We study how the term structure of interest rates relates to mortgage choice, both at the household and the aggregate level. A simple utility framework of mortgage choice points to the long-term bond risk premium as theoretical determinant: when the bond risk premium is high, fixed-rate mortgage payments are high, making adjustable-rate mortgages more attractive. This long-term bond risk premium is markedly different from other term structure variables that have been proposed, including the yield spread and the long yield. We confirm empirically that the bulk of the time variation in both aggregate and loan-level mortgage choice can be explained by time variation in the bond risk premium. This is true whether bond risk premia are measured using forecasters' data, a VAR term structure model, or from a simple household decision rule based on adaptive expectations. This simple rule moves in lock-step with mortgage choice, lending credibility to a theory of strategic mortgage timing by households.

Using loan-level data, we analyze the quality of subprime mortgage loans by adjusting their performance for differences in borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions. We find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005.

I investigate household interest rate risk management by solving a life-cycle asset allocation model that includes mortgage and bond portfolio choice. I find that most investors prefer an adjustable-rate mortgage, and thereby save on the bond risk premium that is contained in fixed-rate mortgage payments. Only older, risk-averse investors hold some fixed-rate mortgage debt. Together with a position in short-term bonds this enables them to hedge against changes in the real interest rate, while the inflation exposure of the debt and bond positions cancel out. Hedging house price changes with bonds only occurs at the end of the life cycle. Early in the life cycle short-sale constraints prevent an effective hedge.

We assess the economic benefits of having access to housing futures for homeowning investors, using a model for the portfolio choice between stocks, bonds of various maturity, different mortgage types, and housing futures. We compare the utility gains of housing futures with the economic benefits of two other important housing-related portfolio decisions: (i) incorporating the housing exposure in financial portfolio choice and (ii) mortgage choice. Our analysis indicates that the portfolio implications and welfare improvements of the housing futures are small. This is mainly due to the large remaining idiosyncratic house price risk which cannot be hedged using futures written on a city-level house price index.