CITATION ANALYSIS

Below is a list of cites to my papers by published or forthcoming articles and books. The list does not include cites by working papers, unless they are forthcoming. The list was compiled using Web of Science, Google, and Google Scholar.

The number of citations, **104 (95 net of self-citations)**, is higher than the corresponding number in the Web of Science database, for various reasons: The Web of Science database does not include cites by forthcoming articles or books, for some journals the database is only updated once a year, and other journals are not included to begin with.

Note: The corresponding number of citations in the Web of Science database is 54. Cites to my publications and working papers with Panunzi, Philippon, and Wärneryd can be found by searching under MU*LLER H* (to account for spelling errors). Cites to my working papers and working paper versions of published papers with Inderst can be found by searching under INDER* R*. It sometimes requires a bit of work to determine whether a working paper listed under INDER* R* is also a joint paper with MU*LLER H*, for the citation might not show the title of the paper or an old title. In this case, clicking on the box next to the citation and hitting the “Finish Search” button may help. If the citation includes an NBER or CEPR working paper number, then going directly to the NBER or CEPR website is often the best way.

Many of my published papers had more than one title during the various stages of their (working paper) lives, and finding all of the citations below requires searching under all of the different titles. In the list below, old working paper titles are listed as “a.k.a.”

**Concentrated Ownership and Labor Relations, 2006, mimeo, NYU**


**CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia, 2006, mimeo, NYU**

a.k.a. Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment
a.k.a. Incentives for CEOs to Exit


**Specific Human Capital and Broad-Based Incentive Pay, 2006, mimeo, NYU**

a.k.a. Benefits of Broad-Based Option Pay
a.k.a A Theory of Broad-Based Option Pay


a.k.a. Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design


**Distributional Conflict in Organizations, forthcoming, European Economic Review**

*Influence Costs and Hierarchy, 2005, Economics of Governance*
The paper was initially titled “Influence Costs and Hierarchy,” before it was split into two papers.


[21] Inderst, R., H.M. Mueller, and K. Wärneryd, 2005, Influence costs and hierarchy, Economics of Governance 6, 177-197 (citing “Distributional Conflict in Organizations”)


**Tender Offers and Leverage, 2004, Quarterly Journal of Economics**


a.k.a. Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure
a.k.a. Competition and Efficiency in the Market for Venture Capital


a.k.a. Corporate Borrowing and Financing Constraints
a.k.a. Project Bundling, Liquidity Spillovers, and Capital Market Discipline


a.k.a. Why Peaches Must Circulate Longer than Lemons

[74] Inderst, R., 2005, Competitive search markets with heterogeneous workers, European Economic Review 49, 1525-2542


[81] Castillo, R., and S. Skaperdas, 2005, All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure, Economics of Governance 6, 93-164


[89] Skaperdas, S., 2003, Restraining the genuine homo economicus: Why the economy cannot be divorced from its governance, Economics and Politics 15, 135-162


Asymptotic Efficiency in Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems, 2000, Journal of Economic Theory
a.k.a. Randomization in Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems


Sung, J., 2005, Optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard: A continuous-time approach, Review of Financial Studies 18, 1021-1073


Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt, 1999, mimeo, University of Mannheim


Sung, J., 2005, Optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard: A continuous-time approach, Review of Financial Studies 18, 1021-1073


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