A Pyrrhic Victory?
Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk*

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Abstract

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost leads to increased sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government debt guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swaps (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks for 2007-11, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk. We document that post-bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank-level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign-bank loop.

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1 Introduction

Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-08, there was essentially no sign of sovereign credit risk in the developed economies and a prevailing view was that this was unlikely to be a concern for them in the near future. However, since the Fall of 2008 sovereign credit risk has become a significant problem for a number of developed countries, most notably in Europe. In this paper, we are motivated by three closely related questions surrounding this development. First, were the financial sector bailouts an integral factor in igniting the rise of sovereign credit risk in the developed economies? We show that they were. Second, what was the mechanism that caused the transmission of risks between the financial sector and the sovereign? We propose a model wherein the government can finance a bailout through increased taxation and via dilution of existing government debt-holders. The bailout is beneficial; it alleviates a distortion in the provision of financial services. However, financing is costly because increased taxation reduces the non-financial sector’s incentives to invest. Therefore, when the optimal bailout is large, dilution becomes a relatively attractive option, leading to deterioration in the sovereign’s creditworthiness. Finally, we ask whether sovereign credit risk also feeds back onto the financial sector, leading to a loop between the credit risk of sovereigns and banks. We explain, and verify empirically, that such a feedback is indeed present, due to the financial sector’s implicit and explicit guarantees and holdings of sovereign bonds.

This two-way feedback between financial sector and sovereign credit risks calls into question the usually implicit assumption that government resources are vastly deep and that the main problem posed by bailouts is moral hazard, the distortion of future financial sector incentives. While the moral hazard cost is pertinent, our conclusion is that bailout costs are not just in the future. They are tangible at the time of bailouts and are priced into the sovereign’s credit risk and cost of borrowing, and weaken the financial sector further. Thus, aggressive bailout packages that stabilize financial sectors in the short run but ignore the ultimate taxpayer cost can end up being a Pyrrhic victory.

Motivation: The case of Irish bailout. On September 30, 2008 the government of Ireland announced that it had guaranteed all deposits of six of its biggest banks. The immediate reaction that grabbed newspaper headlines the next day was whether such a policy of a full savings guarantee was anti-competitive in the Euro area. However, there was something deeper manifesting itself in the credit default swap (CDS) markets for purchasing protection against the sovereign credit risk of Ireland and its banks. Figure 1 shows that while the
cost of purchasing such protection on Irish banks – their CDS rate – fell overnight from around 400 basis points (bps) to 150 bps, the CDS rate for the Government of Ireland rose sharply. Over the next month, this rate more than quadrupled to over 100 bps and within six months reached 400 bps, the starting level of its financial firms’ CDS. While there was a general deterioration of global economic health over this period, the event-study response in Figure 1 suggests that the risk of the financial sector was substantially transferred to the government balance sheet, a cost that Irish taxpayers – or taxpayers of countries that share the cost – eventually bear. By the Fall of 2010 this cost had risen tremendously, leading to a significant widening of the spread between Irish and German government bonds, and a bailout of the Irish government by the stronger Eurozone countries.\(^1\)

This episode is not isolated to Ireland, though it is perhaps the most striking case. In fact, a number of Western economies that bailed out their banking sectors in the Fall of 2008 have experienced, in varying magnitudes, similar risk transfer between their financial sector and government balance-sheets.\(^2\) Our paper develops a theoretical model and provides empirical evidence that help understand this phenomenon and its implications.

**Model.** Our theoretical model consists of three sectors of the economy: “financial”, “non-financial” (corporate), and a government. The financial and corporate sectors contribute jointly to produce aggregate output: the corporate sector makes productive investments and the financial sector invests in intermediation “effort” (e.g., information gathering and capital allocation) that enhance the return on corporate investments. Both sectors, however, face a potential under-investment problem. The financial sector is leveraged (in a crisis, it may in fact be insolvent) and under-invests in its contributions due to the well-known debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977). We assume that restructuring financial sector debt is impossible or prohibitively expensive. However, the government may undertake a “bailout” of the financial sector, a transfer from the rest of the economy that results in a net reduction of financial sector debt. This transfer must be funded in the future (at least in part) through taxation of the corporate sector, which induces the corporate sector to under-invest.

\(^1\)Just one of the Irish banks, Anglo Irish, had cost the government up to Euro 25 billion (USD 32 billion), amounting to 11.26% of Ireland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The original bailout cost estimate of Euro 90 billion was re-estimated to be 50% higher and Ireland’s credit rating had been revised downwards. See “Ireland’s banking mess: Money pit – Austerity is not enough to avoid scrutiny by the markets”, the Economist, Aug 19th 2010; “S&P downgrades Ireland” by Colin Barr, CNNMoney.com, Aug 24th 2010; and, “Ireland stung by S&P downgrade”, Reuters, Aug 25th, 2010.

\(^2\)While Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden experienced relatively little deterioration of credit risk due to the robustness of their financial sectors, countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain had more precarious outcomes.
The government determines the optimal size of the bailout to maximize the economy’s current and future output. To fund the bailout it issues bonds, which are repaid by future tax proceeds. We show that the tax proceeds that can be used to fund the bailout have a Laffer curve property (as the tax rate is varied), so that the optimal bailout size and tax rate are interior.

As a consequence, there are two constraints on the bailout size. First, the greater is the existing debt of the government, the lower is its ability to undertake a bailout. This is because the Laffer curve of tax proceeds leaves less room for the government to increase tax rates for repaying bailout-related debt. Second, the announcement of the bailout lowers the price of government debt due to the anticipated dilution from additional debt issuance. This causes some “collateral damage” for the financial sector because of its significant holdings of government debt and its reliance on explicit and implicit government guarantees.\(^3\)

We solve for the optimal size of the government’s bailout and additional debt issuance. If the debt overhang in the financial sector is severe and existing government debt is large, then the under-investment cost of fully funding the bailout with tax revenues is high. It can then be optimal for the government to ‘sacrifice’ its creditworthiness and fund the bailout by diluting existing debt, issuing additional debt without enacting a matching increase in tax revenue.\(^4\) This triggers an increase in the government’s credit risk and gives rise to a positive relationship between its level of debt and its credit spread.

Due to the collateral damage channel, any subsequent adverse shocks to output growth, and hence tax revenues, not only lower the sovereign’s own debt values, but also increase the financial sector’s risk of default. This is because there is a decrease in both the value of the financial sector’s government bond holdings, and the value of government guarantees which benefit the financial sector. These channels induce a post-bailout co-movement between the financial sector and sovereign’s credit risks, even though the immediate effect of the bailout

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\(^3\)For example, in mid 2011 the exposure of UniCredit and Intesa (two big Italian banks) to Italian bonds was 121 percent and 175 of their core capital. In Spain, the ratios for the two biggest banks, BBVA and Santander, were 193 percent and 76 percent, respectively. See “Europe’s Banks Struggle With Weak Bonds” by Landon Thomas Jr., NYTimes.com, August 3, 2011.

\(^4\)While we do not consider inflation, which is an alternative mechanism for diluting the real value of debt, we note that it imposes high costs on the economy by distorting borrowing and savings decisions, wages, and investment. Moreover, the high inflation required to significantly reduce debt levels could have similarly negative reputational costs for a government as an outright default, and would also lead to an increase in its future borrowing costs due to investors pricing in a high inflation risk premium. Finally, whereas the impact of solvency-based dilution is mostly borne by bondholders, the costs of large increases in inflation are imposed on everyone in an economy. Thus, while inflation may help to delay default to some extent, default risk remains a serious concern for highly indebted governments.
is to lower the financial sector’s credit risk and raise the sovereign’s.

**Empirics.** Our empirical work analyzes the two-way feedback between financial sector and sovereign credit risk in Europe. We examine sovereign and bank CDS during the crisis period of 2007 to 2011 and identify three distinct periods.

The first period begins in January 2007, before the start of the financial crisis, and continues until the first bank bailout announcement in late September 2008. Across all countries, we document a large, sustained rise in bank CDS as the financial crisis deepens. At the same time, sovereign CDS spreads remain low. This evidence is consistent with a significant increase in the default risk of the financial sector with little effect on sovereigns.

The second period covers the bank bailouts starting with the announcement of a bailout in Ireland in late September 2008 and ending with a bailout in Sweden in late October 2008. During this one-month period, we find a significant decline in bank CDS and a corresponding increase in sovereign CDS across countries, suggesting that the bank bailouts transferred default risk from the financial sector to sovereigns.

The third period starts after the bank bailouts and continues until April 2011. Consistent with the model, we document that post-bailouts there emerges a strong, positive relationship between public debt-to-GDP ratios and sovereign CDS, though no relationship existed before the bailouts. The increase in sovereign CDS is larger for countries whose banking sector was more distressed prior to the bailouts, and whose public debt-to-GDP ratio was higher. We further show that countries with a more distressed banking sector spent a larger amount on bank recapitalization. Hence, we show that bank bailouts transferred default risk from the financial sector to the sovereigns, triggering the rise in sovereign credit risk.

Next, we quantify the direct feedback loop between sovereign and financial credit risk emphasized by our model. Before the bailouts we find no relationship between financial and sovereign credit risk. In contrast, in the post-bailout period we find a statistically and economically significant relationship: a 10% increase in the level of sovereign CDS is associated with a 0.9% increase in the level of bank CDS. This result is robust to controlling for common variation in sovereign and bank CDS, country-level differences in foreign exposures, and heterogeneity in banks exposure to CDS market and volatility conditions.

We conduct several robustness tests. First, we examine robustness to adding a bank’s equity return as a control variable. Since bank bailouts are targeted at bank debt rather than equity, controlling for equity returns allows us to examine the impact of sovereign CDS on bank CDS while controlling for changes in the value of bank assets. We find that all our results remain statistically significant, though the point estimates are slightly smaller.
Second, we measure sovereign credit risk based on government bond yield spreads instead of sovereign CDS spreads and show that our results are robust to using this alternative sovereign risk measure. Third, we measure the value of government support implied by the difference between standard and stand-alone credit ratings assigned by Moody’s Investor Services. We find that the value of government support depends on sovereign credit risk. Fourth, we show that our results are robust to adding controls for leverage, using an unbalanced panel, estimation at different frequencies, and lengthening the analysis period.

Finally, we find that holdings of government bonds are an important channel for the transmission of both domestic and foreign sovereign credit risk to banks, consistent with our model. Using data released as part of the 2010 Eurozone bank stress tests, we document a significant “home bias” in banks’ holdings of sovereign bonds, as 70% of the average bank’s sovereign bonds (roughly one-sixth of its risk-weighted assets) were in the home sovereign. Using data from the Bank of International Settlements, we further show that changes in the value of banks’ foreign exposure explain changes in their CDS.

**Related literature.** The theoretical literature on bank bailouts has mainly focused on how to structure bank bailouts efficiently. While the question of how necessarily involves an optimization with some frictions, the usual friction assumed is the inability to resolve failed bank’s distress entirely due to agency problems. Our paper instead focuses on the cost and benefit of bank bailouts. A large body of existing literature in banking analyzes the ex-ante moral hazard cost of bank bailouts at the individual-bank level (Mailath and Mester, 1994) and at the collective level through herding (Penati and Protopapadakis, 1988, Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Only a small part of this literature, however, does consider ex-post fiscal costs of bailouts as we do. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) and Philippon and Schnabl (2013) assume, in a reduced-form manner, a cost of bank bailouts to the government that is increasing in the quantity of bailout funds. As a possible motivation they provide taxation-related fiscal costs, which we derive endogenously. Panageas (2010a,b) considers the optimal taxation to fund bailouts in a continuous-time dynamic setting, also highlighting when banks might be too big to save, but does not consider the reverse feedback from sovereign credit risk to banks. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, b) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) document

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5This could be due to under-investment problem as in our setup (e.g., Philippon and Schnabl, 2013), adverse selection (e.g., Gorton and Huang, 2004), risk-shifting or asset substitution (e.g., Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011, and Diamond and Rajan, 2011), or tradeoff between illiquidity and insolvency problems (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2005). Some other papers (Philippon and Schnabl, 2013, Bhattacharya and Nyborg, 2010, among others) focus on specific claims through which bank bailouts can be structured to limit these frictions.
empirically that economic activity remains in deep slump “after the fall” (that is, after a 
financial crisis), and private debt shrinks significantly while sovereign debt rises, effects that 
are all consistent with our model.

In the theoretical literature on sovereign default risk, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) 
initiated a body of work that focused on ex-post costs to sovereigns of defaulting on external 
debt, e.g., due to a reputational cost in future borrowing, imposition of international trade 
sanctions and conditionality in support from multi-national agencies. Broner and Ventura 
(2005), Broner, Martin and Ventura (2008), Acharya and Rajan (2010) and Gennaioli, Mar-
tin and Rossi (2010), Bolton and Jeanne (2011), among others, consider a collateral damage 
to the financial institutions and bond markets when a sovereign defaults. They employ this 
as a possible commitment device that gives the sovereign “willingness to pay” its creditors. 
Our model considers both of these effects, an ex-post deadweight cost of sovereign default in 
external markets as well as an internal cost to the financial sector through bank holdings of 
government bonds, in addition to modeling the transmission of risk from financial sector to 
the sovereign when bank bailouts are undertaken.

In related empirical work, one strand focuses on quantifying the ex-post cost of bank 
bailout packages. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) conduct an event study of the U.S. govern-
ment intervention in October 2008 through TARP and find that the government intervention 
increased the value of banks by over $100 billion, primarily of bank creditors, but also esti-
mate a tax payer cost between $25 to $47 billion. Panetta et al. (2009) and King (2009) 
assess the Euro zone bailouts and reach the conclusion that while bank equity was wiped 
out in most cases, bank creditors were backstopped reflecting a waiting game on part of 
bank regulators and governments. Laeven and Valencia (2010) put together a time-series of 
banking crises and examine their economic costs. They too find that the median output loss 
of recent banking crises was large and accounted for about 25% of GDP.

Another strand of recent empirical work relating financial sector and sovereign credit 
risk during the ongoing crisis shares some similarity to our paper. Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Attinas, Checherita and Nickel (2009), Alter and Schueler (2011), Mody and Sandri (2011), 
and Ejsing and Lemke (2011) focus on the effect of bank bailouts on sovereign credit risk 
measured using CDS spreads. Some of their evidence mirrors our descriptive evidence. 
Dieckmann and Plank (2009) analyze sovereign CDS of developed economies around the 
crisis and document a significant rise in co-movement following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) do an international study of equity prices 
and CDS spreads around bank bailouts and show that some large banks may be too big to
save rather than too big to fail. Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2013) show that banks on average hold a significant share of their assets in government bonds and that these holdings may crowd out loans during sovereign debt crises.

Our analysis corroborates and complements these two strands of empirical literature. In particular, (i) identification of a causal linkage between bank CDS and sovereign CDS by exploiting the pre-bailout, bailout and post-bailout periods, and (ii) isolating empirically the effect of government guarantees on bank credit risk, represent important novel contributions of our analysis.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 provides empirical evidence and in conclusion also discusses the case of Iceland as a possible counterfactual for the case of Ireland. Section 5 concludes. All proofs not in the main text are in the online Appendix.

2 Model

There are three time periods in the model: \( t = 0, 1, \) and 2. The productive economy consists of two parts, a financial sector and a non-financial sector. In addition, there is a government and a representative consumer. All agents are risk-neutral. A timeline of the model is shown in Figure 2.

Financial sector: The manager of the financial sector solves the following problem. At time \( t = 0 \) he chooses the amount of financial services to supply in order to maximize his expected payoff at \( t = 1 \) net of the effort cost required to produce these services:

\[
\max_{s_0} E_0 \left[ \left( w_s s_0 - L_1 + \tilde{A}_1 + A_G + T_0 \right) \times 1 \{ -L_1 + \tilde{A}_1 + A_G + T_0 > 0 \} \right] - c(s_0) .
\] (1)

The quantity \( s_0 \) is the amount of financial services supplied by the financial sector at \( t = 0 \). In return, the financial sector earns revenues at time \( t = 1 \) at an equilibrium-determined rate \( w_s \) per unit of financial service supplied. To produce \( s_0 \) units, the manager of the financial sector incurs a cost of \( c(s_0) \), measured in units of the consumption good. We assume that \( c'(s_0) > 0 \) and \( c''(s_0) > 0 \).

The financial sector has both liabilities and assets on its books. The liabilities have face value \( L_1 \) and are due (i.e., mature) at time \( t = 1 \). This implies that the manager of the financial sector receives the revenues from supplying financial services only if the value of
assets at time $t = 1$ exceeds $L_1$. This solvency condition is given in equation (1) by the indicator function for the expression $\{ -L_1 + \tilde{A}_1 + A_G + T_0 > 0 \}$. There are two types of assets held by the financial sector, denoted $\tilde{A}_1$ and $A_G$. $A_G$ is the value of the financial sector’s holdings of a fraction $k_A$ of the existing stock of government bonds (before the bailout). $\tilde{A}_1$ represents the uncertain value at $t = 1$ of all of the other assets held by the financial sector. We model $\tilde{A}_1$ as a continuously valued random variable which takes values in $[0, \infty)$. The payoff and value of government bonds is discussed below. The variable $T_0$ represents the value of the transfer made by the government to the financial sector at $t = 0$ and is also discussed below. Finally, in case of insolvency, debtholders receive ownership of all financial sector assets and wage revenue.

We highlight several important features of the financial sector that together make it particularly well-suited for the role that it has in our model. First, due to the nature of its business the financial sector is both highly leveraged and exposed to (systematic) risk, making it particularly susceptible to debt overhang and the resulting distortions in incentives. For the same reasons, it is subject to runs. Second, financial sector debt is difficult to restructure (i.e., ‘hard’ debt), perhaps because it is subject to runs. This makes private-sector resolution of the debt-overhang problem very difficult and creates a role government intervention. Third, the financial sector is large, even by comparison with national output. This means that the resources required to address a crisis are large even relative to total tax revenues, and leads to the trade-offs highlighted by our model.

**Non-financial sector:** The non-financial sector comes into time $t = 0$ with an existing capital stock $K_0$. Its objective is to maximize the sum of the expected values of its net payoffs, which occur at $t = 1$ and $t = 2$:

$$\max_{s_0, K_1} E_0 \left[ f(K_0, s_0^d) - w_s s_0^d + (1 - \theta_0) \tilde{V}(K_1) - (K_1 - K_0) \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The function $f$ is the production function of the non-financial sector. It takes as inputs the capital stock, $K_0$, together with the amount of financial services demanded by the non-financial sector, $s_0^d$, and produces consumption goods at time $t = 1$. The output of $f$ is deterministic and $f$ is increasing in both arguments and concave. At $t = 1$, the non-financial sector faces a decision of how much capital $K_1$ to invest, at a cost $(K_1 - K_0)$, in a project $\tilde{V}$, whose payoff is realized at $t = 2$. This project represents the continuation value of the

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6We omit the revenue $w_s s_0^d$ from the solvency condition, since including it embeds an additional layer of complexity in the analysis without changing any of the conclusions.
non-financial sector and is in general subject to uncertainty. The expectation at $t = 1$ of this payoff is given by $V(K_1) = E_1[\tilde{V}(K_1)]$, which is a function of the level of investment $K_1$. Moreover, we assume that $V'(K_1) > 0$ and $V''(K_1) < 0$, so that the expected payoff is increasing but concave in investment. A proportion $\theta_0$ of the payoff of the continuation project at $t = 2$ is taxed by the government to pay its debt, both new and outstanding, as we explain next.

**Government:** The government’s objective is to maximize the total output of the economy and hence the welfare of the consumer. It does this by reducing the debt overhang problem of the financial sector, which increases the supply of financial services, thereby increasing output. To achieve this, the government issues some new bonds at $t = 0$ and transfers them to the balance sheet of the financial sector.\(^7\) Note that there is no difference between these ‘new’ bonds and the ‘old’ bonds, they are assumed to be pari-passu. All bonds mature at time $t = 2$ and are repaid with the tax revenues generated by the tax of $\theta_0$ on the time-2 payoff of the non-financial sector.\(^8\) The government sets the tax rate $\theta_0$ at $t = 0$, and it is levied at $t = 2$ when the payoff $\tilde{V}(K_1)$ is realized.\(^9\)

We denote the number of bonds that the government has issued in the past – its outstanding stock of debt – by $N_D$. For simplicity, bonds have a face value of one, so the face value of outstanding debt equals the number of bonds, $N_D$. To accomplish the transfer to the financial sector, the government issues $N_T$ new bonds. Let $P_0$ denote the price of governments bonds (both old and new) at $t = 0$, which is determined in equilibrium based on the government’s actions. At $t = 2$ the government receives realized taxes equal to $\theta_0\tilde{V}(K_1)$ and then uses them to pay bondholders $N_T + N_D$. We assume that if there are still tax revenues left over (a surplus), the government spends them on programs for the representative consumer, or equivalently, just rebates them to the consumer. On the other hand, if tax revenues fall short of $N_T + N_D$, then bondholders receive all of the tax revenues, but the government defaults on its debt. We further assume that default creates a fixed deadweight

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\(^7\)Note that we have purposefully kept the government’s toolkit simple, since our focus is not the specifics of the optimal bailout structure. The results will continue to hold so long as the bailout obeys two key characteristics, no matter how it is structured: (i) the bailout is not free to the government (it involves a net transfer from the government to the financial sector, and (ii) the larger the debt-overhang problem, the greater is the cost of the bailout.

\(^8\)Issuing bonds that are repaid with future taxes allows the government to smooth taxation over time. We do not explicitly model the tax-smoothing considerations here, but note that tax-smoothing would arise if, for example, there is a convex cost of taxation in each time period.

\(^9\)Committing to carrying through on imposing the tax is optimal ex-ante. Moreover, it is actually incentive-compatible at time 2 since the underinvestment costs of taxation depend only on decisions made a time 1.
loss of \( D \). Hence, default is costly and there is an incentive to avoid it.\(^\text{10}\)

The government’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of the representative consumer, who consumes the combined output of the financial and non-financial sector. Hence, the government faces the following problem\(^\text{11}\):

\[
\max_{\theta_0, N_T} E_0 \left[ f(K_0, s_0) + \bar{V}(K_1) - c(s_0) - (K_1 - K_0) - 1_{def} D + \bar{A}_1 \right]
\]

(3)

where \( s_0 \) is the equilibrium provision of financial services. This maximization is subject to the budget constraint \( T_0 = P_0 N_T \), with \( P_0 \) determined in equilibrium, and to the simultaneous choices made by the financial and non-financial sectors. Note that \( 1_{def} \) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the government defaults (if \( \theta_0 \bar{V}(K_1) < N_T + N_D \)) and 0 otherwise.

**Consumer:** The representative consumer consumes the output of the economy. He allocates his wealth \( W \) between consumption and the bonds and equity of the government, financial and non-financial sectors. Let \( P(i) \) and \( \bar{P}(i) \) denote the price and payoff of asset \( i \), respectively. Since the consumer is risk-neutral and has no time-discounting, he chooses his optimal portfolio allocations, \( \{n_i\} \), at time \( t = 0 \), to solve the following problem:

\[
\max_{n_i} E_0 \left[ \sum_i n_i \bar{P}(i) + (W - \sum_i n_i P(i)) \right]
\]

(4)

The first order condition then implies that the equilibrium price of an asset is given by its expected payoff, \( P(i) = E_0[\bar{P}(i)] \).

Since the empirical analysis focuses on the prices of credit default swaps (CDS), for completeness we introduce a CDS contract on the government bond. The CDS contract pays the buyer the difference between the bond’s face value and its recovery value upon a default. For simplicity, assume the CDS contract matures at \( t = 2 \) and that the buyer makes one payment of the CDS fee at that time. It then follows the CDS fee (i.e. price) is \( 1 - \bar{P}_0 \).\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{10}\)One can think of the loss \( D \) as arising from a loss of government reputation internationally, loss of domestic government credibility, degradation of the legal system and so forth.

\(^{11}\)We assume that the government is not further restricted in its actions by any arrangements, such as no-bailout commitments, made prior to time 0. This situation arises either because the government is unable to credibly commit to such restrictions, or because such restrictions are not optimal.

\(^{12}\)Let \( P_2 \) be the value of the government bond at \( t = 2 \), which is equal to 1 if there is no default and to the recovery value upon default. Since the representative consumer is risk-neutral and has no time discounting, the CDS fee equals \( E[1 - P_2] = 1 - E[P_2] = 1 - \bar{P}_0 \).
3 Equilibrium Outcomes

We begin by analyzing the maximization problem (1) of the financial sector. Let \( p(\tilde{A}) \) denote the probability density of \( \tilde{A} \). Furthermore, let \( A_1 \) be the minimum realization of \( \tilde{A}_1 \) for which the financial sector does not default: \( A_1 = L_1 - A_G - T_0 \). The first order condition of the financial sector can be written as:

\[
ws p_{solv} - c'(s_0^s) = 0
\]  

(5)

where \( p_{solv} \equiv \int_{A_1}^{\infty} p(\tilde{A}_1) d\tilde{A} \) is the probability that the financial sector is solvent at \( t = 1 \). Henceforth, we parameterize \( c(s_0) \) as: \( c(s_0) = \beta \frac{1}{m} s_0^m \) where \( m > 1 \).

Next, consider the problem of the non-financial sector at \( t = 0 \), given by (2). Its demand for financial services, \( s_d^0 \), is determined by the first-order condition:

\[
\frac{\partial f(K_0, s_d^0)}{\partial s_d^0} = ws .
\]  

(6)

We parameterize \( f \) as Cobb-Douglas with the factor share of financial services given by \( \vartheta \): \( f(K_0, s_0) = \alpha K_0^{1-\vartheta} s_0^{\vartheta} \).

In equilibrium the demand and supply of services are equal: \( s_d^0 = s_s^0 \). We subsequently drop the superscripts and simply denote the equilibrium quantity of services by \( s_0 \).

3.1 Transfer Reduces Underprovision of Financial Services

Together, the first-order conditions of the financial sector (5) and non-financial sector (6) show how debt overhang impacts the provision of financial services by the financial sector. The marginal benefit of an extra unit of services to the economy is given by \( w_s \), while the marginal cost, \( c'(s_0) \), is less than \( w_s \) when there is a positive probability of financial sector insolvency. In this case, the equilibrium allocation is sub-optimal. The reason is that the possibility of liquidation \( (p_{solv} < 1) \) drives a wedge between the social and private marginal benefit of an increase in the provision of financial services. There is therefore an under-provision of financial services relative to the first-best case \( (p_{solv} = 1) \). Consequently, we have the following:

\[\tag{13}\]

Both the second-order conditions of the financial and non-financial sectors are satisfied: \(-c''(s_0) < 0\) and \( \frac{\partial^2 f(K_0, s_d^0)}{\partial^2 s_d^0} < 0 \).
Lemma 1. An increase in the transfer \( T_0 \) leads to an increase in the provision of financial services by raising the probability \( p_{\text{solv}} \) that the financial sector is solvent at \( t = 1 \).

Hence, the government can alleviate the under-provision of financial services via the transfer to (i.e., bailout of) the financial sector.

3.2 Tax Revenues: A Laffer Curve

To understand the government’s problem in (3), we first look at how expected tax revenue responds to the tax rate, \( \theta_0 \). Let the expected tax revenue, \( \theta_0 V(K_1) \), be denoted by \( T \). Raising taxes has two effects. On the one hand, an increase in the tax rate \( \theta_0 \) captures a larger proportion of the future value of the non-financial sector, thereby raising tax revenues. On the other hand, this decreases the incentive of the non-financial sector to invest in its future projects, thereby reducing \( V(K_1) \) and hence also tax revenues.\(^{14}\)

To see this, consider the first-order condition for investment of the non-financial sector at \( t = 1 \):

\[
(1 - \theta_0)V'(K_1) - 1 = 0.
\]

Taking the derivative with respect to \( \theta_0 \) and rearranging gives:

\[
\frac{dK_1}{d\theta_0} = \frac{V'(K_1)}{(1 - \theta_0)V''(K_1)}.\]

Since the production function \( V(K_1) \) is concave (\( V''(K_1) < 0 \)), investment decreases with the tax rate (\( \frac{dK_1}{d\theta_0} < 0 \)). At the extreme, if \( \theta_0 = 1 \), tax revenue will be reduced to zero. Hence, tax revenues satisfy the Laffer curve property with the marginal tax revenue decreasing until it eventually becomes negative:

Lemma 2. The tax revenues, \( \theta_0 V(K_1) \), are at first increasing in the tax rate \( \theta_0 \) as it increases from zero (no taxes), but eventually decline.

Henceforth, we parameterize \( V \) with the functional form \( V(K_1) = K_1^\gamma \), \( 0 < \gamma < 1 \).\(^{15}\) It can then be shown that:

\(^{14}\)While the particular tax we model induces a distortion in investment, the model would work similarly under alternative tax-induced distortions that reduce overall output. For instance, we could have included a labor-leisure tradeoff for the non-financial sector and incorporated a labor income tax. In this case the tax would decrease the marginal benefit of labor and reduce total output. Though we think the distortion of investment is important, our focus is not the particular tax-induced distortion or the optimal taxation mechanism, but to capture the tax-induced cost of bailouts and the ensuing tradeoff with sovereign credit-worthiness.

\(^{15}\)This functional form is a natural choice for an increasing and concave function of \( K_1 \). Internet Appendix IA.1.2 motivates this functional form based on the non-financial sector’s production function, suggesting that it would take a similar form in a multiperiod model.
Lemma 3. The tax revenue $T$ is maximized at $\theta_0^{\text{max}} = (1 - \gamma)$, is increasing ($dT/d\theta_0 > 0$) and concave ($d^2T/d\theta_0^2 < 0$) on $[0,\theta_0^{\text{max}})$, and is decreasing ($dT/d\theta_0 < 0$) on $(\theta_0^{\text{max}}, 1)$.

### 3.3 Optimal Transfer Under Certainty

We now analyze the government’s optimal policy. To make the tradeoffs faced by the government clear, we start with a simplified version of the general problem setup. We make two simplifying assumptions: (A1) we set the variance of time $t = 2$ output to zero, so that it is known with certainty, i.e., $\bar{V}(K_1) = V(K_1)$; (A2) we constrain the government’s policy so that it must maintain solvency.

Forcing the government to maintain solvency means that it is constrained to only issue a number of new bonds $N_T$ that it can pay off in full. Of course this depends on the amount of tax revenue it chooses to raise. By assumption (A1), the tax revenue is exactly equal to $T$ (since there is no uncertainty), and hence, by assumption (A2), $N_T + N_D = T$. Moreover, since bonds have a sure payoff of 1, the bond price is $P_0 = 1$. The transfer to the financial sector is $T_0 = \theta_0 V(K_1) - N_D$, and there is no probability of default, $E[1_{\text{def}}] = 0$. Hence, the tax rate is the only choice variable for the government in this case.

Instead of looking at the government’s first-order condition with respect to the tax rate, it turns out to be clearer to analyze the first-order condition for the optimal tax revenue ($T$). The optimal tax revenue equates the marginal gain ($\mathcal{G}$) and marginal loss ($\mathcal{L}$) of increasing tax revenue:

$$\frac{d\mathcal{G}}{dT} + \frac{d\mathcal{L}}{dT} = 0,$$

where

$$\frac{d\mathcal{G}}{dT} = \frac{\partial f(K_0, s_0)}{\partial s_0} (1 - p_{\text{solv}}) \frac{ds_0}{dT_0},$$

and

$$\frac{d\mathcal{L}}{dT} = \theta_0 V'(K_1) \frac{dK_1}{dT}.$$

The derivation is provided in the Appendix. The term $d\mathcal{G}/dT$ is the marginal gain to the economy of increasing expected tax revenue. Increasing tax revenue increases the transfer $T_0$, which induces an increase in the supply of financial services ($ds_0/dT_0 > 0$). This expression shows, all else equal, the marginal gain is large when the financial sector’s probability of solvency ($p_{\text{solv}}$) is low and hence debt overhang is significant. The term $d\mathcal{L}/dT$ in (8) is the marginal underinvestment loss to the economy of increasing expected tax revenue. This quantity is negative since increasing tax revenue leads to a decrease in investment.
\((dK_1/dT < 0)\). The following proposition characterizes the solution to the government’s problem under (A1)-(A2) and assuming that \(m \geq 2\theta\).

**Proposition 1A.** There is a unique optimal tax revenue \(\hat{T}\), which is generated by an optimal tax rate that is strictly less than \(\theta_0^{\text{max}}\). The optimal transfer \(T_0\) is given by \(T_0 = \hat{T} - N_D\). Moreover,

1. The optimal tax revenue \(T\) is increasing in the financial sector’s debt-overhang \((L_1)\) and in the amount of existing government debt \((N_D)\).

2. The optimal transfer \(T_0\) is increasing in the financial sector’s debt-overhang \((L_1)\) and decreasing in the amount of existing government debt \((N_D)\).

The optimal tax rate is less than \(\theta_0^{\text{max}}\) due to the Laffer-curve property of tax revenues. Moreover, the optimal tax rate will be strictly greater than zero if there is financial sector debt-overhang \((p_{\text{solve}} < 1)\) since the transfer provides a marginal benefit.

The marginal gain from an increase in the transfer is larger when there is a bigger distortion in the provision of financial services. Hence, a more severe financial sector debt overhang induces the government to raise more tax revenue to generate a larger transfer.

The effective transfer generated by any level of tax revenue \(T\) is smaller when the amount of existing government debt \((N_D)\) is increased. This raises the marginal benefit of additional tax revenue and increases the optimal tax revenue. However, since the underinvestment cost of taxation is convex, optimal tax revenues increase less than one-for-one with existing government debt and a larger existing government debt is associated with a smaller optimal transfer.

### 3.3.1 Default

Next we remove assumption (A2) and allow the government to default. When there is no uncertainty about future output and tax revenues this occurs only if the government issues new bonds \(N_T\) in excess of \(T - N_D\). It will be useful in the ensuing analysis to map the decision on how much new debt to issue to a new variable:

\[
H = \frac{N_T + N_D}{T}
\]

the ratio of the total face value of debt to expected tax revenue. We call this the sovereign’s “insolvency ratio”. When there is no uncertainty, default occurs if the government increases
Above a value of one. Doing so has both a cost and a benefit. The cost is the dead-weight default loss \( D \). The benefit is that increasing \( H \) above one generates a larger transfer by diluting the claim of existing debt on tax revenues. This allows the government to increase the transfer without increasing taxes and incurring greater underinvestment.

When there is no uncertainty, the optimal choice of \( H \) is either one or infinity, since it is suboptimal to incur the default cost \( D \) without obtaining the full benefits of dilution. Raising \( H \) to infinity lets the government fully dilute existing debt, thereby capturing all tax revenues towards the transfer. The following proposition characterizes how different factors affect the value to the sovereign of defaulting, net of the default loss \( D \).

**Proposition 1B.** The net benefit to defaulting is:

1. **increasing** in the financial sector’s debt-overhang \((L_1)\) and in the amount of existing government debt \((N_D)\).

2. **decreasing** in the fraction of existing government debt held by the financial sector \((k_A)\), and in the dead-weight loss \( D \).

An increase in the financial sector’s debt-overhang increases the marginal gain from the transfer and, as defaulting enables the sovereign to generate a larger transfer, raises the benefit to defaulting. An increase in the amount of existing government debt also implies a bigger benefit from defaulting by freeing up more resources for the optimal transfer and by decreasing the optimal tax rate and associated underinvestment. Lastly, an increase in the fraction of existing sovereign debt held by the financial sector makes default less attractive since defaulting causes greater collateral damage to the financial sector balance sheet.

### 3.4 Uncertainty

Lastly, we remove assumption (A1) and introduce uncertainty about future output \( \tilde{V}(K_1) \). To that end we let

\[
\tilde{V}(K_1) = V(K_1) \tilde{R}_V ,
\]

where \( \tilde{R}_V \) is the shock to output growth, and \( \tilde{R}_V \geq 0, E[\tilde{R}_V] = 1, \sigma(\tilde{R}_V) > 0 \). We assume that \( \tilde{R}_V \) is independent of the other variables in the model.

With uncertainty the sovereign no longer faces a binary decision of default or no default. Instead, the probability of default and sovereign bond price are continuous functions of the
insolvency ratio $H$,

$$
P_0 = E_0 \left[ \min \left( 1, \frac{1}{H} \tilde{R}_V \right) \right], \quad (9)
$$

$$
p_{def} = \text{prob} \left( \tilde{R}_V < H \right), \quad (10)
$$

while the transfer $T_0$ is a function of both $T$ and $H$. The government now chooses both the optimal value tax revenue $T$ and insolvency ratio $H$. The first-order condition for the optimal tax revenue is essentially the same as under certainty, except for an adjustment to account for a value of $H$ different from one. The first-order condition for $H$ is

$$
\frac{dG}{dT_0} \frac{dT_0}{dH} - D \frac{dp_{def}}{dH} = 0 \quad (11)
$$

Raising $H$ dilutes existing bondholders since it raises the total face value of debt without increasing expected tax revenue. By capturing a greater fraction of tax revenues, it generates a bigger transfer (i.e., $dT_0/dH > 0$) without the need to worsen underinvestment. The cost of this is that it raises the sovereign’s probability of default. Hence, the sovereign ‘sacrifices’ its own creditworthiness in order to alleviate debt-overhang in the financial sector.

Figure 3 illustrates this trade-off. It shows the marginal gain (solid line) and loss (dashed line) of increasing $H$, holding $T$ fixed.\footnote{Since $N_T = (T - N_D/H)H$, we can express $T_0$ in terms of $T$ and $H$,}

$$
T_0 = N_T P_0 = \left( T - \frac{N_D}{H} \right) E_0 \left[ \min \left( H, \tilde{R}_V \right) \right].
$$

\footnote{For the plots we let $\tilde{R}_V$ be uniformly distributed.}

The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the plot of the government’s objective (i.e., total welfare) as a function of $H$. The plot shows that for the given configuration the optimum occurs at the intersection of the gain and loss curves. Note that this optimal value of $H$ exceeds the lower end of the support of $\tilde{R}_V$ (the origin in the figure), implying a positive probability of default. Note also that the objective function starts to rise again once $H$ exceeds the upper end of the support of $\tilde{R}_V$. This occurs because once debt issuance is large
enough that default is certain, it is optimal to fully dilute existing bondholders and capture all tax revenues for the transfer.

The following proposition shows that once financial sector debt-overhang is large enough, any further increases in it induce the government to increase the insolvency ratio. This increase in the insolvency ratio triggers an increase in the sovereign’s probability of default. In this way there is a ‘spillover’ of financial credit risk onto sovereign credit risk.

**Proposition 2.** Let \((\hat{T}, \hat{H})\) be an interior solution to the government’s problem on a region of the parameter space. Then the optimal insolvency ratio \(\hat{H}\) and expected tax revenues \(\hat{T}\) are increasing in the financial sector’s debt overhang \(L_1\).

Note that this spillover is strategic. Since tax revenues are below their maximum value, the government could instead choose to fund the transfer with increased tax revenues. Instead, it chooses to dilute existing debt to avoid further costly underinvestment.

### 3.4.1 Emergence of Sovereign Credit Risk

Figure 4 plots the equilibrium values of the expected tax revenue \((T)\), insolvency ratio \((H)\), transfer size \((T_0)\), and sovereign bond price \((P_0)\) as financial sector debt-overhang \(L_1\) is varied. The top-right subplot shows that \(T\) increases monotonically in \(L_1\) up to the discontinuity indicated by the dotted line. This discontinuity represents the point at which total default \((H \rightarrow \infty)\) is optimal, which permit less tax revenue to be raised since existing debt gets fully diluted.

The subplot for \(H\) (top left) tells a different story. For low levels of debt overhang the sovereign holds the insolvency ratio \(H\) constant at a low value implying a zero default probability (the lower support of the \(\hat{R}_V\) distribution) and hence a bond price of one. However, when financial sector debt-overhang is severe (high \(L_1\) value), as in a financial crisis, it is optimal for the sovereign to increase \(H\) and thereby ‘sacrifice’ its creditworthiness to generate a larger transfer. This is reflected in the plot for \(P_0\) (bottom right). It shows that sovereign credit risk only emerges–reflected by the decrease in \(P_0\)–when financial sector debt overhang \(L_1\) is high. If debt overhang is made more severe still, the optimal response can become total default, causing \(P_0\) to approach zero.\(^{18}\) By fully diluting existing debt, total default frees up maximum tax revenues for the transfer. This is reflected by a jump up in the optimal transfer size \(T_0\) (bottom left subplot).

\(^{18}\)Though \(P_0 \rightarrow 0\), \(N_T \rightarrow \infty\) at the same time, so that \(T_0 \rightarrow T\).
Figure 5 provides another look at the emergence of sovereign credit risk. It plots the relationship between the sovereign’s CDS spread \((1 - P_0)\) and the ratio of government debt to expected future output, \((N_T + N_D)/V(K_1)\), corresponding to Figure 4. The plot shows that when government debt is low, the sovereign credit spread remains zero as debt increases. In this region financial sector debt-overhang is low and the government generates additional transfer solely via increases in tax revenues. Consequently, in this region there is no relationship between the sovereign’s level of debt (to output) and its CDS spread. In contrast, when debt-overhang is increased sufficiently, the government begins to dilute existing debt to help generate the transfer. This event triggers a rise in the credit spread and leads to a positive relationship between the sovereign’s level of debt and its credit spread.

Figure 6 plots the corresponding equilibrium responses of the variables as the level of existing government debt \(N_D\) is varied. For low levels of existing debt, the sovereign chooses \(H\) to be low, there is no probability of default, and \(P_0\) is one. In this region the size of the transfer is decreasing in \(N_D\). When \(N_D\) is sufficiently large, high underinvestment costs make it optimal to increase \(H\) to generate the transfer. The probability of default then rises and \(P_0\) begins to decline. In this region the transfer size is actually increasing in \(N_D\), since dilution of existing bondholders is an effective way to increase the transfer when existing debt is large.

### 3.5 Government ‘Guarantees’

A large part of many governments’ banking system bailout programs has been to provide explicit guarantees of non-deposit debt as well as various ‘troubled’ assets.\(^\text{19}\) Moreover, the actions of governments to step in and prevent the liquidation of banks by guaranteeing their debt strongly suggests that there is an implicit ‘safety net’.\(^\text{20}\)

We extend the model to capture a simple notion of government guarantees of financial sector debt. We do this for two reasons. First, guarantees serve to prevent liquidation of banks by debtholders, a necessary pre-condition for increasing the provision of financial services. Second, guarantees are rather unique in that, by construction, their benefits are targeted at debt holders and not equity holders. This unique feature will be important for our empirical work to help identify a direct channel between sovereign and financial

\(^{19}\)A non-exhaustive list includes the programs of the UK, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United States.

\(^{20}\)The fallout from the failure of Lehman Brothers and the apparent desire to repeat this experience has strongly reinforced this view.
sector credit risk. In the interest of simplicity, and since debt overhang alleviation is the central objective of bailouts in the model, we do not explore the feedback of guarantees on the transfer and taxation decisions analyzed above. Instead, we set the stage for the implications of guarantees for our empirical strategy.

We model debtholders as potentially liquidating (or inducing a run on) the financial sector if they are required to incur losses in case of financial sector default. To prevent debtholders from liquidating, the government ‘guarantees’ their debt. It does this by pledging to them tax revenues equal to $L_1 - \tilde{A}_1 - T_0$, the face value of bank debt minus bank assets, in case of insolvency. We assume the guarantee is pari-passu with other claims on tax revenue. Therefore, it has the same credit risk as other sovereign liabilities. Hence, the guarantee is equivalent to a claim that issues bank debtholders $L_1 - \tilde{A}_1 - T_0$ new government bonds in case of insolvency.

Note that the payoff from this claim accrues exclusively to debtholders. This differentiates it from general assets of the financial sector, such as $\tilde{A}_1$ or the transfer $T_0$. While a change in the value of general assets changes the values of equity and debt in a fixed proportion (depending on the bank’s leverage), a change in the value of the guarantee only impacts the value of debt. Therefore, when there are guarantees, changes in equity value are not sufficient for capturing changes in debt value. This is formalized by the following proposition.

Proposition 3. Assume that $\tilde{A}_1 \sim U[A_{\text{min}}, A_{\text{max}}]$. Let $D$ denote the value of the bank’s debt and $E$ the value of its equity. In the absence of a guarantee, the equity return is sufficient for capturing the debt return. In contrast, in the presence of a guarantee, capturing the debt return requires both the equity return and the government bond return,

$$\frac{dD}{D} \approx \beta_E \frac{dE}{E} + \beta_g \frac{dP_0}{P_0}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

The idea that the equity return should be (locally) sufficient for capturing the debt return goes back to the contingent claims model of Merton (1974).\(^{21}\) The loading on the equity return ($\frac{dE}{E}$) captures the impact of changes in the value of the firm’s assets, including expected profits, on its debt return. This ‘one-beta’ representation of the debt return is sufficient in the absence of a guarantee. In contrast, the presence of a guarantee necessitates a ‘two-beta’ representation since changes in sovereign credit risk ($\frac{dP_0}{P_0}$) are needed to capture

\(^{21}\)With stochastic volatility it also becomes necessary to know the change in firm volatility. Equation (12) can then be extended to include an this additional term on the right-hand side.
variation in the value of the guarantee, which impacts debt but not equity.\footnote{More generally, the ‘second beta’ is required if changes in the guarantee value have a differential impact, though not necessarily zero, on equity relative to debt as compared to general changes in the firm’s asset values.}

### 3.6 The Sovereign-Bank Loop

Propositions 1 through 3 highlight a loop between financial sector and sovereign credit risk. To alleviate severe financial sector debt overhang (large $L_1$), the sovereign needs to make a large transfer to the financial sector. When the underinvestment costs of taxation becomes high, an efficient means of doing so is through raising the insolvency ratio (Proposition 3) and thereby diluting existing debt. Hence, the sovereign accepts a positive probability of default, and there emerges a positive relationship between the sovereign’s level of debt and its credit risk (Figure 4). In this way, financial sector credit risk ‘spills over’ into sovereign credit risk, with a higher level of existing sovereign debt making dilution more likely (Proposition 1B and Figure 4).

Once the sovereign takes on credit risk, there is feedback from the credit risk of the sovereign to that of the financial sector. After the sovereign becomes susceptible to credit risk, a negative shock (e.g., to output and hence tax revenue) reduces the sovereign’s creditworthiness and feeds back to the financial sector’s credit risk via its sovereign exposure. As highlighted in the model, this direct sovereign-bank feedback occurs through several channels: decreases in the value of the transfer pledged to the financial sector, decreases in the value of large financial sector government bond holdings, and decreases in the value of explicit and implicit government guarantees (Propostion 3). The result of this post-bailout sovereign-bank feedback is a positive co-movement between sovereign and bank credit risk, which contrasts with the immediate impact of the bailout announcement, a reduction in financial sector credit risk and an increase in sovereign credit risk.

### 3.7 State-Contingent Taxation

The Internet Appendix presents a modification of the model in which we allow the government to set the tax rate at time $t = 2$, thereby making the rate fully state contingent. We solve for the optimal state-contingent tax rate and show that the government’s optimal policy continues to involve a positive probability of default, due to the tradeoff between increased taxation and increased sovereign credit risk.\footnote{We thank a referee for suggesting this extension.} Moreover, the expression for the
optimal expected tax revenue shows directly how raising the probability of default increases the dilution of existing debt \( (N_D) \), and hence reduces the expected tax revenues required to generate a given bailout size. We further derive analogs to Propositions 1 and 2, and show that the optimal probability of default is zero when financial sector debt-overhang is low, but increases in debt-overhang once its level is sufficiently high.

4 Empirical Analysis

In this section we present empirical evidence in favor of the main arguments formalized in our model: (1) bank bailouts reduced financial sector credit risk but were a key factor in triggering the rise in sovereign credit risk in developed countries, and (2) there is a feedback loop between the credit risk of the sovereign and the financial sector.

Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the emergence of sovereign risk during the European financial crisis of 2007-11. We present evidence that bank bailouts transferred risks from banks balance sheet to sovereigns and triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk. We further show that a country’s pre-bailout level of financial sector distress predicts its post-bailout increase in sovereign credit risk, as predicted by our model. The confirmation of these model predictions supports our view that the bailouts led to the emergence of sovereign credit risk in Europe.

The second part of our analysis focuses on the feedback loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. We use a broad panel of bank and sovereign CDS data to carry out tests that establish this channel and show that it is quantitatively important. A significant challenge in demonstrating a direct feedback between sovereign and bank credit risk is the concern that another (unobserved) factor drives both bank and sovereign credit risk, and hence gives rise to co-movement between them even in the absence of any direct feedback. We address these concerns by utilizing a particularly useful feature of government ‘guarantees’—that they are targeted specifically at protecting bank debt holders, not equity. This allows us to control for bank fundamentals using equity returns and establish a direct feedback between sovereign and bank credit risk.
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics

The focus of our study is the European financial crisis. We include all countries in the Eurozone plus Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. We use Bankscope to identify all banks headquartered in these countries with more than $10 billion in assets. We then search in Datastream whether the bank has publicly traded credit default swaps. We double-check with other data sources (Markit, Bloomberg) to ensure that we include all banks with publicly traded CDS. We drop banks that merged or were acquired by other banks prior to the bank bailouts. We identify 58 banks with publicly traded CDS. Next, we search in Datastream whether the bank has publicly traded equity. We identify 43 banks that have both publicly-traded equity and CDS. We limit our data set to banks that have publicly traded CDS spreads throughout the analysis period. This yields our main dataset of 36 banks. We match our dataset to Bankscope to get bank characteristics. We also match our data to sovereign CDS from Datastream (based on bank headquarters) and OECD Economic Outlook data on public debt. We further collect data on government bond holdings from the first round of European bank stress tests conducted in March 2010.

Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the balanced panel of banks with CDS prices. As of January 2007, the average bank had assets of €662.5 billion and book equity of €26.2 billion. The main sources of funding were deposits (49.5%), long-term debt (33.1%), short-term debt (12.6%), and equity (4.7%). The average bank rating was AA- (we assign numerical value to ratings such that AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.). Relative to the average European bank, the banks in our sample are large and highly levered.

Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics on bank and sovereign credit risk. Our analysis focuses on the period from January 2007 to April 2011. We divide the crisis into three separate periods relative to the bailouts: pre, during, and post bailouts. We drop observations with two consecutive zero changes in bank CDS or sovereign CDS to avoid stale data. Before the bank bailouts, the average bank CDS spread was 63 bps. The average sovereign CDS spread was 14 bps. The low sovereign CDS spreads for sovereigns suggest that financial market participants did not anticipate large-scale bank bailouts right up to the end of September 2008.

In the bailout period, we see a significant rise in both bank and sovereign credit risk with average bank and sovereign CDS of 148 bps and 48 bps, respectively. Bank equity values declined sharply during this period with an average daily return of negative 2.8%.

24Among the Eurozone members as of January 2007, we exclude Luxembourg because it has no publicly traded CDS.
In the post-bailout period, average bank and sovereign CDS were 184 and 112 bps, respectively. These CDS levels are suggestive of a significant transfer of financial sector credit risk onto sovereign balance sheets. We also find significant variation in sovereign CDS with a standard deviation of daily changes of 4.7%. This evidence suggests the emergence of significant sovereign credit risk after the bank bailouts.

Panel C of Table 1 presents summary statistics for all banks that participated in the European stress tests (which includes many banks without a traded bank CDS). The results are similar if we restrict the sample to the banks in Panels A and B. As of March 2010, the average bank had risk-weighted assets of €126 billion. The average gross holdings of European sovereign bonds was €20.6 billion. Hence, the average bank holds about one sixth of risk-weighted assets in sovereign bonds. Banks have a strong home bias in their sovereign holdings: 69.4% of bonds are issued by the country in which a bank is headquartered. Most of the bonds are held in the banking book, which indicates that banks plan to hold these bonds for an extended period. This evidence provides direct support for one of the model’s assumptions that banks are exposed to home-country sovereign risk through their holdings of sovereign bonds.

4.2 The Sovereign Risk Trigger

4.2.1 Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk

The first bank bailout announcement in Western Europe was on September 30, 2008 in Ireland. We define the pre-bailout period as starting on January 1, 2007 and ending on September 26, 2008. We start the period in January 2007 to include the increase in bank credit risk caused by the financial crisis. Importantly, the pre-bailout period includes the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and the period immediately afterwards. Thus, the pre-bailout period captures both the gradual but steady increase in bank credit risk in 2007/08 and the post-Lehman spike that occurs before the bank bailouts.

We examine the evolution of bank and sovereign credit risk during this period by analyzing the change in bank and sovereign CDS across countries. We compute a country’s bank CDS as the weighted average of all banks’ CDS within a country, with the weights determined by banks’ assets as of January 2007. Figure 7 plots the results. For each country, the first column depicts the change in sovereign CDS and the second column depicts the change in bank CDS over the pre-bailout period. The figure shows that there is a large increase in bank CDS, while almost no change in sovereign CDS. For example, the average
bank CDS in Ireland increased by 471 basis points, whereas there was almost no change in Ireland’s sovereign CDS. The results for the other countries are qualitatively similar. Hence, the credit risk of the financial sector greatly increased during the pre-bailout period but there was almost no impact on sovereign credit risk.25

Next, we examine the change in bank CDS and sovereign CDS over the bailouts period. Within one month after the announcement of the Irish bailout, almost every other Western European country also announced a bailout.26 In fact, many countries followed Ireland’s example, in part to offset outflows from their own financial sectors to newly secured financial sectors. The bailouts consisted of asset purchase programs, debt guarantees, and equity injections or some combination thereof. The cost of these programs were substantial with estimated costs of 54% of GDP in Great Britain, 28% of GDP in Germany, and 22% of GDP in the United States (Panetta et al. (2009), Laeven and Valencia (2010)). We therefore define the bailout period as the one-month period in which the European bailouts were announced.

Figure 8 plots the average change in bank CDS and sovereign CDS during the bailout period. For most countries, bank CDS significantly decreased during this period, while sovereign CDS significantly increased. For example, the average bank CDS in Ireland decreased by about 150 basis points, while the sovereign CDS increased by about 50 bps. Most other countries followed a similar pattern. The appearance of this striking pattern shows that sovereigns’ response to financial sector distress via bailouts led to a substantial reduction in banks’ credit risk across a broad cross-section of countries. However, this also caused a contemporaneous, immediate increase in sovereigns’ credit risk, consistent with our model.

Finally, Figure 9 plots the change in bank CDS and sovereign CDS over the post-bailout period. The figure plots these changes up until June 2010, but the pattern is robust to the end date. We find that both sovereign CDS and bank CDS increased across most countries. Moreover, bank CDS and sovereign CDS move together after the bank bailouts, suggesting that they may feedback on each other, as we explore in detail below.

25We note that some investors may have expected bank bailouts even before the first official announcement on September 30, 2008. Such an expectation would reduce the observed increase in bank CDS and shift forward in time the rise in sovereign CDS. To the extent that investors held such expectations prior to September 30, 2008, they can explain the small rise in sovereign CDS that occurs late in the pre-bailout period. However, the absence of any significant change in sovereign CDS during the pre-bailout periods suggests that the bailouts were a surprise to many investors.

26Our analysis includes all Eurozone countries plus Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland. According to the systemic banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2010), all countries with the exception of Norway suffered a banking crisis during this period.
4.2.2 Debt Ratios, Financial Distress and Sovereign CDS

Our model predicts that the increase in a sovereign’s credit risk upon its bailout should depend on its level of debt and the level of distress in its financial sector before the bailout. The model also predicts that bank bailouts can trigger an increase in sovereign credit risk so that a positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and the level of government debt appears after the bailouts, even if there is no such relationship beforehand.

Figure 10 examines the relationship between sovereign CDS and public debt-to-GDP ratios across countries. The left panel plots the relationship before the bailouts. The panel shows almost no correlation between the two variables. The right panel plots the relationship after the bank bailouts. The panel shows a strong and positive relationship between the two variables. These figures strongly suggest that a relationship between public debt and sovereign credit risk emerged due to the bailouts.

To test this relationship formally, we estimate the impact of pre-bailout government debt and financial sector distress on sovereign credit risk. We measure financial sector distress at the country level as the weighted average of bank CDS prior to the bailouts (on September 22, 2008), with weights determined by bank assets as of January 2007. We choose this date since it is midway between Lehman’s bankruptcy and the first bailout announcement. We measure the public debt-to-GDP ratio as the government gross liabilities as a percentage of GDP as of June 2008.

We estimate the following OLS regression:

\[ y_i = \alpha + \beta (\text{Debt-to-GDP ratio}_i) + \gamma \log (\text{Financial Sector Distress}_i) + \varepsilon_i \]

where the outcome variable \( y_i \) is the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS of country \( i \).

We first examine the impact of financial distress and government debt on sovereign CDS before the bailouts. As shown in Column (1) of Table 2, we only find a weak relationship between financial sector distress and sovereign CDS. The coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. In Column (2), we add the public debt-to-GDP ratio as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient on financial sector distress is almost unchanged and there is no economically or statistically significant effect of public debt-to-GDP on sovereign CDS. Hence, the level of government debt and financial sector distress have no predictive power for the level of sovereign CDS before the bailouts.

Next, we examine the impact of financial sector distress and government bailout on sovereign CDS after the bank bailouts. Column (3) finds that a 1% increase in pre-bailout
financial sector distress leads to a 1.0% increase in sovereign CDS. Column (4) shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the pre-bailout public debt-to-GDP ratio increases sovereign CDS by 1.3%. The coefficient on financial sector distress decreases slightly but remains statistically significant. The R-squared of the regression is high with 54%. These results suggest that pre-bailout financial sector distress and public debt-to-gdp ratio are highly predictive of post-bailout sovereign credit risk.

We also examine the channels for the emergence of sovereign credit risk. Our model suggests that the bank bailouts affect sovereign credit risk through an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We therefore examine whether financial sector distress predicts the change in public debt-to-GDP ratios after the bailouts. Our outcome variable is the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio from July 2008 to July 2010. As shown in Column (5), we find that pre-bailout financial sector distress predicts the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios. Specifically, a 10% increase in financial sector distress before the bailouts predicts a 2.4 percentage point increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. As shown in Column (6), this result is robust to controlling for the pre-bailout level of the public debt-to-GDP ratio.

Our model further suggests that the increase in public debt-to-GDP ratios is caused by the cost of bank bailouts. To the extent that the cost can be measured, we should therefore observe that pre-bailout financial sector distress predicts the cost of bank recapitalization. Laeven and Valencia (2010) provide country-level estimates of the cost of bank recapitalization relative to GDP.27 As shown in Column (7), a 10% increase in pre-bailout financial sector distress raises the cost of bank recapitalization by 1.8 percentage points. As shown in Column (8), this result is robust to controlling for the pre-bailout public debt-to-GDP ratio. This result shows that a large increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is caused by the direct cost of bank recapitalization.

4.3 The Sovereign-Bank Feedback

4.3.1 Benchmark Specification

This section analyzes the two-way feedback between sovereign and bank sector credit risk. Once the sovereign opens itself up to credit risk due to bailouts, the price of its debt becomes sensitive to macroeconomic shocks. Moreover, our model indicates that subsequent changes

27Laeven and Valencia (2010) report that all countries in our dataset had a banking crisis with the exception of Norway. We therefore impute a cost of zero for Norway. The results are robust to dropping Norway from the estimation.
in the sovereign’s credit risk should impact the financial sector’s credit risk through three channels: (i) ongoing bailout payments and subsidies, (ii) direct holdings of government debt, and (iii) explicit and implicit government guarantees. In our empirical analysis, we estimate the aggregate effect of the two-way feedback between sovereign and bank credit risk.

The main challenge in establishing a direct feedback between sovereign and financial sector credit risk is that there may be another (unobserved) factor that affects both bank and sovereign credit risk. Such a factor could explain co-movement between sovereign and bank credit risk without there necessarily being an underlying direct channel between sovereign and bank credit risk. For example, sovereign credit risk reflects changes in expectations about macroeconomic fundamentals, such as employment, economic growth, and productivity. These fundamentals also have a direct effect on the value of bank assets such as mortgages or bank loans. Hence, changes in macroeconomic conditions may generate a correlation between sovereign and bank credit risk even in the absence of the direct feedback mechanism.

We address this concern by including three sets of controls to capture the direct effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on bank and sovereign credit risk. First, we include day fixed effects to capture market-wide changes in macroeconomic fundamentals that directly affect both bank and sovereign credit risk. These fixed effects capture all macrofundamentals that have a common effect on the financial sector.

Second, we control for the foreign credit risk exposure of each country’s financial sector. We compute foreign exposure as the weighted average of the other countries’ sovereign CDS spreads, where the weights are determined according to the total country specific exposures provided quarterly by the Bank of International Settlement. We scale a country’s exposures by the size of its financial sector, collected from the European Central Bank Statistics website. This control variable captures changes in banks’ credit risk due to changes in the sovereign credit risk of other countries. The coefficient on this variable is also of independent interest because it provides a measure of the sensitivity of bank credit risk to foreign credit risk exposure.

Third, we control for heterogeneity in banks’ exposure to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals by controlling for bank fixed effects and allowing bank-specific coefficients on a CDS-market index and on a measure of aggregate volatility. Our CDS market index is the iTraxx Europe index, which is comprised of 125 of the most liquid CDS names referencing European investment grade credits. The CDS market index captures market-wide variation
in CDS rates caused by changes in fundamental credit risk, liquidity, and CDS-market specific shocks.\textsuperscript{28} For the volatility index we follow the empirical literature and use a VIX-like index, the VDAX, which is the German counterpart to the VIX index for the S&P 500. This index captures changes in aggregate volatility, which is an important factor in the pricing of credit risk.

Specifically, we estimate the following OLS regression:

$$\Delta \log(\text{Bank CDS}_{ijt}) = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta \Delta \log(\text{Sovereign CDS}_{jt}) + \gamma_i \Delta X_{ijt} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

where $\Delta \log(\text{Bank CDS}_{ijt})$ is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the CDS spread of bank $i$ headquartered in country $j$, $\Delta \log(\text{Sovereign CDS}_{jt})$ is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the sovereign CDS of country $j$, $\Delta X_{ijt}$ are daily changes in the control variables, $\gamma_i$ are bank-specific coefficients, $\delta_t$ are day fixed effects, and $\alpha_i$ are bank fixed-effects. We cluster the standards errors at the bank-level to allow for correlation of errors terms within banks. The coefficient of interest $\beta$ captures the relationship between changes in bank and sovereign CDS spreads.

Table 3 presents the results. We separately present results for the period before, during, and after the bank bailouts. For each period there are two columns of results. The first column reports results for a specification with day fixed effects and controls for foreign exposure. The second column reports results for the a specification that also includes controls for bank-specific exposure to the CDS market and volatility indices. We first examine the period before the bailouts. Column (1) finds no evidence for the feedback in the pre-bailout period. The coefficient is economically small and statistically insignificant. Column (2) finds that the results are unchanged after including bank-level controls. These results suggests that there was no feedback between sovereign and banks prior to the bailouts.

Next, we analyze the sovereign-bank feedback during the bailout period. Column (3) finds a large negative and statistically significant coefficient. A 10% increase in the sovereign CDS spread leads to 4.5% decrease in the bank CDS spread. Column (4) finds that the result is robust to including bank-specific controls. These results support the view that bank bailouts were the trigger for rise in sovereign CDS and that banks transferred some of their credit risk to their sovereign.

\textsuperscript{28}Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find that a substantial part of the variation in corporate credit spread changes is driven by a single factor that is independent of changes in risk factors or measures of liquidity. They therefore conclude that this variation represents ‘local supply/demand shocks’ in the corporate bond market.
Finally, we examine the sovereign-bank feedback after the bailouts. Column (5) finds a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient. The magnitude is also economically important, implying that an increase in sovereign CDS of 10% translates into a 0.9% increase in bank CDS. Altogether, the variables explain 45.4% of the variation in daily bank CDS. Column (6) adds bank fixed effects and includes bank-specific coefficients on market-level controls. The coefficient on sovereign CDS decreases slightly but remains highly statistically significant. Given the flexibility of this specification, we interpret the coefficients on sovereign CDS spreads as robust evidence in favor of direct sovereign-to-bank feedback.

We further note that the coefficients on foreign exposure CDS is positive and statistically significant in the period after the bailouts. An increase of 10% in foreign exposure CDS raises bank CDS by 0.2%. This result suggests that exposure to foreign sovereigns emerged as a factor in the pricing of bank credit risk after the bank bailouts. This result is of independent interest because it provides further evidence that sovereign (albeit foreign) credit risk affects banks’ credit risk. Note that it is unlikely that this result is driven by aggregate-level shocks to fundamentals because the result is identified off variation in the exposure to foreign countries’ sovereign CDS after controlling for common variation across countries and for bank-specific exposures to CDS market and volatility indices. The difference with our main result is that there is no feedback mechanism as in the case of home sovereign credit risk.

4.3.2 Controlling for Bank Fundamentals

Our results above establish that there is a strong sovereign-bank credit risk feedback. However, there may remain a concern that to this point our strategy does not sufficiently control for country-specific macroeconomic shocks that affect both sovereign and bank credit risk. Though we have no particular reason to believe this is the case, we provide an alternative identification strategy for our results.

Our alternative identification strategy utilizes a particularly useful feature of bank bailouts. Specifically, most bailouts were partly structured in the form of government ‘guarantees’, either explicitly or implicitly, which are targeted specifically at protecting debt rather than equity. As Proposition 3 shows, this implies that sovereign-specific shocks should have a disproportionate impact on the price of debt relative to equity compared to other shocks to bank assets or fundamentals. On the other hand, if there is no direct sovereign-bank credit channel, then controlling for banks’ own equity returns will soak up the impact of any country-level shocks on bank debt values and eliminate sovereign CDS as an explanatory variable. This second possibility is much more general than Proposition 3. It holds also
under any defaultable-bond model where debt and equity are contingent claims on total firm value, and hence the return on equity locally captures the return on debt.\textsuperscript{29}

Therefore, to establish whether there is a direct sovereign-to-bank feedback, we test if changes in sovereign CDS remain a determinant of changes in bank CDS after controlling for banks’ own equity returns. We give alternative models the maximum flexibility to capture the explanatory power of sovereign CDS by incorporating bank-specific betas on bank’s own equity returns, the change in the volatility index, and CDS market return. Hence, a finding that sovereign CDS continues to have explanatory power for bank CDS provides strong evidence for a direct sovereign-to-bank channel.

The results of these regressions are shown in Table 4, which retains the same structure as Table 3. Column (1) finds that the coefficient on sovereign CDS remains economically small and statistically insignificant during the pre-bailout period. The coefficient on the equity control is statistically significant and negative, as expected. Column (2) allows for bank-specific coefficient on the controls, including the bank equity returns, but the coefficient on the sovereign CDS spread remains unchanged.\textsuperscript{30} Columns (3) and (4) examine the sovereign-bank feedback during the bailout period. After adding equity returns the coefficients on sovereign CDS are slightly smaller in magnitude, but remain statistically significant.

Columns (5) and (6) present the results for the post-bailout period. Although the bank stock return coefficient is highly statistically significant and possesses the expected negative sign, its inclusion has little impact on the magnitude of the sovereign CDS coefficient. We find that the coefficients on sovereign CDS spreads are only slightly smaller than in Table 3 and remain highly statistically significant.\textsuperscript{31}

Overall, our results are highly robust to including equity returns as a control variable and suggest that we identify a direct sovereign-bank feedback.

\textsuperscript{29}The canonical example is the Merton (1974) model. Since debt guarantees discriminating in favor of debt over equity, they break the contingent-claims relationship inherent in the the vast majority of defaultable-bond models.

\textsuperscript{30}The interpretation of the coefficient on equity returns in Column (2) changes relative to Column (1) because it now represents the coefficient on one particular bank rather than a common coefficient across all banks.

\textsuperscript{31}For the purposes of establishing the existence of sovereign-bank feedback, we focus on changes in bank CDS. It is also interesting to look at the impact of bailouts on bank equity returns. From the viewpoint of the model, bank equity returns should reflect changes in sovereign credit risk due to their impact on the value of continuing bailout payments and banks’ holdings of government bonds. To check this, we also estimated the regressions from Table 3 with equity returns as the outcome variable. We find a similar relationship for bank equity returns as we find for bank CDS in Table 3 (as expected, the coefficient in the post-bailout period has the opposite sign because a rise in sovereign CDS reduces equity returns). This finding also supports the assumption that equity returns capture changes in bank fundamentals.
4.3.3 Estimation using government bond yields

Our main results use sovereign CDS rates to measure sovereign credit risk. Instead, one could also use the spread of the government bond yield over the maturity-matched risk-free yield. Under the textbook treatment of CDS pricing, the two should be equal. Like many other recent empirical credit-risk studies, we focus on CDS rates since their standardization and liquidity give them several important advantages over bond yield spreads for empirical work.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, without using CDS rates it is difficult to precisely identify the the credit component of sovereign bond yields since there may not be a separate reading of the risk-free yield.

Nevertheless, since CDS spreads and bond yield spreads sometimes diverge in practice (i.e., there is a “basis”) one may be concerned that the use of CDS rates somehow drives our results. To address this concern, we re-estimate our main regressions from Table 4 replacing each country’s sovereign CDS with its government bond yield spread. We focus on government bond yields because 5-year government bond data are widely available and of high quality. We collect the government bond yield data from Datastream which provides 5-year bond yield data for all countries in our sample with the exception of Norway. To compute the changes in government bond spreads we need a proxy for changes in the risk-free rate, and we choose changes in Swiss government bond yields. We believe this is a sensible choice since the Euro-area countries were generally considered to have default risk during the financial crisis.\textsuperscript{33}

Table 5 presents the results. Similar to Table 4, we find that the coefficients on sovereign CDS in Columns (1) to (2) are economically small and statistically insignificant before the bailouts. During the bailouts, we find that the coefficients in Columns (3) and (4) are negative but not statistically significant. We believe the lack of statistical significance may be caused by the short duration of the bailout period (only four weeks), which makes it difficult to find statistically significant effects if there is noise in the data. Most importantly,

\textsuperscript{32}For instance, CDSs are constant maturity contracts, which means there is no need to choose a roll-over date or worry about on-the-run versus off-the-run bonds and their differential liquidities. For the same reason, liquidity is concentrated in a single contract rather than being dispersed amongst many individual bonds. Selling CDS is also easier than shorting bonds, since it doesn’t require borrowing a security. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) argue that these factors cause CDS prices to lead those of bonds.

\textsuperscript{33}We could instead have replaced bank CDS with bank bond spreads. However, this would have been difficult to implement because 5-year bank bond yield data are not readily available via standard data sources (e.g., Datastream, Bloomberg). Moreover, the results would depend on specific assumptions on how to interpolate the yield curve and whether there is sufficient data on bank bonds in the 5-year maturity neighborhood.
we find that the coefficients in Columns (5) to (6) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones in Table 4 for the period after the bailouts, confirming the robustness the results.

### 4.3.4 Estimation using stand-alone credit ratings

Our main tests use changes in bank and sovereign CDS rates to test whether bank credit risk depends on sovereign credit risk. As an alternative, we can also use a direct measure of the value to banks of government guarantees. We construct this measure based on credit ratings data.

Moody’s Investor Services provides ratings for financial institutions with and without government support. Hence, the difference between the two ratings can be interpreted as a measure of the value of government support. To construct this difference we use Moody’s *Long-Term Issuer Rating*, which incorporates government support, and *Bank Financial Strength Rating*, which does not. The difference between the two ratings is therefore Moody’s estimate of the value of government support to banks (“ratings uplift”).

We hand collect data on *Long-Term Issuer Ratings* and *Bank Financial Strength Ratings* from Moody’s website. We find 31 banks (out of 36 banks) that have both ratings. We construct the variable *Ratings Uplift* in three steps. First, we use Moody’s conversion table to transform stand-alone ratings into long-term issuer equivalent ratings (Moody’s Investor Services (2007)). Second, we follow common practice in the analysis of credit ratings and assign numerical values to each rating (AAA=1, AA+2, etc.). Third, we compute the ratings uplift as the difference between the two variables such that a higher number indicates a higher value of government support.

Next, we analyze whether sovereign credit risk affects the ratings uplift. We consider two variables as proxies for sovereign credit risk. The first variable is Country Rating (*Moody’s Long-term issuer Rating (domestic)*). We choose this variable because country ratings are based on the same methodology as bank ratings and updated at a similar frequency. The second variable is the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS. We use this variable because this is our main measure of sovereign credit risk throughout the paper. We run the same specifications as in Table 4. 34

Table 6 in the paper presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) find no statistically significant effect of sovereign credit risk on ratings uplift before the bailouts. The coefficients are negative, as one would expect, but they are economically small. In contrast, Columns

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34 We focus on the pre- and post-bailout period. The reason is that the bailouts itself only last for four weeks and this is too short for analyzing changes in slow-moving credit ratings.
(3) and (4) finds an economically and statistically significant effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit ratings after the bailouts. Specifically, a one-notch decrease in a country’s credit ratings reduces the ratings uplift by 0.32 notches. The results strongly suggest that higher sovereign credit risk reduces the value of government support for banks. In short, our results are robust to using ratings uplift as as alternative dependent variable.

4.3.5 Bank-level Heterogeneity

This section analyzes heterogeneity in the sensitivity of bank credit risk to sovereign credit risk. We focus on heterogeneity in country characteristics because our main variable of interest varies at the country level. In Table 7, we estimate the same specifications as in Table 4 and add interaction terms for changes in sovereign CDS with specific country-level variables. We focus on the pre- and post-bailout period because the bailout period is too short for reliably estimating interactions.

We first examine the impact of sovereign credit risk on the sovereign-bank feedback. We measure the level of sovereign credit risk using the country’s credit rating. Column (1) finds no effect before the bailouts. Column (2) finds that the interaction is positive and statistically significant after the bailouts. A one-notch decrease in the sovereign credit rating raises the sensitivity to a 10% increase in sovereign CDS spreads by 0.37%. Columns (3) and (4) find a similar effect using the lagged sovereign CDS as an alternative measure of sovereign credit risk. This evidence is supportive of our model, in that bank bailouts trigger sovereign credit risk and this effect is larger for countries with a higher level of sovereign credit risk.

Next, we examine the effect of government debt on the sovereign-bank feedback. We measure government debt as the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Column (5) finds no effect before the bailouts. Columns (6) finds a positive and statistically significant effect after the bailouts. A one-standard deviation increase in the public-debt to GDP ratio increases the sensitivity to a 10% increase in sovereign CDS spreads by 0.43%. This effect is comparable to the impact of lowering a country’s credit rating by one notch. This evidence suggests that an increase in public debt raises the sovereign-bank feedback.

We also examine whether the size of the financial system affects the sovereign-bank feedback. We measure the size of the financial sectors as total bank assets relative to GDP. Column (7) finds no effect before the bailouts. Column (8) finds a negative and statistically significant effect after the bailouts. A one-standard deviation increase in the public-debt to GDP ratio reduces the sensitivity to a 10% increase in sovereign CDS spreads by 0.39%. This result may be evidence of the too-big-to-save problem in that a government may be
limited in its ability to save the banking sector if it is very large.

We further analyze whether our results differ between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Column (9) finds no difference between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries before the bailouts. Column (10) shows that the effect is larger for Eurozone countries after the bailouts. This result suggests that the sovereign-bank feedback may be stronger for countries within a currency union.

In short, our results show that the bank-sovereign CDS relationship is stronger for riskier countries, countries with high levels of government debt, countries with a small financial sector, and countries in a currency union.

4.3.6 Robustness

We conduct several other tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, our main analysis ends in April 2011. We chose this date because the first version of this paper was finished in Summer 2011. As part of revising the paper, we later collected data for the period from May 2011 to December 2012. We can therefore repeat our analysis for this new period. Given that the European financial crisis has continued throughout this period, this analysis represents an ‘out-of-sample test’ in the sense that these data were not previously available. We estimate the same specifications as in Table 4. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results. We find that the coefficients are similar to the ones in Table 4.

Second, our main regressions are estimated at the daily level. Using daily data provides us with a large data set but our estimates may suffer from measurement error. We can therefore estimate our results at a lower frequency, which smooths out measurement error. This is important in our context because we are first-differencing our data, which magnifies any pre-existing measurement error. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. We find qualitatively similar results as in Table 4. There is no relationship in the pre-bailout period, a negative relationship during the bailout period, and a statistically significant and positive relationship during the post-bailout period. The estimates are somewhat larger than with daily data, which is consistent with some measurement error in the first-differenced daily data.

Third, we estimate our main regressions using the natural logarithm of CDS spreads. We make this choice because the relationship between non-negative financial variables, such as CDS spreads, is typically log-linear and the use of the natural logarithm reduces the impact of outliers. However, to ensure robustness we also estimate the effect in levels. Panel C of Table 8 presents the results. We find qualitatively similar results as in Table 4. There is no
relationship in the pre-bailout period, a negative relationship during the bailout period, and a statistically significant and positive relationship during the post-bailout period.

Fourth, our main regressions are estimated with a balanced panel. This choice ensures that our results are not driven by entry and exit into the data set. However, arguably most entry and exit is unrelated to the sovereign-bank feedback mechanism. Hence, we can also estimate our results for the unbalanced panel. Panel D of Table 8 presents the results. The results are similar to the balanced panel.

Fifth, we include foreign exposure as a control variable in all our regressions. We report the coefficient on this variable because it provides direct evidence of the importance of foreign sovereign credit risk in pricing bank credit risk. However, our measure is constructed at the country-level and banks may have different loadings on this variable. Hence, we can also allow for bank-specific coefficients on this variable. We present the result in Panel E of Table 8. The coefficients are almost unchanged relative to Table 4.

Sixth, bank credit risk may also be affected by changes in bank leverage. We compute bank leverage as the ratio of market equity plus book debt divided by market equity. We collect data on market equity from Datastream and book debt from Bankscope. We include leverage as an additional control variable. Panel F of Table 8 presents the results. We find that all our results are essentially unchanged. Moreover, we find that changes in leverage are only statistically significant in specification without bank-specific coefficients on equity returns. Put differently, there is no explanatory power of leverage after including bank-specific coefficients on equity returns.

4.4 The Case of Iceland: A Counterfactual?

We conclude the analysis by considering the case of Iceland. By 2008 the Icelandic banking sector was extremely highly leveraged and very large compared to the size of the Icelandic economy. The three biggest Icelandic banks had active subsidiaries in the UK, Scandinavia, and continental Europe. In late September 2008, fears of a run on the Icelandic banks led to them being put into receivership under the supervision of the Icelandic government. At the very onset of this crisis the Icelandic government moved to bail out the first of its failing banks. However, it soon became clear that the government would not be able to save the Icelandic banks since the outstanding debts of the three biggest banks alone included over $62 billion in foreign currency obligations, which is an order of magnitude bigger than Iceland’s 2007 GDP.
Facing no possibility of a successful bailout, the Icelandic government separated the domestic and international parts of its banks’ operations. It kept the foreign liabilities within the failed lenders and provided no support to banks’ foreign creditors (either bondholders or depositors). Hence, Iceland’s banks became effectively bankrupt and still owe creditors $85 billion today. The banking crisis was followed by high inflation, a large depreciation in the currency, and a severe contraction of the Icelandic economy.

At the onset of the crisis, the CDS rate on Euro-denominated Icelandic government obligations increased tremendously, reaching well over 1000 bps. Since Iceland’s pre-crisis foreign-currency obligations were not large, this reflected the market’s fear that the large foreign-currency obligations of the banks would end up on the government’s balance sheet. Hence, Iceland faced an extreme version of the problem faced by the government in our model.

Ultimately, Iceland did not take on significant foreign obligations from its banking sector. This was arguably due to the tremendous magnitude of the obligations relative to Iceland’s resources. Within our model, this outcome can be interpreted as the corner solution that arises when the government is incapable of increasing the financial sector’s probability of solvency \( p_{\text{solv}} \) above zero for any level of taxation and corresponding transfer. Under such circumstances it is optimal within the model for the government to avoid increasing outstanding debt or giving any transfer to the financial sector.

As Figure 11 shows, Iceland CDS rates subsequently decreased tremendously. The figure compares the sovereign CDS of Iceland with that of Ireland. It shows that by the beginning of 2011 Iceland CDS rates were significantly below those of Ireland. This difference does not reflect Iceland’s superior economic performance over the ensuing period since, by all estimates, Iceland experienced a contraction in output that was greater than that of Ireland. In this sense Figure 11 serves as a counterfactual that supports the inference that if sovereigns abstained from financial sector bailouts, then they would face lower sovereign credit risk.

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35 The credit-rating agencies precisely expressed this concern as they downgraded Iceland’s sovereign debt in 2008, with Moody’s stating that “the Icelandic authorities’ resolution not to save the whole banking system at the cost of jeopardizing the government’s creditworthiness – reflected in decisions damaging to bank creditors’ interests – is fraught with operational difficulties”, and “some of the banks’ external liabilities will eventually filter through to the government’s balance sheet” (Moody’s Investors Services, 8 October 2008)
5 Conclusion

In this paper we examine the intimate and intricate link between bank bailouts and sovereign credit risk. In our model the government faces an important trade-off: bank bailouts ameliorate the under-investment problem in the financial sector but reduce the investment incentives of the non-financial sector due to the corresponding increase in future taxation. In the short-run, bailouts are funded through the issuance of government bonds. A high level of issuance helps to fund the bailout but dilutes existing bondholders and introduces credit risk into the government bond price. This creates a two-way feedback between sovereign and financial sector credit risk because financial firms are exposed to the value of government debt through both their direct bond holdings and via the value of explicit government guarantees or an implicit safety net. Using bank and sovereign credit default swap data from the financial crisis of 2007 to 2011, we provide strong evidence of such a two-way feedback.

Since the summer of 2011, sovereign CDS in the Eurozone started rising further amid a growing threat of sovereign default, and this in turn led to fears of a renewed banking crisis. While the burgeoning size of government expenditures in countries such as Greece and Italy appears to have partly contributed to this, the situation in Spain involves significant largesse for the country’s banks and Cajas. Indeed, the channels we highlight have been at the core of these developments in one way or another; banks’ CDS rose and their balance sheets damaged by losses on sovereign bond holdings and by the drop in value of government guarantees and support. This raised banks’ borrowing costs or shut them out of markets entirely, and heightened fears of bank runs. The Eurozone and ECB’s reaction, to provide greater bailouts to countries and funding support to distressed banks, represents a repetition of the scenario modeled by our paper, but now with a pan-European entity playing the role of the sovereign that sacrifices its creditworthiness for the bailout. In turn, CDS rates on some of the strongest Eurozone countries have responded by rising noticeably, raising again the risk of a Pyrrhic victory from bailouts of banks and weaker sovereigns.

Overall, we consider the post-bailout emergence of meaningful sovereign credit risk in the Western economies and its damaging feedback effect on bank solvency as an important potential cost of bank bailouts. This cost can render the immediate stabilization of the financial sector a Pyrrhlic victory, a point that has received little theoretical attention and has also not been analyzed empirically. Taking cognizance of this ultimate cost of bailouts

36 Similarly, S&P’s downgrade of US Treasuries in August 2011 led to downgrades of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and a rise in the CDS rates of US banks, insurance companies, other financial entities.
has important consequences for the future resolution of financial crises, the design of fiscal policy, and the nexus between the two.

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Figure 1 plots the sovereign CDS and bank CDS for Ireland in the period from 3/1/2007 to 8/31/2010. The bank CDS is computed as the equally-weighted average of bank CDS for banks headquartered in Ireland (Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, and Irish Life and Permanent). The data are from Datastream.
Figure 2: Model Timeline

$t=0$  $t=1$  $t=2$

**Financial sector**
- Decides how much financial services to supply
- Receives revenues from supplying financial services
- Risky asset value is realized

**Non-financial sector**
- Decides how much financial services to buy for production
- Decides how much capital $K_1$ to invest in future projects based on tax rate
- Output of future projects is realized

**Government**
- Decides how many new bonds to issue and transfer to the financial sector
- Chooses tax rate
- Levy tax on realized output
- Pay tax revenues to bondholders
- If tax revenues are insufficient then default on all debt, incur deadweight loss $D$
The top panel of Figure 3 plots the marginal gain $dG/dH$ (solid line and dash-dot line) of increasing the insolvency ratio $H$, holding constant expected tax revenues $T$. The dash-dot line corresponds to a higher level of $L_1$ than the solid line. The top panel also shows the corresponding marginal increase in expected dead-weight default cost $D d_{def}^d dH$ (dashed line). The bottom panel of the Figure shows the resulting value of the government’s objective function, with the the solid and dash-dot lines corresponding to their counterparts in the top panel. The plots correspond to a parameterization of the model where $\bar{R}_V \sim U[0.6, 1.4]$, $\bar{A}_1 \sim U[0, 1]$, $L_1 = 0.5$ (solid line), $\alpha = 1$, $\vartheta = 0.3$, $\gamma = 0.2$, $\beta = 0.5$, $m = 1.3$, $D = 0.06$, $k_A = 0$, and $N_D = 0.25$. 
Figure 4 plots the equilibrium values for expected tax revenue $T$, the insolvency ratio $H$, the transfer $T_0$, and the sovereign bond price $P_0$, as the severity of debt overhang $L_1$ is varied. The dotted line in the plots represents the point at which total default ($H \rightarrow \infty$) is optimal, resulting in a discontinuity in the plot. The model is parameterized as follows: $\tilde{R}_V \sim U[0.6,1.4]$, $\tilde{A}_1 \sim U[0,1]$, $\alpha = 1$, $\vartheta = 0.3$, $\gamma = 0.2$, $\beta = 0.5$, $m = 1.3$, $D = 0.06$, $k_A = 0$ and $N_D = 0.25$. 
Figure 5 plots the equilibrium credit spread on government bonds $(1 - P_0)$ versus the ratio of total government debt to expected future output $([N_T + N_D]/V(K_1))$. The points correspond to the different values of debt-overhang $(L_1)$ shown in Figure 4. For low levels of government debt (to output), the sovereign credit spread remains zero even as government debt rises. This region corresponds to low levels of debt overhang. As debt-overhang becomes more severe, the government chooses to dilute existing debt, leading to an increase in both government debt to output and the credit spread. The dotted line in the plot represents the point at which total default $(H \to \infty)$ is optimal. The model parameters are the same as in Figure 4.
Figure 6 plots the equilibrium values for expected tax revenue $T$, the insolvency ratio $H$, the transfer $T_0$, and the sovereign bond price $P_0$, as the level of pre-bailout government debt $N_D$ (bottom panel) is varied. The dotted line in the plots represents the point at which total default ($H \to \infty$) is optimal, resulting in a discontinuity in the plot. The model is parameterized as follows: $R_V \sim U[0.6, 1.4]$, $A_1 \sim U[0, 1]$, $L_1 = 0.5$, $\alpha = 1$, $\vartheta = 0.3$, $\gamma = 0.2$, $\beta = 0.5$, $m = 1.3$, $D = 0.06$, and $k_A = 0$. 
Figure 7 plots the change in average bank CDS and sovereign CDS for Eurozone countries plus Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the period from 1/1/2007 to 9/25/2008. The bank CDS is computed as the equal-weighted average of bank CDS for banks headquartered in that country. The data are from Datastream (Great Britain sovereign CDS data start in November 2007; Norwegian bank CDS data start in May 2008; there are no data for Swiss sovereign CDS and Greek bank CDS during this period).
Figure 8 plots the change in average bank CDS and sovereign CDS for Eurozone countries plus Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the period from 9/26/2008 to 10/21/2008. The bank CDS is computed as the equal-weighted average of bank CDS for banks headquartered in that country. The data are from Datastream (there are no data for Swiss sovereign CDS and Greek bank CDS during this period).
Figure 9 plots the change in average bank CDS and sovereign CDS for Eurozone countries plus Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the period from 10/22/2008 to 6/30/2010. The bank CDS is computed as the equal-weighted average of bank CDS for banks headquartered in that country. The data are from Datastream.
Figure 10: Correlation between Sovereign CDS and Public Debt before and after Bank Bailouts

Figure 10 shows the correlation between sovereign CDS (in basis points) and public liabilities (as a percentage of GDP) for Western European countries before and after the bank bailouts. The left figure shows no correlation before the bailouts (as of 1/1/2007). The right figure shows a strong correlation after the bank bailouts (as of 3/31/2010). The CDS data are from Datastream and the public liabilities data are from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
Figure 11: Sovereign CDS of Iceland and Ireland

Figure 11 plots the sovereign CDS of Iceland and Ireland in the period from 3/1/2007 to 4/30/2011. The data are from Datastream.
Table 1: Summary Statistics

This table provides summary statistics on bank characteristics and bank credit risk. The sample covers all banks with publicly traded credit default swaps (CDS) headquartered in Eurozone countries and Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Panel A presents bank characteristics as of 1/1/2008. Assets is total bank assets, equity is total bank equity, deposit ratio is the ratio of deposits to assets, long-term debt ratio is the ratio of long-term debt to assets, short-term debt ratio is the ratio of short-term debt to assets, equity ratio is the ratio of equity to assets, and bank ratings is Moody’s credit rating (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.). Panel B presents summary statistics for the periods before, during, and after the bank bailouts at the daily level. Bank CDS is the average bank CDS in basis points (bp), Sovereign CDS is the average sovereign CDS, Bank Equity Return is the average equity return, Δ Log(Bank CDS) is the daily log change in bank CDS, Δ Log(Sovereign CDS) is the daily log change in sovereign CDS, and Δ Log(Foreign Exposure CDS) is the daily change in foreign exposure CDS. Panel C presents data on the holdings of European sovereign debt as of March 31, 2010. Risk-weighted Assets are total risk-weighted assets, European Sovereign Bond Holdings are total holdings of European Sovereign Bonds, Home Sovereign Bond Holdings are total holdings of Home Sovereign Bonds, Home Share is home sovereign bonds as a share of total European Sovereign Bonds, and Share Banking Book is the share held in the bank’s banking book.

### Panel A: Cross-Section (1/1/2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std.Dev</th>
<th>50th percentile</th>
<th>5th percentile</th>
<th>95th percentile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assets (Euro billion)</td>
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<td>498.6</td>
<td>462.2</td>
<td>333.2</td>
<td>58.6</td>
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<td>Equity (Euro billion)</td>
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<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>56.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equity share (%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term debt share (%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-term debt share (%)</td>
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<td>12.2%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deposit share (%)</td>
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<td>49.2%</td>
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<td>70.7%</td>
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<td>Credit Rating</td>
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<td>6</td>
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### Panel B: Time-Series

#### Pre-Bailout (1/1/2007-9/26/2008)

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<th>5th percentile</th>
<th>95th percentile</th>
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<td>Bank CDS (bp)</td>
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<td>63.1</td>
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<td>53.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<td>Sovereign CDS (bp)</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Bank CDS)</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-11.6%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-14.2%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Equity Return</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>-15.0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
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<td>148.4</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>121.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>325.0</td>
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<td>42.3</td>
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<td>91.7</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-22.3%</td>
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<td>10.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>-8.7%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Equity Return</td>
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<td>-2.8%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>-16.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bank CDS (bp) | 22,168 | 183.7 | 200.6 | 131.5 | 63.8 | 469.0 |
| Sovereign CDS (bp) | 22,168 | 111.9 | 99.0 | 78.7 | 24.4 | 302.7 |
| Δ Log(Bank CDS) | 22,168 | 0.0% | 4.7% | 0.0% | -6.6% | 6.9% |
| Δ Log(Sovereign CDS) | 22,168 | 0.0% | 4.7% | 0.0% | -7.2% | 7.7% |
| Bank Equity Return | 22,168 | 0.0% | 4.4% | 0.0% | -5.8% | 5.8% |
| Δ Log(Foreign Exposure CDS) | 22,168 | 0.0% | 5.3% | 0.0% | -7.1% | 7.4% |

Panel C: European Bank Stress Tests (3/31/2010)

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<th>Obs</th>
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<th>Std.Dev</th>
<th>50th percentile</th>
<th>5th percentile</th>
<th>95th percentile</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Risk-weighted Assets (Euro billion)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>126.3</td>
<td>179.1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>European Sovereign Bond Holdings (Euro billion)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home Sovereign Bond Holdings (Euro billion)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home share (%)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
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<td>Share Banking Book (%)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
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Table 2: Emergence of Sovereign Credit Risk

This table analyzes the risk transfer of financial sector distress onto government balance sheets. The sample covers the Eurozone countries plus Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Financial Distress is the average bank CDS as of 9/24/2008 (prior to bailouts). Debt/GDP Ratio is the ratio of government liabilities to GDP as of June 2008 (collected from the OECD Economic Outlook). Log (Sovereign CDS) is the log of the sovereign CDS. ∆ Debt/GDP Ratio is the increase in the public debt to GDP ratio from June 2008 to June 2010. Bank Recapitalization Cost/GDP is the ratio of total expenditure for bank recapitalization relative to GDP. We report robust standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Distress&lt;sub&gt;08&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Log (Sovereign CDS, Jan 08)</th>
<th>Log (Sovereign CDS, March 10)</th>
<th>∆ Debt/GDP Ratio, Years 2008-10</th>
<th>Bank Recapitalization Cost/GDP</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Distress&lt;sub&gt;08&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.941***</td>
<td>23.598**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>(9.742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt/GDP Ratio&lt;sub&gt;08&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log (Sovereign CDS, Jan 08) | Log (Sovereign CDS, March 10) | ∆ Debt/GDP Ratio, Years 2008-10 | Bank Recapitalization Cost/GDP |
<table>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Distress&lt;sub&gt;08&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.941***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>(9.742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt/GDP Ratio&lt;sub&gt;08&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk

This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis. The sample covers all banks with publicly traded credit default swaps (CDS) headquartered in Eurozone countries plus Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Columns (1) to (2) cover the pre-bailout period (1/1/2007-9/26/2008), Columns (3) to (4) cover the bailout period (9/27/2008-10/22/2008), and Columns (5) to (6) cover the post-bailout period (10/23/2008-04/30/2011). \( \Delta \text{Log(Bank CDS)} \) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of bank CDS. \( \Delta \text{Log(Sovereign CDS)} \) is the daily change in the sovereign CDS of the country in which the bank is headquartered. The variable \( \Delta \text{Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)} \) is the change in the sovereign CDS of other countries weighted by cross-country exposure. All columns include time fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include bank fixed effects and interactions of bank fixed effects with the change in the CDS market index and the change in the volatility index. The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Δ Log(Bank CDS)</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Log(Sovereign CDS)} )</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.450***</td>
<td>-0.487***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
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<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)} )</td>
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<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.036</td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
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<td>(0.115)</td>
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<td>Time FE</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>0.402</td>
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Table 4: Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk (controlling for equity returns)

This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis. The sample covers all banks with publicly traded credit default swaps (CDS) headquartered in Eurozone countries and Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Columns (1) to (2) cover the pre-bailout period (1/1/2007-9/26/2008), Columns (3) to (4) cover the bailout period (9/27/2008-10/22/2008), and Columns (5) to (6) cover the post-bailout period (10/23/2008-04/30/2011). $\Delta \log(\text{Bank CDS})$ is the daily change in the natural logarithm of bank CDS. $\Delta \log(\text{Sovereign CDS})$ is the daily change in the sovereign CDS of the country in which the bank is headquartered. $\Delta \log(\text{Foreign Exposure CDS})$ is the change in the sovereign CDS of other countries weighted by cross-country exposure. $\Delta \text{Equity Return}$ is the daily bank equity return. All columns include time fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include bank fixed effects and interactions of bank fixed effects with the change in the CDS market index, the change in the volatility index, and bank equity returns. The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
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</thead>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>$\Delta \log(\text{Sovereign CDS})$</td>
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<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.438***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
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<td>$\Delta \log(\text{Foreign Exposure CDS})$</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.171***</td>
<td>-0.161***</td>
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<td>(0.047)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk (using government bonds)

This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis. The sample covers all banks with publicly traded credit default swaps (CDS) headquartered in Eurozone countries and Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden. Columns (1) to (2) cover the pre-bailout period (1/1/2007-9/26/2008), Columns (3) to (4) cover the bailout period (9/27/2008-10/22/2008), and Columns (5) to (6) cover the post-bailout period (10/23/2008-04/30/2011). \( \Delta \text{Log(Bank CDS)} \) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of bank CDS. \( \Delta \text{Log(Bond spread)} \) is the daily log change in the yield of the five-year government bond minus the yield on five-year Swiss government bonds (bond spread) of the country in which the bank is headquartered. \( \Delta \text{Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)} \) is the change in the sovereign CDS of other countries weighted by cross-country exposure. \( \Delta \text{Equity Return} \) is the daily bank equity return. All columns include time fixed effects. Column (2), (4), and (6) include bank fixed effects and interactions of bank fixed effects with the change in the CDS market index, the change in the volatility index, and bank equity returns. The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th></th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Log(Bond Spread)} )</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)} )</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Equity Return} )</td>
<td>-0.141**</td>
<td>-0.156*</td>
<td>-0.159**</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
<td>-0.032**</td>
<td>-0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | Y           | Y        | Y       | Y        | Y           | Y        |
|                      | N           | Y        | N       | Y        | N           | Y        |
|                      | N           | Y        | N       | Y        | N           | Y        |

| Observations         | 11,540      | 11,540   | 756     | 756      | 21,040      | 21,040   |
| Banks                | 35          | 35       | 35      | 35       | 35          | 35       |
| R-squared            | 0.179       | 0.205    | 0.431   | 0.569    | 0.344       | 0.381    |
Table 6: Ratings Uplift

This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis. The sample covers all banks with publicly traded credit default swaps (CDS) and Moody’s credit ratings headquartered in Eurozone countries and Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden. Columns (1) to (2) cover the pre-bailout period (1/1/2007-9/26/2008) and Columns (3) to (4) cover the post-bailout period (10/23/2008-04/30/2011). Ratings Uplift is the difference between Moody’s long-term issuer credit rating and Moody’s bank stand-alone financial strength credit rating. We compute this difference by converting ratings into a numerical scale (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.). We use the Moody’s conversion table to map both ratings into the same numerical scale. Country Rating is Moody’s country credit rating converted into a numerical scale (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.). Δ log(Sovereign CDS) is the daily change in the sovereign CDS of the country in which the bank is headquartered. Δ Log(Foreign Exposure CDS) is the change in the sovereign CDS of other countries weighted by cross-country exposure. All regressions include day fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include bank fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratings Uplift</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Bailout</td>
<td>Post-Bailout</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Rating</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.319***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.406***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Foreign Exposure CDS)</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.626**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7,457</td>
<td>7,457</td>
<td>18,046</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7: Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk (Interactions)

This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis. The sample covers all banks with publicly traded credit default swaps (CDS) headquartered in Eurozone countries and Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden. *Public/Debt* is the public debt-to-GDP ratio. *Financial Sector/GDP* is the size of a country’s financial sector relative to GDP. *Eurozone* is an indicator variable for countries in the Eurozone. The other variables are defined in Tables 3 and 6. All regressions include the main effect and all controls specified in Table 4. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre (1)</th>
<th>Post (2)</th>
<th>Pre (3)</th>
<th>Post (4)</th>
<th>Pre (5)</th>
<th>Post (6)</th>
<th>Pre (7)</th>
<th>Post (8)</th>
<th>Pre (9)</th>
<th>Post (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)*Country Rating</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.037**</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)*Lagged Log(Sov CDS)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)*(Public Debt/GDP)</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.174**</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)*(Financial Sector/GDP)</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)*Eurozone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.184**</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.163***</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Effect</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Robustness

This table examines the robustness of our main sample. Panel A estimates the regression from Table 4, Column 5 and 6, for the period from May 2011 to December 2012. Panel B estimates the regressions from Table 4 at the weekly level. Panel C estimates the regressions from Table 4 using level changes in bank CDS and sovereign CDS instead of log changes. Panel D estimates the regressions from Table 4 using the unbalanced panel. Panel E estimates the regressions in Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4 after adding bank-specific coefficients on change in cross-country exposure CDS. Panel F estimates the regressions of Table 4 after adding a control for bank leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, and * 10% significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Out-of-sample test</th>
<th>Δ Bank CDS</th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>0.064***</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>10,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Weekly Data</th>
<th>Δ Log(Bank CDS)</th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(1.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.832</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Panel C: Estimation in levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Sovereign CDS</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.234*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>22,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel D: Unbalanced Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.438***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11,560</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>25,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.0962</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel E: Cross-Country Exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Log(Sovereign CDS)</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.394***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11,248</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>22,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Panel F: Controlling for leverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ Bank CDS</th>
<th>Pre-Bailout</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Post-Bailout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Sovereign CDS</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.416***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Leverage</td>
<td>-2.006**</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-2.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.735)</td>
<td>(0.645)</td>
<td>(2.902)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Controls   | Y           | Y        | Y            | Y            | Y            | Y            |
| Observations | 10,830      | 10,830   | 764          | 764          | 21,601       | 21,601       |
| Banks      | 36          | 36       | 36           | 36           | 36           | 36           |
| R-squared  | 0.101       | 0.110    | 0.412        | 0.535        | 0.505        | 0.545        |