The Real Value of China’s Stock Market*

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Abstract

China is the world’s largest investor and greatest contributor to global economic growth by wide margins. The efficiency of its financial system in allocating capital to investment will be important to sustain this growth. This paper shows that China’s stock market has a crucial role to play. Since the reforms of the last decade, China’s stock market has become as informative about future corporate profits as in the US. Moreover, though it is a closed market, Chinese investors price risk and other stock characteristics remarkably like investors in other large economies. They pay up for large stocks, growth stocks, and long shots, and they discount for illiquidity and market risk. China’s stock market no longer deserves its reputation as a casino. In addition, the trend of stock price informativeness over the last two decades is highly correlated with that of corporate investment efficiency. China’s stock market appears to be aggregating diffuse information and generating useful signals for managers. Finally, because of its low correlation with other stock markets and high average returns, China’s stock market offers high alpha to diversified global investors who can access it. Yet this high alpha amounts to an inflated cost of equity capital, constraining the investment of China’s smaller, more profitable enterprises. Further reforms that open this market to global investors and improve stock price informativeness will be important to increase China’s investment efficiency and fuel its continued economic growth.
China became the world’s largest investor in 2010 and has held the leading position ever since. In 2013, China made $4.4 trillion of total fixed-asset investment, compared with $3.1 trillion in the US and $1.2 trillion in Japan. China has also been the greatest contributor to global growth since 2006, contributing $0.7 trillion to the increase in global GDP in 2013, compared with $0.5 trillion from the US and $0.1 trillion from Russia. Adjusted for purchasing power, China’s investment and contribution to growth are almost twice as large. The efficiency of China’s financial system in allocating capital across investment opportunities will be an important determinant of global economic growth in the coming decades. This paper presents evidence indicating that China’s stock market has a crucial role to play.

Though it has become one of the largest in the world, with a market capitalization of $3.7 trillion in 2013, China’s stock market is still a sideshow in a financial system dominated by a massive state-controlled banking sector. After a rocky first decade from 1990 to 2000, China’s stock market earned a reputation as a casino manipulated by speculators and insiders. More recently, China’s post-crisis stock market recovery has lagged those of other large economies, as its rapidly expanding shadow banking sector, issuing new high-yielding but implicitly guaranteed wealth-management products to finance both market-driven and centrally planned investment, has pulled in financial capital and raised required equity returns.

This paper presents evidence that overturns two widely held perceptions about China’s stock market and suggests that China would do well to open this market to international investors and let it pick winners, too. First, we show that China’s stock market no longer deserves its reputation as a casino. On the contrary, over the last decade, the informativeness of stock prices about future corporate earnings has increased steadily, reaching levels that compare favorably with those in the US. Moreover, although China’s financial market is largely inaccessible to foreign investors, the cross-sectional pattern of its stock returns is strikingly similar to that in global equity markets. Like global investors, Chinese investors pay up for large stocks, growth stocks, and long shots, and discount for illiquidity and market risk. In addition, the trend of stock price informativeness in China over the last two decades is highly correlated with the efficiency of its corporate investment. Stock prices in China have become strongly linked with firm fundamentals and appear to play an important role in aggregating diffuse information and generating useful signals for managers.

Second, although the buy-and-hold return earned by undiversified domestic investors in China’s stock market is depressed by the market’s extremely high volatility, the market offers very attractive returns to diversified international investors who can access them. Unlike stock returns in integrated financial markets, stock returns in China exhibit very low
correlation with those in other large economies. At the same time, the average monthly excess return on China’s stock market is twice that in the US. As a result, China offers high alpha with respect to global risk factors to international investors who can access it.

However, this high alpha to potential international investors amounts to an inflated cost of equity capital for China’s firms, constraining the investment of its smaller and more profitable enterprises. In addition, the high volatility of China’s stock market represents high systematic risk to Chinese investors who cannot diversify it. Both of these problems would be mitigated by opening financial capital flows between China and the global investment community. Regulatory reforms over the last decade, such as the unlock of state-owned shares, the introduction of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program, and rules that have strengthened minority shareholder protection, dividend policy, and disclosure, have done much to improve the functioning of China’s stock market. But further reforms that liberalize capital flows and improve stock price informativeness will be important to increase China’s investment efficiency and fuel its continued economic growth.

A large literature in economics, finance, and accounting going back to Hayek (1945) and Fama (1970) links good legal and market institutions, informativeness of stock prices about future profits, and efficiency of corporate investment and economic growth. Relative to other components of the financial system, such as banks, stock markets can improve the efficiency of capital allocation by creating stronger incentives for information generation and by aggregating that information across a broader set of market participants. In addition, listing standards and auditing and disclosure processes for publicly traded firms provide transparency. Stock markets also channel tradable equity capital to firms, lowering the cost of equity capital, and enriching the portfolio choice of investors. Relative to other financing channels, stock markets can also be the preferred access point for foreign portfolio investors because of the relative transparency and liquidity of traded equities. Finally, because of their role in generating information and transparency, stock markets can be important complements to the relationship-driven, custom-tailored, but often opaque banking and shadow banking sectors.

China’s financial system is dominated by its state-controlled banking sector and expanding shadow banking sector. Total bank credit was 128% of GDP in 2012, according to Elliott and Yan (2013), and total credit in the shadow banking sector is reckoned to be as much as 90% of GDP, while China’s stock market capitalization is only 44% of GDP. By contrast, US bank credit and stock market capitalization were 48% and 118% of GDP in 2012. As in other socialist countries, the dominance of China’s banking sector within its larger financial system is rooted in its political economy. This sector is the key instrument of centrally planned investment policy.
The post-crisis expansion of China’s shadow banking sector is also partly by design. This sector has been crucial to implementing China’s massive post-crisis economic stimulus by quickly channeling large amounts of capital to new real estate and infrastructure projects in order to avert a recession, fuel real investment, and sustain economic growth. China’s shadow banking sector represents an important extension of its traditional banking sector, which leverages the reputation and relationship-based enforcement mechanisms that underlie some of China’s most effective financing channels. As Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) show, China is a counterexample to the findings of the law, institutions, growth, and finance literature such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000), and its alternative financing channels have been essential to its rapid growth. The shadow banking sector has also been a laboratory for China’s interest rate liberalization. Despite increasing concerns about the rapid growth of this sector and the bad loans and systemic risk it has created, China’s government has tolerated this growing sector as an incubator for more market-driven lending and expertise.

However, the implicit guarantee of the China’s shadow banking sector may be undermining the development of an equally important financing channel—China’s stock market. This paper argues that because of its unique ability to aggregate diffuse information, create transparency, and channel capital accordingly, this stock market has a crucial and complementary role to play alongside the state-controlled, relationship-based banking sector. We begin with an analysis of the informativeness of China’s stock market over the period 1996 to 2012, using data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Following Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013), we define the informativeness of the market as the cross-sectional variation in future earnings predicted by firm market value. Our results suggest that the informativeness of prices has steadily improved since the establishment of market reforms around the time of China’s entry into the WTO and compares favorably with that in the US. We relate the trends in the price informativeness of China’s stock market to China’s legal, market, and accounting regimes since 1996. We also analyze the stock price synchronicity measure introduced by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and show that cross-country comparisons must account for differences in overall market volatility in order to yield correct implications about stock price informativeness.

Next, we examine the efficiency of corporate investment in China over the same period. Adapting the approach of Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) to the Chinese setting, we define the efficiency of investment as the unexpected change in equity value associated with a unit of unexpected investment, measured in a cross-sectional regression. We find that the trend of investment efficiency closely follows that of price informativeness over our sample period, with an economically and statistically high correlation between the series. This strong positive
association between China’s stock price informativeness and corporate investment efficiency emphasizes the real economic value of China’s stock market and merits the attention of financial market reformers.

Having established the link between stock prices and future corporate profits, the paper turns to the study of stock returns in China. This analysis begins by characterizing the cross-section of Chinese stock returns and their correlation with stock returns in other large economies. In contrast to the high correlations in returns across open markets, returns in China’s stock market exhibit low correlation with those in stock markets in other large economies. Yet, despite China’s segmentation from other markets, the cross-sectional pattern of its stock returns is remarkably similar to that in the US and in other global equity markets. In this respect, China’s stock market seems to be as efficient as those of other large economies, yet again challenging the casino theory.

Finally, we analyze the overall performance of China’s stock market and uncover a number of striking new results. The much-publicized Shanghai Stock Exchange index earned China’s stock market a reputation for poor performance during the post-crisis period, particularly in terms of its buy-and-hold return for undiversified domestic Chinese investors, and this culminated in the closure of the market to IPOs in 2012. However, our analysis of the broader market, including stocks on the Shenzhen, SME, and ChiNext boards, suggests that China’s stock market has in fact done very well over our full sample period 1995-2012, and offers attractive returns and opportunities for diversification to international equity investors who can access it, such as those approved as QFIIs. In particular, we show that China’s stock market has had a high average monthly USD return, and a high alpha with respect to the US and global market, size, value, and momentum factors. However, this high alpha translates to a high cost of capital for China’s firms, re-emphasizing the importance of opening China’s stock market to the global investment community.

China’s stock market is still young, but our results suggest that it is already serving an important role. To sustain China’s continued contribution to global growth, further reforms that increase its stock market informativeness, liberalize its capital flows, and attract international capital will be important to reduce corporate China’s cost of equity capital, increase its investment efficiency, and support economic growth worldwide.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the history and unique features of China’s stock market. Section 2 analyzes the informativeness of stock prices in China and shows that it compares favorably with that in the US, particularly since the reforms of the last decade. Section 3 examines the efficiency of corporate investment in China and documents its high positive correlation with China’s stock price informativeness. Section 4 studies the cross-sectional pricing of China’s stocks and analyzes its overall market
performance, correlation with other markets, and opportunities for international investors.

1 Overview of China’s stock market

In contrast to the markets of developed countries, China’s stock market has a history of only 23 years. However, since its opening in 1991 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, it has become one of the most important enterprise financing channels in China. As a country, China has the second largest stock market by trading volume and the third largest by market capitalization, $3.7 trillion in 2013, after the US and Japan. Figure 1 shows that the number of stocks has risen from 53 in 1992 to 2538 in 2012. The main boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges list larger more mature stocks, like the NYSE in the US. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange also includes two other boards, the Small and Medium Enterprise Board and the ChiNext Board, also known as the Growth Enterprise Board, which provide capital for smaller and high-technology stocks, like the NASDAQ in the US.

China’s stock market has a number of distinctive features. First, it is a pure order-driven market, as opposed to a quote-driven market, whereas the US and several other countries have hybrid equity market systems. Second, it is a centralized market, whereas the US market is fragmented, with multiple exchanges, dark pools, and other off-exchange trading. This may have important implications for market informativeness. There are no dark pools with hidden orders in China, all orders are visible. Moreover, there is no extended trading period for institutional investors. Institutional and retail investors have equal access to information from a market microstructure point of view. In addition, China’s stock market has a daily price change limit of 10%, which is intended to reduce excess volatility and deter stock price manipulation.

China’s stock market has a dual-share system in which domestic investors can invest only in A shares, while foreign investors can invest only in B shares. In addition, many firms have H shares, traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. A number of articles, such as Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) and Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2009), study the price discount of B shares and H shares relative to A shares, a phenomenon that they attribute to information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors and speculative motives. With the introduction of programs such as the QFII program of 2002, which relaxed the cross-trading restrictions, B share issuance and trading have mostly vanished. In addition, China’s equity market used to have a large nontradable component, held by corporate founders, often central or local governments. With the share structure reform starting in 2005, this phenomenon has mostly disappeared among mid and small-cap stocks, though not entirely among large stocks.
In 2001, a famous Chinese economist, Wu Jinglian, characterized China’s stock market as a “casino” manipulated by speculators, misled by the central government’s visible hand to unfairly support state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and without a strong link to fundamentals. Moreover, much of the academic literature in finance on China has emphasized the market’s imperfections. However, our results suggest that this view is no longer correct. On the contrary, China’s stock market has become as effective as the US stock market at aggregating and impounding information about future profits into prices, and exhibits a cross-sectional return pattern surprisingly similar to those in developed markets, despite its segmented nature.

2 The informativeness of stock prices in China


A branch of the literature introduced by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) proposes stock price asynchronicity and idiosyncratic firm risk as measures of firm-specific information in prices. More recently, Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013) define price informativeness as the predicted variation in a cross-sectional regression of future corporate earnings on firm market values and study its trend in the US stock market. Subsection 2.1 examines the price informativeness of China’s stock market, shows that it is comparable to that in the US, and relates its trends to the regulatory regimes that prevailed during its history. Subsection 2.2 shows that the average idiosyncratic risk of China’s stocks is greater than that in the US and highlights the difficulties of comparing $R^2$’s across countries.

2.1 Price informativeness about future earnings

Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013) develop a model in which stock price informativeness
promotes efficient allocation of corporate investment and economic growth. They define price informativeness as the extent to which market valuations differentiate firms that will have high profits from those that will not. Empirically, they define price informativeness in a given year $t$ as the predicted variation, $a_t \times \sigma_t(\log(M/A))$, in the following cross-sectional regression of future earnings on current market equity value and lagged earnings, normalized by book asset value,

$$\frac{E_{i,t+k}}{A_{i,t}} = c_t + a_t \log(\frac{M_{i,t}}{A_{i,t}}) + b_t(\frac{E_{i,t}}{A_{i,t}}) + \varepsilon_{i,t+k},$$

with industry fixed effects to control for differences in discount rates. Their focus is on the trend of stock price informativeness in the US, which they find has not increased since 1960. We take this model to the data on earnings, equity market value, and asset book value from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database from 1996 to 2012. To filter out bad data, we eliminate observations with earnings greater than three times book asset value. A number of papers in the accounting literature document the low quality of auditing and reported earnings in China (DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999), Chen and Yuan (2004), Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008)). Such errors should bias our results against finding price informativeness.

Figure 2 plots the coefficients $a_t$ inside their 95% confidence bands, the predicted variation $a_t \times \sigma_t(\log(M/A))$, and the marginal $R^2$ of regression (1) for forecasting periods $k = 1, 2,$ and $3$, for each year $t = 1996$ to $2012 - k$.\footnote{The confidence bands use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. We also calculated standard errors clustered by industry, with qualitatively similar results.} Marginal $R^2$ is the increment in the $R^2$ of regression (1) created by adding $\log(\frac{M_{i,t}}{A_{i,t}})$ as a regressor. A comparison with evidence on US stock price informativeness in Figure 2 of Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013) shows that the average level of stock price informativeness in China over the period is similar to that in the US. However, four distinct periods are apparent, which we interpret in the context of the regulatory regimes that prevailed over the life of China’s stock market in Figure 3.

The first stage of the development of China’s stock market, a period of market opening and construction from 1991 to 1997, is characterized by the establishment of the exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen and the transition from a decentralized and disorganized stock market to a centralized modern market. During the first five years, the number of stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges grew from eight stocks to more than five hundred stocks. Many stocks moved from an OTC platform to Shanghai and Shenzhen’s electronic trading platform. In 1992, a direct electronic trading system was implemented, which increased liquidity in the equity market.
By 1996, over five hundred companies had stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges and Dow Jones began to publish the China, Shanghai 30, and Shenzhen indices, which attracted a significant following by equity analysts. In addition, these exchanges unified limit-order books and greatly reduced trading commissions, which also increased liquidity. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) show theoretically that increasing liquidity improves market efficiency and informativeness, which suggests that these developments contributed to the rise of informativeness in China’s stock market over this period. The adoption of a price change limit of 10% and a one-day minimum holding period in 1996 may also have deterred stock price manipulation, as suggested by Kim and Park (2010). In 1997, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) become the official regulator of China’s stock market. These policies shaped the market opening and construction period of China’s stock market and the prototype of an efficient capital allocation platform for China’s business and enterprises.

The second stage, from 1998 to 2001, is a period of rampant speculation and accounting fraud, flagrant stock price manipulation, and the birth of the casino theory. In 1998, prices of firms in Special Treatment for financial distress began to soar and the CSRC reported widespread market manipulation. Pump-and-dump schemes were also common during this period. The average PE ratio of China’s stocks surged to 70 by the end of 2000, suggesting that prices were deviating from fundamental value. This may be consistent with the theory in Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013) showing that undesirable coordination across speculators makes the market less informative, decreases real investment, and increases stock market volatility.

Accounting fraud was a major problem during this period as well. In early 2000, the first stock traded above 100 RMB, which was an important cognitive benchmark. This sparked an investigation by the CSRC, which revealed serious accounting fraud. Later that year several other major accounting scandals came to light. DeFond et al. (1999) argue that the fraudulent accounting stemmed from a unregulated and poorly supervised audit market. They suggest that the audit market in China was dominated by government-affiliated auditors, who tended to audit in favor of government-affiliated companies. They also report that auditors lost market share after they behaved more independently, implying that they may have had incentive not to report frauds in order to retain clients. At the end of 2000, Chinese financial economist Wu Jinglian proposed the famous casino theory, suggesting that China’s equity market failed to fulfill its capital allocation function, and merely provided a platform for insiders and speculators to profit illegally at the expense of retail investors and minority shareholders whose interests were unprotected.

The third stage, from 2001 to 2007, is a period of market reform. This stage is milestone...
by China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and marked by improvements in regulatory protection of minority shareholders, increases in accounting transparency and audit quality, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the increase of foreign investors’ direct investment in the A-share market. Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) show that stock price synchronicity in China significantly declined with the increase in foreign shareholding, audit quality, and the decrease of ownership concentration. At the end of year 2001, the CSRC enforced new and stricter delisting regulations to protect retail investor interests. In 2002, the CSRC ratified the QFII program, enabling qualified foreign institutional investors to invest in A shares directly. The first two foreign institutional investors were the Nomura and UBS open-end mutual funds. In 2004, the CSRC established the National Nine Rules to protect minority shareholder interests, deter stock price manipulation, and deter accounting and audit fraud.

In 2005, the CSRC introduced the split share structure reform to unlock nontradeable shares gradually and privatize them in a way that compensated the holders of tradeable shares. Our results in Figure 3 suggest that this expansion and diversification of the base of market participants was a key turning point in the informativeness of stock prices. Liao, Liu, and Wang (2011) and Li, Wang, Cheung, and Jiang (2011) also study this share unlock and the improvements in information discovery and risk sharing it enabled.

In 2006, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges introduced margin trading and short selling pilot programs, which expanded gradually in the subsequent years. In a study of 46 countries, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) find evidence that allowing short sales permits prices to incorporate negative information more quickly. More recently, Ljungqvist and Qian (2014) document a direct mechanism through which the possibility of short sales gives arbitrageurs an incentive to incorporate negative information into prices. The combination of regulatory reforms, capital market development, improving accounting and auditing quality, and foreign investors’ direct participation in the market may all have helped to boost price informativeness in China’s stock market during this period.

The fourth and last stage, from 2008, is the financial crisis period, during which price informativeness declined somewhat. The crisis could have depressed realized price informativeness for at least two reasons, one, because it precipitated extreme realizations from the distribution of earnings, and two, because it lead to some dislocation and mistrust of capital markets, which did in fact undermine the informativeness of prices. Nevertheless, price informativeness has remained relatively high and comparable to price informativeness in the US stock market.
2.2 Idiosyncratic firm risk

This section examines stock price informativeness in China measured by average idiosyncratic firm risk and market model $R^2$, as proposed by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003), and Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2013). Li, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2013) catalog a large literature that links these measures to stock price informativeness, investment efficiency, disclosure and audit quality, and corporate governance.

For each stock $i$ with a return time series of at least 36 months during the period 1995-2012, we estimate the idiosyncratic variance $\sigma^2_{\varepsilon_i}$ from the monthly market model regression

$$r_{i,t} - r_{f,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

and then calculate the cross-sectional average idiosyncratic variance. Table 1 shows that the square root of the average annualized idiosyncratic variance in China is 58%, compared with 27% in the US during the period 1962-1997, as estimated in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001). By this metric, the firm-specific information content of stocks in China is more than double that in the US.

Table 1 also shows that the annualized volatility of the excess return on the market portfolio in China is 32% over the period 1995-2012, double the US market volatility of 16% over the period. To reconcile these results with commonly recognized stock return volatility figures and highlight China’s high return variance, note that representative firms with these variance decompositions and market beta’s of one would have total return volatility of 66% and 31% in China and the US, respectively.

This high market return variance in China drives up its synchronicity measure

$$R^2_i = \frac{\sigma^2_{\varepsilon_m}}{\sigma^2_{\varepsilon_m} + \sigma^2_{\varepsilon_i}}.$$

As the last column of Table 1 summarizes, based on Panel B of Figure 2 of Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2013), the average firm $R^2$s is 36% in China versus 14% in the US. By this comparison, stock prices in the US would appear to contain greater firm-specific information than those in China. But by direct comparison of average idiosyncratic risk, stock prices in China contain greater firm-specific information. This illustrates the problem with comparing $R^2$s across countries with very different market return variances, as Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2013) point out. Li, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2013) and Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2013) elaborate on additional limitations of the $R^2$ measure.

Another measure of stock price synchronicity used to quantify the lack of firm-specific information in prices is co-movement, the fraction of stocks in the market that move together.
It is easy to show under reasonable assumptions that, like $R^2$, co-movement is another measure that increases with the variance of the return on the market, holding idiosyncratic firm variance constant. Thus, a high degree of co-movement in China’s stock market may be attributable to the high variance of the market rather than to a shortage of firm-specific information in stock prices.

Table 1: Average idiosyncratic firm risk and $R^2$ in China and the US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Idiosyncratic volatility</th>
<th>Market volatility</th>
<th>Total volatility</th>
<th>Average $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>57.81</td>
<td>32.25</td>
<td>66.20</td>
<td>36.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>26.57</td>
<td>16.14</td>
<td>31.09</td>
<td>14.00</td>
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3 Efficiency of corporate investment in China

Summarizing economic arguments that go back to Hayek (1945) and Fama (1970), Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) state that “corporate capital investment should be more efficient where stock prices are more informative.” They find a positive cross-sectional correlation between their measure of corporate investment efficiency and firm-specific variation in stock returns in US firms. More broadly, in a study of 65 countries, Wurgler (2000) finds a positive correlation between the efficiency of capital allocation and the development of the financial sector and a positive correlation between efficiency and the amount of firm-specific information in domestic stock returns. This section examines the link between stock price informativeness and corporate investment efficiency in China and finds a strong positive correlation.

We define the efficiency of corporate investment as the unexpected change in equity value associated with a unit of unexpected investment, measured for each year $t$ by the coefficient $\beta_i$ in the following version of the cross-sectional regression proposed by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004),

$$\frac{\Delta V_{i,t}}{A_{i,t-1}} = \alpha_t + \beta_i \frac{\Delta A_{i,t}}{A_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_i \frac{V_{i,t-1}}{A_{i,t-1}} + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

(4)

where the second regressor above controls for the anticipated return on equity and in addition, we include industry fixed effects to control for differences in expected growth and depreciation.
rates of capital stock. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) use market asset value instead of equity value, they interpret the coefficient $\beta_t$ as the marginal Tobin’s $q$, and they measure efficiency of investment as the difference between this coefficient and one, based on the argument that the marginal $q$ of firms that are investing optimally should be one. By contrast, we interpret the coefficient $\beta$ above as a direct measure of investment efficiency for several reasons. First, unexpected investment may be “good news” about the productivity of both past and future investment, and may optimally translate to changes in value greater than one for one. Second, as the coefficient measures the relationship between investment and changes in value over a year, it is average rather than marginal $q$. Third, in a setting such as China, where most firms face potentially severe capital constraints, it may be difficult for firms to reach the optimal investment level. Thus, we interpret a larger coefficient in the cross-section as reflecting greater efficiency of investment.

Figure 4 plots the time series of investment efficiency coefficients inside their 95% confidence bands over the period 1996-2012. Figure 5 plots this time series of investment efficiency coefficients using the right-hand scale, in combination with the time series of Bai-Philippon-Savov price informativeness measures we calculated in Section 2.1, using the left-hand scale, for three different earnings forecasting periods. The patterns of the two time series are strikingly similar, and the correlation between them is high and statistically significant in the cases of earnings forecasting periods of 2 and 3 years, despite the short sample period.

This high correlation supports the idea that corporate investment is more efficient when stock prices are more informative. It may be that a listing on the stock exchange in salutary information environments improves the efficiency of corporate investment for other reasons as well, for example, because disclosure and auditing standards in and of themselves lead to better managerial decision-making. The positive correlation may also flow from broader channels. For example, legal, regulatory, and accounting environments in which the stock market is functioning well are also those in which managerial investment decisions are more informed and better aligned with equity value maximization. In any case, this significant positive association between stock price informativeness and investment efficiency is an important empirical result, worthy of attention and careful consideration by financial market reformers in China. Finally, we note that the average level of investment efficiency over the sample period is 1.00, compared with an average coefficient of 0.91 in the US, reported by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004).
4 Equity pricing and investment opportunities in China

While the last section examines the informativeness of stock prices about future profits and its relation to corporate investment, this section studies the pricing of those profits and implications for financial investors and corporate cost of capital. We analyze the cross-sectional structure of returns and equity premia paid to Chinese investors, the performance of China’s stock market and correlation with stock markets in other countries, and investment opportunities for foreign investors. Our results challenge two widely held perceptions about China’s stock market. First, we find that despite the market’s segmentation from other major markets and its early reputation as a casino, the cross-sectional pattern of returns is quite similar to that in the US and other global stock markets. This is especially surprising given the low correlation between returns in China and those in other large economies. Second, despite the perception of overall poor performance, China's stock market offers attractive returns and opportunities for diversification, i.e., high alpha, to international equity investors who can access it. However, this high potential alpha for USD investors suggests that capital controls are raising the cost of equity capital for China’s firms and that China has much to gain from opening its market to foreign investors.

4.1 The cross-section of expected returns

This section presents new evidence on the cross-section of expected stock returns in China. In earlier work, Chen, Kim, Yao, and Yu (2010) examine cross-sectional stock return predictability in China over the period July 1995 to June 2007 using data on A shares from the PACAP-CCER China database. They consider 18 firm-specific variables found to have predict returns in the US and find all 18 have signs consistent with US evidence, and five are significant in their sample, compared with eight variables that are significant in the US data over the same period. Cakici, Chan, and Topyan (2011) analyze stock return predictability in China from January 1994 to March 2011 using data on A shares traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from Datastream and find strong predictive power for size, book-to-market, cash-flow-to-price, and earnings-to-price, but not momentum. We update and extend this evidence using data from March 1995 to December 2012 on A shares of firms traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges from the CSMAR database.

4.1.1 Firm-level cross-sectional regressions

We begin with Fama and MacBeth (1973) firm-level cross-sectional regressions of returns on eight predictor variables: BETA, SIZE, BM, MOM, ILLIQ, MAX, REV, and SOE. Following
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) to account for nonsynchronous trading, BETA is obtained from regressing daily firm return on daily current, lead, and lagged market returns over the previous month and summing the three coefficients. Following a long literature going back to Banz (1981), SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of firm equity at the end of the previous month. As in Fama and French (1992), BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of the previous calendar year. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), momentum, MOM, is defined as the cumulative stock return over the previous eleven-month period, lagged one month. We measure illiquidity, ILLIQ, as the average over the previous month of the daily ratio of the absolute value of the stock return to the total value of shares traded, as in Amihud (2002). Following Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), MAX is the maximum daily stock return over the previous month and, following Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990), short-term reversal, REV, is the return on the stock over the previous month. Given the importance of the level of state ownership in China in distinguishing firms’ political risk, governance structure, objectives, opportunity set, and access to capital, we also introduce the variable SOE, which is the percentage of the firm’s shares held by the central or local government in the previous month.

Table 2 presents the results of univariate regressions for each predictor, multiple regressions with BETA, SIZE, BM, and MOM, and multiple regressions with the additional predictor variables as well. Overall, the results are surprisingly similar to those for US stocks reported in Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011). The coefficient on BETA is significantly positive in the multiple regressions, but not by itself, with comparable magnitudes. The coefficient on SIZE is generally strongly significantly negative, though it loses magnitude and significance in the presence of ILLIQ. The coefficient on BM is consistently significantly positive, though smaller in magnitude than in the US data. The coefficient on MOM by itself is insignificant, in contrast to the US results, but it regains significance in the multiple regressions. Whether or not the premiums attributable to size, book-to-market, and momentum should be interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency, the predictive power of these variables for stock returns in China is in line with the cross-sectional return patterns documented for developed economies, such as in Fama and French (1998) and Fama and French (2012).

The coefficient on ILLIQ is consistently significantly positive. As in the US, Chinese investors charge a premium for bearing illiquidity, whether to compensate for direct trading costs or the probability of trading against more informed market participants. Information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders, government insiders and outsiders, and domestic and foreign investors is regarded as a major concern in China. These results suggest that legal, accounting, and market reforms that increase transparency and level the playing
Table 2: Firm-level cross-sectional return regressions

The table reports time-series averages of slope coefficients and associated Newey-West adjusted $t$-statistics from cross-sectional regressions of firm returns on the predictor variables for each month from July 1995 to December 2012. BETA is the Scholes-Williams-Dimson beta obtained from regressing daily firm return on daily current, lead, and lagged market returns over the previous month. SIZE is the log of total market value of equity at the end of the previous month. BM is the Fama-French book-to-market ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of the previous calendar year. MOM is Jegadeesh-Titman momentum defined as the cumulative stock return over months $t - 12$ to $t - 1$. ILLIQ is Amihud illiquidity measured as the average over the previous month of the daily ratio of the absolute value of the stock return to the total value of shares traded. MAX is the Bali-Cakici-Whitelaw maximum daily stock return over the previous month. REV is Jegadeesh-Lehmann short-term reversal defined as the return on the stock over the previous month. SOE is the percentage of shares held by the central or local government measured at the previous month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BETA</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>BM</th>
<th>MOM</th>
<th>ILLIQ</th>
<th>MAX</th>
<th>REV</th>
<th>SOE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.0060</td>
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<td>-3.20</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0186</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0020</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>8.45E+06</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0313</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-5.12E-06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0023</td>
<td>-0.0061</td>
<td>0.0176</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.35</td>
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<td>2.12</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>-0.0030</td>
<td>0.0179</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
<td>3.70E+07</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.10</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>-0.0064</td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>-0.1902</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.76</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>-0.0032</td>
<td>0.0158</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
<td>3.93E+07</td>
<td>-0.1753</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>-6.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0039</td>
<td>-0.0034</td>
<td>0.0155</td>
<td>0.0050</td>
<td>4.31E+07</td>
<td>-0.1333</td>
<td>-0.0293</td>
<td>2.87E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>-1.81</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>-3.55</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
field could not only attract more market participants, but also lower firms’ cost of capital.

The coefficient on MAX is strikingly significantly negative, as in the US data. The evidence suggests that, like US investors, Chinese investors also pay up for lottery-like payoffs. This similarity in investor preferences is especially noteworthy considering potentially strong cultural differences between the two groups, and it raises the possibility that many of the behavioral biases documented for US investors may also hold more universally. The coefficient on REV is also significantly negative, as in the US.

Finally, the coefficient on SOE, the percentage of government-owned shares, is significantly positive in the multiple regression. This suggests that Chinese investors discount state-controlled firms, perhaps for the political risk that government subsidies may be removed in the future, or more general uncertainties about state-owned firms’ future objectives, governance structure, access to capital, and investment opportunity sets.

### 4.1.2 Portfolio-level analysis

This section provides further evidence on the pricing of size, book-to-market, momentum, illiquidity, and asymmetric returns through analysis of return differences across portfolios sorted by the predictor variables. Following Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and the Ken French Data Library, we form the six $2 \times 3$ value-weighted SIZE-BM portfolios and the six $2 \times 3$ value-weighted SIZE-MOM portfolios and construct the size, book-to-market, and momentum zero-cost factor portfolios SMB, HML, and WML for China. Throughout our analysis, we use tradeable rather than total market value in the weighting. Table 3 presents the returns and alphas for the twelve double-sorted portfolios as well as for the factor portfolios. The CAPM alphas are from time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on the excess return of the market, RMRF. Table 4 confirms the robustness of the illiquidity and maximum return effects by documenting the systematic pattern of CAPM and four-factor alphas of portfolios sorted on these characteristics.

Table 3 shows that small stocks consistently outperform large stocks and value stocks consistently outperform growth stocks in China, in terms of both excess return and CAPM alpha. Moreover, the SMB and HML factors returns are significantly positive. On the other hand, consistent with Cakici, Chan, and Topyan (2011), the WML factor returns are insignificant. Xu and Zhang (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of the Fama-French factor portfolios and their ability to explain size and book-to-market effects in stock returns in China. We use these China factor portfolios to check the robustness of our previous results and then examine correlations and investment opportunities across countries in the next section.

We form value-weighted portfolios of stocks sorted into quintiles by Amihud illiquidity
Table 3: Returns on portfolios sorted by size, book-to-market, and momentum

Average returns and alphas on the six 2×3 value-weighted size/book-to-market portfolios and the six 2×3 value-weighted size/momentum portfolios that go into the construction of the size, book-to-market, and momentum factor portfolios, SMB, HML, and WML, for China over the period March 1995 to December 2012, and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics for differences. CAPM alphas are from time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on the excess return of the market, RMRF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>CAPM alphas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A. Size-book-to-market portfolios</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B. Size-momentum portfolios</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel C. Differences and t-statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMB</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HML</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WML</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Returns on portfolios sorted by illiquidity and maximum return

Average returns and alphas on value-weighted quintile portfolios over the period March 1995 to December 2012, and Newey-West adjusted $t$-statistics for differences. The CAPM alphas are from time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on the excess return of the China market portfolio, RMRF. The four-factor alphas are from time-series regressions of the portfolio excess returns on the Fama-French-Carhart market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factor portfolios RMRF, SMB, HML, and WML, constructed from stocks in China. In panel A, stocks are sorted into portfolios based on Amihud illiquidity, measured as the average over the previous month of the daily ratio of the absolute value of the stock return to the total value of shares traded. In panel B, stocks are sorted into portfolios based on Bali-Cakici-Whitelaw maximum daily stock return over the previous month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>CAPM alphas</th>
<th>Four-factor alphas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A. Portfolios sorted by illiquidity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiquid</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$-stat</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B. Portfolios sorted by maximum return</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low MAX</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High MAX</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$-stat</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and by Bali-Cakici-Whitelaw maximum return. Table 4 shows the returns, CAPM alphas, and four-factor alphas for the quintile portfolios and the difference in these quantities between quintiles one and five. The four-factor alphas are from time-series regressions of the portfolio excess returns on RMRF, SMB, HML, and WML. Panel A shows an almost monotonic illiquidity effect across the quintiles, and the differences between top and bottom quintiles are significant for all performance measures. Panel B shows performance across MAX quintiles. Similar to the findings of Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) for US stocks, the pattern is slightly hump-shaped, rather than strictly monotonic, but the difference in alphas between low and high max quintiles is significant. The magnitudes of the differences are also similar to those for US stocks.

4.2 Market integration and investment opportunities

This section provides evidence on China’s stock market integration with other markets and opportunities available to international investors. Section 4.2.1 examines the correlations of the market, size, value, and momentum factor portfolio returns across four major markets, China, the US, Europe, and Japan. In contrast to the high correlations in returns across open markets, returns in China’s stock market have low correlations with those in other large economies. China has begun to open its doors to foreign investors through its QFII program, but it is still a segmented market.

Section 4.2.2 examines the overall performance of the different markets and the excess returns that China offers to international investors who can access them. Counter to the perception that China’s stock market has performed poorly, we show that China’s stock market offers attractive returns and opportunities for diversification to international investors, i.e., high alpha. This high alpha for potential international investors amounts to an inflated cost of capital for China’s firms and suggests that China has much to gain from liberalizing its capital account.

Section 4.2.3 distinguishes the perspective of a globally diversified USD investor, who would measure China’s stock market performance by its average USD return, and ultimately alpha, from that of an undiversified Chinese investor, who would consider the stock market’s CNY buy-and-hold return. We show how China’s large stock market volatility drives a wedge between these performance measures over our sample period, because what would be idiosyncratic risk to a globally diversified investor is systematic risk to the undiversified Chinese investor. This re-emphasizes the importance of opening capital markets, so as to give Chinese investors access to international diversification as well as to reduce the cost of capital for Chinese firms. Finally, Section 4.2.4 discusses the post-crisis shadow banking
boom in China and hypothesizes that competition from its high-yielding wealth-management products partly explains the stock market decline over this subperiod.

### 4.2.1 Stock market correlations across large economies

This section gives preliminary evidence on the degree of integration between China’s stock market and those of other large economies and discusses the implications and related literature. Table 5 presents correlations across monthly returns from China, the US, Europe, and Japan for each of the four factor portfolios, RMRF, SMB, HML, and WML, from 1995 to 2012. Table 5 documents the high degree of correlation across the developed markets for RMRF, HML, and WML, ranging from 0.38 to 0.83. These results are consistent with Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), who find average correlations of 0.68 and 0.65 for value and momentum strategies, respectively, across the US, the UK, Europe, and Japan.

However, in contrast to the developed markets, returns in China have low correlations with returns elsewhere. China’s correlations range from 0.07 to 0.21 for the market, value, and momentum factors, and China’s size factor actually correlates negatively with the size factors of the other large markets. China looks like a segmented market, which is consistent with the lack of overlap between investors in China and investors in other markets. However, one might expect there to be a common global cash flow factor in all markets. As exporters, Chinese firms should be exposed to this factor. In other words, capital markets are segregated, but the economy is not. That would explain the small but generally positive correlations.

This evidence of market segmentation has a number of implications. A large literature provides both theory and evidence on the positive effects of liberalization and integration on emerging markets’ cost of capital, investment, growth, and investment opportunities for foreign investors through improvements in risk sharing across countries. For example, in samples of up to 16 emerging markets, Stulz (1999), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) find that opening a country to portfolio flows decreases its cost of capital without increasing its volatility or creating excessive contagion effects, although liberalizations do not generally lead to full market integration. In samples of up to 25 countries, Henry (2000a), Henry (2000b), Henry (2003), and Chari, Henry, and Sasson (2012) find that stock market liberalizations reduce cost of capital and boost investment, growth, and wages. Chari and Henry (2004) and Chari and Henry (2008) study the effect of market liberalization at the firm level and show how stock prices and corporate investment respond to reductions in cost of capital that occur after liberalization. China’s QFII program has awarded over $50 billion of investment quotas, and China and Hong Kong have just launched a new Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program, which is slated to allow an additional
$50 billion of financial capital to flow from Hong Kong to the Shanghai Stock Exchange and $40 billion from Shanghai to Hong Kong. However, this is still only a beginning. Our evidence suggests that China still has much more to gain from opening its stock market to the international investment community.

### 4.2.2 Investment performance and opportunities

This section examines the stock market performance in China over our sample period and explores investment opportunities for international investors. Table 6 presents mean returns, volatilities, and cross-factor correlations for the market, size, value, and momentum factors in the four different markets. Consistent with Fama and French (2012), we find a significant value premium in all four markets. There is a momentum premium in the western markets. The size premium is only apparent in China over this period.

In terms of overall market performance, China’s stock market is striking for both its high mean excess return and high volatility. Both its mean and volatility are double those of the US stock market over the sample period, thus delivering the same Sharpe ratio. The mean annualized return of 15.78% runs counter to the perception that China’s stock market has performed poorly over its history. To illustrate the components of China’s market return, Figure 6 shows the cumulative and average returns of the publicized Shanghai and Shenzhen price indexes in CNY, the return on the CNY, and the average USD return on the CSMAR market portfolio, which is weighted by tradeable market value and includes dividends. The Shanghai Stock Exchange index has an average annualized monthly appreciation of only 12.44% in CNY over the period. The Shenzhen price index, which includes the smaller stocks on the Shenzhen, SME, and ChiNext Boards, has done better, averaging 16.96%. The smaller

---

Table 5: Correlations of FFC factors across large economies 1995-2012

Correlations of monthly USD returns on FFC factors across large economies over the period March 1995 to December 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMRF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HML</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
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<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Equity premiums and factor structures in large economies 1995-2012

Annualized means and volatilities in percent and Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics for monthly USD returns on the market, size, value, and momentum factors and the cross-factor correlations in decimal over the period March 1995 to December 2012 in China, the US, Europe and Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RMRF</th>
<th>SMB</th>
<th>HML</th>
<th>WML</th>
<th>RMRF</th>
<th>SMB</th>
<th>HML</th>
<th>WML</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (in %)</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>13.44</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility (in %)</td>
<td>32.25</td>
<td>16.03</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>16.14</td>
<td>12.47</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>19.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-mean</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMRF</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SMB</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HML</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (in %)</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>-1.91</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>2.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volatility (in %)</td>
<td>18.34</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>15.84</td>
<td>18.82</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>16.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>t-mean</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMRF</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMB</td>
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<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>HML</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.27</td>
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enterprises, outside the state-controlled sector have been the growth drivers in China’s corporate sector. China’s USD return is further augmented by an annualized average USD return on the CNY of 1.71% over the period. Altogether, the average annualized monthly tradeable-market-value-weighted USD return on China’s stock market is 18.68% over the period.

The evidence of high mean portfolio returns in China and low correlations with developed markets suggests that China offers attractive investment opportunities for international investors. Following Fama and French (2012), Table 7 provides evidence on this question by examining alphas of the China portfolios with respect to the US and global factors. As the table shows, China’s market portfolio earned an economically significant alpha with respect to the US and global factors of over 1% per month. Its size and book-to-market factor portfolios also earn large alphas, which are highly statistically significant.

We rule out the possibility that these results are driven by a missing China factor in US returns by examining the effect of adding the China market portfolio as a fifth factor, along with the US RMRF, SMB, HML, and WML factors, in time series regressions of US test portfolio returns on these factors. We use as test portfolios the 25 Fama-French size/book-to-market portfolios and the 30 Fama-French industry portfolios from the Ken French Data
Library. We find that their alphas, factor loadings, and $R^2$s scarcely change and they do not load significantly on the China factor, consistent with our earlier results on the low correlation between US and China factors. This robustness check reconfirms our evidence of the availability of high alphas in China for international investors who can access them.

Table 7: Alphas of China portfolios with respect to US and global factors

Monthly alphas (in %) of USD returns on the China market, size, value, and momentum factor portfolios with respect to the US and global Fama-French-Carhart factors, and their Newey-West adjusted t-statistics, over the period March 1995 to December 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China portfolio</th>
<th>US factors</th>
<th>Global factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-factor</td>
<td>4-factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMRF</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>1.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t-stat</td>
<td>1.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMB</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t-stat</td>
<td>2.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>HML</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t-stat</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WML</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t-stat</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.3 Average monthly vs. buy-and-hold returns

The analysis of monthly USD returns above applies to a USD investor who could access China’s A-share market and hold it in a well-diversified dynamically rebalanced portfolio, such as a QFII. Traditional portfolio theory shows that for a diversified investor, the relevant risk of an asset is its contribution to total portfolio risk, as measured by its covariance with the return on the rest of the investor’s portfolio, and the relevant performance measure is the asset’s mean per period return, or, ultimately, its alpha. By these metrics, China’s stock market has high performance and low risk. However, for a domestic Chinese investor who could invest only in China’s A-share market, China’s total risk would have to be borne, so total stock market volatility would be the relevant risk measure, and the mean buy-and-hold return over the holding period would the relevant performance measure.

To see the effect of an asset’s volatility on its buy-and-hold return over multiple periods, note that while the annualized average per period return is an arithmetic mean, the annualized buy-and-hold return over the holding period involves a geometric mean. The mean buy-and-hold return converges to the mean of the log of one plus the simple return. Thus, the buy-and-hold return is less than the average simple return by approximately one-half
the variance of the simple return. If the return volatility were zero, the average per period return would equal the buy-and-hold return. The larger the return volatility, the larger the difference between these two performance measures. Put simply, all else equal, higher volatility assets look less attractive for undiversified investors. China’s stock market variance is extremely high, so the difference is large. This highlights the difference in perspective on China’s stock market between an investor who can hold China in a globally diversified portfolio, and an investor who can invest only in China’s stock market. It also emphasizes the importance of opening capital markets in countries with high asset volatility so as to allow domestic investors to diversify risk globally.

An additional difference in perspective on performance arises when investors measure returns in different currencies. The CNY appreciated against the USD over our sample period, making the USD return on China’s stock market more attractive than its CNY return, but this effect is small relative to the volatility effect over the full sample period. Finally, inflation drives a wedge between nominal returns and real returns. Our analysis above uses nominal returns, but the results for excess returns and alphas would be essentially unchanged if we used real returns.

Table 8 illustrates these volatility, currency, and inflation effects, and the differences they create between average monthly nominal USD returns and real CNY buy-and hold returns on China’s stock market, over our full sample period 1995-2012 and over two subperiods, 2001-2012 and 2010-2012. For comparison, the table also shows the corresponding performance measures for the US stock market, where the volatility effect is much smaller. The exchange rate data are from Datastream and the CNY inflation data are from the World Bank. As the table shows, the real CNY buy-and-hold return is approximately equal to the average monthly USD return minus half the variance of this return, minus the average CNY appreciation against the USD, minus the average CNY inflation rate. All quantities in the table are annualized, i.e., all calculations are done at the monthly level and then multiplied by twelve.

Table 8 shows that over the periods 1995-2012 and 2001-2012, the difference between the average monthly and buy-and-hold returns is primarily due to the high volatility of China’s stock market return, although this volatility diminishes over time. Nevertheless, despite its high volatility, China’s stock market still outperforms the US stock market over these subperiods, even in terms of buy-and-hold return. Using data from Datastream, Allen, Qian, Shan, and Zhu (2014) find that over the period 2001-2012, the cumulative real CNY buy-and-hold return is 0.62, for an annualized buy-and-hold return of -3.91%. The difference between this result and our 1.32% shown in Table 8 is partly attributable to the difference in weighting scheme. Allen, Qian, Shan, and Zhu (2014) weight stock returns by total market
Table 8: Average monthly vs. buy-and-hold returns

Average monthly nominal USD returns in the top row, real CNY buy-and-hold returns in the bottom row, and the volatility, currency, and inflation effects that explain the difference, in the middle rows, for the China and US stock markets over three sample periods. All quantities are annualized and in percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg monthly nom USD return</td>
<td>18.68</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>10.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5*Var of monthly nom USD return</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg monthly USD return on CNY</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg CNY inflation</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx real CNY BHR return</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual real CNY BHR return</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

capitalization, which relates to the market valuation of China’s macroeconomy, while we weight by tradable market value, reflecting our focus on investment opportunities. Weighting by total market capitalization gives more weight to the large state-owned enterprises, which did less well than the smaller private firms over the period. Another difference is in the sample of firms. The sample of Allen, Qian, Shan, and Zhu (2014) consists of stocks traded on the main boards of Shanghai and Shenzhen. Our sample also includes the stocks on the SME and Chinext Boards, which did better over the period, in addition to the stocks traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main boards.

4.2.4 China’s post-crisis shadow banking boom and stock market bust

The years after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing economic recession have been a period of major economic stimulus and reconstruction of financial markets by central banks and regulators across the globe. In China, this has taken the form of a massive economic stimulus that started in 2009 and the development of a shadow banking sector large enough and flexible enough to channel large amounts of capital quickly to real estate, infrastructure, and other projects across the country and thus fuel real investment and economic growth. The development of this shadow banking sector has also been the first step in China’s liberalization of interest rates. While the asset side of China’s shadow banking balance sheet represents real investments in spaces previously unspanned by the traditional banking sector, the liability side offers a rich new menu of wealth management products that give domestic Chinese investors access to interest rates higher than the 3% cap on traditional bank deposit rates. In particular, this period has seen an explosion in short-term money-market products.
offering rates of 4-7% and higher. These products can be offered by traditional banks, marketed through the banks by trusts, or offered directly by trusts and other shadow banks. Other shadow banks include internet companies such as Alibaba, which offers 7-day money market products to its e-commerce customers online.

Although these wealth management products carry warnings about risk, most of them enjoy a halo effect created by their association with the traditional banking sector and an implicit backing by the government through its deep network of guarantees to the state-owned banks, state-owned enterprises, and local governments. In fact, because of its deep pocket and its political, economic, and regulatory structure, China may have the biggest implicit guarantee problem in the world. Until China institutes deposit insurance and other reforms that draw more explicit boundaries around its guaranteed bank sector, it is highly implausible that it will allow large-scale defaults on wealth-management products and risk a run on the interconnected banking and shadow banking sector that is supporting its economic growth. To the extent that investors therefore perceive these products to be virtually risk free, the proliferation of these higher yielding wealth management products amounts to an increase in China’s risk-free rate over what has been available on administered deposits. Consistent with this idea, the 2014 China Financial Stability Report of the People’s Bank of China asserts that “the rigid payment (implicit guarantee) in wealth management market eroded market discipline, fueled moral hazard risks, elevated price of risk-free capital, and caused misallocation of funding among different markets.”

Indeed, at the same time that wealth management products issued by the shadow banking sector have proliferated, China’s post-crisis stock market recovery has lagged well behind those of other large economies. The last two columns of Table 8 show that China’s stock market had negative returns over this period by both performance measures, in contrast to the high returns earned by the US stock market. This period of poor performance precipitated a loss of confidence in China’s stock market and reinforced the perception that it has not been functioning properly. This period culminated in the closure of the stock market to IPOs at the end of 2012.

We argue that this period of poor stock market returns in China is not dysfunctional, but rather a rational downward price adjustment in response to negative shocks to GDP growth forecasts and positive shocks to discount rates associated with the liberalization of interest rates and implicit subsidies to the shadow banking sector. The prices of stocks of so-called dual-listed firms, those with A-share listings in the mainland exchanges and H-share listings in Hong Kong, provide some evidence for this conjecture. In principle, A and H shares on the same firm reflect the pricing of the same future cash flows, but using different discount rates, with Chinese investors discounting the A shares, and global
investors discounting the H shares, which are traded in Hong Kong in HKD. An upward shock to discount rates in mainland China would affect the A shares but not the H shares. In particular, if the risk-free rate in mainland China effectively rose from 3% to more like 5% over the period 2010-2012, then China’s A-share prices would have to adjust downward so that they could offer competitive returns going forward. H-share prices, which reflect discounting by global investors, would not have experienced this shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, the Hang Seng China A-H Premium Index at the HKEX (2014) website, which tracks the average price difference of A shares over H shares for the largest and most liquid dual-listed Chinese companies, declined over this period. After this adjustment to mainland China’s high liberalized interest rates is complete, we might expect to see higher returns on A shares going forward.

Higher required returns for China’s stocks translate to higher costs of capital for China’s smaller private companies, which have relatively more difficulty getting bank loans. On one hand, this could be an efficient market adjustment to high liberalized interest rates in a fast-growing economy. On the other hand, if China’s implicit guarantee of the banking sector is creating an excessive supply of high-yielding low-risk financial assets, and thereby pulling capital away from the equity market to the banking sector where more politically-driven lending takes place, then this implicit guarantee could be channeling capital to less efficient investment and slowing economic growth. A recent article in The Economist (2014) cites research from the People’s Bank of China that finds “a strongly negative correlation between growth in lending and in total factor productivity” and interprets this as “an indication that state-owned banks, which still dominate China’s financial sector, are still not disbursing enough credit to the country’s most deserving companies.”

As a component of its larger financial system, China’s state-controlled banking sector is the key instrument of its centrally planned investment policy. Its shadow banking sector has also played an essential role in averting a post-crisis recession and fostering more market-driven capital allocation. But our results suggest that China would do well to let its stock market pick winners, too. As Figure 3 shows, A-share prices have remained highly informative about future corporate earnings even during the post-crisis period. As important steps in this direction, the CSRC re-opened the IPO window early this year and the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program is slated to open a small new channel for capital flow between global and domestic Chinese stock markets this fall. Additional reforms that further open capital channels and allow prices to reflect available information, such as reforms to listing procedures as suggested by Allen, Qian, Shan, and Zhu (2014), could help China harness the potential of this market.
5 Conclusions

China is the world’s largest investor and greatest contributor to global growth by wide margins. The success of China’s stock market in attracting domestic and international capital and allocating it efficiently to corporate investment will be an important determinant of global growth in the coming decades. China’s stock market is young but, despite its early reputation as a casino, has functioned well since the reforms of the last decade. Stock price informativeness has increased and compares favorably with that in the US. The efficiency of corporate investment is highly correlated with stock price informativeness and has followed a strikingly similar trend. Despite its segmented nature, China’s equity market delivers a cross-sectional pattern of returns that is surprisingly similar to that found in other countries, with high premia for size, value, illiquidity, and right-skewed payoffs. Moreover, counter to perception, China’s stock market has performed very well on average, especially its small and medium enterprises. Furthermore, the market exhibits low correlation with other equity markets, reflecting restrictions on international capital flows. As a result, China’s factor portfolios offer high alphas for US and global investors who can navigate capital controls through programs such as QFII. At the same time, this high alpha amounts to an inflated cost of capital for China’s firms and suggests further capital market liberalization would reduce equity cost of capital in China. Taken together, our results suggest that while China’s stock market is already playing a vital role in supporting economic growth, especially through its small and medium enterprises, additional regulatory reforms to improve the information environment and liberalize the flow of capital would further empower the market to attract capital, allocate it efficiently, and support economic growth worldwide.

References


Figure 1. China's Stock Market 1992-2012
Figure 2. Stock price informativeness in China: Forecasting earnings with equity prices
Figure 3. Stock Price Informativeness in China

I. 1991-1997
- Dow Jones
- China, Shanghai, and Shenzhen
- Opening & Construction
- 5/29/1996: Dow Jones
- 12/13/1996: Daily price change limit of 10% set for all stocks
- 2/15/2000: First stock trades above 100 Yuan, speculation & accounting fraud

II. 1998-2001
- Speculation & Accounting Fraud
- 11/18/2002: The CSRC ratifies QFII program for direct foreign inst. A-share ownership

III. 2001-2007
- Market Reform
- 02/02/2004: National nine rules strengthen minority shareholder protection and dividend policy

IV. 2008-2010
- Financial Crisis
- 2005 Split Share Reform, nontradable shares begin to go public, tradable shareholders compensated
- 01/13/2006 Margin trading and short selling pilot program introduced

1996-2010
- 1998 Prices of firms in ST skyrocket, manipulation rampant
- 2001 Economist Wu Jinglian proposes "Casino" theory of China’s stock market
- 2003 Several major accounting scandals revealed
- 2004 The CSRC tightens reporting rules to deter accounting fraud
- 2010
Figure 4. Efficiency of corporate investment in China 1996-2011
Figure 5. Stock price informativeness and investment efficiency in China 1996-2012

Price informativeness ($k=1$) and investment efficiency - corr 37%, t-stat 1.48

Price informativeness ($k=2$) and investment efficiency - corr 58%, t-stat 2.56

Price informativeness ($k=3$) and investment efficiency - corr 50%, t-stat 2.00
Figure 6. Cumulative and Average Returns 1995-2012