$ of social security entitlements to all individuals who were in the work force at $t$ and retire at $t+v+1$. The expression for $S^w_t$, therefore, is just the discounted sum of this capitalized value from $v = 0$ to $v = \infty$. It is thus a measure of the aggregate value of social security entitlements to the work force at time $t$.

Combining the new expressions $C^i_t$ and $C^w_t$ yields the new aggregate consumption function:

$$C_t = \pi_t[(1-\lambda_t)R_t A_t + H_t + S^w_t + \epsilon_t(\lambda_t R_t A_t + S_t)].$$

(4.8)

19To see this, note that $(1-\omega)\omega^v N_t$ is the number of workers from the time $t$ labor force that retires at $t+v+1$; and $\frac{\epsilon_{t+1+v}\hat{S}_{t+1}^{t+1+v}}{R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1}}$ is the value at $t+v$ of a stream of social security payments to an individual that begins in the subsequent period. The ratio of the retiree’s to the worker’s mpcw, $\epsilon_{t+1+v}$ enters this expression, since it reflects the value to worker of being able to consume today from wealth to be received in retirement.
Equation (4.8), in conjunction with equations (4.6), (4.7), and (4.4), compactly expresses the impact of fiscal policy and social security on aggregate consumption. Taxes influence consumption demand via the measure of workers' human wealth, \( H_t \). As equation (4.6) indicates, though, the rate at which the work force discounts future taxes, given by \((1 + n)R_t\Omega_t/\omega\) exceeds the rate at which the government can borrow, \( R_t \). Thus, policies which postpone taxes into the future - e.g., current deficits financed by future tax increases - raise \( H_t \), and stimulate consumption demand. Similarly, workers do not fully capitalize the stream of taxes associated with anticipated paths of government expenditures (see equation (4.2)), again due to the difference between private and public discount rates. Thus, government expenditures have a greater impact on demand in the life-cycle setting here than when households have infinite horizons: Everything else equal, government expenditures crowd out less private consumption.

Finally, even after controlling for the impact of the timing of taxes, social security payments raise consumption demand. Transfers from workers to retirees stimulate consumption, since the latter have a greater propensity to consume than do the former. Equation (4.8) captures this phenomenon since the propensity to consume out of aggregate retiree social security wealth, \( S_t \), exceeds the propensity to consume out of aggregate human wealth (which incorporates the taxes on workers used to finance the entitlement payments).

Social security also influences the evolution of the distribution of wealth. Given that retirees receive a total transfer of \( E_t \) per period, total retiree nonhuman wealth evolves according to

\[
\lambda_{t+1} A_{t+1} = \lambda_t R_t A_t + E_t - C^t_t + (1 - \omega) [(1 - \lambda_t) R_t A_t + N_t W_t - T_t - C^m_t].
\]

It follows that the difference equation for retirees' share of financial wealth, \( \lambda_{t+1} \), is now given by

\[
\lambda_{t+1} = \omega (1 - \epsilon_t \tau_t) \lambda_t R_t \frac{A_t}{A_{t+1}} + \omega [E_t - \epsilon_t \tau_t S_t] / A_{t+1} + (1 - \omega).
\] (4.9)

### 4.2 Dynamic equilibrium and steady state with fiscal policy and social security

Nonhuman wealth now equals the sum of capital and government bonds:

\[
A_t = K_t + B_t
\] (4.10)

with government consumption, capital evolves according to

\[
K_{t+1} = Y_t - C_t - G_t + (1 - \delta) K_t
\] (4.11)

where aggregate output, \( Y_t \) still obeys the Cobb-Douglas formulation given by equation (3.1).
Government policy fixes the ratio of government consumption to output, $\tilde{g}_t$, the ratio of social security payments to output, $\tilde{\varepsilon}_t$, and the stock of government bonds to output, $\tilde{b}_t$. Accordingly,

$$G_t = \tilde{g}_t Y_t,$$

$$E_t = \tilde{\varepsilon}_t Y_t,$$

$$B_t = \tilde{b}_t Y_t.$$ (4.12)

Given the paths of $G_t$, $E_t$, and $B_t$, the government adjusts taxes, $T_t$, to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, given by equation (4.2).

**Definition 2.** (Equilibrium with fiscal policy and social security): An equilibrium with fiscal policy and social security is a sequence of endogenous predetermined variables $\{K_{t+1}, \lambda_{t+1}\}$ and a sequence of endogenous variables $\{\pi_t, \epsilon_t, \Omega_t, H_t, C_t, W_t, R_t, A_t, T_t, S_t, S^w_t\}$ that satisfy equations (4.11), (4.9), (2.12), (2.7), (2.10), (4.6), (4.8), (3.3), (3.4), (4.10), (4.2), (4.4), and (4.7), given the sequences of the exogenous predetermined variables, $\{N_{t+1}, X_{t+1}\}$ specified by (2.1) and (3.2) and of the exogenous policy variables $\{b_t, g_t, \varepsilon_t\}$ and given the initial values of the predetermined variables, $K_t, \lambda_t, N_t,$ and $x_t$.

Fiscal policy and social security add three new endogenous variables, $T_t, S_t,$ and $S^w_t$ and three new exogenous variables, $\tilde{b}_t, \tilde{g}_t,$ and $\tilde{\varepsilon}_t$. As before, $K_t$ and $\lambda_t$ are the endogenous state variables. The paths of these variables, however, now depend on government policy, as I will demonstrate later. In practice, it is now possible to reduce the model to a system of seven difference equations, with the two predetermined variables and five jump variables: $H_t, \pi_t, \epsilon_t, S_t,$ and $S^w_t$. Recall that before we could reduce the system to five difference equations in two predetermined variables and three jump variables: $H_t, \pi_t,$ and $\epsilon_t$. The addition of social security necessitates difference equations for $S_t$ and $S^w_t$.

Let $\tau, s,$ and $s^w$ be the steady-state values of $\frac{T_t}{Y_t}, \frac{S_t}{Y_t}$ and $\frac{S^w_t}{Y_t}$. Suppose, further, that $\tilde{b}_t, \tilde{g}_t,$ and $\tilde{\varepsilon}_t$ are fixed at $\tilde{\delta}, \tilde{\gamma},$ and $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ in the long-run equilibrium. The steady-state equilibrium then becomes a system of ten nonlinear equations that determine ten variables. Seven variables are from the steady-state system without government policy (see Section 3): $k, \lambda, h, \pi, \epsilon, R, \Omega$. Three variables are new: $\tau, s$ and $s^w$. The equations for $\pi, \epsilon, R,$ and $\Omega$ are unchanged, and are thus still given by (3.9). The new relations for $k, \lambda,$ and $h$ are:

$$(x + n + \delta)k = 1 - \pi\{(1 - \lambda)R(k + \tilde{\delta}) + h + s^w + \epsilon[\lambda R(k + \tilde{\delta}) + s]\} - \tilde{\gamma},$$

$$\lambda = (\psi + \frac{\omega(\tilde{\epsilon} - \epsilon \pi s)(k + \tilde{\delta})^{-1}}{(1 + n - \gamma)(1 + x + n)} \cdot \frac{1 + n - \gamma}{1 - \gamma \omega(R\beta)^{\sigma}/(1 + x + n)},$$

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The equations for the new variables \( \tau, s \) and \( s^w \) are:

\[
\tau = [R - (1 + x + n)]\tilde{b} + \tilde{g} + \tilde{\epsilon},
\]

\[
s = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma(1 + x)/R}\tilde{\epsilon},
\]

\[
s^w = \Gamma(R, \Omega) \cdot \frac{(1 - \omega)\epsilon}{\Omega R} \cdot \frac{s/\psi(1 + x)}{1 - (1 + x + n)/R}.
\]

In general, because of life-cycle factors, \( k \) depends on the exogenous policy variables \( \tilde{b}, \tilde{g} \) and \( \tilde{\epsilon} \). Substitute the expression for \( \tau \) into the equation for \( h \) to obtain

\[
h = \Gamma(R, \Omega)\left[\frac{\alpha - \tilde{g} - \tilde{\epsilon}}{1 - (1 + x + n)/R} - Rb\right].
\]

As equation (4.15) indicates, workers only capitalize the fraction \( \Gamma(R, \Omega) \) of future tax liabilities associated with government debt (again, because life-cycle factors make the workers’ discount rate exceed the rate at which the government can borrow). Put differently, the net wealth of government bonds (normalized by output) to the private sector is \( [1 - \Gamma(R, \Omega)]Rb \). A rise in \( \tilde{b} \) thus stimulates consumption and reduces saving, forcing down \( k \). The effect is magnified, further, to the extent that retirees are holding the bonds, since retirees have a larger mpcw than do workers. The equation for \( k \) in (4.13) shows that reallocating wealth in favor of retirees works to reduce the steady-state capital intensity.

A rise in \( \tilde{g} \) also reduces \( k \). In the standard one-sector growth model with a representative agent, a rise in \( \tilde{g} \) has no impact on \( k \): Consumption drops to fully offset the rise in \( \tilde{g} \). In the life-cycle economy, however, there is less than full crowding-out of consumption. As equation (4.15) shows, workers do not fully capitalize the future tax liabilities associated with government expenditures. A rise in \( \tilde{g} \) therefore reduces net saving in equilibrium, thereby reducing \( k \).

Finally, social security matters. A rise in \( \tilde{\epsilon} \) raises \( s \) and \( s^w \). It also reduces \( h \), though not enough to compensate for the gross rise in social security wealth. Because retirees have a higher mpcw than workers, social security unambiguously reduces \( k \). In the next section, I present some numerical simulations to illustrate this prediction as well as the other policy predictions.

4.3 Policy experiments

This section considers a variety of quantitative policy exercises. I begin by calculating a steady state for baseline values of policy parameters. The values
for the exogenous nonpolicy parameters are: \( \beta = 1, \delta = .1, \sigma = .25, \alpha = .667, \omega = .977, \gamma = .9, x = .01, n = .01 \). These values are the same as were used for the laissez-faire economy of Section 3, except that I raise the discount factor \( \beta \) from .96 to 1.0 to permit the model to generate a plausible steady-state real rate in the benchmark case.\(^{29}\) The values for the policy parameters are: \( \bar{\gamma} = .2, \bar{b} = .25, \bar{\varepsilon} = .02 \). The ratio of government consumption to output, \( \bar{\gamma} \), is in rough accord with the empirical postwar average. The ratios of government debt to output and of social security to output roughly match their empirical counterparts for the 1970s.

Table 2 reports the values of steady-state variables, using the baseline policy parameters as inputs. The addition of government policy raises the net interest rate to 4.9 percent (despite the rise in \( \beta \) from .96 to 1) and, in correspondence, reduces the capital-output ratio to 2.2. Interestingly, the fraction of government bonds that is net wealth for the current population is \( .62 (= 1 - \Gamma) \), which is in line with Bernheim’s (1987) estimate of roughly .5. Finally, the ratio of social security wealth to GDP for this economy is roughly \( .5 (= s + s^w) \), also a plausible number.

Table 2:
Steady State with Government Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( k )</th>
<th>( \lambda )</th>
<th>( h )</th>
<th>( R )</th>
<th>( \pi )</th>
<th>( \epsilon )</th>
<th>( \Omega )</th>
<th>( \Gamma )</th>
<th>( \tau )</th>
<th>( s )</th>
<th>( s^w )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>4.624</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>2.102</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I next consider a variety of policy experiments involving, in turn, government debt, social security, and government consumption:

**Government debt.** Figure 4 reports the steady-state impact of varying the ratio of government debt to output on \( \frac{K}{X_N} \) and \( R \). The impact is substantial. Varying \( \bar{b} \) from 0 to 1 leads to a reduction of \( \frac{K}{X_N} \) by nearly a third and to a roughly four-hundred basis-point rise in \( R \). The actual variation in \( \bar{b} \) for the postwar U.S. economy is much smaller than this, of course. However, the figure also suggests a significant impact of the Reagan “experiment” of raising \( \bar{b} \) from .25 to .5: the interest rate rises by about 100 basis points and \( \frac{K}{X_N} \) declines about 9 percent. The numbers are reasonable, in light of the actual historical experience.

Figure 5 portrays the transition dynamics that result from a rise in government debt. The specific policy experiment is a rise in government debt that is phased in over a period of ten years, meant to approximate the actual buildup of debt that occurred during the Reagan-Bush years. Specifically, \( \bar{b} \)

\(^{29}\) A value \( \beta \) equal to unity is consistent with the micro evidence in Hurd (1990).
Figure 4: Steady-State Impact of Government Debt.
increases from .25 to .5 over a ten-year period, in equal increments each year. I assume, further, that the policy change is fully anticipated.

Social security. Figure 6 reports the impact of varying social security benefits from 0 percent to 5 percent of GDP, holding constant the demographic structure, and given a ratio of government debt to GDP equal to .25. The total effect is quite large: the interest rate rises by almost 600 basis points and the capital per efficiency unit of labor falls by nearly forty percent. Note, however, that this experiment assumes that all the rise in social security comes from an increase in benefits per retiree as opposed to a rise in the number of retirees. In results that I do not report here, I show that if the rise in aggregate social security payments comes about because retirees live longer, then the capital stock may actually rise: the longer horizon of retirees works to increase individual saving (see Figure 2). 21

Figures 7 and 8 report two dynamic experiments designed to illustrate the impact of phasing-out social security. The first cuts the level of aggregate social security in half smoothly over a ten-year period. Aggregate social security begins at 5.0 percent of GDP at date t, and is then reduced each year in equal percentage increments to 2.5 percent at date t + 10. The second experiment is the same as the first, except that the start of the phase-out is delayed for ten years (until t + 10), but is perfectly anticipated by individuals alive at t. In addition to \( R_t, K_t/X_tN_t, \) and \( A_t \), the figures report the dynamic response of human and social security wealth for workers and retirees (scaled relative to efficiency units of labor).

The dotted line reports the impact of the reduction that begins at t. The long-term effect is to raise the capital stock by nearly a third and, commensurately, reduce the real rate by about 275 basis points. It takes about thirty years to realize the full impact of the policy change. About two-fifths of the change takes place in the first ten years. At the same, there is a significant redistribution of wealth, in favor of workers. Retirees' social security wealth, \( S_t/X_tN_t \), drops sharply. So does workers' social security wealth \( S_t/X_tN_t \). On the other hand, workers' human wealth, \( H_t/X_tN_t \), rises sufficiently to generate a rise in their total nonfinancial wealth, \( (H_t + S'^w_t)/X_tN_t \). In this respect, workers gain at the expense of retirees.

Delaying the start of the reduction in social security benefits can mitigate the capital loss that retirees suffer. The solid line reports the effect of the reduction that begins at t + 10. Note that capital intensity rises and the real rate falls prior to t + 10, as individuals save in anticipation of the planned

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21 In the U.S., social security has risen for three reasons: (1) increased benefit levels; (2) increased life spans; and (3) demographic effects of the baby-boom. The model as it stands can capture the first two effects. It is however possible to modify the framework to allow for nonstationary demographics that would capture baby-boom effects. I am currently working on this issue.
Figure 5: Adjustment to Rise in Government Debt
Figure 6: Steady-State Impact of Social Security
Figure 7: Dynamic Response to a Reduction in Social Security (R, K/XN, λ).
Figure 8: Dynamic Response to a Reduction in Social Security (H/XN, S/XN, Sw/XN, (H+Sw)/XN).
benefit reduction. Delaying the policy action further reduces the net capital loss to existing retirees at \( t \), since the reduction in benefits occurs beyond the expected remaining lifetimes of these individuals. Workers still on net gain, however, due to the rise in human wealth.

**Government consumption.** Figure 8 shows the effect of a rise in the share of government consumption from 20 to 30 percent of GDP. There is a significant decline in the capital stock, since private consumption does not fall sufficiently to offset the rise in \( g \), in contrast to what occurs in the conventional representative agent framework. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) show that, empirically, a rise in \( g \) is associated with a decline in the growth rate. One could capture these facts with this model by adjusting it to allow for endogenous growth. Alternatively, with the model as it stands, a rise in \( g \) produces a decline in the growth rate along the transition to the new steady state.

### 4.4 Some robustness exercises

The quantitative effects of government debt and social security depend critically on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, \( \sigma \), since this parameter governs the interest sensitivity of saving. Also critical is the subjective discount factor \( \beta \), since this parameter influences the impact on consumption spending of the wealth effects that these policies generate.

There does appear to be a considerable divergence between the public-finance literature and the business-cycle literature over the choice of \( \sigma \). The public-finance literature tends to use values of \( \sigma \) well below unity, citing micro evidence on the interest elasticity of saving (see, e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)). The business-cycle literature tends to use larger values based on other considerations (see, e.g., the discussion in Cooley (1995)). Given this disparity of views, it is important to explore the sensitivity of the analysis to different values of \( \sigma \).

Figure 9 explores the impact of raising \( \sigma \). It repeats the steady-state analysis of government debt and fiscal policy, this time for: \( \sigma = .25, \sigma = .33, \) and \( \sigma = .5 \). Note that as \( \sigma \) goes up, the effects of policy on the steady-state interest rate decline significantly. Put differently, bringing the interest sensitivity of saving closer to the region used in the business-cycle literature greatly weakens the crowding-out effects of government debt and social security.

On the other hand, pushing up \( \sigma \) also reduces the steady-state interest rate to counterfactually low rates. Raising \( \sigma \) reduces the marginal propensity to consume, everything else equal. The enhanced saving forces down the steady-state rate. However, since my choice of the discount factor \( \beta \) was based on ensuring that the model produce a sensible steady-state interest rate given \( \sigma \) (as well as other model parameters), it does not seem reasonable
Figure 9: Steady-State Impact of Government Consumption
to hold $\beta$ constant when varying $\sigma$. This leads me to consider the following experiment where I vary $\beta$ as $\sigma$ changes in the following way: adjust $\beta$ as $\sigma$ varies so that each parameterization generates the same steady-state interest rate at the benchmark values of the policy variables (used to generate Table 2).

Figure 10 reports the effects of "$\beta$-adjusted" changes in $\sigma$. Note in each case that the lines intersect at the benchmark policy values. The effects of policy still weaken as $\sigma$ goes up, but the effects are less dramatic than in the previous case. The adjustment in $\beta$ mitigates the impact of the rise in $\sigma$ on the marginal propensity to save, and thus reduces the dampening effect on policy.

5 Extensions

I now present two extensions of the baseline model. First, I show how it is easy to modify the model to make it a small open economy. Second, I demonstrate how it is possible to allow for variable labor supply.

5.1 The open economy

It is easy to extend the analysis to the case of a small open economy. Let $F$ be the economy's net foreign-asset position. Assuming that it is possible to borrow and lend abroad at the world interest rate, $\bar{R}$, the economy-wide resource constraint becomes

$$K_{t+1} = Y_t - C_t - G_t + (1 - \delta)K_t - F_{t+1} + \bar{R}F_t. \tag{5.1}$$

To convert the closed economy to a small open economy, simply replace equation (3.6) with (5.1) and impose that $R$ equal the world rate $\bar{R}$. Similarly, to modify the steady state simply replace the steady-state resource constraint in equation (4.13) with

$$(x+n+\delta)k = 1 - \pi \{(1-\lambda)R(k+\bar{b})+h+s[w+e]\lambda R(k+\bar{b})+s]} - \bar{g} - [(1+x+n)-R]f$$

where $f = \frac{F}{Y}$.

Figure 12 reports the steady-state impact on $f$ of government debt and of social security. A dollar rise in government debt leads to a decline in net foreign assets of between fifty and sixty cents. The impact of a rise in social security on net foreign assets is similarly substantial.

5.2 Variable labor supply

Now assume that each individual has one unit of time per period which he may use either to work or to enjoy leisure. Retirees as well as workers may
Figure 10: Changes in $\sigma$
Figure 11: "β adjusted" changes in σ
do some work (thus the term "retiree" is somewhat of a misnomer in this case.) However, I assume that they are less productive than workers, as is consistent with the evidence. Accordingly, in equilibrium they will supply less labor than workers.

Let $I_t^w$ denote the fraction of time allocated to work at time $t$ by a worker. Let $I_t^r$ be the corresponding fraction at time $t$ by a retiree. Individuals now enjoy utility from leisure as well as consumption. The utility functions for retirees and workers are given by:

$$V_t^r = \left\{ \left( C_t^r \right)^\rho (1 - I_t^r)^{1-\rho} \right\} (1 - \gamma V_{t+1}^r)^{1-\rho}$$

$$V_t^w = \left\{ \left( C_t^w \right)^\rho (1 - I_t^w)^{1-\rho} \right\} + \beta \gamma V_{t+1}^w + (1 - \omega) V_{t+1}^r)^{1-\rho}$$

Finally, let $\xi \in (0, 1)$ be the productivity of a unit of labor supplied by an older person (retiree) relative to a younger person (worker). Then the per-period budget constraints for retirees and workers are given by, respectively:

$$A_{t+1}^r = \left( \frac{R_t}{\gamma} \right) A_t + W_t \xi I_t^r - C_t^r$$

$$A_{t+1}^w = R_t A_t^w + W_t I_t^w - C_t^w$$

The first-order necessary conditions yield the following labor supply curves:

$$I_t^r = 1 - \frac{\xi}{W_t} C_t^r$$

$$I_t^w = 1 - \frac{\xi}{W_t} C_t^w$$

where $\zeta = \frac{1 - \nu}{\nu}$. In each instance, labor supply is positively related to the wage. Note that for retirees the wage per unit of time is just $\xi W_t$, due to the productivity differential. Note also that there is a negative wealth effect on labor supply in each instance that works its way through consumption. As before, consumption is proportionate to wealth for both workers and retirees. The only significant difference is that retirees now have human wealth from wage income along with financial and social security wealth. Thus, government debt and social security not only affect consumption and saving in this instance but also labor supply.

Since the individual labor-supply curves are linear in consumption, which is in turn linear in wealth, it is straightforward to aggregate up to obtain total labor supply for workers, $L_t^w$, and for retirees, $L_t^r$:

$$L_t^w = N_t - \frac{\zeta}{W_t} C_t^w$$

I keep the retirement age exogenous, however. Relaxing this assumption would be difficult. Nonetheless, it is possible to approximate analyzing the effects of social policies which push back the age eligible for social security by instead analyzing the effect of an analogous reduction in the present value of social security benefits.
Finally, aggregate output is now given by
\[ Y_t = X_t^\alpha (L_t^w + \xi L_t^r)^\alpha K_t^{1-\alpha} \] (5.9)
where \( \xi L_t^r \) is the effective quantity of labor supplied by retirees. The derivation of the rest of the model follows closely the case with inelastic labor supply. Appendix 2 provides details.

I now briefly illustrate the implications of allowing for variable labor supply by reconsidering the steady effects of varying social security. Two additional parameters I need to fix are \( \nu \) and \( \xi \). I set \( \nu = 0.4 \), which is roughly in line with the business-cycle literature (see, e.g., Cooley (1995)). I fix \( \xi = 0.6 \), which approximates the age-profile productivity data in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).

Figures 13 and 14 repeat the same social security experiment as portrayed in Figure 6, but this time allowing for variable labor supply. Figure 13 portrays the impact on the gross interest rate and the capital labor ratio, while Figure 14 portrays the impact on labor supply as a fraction of total time endowment for workers and for retirees.

Even in the absence of social security, retirees supply far less labor than do workers. This reflects the combination of lower wages for retirees and the fact that retirees have on average more accumulated financial wealth. Increasing social security has a strong negative wealth effect on retiree labor supply, which drops to zero as \( e \) adjusts from 0.00 to 0.05. 23 There is also a modest reduction in worker labor supply due to the increased social security benefits.

6 Concluding remarks

The framework of this paper embeds life-cycle behavior within a dynamic general equilibrium economy. The model is very tractable, yet permits individuals to have realistic average lengths of life, work, and retirement. Under plausible parameter values, government debt and social security have significant effects on capital intensity, real interest rates, and labor supply.

The quantitative predictions of the model, however, are sensitive to savings and labor-supply elasticities. As the intertemporal elasticity of substitution rises from the relatively low values used in the public-finance literature to the relatively high values used in the business-cycle literature, for example, the effects of debt and social security on real activity weaken considerably.

23 Note that I continue to assume that social security payments are lump sum. Interestingly, the wealth effects of these lump-sum transfers drive the labor supply of the elderly close to zero.
Figure 12: Steady-State Impact of Debt and Social Security in the Open Economy
Figure 13: Policy Responses with Variable Labor Supply (R and K/XL)
Figure 14: Policy Responses with Variable Labor Supply (Lw/N and Lr/(W N))
All this suggests that robustness analysis is imperative. Given its parsimony, the model presented here is quite conducive to performing this kind of sensitivity analysis.

Many extensions are possible. There are a number which take advantage of the model's tractability. For example, it is possible to analyze the impact of changing demographics on growth. One could, for example, allow for nonstationary demographics by letting the fertility rate vary over time. It is then possible to study not only the current dilemma over old-age entitlements but, more generally, how demographics may influence growth when life-cycle behavior is present. Given the model's parsimony, one could examine the impact of demographics in economies with endogenous as well as exogenous technological change. Within an endogenous growth setting, the effects of policy and demographics on saving that arise from the life-cycle setup would translate into effects on the growth rate.

Another possibility would be to incorporate aggregate uncertainty. With conventional large-scale overlapping generations models, it is difficult to allow for economy-wide disturbances. This task is quite feasible in my framework, since the state space is small. One could then examine, for example, the impact of uncertain policy changes. Another possibility would be to incorporate uncertainty over the future demographic structure.
Appendix 1: Retiree and Worker-Decision Problems

This appendix provides solutions to the retiree and worker partial equilibrium consumption/saving decisions. I consider the laissez-faire economy. Extension to the case with government policy is straightforward.

Retiree-decision problem: Maximize

$$V_t^r = \left[ (C_t^r)^\rho + \beta \gamma (V_{t+1}^r)^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

subject to

$$A_{t+1}^r = (R_t/\gamma) A_t^r - C_t^r$$

The F.O.N.C. are given by

$$(C_t^r)^{\rho-1} = \beta \gamma \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r} (V_{t+1}^r)^{\rho-1}$$

From the envelope theorem:

$$\frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r} = R_{t+1}/\gamma (C_{t+1}^r)^{\rho-1} (V_{t+1}^r)^{1-\rho}.$$ Then

$$(C_t^r)^{\rho-1} = R_{t+1} \beta (C_{t+1}^r)^{\rho-1}$$ or, equivalently,

$$C_{t+1}^r = (R_{t+1} \beta)\sigma C_t^r$$

with $\sigma = \frac{1}{1-\rho}$.

Next, conjecture a solution of the form: $C_t^{r_{jk}} = \epsilon_t \pi_t (R_t/\gamma) A_t^{r_{jk}}$. Then combining this conjectured solution with the per-period budget constraint yields a difference equation that solves for $\epsilon_t \pi_t$:

$$\epsilon_t \pi_t = 1 - \left( R_{t+1}^\sigma - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_t \pi_t}{\epsilon_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}} \right)$$

This completes the solution for retiree consumption.

To find a solution for the value function, conjecture that $V_t^r = \Delta_t^r C_t^r$. Then, to obtain an expression for $\Delta_t^r$, substitute the conjectured solution for $V_t^r$ into the objective to obtain

$$\Delta_t^r C_t^r = \left[ (C_t^r)^\rho + \beta \gamma (\Delta_{t+1}^r C_{t+1}^r)^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

Then substitute the first-order conditions for consumption in for $C_{t+1}^r$ to obtain

$$\Delta_t^r C_t^r = \left[ (C_t^r)^\rho + \beta \gamma [\Delta_{t+1}^r (R_{t+1} \beta)\sigma C_{t+1}^r)^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}},$$ which implies that $\Delta_t^r$ is given by

$$(\Delta_t^r)^\rho = 1 + \beta^\sigma R_{t+1}^{-1} \gamma (\Delta_{t+1}^r)^\rho$$

From this equation and the difference equation for $\epsilon_t \pi_t$, it is straightforward to show that

$$\Delta_t^r = (\epsilon_t \pi_t)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}$$
Worker-decision problem: Maximize

\[ V_t^w = \{(C_t^w)^\rho + \beta[wV_{t+1}^w + (1 - \omega)V_{t+1}^r]\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \]

subject to

\[ A_{t+1}^w = R_tA_t^w + W_t - C_t^w \]

The F.O.N.C. are given by

\[
(C_t^w)^{\rho-1} = \beta[w \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^w}{\partial A_{t+1}^w} + (1 - \omega) \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r}] [wV_{t+1}^w + (1 - \omega)V_{t+1}^r]^{\rho-1}
\]

From the envelope theorem \( \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^w}{\partial A_{t+1}^w} = R_{t+1}(C_{t+1}^w)^{\rho-1}(V_{t+1}^w)^{1-\rho} \) and \( \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r} = R_{t+1}(C_{t+1}^r)^{\rho-1}(V_{t+1}^r)^{1-\rho} \) (for an individual who is a worker at \( t \) and a retiree at \( t+1 \)). Conjecture that \( V_t^w = \Delta_t^w C_t^w \) and that \( \Delta_t^w = \pi_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \). Given this conjecture and given that \( V_t^r = \Delta_t^r C_t^r \) with \( \Delta_t^r = (\epsilon_{t+1})^{1-\sigma} \) (see above), \( (C_t^w)^{\rho-1} = R_{t+1} \beta[w + (1 - \omega)(\Delta_{t+1}^{\rho-1})^{1-\rho}] [wC_{t+1}^w + (1 - \omega)\Delta_{t+1}^{\rho-1}C_{t+1}^r]^{\rho-1} \), implying

\[ \omega C_{t+1}^w + (1 - \omega)A_{t+1}C_{t+1}^r = \left\{ R_{t+1}C_{t+1}^r \beta \right\}^\sigma C_t^w \]

where \( \Lambda_{t+1} = \frac{\Delta_{t+1}}{\Delta_{t+1}} = (\epsilon_{t+1})^{1-\sigma} \) and \( \Omega_{t+1} = [w + (1 - \omega)(\Delta_{t+1}^{\rho-1})^{1-\rho}] = [w + (1 - \omega)\epsilon_{t+1}]^{1-\sigma} \). (Recall \( \rho = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \).

Next, conjecture \( C_t^w = \pi_t(R_tA_t^w + H_t^r) \), and then combine this conjecture with the first-order condition above to obtain the a difference equation for \( \pi_t \):

\[ \pi_t = 1 - \left( R_{t+1}\Omega_{t+1} \right)^{\sigma-1} - \beta \sigma \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \]

This completes the solution for the worker's consumption decision.

To verify the conjectured solution for the value function \( V_t^w \), substitute this conjecture and the implied solution for \( V_{t+1}^w \) and the solution for \( V_{t+1}^r \) into the expression for the value function to obtain

\[ \Delta_t^w C_t^w = \{(C_t^w)^\rho + \beta[\omega A_{t+1}^w C_t^w + (1 - \omega)A_{t+1}^r C_{t+1}^r]\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \]

Then substitute in the first-order condition for consumption to obtain \( \Delta_t^w C_t^w = \{(C_t^w)^\rho + \beta[\Delta_{t+1}^w(R_{t+1}\Omega_{t+1})^{\sigma-1}C_{t+1}^r]\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \), or equivalently,

\[ (\Delta_t^w)^\rho = 1 + \beta^{\sigma}(R_{t+1}\Omega_{t+1})^{\sigma-1}(\Delta_{t+1}^w)^\rho \]

From this equation and equation (2.12) in the text it is straightforward to show that \( \Delta_t^w = \pi_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \), as conjectured.
Appendix 2: Variable Labor Supply

This appendix characterizes the solutions to the retiree- and worker-decision problems for the case of elastic labor supply. Again, I restrict attention to the case absent government policy. Adding policy is straightforward.

**Retiree-decision problem:** Maximize

\[
V_t^r = \left\{ [(C_t^r)^\nu (1 - l_t^r)^{1-\nu}]^\rho + \beta \gamma (V_{t+1}^r)^{1/\rho} \right\}^{1/\nu}
\]

subject to

\[
A_{t+1}^r = (R_t/\gamma)A_t + W_t \xi l_t^r - C_t^r
\]

The F.O.C. for consumption and labor supply yield:

\[
v(C_t^r)^{\nu-1}(1 - l_t^r)^{(1-\nu)\rho} = \beta \gamma \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r} \cdot (V_{t+1}^r)^{\rho-1}
\]

\[
l_t^r = 1 - \frac{\xi}{\xi W_t} C_t^r
\]

with

\[
\frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r} = \frac{R_{t+1}}{\gamma} v(C_{t+1}^r)^{\nu-1}(1 - l_{t+1}^r)^{(1-\nu)\rho}(V_{t+1}^r)^{1-\rho}
\]

Combining these relations yields the following consumption Euler equation:

\[
C_{t+1}^r = \left[ \frac{W_t}{W_{t+1}} \right]^{(1-\nu)\rho} \beta R_{t+1} \gamma \frac{\epsilon_t \pi_t}{\epsilon_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}}
\]

Conjecture \( C_t^r = \epsilon_t \pi_t [(R_t/\gamma)A_t + H_t^r] \), then combine this conjecture with the consumption Euler equation and the per-period budget constraint to obtain a difference equation for \( \epsilon_t \pi_t \).

\[
\epsilon_t \pi_t = 1 - \frac{W_t}{W_{t+1}}^{(1-\nu)\rho} \beta^\sigma R_{t+1}^{\gamma-1} \frac{\epsilon_t \pi_t}{\epsilon_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}}
\]

This completes the solution for \( C_t^r \) and \( l_t^r \):

To obtain a solution for the value function, first conjecture \( V_t^r = \Delta_t C_t^r (\xi W_t)^{1-\nu} \). Then insert this conjecture into the expression for the value function to solve for \( \Delta_t \). As in the case with inelastic labor supply, \( \Delta_t = (\epsilon_t \pi_t)^{-1/\gamma} \).

**Worker-decision problem:** Maximize

\[
V_t^w = \left\{ [(C_t^w)^\nu (1 - l_t^w)^{1-\nu}]^\rho + \beta \omega V_{t+1}^w + (1 - \omega) V_{t+1}^r \right\}^{1/\rho}
\]

subject to

\[
A_{t+1}^w = R_t A_t^w + W_t l_t^w - C_t^w
\]
The F.O.N.C. for consumption and labor are given by, respectively:

\[ v(C_t^w)^{\nu-1}(1-l_t^w)^{(1-\nu)} = \beta[\omega \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^w}{\partial A_{t+1}^w} + (1-\omega) \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^r}{\partial A_{t+1}^r}] [\omega V_{t+1}^w + (1-\omega) V_{t+1}^r]^{\rho-1} \]

with

\[ l_t^w = 1 - \frac{s}{W_t} C_t^w \]

with

\[ \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^j}{\partial A_{t+1}^j} = R_{t+1} v(C_{t+1}^j)^{\nu-1}(1-l_{t+1}^j)^{(1-\nu)}(V_{t+1}^j)^{1-\rho} \]

for \( j = w, r \).

Conjecture that the form of \( V_t^w \) is analogous to the form of \( V_t^r \), implying \( V_t^w = (\pi_t)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} C_t^w (\frac{e_t}{W_t})^{1-\nu} \). Combine this conjecture with the above three relations and the expression for \( V_t^r = (\epsilon_t \pi_t)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} C_t^w (\frac{e_t}{W_t})^{1-\nu} \) to obtain the following consumption Euler equation:

\[ \omega C_{t+1}^w + (1-\omega) \chi(\epsilon_{t+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} C_{t+1}^r = \left\{ \left( \frac{W_t}{W_{t+1}} \right)^{(1-\nu)} \beta R_{t+1} \left[ \omega + (1-\omega) \chi(\epsilon_{t+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \right] \right\}^{\sigma} C_t^w \]

with \( \rho = 1/(1-\sigma) \) and \( \chi = (\frac{e_t}{W_t})^{(1-\nu)} \).

Next, conjecture \( C_{t+1}^w = \pi_t (R_t A_t^w + H_t^w) \) and then combine this conjecture with the consumption Euler equation and the per-period budget constraint to obtain

\[ \pi_t = 1 - \left( \frac{W_t}{W_{t+1}} \right)^{(1-\nu)\rho} \beta^\sigma (R_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1})^{\sigma-1} \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \]

with

\[ \Omega_{t+1} = \omega + (1-\omega) \chi(\epsilon_{t+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \]

This completes the solution for the worker’s consumption and labor-supply decisions. To verify the conjecture for the worker’s value function, substitute the conjecture into the expression for the value function, as in the previous case.
Appendix 3:
Steady State with Elastic Labor Supply and Government Policy

The steady-state equations are given by

\[(x + n + \delta)k = 1 - c^w - c^r - g\]

\[c^w = \pi^w[(1 - \lambda)Rk + h^w + s^w]\]

\[c^r = \pi^r[\lambda Rk + h^r + s]\]

\[h^w = \left[\alpha \frac{L^w}{L} - \tau + (1 - \omega)h^r (1 + x)/R\Omega\right][1 - \omega(1 + x)/R\Omega]^{-1}\]

\[h^r = \alpha \frac{L - L^w}{L}[1 - \omega(1 + x)\gamma/R]^{-1}\]

\[\frac{L^w}{L} = \frac{N}{L} - \frac{\phi}{\alpha} c^w\]

\[\frac{L}{N(1 + \xi\psi)} = [1 + (c^w + c^r)\phi/\alpha]^{-1}\]

\[\lambda = [\psi + \frac{\omega[\alpha \frac{L - L^w}{L} + e - \pi^r(h^r + s)](k + b)^{-1}}{1 + n - \gamma}] \frac{1 + n - \gamma}{1 - \gamma(\omega R^2)/((1 + x + n))}\]

The equations for \(\epsilon\pi, \pi, \Omega, \tau, b, s, s^w, g, r\) are the same as in the case with inelastic labor supply.
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