An important challenge faced by media broadcasting companies is how to allocate limited advertising space between upfront contracts and the spot market (referred to in advertising as the scatter market), in order to maximize profits and meet contractual commitments. We develop stylized optimization models of airtime capacity planning and allocation across multiple clients under audience uncertainty. In a short term profit maximizing setting, our results suggest that broadcasting companies should prioritize upfront clients according to marginal revenue per audience unit, also known as CPM (cost per thousand viewers). For capacity planning purposes, accepted upfront market contracts can be aggregated across clients. The upfront market capacity should then be allocated to clients in proportion to their audience requirement. Closed form solutions are obtained in a static setting. These results remain valid in a dynamic setting, when considering the opportunity to increase allocation by airing make-goods during the broadcasting season. Our structural results characterize the impact of contract parameters, time and audience uncertainty on profits and capacity decisions. The results hold under general audience and spot market profit models. Our numerical results, based on real data, suggest that the benefits from modeling audience uncertainty in the media revenue management context can be significant.

1. Introduction

Optimally managing and valuing limited advertising space is one of the key problems faced by media companies today (Alvarado 2007, Zhang 2006). This paper provides formal models and solutions for the problem of managing broadcast advertising capacity. We begin by describing how advertising is sold, in order to illustrate the complexities of this problem, and motivate the focus of our work. This introduction further highlights our contribution and related literature, and introduces industry-specific terminology.

1This author’s research was funded by the Booz & Co. Chair in Revenue Management at INSEAD.
1.1 The Media Broadcasting Advertising Market

In the 1930s, the sponsorship of radio serials by makers of household-cleaning products led to the soap opera. Listeners were enthralled by episodic, melodramatic storylines, and advertisers were guaranteed a big audience. According to TNS media intelligence, 2006 U.S. advertising spending exceeded USD 150 billion. Of this, television accounts for 44%, with advertisers ready to pay up to half a million dollars for a 30 second commercial in a popular show such as *Friends*, and new-show campaigns reaching up to USD 10 million (source adage.com). According to the A.C. Nielsen Co., the average American watches more than 4 hours of TV each day, 30% of which is advertising (source: nielsenmedia.com).

Media broadcasting companies such as TV channels, cable networks or radio stations collect most of their revenues from selling impressions (“eye-balls”), through advertising space (30 second commercial slots) during various programs. Typically, in north America and several European countries, the bulk of advertising space (about 60-80%) is sold during an *upfront market*, following the announcement of program schedules and prices for the year. In the US, the upfront market occurs during less than a couple of weeks in May, much before the broadcasting season starts in mid-September. During this period, a few major advertisers (MA) buy long term contracts (called *media plans*, or *campaigns*) from the broadcasting company (BC) at relatively low margins. In reality, sales are either direct or managed by intermediary buying and selling houses which represent their respective clients’ interests. Our results and analysis are relevant to the party in charge of the capacity planning and revenue management function, for simplicity referred to as broadcasting company (BC). Upfront contracts stipulate a budget to be spent throughout the year, and a cost per thousand viewers (*CPM*), the ratio of the two providing a target level of audience (or ratings) to be reached by the campaign. The remaining advertising space is sold throughout the broadcasting season on a spot market, called *scatter market* in the industry, on a price-per-slot basis, usually at a higher margin and with no audience guarantee.

This paper investigates the problem of optimally managing media advertising capacity. This problem resembles in many ways the standard capacity control paradigm in revenue management (see Talluri and van Ryzin 2004 for a comprehensive treatment and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003 for a review). In this problem, a service provider allocates limited capacity (e.g. seats on a flight or rooms in a hotel) between customer classes with different valuations and arrival patterns (e.g. business and leisure customers). Similarly, in the media
revenue management problem, the broadcasting company allocates limited advertising space, called airtime or media capacity, between two customer classes: *upfront* (market) clients, who buy early during the upfront market at high discounts, and *scatter* (market) clients, who buy later on the spot (or scatter) market at higher prices. Advertising capacity is fixed, by physical time limitation and regulations.\(^2\) Revenue management is particularly relevant when capacity is tight, which is the case for example with prime-time advertising.

Several specificities differentiate the problem of managing media capacity from the standard revenue management setup. First, unlike traditional revenue management, in the media problem the *value of advertising capacity is uncertain* at the time when capacity allocation decisions are made. This is because upfront contract pricing is state contingent: the amount paid by an upfront client for a 30 second advertisement is determined by the audience reached, multiplied by the negotiated rate per viewer (CPM). Audience (i.e. the number of viewers, or impressions) is unknown ex-ante, when capacity allocation is made, but provided ex-post by media rating agencies. Therefore, in managing advertising capacity, the broadcasting company (BC) bears the risk of audience uncertainty in the upfront market. The value of an advertising slot depends both on the uncertain audience level, and on the opportunity cost of selling it later on the scatter market. Our goal is to develop a revenue management framework for valuing and managing limited advertising capacity under audience uncertainty.

Other important differences from traditional revenue management stem from the media B2B setting: transactions are contract based, upfront clients hold a strong bargaining power and retention of key accounts is an important strategic issue.\(^3\) Strategic decisions, such as rate card pricing and contracting, while highly relevant, are best addressed in a competitive, long term profitability setting. This paper focuses on the short term profit maximization problem of the firm in managing advertising capacity between upfront and scatter markets, with given contracts and prices, during one broadcasting season. We refer to this as the media revenue management, or capacity planning problem.

The media revenue management problem is a highly complex multi-level problem (Zhang 2006). Industry practice, organizational and technical considerations, all argue for a hier-

\(^2\)In Europe for example, EU directives restrict advertising to 15% of total airtime, with at most 12 advertising minutes per hour, and not more than one break per movie. American regulations are less strict (about 30% of airtime).

\(^3\)This partly explains the large volume sold at low margins upfront; other arguments include stock market signaling, account executive incentives, BC’s risk aversion.
architectural planning approach, separating strategic, operational and tactical layers of decision making. First, during the upfront market, the BC negotiates contract allocation and estimates overall capacity requirements for the upfront clients; this is known in practice as the strategic or upfront planning phase. Subsequently, account executives allocate an initial portion of advertising capacity to the client (known as a media plan or sales plan), with the provision that additional capacity, so-called make-goods (or audience deficiency units, ADU), will be allocated during the scatter market if the plan under-performs. Sequential make-goods allocation decisions are made periodically during the rest of the year; this is called operational planning. At the tactical planning level, individual commercials are scheduled in breaks, accounting for product conflict and other scheduling constraints. A detailed description of this process is provided in Section 2.2.

Current practice in the industry is to make such decisions qualitatively (see e.g. Bollapragada and Mallik 2007, Zhang 2006). With the notable exception of a few companies (e.g. NBC), who use models for scheduling commercials in breaks, to our knowledge, no mathematical model is currently being used for capacity planning or make-goods allocation. Previously published work on media revenue management has focused on providing algorithms for scheduling commercials in breaks and generating sales plans, based on complex, deterministic combinatorial models (Bollapragada et al. 2002, Bollapragada and Garbiras 2004, Zhang 2006, Kimms and Müller-Bungart 2007; the first two refer to models implemented at NBC, see Section 1.3 for details).

In contrast, our goal is to provide insights from incorporating the effects of audience uncertainty in upfront and operational planning decisions. Specifically, we are interested in how the amount of inventory allocated to the upfront market should be adjusted to hedge for variability in ratings, both before and during the broadcasting season (make-goods). Our structural results characterize the sensitivity of capacity decisions to key contract parameters, audience and time. In order to tractably capture the effect of uncertainty on profits and decisions, we propose stylized, stochastic models which capture aspects of the media revenue management problem where audience variability is most relevant, and likely to affect decisions. Specifically, we focus on high level, aggregate capacity planning decisions. For the sake of focus and tractability, we do not address tactical, combinatorial decisions such as matching clients to programs and scheduling of commercials in breaks, previously addressed in the literature (in a deterministic setting). We also do not address strategic level decisions such as rate card pricing and upfront negotiation, best analyzed in a competitive,
long-term profitability setting. Our insights can ultimately be incorporated into other layers of decision making, such as scheduling, which ignore variability in ratings.

1.2 Structure and Results

The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews related work and positions our contribution in the media broadcasting, revenue management and random yield literature streams. Section 2 provides further background about the media problem and business model, allowing us to set up the terminology, modeling ingredients and assumptions. We discuss models of audience uncertainty, as well as upfront and scatter market revenue models.

Section 3 derives insights from a simple static, aggregate model for upfront capacity planning under audience uncertainty. This model is similar to classical random yield and newsvendor models. We investigate the impact of audience uncertainty on the model, profits and decisions. In particular, we find that shows with (stochastically) larger, or less variable, audiences do not necessarily command lower capacity allocations. We further provide static upfront planning recommendations across multiple periods (air-dates or quarters) or shows.

The results described so far focus on aggregate models of capacity allocation for upfront vs. scatter markets. Section 4 analyzes capacity allocation decisions across multiple customers. Our main result is that upfront clients can be aggregated for capacity planning and make-goods allocation. Individual client allocations are obtained by solving a single aggregate model for the entire upfront market, and allocating the resulting capacity in proportion to clients’ performance targets. These results provide the BC with insights for upfront contract negotiation and capacity planning tasks. For modeling purposes, these results allow us to simplify the analysis by focusing on aggregate planning models.

Section 5 focuses on how capacity decisions are operationalized. We propose dynamic models for “make-goods” vs. scatter market allocation during the broadcasting season, when audience, modeled as a stochastic process, is revealed periodically. Our structural results show that initial capacity commitment to the upfront market should be minimal (known in the industry as “gapping”), and the optimal make-goods allocation policy is a monotone threshold type policy.

Section 6 provides numerical insights based on real data, obtained from a major broadcasting network. In a static (aggregate) setting, we find that ignoring audience uncertainty in upfront decisions leads to significant profit loss and allocation error (exceeding 30%), in the context of the data at hand. We propose several simple and intuitive heuristics for dynamic
make-goods allocation. We find that policies which take audience uncertainty into account (e.g. resolving myopic and static heuristics) provide very good approximations for the optimal value function, and significantly outperform policies based on deterministic audience models.

The last section concludes, outlining opportunities for further research.

### 1.3 Literature and Positioning

The marketing literature has extensively investigated the impact of TV advertising on the consumer and sales (staring with Metheringham 1964, see also Kanetkar et al. 1992 and Lodish et al. 1995), but largely ignored the issue of airtime capacity planning. Despite its richness and complexity, the media revenue management problem has received limited attention in the operations literature. Chapter 10.5 of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) provides a brief account of the media revenue management problem (this book is the most complete reference on revenue management to date).

Previous papers on broadcast inventory and revenue management focus on scheduling problems, using deterministic, combinatorial models. Referring to algorithms successfully implemented at NBC, Bollapragada et al. (2002) and Bollapragada and Garbiras (2004) present sales plan generation models for single, respectively multiple clients. These models are deterministic version of those in Section 3.3, which in addition account for scheduling constraints (e.g. show mix and product conflict), but ignore spot market opportunity costs and audience uncertainty. Zhang (2006) uses a two-step hierarchical approach to first select advertisers and match them with shows (winner determination), and then schedule their commercials to individual slots within a specific show (pod assignment). An integrated approach is proposed by Kimms and Müller-Bungart (2007). The first two papers use linear penalties for violated constraints (e.g. client targets), whereas the latter two force all constraints to be met.

In contrast with previous work which focused on scheduling media plans using deterministic models, this paper uses a stochastic model to capture the big picture that is driven by uncertainty in ratings. Parallel work by Bollapragada and Mallik (2007) shows how a risk averse BC should allocate rating points between aggregate upfront and scatter markets, when audience and scatter market revenues are uncertain and independent. Target revenue and value (revenue) at risk objectives are optimized in a static one period model that aggregates demand from each market, similar to our aggregate model in Section 3. They also
provide comparative statics with respect to audience parameters. In their model, the sole decision variable is the total number of rating points sold in the upfront market. There is no specification of how this translates into actual capacity allocation, and how this allocation is “operationalized” across clients and over time. Our work complements theirs by answering these questions in a risk neutral context.

Besides media, there are several industries where capacity is sold partly in a forward (advance purchase) market and partly on a spot market, such as electricity markets, cargo shipping, manufacturing etc. A growing body of literature, reviewed by Kleindorfer and Wu (2003), investigates inventory management in such settings. Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) develop a two-stage framework that integrates spot market transactions with supply chain contracting. In a multi-period model, Araman and Ozer (2005) study optimal inventory allocation between a long term sales channel and a spot market. Work in this area focuses mainly on production models under demand uncertainty and supply contracts.

One feature that distinguished the media problem from the above literature, and much of the operations literature, is the uncertain value of supply: audience is contracted for, but only realized after airtime capacity allocation is made. This aspect makes our problem similar to production planning models under random yield, for which Yano and Lee (1995) provide an excellent review. Specifically, our static models are equivalent to the random yield model proposed by Shih (1980), with no holding cost, non-linear salvage value and deterministic demand. Our multiplicative performance model corresponds to a stochastically proportional (SP) yield model (see Yano and Lee, 1995, and references therein). Because of the lack of holding costs, our models can be viewed as a special case of those used in the random yield literature. At the same time, our models are more general, in that they allow general audience (yield) distributions, and performance measures.

The dynamic make-goods allocation model in Section 5 falls in the class of multiple lotsizing in production to order (MLPO) with random yield problems, surveyed by Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (2004) (see also Yano and Lee 1995, page 321). Such models aim to satisfy a fixed initial demand target through a pre-specified number of production runs to minimize inventory (holding and penalty) costs. In each production run, a random output is produced, that is a function of the lot size decision. In our case, the input decision is the number of ads to air for a client, and output is the audience (or ratings) for these ads. Finite horizon models that come closest to our work are studied by Sepheri et al. (1986), under a binomial yield distribution and Guu and Zhang (2003), for interrupted geometric (IG) yield distributions.
(as opposed to SP). Both papers use a distribution specific approach, but allow for non-zero holding costs. Due mainly to the absence of holding costs, we are able to obtain several structural results for the media problem, which do not always hold for random yield/MLPO problems. These include monotonicity of run size (capacity allocation $x$) with respect to demand (target audience $N$) and number of runs (horizon length). Moreover, our results hold for general yield models (performance $\Psi$).

In summary, despite modeling similarities, our results (except for Proposition 1) are different, and cannot be implied from the random yield literature. While our results are specific to the media problem, they can be viewed as a contribution to random yield problems without holding costs.

2. Audience and Revenue Models and Assumptions.

This section provides further background for the media revenue management problem and business model. We describe the main ingredients of our models, including upfront and scatter market contracting terms, as well as audience and performance measures.

Our models and results focus on prime time inventory allocation, where RM is most relevant, because capacity is constrained and advertisers’ willingness to pay is high, due to large viewing audiences. Throughout the paper, an ad, or slot, corresponds to one unit of airtime capacity, e.g. a 30 second slot during a commercial break in a (prime-time) program. For example, an hour long show in the US typically contains five to seven one to two minutes long commercial breaks (a.k.a. pods), each containing a set number of advertising slots.

2.1 Audience and Performance Models

An important contribution of this paper is to specifically consider the impact of audience uncertainty in the media planning task. Hence, an important prerequisite for our work is to understand ex-post audience metrics and motivate ex-ante forecast models of audience variability and campaign performance.

**Audience** is the gross sum of all media exposures (the number of impressions, or “eyeballs” watching a given show), regardless of duplication. This is unknown ex-ante, but provided ex-post by media rating agencies, such as Nielsen Media Research in the US, or Médiamétrie

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4 TV prime time includes all regularly scheduled programs 8:00pm-11:00pm (EST) Monday to Saturday and 7:00pm-11:00pm on Sunday. Average prime-time price is USD 200,000 per 30 second slot (see Zhang 2006).
in France. Another popular metric is GRP (gross rating point), also known as rating, the percentage of the target audience reached by an advertisement. Because the ratio of audience to GRP is a constant (the number of TV viewers/households), the two terms are used interchangeably with no loss of generality.

To obtain ratings forecasts, the audience (or equivalently GRP) that will be viewing an ad is modeled ex-ante as a positive random variable $\xi$ with mean $\mu$, standard deviation $\sigma$, distribution $F$ and density $f$. Its realization, as well as relevant metrics, are provided ex-post by media rating agencies. For example, a subjective probability $q$ that each of $M$ potential viewers watches a given show suggests a binomial model $\xi \sim Bin(M, q)$, which for large market sizes $M$ could be approximated by a normal distribution. All our results are distribution independent.

The performance of a media plan is the sum of the ratings obtained for each ad aired. In order to assess the ex-ante performance of a media plan under audience uncertainty, our models make several simplifying assumptions. Specifically, (1) we focus on modeling prior uncertainty in ratings $\xi$ (within the relevant allocation period), and (2) assume that inventory is homogeneous, i.e. different ads capture similar audiences. These assumptions, discussed below, allows us to model the ex-ante performance from allocating $x$ homogeneous slots with prior audience uncertainty $\xi$, as $\Psi(x, \xi) = x\xi$. This multiplicative performance model essentially assumes that the GRP for each ad is the same, but unknown ex-ante, i.e. an a priori unknown fraction of the population views a constant fraction of the ads. In the upfront market, $\xi$ captures the high level prior uncertainty, before the season starts, regarding the channel’s share of audience. During the broadcasting season, $\xi$ captures lower level prior uncertainty about popularity during a particular month or quarter.

An important quantity used in practice and throughout the paper is the GRP allocation, defined by $w = N/x$, where $N$ is a client’s performance target. Under the multiplicative model, this corresponds to the average ratings (i.e. realized audience $\hat{\xi}$) for which the performance target $N$ is exactly met by allocating $x$ units of advertising space.

The multiplicative performance model corresponds to the stochastically proportional yield model used in random yield problems (Yano and Lee, 1995) where the fraction of output (good) units is random and independent of the input units. Its main advantage is

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5For example, during the week of November 20, 2006, the ABC show “Desperate Housewives” topped the US household ratings at 13.5, meaning that 13.5% of the estimated 110.2M TV households in the US watched the show that week.
that it is simple to work with and fairly general. Our sensitivity results for upfront and
dynamic make-goods allocation extend for more general performance models of the form
\( \Psi(x, \xi) \), with \( \Psi \) an increasing function of both arguments and concave in \( x \). Concavity is
justified by “repetition wearout”, i.e. the diminishing marginal benefit of repeatedly reaching
the same individuals.

The multiplicative performance model, defined above, is most appropriate when inventory
is homogeneous. In reality, this is not the case: media plans spread over multiple shows, and
audience varies by show and air-date, and across demographic segments. The homogeneous
inventory assumption is reasonably realistic, if we focus on capacity allocation for a specific
show, or day-part (prime-time in our case), in a specific demographic. In practice, clients
have specific prime-time targets, show preferences and demographic requirements, and the
BC matches clients to shows that provide the best value in their desired demographics (a.k.a.
winner determination, see Zhang 2006). Assuming that clients and prime-time programs
are pre-partitioned by demographics, the inventory allocation problem becomes separable,
favoring the homogeneous inventory assumption. This is appropriate, for example, in French
TV markets, where the level of demographic segmentation is low.

In reality, there is more variability in audience than prior popularity effects captured
by our multiplicative performance model. Prime-time audience varies from week to week,
even for the same show. Section 3.3 provides an aggregation method that deals with such
variability. The next example suggests how the multiplicative model can be viewed as a first
order approximation of a more complex model, which captures audience variability across
individual ads.

**Example 1.** The total number of (possibly duplicated) impressions from airing \( x \) ads
with audiences \( \xi_1, \ldots, \xi_x \) is the convolution \( \xi^{(x)} = \xi_1 + \cdots + \xi_x \). If the number of ads \( x \)
is large and audiences are i.i.d., the central limit theorem insures that \( \xi^{(x)} \sim N(x\mu, x\sigma^2) \).
However, audiences for a given show are usually highly correlated, especially within a narrow
time-frame. Assuming they are exchangeable (i.e. their joint distribution is not affected by
permutations of the individual random variables), jointly normally distributed with mean \( \mu \),
variance \( \sigma^2 \) and correlation \( \rho \), we obtain that \( \xi^{(x)} \sim N(x\mu, (1 - \rho + x\rho)x\sigma^2) \). Hence, denoting
\( Z \sim N(0, 1) \), we have:

\[
\Psi(x, \xi) = \xi^{(x)} = x\mu + \sigma \sqrt{x(1 - \rho + x\rho)} Z = x \left( \mu + (\xi - \mu) \sqrt{\frac{1 - \rho}{x} + \rho} \right),
\]
which is increasing concave in $x$. Because $x$ is large and $\rho$ is high, ignoring second order terms, we obtain $\Psi(x, \xi) \simeq x \left( \mu + \sqrt{\rho}(\xi - \mu) \right) = x\zeta$, where $\zeta = \sqrt{\rho}\xi + (1 - \sqrt{\rho})\mu$. Hence we can approximate $\Psi$ by a multiplicative model corresponding to a modified audience $\zeta$, with additional point-mass at the mean. In particular, if audiences are perfectly correlated $\rho = 1$, we obtain $\xi(x) \sim N(x\mu, x^2\sigma^2)$, which has the same distribution as the multiplicative model $x\xi$. □

2.2 Revenue and Business Model, Terms and Decisions

This paper focuses on (short term) revenue maximization from selling advertising space to upfront and scatter markets. We next describe the business and revenue models governing these markets. For details regarding business processes see Bollapragada et al. (2002).

**Upfront Market.** Following the announcement of program schedules and list prices in May, clients contact the BC with upfront market requests to purchase advertising space in bulk, for the entire season. A typical request consists of a budget $B$ for the entire year, and a negotiated CPM (cost per thousand viewers) $C$.

For example, in 2005, US TV advertising budget for P&G, the largest US advertiser, was $2.5$ Billion, whereas Toyota’s was half a billion. American prime time CPM averaged between $20-35$ for TV, and $8-10$ for cable.

This translates into a target performance $N = B/C$, measured by the total audience of the campaign, in the client’s desired demographic (e.g. men between 18 and 49 years old, or adults 25 to 54). Audience is unknown ex-ante, but provided ex-post by media rating agencies. Additionally, the MA may specify performance targets for specific periods (quarterly or weekly weighings) and programs (e.g. preferred shows, prime time targets). In response to the sales request, the BC provides a sales plan or proposal, consisting of a list of commercials to be aired, by show and airdate; the specific break location is decided later, close to broadcasting time. For examples of plan requests and proposals, see Figures 3 and 4 in Bollapragada et al. (2002).

Because upfront contracts offer performance guarantees, the BC bears the risk of audience uncertainty. If the plan exceeds contracted performance, i.e. ratings exceed GRP allocation, the BC receives no additional payment. On the other hand, the BC is penalized (e.g. by providing make-goods) if at the end of a season a plan has under-performed (e.g. if large ratings were committed upfront for a show that turns out to be a miss). Our models account for unmet performance targets via a constant unit penalty $b$, which amounts to a total penalty cost of: $b \cdot (N - N_T)^+$, where $N_T$ is the performance of the plan, i.e. the total...
number of impressions delivered by the end of the season. Penalties are not contractual, they are a mechanism to model and control under-performance. This approach is consistent with the previous literature (Bollapragada et al. 2002, Bollapragada and Mallik 2007). Under-performance penalties are a natural interpretation of strategic service constraints, whereby the BC commits to satisfy (aka 'steward') client requests within a given probability, or expected fraction. In practice, this is uniformly high, around 95%.

In summary, the direct expected profit from an upfront market client is the result of the client’s budget $B$ minus the expected penalty cost of failing to meet the audience target $b \cdot (N - N_T)^+$, realized at the end of the season. In particular, under the multiplicative performance model discussed in Section 2.1, if $x$ (homogeneous) slots with audience $\xi$ are allocated to the client, the expected penalty cost is $bE[N - x\xi]^+$. The model so far does not account for the opportunity cost of allocating capacity to the scatter market, discussed next.

**Scatter Market.** As opposed to upfront contracts which are audience/CPM based, scatter market pricing is per advertising slot, with no audience guarantee. Broadcasting companies typically have to commit list prices for the scatter market in advance. On top of these baseline prices, the BC applies discounts based on buyer characteristics (bundle, volume, loyalty) and capacity status. If advertising capacity is $Q$, and $x \leq Q$ slots are allocated to the upfront market, the expected scatter market profit from the remaining $Q - x$ slots is denoted $\pi(x)$. This is a general model, which can implicitly allow for scatter market price and demand to be audience dependent, and price to decline with available capacity. To see this, let for example $\pi(x) = E_\xi[\Pi(Q - x, \xi)]$, where $\Pi(y, \xi) = p(y, \xi)S(y, \xi)$ is the scatter market profit from $y$ available advertising slots with audience $\xi$, and $S$ is the number of ad slots sold at price $p(y, \xi)$, given capacity level $y$.

All our structural results hold under a general scatter profit model $\pi(x)$ that is decreasing and concave in $x$, accounting for diminishing marginal returns to the scatter market. For simplicity of exposition, the next section (only) focuses on linear models $\pi(x) = p(Q - x)$, corresponding to a constant scatter market price $p$ per advertising slot. This allows for closed form solutions and clearer insights with no loss of generality.

For convenience, Table 1 summarizes the main notation used in the paper.

**Decision Making Layers.** The following hierarchical decision making approach reflects industry practice, and motivates our approach in this paper. At the strategic planning phase, the BC must decide which client contracts to accept upfront. For this purpose, the firm needs to assess how much capacity is required to satisfy upfront market clients. This capacity is
not committed to the client upfront; it serves only for (strategic) capacity planning purposes at the upfront stage. At the operational level, the decisions of how much initial capacity to commit to the upfront clients/market are made, with the specific provision of subsequent make-goods allocation during the scatter market. During the broadcast season, the BC periodically decides how many additional make-goods to allocate to upfront clients (vs. the scatter market), given the current performance of a campaign.

We begin by investigating aggregate capacity planning and allocation decisions under audience uncertainty, for the upfront market as a whole, and then extend the results to handle multiple upfront clients.

### Table 1. Summary of notation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>audience (or GRP) distribution; reflects prior uncertainty about popularity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F, f, \mu, \sigma$</td>
<td>audience cdf, density, mean and standard deviation, respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>upfront advertising budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>audience (or performance) target for the upfront market; referred to as target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>penalty per unmet audience unit in the upfront market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>airtime capacity; no. of available (homogenous) inventory units (30sec. slots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>capacity allocation; no. of (homogenous) inventory units (ad slots) allocated to the upfront market (decision variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^*, x_0$</td>
<td>optimal allocation under stochastic, respectively deterministic audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Psi(x, \xi)$</td>
<td>performance from $x$ ads with audience $\xi$; usually multiplicative $\Psi(x, \xi) = x\xi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w = N/x$</td>
<td>GRP allocation (target audience per allocated capacity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi(x)$</td>
<td>scatter market profit when $x$ units are allocated to the upfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>scatter market price per slot, under linear scatter profit $\pi(x) = p(Q - x)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CPM, C$</td>
<td>cost per thousand viewers; upfront $C = B/N$, scatter market $CPM = p/\mu$.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### 3. Aggregate Planning with Uncertain Audience

This section derives insights from a simple, static aggregate model of upfront capacity planning under audience uncertainty. This model is an important milestone for our multi-period and multi-client analysis in subsequent sections. A similar aggregate allocation problem is investigated by Bollapragada and Mallik (2007), in a risk sensitive setting; their results, in terms of rating-points allocation, do not directly translate into inventory allocation. Our basic model studied in this section can be interpreted as a single-period random yield model with stochastically proportional yield (see e.g. Shih 1980), but no holding cost. The total capacity requirement for the upfront market can be expressed as a critical fractile, in the
spirit of the classical newsvendor problem. This allows us to further analyze the impact of audience uncertainty on profits and managerial decisions.

3.1 Aggregate Upfront Planning.

An important question faced by media revenue managers is how much capacity should be allocated to upfront vs. scatter markets. In particular, once a given budget and audience target have been contracted upfront, what is the corresponding capacity requirement for the entire broadcasting season (see e.g. Alvarado 2007)? Central to our derivations is a simple aggregate upfront planning model, which answers the latter question by collapsing all upfront client targets into one cumulative audience target \( N \). Based on the model and assumptions set up in Section 2, the total expected cost of allocating \( x \) homogeneous capacity units with uncertain audience \( \xi \) to the upfront market can be expressed as:

\[
c^*(N) = \min_{0 \leq x \leq Q} px + b\mathbb{E}[N - x\xi]^+.
\] (1)

The main trade-off captured by this model is between the opportunity cost \( p \) of allocating a slot to the spot market and the penalty cost of not meeting the performance target \( N \) of the upfront market. In this section only, we focus on constant scatter market prices \( p \), for cleaner insights; all our results extend for non-linear scatter market profits.

Recall that \( F \) is the cdf of audience uncertainty \( \xi \) (as described in Section 2.1), and denote its left tail expectation by:

\[
G(u) = \mathbb{E}[\xi I(\xi \leq u)],
\] (2)

where \( I(\cdot) \) denotes the indicator function. This allows to write the cost objective in (1), i.e. the cost of allocating \( x \) units of capacity to the upfront, as:

\[
c(N, x) = px + b\mathbb{E}[N - x\xi]^+ = px + b\left[NF(N/x) - xG(N/x)\right].
\] (3)

The next result follows directly from the first order conditions, by convexity of the cost function and monotonicity of \( G \). Its proof is omitted for conciseness. Throughout the paper, increasing/decreasing refer to weak monotonicity.

**Proposition 1** The optimal solution to Problem (1) is \( x^* = \min(Q, \bar{x}) \), where the unconstrained optimum \( \bar{x} \) satisfies:

\[
G(N/x) = p/b.
\] (4)
Furthermore, $x^*$ is piecewise linear and increasing in the target performance $N$, increasing in the penalty $b$ and decreasing in the spot price $p$, all else equal. The optimal cost $c^*(N)$ equals $bNF(G^{-1}(p/b))$, if $p/b \geq G(N/Q)$ and $c(N, Q)$ otherwise.

Incidentally, Proposition 1 suggests that the penalty level $b$ effectively corresponds to offering a type 1 service level $1 - \epsilon = 1 - \mathbb{P}(x^*\xi \leq N)$, which satisfies $G^{-1}(p/b) = F^{-1}(\epsilon)$.

Relation with Random Yield and Inventory Models. In the media revenue management problem, demand, measured in audience units, is deterministic ($N$), whereas the value of allocated supply is uncertain ($x\xi$). This makes our problem akin to production problems with random yield. Problem (1) is a special case of a single-period random yield model due to Shih (1980), with stochastically proportional yield and no holding cost (see also Yano and Lee 1995, page 318). In this problem, $x$ units are produced at a unit cost $p$. Of these, an uncertain fraction $\xi$ (the yield rate) satisfies quality standards and can be used to satisfy demand. Demand is “rigid” and equal to $N$, and unit shortage cost is $b$.

Alternatively, Problem (1) can be recast as a single-period newsvendor problem, with lost sales and no holding cost (Porteus 2002). This is achieved by translating all model ingredients, in particular demand, in terms of inventory units (i.e. 30 second advertising slots). The transformation is particularly appealing because the BC’s operational decision is necessarily in terms of advertising space.

Remark 1 Problem (1) is equivalent to an inventory model with cost $= p$, price $= b\mu$, demand $\theta$ with cdf $\mathbb{P}(\theta \leq x) = 1 - G(N/x)/\mu$, and objective $c(N, x) = px + b\mu\mathbb{E}[\eta - x]^+$. The corresponding critical fractile solution, equivalent to (4), is

$$\mathbb{P}(\theta \geq x) = \frac{p}{\mu b}. \quad (5)$$

Proof: First note that the cdf of $\theta$ is well defined because $G(u)$ is increasing and bounded in $[0, \mu]$. We can write $\theta = N/\zeta$, where $\zeta$ is a random variable with cdf $\mathbb{P}(\zeta \leq u) = G(u)/\mu$ (also well defined for the same reasons). Indeed, $\mathbb{P}(\theta \leq x) = 1 - G(N/x)/\mu = \mathbb{P}(\zeta \geq N/x)$. The objective in Problem (1) can be recast as follows:

$$c(N, x) = px + b\mu\mathbb{E}[\xi/\mu(N/\xi-x)^+] = px + b\mu\mathbb{E}[N/\xi-x]^+ = px + b\mu\mathbb{E}[\eta-x]^+. \quad (5)$$

The second equality is based on a change of measure transformation from $\xi$ to $\zeta$. By definition, $\zeta$ has density $h(u) = u/\mu f(u)$, so the likelihood ratio of the two measures is $\xi/\mu$. The second equality follows because $\theta = N/\zeta$. □
In the next section, this transformation serves to shed light on how uncertainty affects capacity allocation in the media problem. This transformation is different from transformations of random yield models to newsvendor models proposed in the literature. Shih (1980) was the first to observe that the solution of the stochastically proportional random yield problem is a modification of the conventional inventory problem with no defective products, but he does not suggest a specific change of variable. Bollapragada and Morton (1999) propose a transformation where the new random variable \( \eta = N - (\xi - \mu)x \) in our notation) is a function of the decision variable. In our case, the new distribution \( \theta \) remains exogenous, which is essential for the results.

### 3.2 The Impact of Audience Uncertainty

This section studies the impact of audience uncertainty on profits and decisions. We first show how our model predictions differ from deterministic audience models, most common in the literature. Then we investigate how variations in audience, such as show popularity effects, affect optimal capacity allocation, costs and profits.

**Deterministic vs. Stochastic Audience.** Consider a deterministic version of model (1) obtained by approximating audience by its mean \( \xi \equiv \mu \). The optimal allocation for this model is \( x_d = \min(Q, N/\mu) \). Based on Remark 1, inventory considerations suggest writing \( x^* = x_d + SS_\theta \), where \( SS_\theta \) is the safety stock. It is easy to see that this is usually positive:

**Lemma 1** The optimal capacity allocation is higher under audience uncertainty than for a deterministic audience model, i.e. \( x^* > x_d \), whenever \( G(\mu) > p/b \).

In practice, penalties much exceed scatter market CPM, \( b \gg p/\mu \), so the condition in Lemma 1 is likely to hold. In other words, the right hand side in the critical fractile condition (5) is positive and close to 0, indicating a positive safety stock. We conclude that a deterministic model prediction would typically underestimate the capacity allocation (i.e. overestimate GRP allocation) required to hedge for audience uncertainty. Our numerical results in Section 6, based on real data, suggest that the relative error in allocation, as well as profit, exceeds 30% (see Table 2).

**Popularity effects.** It seems natural to expect that more popular (i.e. higher audience) shows require a lower capacity provision. Similarly, one would expect that the introduction of TIVO, leading to an overall decrease in audience for advertisements, would call for higher
capacity allocation. This is obviously true under deterministic audience models. Interestingly however, it is not necessarily the case under audience uncertainty, as illustrated further.

To see this, we model "show popularity" with a factor $z$, such that scatter market price $p(z)$ is increasing in $z$ and audience $\xi(z)$ is stochastically increasing in $z$. By default, stochastic monotonicity refers here to first order dominance, denoted $\preceq_{st}$. Here $z$ can be seen as a signal or available information on the current status of the audience and market. Clearly, profits $r(x, z) = (Q - x)p(z) - bE[N - x\xi(z)]^+$ increase with $z$, and so does $r^*(z) = \max_{0 \leq x \leq Q} r(x, z)$. However, allocation cost $c(x, z) = p(z)x + bE[N - x\xi(z)]^+$ does not necessarily decrease with $z$, because spot market opportunity costs increase, whereas penalty costs decrease. We next study how $x^*(z)$ changes with $z$.

**Counterexample 1.** Consider two shows such that audience uncertainty for the first show, $\xi_1$ (measured in millions of viewers) is uniformly distributed on $[1, 3]$ (so $\mu_1 = 2$). There are two layers of uncertainty about the audience for the second show, $\xi_2$: with probability $\alpha = 0.5$, $\xi_2$ is uniform on $[1.5, 2]$, otherwise, it is uniform on $[2, 3]$; that is, the show is a miss with probability $\alpha$. It is easy to see that $\xi_1 \preceq_{st} \xi_2$, suggesting that the second show is more popular, in a stochastic sense. Consider the same penalty level $b = 10$ and scatter market $CPM = p/\mu = 5$, i.e. scatter pricing correctly adjusts for popularity effects. Eq. (4) implies that the less popular show requires less capacity allocation: $x^*_1 = 22 < x^*_2 = 23$. □

Counterexample 1 illustrates the counter-intuitive fact that a higher popularity show, in the sense of first order dominance, may actually require a higher allocation $x^*(z)$. Moreover, this cannot be attributed to inconsistent pricing; pricing is so-called consistent if scatter prices reflect popularity effects, by keeping scatter market CPM $p(z)/\mu(z)$ constant. To understand this, consider the critical fractile solution (5). This suggests that $x^*(z)$ decreases in $z$ if demand uncertainty, measured in capacity units, $\theta(z)$ stochastically decreases (a sufficient condition). In general, however, a stochastically increasing audience $\xi(z)$ does not guarantee $\theta(z)$ to decrease stochastically, as is the case with Counterexample 1 (it is easy to check that $\theta_1$ is not stochastically larger than $\theta_2$).

Nevertheless, optimal allocation does decrease with popularity for a large class of audience distributions, including usual parametric families, additive and multiplicative models. Recall that $\xi_1$ dominates $\xi_2$ in the likelihood ratio order, written $\xi_1 \preceq_{lr} \xi_2$, if and only if the ratio of the corresponding densities $f_2/f_1$ is increasing (see e.g. Müller and Stoyan 2002).

**Proposition 2** Let $\xi_0$ be a fixed random variable (independent of $z$), and $\mu(z)$ an increasing
function of $z$. The following alternative conditions on the non-negative audience distribution, $\xi(z)$, insure that the optimal allocation, $x^*(z)$, decreases in the popularity factor $z$:

(a) $\xi(z) = \mu(z) \xi_0$, and scatter market CPM, $p(z)/\mu(z)$, is constant (or non-decreasing).

(b) $\xi(z) = \mu(z) + \xi_0$, where $\xi_0$ is unimodal with mean 0 and non-negative mode, and the condition in Lemma 1 is met, i.e. $b > \sup_z \{p(z)/G(\mu(z))\}$.

(c) $\xi(z)$ is stochastically increasing in $z$ in the likelihood ratio order.

(d) $\xi(z)$ belongs to any of the following parametric distribution families: binomial, geometric, poisson, beta, exponential, gamma and lognormal, with the natural order of parameters that induces first order dominance (see e.g. Table 1.1 in Müller and Stoyan 2002).

All remaining proofs are in the Appendix. In all the above cases $\xi(z)$ is stochastically increasing in $z$. The first two cases capture general situations where popularity either scales or shifts the audience distribution, leading to multiplicative, respectively additive models. This would roughly correspond to practical settings where, for example, (a) each individual’s viewing probability is increased and (b) a new viewership segment is captured (from another show). The third case captures a stronger type of stochastic dominance that insures monotonicity of the allocation policy. Overall, our results suggest that intuitive comparative statics hold for most common, but not all types of audience distributions. In particular, they may not hold if several layers of uncertainty are at play.

Similarly, by defining the factor $z$ as a measure of audience variability (instead of show popularity), we can show that revenues decrease with variability in audience, but optimal allocation does not necessarily increase.

In a random yield context, Gupta and Cooper (2005) study the stochastic monotonicity of the profit in response to changes in the yield distribution. Their results are different from ours, due in particular to the absence of holding costs in our model. Moreover, they do not investigate changes in the decision variable, which is our main purpose in this section.

### 3.3 Static Multidimensional Upfront Planning

During the upfront planning stage, broadcasters plan the total capacity requirement for the upfront market for the entire season (as determined in Section 3.1). In addition, they need to plan the distribution of this capacity across multiple periods (e.g. quarters or weeks), day-parts (e.g. prime-time, day, night) and shows. This section briefly extends our basic aggregate upfront capacity planning model (1) to address such issues.
Let $\xi$ and $p$ denote the vectors of audiences and prices for each of $k$ periods, $x$ the corresponding allocations, and $Q = [0, Q_1] \times \ldots \times [0, Q_k]$. Bold characters are reserved for vectors throughout. When a cumulative target $N$ is demanded for multiple air-dates with varying audiences, we obtain the following static multi-stage capacity planning problem:

$$\quad (CT) \min_{x \in Q} p'x + b\mathbb{E}[N - x'\xi]^+. \quad (6)$$

This is a convex stochastic programming problem without recourse, for which standard solution techniques apply (see e.g. Prékopa 1995). Numerical solutions for a more general (non-convex) version of this problem are provided in Yang et al. (2007), who study a sourcing problem with one buyer (with stochastic demand $N$) and multiple suppliers facing random yield. They do not provide structural results.

Recall that the random variables $\xi_i$ are said to be exchangeable if their joint distribution is not affected by permutations of the individual random variables.

**Proposition 3** Assume that audience distributions $\xi_i$ are exchangeable, and capacities and scatter prices are the same $Q_i \equiv Q$, respectively $p_i \equiv p$. Problem $(CT)$ reduces to solving the aggregate model $(1)$ with audience $\xi = (\sum_{i=1}^{k} \xi_i)/k$, target $N$ and capacity $kQ$, and dividing the resulting capacity equally across the $k$ periods.

The above result shows that, if audience is homogeneous (but not necessarily independent) across air-dates, and consistently priced on scatter (uniform scatter market CPM $p/\mu$), then capacity allocation should be balanced across periods. Incidentally, uniform allocation is standard industry practice, supported by clients’ preference against burstiness. The result extends for general scatter market profit models.

Proposition 3 is also relevant when interpreted in the context of allocation across multiple shows (instead of periods) $i = 1, \ldots, k$. The result suggests that shows with ‘similar’ audiences can be aggregated, when consistently priced. The aggregation result extends for shows with different audiences, as long as scatter market CPM distributions are homogeneous (exchangeable $\xi_i/p_i$), so audience is consistently priced. In that case, the firm should balance opportunity costs $v_i = p_i x_i$, rather than allocation. In absence of such homogeneity assumptions, the optimal allocation can be calculated based on first order conditions on model $(CT)$, but the aggregation result may not necessarily hold.

In the next section, we show that similar aggregation results hold when considering multiple clients, and show-level or period-specific targets (a.k.a quarterly or weekly weighings).
These results are important because they allow us to focus on aggregate models of capacity allocation, and deal with specific client, shows and air-dates in a second stage.

4. Multiple Clients

Our models so far have considered aggregate capacity planning and allocation decisions for the upfront market, where the requirements of all upfront clients were cumulated into one single aggregate upfront market target. This section extends our aggregate planning models to a multi-client setting. We characterize the optimal capacity decision for a set of contracted clients during the upfront market and during the broadcasting season (make-goods). These results are further used to prioritize client contracts.

During the upfront market, multiple clients (say \(k\) of them) approach the BC around the same time (during a couple of weeks in May in the U.S.), and negotiate advertising plans for the entire season. Requests consist of a budget \(B_i\) and CPM (cost per thousand viewers) \(C_i\), resulting in a target performance \(N_i = B_i/C_i, i = 1,\ldots,k\). We let \(N = (N_1,\ldots,N_k)\). During this brief upfront market period, contracts are negotiated in parallel by account executives. The latter report to a strategic planning group, who oversees the process, and considers all client requests and proposals in order to provide strategic sales guidelines. This process motivates a joint optimization model (as opposed to a dynamic, sequential approach) for simultaneous contracting and capacity planning for multiple clients.

Our main result is that upfront clients can be aggregated for capacity planning and make-goods allocation, provided that they are not differentiated in terms of service level, i.e. penalties are uniform across clients \((b_i \equiv b)\). This is precisely the assumption we make in what follows. While the restriction to a common service level may seem to pass up profit opportunities from service differentiation across customers, according to our discussions with industry experts, this assumption is consistent with current industry practice. Clients are differentiated based on price (CPM) and volume buys, but a uniformly high service level is maintained across customers.

This section, and the remainder of the paper, work with a general scatter market profit model \(\pi(x)\), as described in Section 2.2.
4.1 Multiple Client Aggregation

Suppose that the BC has signed contracts stipulating performance targets $N_i, i = 1, \ldots, k$ with a set of $k$ clients. In order to estimate the amount of capacity $X_i$ necessary to satisfy each client’s request at minimal cost to the firm, the following multi-client capacity planning problem is solved:

$$
(M) \quad r^*_M(N) = \max_{X_i \geq 0 \sum X_i \leq Q} \pi\left(\sum_{i=1}^k X_i\right) - b \sum_{i=1}^k E[N_i - X_i \xi]^+. 
$$

Let $N = \sum_{i=1}^k N_i$ be the aggregate performance contracted upfront, and $X = \sum_{i=1}^k X_i \leq Q$, the total capacity provisioned for the upfront market (for planning purposes). Consider the profit maximization version of the aggregate model (1), under a general scatter profit $\pi$:

$$
(A) \quad r^*(N) = \max_{0 \leq X \leq Q} \pi(X) - b E[N - X \xi]^+. 
$$

This problem has a unique solution, whose unconstrained value solves $G(N/x) = -\pi'(x)/b$.

The next result shows that the total upfront planning recommendation prescribed by the aggregate model (A) is optimal, and consistent with model (M). This is surprising, because the aggregate performance target in (A) induces additional pooling effects that may not occur when penalties are incurred at the client level.

**Proposition 4** The optimal solution to Problem (M) equates GRP allocation across clients:

$$
\frac{N_i}{X^*_i} = \frac{N}{X^*}, i = 1, \ldots, k, \text{ where } X^* = \sum_{i=1}^k X^*_i \text{ and } N = \sum_{i=1}^k N_i.
$$

That is, the total upfront allocation $X^*$ solves the aggregate Problem (A) with target performance $N$. Moreover, optimal profits for the two problems are the same $r^*_M(N) = r^*(N)$.

The argument relies on the uniform penalty assumption, motivated by strategic service level operations. The result also extends when penalties are non-linear but convex in GRP allocation $x/N$, i.e. marginal penalty increases with higher percentages of unmet audience.

In summary, given a set of clients and their respective requirements, the firm only needs to determine the upfront market GRP allocation, i.e. contracted audience per capacity unit $w = N/X^*$. This should be set equally across clients, i.e. $N_i/X^*_i = w$. In particular, for linear scatter profit $\pi(x) = p(Q - x)$, client allocation can be determined in close form because $X^* = \min(Q, N/G^{-1}(p/b))$. Bollapragada and Mallik (2007) use GRP allocation as
a single decision variable in an aggregate upfront market model; our results in this section validate their approach.

The aggregation result of Proposition 4 can be alternatively interpreted in a context where a single client requires different performance targets, $N$, on different shows or periods (weekly/quarterly weighings, see e.g. Table 10.7 in Talluri van Ryzin 2004). In this case, if audience is exchangeable, GRP allocation should be balanced across periods, or shows.

4.2 Multi-Client Contracting and Priority Heuristic

In this section, we step back to investigate which upfront clients the BC should accept, among a given set of client requests, consisting of a target performance $N_i$ and budget $B_i$, at the negotiated CPM rate $C_i = B_i/N_i$. An important limitation of this model is that it focuses on the firm's short term profit maximization problem, and thus ignores the impact of current decisions on customer retention in the context of the firm's long term profit maximization problem. Aflaki and Popescu (2007) model the endogenous problem of a service provider when client demand responds to the cumulative service experience.

We consider a setup where the BC may offer partial fulfilment of client requests, at the negotiated CPM level $C_i$. Let $y_i \in Y = [0, 1]$ be the satisfied fraction of client $i$'s demand, and $x_i$ the amount of capacity provisioned for client $i$. Accepting client $i$ increases revenues by $B_i y_i$, less potential penalties for unmet performance, but generates scatter market opportunity cost. Consider the upfront planning profit maximization model:

$$P = \max_{y \in Y} r^*_M (N \circ y) + B'y,$$

where

$$(9)$$

The first term stems from the multi-client upfront planning model ($M$) with contracted client performance targets $N_i y_i$. Proposition 4 reduces this to an aggregate model ($A$) with cumulative target $N'y$. So $r^*_M (N \circ y) = r^* (N'y)$, and the problem can be restated as:

$$P = \max_{y \in Y} r^* (N'y) + B'y$$

$$= \max_N \left\{ r^* (N) + \max_{N'y = N; y \in Y} B'y \right\}.$$  (10)

For any given contracted audience $N = N'y$, the inner problem is a knapsack model, whose optimal fractional solution amounts to serving clients in decreasing order of their marginal profitability, or CPM, $C_i = B_i/N_i$. Hence this will also be true for the optimal solution of Problem (10). Client demands should be served as long as they are profitable (i.e. CPM
exceeds marginal penalty, so under linear scatter profit \( C_i \geq bF(G^{-1}(p/b)) \) and capacity is available. Our results have the following implications for client contracting (in absence of long-term profit considerations):

**Proposition 5** *Client contracts should be accepted sequentially in decreasing order of marginal revenue, or \( CPM C_i = B_i/N_i \), as long as they are profitable and capacity is available.*

The results in this section remain valid when modeling the opportunity to allocate make-goods during the broadcasting season, discussed in the next section.

5. **Operational Decisions. Make-Goods Allocation**

Our results so far focused on static models that provide BCs with decision support during the upfront market decision process. These capacity provisions are for strategic planning purposes; they are not actually committed to the client upfront. This section shows how capacity allocation is operationalized, by extending our basic aggregate capacity planning model of Section 3 to a multi-period setting. While the focus here is on aggregate upfront allocation models, our results extend those in Section 4 to handle make-goods allocation across multiple clients, as argued at the end of this section.

First, the BC decides how much capacity should be *committed* to clients upfront, with the provision that this allocation cannot be reduced, but can be increased by subsequently allocating make goods. Then, as the season starts, and audience ratings unfold, the BC further decides when and whether to increase initial allocation to under-performing upfront market client campaigns, by airing make-goods. This decision is continuously traded-off against immediate scatter market profit opportunities.

Consistent with the broadcasting business cycle, the planning horizon \( T \) is assumed to be one year, discretized into weeks, months or quarters. In this section, \( \xi \) captures prior uncertainty about show popularity; it measures the number of impressions viewing a prime-time ad. For simplicity of exposition, we assume audiences are i.i.d over time \( \xi_t \equiv \xi \), but our results extend for Markovian processes. All comparative statics results extend under a general performance measure \( \Psi(x, \xi) \) that is increasing and concave in \( x \) (accounting for repetition wearout).
5.1 Reversible Allocation

Let \( x_0 \) denote the “irreversible” allocation initially committed to the upfront market. In each period \( t \geq 1 \), given the remaining target performance \( N_t \), the BC decides how many additional make-goods \( x_t - x_0 \) to allocate to the upfront market in order to maximize scatter market profits (realized each period) net of penalties for unmet performance, calculated at the end of the horizon. The resulting profit (net of contracted upfront client budgets) is denoted \( V_t(x_t, N_t) \), and its optimal value \( J_t(N_t) \). For an aggregate contracted upfront market target \( N \), this leads to a dynamic programming model, that optimizes \( J_0(N) = \max_{x_0} J_0(x_0, N) \), given recursively by the following Bellman equation:

\[
J_t(N_t) = \max_{x_0 \leq x_t \leq Q} V_t(x_t, N_t)
\]

where \( V_t(x_t, N_t) = \pi(x_t) + \mathbb{E} J_{t+1}(N_t - \xi x_t) \) (11)

and \( J_T(N_T) = -bN_T^+ \).

Because initial allocation \( x_0 \) is irreversible, it can only limit the firm’s flexibility. It is easy to see that \( J_0(x_0, N) \) is decreasing in \( x_0 \), hence minimizing \( x_0 \) is optimal for \( J_0(N) \). This common industry practice, known as gapping, is practically implemented by overstating performance ratings (i.e. overselling \( \xi \) projections). Technically, this allows us to set without loss of generality \( x_0 = 0 \) in the corresponding Problem (11). In reality, however, excessive gapping can negatively affect client relationships on the long run.

The next result characterizes relevant structural properties of the BC’s expected profit, formalizing the following statements: Expected profit increases with achieved performance, but its marginal value decreases. Moreover, the value of allocating an extra make-good decreases with achieved performance, and there is a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between current make-goods allocation and achieved performance \( (N - N_t) \). Finally, the marginal value of airing an additional make-good (or lowering the performance target by one unit) is higher later in the horizon.

**Lemma 2** The value function has the following properties: (a) \( J_t \) is decreasing and concave in \( N_t \); (b) \( V_t \) is jointly concave and has increasing differences in \( (x_t, N_t) \); (c) \( V_t(x, N) \) has increasing differences in \( (x, t) \); (d) \( V_t \) has increasing differences in \( (x, -N) \) and \( t \).

Recall that a bivariate function \( g(x, y) \) has increasing differences in \( (x, y) \), if for all \( x \leq x' \), \( g(x', y) - g(x, y) \) is increasing in \( y \). In two dimensions, this is equivalent to supermodularity. If \( X \) is a set of integers, monotone differences amounts to monotonicity of \( g(x+1, y) - g(x, y) \).
A standard comparative statics result, Topkis’ Lemma, states that if \( g(x, y) \) has increasing differences, then \( x^*(y) = \max \arg \max_{x \in X} g(x, y) \) is increasing in \( y \) (Topkis 1998).

A consequence of Topkis’ Lemma and Lemma 2(c), the next result shows that, at any point in time, the better the achieved performance, the lower the make-goods allocation, all else equal. Also, the closer the end of the season, the more make-goods need to be aired to achieve a desired target performance. This is because there are less opportunities to make up for under-performance in the future.

**Proposition 6** The optimal make-goods allocation \( x_t^*(N) \) is increasing in the remaining performance target \( N \) at any time \( t \), and decreasing in the remaining horizon \( T - t \) for any \( N \geq 0 \), all else equal.

In particular, there exist threshold levels \( \bar{N}_t \) so that additional make-goods are aired at time \( t \) only if the remaining target exceeds the current threshold \( N_t > \bar{N}_t \). These thresholds are increasing with achieved performance \( N - N_t \), and over time, all else equal.

### 5.2 Irreversible Allocation

Depending on the client’s bargaining power, in certain markets make-goods allocation can be irreversible (e.g. one additional P&G ad will be aired in *Friends* every week until the end of the season). This section considers such an irreversible make-goods allocation process. A similar type of irreversible commitment is common in the study of capacity expansion strategies (see e.g. Oksendal 2000), leading to similar constraints, but different optimization models. In our setting, if \( x_t \) is the total number of slots dedicated to a client at time \( t \), irreversible allocation means that \( x_{t+1} \geq x_t \), and effective available capacity at time \( t + 1 \) is \( Q - x_t \). In practice, sellers do not necessarily resent this limited flexibility, as it often simplifies their decision making task and induces a more uniform allocation.

The aggregate objective is \( \max_{x_0} J_0(x_0, N) \), with the value function given by the recursive Bellman equation:

\[
J_t(x_t, N_t) = \max_{x_t \leq x_{t+1} \leq Q} V_t(x_{t+1}, N_t)
\]

where

\[
V_t(x_{t+1}, N_t) = \pi(x_{t+1}) + \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, N_t - \xi x_{t+1})
\]

and

\[
J_T(x_T, N_T) = -b N_T^+. \tag{12}
\]

Again, gapping considerations suggest that initial upfront allocation should be minimized, so w.l.o.g. we set \( x_0 = 0 \). Given a pre-committed allocation \( x \) and a remaining target \( N \), the
optimal allocation policy is \( x^*_t = x^*_t(x, N) = \arg\max_{x \in [x, Q]} V_{t-1}(x, N) \). This can be obtained by projecting the unconstrained optimum, \( \bar{x}_t(N) = \arg\max_y V_{t-1}(y, N) \), on the interval \([x, Q]\).

**Proposition 7** The results of Lemma 2 and Proposition 6 under reversible allocation extend to the irreversible allocation case. Moreover, the optimal irreversible allocation policy is increasing in the previously committed allocation \( x \), and it is given by \( x^*_t(x, N) = \max(x, \min(\bar{x}_t(N), Q)) \), where \( \bar{x}_t(N) = \arg\max_y V_{t-1}(y, N) \).

The result indicates that the BC should schedule no additional make goods unless the amount already committed, \( x_t \), falls below a certain level, \( \bar{x}_{t+1} \). Equivalently, the optimal policy is characterized by threshold levels, \( \bar{N}_{t+1} = N_t - \bar{x}_{t+1} \mu \), so that additional make-goods are aired only if the remaining target exceeds the current threshold. These thresholds are increasing with past allocation \( x \), achieved performance \( N - N_t \), and over time, all else equal.

Such structural properties, albeit intuitive, are typically difficult to preserve in a dynamic and stochastic setting. In particular, the monotonicity of the optimal allocation over time is a tricky result in the irreversible case, due to the state dependence of the action set \([x, Q]\). This excludes the use of standard structural results for dynamic programs with action independent sets, including Smith and McCardle (2002, e.g. their Proposition 5, p.806).

We conclude this section by observing that the results of Section 4 extend for make-goods allocation. In particular, the multi-client aggregation result for upfront planning decisions obtained in Proposition 4 holds for dynamic make-goods allocation. Specifically, the multi-client make-goods allocation problem reduces to solving the aggregate dynamic program (11) (respectively (12) in the irreversible case), and allocating the resulting make-goods to clients in proportion to their remaining targets (see Proposition 8 in the Appendix). Furthermore, the insights of Proposition 5 remain valid when modeling in (9) the additional recourse provided by the opportunity to allocate make-goods to clients during the broadcasting season.

We conclude that in order to describe the optimal multiple client solution, it is sufficient to characterize the optimal revenue and allocation corresponding to the aggregate model.

### 6. Numerical Results and Heuristics

This section investigates our findings numerically. We first assess the relative error from ignoring audience uncertainty in static models. Heuristics for dynamic make-goods allocation are proposed and compared to the optimal policy. We have been able to obtain real data
from a major broadcasting network, consisting of audience (number of impressions) per half hour time interval, for an entire year between 29/04/2007 and 29/04/2008. We also obtained scatter price data, but in more aggregate form. We first describe how the data was used to generate inputs into the numerical experiments.

6.1 Input Generation based on Data

The best fit distribution to prime-time (8:00pm-11:00pm) audience data was found to be a Gamma distribution (followed closely by logistic and student-t distributions). Based on the data, the average prime-time audience was estimated at $\mu = 1.5$, with a standard deviation of $\sigma = 0.45$, both measured in millions of impressions. We therefore set $\xi$ to follow a Gamma distribution with shape parameter 11 and scale parameter 0.135. For convenience, we measure audience in millions of impressions, and dollar amounts in tens of thousands.

The average scatter market price for prime-time spots was estimated at $25,000, with a standard deviation of $7200. Unfortunately, we did not have access to any sales data, that would allow us to estimate a demand function. For the numerical analysis, we use an iso-elastic scatter market demand function $d(p) = ap^{-\eta}$, with elasticity $\eta > 1$. This leads to a profit model $\pi(x) = ap^{1-\eta} = p_0(Q - x)^{1-1/\eta}$, where $p_0 = a^{1/\eta}$ corresponds to the profit from one unit capacity available to the scatter market. We set $\eta = 1.5$, and used the average estimate based on the data, to set $p_0 = 2.5$ (in tens of thousand of dollars). Our insights are robust with respect to the elasticity $\eta > 1$, and other scatter profit models, including linear and log-demand.

We report results for various penalty levels, $b$, from 10 to 125 (in tens of thousands of dollars), corresponding to service levels of 75% to 98% (see Section 3.1). As expected, penalty values usually much exceed the scatter market CPM, which in our case is at most $p_0/\mu = $16.7 per thousand impressions; this value is realistic for the network at hand.

For make-goods allocation, we focused on a one year, four-quarters horizon ($T = 4$), i.e. make-goods allocation is assumed to be revised once every three months. The capacity $Q$, corresponding to the total number of prime-time ads for a quarter, is set to $Q = 4200$. This is justified by information provided by the network: the number of 30 second ads per hour in prime-time ranges between 16 and 20, amounting to a total capacity of 4008-5040 prime-time ads in 12 weeks (or one quarter).

The target audience $N$ was varied over the range from 0 to 25000 million impressions. This range was chosen based on the expected audience (for the total number of ads available)
over the entire horizon, which is $N_0 = \mu \cdot Q \cdot T = 25200$ million. Empirical evidence suggests that about 80% of a network’s average ratings are sold upfront. For values $N \geq N_0$, all policies appear to behave very similarly, by allocating all the capacity to the upfront.

Our extensive numerical studies, for a wide range of meaningful numerical values, indicate that the results presented here are representative and robust. The numerical results are also scalable, in the sense that similar patterns are observed if make-goods allocation decisions are made with a different frequency, and capacity is adjusted accordingly (e.g. for one month instead of one quarter periods, the total prime-time capacity is in the order of $Q = 1400$ ads, and $N_0 = 8400$ million impressions).

In the realistic context of this data, we first briefly assess the impact of uncertainty in static upfront allocation (ignoring make-goods), as identified in Lemma 1. Table 2 below shows the relative error between the capacity allocation obtained based on a deterministic audience, $x_{d} = \min \{ Q, N/(T \mu) \}$, and the optimal static upfront allocation, $x^{*}$, obtained by solving the stochastic audience model (8). The average relative allocation error, $\Delta_{x}$, is calculated by averaging over $N$ the percentage gap $\frac{x^{*} - x_{d}}{x_{d}}$. We also report the corresponding average relative static profit error $\Delta_{r}$, calculated by averaging $\frac{r^{*}(N) - r(x_{d}, N)}{r^{*}(N)}$ over $N$, where $r(x, N) = \pi(x) - bE[N - x\xi]^{+}$ and $r^{*}(N) = \max_{0 \leq x \leq Q} r(x, N)$, as defined in (8). The results suggest that, by ignoring audience uncertainty, the deterministic approach largely under-allocates capacity to the upfront, and the error deteriorates with higher service levels.

Table 2. Static allocation error for various penalties, and corresponding service levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Penalty level ($b$)</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>125</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative allocation error ($\Delta_{x}$)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative profit error ($\Delta_{r}$)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>138%</td>
<td>144%</td>
<td>299%</td>
<td>605%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.2 Heuristics for Dynamic Make-Goods Allocation

The practical inconvenience of solving the make-goods allocation dynamic program to optimality (due to the curse of dimensionality) motivates us to study several intuitive and efficient heuristics for make-goods allocation, described next.

A myopic policy reduces the visibility of the decision maker to a shorter horizon, by introducing sub-targets for corresponding sub-horizons. For clarity, we consider the extreme situation where each period is a sub-horizon and the target $N$ is initially divided uniformly across periods. The static myopic ($s$-myopic) policy allocates a constant amount of capacity
each period, corresponding to a per period target $N/T$, as long as this does not exceed the actual remaining target. Concretely, in each period $t$, the s-myopic allocation $x_{s\text{-myopic}}$ solves the static model (1) with general scatter profit $\pi$, and target $\tilde{N}_t = \min(N/T, N_t)$, where $N_t$ is the total actual remaining target. A natural improvement over this heuristic is the myopic policy, which periodically updates the target for the next period, by spreading the actual remaining audience target uniformly across the remaining horizon, so $\tilde{N}_t = N_t/(T - t)$.

The static policy provides the corresponding optimal open-loop policy, deciding allocations for each period before audience realizations are revealed. This model is analogous to the multi-stage model $(CT)$ of Section 3.3 with non-linear scatter market profit. Proposition 3 insures that the static policy allocates the same amount of make-goods $x_{\text{static}}$ in each period. Specifically, the static solution solves a non-linear scatter profit version of model (1), with target $N$ and cumulative audience distribution equal to the convolution $\xi^{(T)} = \xi_1 + \cdots + \xi_T$, where $\xi_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, T$ are i.i.d. with the same distribution as $\xi$. That is, $x_{\text{static}}$ solves:

$$\max_{x \in [0, Q]} T\pi(x) - b\mathbb{E}[N - x\xi^{(T)}]^+.$$

By design, the static policy is implicitly also a valid heuristic for the irreversible model. A natural improvement on the static policy is obtained by resolving the static policy in each period, based on the remaining target: this is called the $r$-static heuristic.

The Certainty Equivalent Control (CEC) heuristic approximates the profit-to-go by setting the audience in all remaining periods to its expected value $\mathbb{E}\xi = \mu$ (see e.g. Bertsekas 2008). By ignoring audience uncertainty, the CEC policy is likely to capture, at an aggregate level, what is currently done in practice (where deterministic audience models are used). Specifically, in each period, the CEC solves the deterministic concave problem:

$$\max\{\sum_{i=t}^T \pi(x_i) - bZ \mid Z \geq N_t - (\sum_{i=t}^T x_i)\mu, Z \geq 0 \text{ and } 0 \leq x_i \leq Q, \ t \leq i \leq T\}.$$

Concavity of $\pi$ implies that, at an optimal solution, the allocation is uniform and equal to $x_i^* = \max\{\arg\max(\pi(x) + bx\mu), \frac{N_t}{(T - t + 1)\mu}\}$. This is the amount allocated by the CEC policy in period $t$. The policy re-solves periodically the corresponding deterministic approximation, after updating the remaining target based on realized audience.

Another heuristic that relies on deterministic audience is the minimal postponement policy, which prioritizes allocation to the upfront market, while approximating future audience by its mean. Only once the client target is met, the policy starts selling to the scatter market. Specifically, it sets $x_t = \min(Q, N_t/\mu)$, as long as $N_t > 0$. One can similarly define a
maximum postponement policy. For conciseness, these policies are not reported due to their relatively poor performance.

Figure 1: Heuristic and optimal value functions, and corresponding allocation policies, at $t = 1$, relative to the target $N$, for $T = 4$ and $b = 30$.

The first graph in Figure 1 compares numerically the performance of these policies in terms of total expected profits (calculated by Monte Carlo simulation) at the beginning of a four quarter horizon $T = 4$. Table 3 gives the relative value function error, for different values of the penalty $b$, averaged over initial values of $N$. For a given heuristic $h$, the average relative error $\Delta_h$ is defined as the percentage optimality gap $\left| \frac{J_{rev} - J_h}{J_{rev}} \right|$, averaged across the relevant values of $N$; here $J_{rev}$ is the optimal expected profit under the reversible regime.\(^7\) In our experiments, the $r$-static policy achieved consistently and by far the best value function approximation, with a relative error (with respect to the optimal reversible policy) ranging between 0.2% and 0.5% (it is not distinguishable from the optimal policy on the graph). It is followed by the myopic policy, with a relative error ranging between 1.75% and 5%. The performance of these two heuristics improves as the remaining target $N$ increases. The profit relationships depicted in Figure 1, as well as the policy rankings described in Table 3 are robust for all practically relevant service levels (i.e. penalty values $b \geq 10$). The static policy is the only heuristic among those considered here that is also feasible for the irreversible

\(^7\)Relative profit performance is actually much better than Table 3 reports, because it should also consider the upfront budget $B$, omitted by our value function calculations. To give an idea of the magnitude of $B$, in 2005, the six biggest networks in the US alone collected over $9$ billion in upfront revenues, that is $1/7$ of the $63$ billion TV advertising market, according to TNS. So, accounting for $B$, relative profit performances would be at most $6/7 = 86\%$ of reported values.
model, with respect to which it achieves a relative error in the order of 5%.

Table 3. Average relative error $\Delta_h$ for various heuristics and penalty levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heuristic</th>
<th>$b = 10$</th>
<th>$b = 15$</th>
<th>$b = 20$</th>
<th>$b = 30$</th>
<th>$b = 70$</th>
<th>$b = 125$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>static</td>
<td>26.75%</td>
<td>24.79%</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
<td>39.76%</td>
<td>42.04%</td>
<td>35.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r-static</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s-myopic</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>7.29%</td>
<td>11.51%</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
<td>9.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myopic</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>5.06%</td>
<td>4.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>67.72%</td>
<td>88.38%</td>
<td>92.18%</td>
<td>275.29%</td>
<td>512.06%</td>
<td>519.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second graph in Figure 1 displays the allocation of each heuristic at the beginning of a four period horizon, as a function of the target audience $N$, calculated by Monte Carlo simulation. The figure suggests the following allocation ordering: $x_{CEC} \leq x_{irrev} \leq x_{static} = x_{d-static} \leq x_{rev} \leq x_{myopic} = x_{s-myopic}$. Our numerical results suggest that this is consistent for all practical levels of $b$. We provide an intuitive argument for this. Because the irreversible policy can (only) increase initial allocation in the future, it is expected to set a lower initial allocation than the static one. Relative to the reversible regime, the static policy does not have the opportunity to decrease make-goods allocation over time, so it sets a lower first stage allocation (to avoid unrewarded over-performance). The myopic policies neglect the opportunity of correcting performance in future allocations, hence over-allocate relative to the optimal reversible policy. The CEC policy allocates by far the least amount of capacity, because it ignores the risk of audience uncertainty.

Our numerical investigations indicate that periodically resolving static and myopic policies, based on the simple static upfront allocation model (1), can provide a surprisingly good approximation for the complex dynamic make-goods optimization problem. In addition, simple static policies provide good approximations for irreversible regimes. Incidentally, myopic policies have also been noted to perform well for certain random yield models (see e.g. Sepheri et al. 1986, Bollapragada and Morton 1999), but this is not a robust result, particularly for periodic review (see e.g. Rajaram and Karmakar (2002)).

We conclude that ignoring audience uncertainty for make-goods allocation can lead to relatively poor performance (e.g. the CEC policy), compared to simple policies that use audience uncertainty information (r-static and myopic). This underlines the importance of considering audience uncertainty in the dynamic make goods allocation problem, which is currently not the case in practice.
7. Conclusions

This paper focuses on capacity planning decisions across upfront and scatter markets in the presence of audience uncertainty. We propose stylized models that take into account important elements of the media revenue management problem and provide insights for operational decisions. From a modeling standpoint, an important contribution is that we specifically account for prior uncertainty about audience ratings. We also specifically model the trade-off between spot and upfront allocation to multiple clients.

Our results provide insight into how much capacity should be planned for upfront vs. scatter markets when ratings are uncertain. We also make recommendations for dynamic make-goods allocation during the broadcasting season. Our results suggest the following procedure for upfront client contracting, capacity planning and make-goods allocation:

1. Serve clients in decreasing CPM order; plan capacity requirements for upfront clients in proportion to requested audience (total capacity requirement for the upfront market can be estimated using model (A)).

2. Allocate minimal initial capacity to clients upfront (gapping);

3. Obtain total make-goods allocation by solving the (one-dimensional state) dynamic programming Problem (11) (or e.g. a r-static or myopic heuristic) with aggregate target performance; its value function represents the expected year-end profit (net of client budgets).

4. Allocate make-goods to clients in proportion to their remaining performance targets, i.e. by balancing GRP allocation.

Given that current industry practice is to make such decisions qualitatively, this procedure can provide insights for capacity planning. In particular, the aggregation results have the potential to facilitate a centralized decision process.

We also provide structural results characterizing sensitivity of profits and capacity allocation to model parameters. Our analytical and numeric results suggest that models based on deterministic audience have a tendency to underestimate the capacity allocation required to hedge against audience uncertainty. In addition, while it is expected that more popular shows would require lower capacity allocation to satisfy a certain demand, this is not always the case (it depends on the nature of audience uncertainty). Our numerical assessment of
various heuristics for make-goods allocation confirm the importance of modeling uncertainty in the media planning task. Specifically, periodically resolving static and myopic policies, which account for audience uncertainty, significantly outperforms policies based on deterministic audience approximations.

Our models can also be useful in other settings where the value of supply is uncertain, and/or the firm serves dual markets. For instance, in manufacturing with random yield, a firm with limited resources and uncertain production rate (e.g. machine or workforce reliability) honors both key accounts with long term contracts and small clients with opportunistic contracts (alternatively, our scatter market opportunity cost corresponds to direct production cost). Similarly, non-profit organizations (NPO) afford to sustain pro bono service to a mission market by often offering similar paid services to distinct markets, that share the same limited facilities (e.g. hospitals) powered by uncertain resources (e.g. volunteers). Here, the mission market corresponds to our upfront market and the paying market to our scatter market. de Vericourt and Lobo (2008) investigate revenue management for NPOs.

There are multiple facets of the media revenue management problem that this paper leaves to be explored, including strategic decisions, such as pricing and contract design, as well as tactical scheduling and client-to-show matching. The latter have been studied in the literature using deterministic combinatorial models (Bollapragada et al. 2002, Bollapragada and Garbiras 2004, Zhang 2006, Kimms and Müller-Bungart 2007). An interesting question for future research is to characterize the optimal allocation across multiple shows, with heterogeneous audience uncertainty, especially in a dynamic setting. This involves solving a multi-period stochastic portfolio-type problem. Banciu et al. (2007) investigate bundle pricing strategies for TV ads on the scatter market. Contract design is an interesting area, where the industry is quite sophisticated, managing a variety of flexible products, such as option-cutbacks (revised planning due to client’s budget cuts) or callable products (lower rates with the option of recalling the slot for a higher paying customer). The latter, and their value for standard B2C revenue management are investigated in Gallego et al. (2008).

Finally, it is an irreversible fact that audience is moving online, where capacity is more complex, dynamic and customizable, leading to different contractual terms (e.g. pay per click vs CPM – pay per view). Araman and Fridgeirsdottir (2008) investigate a queuing model for online advertising revenue management.
Acknowledgments

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Appendix (Proofs)

Proof of Proposition 2 (Audience sensitivity)

(a) The first order condition (4) can be restated as $bG_{\xi(z)}(N/x)/\mu(z) - p(z)/\mu(z) = 0$. The assumptions imply that the left hand side is decreasing in $z$, hence so is $x^*(z)$.

(b) Proposition 1 suggests that the optimal (unconstrained) allocation solves:

$$G(N/x, z) = p(z)/b,$$

where $G(N/x, z) = \mathbb{E}[\xi(z)I(\xi(z) \leq N/x)] = \int_{0}^{N/x} yf(y, z)dy$. (13)

Here $f(y, z) = f_0(y - \mu(z))$ denotes the density function of $\xi(z)$. This is decreasing in $z$ for $y \leq \mu(z)$, because $f_0$ is unimodal with non-negative mode. Thus, $G(N/x, z)$ is decreasing in $z$ for $x \geq N/\mu(z)$.

The condition on $b$ implies $x^*(z) > N/\mu(z)$. Monotonicity of $x^*(z)$ follows because $p(z)$ is increasing in $z$ and $G(N/x, z)$ is decreasing $x$, and decreasing in $z$ for $x \geq N/\mu(z)$.

(c) Recall that $\xi_1 \preceq_{lr} \xi_2$ if and only if the ratio of the corresponding densities $\frac{f_2(u)}{f_1(u)}$ is increasing in $u$. The density of $\zeta$ is $h(u) = u/\mu f(u)$, where $f$ is the density of $\xi$ (see e.g. the proof of Remark 1). Therefore $\xi_1 \preceq_{lr} \xi_2$ if and only $\zeta_1 \preceq_{lr} \zeta_2$. Because $\xi(z)$ is stochastically increasing in $z$ in $lr$-order, it follows that $\zeta(z)$ is also increasing in $z$ in $lr$-order, and hence in first order. The latter, together with $\mathbb{P}(\theta(z) \geq x) = \mathbb{P}(\zeta(z) \leq N/x)$ (again by the proof of Remark 1), implies that $\theta(z)$ is decreasing in $z$ in first order dominance. Therefore, by (5), the critical fractile solution, $x^*(z)$, is decreasing in $z$.

(d) The result follows from part (c) because, for all the distributions listed in the proposition, the order of parameters that characterizes first order dominance also induces likelihood ratio ordering (see e.g. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Müller and Stoyan, 2002, pages 62-63).
Proof of Proposition 3 (Multi-stage planning)

The proof relies on the following lemma (Müller and Stoyan 2002, Theorem 8.2.3):

**Lemma 3** Suppose that \( u \) is a decreasing convex function and \( \omega_i \) are exchangeable. The optimal solution \( y^* \in \mathbb{R}^k \) to the problem \( \min_{\mathbf{y}, q, y \geq 0} \mathbb{E}(u(\mathbf{y}', \omega)) \) satisfies \( y^*_i = q/k \) for all \( i \).

Problem (\( CT \)) can be written as

\[
\min_{0 \leq x_i \leq Q} p'x + b\mathbb{E}[N - x'\xi]^+ = \min_{0 \leq q \leq kQ} pq + bZ(q),
\]

where 

\[
Z(q) = \min_{0 \leq x \leq Q} \mathbb{E}[N - x'\xi]^+ \tag{15}
\]

By Lemma 3, the optimal solution of Problem (15) without the capacity constraints \( x_i \leq Q \) is \( x^*_i(q) = q/k, \ i = 1, \ldots, k \). For \( q \leq kQ \), \( x^*_i(q) = q/k \leq Q \), so this solution is feasible, hence also optimal for Problem (15) with capacity constraints. Therefore, Problem (14) becomes:

\[
\min_{0 \leq q \leq kQ} pq + b\mathbb{E}[N - (q/k) \sum_{i=1}^k \xi_i]^+.
\]  

This is precisely Problem (1) with target \( N \), audience distribution \( \xi = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^k \xi_i}{k} \) and capacity \( kQ \). Letting \( q^* \) denote its optimal solution, the optimal allocations in the original problem (\( CT \)) must equal \( x^*_i(q^*) = q^*/k, \ i = 1, \ldots, k \), which proves the desired result.

Proof of Proposition 4 (Upfront planning aggregation)

For any feasible multi-client allocation \( \mathbf{X} = (X_1, \ldots, X_k) \), the corresponding aggregate allocation \( X = \sum_{i=1}^k X_i \) is feasible for model (\( A \)), and the corresponding penalty cost can not be higher in the aggregate model (because of pooling effects \( \sum a_i^+ \geq (\sum a_i)^+ \)). Hence,

\[
r^*_M(N) = \max_{x_i \geq 0, \sum X_i \leq Q} \pi(\sum_{i=1}^k X_i) - b\sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}[N_i - X_i\xi]^+ \leq \max_{0 \leq x \leq Q} \pi(x) - b\mathbb{E}[N - x\xi]^+ = r^*(N).
\]  

Consider now the optimal solution \( x^* \) of the aggregate Problem (\( A \)), and define \( X_i^* = N_i x^*/N, \ i = 1, \ldots, k \). This is feasible to Problem (\( M \)), and satisfies \( \sum_i X_i^* = x^* \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}[N_i - X_i^*\xi]^+ = \mathbb{E}[N - x^*\xi]^+ \). So \( x^* \) achieves the same profit as the optimal aggregate model profit \( r^*(N) \), so it is optimal for model (\( M \)) (and unique by concavity of the objective). Moreover, the optimal profits of the multi-client and aggregate problems are equal.
Proof of Lemma 2

The terminal value function $J_T$ is decreasing and concave in $N_T$. Together with concavity of $\pi_t$, this implies that $V_{T-1}$ is jointly concave and has increasing differences. By induction we obtain that $V_t$ is jointly concave and has increasing differences in $(x, N)$ and $J_t$ is decreasing concave in $N_t$ implying (a) and (b).

Parts (c) and (d) follow by writing $V_{t-1}(x, N) - V_t(x, N) = \mathbb{E}[J_t(N-x\xi) - J_{t+1}(N-x\xi)]$. Concavity (hence decreasing differences) of $J_{t+1}$ implies that, for any realization $z$ of $\xi$, the function inside the expectation below is increasing in $(N, -x)$:

$$\max_{x_0 \leq y \leq Q} \pi(y) + \mathbb{E}[J_{t+1}(N-xz-y\xi) - J_{t+1}(N-xz)].$$

Preliminary Technical Lemmas for Section 5.2

We next present two general technical lemmas that are used to prove the results in this section. The generality of the presentation allows to easily extend the proofs for general performance metrics $\Psi(x, \xi)$, validating the claims made in the Introduction. Specifically, the proof for $\Psi(x, \xi)$ uses Lemma 4 b) and c), and the induction in Proposition 7 should be conducted simultaneously for all increasing concave functions $\Psi(x, \xi)$, in order to achieve the last step of the proof.

Lemma 4

(a) $f$ concave implies $g(x, y) = f(x + y)$ is concave and has decreasing differences.

(b) $f$ concave and $h$ increasing implies $g(x, y) = f(h(x) + y)$ has decreasing differences.

(c) $f$ increasing concave and $h$ concave implies $g(x, y) = f(h(x) + y)$ joint concave.

(d) If $f(x, y)$ has decreasing differences in $(x, y)$ and is concave in $y$ and $h(x)$ is increasing then $g(x, y) = f(x, h(x) + y)$ has decreasing differences in $(x, y)$.

The proof follows from the definitions. Analogous conditions for increasing differences obtain from the fact that $g(x, y)$ has increasing differences if and only if $g(-x, y)$ has decreasing differences if and only if $g(x, -y)$ has decreasing differences.

Lemma 5

(a) The function $g(x) = \max_{y \in S_x} f(x, y)$ is decreasing in $x$ if $f(x, y)$ is decreasing in $x$ and $S_{x'} \subseteq S_x$ for all $x \leq x'$.

(b) The function $g(x) = \max_{y \in S_x} f(x, y)$ is concave in $x$ if $f(x, y)$ is jointly concave in $(x, y)$ and the set $\{(x, y); y \in S_x\}$ is convex.
(c) The function \( g(x, y) = \max_{v \in [x, Q]} f(v, y) \) has decreasing (increasing) differences in \((x, y)\) if \( f(v, y) \) has decreasing (increasing) differences in \((v, y)\).

The proof of the first part is trivial. The second and third parts follow directly from Porteus (2002), Theorem A.4 and Theorem 8.2, respectively.

The next result extends Lemma 2 under irreversible commitment.

**Lemma 6 (Value function properties)** (a) \( J_t \) is decreasing in \( N_t \) and in \( x_t \); (b) \( J_t \) is jointly concave in \((x_t, N_t)\); (c) \( J_t \) has increasing differences in \((x_t, N_t)\) and \( V_t \) has increasing differences in \((x_{t+1}, N_t)\); (d) \( V_t(x, N) \) and \( J_t(x, N) \) have increasing differences in \((x, t)\).

**Proof:** (a) Monotonicity is easily proved by induction and Lemma 5 (a). The base case is trivial, transitions are linear and the profit per stage is state-independent.

(b) We show by backward induction that \( J_t \) is jointly concave in \((x_t, N_t)\). The base case is satisfied because \( J_T(x, N_T) = -bN_T^+ \) is (jointly) concave. Suppose \( J_{t+1} \) is jointly concave, so \( J_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, N_t - \xi x_{t+1}) \) is jointly concave in \((x_{t+1}, N_t)\), hence so is \( V_t(x_{t+1}, N_t) \). By Lemma 5 (b), \( J_t \) is jointly concave in \((x_t, N_t)\).

(c) We prove both statements in parallel by induction. The base case is trivial. Because \( J_{t+1} \) has increasing differences, by Lemma 4 (d), we obtain that \( EJ_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, N_t - \xi x_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \) has increasing differences in \((x_{t+1}, N_t)\), hence the same holds for \( V_t \). Finally, increasing differences and concavity of \( V_t \) implies increasing differences of \( J_t \) by Lemma 5 (c).

(d) The result follows independently from the proof of Proposition 7 below.

**Proof of Proposition 7**

The optimal allocation policy is \( x_t^* = x_t^*(x, N) = \arg\max_{x_t \in [x, Q]} V_{t-1}(x, N) \), which can be obtained by projecting the unconstrained optimum \( \bar{x}_t(N) = \arg\max_y V_{t-1}(y, N) \), on the interval \([x, Q]\). This shows the second part of the statement.

Monotonicity of the optimal policy in \( N \) and \( x \) follows from Lemma 6 (c) together with Topkis' Lemma. It remains to show monotonicity with time. We show by backwards induction the following three statements in parallel:

- **[J-t]** \( J_t(x, N - xz) - J_{t+1}(x, N - xz) \) decreasing in \( x \) for all \( N, z \geq 0 \).
- **[V-t]** \( V_{t-1}(x, N) - V_t(x, N) \) is decreasing in \( x \) for all \( N \geq 0 \).
- **[x-t]** \( x_t^*(x, N) \leq x_{t+1}^*(x, N) \) for all \( N, x \geq 0 \).

The base case \([J-(T-1)]\) is obviously true. The following is true for all \( t \):
The following function (inside the expectation in (19)) is decreasing in $x$ because $V_{t-1}(x, N) - V_t(x, N) = \mathbb{E}[J_t(x, N - x \xi) - J_{t+1}(x, N - x \xi)]$. Therefore $x$ is decreasing in $x$. Indeed, by Lemma 6, the first difference is decreasing in $x$.

Depending if it is optimal to allocate additional make goods at time $t + 1$, we obtain:

$$J_t(x, N - xz) = \begin{cases} J_t(0, N - xz), & \text{if } x_{t+1}^*(x, N - xz) > x \quad \text{(case 1)} \\ V_t(x, N - xz), & \text{if } x_{t+1}^*(x, N - xz) = x \quad \text{(case 2)}. \end{cases}$$

Case 1: To show that $j(x)$ is decreasing in $x$, by Lemma 5 a), it is enough to show that the following function (inside the expectation in (19)) is decreasing in $x$ for all $y, z, v \geq 0$:

$$g(x) = J_t(y, N - xz - yv) - J_t(x, N - xz) = J_t(y, N - xz - yv) - J_t(0, N - xz)$$

$$= [J_t(y, N - xz - yv) - J_t(y, N - xz)] + [J_t(y, N - xz) - J_t(0, N - xz)].$$

Indeed, by Lemma 6, the first difference is decreasing in $x$ by concavity of $J_t$ in the second argument, and the second difference is decreasing in $x$ by increasing differences of $J_t$.

Case 2: We have $x \leq x_t^*(x, N - xz) \leq x_{t+1}^*(x, N - xz) = x$, by the induction hypothesis [x-t]. Therefore $x_t^*(x, N - xz) = x$. This together with (20) allows to rewrite (18) as

$$j(x) = V_{t-1}(x, N - xz) - V_t(x, N - xz) = \mathbb{E}[J_t(x, N - xz - x \xi) - J_{t+1}(x, N - xz - x \xi)].$$

The right hand side is decreasing in $x$ because the function inside the expectation $J_t(x, N - x(z + v)) - J_{t+1}(x, N - x(z + v))$ is so for any $z, v \geq 0$, by [J-t]. This concludes the proof.

**Multi Client Make-goods Aggregation**

The dynamic multi-client make-goods allocation problem can be formulated as:

$$J_t^M(N_t) = \max_{x_0 \leq x_1 \leq \ldots \leq x_T} V_t^M(x_t, N_t)$$

where

$$V_t^M(x_t, N_t) = \pi(1'x_t) + \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}^M(N_t - \xi x_t)$$

and

$$J_t^M(N_T) = -b1'N_T^+,$$

where $1$ is the vector of ones, and $x_0, x_t, N_t$ are vectors denoting, for each client, the initial irreversible allocation, the total allocation at time $t$, and the remaining target at time $t$, respectively. Our next result shows that model (22) reduces to solving the corresponding aggregate model (11), resulting in a dynamic program with a one-dimensional state variable.
Proposition 8 The dynamic-make-goods multi-client allocation Problem (22) is equivalent to the corresponding aggregate Problem (11) with target performance $N_t = 1'N^+_t$, in that: (1) the value functions of the two problems are equal, $J^M_t(N_t) = J_t(N_t)$, and (2) the total optimal make-goods allocation under model (22) equals the optimal make-goods allocation under model (11), $1'x^*_t = x^*_t$. Furthermore, in each period, make-goods $x^*_t$ are optimally allocated to clients in proportion to their remaining performance targets $N^+_t$, i.e. by balancing GRP allocation. The results extend for irreversible allocation.

Proof: The proof is by induction. The base case is given by Proposition 4, so, in particular, $x$ defined by $x/N = X^*/N$ is optimal to the multi-client model, and $J^M_{T-1}(N) = J_{T-1}(N)$.

Now, assuming the result is true for $t+1$, we show that it also holds for $t$. Assume wlog that $N \geq 0$; otherwise replace $N$ by its positive part, because $J^M_t(N) = J^M_t(N^+)$. For $X = 1'x$ we have:

$$V^M_t(x, N) = \pi(1'x) + \mathbb{E}J^M_{t+1}((N - \xi x)^+)$$

$$= \pi(X) + \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}(1'(N - \xi x)^+) \quad \text{(induction step)}$$

$$\leq \pi(X) + \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}((N - \xi X)^+) \quad \text{(monotonicity of } J_t)$$

(23)

Therefore,

$$J^M_t(N) = \max_{0 \leq x \leq Q} V^M_t(x, N)$$

$$= \max_{0 \leq X \leq Q} \pi(X) + \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}(1'(N - \xi X)^+)$$

$$\leq \max_{0 \leq X \leq Q} \pi(X) + \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}((N - \xi X)^+)$$

$$= J_t(N).$$

(24)

Consider the optimal allocation $X^*$ that optimizes $J_t(N)$ above, and let $x$ so that $x_i/N_i = X^*/N$, for all $i$ with $N_i > 0$. This is feasible and achieves (24) with equality, hence it is an optimal solution to the multi-client model, and the two value functions are equal. This concludes the proof of the reversible case.

The aggregation result for irreversible allocation follows the same lines as the reversible allocation case. The only additional condition to verify is feasibility of the multi-client solution provided by the equal GRP rule. We need to show that the lower bounds imposed by the irreversible allocation are satisfied. In a balanced GRP solution, $X^*_t = X^*_j$ for $N^+_t, N^+_j > 0$, so $X^*_i / N^+_i - zX^*_i = X^*_j / N^+_j - zX^*_j$, for any realization $z \geq 0$ of $\xi$, implying $X^*_i / X^*_j = N^+_{t+1} / N^+_{j+1} = X^*_{t+1} / X^*_{j+1}$. This shows that allocation increases proportionally over time for each unsatisfied client, so the irreversibility constraints are met. Hence the multi-client problem reduces to the aggregate case under irreversible commitment. ■
References


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