Banking on Deposits:
Maturity Transformation without Interest Rate Risk

Itamar Drechsler◊ Alexi Savov◊ Philipp Schnabl†

◊NYU Stern and NBER †NYU Stern, CEPR, and NBER

June 2017
Textbook View of Banking and Maturity Transformation

1. Banks borrow short term (issue deposits), lend long term (make loans, buy securities)
   - duration mismatch
   - pay short-term (floating) rate, receive long-term (fixed) rate

2. Earns term premium but creates exposure to interest rates
   - a rise in short rate $\rightarrow$ interest expenses go up $\rightarrow$ profits fall
     $\Rightarrow$ assets fall relative to liabilities, equity capital depleted
   - important at all times, not just in financial crises
   - different from run risk, applies to whole balance sheet

3. Seen as an important channel for monetary policy
   - “bank balance sheet channel” - idea that Fed impacts banks through their interest rate exposure

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
1. Aggregate duration mismatch is about 4 years

⇒ Under textbook view, a 100-bps level shift in rates leads to

- 4 years of 100-bps lower profits (as % of assets)
  ⇒ a 4% drop in assets → a 40% drop in equity since banks are levered 10 to 1; stock price drops on impact

- shocks cumulative over time, 100 bps is small by historical standards
How Exposed are Bank Stocks to Interest Rates?

1. Regress FF49 industry portfolios on $\Delta1$-year rate around FOMC days

2. Bank stocks drop by just 2.4% per 100-bps rate shock ($\ll 40\%$) - no more exposed than average nonfinancial firm or overall market

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
1. Interest rates have varied widely and persistently over past 60 years
1. Interest rates have varied widely and persistently over past 60 years

2. Banks’ **interest income** much smoother, reflecting long-term assets
   \[\Rightarrow\] would suffer frequent and sustained losses if funded at Fed funds rate

*Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)*
1. Interest rates have varied widely and persistently over past 60 years

2. Banks’ **interest income** much smoother, reflecting long-term assets
   \[\Rightarrow\] would suffer frequent and sustained losses if funded at Fed funds rate

3. Instead, banks’ **interest expense** much lower and smoother than Fed funds rate, *even though liabilities are short-term*
Why Is Banks’ Interest Expense so Low and Smooth?

In Drechsler, Savov, Schnabl (2017, QJE) we show that:

1. This is due to banks’ market power in retail deposit markets
   ⇒ allows banks to keep deposit rates low even as the short rate rises

2. On average, deposit rates increase by just 40 bps per 100-bps Fed funds rate increase
   - exploit differences in competition across branches of the same bank

3. Deposits represent over 70% of aggregate bank liabilities
   ⇒ banks’ overall interest expense has a low sensitivity to interest rates
Banks’ Net Interest Margin (NIM)

1. \[ \text{NIM} = \frac{\text{Interest income} - \text{Interest expense}}{\text{Assets}} \]

2. \text{NIM is uncorrelated with short rate} \Rightarrow \text{goes against textbook view}
   - \[ \text{corr}(\Delta \text{NIM}, \Delta \text{FF rate}) \approx 0; \sigma(\Delta \text{NIM}) = 0.13\% \text{ (annual)} \]
1. **NIM** = \(\frac{\text{Interest income} - \text{Interest expense}}{\text{Assets}}\)

2. Construct **NIM** for Treasury portfolio with same duration mismatch as banks (but no deposit market power)
   - Treasury portfolio **NIM** much more sensitive to rates than bank **NIM**

*Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)*
Banks’ Net Interest Margin (NIM) and ROA

1. \[ \text{ROA} = \text{NIM} + \text{Fee income} - \text{Operating costs} - \text{Loan losses} \]

2. ROA is also uncorrelated with short rate
   - well below NIM, reflecting substantial operating costs, 2-3% of assets

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
Related literature

1. Coexistence of deposit-taking and lending
   - these papers focus on liquidity transformation/runs. We provide an explanation for maturity transformation

2. Interest rate risk and the balance sheet channel of monetary policy
   - our results suggest interest rate exposure is very small

3. Deposit pricing and market power
   - we focus on asset-side implication for maturity transformation
Model

1. Time $t \geq 0$, short rate process $f_t$

2. An infinitely-lived bank runs a deposit franchise
   - per-dollar operating cost $c$ (branches, salaries, marketing, etc.)
   - paying $c$ gives the bank market power:

     $$\text{deposit rate} = \beta^{Exp} f_t, \text{ where } \beta^{Exp} < 1$$

     - Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017) provide microfoundations

3. Bank invests deposit dollars to maximize PV of future profits
   - no equity or long-term debt (for simplicity)
   - asset markets are complete, stochastic discount factor $m_t$

\text{Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)}
Setup

Bank solves:

\[ V_0 = \max_{INC_t} E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{m_t}{m_0} (INC_t - \beta^{Exp} f_t - c) \right] \]

s.t. \[ E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{m_t}{m_0} INC_t \right] = 1 \]

and \( INC_t \geq \beta^{Exp} f_t + c \)

Risks:

1. Need to cover interest expenses, sensitivity \( \beta^{Exp} \) to \( f_t \)
   \( \Rightarrow \) *income must be sensitive enough to \( f_t \) in case \( f_t \) is high*
   - yet \( \beta^{Exp} < 1 \) is low because of market power

2. Also need to cover insensitive operating cost \( c \)
   \( \Rightarrow \) *income must be insensitive enough in case \( f_t \) is low*
   - must hold sufficient long-term (fixed-rate) assets
Result

Under ex-ante free entry (zero rents):

1. $V_0 = 0$, income is pinned down: $INC_t^* = \beta^{Exp} f_t + c$

2. Sensitivity matching:

   Income beta $\equiv \beta^{Inc} = \frac{\partial INC_t^*}{\partial f_t} = \beta^{Exp} \equiv$ Expense beta

   - bank is fully hedged against any shock to current or expected rates, or term premium
   - aggregate time series shows tight sensitivity matching
   - test in cross section

3. Bank can implement optimal policy by investing:
   - $\beta^{Exp}$ share of assets in short-term assets
   - $1 - \beta^{Exp}$ in long-term (fixed-rate) assets
Empirical Analysis

1. Call reports, all U.S. commercial banks, 1984 to 2013
   - we’ve posted cleaned data on our websites

2. For each bank $i$, estimate interest expense and income betas

$$\Delta \text{IntExp}_i,t = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \beta_{i,\tau}^{\text{Exp}} \Delta \text{FF}_{t-\tau} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\Delta \text{IntInc}_i,t = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \beta_{i,\tau}^{\text{Inc}} \Delta \text{FF}_{t-\tau} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- $\text{IntExp} =$ Interest expense/Assets
- $\text{IntInc} =$ Interest income/Assets
- 4 quarterly lags of $\Delta \text{FF}$ capture adjustment over a full year

3. Plot $\beta_i^{\text{Exp}} = \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \beta_{i,\tau}^{\text{Exp}}$ versus $\beta_i^{\text{Inc}} = \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \beta_{i,\tau}^{\text{Inc}}$

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
Income versus Expense betas (all banks)

1. Bin scatter plot of $\beta_{i}^{\text{Inc}}$ versus $\beta_{i}^{\text{Exp}}$; 100 bins, $\approx 168$ banks per bin

2. Strong matching: tight linear relationship between income and expense betas, slope is close to 1
Income versus Expense betas (top 5% of banks)

1. Bin scatter plot of $\beta_{i}^{Inc}$ versus $\beta_{i}^{Exp}$

2. Strong matching: tight linear relationship between income and expense betas, slope is close to 1

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
Sensitivity matching (panel regression)

\[
\text{Stage 1: } \Delta \text{IntExp}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \beta_{i,\tau} \Delta \text{FedFunds}_{t-\tau} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
\text{Stage 2: } \Delta \text{IntInc}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \gamma_{\tau} \Delta \text{FedFunds}_{t-\tau} + \delta \Delta \text{IntExp}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}.
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All banks</th>
<th>Top 5%</th>
<th>Top 1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \text{IntExp})</td>
<td>0.765***</td>
<td>0.766***</td>
<td>1.114***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sum \gamma_{\tau})</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>1126023</td>
<td>1126023</td>
<td>44584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq.</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Matching coefficient \(\delta\) close to 1, especially for large banks
   \(\Rightarrow\) a bank with no market power (expense beta = 1) predicted to hold only short-term assets (income beta = 1) \(\rightarrow\) a money market fund

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
ROA Betas vs. Expense Betas

1. No relationship between expense beta and ROA beta
   ⇒ matching unaffected by non-interest income (e.g., fees) and costs

2. Similar result for expense beta vs. NIM beta (by construction)
Cross Section of Bank Equity FOMC Betas

1. No relationship with either expense or income betas
   ⇒ explained by sensitivity matching

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
1. Lower expense beta ⇒ higher asset duration (repricing maturity)
   - slope coefficient = −3.66 years
   - large relative to aggregate asset duration of 4.4 years
1. No relationship with asset duration

⇒ explained by matching of long-term assets with deposit market power
Is Matching Driven by Liquidity (Run) Risk?

1. Perhaps high-$\beta^{Exp}$ banks hold more short-term assets to insure against liquidity risk?
   - does not predict matching coefficient of one

2. High-$\beta^{Exp}$ banks hold more loans and fewer securities
   - but loans are *illiquid* $\rightarrow$ inconsistent with liquidity risk explanation
   - consistent with matching: securities have higher duration than loans
Matching within Securities portfolio

Stage 1: \[ \Delta \text{IntExp}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \beta_{i,\tau}^{\text{Exp}} \Delta \text{FedFunds}_{t-\tau} + \epsilon_{i,t} \]

Stage 2: \[ \Delta \text{IntIncTreasuries}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \gamma_{\tau} \Delta \text{FedFunds}_{t-\tau} + \delta \Delta \text{IntExp}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}. \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All banks</th>
<th>Top 5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Total</td>
<td>(2) Treasuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{IntExpRate} )</td>
<td>0.570***</td>
<td>0.429***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>1115149</td>
<td>322147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R\text{-sq.} )</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Banks match sensitivities even within Treasury and MBS portfolio
   - highly liquid/integrated markets \( \Rightarrow \) not driven by segmentation

2. Implications for asset pricing
1. Bank HHI is the average Herfindahl of all zip codes where the bank has branches

⇒ Banks that face less local competition for deposits (high Bank HHI) have lower expense betas, especially for retail (e.g. savings) deposits
Expense Betas and Market Concentration (HHI)

\[ \Delta \text{IntExp}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \left( \beta_{\tau}^0 + \beta_{\tau}^1 \text{HHI}_{i,t} \right) \Delta \text{FedFunds}_{t,t-\tau} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad \text{[Stage 1]} \]

\[ \Delta \text{IntInc}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau=0}^{3} \gamma_{\tau} \Delta \text{FedFunds}_{t,t-\tau} + \delta \Delta \text{IntExp}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad \text{[Stage 2]} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \sum \beta_{\tau}^1 )</td>
<td>-0.047***</td>
<td>-0.059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma_{\tau} )</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2:</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{Interest income} )</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{IntExp} )</td>
<td>1.264***</td>
<td>1.278***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Bank FE} )</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Time FE} )</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>624,204</td>
<td>624,204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Less competition \( \rightarrow \) less sensitive interest expense (Stage 1)
2. Matching coefficient \( \delta \) close to 1 (Stage 2)

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
Retail Deposit Betas and Within-Bank Estimation

1. Use retail-deposit betas to hone in on market power mechanism

2. Within-bank retail $\beta^{Exp}$:
   - compute county-level retail betas using differences in deposit rates across branches of same bank, average across each bank’s counties
   $\Rightarrow$ gives us geographic variation in $\beta^{Exp}$ purged of bank characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1: Retail $\beta^{Exp}$</th>
<th>Within-bank retail $\beta^{Exp}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum \beta_{T}^1$</td>
<td>0.550***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2: Δ Interest income</th>
<th>Δ Interest income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔIntExp</td>
<td>1.259***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time FE</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>492862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Strong first stage, matching coefficient again close to one

Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017)
Takeaways

1. Despite a large duration mismatch, banks are largely unexposed to interest rate risk.

2. This is due to market power over deposits, which lowers the interest rate sensitivity of banks’ expenses.

3. Banks invest in long-term assets to hedge their deposit franchise.

$\Rightarrow$ Deposits are the foundation of banking, drive maturity transformation:

- explains why deposit taking and long-term lending coexist under one roof.

- implies that “narrow banking” could make banks unstable, reduce long-term lending.

- implies that banks are largely insulated from the “balance sheet channel” of monetary policy.