What capital allocation role can China’s stock market play? Counter to perception, stock prices in China have become as informative about future profits as they are in the US. This rise in stock price informativeness has coincided with an increase in investment efficiency among privately owned firms, suggesting the market is aggregating information and providing useful signals to managers. However, price informativeness and investment efficiency for state-owned enterprises fell below that of privately owned firms after the postcrisis stimulus, perhaps reflecting unpredictable subsidies and state-directed investment policy. Finally, evidence from realized returns suggests Chinese firms face a higher cost of equity capital than US firms.

We develop an empirical model of employee stock option exercise that is suitable for valuation and allows for behavioral channels. We estimate exercise rates as functions of option, stock, and employee characteristics using all employee exercises at 88 public firms, 27 of them in the S&P 500. Increasing vesting frequency from annual to monthly reduces option value by 11% to 16%. Men exercise faster, reducing value by 2% to 4%, while top employees exercise slower, increasing value by 2% to 7%. Finally, we develop an analytic valuation approximation that is more accurate than methods used in practice.

The rise of China and fivefold growth of its stock market over the past decade have fueled a growing literature on this market in financial economics. On the corporate side, researchers have evaluated the progress of China's stages of privatization, analyzed biases in the selection of firms for listing, and documented massive underpricing of initial public offerings. On the asset pricing side, researchers have studied the price premium of domestic A shares over their foreign-share counterparts, analyzed the firm-specific information content of prices, provided new evidence on informational and behavioral effects in prices, and begun to identify systematic cross-sectional patterns in returns. Numerous areas are ripe for future research as China's stock market continues to grow in global influence and as ongoing reform provides new natural experiments. Challenges for the field will be to gain familiarity with China's distinctive financial system and to avoid overapplying research paradigms developed for the US setting.

This paper conducts a comprehensive study of the optimal exercise policy for an executive stock option and its implications for option cost, average life, and alternative valuation concepts. The paper is the first to provide analytical results for an executive with general concave utility. Wealthier or less risk-averse executives exercise later and create greater option cost. However, option cost can decline with volatility. We show when there exists a single exercise boundary, yet demonstrate the possibility of a split continuation region. We also show that, for constant relative risk averse utility, the option value does not converge to the Black and Scholes value as the correlation between the stock and the market portfolio converges to one. We compare our model’s option cost with the modified Black and Scholes approximation typically used in practice and show that the approximation error can be large or small, positive or negative, depending on firm characteristics.

In this paper we analyze the optimal contract for a portfolio manager who can exert effort to improve the quality of a private signal about future market prices. We assume complete markets over states distinguished by asset payoffs and place no restrictions on the form of the contract. We show that trading restrictions are essential because they prevent the manager from undoing the incentive effects of performance-based fees. We provide conditions under which simple benchmarking emerges as optimal compensation. Additional incentives to take risk are necessary when information can be manipulated or else the manager will understate information to offset the benchmarking. (JEL D82, G11)

This paper analyzes corporate bond valuation and optimal call and default rules when interest rates and firm value are stochastic. It then uses the results to explain the dynamics of hedging. Bankruptcy rules are important determinants of corporate bond sensitivity to interest rates and firm value. Although endogenous and exogenous bankruptcy models can be calibrated to produce the same prices, they can have very different hedging implications. We show that empirical results on the relation between corporate spreads and Treasury rates provide evidence on duration, and we find that the endgenous model explains the empirical patterns better than do typical exogenous models.

This article provides a comprehensive study of survivorship issues using the mutual fund data of Carhart (1997). We demonstrate theoretically that when survival depends on multiperiod performance, the survivorship bias in average performance typically increases with the sample length. This is empirically relevant because evidence suggests a multi-year survival rule for U.S. mutual funds. In the data we find the annual bias increases from 0.07% for 1-year samples to 1% for samples longer than 15 years. We find that survivor conditioning weakens evidence of performance persistence. Finally, we explain how survivor conditioning affects the relation between performance and fund characteristics.

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This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager’s optimal policy, the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to infinity. However, the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking. Sometimes, the manager’s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account. Furthermore, giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility.

We simulate standard tests of performance persistence using alternative return-generating processes, survival criteria, and test methodologies. When survival depends on performance over several periods, survivorship bias induces spurious reversals, despite the presence of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in performance. Look-ahead biased methodologies and missing final returns typical of U.S. mutual fund datasets can also materially affect persistence measures. Our results reinforce previous findings that U.S. mutual fund performance is truly persistent. When fund performance is truly persistent, fund attrition affects persistence measures, even when the sample includes all nonsurvivor returns. We also examine the specification and power of the various persistence tests.

In theory, hedging restrictions faced by managers make executive stock options more difficult to value than ordinary options, because they imply that exercise policies of managers depend on their preferences and endowments. Using data on option exercises from 40 firms, this paper shows that a simple extension of the ordinary American option model which introduces random, exogenous exercise and forfeiture predicts actual exercise times and payoffs just as well as an elaborate utility-maximizing model that explicitly accounts for the nontransferability of options. The simpler model could therefore be more useful than the preference-based model for valuing executive options in practice.

Although the Financial Accounting Standards Board has been developing standards for reporting and disclosing derivatives activity for many years, current guidelines are still neither comprehensive nor widely accepted. With regard to recognition of profit or loss from these instruments, the difficulty arises from the fact that some balance sheet items are marked to market, while others are measured at cost. This means that offsetting gains and losses in hedging relationships may be recognized in different reporting periods. Both existing and newly proposed accounting rules address this problem by allowing firms to defer certain derivatives gains and losses until offsetting gains and losses are realized.The problem remains that, because hedging relationships are often complex and dynamic, this approach can be effective only if firms have flexibility in deciding which gains and losses to defer. Yet that very flexibility makes financial statements difficult to interpret and creates the potential for income manipulation. One way to resolve this conflict would be to recognize all gains and losses as they occur, but this solution has always generated controversy. Is it too costly, or just too radical?The problem with regard to disclosure is that the important information about derivatives positions is often not their size and market value, but rather their impact on the probability distribution of future earnings, an aspect that is beyond the scope of traditional accounting. Rulemakers defend the lack of requirements for quantitative risk disclosure by citing the cost of obtaining relevant risk measures and a lack of agreement about them. Yet many derivatives dealers estimate and track quantitative measures of risk on a daily basis. If corporate managers are unable to quantify the risks associated with their derivatives positions, is it prudent for them to expose shareholders to those risks?