What Drives Housing Prices?

James A. Kahn*

June 2009

Abstract

This paper develops a growth model with land and housing services that explains much of the amplitude and timing of medium frequency house price fluctuations over the last forty years. House prices are predicted to have a “bubbly” appearance, with housing wealth rising faster than income for an extended period before collapsing and experiencing an extended decline. The analysis suggests that the current downturn in the housing sector was triggered by a productivity slowdown that began in 2004. One implication of this finding is that policies aimed at affecting house prices through credit market interventions are likely to have only a modest impact.

From 1996 to its peak in early 2007, the real quality-adjusted price of new houses in the United States appreciated by 33 percent in real terms, about the same as the increase in real GDP over the same period. Prices of existing homes grew even faster, by more than 60 percent. Residential investment as a share of GDP peaked at 6.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2005, the highest since 1950. The real estate boom, as well as the recent dramatic downturn, has drawn increased attention to the causes and effects of fluctuations in housing prices and investment. Of course this was not the first time housing boom and bust: a similar episode took place beginning in the late 1960s, when prices boomed for a decade before slowing and even declining in real terms for the subsequent 15 years. Markets in particular geographical areas have exhibited still greater volatility (cf. Himmelberg et al,

*Visiting Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and Visiting Scholar, Stern School of Business, New York University. Please direct all correspondence to the author at: james.kahn@alum.mit.edu. The author acknowledges use of computer routines described in Kim and Nelson (1998), as well as helpful comments by Mark Bils, and by workshop participants at Columbia, NYU, CUNY-Baruch, University of North Carolina, and the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and St. Louis. JEL Codes: E22,E32,O41,O51. Keywords: Housing Prices, Residential Investment, Productivity Growth.
2005). More generally, it has been observed (e.g. Kahn, 2008, Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006) that the amplitude of house price variation tends to exceed that of income variation. These phenomena have been variously attributed to speculative bubbles, at least in specific localities (Case and Shiller, 2003), expansions and contractions in monetary policy (Iacoviello and Neri, 2006), or to changing credit market frictions—innovations such as new types of mortgage instruments, or breakdowns such as the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Such explanations suggest that market imperfections, credit market frictions, or irrationality may have played an important role in housing sector fluctuations.

This paper argues that a substantial portion of this medium-term variation in house prices can be explained by fundamentals—specifically perceived changes in trend productivity growth. It develops a stochastic growth model in which land, capital, and labor are inputs to production, and housing and non-housing consumption provide utility to consumers. Technical progress in output other than housing services is presumed to have a Markov regime-switching component as in Kahn and Rich (2007, hereafter KR). The calibrated model, together with a plausible learning process for trend productivity, can explain the qualitative—and much of the quantitative—behavior of housing prices since the 1960s, including the recent slowdown. In particular, it shows that the regime-switching behavior of productivity growth, which KR finds to be an accurate depiction of postwar data, can give housing prices a “bubbly” appearance in which housing wealth rises faster than income for an extended period, then collapses and experiences an extended decline. The model also provides a partial rationale for the beliefs of investors (and mortgage issuers) in the housing boom in the early part of this decade, as it suggests that the bust that occurred was a low-probability event viewed from the perspective of the early part of the decade.

A key parameter turns out to be the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing consumption. This parameter has been featured in many studies related to housing (e.g. Li et al, 2008; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007; Flavin and Nakagawa, 2008.). At the same time, many studies of housing have assumed, presumably for convenience, a value of one for this elasticity (e.g. Iacoviello and Neri, 2006). We provide evidence based on both aggregate and microeconomic data that this elasticity is considerably less than one. This low elasticity plays a crucial role in the model’s ability to explain both qualitatively and quantitatively the magnitude of housing price fluctuations. In particular it helps to account for a “multiplier” effect that changes in housing price growth rates tends to magnify changes in underlying economic growth. Kahn (2008) finds this multiplier effect in international panel data as well.

Beyond the recent boom and bust, there is a more general view that credit market frictions play an important role in house price fluctuations. This paper does not directly
refute that view, as it has no such frictions in the model; rather, it can be viewed as providing a benchmark for the behavior of house prices in the absence of frictions and bubbles. The results suggest that even a relatively “bare bones” growth model can account for an important part of the medium-term variation in house prices, and therefore sharply limits the role of financial frictions or other nonfundamentals—arguably to more transitory price volatility, or to other phenomena such as fluctuations in ownership rates, transactions rates, foreclosures, and the like.

1 Background

Figure 1 depicts the behavior of inflation-adjusted housing prices over the last few decades, according to several popular series. The one available going back the farthest (to 1963) is the quality-adjusted price index for new homes, published by the Census Bureau. An index of existing home prices based on repeat sales\footnote{This index is published by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).} is available quarterly back to 1975, while the Case-Shiller index, also based on repeat sales, goes back to 1987. We can see that where they overlap, the series behave similarly except for having different trends. Both the Census and OFHEO indexes peak in 1979 or so, then decline until the mid-1980s. All three series have another small peak at around 1990, followed by flat or declining real prices until the second half of the 1990s. Then all three series take off and increase dramatically through 2006 before turning down. The real value of housing wealth, as measured by flow of funds data, has grown an average of 4.6 percent since 1952. This compares with 3.4 percent growth of private net worth excluding real estate, and 3.5 percent growth of personal consumption expenditures over the same time period. Figure 2 plots the ratio of nominal housing wealth to nominal consumption expenditure. This ratio has increased by more than 50 percent since 1952. Figure 3 plots the much more volatile ratio of housing wealth to total net worth. While the enormous volatility of non-real estate wealth (mostly the stock market) hinders precise inferences about relative trends, the upward drift of this ratio is apparent, and not just the result of the runup in real estate wealth over the last decade. The bottom line is that real estate went from 27 percent of net worth in 1952 to 39 percent by 2008.\footnote{Davis and Heathcote (2005), however, argue that there are problems with the Flow of Funds data, particularly over long periods of time, and construct their own measures of housing wealth (though only going back to 1975) that exhibit a less clearcut trend.}

One possible explanation for the relative increase in housing prices and asset values is a simple income effect, or non-homogeneity in preferences. As people get wealthier, they may prefer to have more of their consumption coming from housing services, the price of which will tend to rise because of its being relatively intensive in land, a fixed factor. The (nominal)
share of housing services in GDP has gone from 7.5 percent in 1952 to over 10 percent in 2005. The share of housing services in consumer expenditures has gone from 12.2 percent to 14.6 percent over the same period, but in fact has been without any meaningful trend since 1960 or so. In any case, evidence against this proposition will be presented below. Another driver of housing prices could be differing technical progress trends in housing services versus other goods, as in Baumol (1967). The relatively large share of land and structures, two inputs usually thought to be less amenable to embodied technical progress, in the value of housing makes this story plausible. This paper will argue that the timing of low-frequency changes in both housing prices and productivity suggests that this mechanism is important.

There is some evidence that in fact the increase in housing wealth does not stem from an increase in the value of houses per se, but rather from the increase in the value of the land upon which they are built. First, a price index that include the value of land, the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index, has increased approximately 0.75% faster than indexes that do not, such as the Census’s Composite Construction Cost index, on an annual basis. Davis and Heathcote (2004) compute a land price index based on this type of differential and find that land values have increased at an average annual rate of approximately 3.5% (inflation-adjusted) over the period 1975-2005. That price index may, however, have an upward bias from not adequately adjusting for quality changes. Land price series available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see Figure 4) suggest behavior that is closer to the behavior of new home prices in Figure 1. We focus on the Census Bureau’s quality-adjusted price of new homes in part because of concern over this bias, but also because it goes back to 1963.

Finally, Figure 5 depicts the behavior of the HP-trend component of productivity growth (relative to a linear trend) over the postwar period. While its pattern is similar to low-frequency movements in land and housing prices, the downturn in productivity clearly precedes the downturn in housing and land prices by several years. KR provide more detailed econometric estimates of a regime-switching model of the sort incorporated below into this paper, and find significant regime changes corresponding to the shifts depicted in the figure.

2 Related Literature

Research on aggregate housing prices has emphasized demographics, income trends, and government policy as fundamental drivers. In one well-known study, Mankiw and Weil (1989) argued that population demographics were the prime determinant, and predicted that prices would fall in the subsequent two decades with the maturation of the baby boom generation and resulting decline in the growth rate of the prime home-owning age group. While their
prediction proved inaccurate, Martin (2005) renews the argument for an important role for demographics. Glaeser et al (2005) argues that price increases since 1970 largely reflect artificial supply restrictions. Gyourko et al (2006) also cite inelastically supplied land as a key driver of the phenomenon they call “superstar cities.” Van Nieuwerbergh and Weill (2006), however, argue that so long as there are regional markets in which such restrictions are not present, the aggregate impact of restrictions in some local markets is likely to be modest—in other words, they primarily affect the cross-sectional distribution of housing prices as opposed to the aggregate. Iacoviello and Neri (2006) examine the role of monetary policy with credit market frictions.

While Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) argue that credit market frictions play an important role in house price volatility, their model has a fixed supply of housing and no rental market alternative. Kiyotaki et al (2007) find that credit market frictions primarily affect own vs. rent decisions as opposed to prices. Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008) examine optimal mortgage lending in a setting where housing prices obey essentially the same type of regime-switching behavior assumed here, and find that “many features of subprime lending observed in practice are consistent with economic efficiency and rationality of both borrowers and lenders,” though, as they point out, there may be negative externalities associated with massive defaults in a downturn.

Case and Shiller (2003) and Himmelberg et al (2005) investigate the bubble hypothesis, looking across a large number of cities, and both suggest that the phenomenon is limited to a few localities. As with the research above on inelastic land supplies, these papers emphasize the cross-sectional variation of house prices across metropolitan areas rather than aggregate time series variation. Consistent with the approach in this paper, Attanasio et al (2005) find that “common causality” is an important driver of the comovement of house prices and consumption, as opposed to wealth or the collateral channels.

One important innovation in this paper is to allow for unbalanced sectoral growth. General equilibrium models with production have generally either assumed Cobb-Douglas preferences (e.g. Davis and Heathcote, 2005, Kiyotaki et al., 2007, Iacoviello and Neri, 2006) or have abstracted from longer-term growth issues (e.g. Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill, 2007). This is the first housing model (to my knowledge) with production that features (approximately) balanced aggregate growth and systematically varying sectoral shares due to non-unit elastic preferences. The importance of this is that it is consistent with aggregate growth facts as well as with the evidence on substitution elasticities found by numerous authors (see the discussion below), and also enables the model to match the volatility of housing prices in a plausible and disciplined way. The modeling approach is based on recent work of Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
3 A Simple Static Model

There are two goods, \( c \) and \( h \), each produced by combining capital and land:

\[
\begin{align*}
  c &= AK_c^\alpha L_c^{1-\alpha} \\
  h &= K_h^\beta L_h^{1-\beta}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( A \) is relative TFP in the \( c \) sector, we assume \( \alpha > \beta \) (\( h \) is more land-intensive) and

\[
\begin{align*}
  K_c + K_h &= K \\
  L_c + L_h &= L.
\end{align*}
\]

A representative consumer has a utility function

\[
  u(c, h) = \begin{cases} 
  [\omega \epsilon^{(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon} + (1 - \omega) h^{(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon}]^{\epsilon/(\epsilon-1)} & \epsilon \neq 1, \epsilon > 0 \\
  \omega \ln c + (1 - \omega) \ln h & \epsilon = 1
\end{cases}. \tag{5}
\]

We can examine the impact of \( A \) on equilibrium prices and quantities.

It is straightforward to show that the relative price of \( h \) in units of \( c \), denoted by \( p \) satisfies

\[
  p = A \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \beta} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{K_h}{L_h} \right)^{\alpha-\beta}. \tag{6}
\]

More specifically, think of the measure of “houses” as corresponding to the measure of \( K_h \), each with \( L_h/K_h \) units of land. Now consider the impact of a once and for all increase in \( A \). If \( \epsilon = 1 \), then \( p \) moves one for one with \( A \), while the factor proportions remain fixed in each sector, as the income and substitution effects on \( h \) exactly offset. By contrast, if \( \epsilon < 1 \), factors shift toward the \( h \) sector, both sectors become less land-intensive, and \( p \) goes up disproportionately to the increase in \( A \). Aggregate consumption (in units of \( c \)) \( c + ph \) increases by in proportion to \( A \).

Table 1 gives some results for \( p \) and \( K_h/L_h \) for a doubling of \( A \) from 1 to 2, for various values of \( \epsilon \). The other parameters are as follows: \( \omega = 0.8, \alpha = 0.7, \beta = 0.2 \). For \( \epsilon < 1 \), houses become less land intensive (implicitly, land becomes more expensive relative to capital), and \( p \) increases by more than one-for-one with \( A \).
4 The Dynamic Model

This section presents a general equilibrium growth model that is capable of capturing the important stylized facts about housing and the economy. The model has two sectors, a “manufacturing” sector that produces non-housing related goods and services, as well as the capital (structures and durable goods) that go into housing services. A second sector uses capital, labor, and land to produce a flow of housing services. The model exhibits approximately balanced aggregate growth, but with unequal growth across sectors. We then consider the behavior of the model under a regime-switching specification for productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.

4.1 Firms and Consumers

Competitive final goods firms produce two types of goods: A “manufactured” good $Y_m$, and housing services $Y_h$. Under perfect competition the final goods firms make zero profits and have perfectly elastic supplies of $Y_m$ and $Y_h$ at the above prices. The production functions for the two types of goods are

$$Y_j = A_j K_j^\alpha L_j^{\beta_j} N_j^{1-\alpha-\beta_j}$$

for $j = m, h$, where $K_j$ is capital allocated to $j$, $L_j$ is land, and $N_j$ is labor input. The goods producers rent inputs in competitive markets. In particular, capital is rented from final goods producers of $Y_m$. In the $j$ sector, the representative firm’s nominal profit in period $t$ is given by

$$P_j t Y_j t - W t N_{mt} - R_t L_{mt} - R_k K_{mt}$$

where $R_t$ and $R_k$ are nominal rental rates for land and capital respectively, and $W_t$ is the nominal wage.

There are $N_t$ representative agents at time $t$ supplying $N_t$ labor, where $N$ is exogenous, growing exponentially at constant rate $\nu$.\(^3\) Let $C$ denote the aggregate non-housing consumption good, and $H$ aggregate housing services. We let $c \equiv C/N$ and $h \equiv H/N$ denote per capita quantities. The representative consumer solves the problem

$$\max U = E_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1 + \rho)^{-t} \ln \left( \left[ \omega_c c_t^{(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon} + \omega_h h_t^{(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon} \right]^{\epsilon/(\epsilon-1)} \right) \right\}$$

\(^3\)It is straightforward to endogenize work effort, but this has little impact on any results.
\[ P_{m,t+s} (c_{t+s} + \ell_{t+s}) + P_{h,t+s} h_{t+s} + V_{t+s} [(1 + \nu) \ell_{t+s} - \ell_{t+s-1}] + b_{t+s} / (1 + R_{t+s}) \]

\[ \leq b_{t+s-1} + W_{t+s} + (1 + \nu) R_{k,t+s} P_{m,t+s-1} k_{t+s-1} \]

\[ + R_{\ell,t+s} V_{t+s-1} \ell_{t+s-1} + d_{m,t+s} + d_{h,t+s} \]

\[ (1 + \nu) k_{t+s} = (1 - \delta) k_{t+s-1} + z (\ell_{t+s-1} / k_{t+s-1}) k_{t+s-1} \quad (j = m, h) \]

where \( \ell_t \) denotes total capital investment at date \( t \), \( d_{jt} \) nominal dividends (for simplicity assumed to be distributed in a lump-sum fashion) from the profits of intermediate goods producers in sector \( j \), \( b_t \) nominal one-period discount bonds, \( V_t \) the price of land at date \( t \), and \( k_t \) and \( \ell_t \) per capita capital and land holdings at date \( t \). The constraints reflect the fact that population is growing, so that per capita stocks get deflated at rate \( \nu \). Both \( k_t \) and \( \ell_t \) denote the sum of capital and land in both sectors. The function \( z(x) \) reflects adjustment costs, which will be discussed in more detail below.

### 4.2 Equilibrium Growth

We assume (necessary for balanced growth) that capital’s share \( \alpha \) and depreciation \( \delta \) are the same in both sectors, but labor’s share is higher in manufacturing (implying that land’s share is higher in the housing sector, i.e. \( \beta_h > \beta_m \)). Let \( c \) and \( h \) denote per capita quantities of \( C \) and \( H \), while \( k \), \( \ell \), \( k_i \), \( \ell_h \) refer to per worker quantities in sector \( i \) (e.g. \( k_{ht} \equiv K_{ht}/N_{ht} \), \( k_i \equiv K_i/N_{i+1} \), i.e. no subscript refers to aggregates), while \( n_{it} \equiv N_{it}/N_t \), \( (i = m, h) \).\(^4\) Given the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium is the result of maximizing \( U \) from (8) subject to aggregate resource constraints.

\[ c_t + i_t = A_m k_m^{\alpha} \ell_m^{\beta_m} n_{mt} \]

\[ (1 + \nu) k_t - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} = z (i_t / k_{t-1}) k_{t-1} \]

\[ h_t = A_h k_h^{\alpha} \ell_h^{\beta_h} n_{ht} \]

\[ k_{mt} n_{mt} + k_{ht} n_{ht} = k_{t-1} \]

\[ \ell_{mt} n_{mt} + \ell_{ht} n_{ht} = \ell_t \]

\[ n_{mt} + n_{ht} = 1. \]

\(^4\)The derivations here draw on Ngai and Pissarides (2007), albeit in discrete time, and adding a fixed factor with heterogeneous technology.
Total land $\bar{L}$ is assumed fixed, so $\ell_t/\ell_{t-1} = (1 + \nu)^{-1}$. Average technological progress in sector $i$, i.e. the average growth rate of $A_i$, is denoted $\gamma_i$ ($i = m, h$). Note that the timing assumptions in (14) and (15) are such that while aggregate capital $k$ is chosen one period ahead of time, and total land and labor are exogenous, for simplicity the sectoral allocations are determined contemporaneously.

Note that technical progress in the $h$ sector is unrelated to technological progress in construction. (In fact, home construction occurs in the $m$ sector in this model.) Rather, it refers to an increase in the housing services from given stocks of $K_h$, $L_h$, and labor inputs $N_h$. What this means in practice depends on exactly what the term “housing services” encompasses, and on how one measures $K_h$. In the model it is assumed for simplicity to be indistinguishable from $K_m$ other than by its allocation to the $h$ sector. In particular, it is assumed to have the same price as $K_m$ and $C$. In principle it would include both residential structures and housing service-related consumer durables (home appliances). $N_h$ would include both non-market and market labor involved in the production of housing services such housekeeping and maintenance.

The model abstracts from a number of potentially important factors. First and foremost, the housing and construction sectors are heavily affected by government intervention, both via distortionary taxation and regulations. In particular, much land in the U.S. (and in most other countries as well) is neither residential nor commercial, and is either owned or heavily restricted in its use by the government. Second, there is tremendous heterogeneity in land and housing values. Land near navigable bodies of water, or ports, or along coastlines is much more valuable than land that does not have these features. Obviously this model will have nothing directly to say about the cross-sectional distribution of land values or housing prices (though many of the factors that affect them over time undoubtedly come into play in the cross-section as well). Nonetheless if all of these factors remain relatively constant over time, then ignoring them in a model such as this should not be too great a sin.

The static first-order conditions for the problem (8) can be shown to imply that $p_t$, the relative price of housing services in terms of manufactured goods, satisfies

$$p_t = \frac{A_{mt}}{A_{ht}} \left( \frac{\beta_m}{\beta_h} - \frac{1 - \alpha - \beta_h}{1 - \alpha - \beta_m} \right)^{\alpha + \beta_h - 1} \ell_{mt}^{(\beta_h - \beta_m)}$$  (17)

Thus as in the static example, growth in the price of housing services reflects both relative productivity growth in manufacturing and the increasing scarcity of land.
4.3 Aggregate Growth under Certainty

Let total expenditure \( c + ph \) be denoted by \( x \). It also turns out that \( \mu_m = x^{-1} \) (see the proof in Appendix 1), hence \( \mu_{mt}/\mu_{mt-1} = x_{t-1}/x_t \). We will define aggregate balanced growth under certainty as an equilibrium path in which \( x \) and \( k \) both grow at a constant rate, and in which the interest rate (i.e. the marginal product of capital) is also constant. We will also assume that \( z(i/k) = i/k \) and \( z'(i/k) = 1 \) at the steady state value of \( i/k \), so that adjustment costs are zero on the balanced growth path. Balanced growth clearly requires that \( A\mu_{mt}k^\alpha_{mt}h^\beta_{mt} \) be constant, which amounts to a linear restriction on the growth rates in the \( m \) sector of the capital-labor ratio, technological progress, and the land-labor ratio. Therefore, let

\[
Z_t \equiv \left[ A_{mt} \mu_{mt}^\beta_{mt} \right]^{1/(1-\alpha)}
\]

and define variables with “~” over them to be deflated by \( Z_t \), e.g. \( \tilde{k}_{mt} \equiv k_{mt}/Z_t \). We then have

\[
x_t/k_{t-1} + i_t/k_{t-1} = \tilde{k}_{mt}^{\alpha-1} \tag{19}
\]

\[
(1 + \nu) k_t/k_{t-1} = z(i_t/k_{t-1}) + 1 - \delta \tag{20}
\]

\[
(x_{t+1}/x_t)(1 + \nu)(1 + \rho) q_t = \alpha \tilde{k}_{mt+1}^{\alpha-1} + q_{t+1} [z(i_{t+1}/k_t) + 1 - \delta - (i_{t+1}/k_t)] \tag{21}
\]

With \( \tilde{k}_m \) constant under balanced growth, \( k \) and \( x \) both grow at the same constant rate. From the resource constraints and first-order conditions for maximization, we can show that

\[
k_{mt} \left[ \frac{1 - \alpha - \beta_m n_{ht} + n_{mt}}{1 - \alpha - \beta_h} \right] = k_{t-1}. \tag{22}
\]

Now let

\[
Q_t \equiv 1 + \tau n_{ht} \tag{23}
\]

where

\[
\tau \equiv \frac{\beta_h - \beta_m}{1 - \alpha - \beta_h}.
\]

Then we have \( k_{mt} = k_{t-1}/Q_t \), and we can define \( \hat{k}_t \equiv k_t/(Z_t Q_t) \). This gives a normalization of \( k_t \) that is constant on the balanced growth path. Note that if \( \beta_m = \beta_h \), then \( Q = 1 \) and we would have \( k_{mt} = k_{ht} = k_{t-1} \). But with \( \beta_m > \beta_h \), \( Q > 1 \) and \( n_h \) and \( n_m \) are changing over time (unless \( \epsilon = 1 \)). In particular, if \( \epsilon < 1 \) and \( \gamma_m \geq \gamma_h \), then \( n_h \) (and hence \( Q \)) grows over time.

Thus, strictly speaking, balanced growth requires one of these knife-edge conditions:
\( \epsilon = 1, \beta_m = \beta_h, \) or
\[
(1 + \gamma_m) (1 + \nu)^{\beta_h - \beta_m} = 1 + \gamma_h
\]
(24)

None of these is very palatable: Below I provide evidence that \( \epsilon \) is substantially less than one, and cite other studies with similar findings. I also show that \( \epsilon \) has important implications for housing price dynamics, so assuming \( \epsilon = 1 \) for convenience is not innocuous. Similar comments apply to the assumption \( \beta_m = \beta_h \). To assume (24) is less problematic, as it is tantamount to assuming that \( \rho \) is stationary. It does imply that \( \gamma_h > \gamma_m \), which is hard to believe but also hard to refute directly since \( \gamma_h \) is difficult to measure. If (24) fails to hold (say if \( \gamma_m \geq \gamma_h \), so that \( \rho \) drifts higher over time), the dynamic response of the model will be a function of the level of \( \rho \)—in particular the expected growth rate varies over time and is only asymptotically constant.

It turns out, however, that assuming balanced growth (that is, solving the model by approximating around a fixed point) appears to be innocuous: Both the variation in the growth rate over time and the differences in dynamics are tiny. Thus when (24) does not hold, the model exhibits near-balanced aggregate growth and unbalanced sectoral dynamics, as in Ngai and Pissarides (2007).\(^5\) We will see below that over a wide range of parameters, growth is so close to balanced even when \( \rho \) is growing over time that it is reasonable to treat it as balanced for computational purposes. So the bottom line is that at least for reasonable parameters the model implies that growth is (approximately) balanced even when sectoral growth is unbalanced because \( \rho \) grows over time.

Under balanced growth, \( ZQ \) grows at a constant rate. In fact it is straightforward to show that its growth rate \( g \) satisfies
\[
\left[ (1 + \gamma_m) (1 + \nu)^{-\beta_m} \right]^{1/(1-\alpha)} = 1 + g^* = G^*
\]
(25)

We then have \( \tilde{k}_{mt} = k_{mt}/Z_t = k_{t-1}/(Q_tZ_t) = \tilde{k}_{t-1}Q_{t-1}Z_{t-1}/(Q_tZ_t) \equiv \hat{k}_{t-1}/G_t \). Aggregate output per capita (in terms of manufactured goods), which we denote \( y_t \), is \( A_{mt}k_{mt}^\alpha l_{mt}^{\beta_m} n_{mt} + \rho_t A_{ht}k_{ht}^{\alpha} l_{ht}^{\beta_h} n_{ht} \), or (after substituting for \( \rho_t \) and simplifying as before):
\[
y_t = A_{mt}k_{mt}^\alpha l_{mt}^{\beta_m} Q_t = \tilde{k}_{mt}Z_tQ_t,
\]
(26)

\(^5\)In the stochastic growth case considered below, however, TFP will have a unit root, so it will be necessary to take account of the imbalances away from the balanced growth path. For example, an impulse response to the growth rate of \( A_{mt} \) results in a permanent level effect, and the new balanced growth path (assuming (24) holds again) has slightly different dynamics than the original path. Again, the differences are turn out to be tiny, but this has to be verified.
so we can also define $\hat{y}_t = y_t / (Z_tQ_t) = \hat{k}_m^\alpha = \left[ \hat{k}_{t-1}/G_t \right]^\alpha$ and $\hat{x}_t = x_t / (Z_tQ_t)$.

We can now characterize the dynamics in terms of stationary variables:

\begin{align*}
\hat{x}_t + \hat{t}_t &= \left[ \hat{k}_{t-1}/G_t \right]^\alpha \\
G_t (1 + \nu) \hat{\kappa}_t &= z \left( G_t \hat{\kappa}_t / \hat{k}_{t-1} \right) \hat{k}_{t-1} + (1 - \delta) \hat{k}_{t-1} \\
(\hat{x}_{t+1}/\hat{x}_t) G_t (1 + \nu) (1 + \rho) q_t &= \alpha \left[ \hat{k}_t/G_t \right]^{\alpha-1} - G_t \hat{\kappa}_{t+1}/\hat{k}_t \\
&\quad + q_{t+1} \left[ z \left( G_t \hat{\kappa}_{t+1}/\hat{k}_t \right) + 1 - \delta \right] \\
q_t &= z' \left( G_t \hat{\kappa}_t / \hat{k}_{t-1} \right)^{-1}
\end{align*}

Since along the balanced growth path $G_t$ is constant, $z(x) = x$, and $q = 1$, the aggregate economy behaves exactly as the standard neoclassical growth model. The innovation in this paper is to simultaneously characterize the behavior of sectoral variables, and in particular housing prices and investment, within the aggregate steady state.

The sectoral variables can be solved for directly as functions of the aggregates. Only in the knife-edge cases of $\epsilon = 1$ or (24) will these variables exhibit balanced growth in the sense of either being constant or growing at the same rate as the aggregate economy. (Details are provided in Appendix 1.) We can compute the shadow rental price of land, denoted $\zeta_t$, in terms of manufactured goods:

$$\zeta_t = \beta_m A_m k_m^\alpha q_m^{\beta_m-1}$$

The land rental price grows at rate $g + \nu$ on the balanced growth path, but at a faster rate in the near-balanced growth case in which $p$ grows over time.

4.4 Stochastic Growth

We suppose that the growth rate of $A_h$ is fixed at $\gamma_h$, but that of $A_m$ follows a Markov regime-switching process:

$$A_{mt}/A_{mt-1} = (1 + \tilde{\gamma}_m) \eta_t/\eta_{t-1}$$

where

$$\tilde{\gamma}_m = \begin{cases} 
\gamma_m^1 & \text{if } \xi_t = 1 \\
\gamma_m^0 & \text{if } \xi_t = 0 
\end{cases}$$

\(\eta_t\) is a transitory disturbance, and $\xi_t$ is a state variable with Markov transition matrix $\Theta$, where $\Theta[i,j] = \Pr(\xi_t = j|\xi_{t-1} = i)$. Since the columns of $\Theta$ must sum to one, we write it
as
\[ \Theta = \begin{bmatrix} \theta_1 & 1 - \theta_0 \\ 1 - \theta_1 & \theta_0 \end{bmatrix}. \] (34)

If the diagonal elements of \( \Theta \) are close to one, the growth states will be highly persistent, and a shift from one state to the other will carry with it a sizeable adjustment in the long-term level of \( A_m \).

The log deviation version of \( G_t \) can be written as
\[
G_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left[ \frac{\bar{\gamma}_m - \bar{\gamma}_m}{1 + \bar{\gamma}_m} + \Delta \eta_t + \frac{\tau n_h}{1 + \tau n_h} \Delta n_{ht} - \beta m \Delta \ell_{mt} \right]
\]

We suppose that \( \eta_t = \phi_1 \eta_{t-1} + \phi_2 \eta_{t-1} + v_t \), where \( v_t \) is i.i.d. with a zero mean. In what follows, we will first assume that economic agents observe both \( z_t \) and \( \eta_t \) before making their period \( t \) decisions. Later we will consider the possibility that they only observe \( G_t \) and must estimate \( z_t \) and \( \eta_t \) given the history of \( G_t \).

### 4.5 Asset Prices

Thus far we have only described the behavior of the price of housing services and rental prices for land. The term “housing prices” generally refers to asset values of homes, both the structures and the land. In this model we can calculate the value of what might be called “real estate wealth,” which would be the total value of capital and land allocated to the housing services sector. The value of the capital is just \( K_h = k_h n_h \). The asset value of the land \( L_h = \ell_h n_h \) requires some computation, as described below. Given a land price, which we will denote by \( V_t \) (expressed in terms of \( m \) sector output), valuing a representative house requires constructing an index, because the composition of the representative house changes over time due to changes in the price of land. Given a path \( \{K_{ht}, L_{ht}\} \) we will define a “constant-quality” house price index \( P_{ht} \) as a Laspeyres index by choosing a base year, say \( t = 0 \), and setting \( P_{ht} = 100 (V_t L_{h0} + K_{h0}) / (V_0 L_{h0} + K_{h0}) \).

We know that \( V_t \) is the present discounted value of the stream of rents \( \{\zeta_t\} \):
\[
V_t = \zeta_t + E_t \{ \Phi_{t,1} V_{t+1} \} = E_t \left\{ \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \Phi_{t,\tau} \zeta_{t+\tau} \right\} \] (35)

where
\[
\Phi_{t,\tau} = \frac{\mu_m t+\tau}{\mu_m (1 + \nu)^\tau (1 + \rho)^\tau} = \frac{x_t}{x_{t+\tau} (1 + \nu)^\tau (1 + \rho)^\tau} \] (36)
is the stochastic discount factor. On the balanced growth path we have \( \Phi^{-1} = (1 + g) (1 + \rho) (1 + \nu) \),
and $\zeta_t$, as mentioned previously, (for plausible parameters) almost constant but technically a function of $A_{mt}/A_{nt}$ and $N_t$ (for $\epsilon < 1$ it is increasing in both arguments). Hence while the capital stock and the aggregate output grow at $g + \nu$, the price of land, and hence the price of “houses” (capital plus land in the $h$ sector) grows at a rate (slightly) faster than $g + \nu$.

### 4.6 Calibration

Most of the parameters take on standard values for quarterly data: $\alpha = 0.33$, $\nu = 0.0025$, $\delta = 0.02$. The parameters $\beta_h$ and $\beta_m$ should reflect the shares of land in the cost of housing services and non-housing output respectively. The work of Davis and Heathcote (2004) suggests a value for $\beta_h$ of 0.5. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics capital tables suggest a value for $\beta_m$ of 0.05. Since housing services represent about 20 percent of overall consumer expenditures, we set $\omega_h = 0.2$, $\omega_c = 0.8$, though since expenditure shares vary it is necessary to choose the starting level of $A_m/A_h$ appropriately. We set the time preference rate $\rho$ equal to 0.01. Finally, we choose the parameters of the regime-switching process for productivity to correspond roughly to the results in KR: $\gamma^1_m = 0.00496$, so that the per capita aggregate growth rate $(\gamma^1_m - \beta_m\nu)/(1 - \alpha)$ corresponds to an annualized rate of 2.9 percent; and $\gamma^0_m = 0.00229$, corresponding to 1.3 percent aggregate per capita growth in the low-growth regime. The regimes are highly persistent: we use KR’s estimates of the diagonal elements of the Markov transition, $\theta_1 = 0.99$, $\theta_0 = 0.983$. Thus high growth regimes are slightly more persistent than low-growth, with mean durations of approximately 25 and 15 years respectively. See Appendix 2 for more details about the estimation of these parameters.

### 4.7 The Elasticity of Substitution between Housing and other Consumption

The first-order conditions of the model imply a relationship between the expenditure ratio for housing and non-housing consumption and the relative price.

$$\frac{\omega_c}{\omega_h} \frac{p_t h_t}{c_t} = p_t^{1-\epsilon}$$

(37)

---

6 The choice for $\delta$ represents a compromise between conventional values for structures and equipment for the sake of tractability. Allowing $\delta$ to differ for $K_h$ and $K_m$ complicates the math without altering the predictions of the model in any significant way.

7 Of course there is great variability across subsectors: Manufacturing has a land share of about 0.02, as do most service sectors, while wholesale and retail trade is about 0.07, and agriculture about 0.3. But weighting the various sectors by their share in GDP yields a figure of 0.05.
The long-term behavior of aggregate expenditures on housing services suggests a unit income elasticity for such expenditures, but price inelastic (i.e. $\epsilon < 1$). This is because the ratio expenditures on housing services to non-housing consumption expenditures has no long-run trend, but is positively correlated with the relative price of housing services, at least as measured by NIPA. Figure 6 presents annual data going back to 1929 of the two series, which show a positive relationship for most of the sample, though recently (since roughly 1990) they have diverged. The magnitude of the elasticity, however, is difficult to infer from time series data, given that both the ratio and the price are endogenous variables. In addition, whereas the nominal expenditures on $h$ and $c$ may be measured accurately, there may be substantial error in measuring the true relative price. Whereas the Boskin Commission had estimated an upward bias in CPI rents, Gordon and van Goethem (2005) argue for a downward bias averaging roughly 0.5 percent annually, but varying over time.

As a consequence, we instead examine evidence from micro data. Specifically, we examine data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to gauge the extent of housing service expenditure share variability as a function the relative price of housing services. To do so we construct rent (or owner’s equivalent rent) relative to other expenditures, and match this up with data on housing prices by region, total expenditures, and demographic controls. As the above condition suggests, we can obtain an estimate of $\epsilon$ by a suitable regression of the nominal expenditure ratio on relative price.

Looking at micro data solves several problems. First, it is reasonable to take the price, which is based on regional CPI measures of owner’s equivalent rent relative to the CPI excluding shelter, as exogenous to individual households. Second, the price measurement issue alluded to above is arguably mitigated by reliance on relative prices across regions. Third, we can include specific demographic controls to account for variation in, for example, $\omega_c/\omega_h$.

Consider the following model for individual $i$ at date $t$ in region $j$:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{p_{jt}h_{it}}{(x_{it} - p_{jt}h_{it})} \right] = a_j + b \ln x_{it} + (1 - \epsilon) \ln p_{jt} + z_{it}' \theta + u_{itj}. $$

Here $a_j$ reflects some constant region-specific factor that might affect expenditure shares. For example, if living in a region provides some amenities such as inexpensive public transportation or moderate weather that substitute for other expenditures (automobiles, heating oil), $a_j$ might be positive. Note that we have to assume that $a_j$ is constant over time or else we would not be able to identify the price effect. The coefficient $b$ would reflect a wealth effect to the extent it differs from zero, and the coefficient on $p_{jt}$ has the interpretation indicated: if $\epsilon < 1$, relative expenditures on housing services increase with their cost.
model also includes a set of demographic variables $z_{it}$, which would include things like family size and number of wage-earners. Note that we would expect a negative coefficient on an indicator of two adults working, as this would typically result in less household production and more expenditures on non-housing goods and services. Finally, the error term $u_{ijt}$ represents idiosyncratic variation in preferences for housing services (in the model represented by $\omega_h/\omega_c$), measurement error of the dependent variable, and other omitted variables.

If the CEX had a true panel structure we could difference out the $a_j$. We could also allow for individual fixed effects. Unfortunately each individual household observation is present for at most four quarterly observations, so the panel aspect is probably useless (the other explanatory variables are not likely to change in a meaningful way over the course of a household’s participation). Consequently we choose to pool the sample in levels and use regional dummies to capture the region effects. We also just use one (the first) observation per household, to avoid giving more weight to households simply because they remain in the sample.

Another consideration is adjustment costs. Moving is costly, so many households may be passively accepting changes in their expenditure shares for a while until they decide to move. Consider an $(s, S)$ framework in which households have fixed costs of moving. They remain where they are and simply absorb any price variation so long as the price $p$ is between the lower and upper bounds $s$ and $S$; otherwise they move and obtain a new level of expenditure $p^h \in (s, S)$. If this is the case, we want to gauge the potential bias in estimating $\epsilon$.

While one might think that the tendency for households to move infrequently would bias the estimate of $\epsilon$ toward zero, the results of Caplin and Spulber (1987) suggests that if $p$ is stationary and not very persistent, and households experience idiosyncratic shocks in addition to changes in $p$, then households will be uniformly distributed in the interval $(s, S)$. And if, on the other hand, $p$ has a unit root or is trending over time and $\epsilon \neq 1$, $(s, S)$ will drift along with $p$, but at any point in time households will still be distributed uniformly throughout the interval. Consequently the observed expenditure ratio will likely equal the “desired” or long-run ratios plus some noise. The covariance of this error with $p$ should be zero; that is, households are just as likely to be above as below their desired ratio. This suggests there is no compelling reason to think that the estimate of $\epsilon$ should be biased in one direction or another.

For nominal expenditures on housing services we use rent for renters and owner’s equivalent rent (OER) on the primary residence for owners.\footnote{We do not include rent or OER on vacation or second homes. Though it might be desirable to do so, especially for second homes, it is difficult to distinguish, for example, someone who owns a vacation home but rents it out for 48 weeks of the year and uses it for four weeks, on the one hand, from someone who uses it every weekend. The former should be treated as equivalent to someone who rents a vacation home for} Consequently we subtract mortgage
and home equity interest from total expenditures, as well as property taxes and expenditures on various categories of home repairs and maintenance that would normally be included in rent. We assume that OER is not intended to include utilities, so for owners utility expenditures are included in total but not housing expenditures. For renters, reported utility expenditures are also included only in total expenditures, but a dummy variable is included for renters that report zero utilities expenditures (on the assumption that they are included in rent).

The results of this estimation exercise are shown in Table 2. Because of an unexplained break in the level of the dependent variable that occurs in 1993 (presumably because of some change in variable definitions), all of our estimates included a dummy variable for post-1993 data. The total expenditure variable $x_{it}$ is likely to be measured with error. Such error would tend to produce a potentially large downward bias in the estimate of $b$ because $x_{it}$ enters the denominator of the dependent variable. Fortunately, we have candidates for instruments: demographic variables such as race and education that are plausibly unrelated to the $u_{itj}$. We present results with and without constraining $b = 0$. Imposing $b = 0$ results in $\hat{\epsilon} = 0.284$. Estimating $\hat{b}$ with instrumental variables lowers the estimate of $\hat{\epsilon}$ to around 0.2, though the estimate of $b$ is a somewhat implausible $-0.254$. Similar estimates were obtained without the fixed region effects.  

The fact that the estimates of $\epsilon$ are relatively insensitive to the treatment of other variables in the equation provides some reassurance that it is well below one. This is consistent with a long history of studies that find housing demand to have a low price elasticity (e.g. Hanushek and Quigley, 1980; Polinsky and Ellwood, 1979), or other estimates of $\epsilon$ based on micro data. For example, Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) use PSID data and, taking explicit account of lumpy adjustment costs, estimate $\epsilon$ to be 0.13. Using a different methodology based on asset prices, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) set $\epsilon = 0.05$ in their calibration. The significant negative estimate of $b$ is problematic for the assumption of homotheticity, but is hard to square with the relatively flat expenditure share in Figure 6. If true it would tend to mute the effects described in the simulation, as growth in the demand for housing services would not be as responsive to expected productivity growth. For this reason we will be conservative in our choice of $\epsilon$ and set it equal to 0.3 for our benchmark case.

---

\footnote{four weeks, which we regard as something qualitatively different from housing services.}

\footnote{Without instrumenting for $x$, the estimate of $b$ is an implausibly large negative number (as one would expect given that the explanatory variable is in the denominator of the dependent variable), and the estimate of $\epsilon$ is only 0.134.}
4.8 Model Simulations

The unit root assumption on productivity growth necessitates gauging the evolution of the model economy when (24) does not hold. Specifically, suppose \((1 + \gamma_m) (1 + \nu)^{\beta_h-\beta_m} > 1 + \gamma_h\) so that \(p\) grows over time. We can simulate the model under constant TFP growth around fixed values of \(\hat{k}\) and \(\hat{x}\) and find the value for \(g\) that matches the actual average growth rate of \(QZ\) (which is the growth rate of per capita capital and output) in the simulation. We then examine how much the growth rate of \(QZ\) varies over time, and what that implies for variation in \(\hat{k}\) and \(\hat{x}\). If it turns out to be miniscule, then balanced growth is a good approximation and we can linearize around fixed values of \(\hat{k}\) and \(\hat{x}\) in the usual way.

Table 3 provides the results of this exercise for various values of \(\gamma_h\) implying different average growth rates of \(p\). The simulations were over 50 years (200 quarterly observations), using the parameters described above. The results show that even for the case in which \(p\) grows at one percent annually for 50 years (the growth rates in the table are quarterly percentages), the change in the growth rate is tiny and economically inconsequential in terms of its impact on the level of \(k\) and \(x\).

Given these findings, we can separate the model conveniently into its dynamic aggregate component, which is approximately the neoclassical growth model, and the sectoral variables, which do not have a simple steady state representation, but are static functions of the aggregate state variables. The connection between the two components is in the growth rate \(G_t\), which depends on the changes in sectoral variables from \(t - 1\) to \(t\). Thus we use standard methods (e.g. Uhlig, 1997—see Appendix 1 for more details) to obtain a solution for the linearized aggregate model. It should be noted that parameters related to the sectoral dimension of the model do not enter into this part of the problem. These include \(\beta_h\), \(\epsilon\), \(\gamma_h\), \(\omega_e\), and \(\omega_h\). For given realizations of the exogenous disturbances, time paths for the aggregates can be computed, they can be converted back to levels and become inputs to solving the for the sectoral variables (e.g. \(p, n_m, n_h\), etc.) period-by-period.

The key to doing interesting simulations is to take the peculiar error structure of the disturbance process into account. Even though the conditional expectation of the errors in the \(z_t\) process (the regime states) is zero, actual realizations of zero are not possible, and in fact given the values of \(q_i\) and \(q_0\), a small error (of absolute value \(1 - q_0\) or \(1 - q_i\)) that leaves \(z\) unchanged is highly likely in any given time period. So rather than consider a one-time shock to \(v\), it makes sense to consider a single large shock (a regime-switch) followed by a sequence of identical small shocks that leave the regime unchanged for an extended period of time. Such a path is more like a modal outcome rather than the improbable mean.

Figure 7 gives an example of this type of simulation. The economy is in the low growth regime in periods 1 to 11, and then switches to the high growth regime, where it remains.
The figure plots the behavior of the asset price of a house (a fixed-weight combination of capital and land—see below) against per capita income, for $\epsilon = 0.3$ and 0.9. House prices are clearly much more responsive, both at impact and during the regimes, in the $\epsilon = 0.3$ case. When the regime shift occurs, the price jumps about 5 percent if $\epsilon = 0.3$ versus around 2 percent if $\epsilon = 0.9$. During the high-growth regime the growth rate of the price is about 0.5 percent (annualized) faster if $\epsilon = 0.3$ versus $\epsilon = 0.9$. Prices actually accelerate as long as the economy remains in the high-growth regime, the more so the lower is $\epsilon$.

4.9 Regime Uncertainty

The model solution and simulations above assume perfect knowledge about the growth regime. This is unlikely to be a realistic assumption: Productivity growth is a very noisy process with (as we shall see. Fortunately, the framework in KR provides a natural mechanism for extracting what economic agents know about the growth regime from the behavior of other economic variables. As described in Appendix 2, it is a dynamic factor model with Markov regime-switching in the stochastic growth component.

Figure 8 provides an estimate of the so-called smoothed (incorporating all available data through 2007:Q3) and zero-lag (incorporating data for each observation only up to that date) estimates of regime probabilities, incorporating information about the growth regime from data on productivity, labor compensation, aggregate consumption, and aggregate hours of work. The zero-lag estimates provide a one basis for what economic agents might have thought at the time. Note in particular the recent signs of a shift back to the low-growth regime, roughly coincident with the sudden end of the housing boom.

As an extreme benchmark, we can simulate the model under the assumption of perfect information, i.e. that agents actually observe the regime shifts and level shocks $\eta$ in real time. Figure 9 illustrates the behavior of housing prices according to the model under this extreme assumption, where the simulation assumes, based on Figure 8, that regime shifts occurred in 1973, 1996, and 2004. As suggested by the discussion in the previous section, a regime shift triggers both a level and growth rate change in housing prices. Transitory shocks have relatively little impact since they are not confused with permanent shocks. Note that for these and subsequent simulations, because the linear trend depends on the unobservable $\gamma_h$, we just assume a value for $\gamma_h$ such that the trends line up exactly, and judge the model by its ability to match deviations from the linear trend. By that standard, the perfect information assumption clearly misses on both timing and amplitude.

There are, however, three potential sources of incomplete or imperfect information. First, agents may not observe $\eta_t$, the persistent but transitory disturbance to $A_{mt}$, separately from
$v_t$, the regime-dependent error. This is a standard inference problem addressed by Hamilton (1994) and others. As new data arrive, agents observe $A_{mt}$ and update their assessment of the current regime. It turns out that although this aspect of imperfect information smooths out the implied price series somewhat, the impact is limited by the fact that with full knowledge of the underlying parameters, agents can infer regime switches relatively quickly—typically within two years of when the full sample indicates the switches occurred. Consequently the resulting price series exhibits most of the flaws of the series under perfect information in Figure 9, attenuated only slightly.

This sort of rational expectations updating is implausible in anything other than a stationary environment in which agents know (or have had sufficient time to learn) the underlying parameters of the stochastic processes. As of the early 1970s there had been no experience in the United States with a sustained productivity slowdown since the Great Depression. To believe that the low productivity growth beginning in 1973 was a change in the trend would have required vivid imagination or exceptional insight. Other than considering the experience of other countries, there would have been no realistic way to form estimates of either the alternative mean growth rate or the transition probabilities.

Thus, a second source of imperfect information is the result of agents not knowing the parameters of the productivity process. One way to approach this is to suppose that expectations are formed by estimating the regime-switching dynamic factor model in “real time”—that is, based on data only available at each point in time.\footnote{Edge et al (2007) consider a similar question in a linear context using a Kalman filter. Kahn and Rich (2006) apply this paper’s approach to the 1990’s and find that the model detects the productivity boom relatively quickly—within a year or two of when, with hindsight, it apparently began. This is because by the 1990s the parameter estimates have converged close to the full sample estimates.} This is similar to least squares learning, except that there is no simple recursion to update the parameter estimates. While estimation of a regime-switching model when there is no regime switch (yet) in the data is potentially problematic, as some parameters are not identified, the point in real time at which the estimation begins to detect a regime switch provides a plausible mechanism for dating when economic agents might have done so (apart from the fact that the econometric techniques had not been developed yet!) It turns out that rolling estimation of the KR model annually through the 1970s confirms that it fails even to detect a second regime until around 1978, and only puts high probability on it in 1979 (see Figure 10a). After that the estimation converges quickly to close to the full sample estimates. It is worth noting that 1979 is also the year when a number of studies about “the productivity slowdown” began to appear (e.g. Denison, 1979; Norsworthy et al., 1979), though even these were primarily retrospective and did not take clear stands on how likely the slowdown was to persist. Edge et al (2007) also report that official forecasts of long-run productivity growth drifted down
slowly in the 1970s, but remained above 2 percent through 1978, and then plummeted in 1979 to 1.5 percent.

Yet a third complication is illustrated by Figure 10b. Whereas the KR model estimated with data available as of the end of July 2007—recall Figure 8—shows the current productivity slowdown beginning (with high probability) in 2004, data available prior to July 2007 had not indicated a slowdown with any substantial probability. Even as of June 2007, Figure 10b indicates that the low-growth regime probabilities were in the vicinity of 0.1. Then the benchmark revisions that came out in July 2007 revised productivity growth downward over the previous three years. Thus, in addition to the difficulties presented by learning the parameters of the process, and by—given the parameters—assessing the regime probabilities in real time as the data arrive, there is the third difficulty that the data are regularly revised. While it is possible that the downward revisions did not come as a complete surprise, it is reasonable to assume that there was significant delay in recognizing the magnitude of the productivity slowdown. Hence the real-time estimates from the KR model would appear to be more realistic than the full sample estimates underlying Figure 8.

The general equilibrium model in this paper does not have the complexity that would allow the methods of KR to be applied or simulated directly; in particular, there is only one stochastic variable, so there would be no point to dynamic factor analysis. On the other hand, using actual productivity data would result in unrealistically poor assessments of when the regime switches occurred (see KR). Instead, we construct an artificial productivity process as in (32)–(34), imposing regime switches that correspond to those found in the data, i.e. in 1973, 1996, and 2004. For the \( \eta_t \) process we use the estimated common transitory process from the KR model, scaled so as to obtain similar regime inferences to those obtained by KR.\footnote{Similar results were obtained using Monte Carlo simulations for the \( \eta \) process, but of course the business cycle peaks and troughs did not generally line up with those in the data.} The resulting “productivity” series is then used to estimate the parameters of the process along with regime probabilities as of each date from 1963:Q1 forward. This results in a set of parameters associated with each date, which then are used to simulate the model. The only calibrated (fixed) parameters are the discount rate \( \rho \), the depreciation rate \( \delta \), and the share parameters \( \beta_h \) and \( \beta_m \).

More formally, the idea here is to assume that agents observe \( A_{mt} = A_{mt-1} (1 + \tilde{\gamma}_{mt}) \eta_t / \eta_{t-1}, \) but whereas the true process, and accordingly the values of \( \tilde{\gamma}_{mt} \) and \( \eta_t, \) are as described earlier, agents instead have time-varying estimates of the parameters \( \hat{\gamma}^1_{mt}, \hat{\gamma}^0_{mt}, \hat{\theta}_{1t}, \hat{\theta}_{0t}, \) probabilities \( \hat{\pi}_{t|t} = \text{Pr} (\xi_t = 1|\Omega_t), \) and transitory terms \( \hat{\tau}_{s|t} = E (\eta_s|\Omega_t) \) where \( \Omega_t \) represents data observed through period \( t. \) (We assume only that they know the production function parameters \( \alpha, \beta_h, \) and \( \beta_m, \) and the parameters of the utility function.) They obtain estimates of
the parameters by using maximum likelihood (or, rather, an approximation\textsuperscript{12} based on Kim, 1994). At each date they update their estimates upon observing the latest realization of $A_{mt}$, and revise their expectations of future exogenous and endogenous variables accordingly. In other words, by construction agents’ estimates of the various components of $g_t$ add up to the actual $g_t$, which is observed, but have different implications for expectations compared to the complete information case where the parameters are known and the shocks observed. (See Appendix 1 for additional details)

Figure 11 provides the results of the model simulation of housing prices under the real-time learning assumption, in comparison with the Census and OFHEO indexes. All series are detrended, since the model does not have any prediction about the price trend. While the model misses on the full amplitude of the price fluctuations, it gets most of it: The amplitude of the model’s predicted price path is roughly plus or minus 10 percent relative to trend, while both the new and existing home price series get to around 15 percent above trend, and the existing home price series plunges to more than 15 percent below trend in the mid-nineties. With regard to timing, the model tends to anticipate the actual price increases, especially in the 1960s, but gets the timing of the peaks and troughs remarkably well.

Another check on the model is its predictions about investment. Clearly the lack of adjustment costs at the sectoral level will mean that sectoral investment will be excessively volatile at high frequencies. Aggregate adjustment costs appear to have little impact on this volatility: With relative price changes, the model makes it too easy to flip capital from one sector to the other. Nonetheless we can still examine the model’s predictions and focus on the lower frequencies of interest. Figure 12 displays the behavior of residential investment (defined as the change in residential capital), along with actual series. Both series are detrended, the model’s by the steady state growth trend, and the data by a Hodrick-Prescott trend for real GDP. Just as the model overpredicts prices in the early part of the sample, it overpredicts residential investment as well. Overall the model hits the medium frequency movements reasonably well, albeit predicting somewhat greater medium-frequency amplitude than is in the data. The only substantive miss after 1975 is the model’s prediction of a mini-cycle in the second half of the 1990s that never occurred. This is the mirror image of the model’s slightly premature prediction of a price runup beginning at the same time. It appears that the artificial learning that takes place in the model is a little too rapid, at least in response to favorable news.

\textsuperscript{12}The approximation arises because the inferences about $\eta_t$ and $\eta_{t-1}$ should involve expectations conditional on not only the current regime, but on the whole history of regimes. Instead these are collapsed into single unconditional values.
The finding that the model slightly underpredicts the amplitude of price fluctuations and overpredicts the amplitude of investment fluctuations is not surprising given the lack of any adjustment costs or other real frictions. In addition, the model omits demographics, which may have played some role, particularly in the early part of the sample in the wake of the baby boom: There was an explosion of family formation and residential investment following World War II, and the offspring in those families had for the most part not yet come of age. This may have held down both prices and investment in the 1960s and early 1970s, and boosted them in the late 1970s and 1980s and again in recent years during the “echoes” of the baby boom.

Overall, given its parsimony and simplicity, and the fact that it has only one driving force, the model explains a substantial part of both price and quantity fluctuations. This is noteworthy considering that the key parameters—the elasticity of substitution, the land share parameters in the production functions, and the productivity process, are calibrated either from micro data or, in the case of the productivity process, from empirical exercises that do not take the housing sector into account. Certainly there are parameters that would result in an even better fit, but the goal here was not to explain everything, only to quantify the role of changes in trend productivity.

5 Conclusions

This paper has developed a growth model with land, housing services, and other goods and shown that it is capable both qualitatively and quantitatively of explaining a substantial portion of the movements in housing prices and, to a lesser extent, residential investment over the past 40 years, including the recent downturn. The paper also uses micro data to calibrate a key cross-elasticity parameter that governs the relationship between productivity growth and home price appreciation. The matching of the model to the data relies not on fitting the overall trend (which depends on an unobservable), but on the deviations from that trend as a function of productivity growth. The calibrated model under rational expectations can explain some of the acceleration in housing prices that occurred both in the 1960s and since the mid-1990s, and also suggests a contributing explanation for the recent downturn, but fails to get the full amplitude and timing of the fluctuations. When a realistic model of learning is added in lieu of rational expectations, however, the model does much better on both. In particular, the continued boom in housing prices in the 1970s is largely explained by the time it took for agents to figure out that the productivity slowdown was quasi-permanent. Finally, the paper also has some success in matching the low frequency behavior of housing investment, in particular the boom that began in the late 1990s. Even
so, future work will incorporate adjustment costs, and other sources of shocks to capture more accurately the high frequency behavior of both prices and quantities.

Another implication of this analysis is that it sheds new light on recent subprime mortgage crisis and the ripple effects on financial markets. If we accept the idea that the housing downturn was triggered by a productivity slowdown, and that this was a low probability event in light of what was known prior to 2007 about productivity growth, it may be that subprime mortgage lending was, ex ante, economically rational. The probability of a productivity slowdown—and therefore of a reversal in housing prices—such as the one that occurred in 1973 could reasonably have been viewed as small over the relevant horizon for mortgage lenders.. Indeed, a recent paper by Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008) makes precisely this point. They examine optimal mortgage lending in a setting where housing prices obey essentially the same type of regime-switching behavior, and find that “many features of subprime lending observed in practice are consistent with economic efficiency and rationality of both borrowers and lenders,” though, as they point out, there may be negative externalities associated with massive defaults in a downturn.

Moreover, if indeed house prices are driven to a great extent by long-term fundamentals like productivity growth, and not so much by credit market frictions, this has important implications not just for a historical understanding of the causes of the housing bust that began in 2005, but also for policies aimed at shoring up house prices by providing foreclosure relief, subsidized mortgages, and the like. The results in this paper suggest that such policies are likely to have limited impact, since they do not affect the economy’s long-term growth potential. More generally, the results suggest that policies aimed at stimulating the economy by supporting house prices are getting it backwards: The best way to support house prices is to undertake policies that support long-term economic growth.
6 Appendix 1

6.1 Solving the Model under Complete Information

Proof that \( \mu_m = x^{-1} \): \( \mu_m = u_c = \phi_c / \phi \).

Since \( \phi \) is homogeneous of degree one, \( \phi = \phi_c c + \phi_h h \). Also \( p = \phi_h / \phi_c \), so \( \phi = \phi_c (c + ph) = \phi_c x \). Hence \( \phi_c / \phi = x^{-1} \).

Modeling the regime shift process:

Since the stationary distribution of \( \xi \) is \( \xi^* \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1-\theta_0}{2-\theta_1-\theta_0} & \frac{1-\theta_1}{2-\theta_1-\theta_0} \end{bmatrix}' \), the average growth rate of \( A_m \) is

\[
\bar{\gamma}_m = \frac{1-\theta_0}{2-\theta_1-\theta_0} \gamma^1_m + \frac{1-\theta_1}{2-\theta_1-\theta_0} \gamma^0_m. \tag{38}
\]

For concreteness we will call \( \xi = 1 \) the “high-growth” regime, and \( \xi = 0 \) the “low-growth” regime, i.e. we assume \( \gamma^1_m > \gamma^0_m \).

Elaborating on Hamilton (1994), we can describe \( \mu \) as an AR(1) process. We have

\[
\xi_t = 1 - \theta_0 + (\theta_1 + \theta_0 - 1) \xi_{t-1} + v_t \tag{39}
\]

where \( E_{t-1}(v_t) = 0 \), and is distributed as follows:

\[
v_t = \begin{cases} 
1 - \theta_1 & \text{Prob } \theta_1 \text{ if } \xi_{t-1} = 1 \\
-\theta_1 & \text{Prob } 1 - \theta_1 \text{ if } \xi_{t-1} = 0 \\
-(1 - \theta_0) & \text{Prob } \theta_0 \text{ if } \xi_{t-1} = 0 \\
\theta_0 & \text{Prob } 1 - \theta_0 \text{ if } \xi_{t-1} = 0
\end{cases} \tag{40}
\]

Note that while \( E (v_t | \xi_{t-1}) = 0 \), \( v_t \) is not identically distributed over time, as the conditional distribution depends on \( \xi_{t-1} \).

The first-order conditions for the planner are as follows: Letting

\[
\phi (c, h) \equiv \left[ \omega_c c^{(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon} + \omega_h h^{(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon} \right]^{\epsilon/(\epsilon-1)}
\]
we have:

\[ \omega_c \phi^{-(1/\epsilon)} c_t^{1/\epsilon} = \mu_{mt} \]  
\[ \omega_h \phi^{-(1/\epsilon)} h_t^{1/\epsilon} = \mu_{ht} \]  
\[ \mu_{mt} \beta_m A_{mt} k_m^\alpha \ell_m^{\beta_m-1} = \mu_{ht} h_t \beta_h A_{ht} k_t^\alpha \ell_t^{\beta_h-1} \]  
\[ \mu_{mt} A_{mt} k_m^{\alpha-1} \ell_m^{\beta_m} = \mu_{ht} A_{ht} k_t^{\alpha-1} \ell_t^{\beta_h} \]  
\[ \mu_{mt} A_{mt} k_m^\alpha \ell_m^{\beta_m} = \mu_{ht} A_{ht} \times \]  
\[ \left[ \alpha k_{ht}^{\alpha-1} \ell_{ht} k_{mt} + \beta_h k_{ht}^\alpha \ell_{ht}^{\beta_h-1} \ell_{mt} + (1 - \alpha - \beta_h) k_{ht}^\alpha \ell_{ht}^{\beta_h} \right] \]  
\[ \lambda_t z'(i_t/k_{t-1}) = \mu_{mt} \]  
\[ \lambda_t (1 + \nu) (1 + \rho) = E_t \left\{ \mu_{mt+1} A_{mt+1} \alpha k_{mt+1}^{\alpha-1} \ell_{mt+1}^{\beta_m} + \right. \]  
\[ \lambda_{t+1} \left[ z(i_{t+1}/k_{t}) - (i_{t+1}/k_{t}) z'(i_{t+1}/k_{t}) + 1 - \delta \right] \]  

\[ \mu_{mt}, \mu_{ht}, \text{ and } \lambda_t \text{ are shadow prices on the resource constraints (11), (13), and (12). Note that in the absence of adjustment costs, i.e. when } z(x) = x, \text{ we have } \lambda_t = \mu_{mt}, \text{ and (48) becomes} \]  
\[ \mu_{mt} (1 + \nu) (1 + \rho) = E_t \left\{ \mu_{mt+1} \left[ A_{mt+1} \alpha k_{mt+1}^{\alpha-1} \ell_{mt+1}^{\beta_m} + 1 - \delta \right] \right\} \]  

which is just the familiar condition that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal product of capital.

To solve the model, first we linearize the system

\[ \hat{x}_t + \hat{\ell}_t = \left[ \hat{k}_{t-1}/G_t \right]^\alpha \]  
\[ G_t (1 + \nu) \hat{k}_t = z \left( G_t \hat{\ell}_t/\hat{k}_{t-1} \right) \hat{k}_{t-1} + (1 - \delta) \hat{k}_{t-1} \]  
\[ (1 + \nu) (1 + \rho) q_t = E_t \left\{ (\hat{x}_t/\hat{x}_{t+1}) G_t^1 \left[ \alpha \left[ \hat{k}_t/G_t \right]^{\alpha-1} + \right. \]  
\[ q_{t+1} \left[ z \left( G_t \hat{\ell}_{t+1}/\hat{k}_{t} \right) + 1 - \delta \right] - G_t \hat{\ell}_{t+1}/\hat{k}_{t} \right\} \]  
\[ q_t = z' \left( G_t \hat{\ell}_t/\hat{k}_{t-1} \right)^{-1} \]  

around the quasi-steady state values \( \hat{k}, \hat{x}, \text{ and } G. \) After some rearranging, and letting \( R \equiv \alpha \left[ \hat{k}/G \right]^{\alpha-1} + 1 - \delta = (1 + \rho) (1 + \nu) G, \) the linearized versions of the four equations
can be expressed as

\[ G (1 + \nu) \hat{k}_t = R \left( \hat{k}_{t-1} - G_t \right) - \hat{x}_t \left[ G \hat{x}/\hat{k} \right] \]
\[ \hat{x}_t \left[ G \hat{x}/\hat{k} \right] + \hat{\iota}_t \left[ G \hat{\iota}/\hat{k} \right] = [R - (1 - \delta)] \left( \hat{k}_{t-1} - G_t \right) \]
\[ R_q_t = E_t \left\{ [\hat{x}_t - \hat{x}_{t+1} - G_t] R \right\} \]
\[ -\alpha (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{k}{G} \right)^{\alpha-1} \left( \hat{k}_t - G_t \right) + q_{t+1} \left( G \hat{\iota}/\hat{k} + 1 - \delta \right) \}
\[ 0 = q_t + z'' \left( G \hat{\iota}/\hat{k} \right) \left( G_t + \hat{\iota}_t - \hat{k}_{t-1} \right) \]

Note that

\[ \alpha \left( \frac{k}{G} \right)^{\alpha-1} + 1 - \delta = (1 + \rho) (1 + \nu) G \]
\[ G \hat{x}/\hat{k} = \left( \frac{k}{G} \right)^{\alpha-1} + 1 - \delta - (1 + \nu) G. \]

The log deviation version of \( G_t \) can be written as

\[ G_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left[ \frac{\bar{\gamma}_m - \bar{\gamma}_m}{1 + \bar{\gamma}_m} + \Delta \eta_t + \frac{\tau n_h}{1 + \tau n_h} \Delta n_{ht} - \beta_m \Delta \ell_{mt} \right] \]  \hspace{1cm} (50)

where \( \Delta n_{ht} \) and \( \Delta \ell_{mt} \) are deviations from their local means given growth at \( G \). Thus \( G_t \) reflects the endogenous resource shift toward or away from the \( h \) sector in response to the shock.\(^{13} \)

The near-balanced growth behavior of the system means that we can approximate the

\(^{13} \) Note that the unit root in productivity means that, strictly speaking, the dynamics of the model are not independent of the initial position in levels, as \( n_h \) will will not be stationary. It turns out, however, that this variation is miniscule, because \( n_h \) evolves slowly and the coefficient on \( (n_{ht} - n_{ht-1}) \) above is sufficiently small and insensitive to \( n_h \) so that this can be neglected.
growth rates of the sectoral variables by linearizing the system

\[ p_t h_t = A_{mt} k_{mt}^{\alpha} \ell_{mt}^{\beta_m} (1 + \tau) n_{ht} / (1 + \tau n_{ht}) \]  
(51)

\[ 1 = \omega_c \phi (c_t, h_t)^{-(\epsilon-1)/\epsilon} c_t^{1/\epsilon} x_t \]  
(52)

\[ h_t / c_t = p_t^\epsilon (\omega_h / \omega_c)^\epsilon \]  
(53)

\[ \ell_{mt} = \frac{\bar{L}}{N_t} n_{ht} (1 + \tau - \beta_m / \beta_h) + \beta_m / \beta_h \]  
(54)

\[ p_t = \frac{A_{mt}}{A_{ht}} \left( \frac{\beta_m}{\beta_h} \right)^{\beta_h} (1 + \tau)^{1 - \alpha - \beta_h} \ell_{mt}^{-(\beta_h - \beta_m)}. \]  
(55)

\[ k_{mt} = k_{t-1} / (1 + \tau n_{ht}) \]  
(56)

in logarithmic first differences around the values that obtain under aggregate growth of \( G \) and population growth \( \nu_t \). Here we can assume that \( k_m \) and \( x \) grow at \( G \), while \( h, c, n_h, \) and \( \ell_m \) each grow at locally constant rates, which as we have seen is a good approximation over periods of many decades. This results in a system of the form:

\[ \Phi \Delta s_t = \Omega \Delta m_t \]  
(57)

where \( s_t \equiv [p_t \ c_t \ h_t \ \ell_{mt} \ n_{ht} \ k_{mt}]' \) and \( \Delta m_t \equiv \left[ \gamma_{mt} \ \Delta x_t \ \Delta k_{t-1} \ 0 \ 0 \right]' \), all in deviations. \( \Phi \) is \( 6 \times 6 \) and \( \Omega \) is \( 6 \times 5 \).

The local constant growth rates can be found from

\[ \Phi^{-1} \Omega \Delta \bar{m} \]  
(58)

where \( \Delta \bar{m} = \left[ \gamma_{mt} \ g \ g \ \nu \ \gamma_h \right]' \). We then have

\[ \Delta s_t = \Phi^{-1} \Omega \Delta m_t \]  
(59)

\[ G_t = \zeta' \Delta m_t = \pi' \Phi^{-1} \Omega \Delta m_t + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \gamma_{mt} \]  
(60)

where \( \zeta \) is \( 5 \times 1 \) and \( \pi = \left[ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ \frac{\beta_m}{1 - \alpha} \ \tau n_h / (1 + \tau n_h) \ 0 \right]' \) from (50) above. Thus the growth rate can be expressed in terms of the first differences of the aggregate exogenous and endogenous variables.

The result is a system is of the form (if we neglect adjustment costs for the sake of
exposition):

\[
0 = A \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{k}_{t-1} \\ \hat{x}_t \\ \hat{x}_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + B \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_{t-1} \\ \hat{k}_{t-2} \\ \hat{x}_{t-1} \\ \hat{x}_{t-2} \end{bmatrix} + CG_t + DA_t
\]

\[
0 = E_t \left\{ F \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_{t+1} \\ \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{x}_{t+1} \\ \hat{x}_t \end{bmatrix} + G \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{k}_{t-1} \\ \hat{x}_t \\ \hat{x}_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + H \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_{t-2} \\ \hat{x}_{t-1} \\ \hat{x}_{t-2} \end{bmatrix} + JG_{t+1} + KG_t + LA_{t+1} + MA_t \right\}
\]

\[
\Lambda_{t+1} = N\Lambda_t + \Xi_{t+1}
\]

where

\[
\Lambda_t = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{\xi}_t & \eta_t & \eta_{t-1} \end{bmatrix}',
\]

\[
\hat{\xi}_t \equiv \xi_t - \bar{\xi}, \text{ and}
\]

\[
A = \begin{bmatrix}
(1 + \nu) G & 0 & G\hat{x}/\hat{k} \\
0 & -\zeta_1 & -\zeta_2 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix},
B = \begin{bmatrix}
-R & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \zeta_1 & \zeta_2 & 0 \\
-1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & -1 & 0
\end{bmatrix},
C = \begin{bmatrix}
R \\
1 \\
0 \\
0
\end{bmatrix},
D = \begin{bmatrix}
-\zeta_1 & 0 & \gamma_1^1 & \gamma_0^0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 - \alpha & 0 & 1 + \gamma_1^1 & -1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
F = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & -R & 0
\end{bmatrix},
G = \begin{bmatrix}
-(1 - \alpha) [R - (1 - \delta)] & 0 & R & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
H = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & G\hat{i}/\hat{k} + 1 - \delta & 0
\end{bmatrix},
J = (1 - \alpha) [R - (1 - \delta)] - R
\]

\[
K = 0, \quad L = 0, \quad M = 0
\]

\[
N = \begin{bmatrix}
\theta_1 + \theta_0 - 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \phi_1 & \phi_2 \\
0 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]
and

\[ \Xi_t = \begin{bmatrix} v_t \\ u_t \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \]

where \( v_{1t} \) and \( v_{2t} \) are as defined earlier. We can then use the method of undetermined coefficients outlined by Uhlig (1997) to find the solution of the model in the form

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\dot{k}_t \\
\dot{k}_{t-1} \\
\dot{x}_t \\
\dot{x}_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} = P
\begin{bmatrix}
\dot{k}_{t-1} \\
\dot{k}_{t-2} \\
\dot{x}_{t-1} \\
\dot{x}_{t-2}
\end{bmatrix} + Q\Lambda_t, \quad G_t = R
\begin{bmatrix}
\dot{k}_{t-1} \\
\dot{k}_{t-2} \\
\dot{x}_{t-1} \\
\dot{x}_{t-2}
\end{bmatrix} + S\Lambda_t
\]

where in this we know that the \((2,1)\) and \((4,3)\) elements of \( P \) are 1 and the remaining elements of the two rows are zeros. Given paths for \( \dot{k}_t, \dot{x}_t, \) and \( A_{mt} \) we can compute the path of \( s_t \), i.e. the levels of the sectoral variables and work effort, using the system \((51) - (56)\) The rates of change of these variables will be very similar to those computed from \((59)\), the linearized system.

### 6.2 Learning

Now the system describing the equilibrium is a time-dependent version of what we had under complete information:

\[
0 = A_t \begin{bmatrix} \dot{k}_t \\ \dot{k}_{t-1} \\ \dot{x}_t \\ \dot{x}_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + B_t \begin{bmatrix} \dot{k}_{t-1} \\ \dot{k}_{t-2} \\ \dot{x}_{t-1} \\ \dot{x}_{t-2} \end{bmatrix} + C_t G_t + D_t \Lambda_t
\]

\[
0 = E_t \begin{bmatrix} \dot{k}_{t+1} \\ \dot{k}_t \\ \dot{x}_{t+1} \\ \dot{x}_t \end{bmatrix} + G_t \begin{bmatrix} \dot{k}_t \\ \dot{k}_{t-1} \\ \dot{x}_t \\ \dot{x}_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + H_t \begin{bmatrix} \dot{k}_{t-1} \\ \dot{k}_{t-2} \\ \dot{x}_{t-1} \\ \dot{x}_{t-2} \end{bmatrix} + J_t G_{t+1} + K_t G_t + L_t \Lambda_{t+1} + M_t \Lambda_t
\]
The exogenous state vector $\Lambda_t$ is reassessed at each date according to the procedure described in the text. The solution will be similarly time-dependent:

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
\hat{k}_t \\
\hat{k}_{t-1} \\
\hat{x}_t \\
\hat{x}_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
\hat{k}_{t-1} \\
\hat{k}_{t-2} \\
\hat{x}_{t-1} \\
\hat{x}_{t-2}
\end{bmatrix} + Q_t \Lambda_t
$$

$$
G_t = R_t
\begin{bmatrix}
\hat{k}_{t-1} \\
\hat{k}_{t-2} \\
\hat{x}_{t-1} \\
\hat{x}_{t-2}
\end{bmatrix} + S_t \Lambda_t.
$$

As with many learning models, agents do not take into account the fact that there is parameter uncertainty and that their beliefs about the parameter values and shocks will change over time.

7 Appendix 2: Econometric Methodology for Regime-Switching

The starting point is a dynamic factor model describing a set of possibly cointegrated time series $\{Y_{it}\}$ with two unobserved common factors: a growth or “permanent” component $X_t$ and a transitory component $x_t$.

$$
Y_{it} = a_i X_t + b_i x_t + \zeta_{it}
$$

where

$$
(1 - \phi (L)) (1 - L) X_t = \mu(S_t) + \nu_t
$$

$$
(1 - \theta (L)) x_t = \epsilon_t
$$

$$
(1 - \psi (L)) \zeta_{it} = \eta_{it}
$$

and

$$
\mu(S_t) = \begin{cases} 
\gamma_1 & \text{if } S_t = 1 \\
\gamma_0 & \text{if } S_t = 0
\end{cases}
$$
with transition matrix (34) as described in the text. The permanent component is an autoregressive process with a unit root and a two-state Markov process for intercept.\textsuperscript{14} The motivation for this setup is the idea that to assess something like the underlying trend in a noisy variable like output per hour, it makes sense to look at more than just that time series, since theory suggests that other series will have a common trend. Using the joint information in multiple series allows more precise assessments of regimes, both current and past.

The four series used in the analysis are non-farm output per hour, real non-farm labor compensation, real consumption expenditures normalized by hours of work in the non-farm sector, and detrended hours of work in the non-farm sector. The first three are cointegrated with a common factor loading on the permanent component (that is, the equations are estimated constraining $a_1 = a_2 = a_3$) while fourth variable, being detrended, has $a_4 = 0$. Estimation makes use of the state space representation of the above system as developed by Kim and Nelson (1998), and yields estimates of the key parameters as described in the calibration section. It also yields estimates of the regime probabilities, following the methods of Hamilton (1994).

For the simulations, because the model does not have the richness of the data (there is only one shock), an artificial productivity process is generated with actual regimes as suggested by Figure 8 (i.e. high growth through 1973, low growth from 1973-96, high growth from 1996-2004, and then low growth), but with sufficient noise such that the inferred regime probabilities resemble those in Figure 8. We also feed in the estimated aggregate transitory shocks from the actual system estimation as part of the noise to the series.

\textsuperscript{14}In KR the transitory component also has an independent regime-switching component described as a “pluck” — a temporary level change.
References


34


Table 1: Results from Static Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\epsilon$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$K_h/L_h$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$K_h/L_h$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$K_h/L_h$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.444</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>1.769</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>2.126</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Parameter Estimates from CEX Household Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\epsilon}$</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{b}$</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Deviations from Balanced Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$\gamma_h$</th>
<th>avg. $p$ growth*</th>
<th>$QZ$ growth*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_h$</td>
<td>0.0050</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avg. $p$ growth*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$QZ$ growth*</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.5587</td>
<td>0.5644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min</td>
<td>0.5587</td>
<td>0.5629</td>
<td>0.5654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>0.5587</td>
<td>0.5661</td>
<td>0.5810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{k}$</td>
<td>min</td>
<td>25.143</td>
<td>25.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>25.143</td>
<td>25.071</td>
<td>25.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{x}$</td>
<td>min</td>
<td>2.215</td>
<td>2.2136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>2.215</td>
<td>2.2126</td>
<td>2.2080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*quarterly percentage growth rate (not annualized)

$QZ$ is the aggregate economy’s stochastic trend
Figure 1: Alternative Home Price Indexes (Inflation-Adjusted)

Note: Logarithmic scale, 2000:Q1 = 1.00
Figure 2: Ratio of Housing Wealth to Consumption

Figure 3: Ratio of Housing Wealth to Total Net Worth

Source: Flow of Funds
Figure 4: Inflation-Adjusted Land Prices (relative to linear trend)

Source: BLS

Note: Both series are in logarithms. The land series are from different vintages of BLS data.

Figure 5: Non-Farm Productivity (HP-smoothed, relative to linear trend)

Source: BLS

Note: Both series are in logarithms. The land series are from different vintages of BLS data.
Figure 6: Housing Services: Expenditures and Prices

Note: The chart depicts the logarithm of the ratios.

Figure 7: Housing Price Response to Low-to-High Growth Regime Switch

\( \varepsilon = 0.3 \)

\( \varepsilon = 0.9 \)
Calculations based on Kahn and Rich (2007)
Figure 10a: Real-Time Probabilities of Low-Growth Regimes

Figure 10b: Real-Time Low-Growth Regime Probabilities since 2005
Figure 11: Model vs. Actual Housing Prices (detrended)

- Model Simulation
- New Home Price Index (detrended)
- OFHEO Repeat Sales Index (detrended)

Figure 12: Model vs. Actual Residential Investment (detrended)

- Model Simulation (raw)
- Model Simulation (smoothed)
- NIPA Real Residential Investment