

Housing Collateral, Consumption Insurance, and Risk Premia: An Empirical Perspective (JF, 2005)

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- Housing is an important factor in US households' portfolios.
- Collateral restrictions are tied to house prices (e.g. through home equity loans).
- Decreases in house prices lead to:
 - decrease in risk-sharing among households
 - associated increase in consumption growth inequality
- Nonseparability between consumption and housing services leads to hedging motive.
- Both of these channels impact risk premia.

Model - Endowments and Preferences

- Continuum of agents with stochastic labor income that consume nondurable consumption and housing services.
- History of events captured by $s^t = (y^t, z^t)$, where y^t are idiosyncratic events and z^t are aggregate events.
- Evolution of non-housing/housing expenditure governed by
$$r_t(z^t) = \frac{c_t^a(z^t)}{\rho_t(z^t)h_t^a(z^t)}.$$
- Preferences are given by:

$$U(c, h) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t u(c_t, h_t)$$
$$u(c_t, h_t) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left[c_t^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} + \psi h_t^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \right]^{\frac{(1-\gamma)\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

- Housing markets are frictionless.
- Agents can trade a complete set of contingent securities subject to a solvency constraint:

$$\Pi_{s^t} [c_t(s^t) + \rho_t(z^t)h_t(s^t)] \geq \Pi_{s^t} [\eta_t(s^t)]$$

- Tightness of this constraint is governed by collateral ratio my :

$$my_t(z^t) = \frac{\Pi_{z^t} [\rho h^a]}{\Pi_{z^t} [c^a]}$$

- Model is interesting because empirically this has large and persistent swings.

Model - Equilibrium Consumption

- Consumption share always decreasing, except when constraint is binding, in which case it jumps.
- Consumption of nondurables and housing services governed by shares $\tilde{\omega}_t(\omega, s^t)$:

$$c_t(\omega, s^t) = \frac{\tilde{\omega}_t(\omega, s^t)}{\zeta_t^a(z^t)} c_t^a(z^t) \text{ and } h_t(\omega, s^t) = \frac{\tilde{\omega}_t(\omega, s^t)}{\zeta_t^a(z^t)} h_t^a(z^t)$$

- Absent of collateral ($my_t = 0$), consumption share is set to labor income share: $\frac{\omega_t(\omega, s^t)}{\zeta_t^a(z^t)} = \hat{\eta}(y_t, z_t)$

Market Price of Aggregate Risk - Nonseparable Case

- Unconstrained household will have stochastic discount factor:
 $m_{t+1} = m_{t+1}^a g_{t+1}^\gamma$.
- Here, the first factor is given by:

$$m_{t+1}^a = \delta \left(\frac{c_{t+1}^a}{c_t^a} \right)^{-\gamma} \left(\frac{\alpha_{t+1}}{\alpha_t} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon - \frac{1}{\gamma}}{\frac{1}{\gamma}(\epsilon - 1)}}$$

- α_t is the nonhousing expenditure share.
- This risk turns out to be small: unrealistic level of rent growth volatility needed to make SDF large.

Market Price of Aggregate Risk - Separable Case

- Focus on the separable case to highlight the role of the liquidity factor.

$$m_{t+1} = \delta \left(\frac{c_{t+1}^a}{c_t^a} \right)^{-\gamma} g_{t+1}^\gamma$$

- Liquidity factor needs to be negatively correlated with consumption growth.
- It is, since when consumption growth is low, we have empirically:
 - ① Increase in cross-sectional dispersion of labor income shocks
 - ② Decrease in amount of collateral
- This will amplify the effect of time varying consumption growth on asset prices.

Time Series Evidence - Measuring Collateral Ratio

- In the model, only aggregate collateral available matters, not its distribution.
- Housing wealth is measured in three ways:
 - Value of outstanding home mortgages (mo)
 - Market value of residential real estate wealth (rw)
 - Net stock current cost value of owner-occupied and tenant-occupied residential fixed assets (fa)
- Housing collateral ratio is estimated as cointegrating residual of labor income and housing wealth.

Time Series Evidence - Estimated Collateral Ratio




Figure 4. Estimated housing collateral ratio, 1889–2002. Deviation from the cointegration relationship between human wealth (y) and outstanding home mortgages (mo , full line), nonfarm residential wealth (rw , dashed line) and residential fixed asset wealth (fa , dash-dotted line). Data are for 1889–2002.

Time Series Evidence - Stock Return Predictability I




Figure 6. Ten-year excess market return and the housing collateral ratio. The housing collateral ratio is $mymo$, the measure based on outstanding mortgages. We use the cum-dividend return on Standard and Poor's composite stock price index, denoted R_t^{vw} . The market return is expressed in excess of a risk-free rate, the return on 6-month prime commercial paper.

Time Series Evidence - Stock Return Predictability II

Long-Horizon Predictability Regressions

The results are for the regression $r_{t+K,uv}^{e,K} = b_0 + b_{my} \widetilde{my}_t + \epsilon_{t+K}$, where $r_{t+K,uv}^{e,K}$ are cumulative (log) excess returns on the S & P Composite Index over a K -year horizon. Panel A reports results for the full sample 1889–2002; the sample size decreases from 113 observations for $K = 1$ –104 years for $K = 10$. Panel B reports the results for 1926–2002; the sample size decreases from 77 observations for $K = 1$ –68 years for $K = 10$. The subpanels report the results for the different collateral measures. Subpanel 1 reports results for the mortgage-based collateral measure $mymo$, subpanel 2 for the measure based on residential wealth $myrw$, and subpanel 3 for the measure based on fixed assets $myfa$. The housing collateral ratio is rescaled so that it lies between 0 and 1 and measures collateral scarcity: $\widetilde{my}_t = (\frac{my^{\max} - my_t}{my^{\max} - my^{\min}})$, where my^{\max} and my^{\min} are the maximum and minimum observation in the respective samples. The first row of each subpanel reports least squares estimates for $b = b_{my}$. Newey–West HAC standard errors σ^{nw} are reported in the second row of each subpanel. The standard errors correct for serial correlation of order K , where K is the holding period. The third row reports the R^2 for this OLS regression. The fourth row of each subpanel reports the p -value of the null hypothesis of no predictability, obtained by bootstrap.

Horizon K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Panel A: 1889–2002										
Subpanel 1: Collateral Measure: Mortgages $mymo$										
b	0.08	0.19	0.29	0.32	0.48	0.74	1.12	1.65	2.15	2.54
σ^{nw}	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.24	0.29	0.33	0.36	0.40
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.15	0.22	0.26
$p - val$	0.15	0.12	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
Subpanel 2: Collateral Measure: Residential Wealth $myrw$										
b	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.24	0.43	0.71	1.08	1.45
σ^{nw}	0.04	0.08	0.12	0.18	0.24	0.30	0.38	0.46	0.53	0.61
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.08
$p - val$	0.21	0.27	0.34	0.44	0.38	0.27	0.19	0.11	0.05	0.02

Long-Horizon Predictability Regressions

The results are for the regression $r_{t+K}^{sp,i,j} = b_0 + b_{my} \widetilde{m}y_t + \epsilon_{t+K}$, where $r_{t+K}^{sp,i,j}$ is the spread in log K -period holding returns for two extremum portfolios i and j formed on the basis of the six Fama-French benchmark portfolios (two independent sorts, two by size and three by book-to-market). Panel A reports results for the mortgage-based collateral measure $mymo$, Panel B for the measure based on residential wealth $myrw$ and Panel C for the measure based on fixed assets $myfa$. The housing collateral ratio is rescaled so that it lies between 0 and 1 and measures collateral scarcity. The first row of each panel reports least-squares estimates for $b = b_{my}$. Newey-West HAC standard errors σ^{nw} are reported in the second row of each panel. The standard errors correct for serial correlation of order K , where K is the holding period. The third row reports the R^2 for this OLS regression. The fourth row of each panel reports the p -value of the null hypothesis of no predictability, obtained by bootstrap. The estimation results are for 1927–2002.

Horizon K	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Panel A: Collateral Measure: Mortgages $mymo$										
Spread: Small Value Minus Small Growth										
b	0.32	0.56	0.75	0.93	1.04	1.10	1.07	0.99	0.84	0.69
σ^{nw}	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.28
R^2	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.12	0.09	0.06	0.04
$p - val$	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.14	0.19
Spread: Big Value Minus Big Growth										
b	0.21	0.42	0.61	0.73	0.79	0.86	0.93	0.90	0.77	0.57
σ^{nw}	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.14	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.29	0.33	0.37
R^2	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.02
$p - val$	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.15	0.22

Cross-sectional Evidence - Estimation Strategy

- Need to approximate liquidity factor since agents have to forecast aggregate consumption weight growth.

$\log(g_t(z_t^\infty, my_0)) \simeq \phi(F_t^a, \dots, F_{t-k}^a; my_t)$, where $F_t^a = (\Delta \log(c_t^a), \Delta \log(\alpha_t))$

- Then GMM can be used to identify the function ϕ as well as the structural parameters via moment conditions of the form:

$$E_t \left[m_{t+1}^a \exp(\gamma * \phi(F_t^a, \dots, F_{t-k}^a; my_t)) R_{t+1}^j \right] = 1$$

- Additional inequality constraints that follow from model are also used as overidentifying restrictions, including Kuhn Tucker restrictions of the form:

$$\lambda(\theta) E[m_{t+1}^a R_{t+1}^j - 1] = 0$$

Cross-sectional Evidence - Results with Seven Test Assets

Table VII
Cross-Sectional Results Collateral Model: Seven Assets

Shown here are GMM parameter estimates for the collateral model for 1926–2002. The estimates minimize the pricing errors on the market return, the T-bill return, a 10-year bond, and the four extremum size and value portfolios. The estimation also imposes seven inequality conditions. The left panel imposes separability by fixing ϵ at 0, while the left panel fixes ϵ at 0.85. In columns 1 and 4, $\hat{\phi}(\cdot)$ is a first-order, in columns 2 and 5, it is a second-order, and in columns 3 and 6, it is a third-order Tchebychev polynomial. The penalty parameter c is 100 (columns 1), 12 (column 2), 11 (column 3), 300 (column 4), 2 (columns 5 and 6). The time discount factor δ is fixed at 0.95 in the estimation. The identity weighting matrix is used in the first stage, and the Newey–West matrix with lag length 3 is used to compute standard errors.

Parameters	Separability			Nonseparability		
	Polynomial Order			Polynomial Order		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
$\hat{\gamma}$	4.78	4.96	4.67	2.07	1.35	1.35
SE	[1.72]	[1.68]	[1.58]	[0.32]	[0.19]	[0.20]
$\hat{\theta}_1$	0.37	0.63	-0.31	-0.15	7.31	0.44
SE	[0.31]	[3.15]	[2.77]	[2.43]	[3.96]	[6.78]
$\hat{\theta}_2$	-2.00	-1.93	-6.61	-5.16	-8.14	6.44
SE	[0.92]	[0.85]	[13.46]	[1.78]	[4.87]	[7.40]
$\hat{\theta}_3$		0.33	-0.77	-3.67	3.63	0.23
SE		[4.05]	[3.16]	[8.31]	[28.37]	[10.14]
$\hat{\theta}_4$			-1.69		-0.92	-6.59
SE			[5.26]		[19.73]	[5.83]
$\hat{\theta}_5$					7.56	6.53
SE					[14.21]	[3.13]
$\hat{\theta}_6$						7.53
SE						[7.95]
$\hat{\theta}_7$						-0.70
SE						[13.37]
J	33.68	110.37	56.31	14.18	60.36	54.15
p	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1671	0.0000	0.0000

Cross-sectional Evidence - Linear Factor Model

Cross-Sectional Results, Linear Factor Model

Shown here is the estimation of the market prices of risk $\tilde{\lambda}$, using the Fama-MacBeth procedure for 1926–2002. The asset-pricing factors are $\Delta \log(c_{t+1})$ in row 1, $\Delta \log(c_{t+1})$ and $\Delta \log(\alpha_{t+1})$ in row 2, $\Delta \log(c_{t+1})$, $\tilde{m}\tilde{y}_t$, $\tilde{m}\tilde{y}_t \Delta \log(c_{t+1})$ in rows 3–5, and $\Delta \log(c_{t+1})$, $\Delta \log(\alpha_{t+1})$, $\tilde{m}\tilde{y}_t$, $\tilde{m}\tilde{y}_t \Delta \log(c_{t+1})$, and $\tilde{m}\tilde{y}_t \Delta \log(\alpha_{t+1})$ in rows 6–8. The housing collateral variable is the mortgage-based *mymo* in rows 3 and 6, the residential-wealth-based *myrw* in row 4 and 7, and the fixed-assets-based *myfa* in row 5 and 8. *my* is estimated with data from 1925 to 2002. OLS standard errors are in parentheses, and Shanken-corrected standard errors are in brackets. The last column reports the R^2 and the adjusted R^2 just below it.

Model	$\tilde{\lambda}_0$	$\tilde{\lambda}_c$	$\tilde{\lambda}_\alpha$	$\tilde{\lambda}_{my}$	$\tilde{\lambda}_{m y c}$	$\tilde{\lambda}_{m y \alpha}$	R^2
1	8.87	1.61					9.4
CCAPM	(2.55) [2.77]	(1.01) [1.18]					5.6
2	6.90	0.51	0.55				37.5
HCAPM	(2.31) [2.60]	(0.88) [1.08]	(0.24) [0.30]				32.0
3	4.22	1.94		-0.03	2.23		86.5
Separable Prefs. <i>mymo</i>	(2.29) [3.31]	(1.05) [1.58]		(0.06) [0.09]	(0.79) [1.17]		84.6
4	3.52	2.12		-0.03	1.36		87.8
Separable Prefs. <i>myrw</i>	(2.25) [3.33]	(1.02) [1.58]		(0.03) [0.05]	(0.47) [0.72]		86.1
5	2.81	0.97		-0.00	0.66		73.3
Separable Prefs. <i>myfa</i>	(2.27) [2.93]	(0.94) [1.28]		(0.02) [0.03]	(0.35) [0.47]		69.7
6	2.87	2.59	0.11	-0.02	2.77	0.05	87.4
Nonsep. Prefs. <i>mymo</i>	(2.73) [4.45]	(0.81) [1.38]	(0.26) [0.44]	(0.06) [0.10]	(0.64) [1.09]	(0.18) [0.30]	84.3
7	3.62	2.30	0.25	-0.03	1.45	0.11	88.1
Nonsep. Prefs. <i>myrw</i>	(2.48) [3.81]	(0.92) [1.47]	(0.20) [0.33]	(0.03) [0.06]	(0.41) [0.65]	(0.08) [0.13]	85.1
8	3.20	1.56	-0.05	-0.02	0.94	0.05	85.4
Nonsep. Prefs. <i>myfa</i>	(2.44) [4.11]	(1.01) [1.75]	(0.21) [0.38]	(0.02) [0.04]	(0.38) [0.66]	(0.06) [0.11]	81.7

Cross-sectional Evidence - CCAPM vs. Collateral CCAPM




Figure 7. Realized versus predicted returns: The consumption-CAPM and collateral-CAPM. Left panel: Realized average excess returns on 25 Fama–French portfolios and the value-weighted market return against predicted excess returns by standard consumption-CAPM. Right panel: Against predicted returns by collateral-CAPM (under separability).

Quantitative Results - Average Pricing Error Comparison

Average Pricing Errors, Linear Collateral Model

Test Asset	CCAPM	Fama-French	Coll-CCAPM
R^{adj}	2.97	-0.20	0.07
S1B1	7.97	3.96	1.79
S1B2	1.89	2.51	1.23
S1B3	-1.01	-1.08	-0.34
S1B4	-7.10	-2.07	1.53
S1B5	-5.29	-2.78	-0.62
S2B1	4.64	1.94	2.03
S2B2	-0.30	-1.15	-1.27
S2B3	-2.65	-1.23	-0.96
S2B4	-3.31	-0.79	-1.14
S2B5	-3.00	-0.08	-1.72
S3B1	1.99	-1.41	2.00
S3B2	-0.24	-1.12	0.28
S3B3	-0.50	-0.62	-0.55
S3B4	-1.28	0.03	-1.40
S3B5	-1.92	1.58	0.38
S4B1	1.65	-2.54	-1.25
S4B2	0.90	0.70	0.85
S4B3	-0.22	0.24	-2.08
S4B4	-1.18	0.64	0.62
S4B5	-3.90	-0.11	-2.38
S5B1	3.41	-2.52	-0.07
S5B2	3.31	0.73	-0.21
S5B3	2.13	0.46	-0.59
S5B4	1.19	1.96	-0.10
S5B5	-3.95	-0.86	0.10
RMSE	3.27	1.61	1.21
χ^2	72.1***	61.1***	35.1*



Conclusion

- House price fluctuations impact risk-sharing via the collateral channel
- This has a large quantitative impact on the market price of risk
- Allows us to obtain small pricing errors in the cross section and time series predictability with reasonable risk aversion parameter
- Also highlights role of imperfect risk-sharing, and in particular time-variation in risk-sharing opportunities

Discussion - Cointegration Results

- Authors extract my_t as cointegrating residual of labor income and housing wealth
- What about other forms of wealth?
- Is this the appropriate thing to do because households that are constrained have housing as largest component of wealth?
- What is the aggregate budget constraint or other restriction that ties these together (as in *cay*)?

Discussion - Correlation with Other Measures (Sufi and Mian, 2009)



Discussion - Endogenize Collateral Value

- Where does the change in nonhousing consumption come from?
- Making this exogenous leads to surprisingly good fit (as we saw from last slide).
- However, it would be nice to have fully endogenous decision on how much of collateral is used.
- Also, interaction between credit market conditions and housing collateral likely to be important.