

INFORMATION CHOICE IN MACROECONOMICS AND
FINANCE

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October 6, 2010

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Acknowledgements

While working on this project, I received constructive suggestions and comments from many people. The book grew out of a set of notes that I prepared for a Ph.D. symposium held at Humboldt University in Berlin and later expanded for a Ph.D. topics class in macroeconomics at New York University. The students in both classes read through drafts of the book and provided me with enormously useful feedback.

In addition, many colleagues and economists at other schools provided their input. In particular, I am grateful to Manuel Amador, Cosmin Ilut, Peter Kondor, Mirko Wiederholt, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and two anonymous reviewers for extensive comments. Anna Orlik provided invaluable editing and proofreading assistance and helped to formulate and solve many of the exercises. Of course, I retain responsibility for any remaining errors. I appreciate being notified of errata. Please email comments to lveldkam@stern.nyu.edu. I will try to maintain a list of corrections on my homepage.

Last, but not least, I am indebted to my husband, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, for encouraging me to undertake and complete this project.