Roy Radner

Contact Information:
Department of Information Systems
Leonard N. Stern School of Business
New York University
44 West 4th Street, Room 8-87
New York, NY 10012-1126

Phone: (212) 998-0813

Fax: (212) 995-4228

E-mail: rradner@stern.nyu.edu

 

TEACHING

Fall 2008- Microeconomics: Theory and Applications, B30.3335, Wednesday, 9 am - 12 noon

Fall 2008- Business and the Environment, C30.0225.001, Tuesday and Thursday, 9:30 am -10:45 am

Spring 2007- Environmental Economics, C30.0300.001, Tuesday and Thursday, 2 pm - 3:15 pm

BACKGROUND

Roy Radner is a Leonard N. Stern School Professor of Business at New York University. He teaches microeconomics and interdisciplinary topics. His current research interests include bounded rationality, strategic analysis of global climate change, game-theoretic models of corruption, pricing of information goods, statistical theory of data mining, models of information processing and decentralization, and pricing fo information goods. He did his undergraduate and graduate studies at the University of Chicago, receiving an M.S. in mathematics (1951) and a Ph.D. in mathematical statistics (1956). He is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is also a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economics Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, is a Fellow and Past-President of the Econometric Society, and has been a Guggenheim Foundation Fellow and an Overseas Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge. He is on the editorial boards of several journals, and regularly serves on committees of the National Research Council. Dr. Radner came to NYU Stern in 1995. Prior to that, he was a faculty member at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Distinguished Member of Technical Staff at AT&T Bell Laboratories.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

Books:

  1. Notes on the Theory of Economic Planning, Athens, Greece: Center for Economic Research, 1963.
  2. Optimal Replacement Policy (with D.W. Jorgensen and J.J. McCall), North-Holland Press and Rand-McNally, 1967 (also released as RAND Corporation Report R-437-PR, April 1966).
  3. Economic Theory of Teams (with J. Marschak), Cowles Foundation and Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972.
  4. Demand and Supply in U.S. Higher Education (with L.S. Miller), Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and McGraw-Hill, New York, 1975.
  5. Mathematics in Academia (with C.V. Kuh), Conference Board of the Mathematical Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1980.

Articles:

  1. "The Evaluation of Information in Organizations," in Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Probability and Statistics. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1961, Vol. 1, pp. 491-530.
  2. "Paths of Economics Growth that are Optimal with Regard Only to Final States: A 'Turnpike Theorem'," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 28, 1961, pp. 98-104.
  3. "Team Decision Problems," Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 33, 1962, pp. 857-81.
  4. "Marches a terme et au comptant en cas d'incertitude," Cahiers d'Econometrie, No. 9, 1967, pp. 30-47.
  5. "Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty," Econometrica, 1967, pp.30-47.
  6. "Shadow Prices for Infinite Growth Programs: The Functional Analysis Approach" (with M. K. Majumdar), in Techniques of Optimization, A. V. Balakrishnan, (ed.), Academic Press, New York and London, 1972.
  7. "Allocation of Resources in a Team" (with T. F. Groves), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 4, 1972, pp. 415-441.
  8. "Satisficing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 2, 1975, pp. 253-62.
  9. "On the Allocation of Effort" (with M. Rothschild), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 10, 1975, pp. 358-76.
  10. "Allocation of Resources in Large Teams" (with K. J. Arrow), Econometrica, Vol. 47. 1979, pp. 361-386.
  11. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Vol. 47, 1979, pp. 655-678.
  12. "Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies With Long but Finite Lives," J. of Econ. Theory, Vol. 22, 1980, pp. 136-154.
  13. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Vol. 49, 1981, pp. 1127-1148.
  14. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Vol. 53, 1985, pp. 1173-1198.
  15. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53 (1986), 43-57.
  16. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53 (1986), 59-69.
  17. "The Internal Economy of Large Firms," The Economic Journal, Vol. 96, Supplement, 1986, 1-22.
  18. "Can Bounded Rationality Resolve the Prisoners' Dilemma?", in A. Mas-Colell and W. Hildenbrand, eds., Contributions to Mathematical Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 387-399.
  19. "Decentralization and Incentives," in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms, U. of Minn. Press, Minneapolis, 1987.
  20. "A Model of Defense-Protected Build-Down," in A. M. Weinberg and J. N. Barkenbus (eds.), "Strategic Defenses and Arms Control," The Washington Institute, Washington, 1987.
  21. "Equilibria of the Sealed-Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information" (with W. Leininger and P. B. Linhart), J. Econ. Theory, vol. 48 (June 1989), 47-62.
  22. "The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study" (with A. Schotter), J. Econ. Theory, vol. 48 (June 1989), 179-220.
  23. "Transfer Payments and the Core of a Profit-Center Game," in D. Gale, et al, eds., "Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn," Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 316-339.
  24. "Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset" (with J. Benhabib), Economic Theory, 2 (1992), 155-190.
  25. "Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing," J. of Economic Literature, vol. 30 (Sept. 1992), 1382-1415.
  26. "Price Caps" (with P. B. Linhart), Annals of Operations Research, 36 (1992), 17-32.
  27. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, 61 (1993), 1109-1146.
  28. "Efficiency in Partnership when the Joint Output is Uncertain" (with S. R. Williams), in J. Ledyard, ed., The Economics of Informational Decentralization, Kluwer, Boston, 1995, pp. 79-99.
  29. "Moral Hazard (with P. K. Dutta), in R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1995.
  30. "Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Managerial Theory of the Firm," in Z. Shapira, ed., Organizational Decision Making, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 1997. [A shorter version published as "Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm," Economic J., 106, no. 438 (Sept. 1996), 1360-1373.]
  31. Economic Survival, Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture, Northwestern University, 1996; reprinted in D. P. Jacobs, et al, Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 183-209.
  32. "On the Optimal Schedule for Introducing a New Technology" (with P. B. Linhart), in G. Chichilnisky, ed., Markets, Information, and Social Choices, Cambridge U. Press, 1999, pp. 165-190.
  33. "Market Selection and the Profit-Maximization Hypothesis" (with P. K. Dutta), Review of Economic Studies, 66(1999), 769-798.
  34. "A Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information" (with T. Ichiishi), Review of Economic Design, 4 (1999), 307-343.
  35. "Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing and Returns to Scale" (with T. Van Zandt), Economic Theory, 17 (no. 3, May 1999), 545-575.
  36. "Costly and Bounded Rationality in Individual and Team Decision-Making," Industrial and Corporate Change, v.9, no. 4 (2000), 623-658.
  37. "On the Core of a Cartel," in G. Debreu, W. Neuefeind, and W. Trockel, eds., Economics Essays, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 315-331.
  38. "Viscous Demand," September, 2002, to appear in the J. of Economic Theory, 112 (2003), 189-231.
  39. "Self-Enforcing Climate-Change Treaties" (with P.K. Dutta), Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S., 101 (2004), 4746-4751,

| Link to complete CV |