

# The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences\*

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## Abstract

We document that the recent decline in aggregate volatility has been accompanied by a large increase in firm level risk. The negative relationship between firm and aggregate risk seems to be present across industries in the US, and across OECD countries. Firm volatility increases after deregulation. Firm volatility is linked to research and development spending as well as access to external financing. Further, R&D intensity is also associated with lower correlation of sectoral growth with the rest of the economy.

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## Introduction

Over the past 30 years, there has been a decline in aggregate volatility ( McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002)). At the same time, there has been a large increase in the volatility of firms (Comin (2000), Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), Comin and Mulani (2003) and Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002)).

Our paper has five parts. We first document the upward trend in various measures of firm volatility. Second, we present a decomposition of aggregate volatility between the average volatility of sectors and the correlation of growth across sectors. This decomposition suggests that the decline in aggregate volatility is mostly due to a decline in the correlation growth rates across sectors.

Third, we explore whether the firm level trend towards more volatility and the aggregate trend towards more stability are related, or whether the two have moved in opposite directions by coincidence. The two trends appear to be related. We find that TFP growth in industries where firms have become more volatile tends to be less correlated with aggregate TFP growth. Across countries, there also seems to be a negative relationship between aggregate and firm level volatility.

Fourth, we explore the potential explanations for the increase in firm level volatility. We find support for the idea that firm volatility has increased because of higher competition in the goods market. We find that firm volatility increases after deregulation. We also find that the increase in firm level volatility is correlated with high research and development activity, as well as more access to debt and equity markets. However, we find no evidence that sectors with more access to external finance have become less correlated with the rest of the economy, while we do find evidence that sectors with larger increases in R&D investment have become less correlated with the rest of the economy.

## 1 The Facts

The decline in aggregate volatility has been documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2002).

On the other hand, firm level volatility has increased. Firm level volatility can be measured using financial data or real data. Using financial data for the US, Comin (2000) and

Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document an increase in volatility of idiosyncratic stock returns. Using accounting data, Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002) and Comin and Mulani (2003) show an increase the idiosyncratic volatility of employment, sales, earnings and capital expenditures.

Throughout the paper, we will use aggregate data from the NIPA, and firm level data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. We will also use the sectoral data set developed by Jorgenson and Stiroh (from now on, KLEM data).<sup>1</sup>

## 1.1 Volatility: GDP versus Firm Sales

In this section, we document the increase in firm volatility using real measures, like sales, employment or capital expenditures. Our sample includes all the firms in COMPUSTAT with, at least, 11 consecutive observations of the relevant variable. **Table 1** contains the basic descriptive statistics for our sample.

- Insert Table 1 Here -

**Figure 1** shows the evolution of idiosyncratic and aggregate volatility. Aggregate volatility ( $\sigma_t^a$ ) is defined as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate ( $\gamma_t$ ) of real GDP

$$\sigma_t^a = \left[ \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=-4}^{+5} (\gamma_{t+\tau} - \bar{\gamma}_t)^2 \right]^{\frac{1}{2}} \quad (1)$$

where  $\bar{\gamma}_t$  is the average growth rate between  $t - 4$  and  $t + 5$ . For each firm  $i$ , we compute

the volatility of the growth rate of sales ( $\gamma_{t,i}$ ) as

$$\sigma_{i,t} = \left[ \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=-4}^{+5} (\gamma_{t+\tau,i} - \bar{\gamma}_{t,i})^2 \right]^{\frac{1}{2}} \quad (2)$$

- Insert Figure 1 Here -

We then take the median across all firms present in the sample at time  $t$  as our measure of typical firm volatility

$$\sigma_t^f = \text{median}_i \{ \sigma_{i,t} \}$$

**Figure 1** shows the decline in  $\sigma_t^a$  and the increase in  $\sigma_t^f$ . Note also the difference of scale between the two measures. Idiosyncratic volatility is an order of magnitude larger than

aggregate volatility.<sup>2</sup> **Figure 2** shows the evolution of the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the distribution of firm volatility. It is clear that the whole distribution has moved upward, and that the increase in volatility is even more pronounced at the top.<sup>3</sup>

- Insert Figure 2 Here -

Our first task is to show the robustness of these findings. The main issues are sample selection bias and measurement errors. Sample selection is an issue because more small firms have entered the COMPUSTAT database over time. Since small firms tend to be more volatile, the changing composition could explain the trend. We deal with this first issue by controlling for size and age, and showing that the increase in firm volatility holds within groups of comparable firms. Comin and Mulani (2003) also show that the results are robust to the inclusion of firms fixed effects.<sup>4</sup>

The second issue is whether firm level results are economically meaningful. To take an extreme example, suppose that we live in a world of constant returns without financial frictions or incentive problems, in which boundaries of organizations do not matter. Plants could move among firms without any real consequences, yet firms would appear to be volatile. Firms would simply not be the right units of observation. One could perhaps argue that M&As fall partly into the category of irrelevant ownership changes. Thus, as a robustness check, we are going to show that our results are not driven by M&As.

- Insert Figure 3 Here -

**Figure 3** shows that the trend increase in firm volatility is not driven by the entry of young and small firms, or by an upsurge in M&A activity.<sup>5</sup> Another way to show that our results are economically meaningful is to show that they relate to results obtained in other data sets. Guvenen and Philippon (2005) show that firm volatility measured across industries in COMPUSTAT is a good predictor of both unemployment risk and wage inequality measured across the same industries in PSID. Comin, Groshen, and Rabin (2005) relate firm-level volatility to wage volatility at the occupation level by taking advantage of a unique data set that contains firm-level and worker-level information for a sample of firms in Ohio. They document a positive relationship between firm level volatility and the volatility and dispersion of wages at the occupation level. We will not discuss these results further,

but we note that they show that our measures of volatility capture real economic risks, not just measurement error or sample composition bias.

## 1.2 Turnover of Leaders within Industries

The distribution of firm sizes is famously skewed, and a few firms account for most of the sales in each industry. Thus, one might argue that firm volatility is relevant only if it affects the industry leaders. We define turnover in industry  $I$  at time  $t$  as the probability of leaving the top quintile of the industry over a five year period,

$$TopTurn_{I,t} = P \left( Z_{it+5} < Z_{t+5}^{top,I(i)} \mid Z_{it} > Z_t^{top,I(i)} \right) ,$$

where  $Z_{it}$  is either operating income or market value of firm  $i$  at time  $t$ , and  $Z_t^{top,I(i)}$  is the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of  $Z_{it}$  at time  $t$  in industry  $I(i)$ . This measure is robust to the entry of small firms in the particular industry. We then define average turnover as the median of turnover across all industries.

- Insert Figure 4 Here -

**Figure 4** shows the increase in turnover among leaders, for both operating income and market value. There are too few firms in the sample in the 1950s to obtain a reasonable estimate of the probability, so we also computed the correlation of ranking over time, using all the firms and not only the top 20%. For a particular measure  $Z$ , we define

$$RkCorr = Corr_{i \in I} (rank_{I,t}(Z_{it}), rank_{I,t}(Z_{it+\tau}))$$

where  $rank_{I,t}(Z_{it})$  is the rank of firm  $i$  in industry  $I$  at time  $t$  according to  $Z$ . The picture using market value or operating income is similar to the one in **figure 4**, and, for the sake of completeness, we present the results based on labor productivity rankings.

- Insert Figure 5 Here -

**Figure 5** shows the evolution of the ranking correlation of firms, over 5 and 10 years, based on labor productivity. There has been a clear decline in the ranking correlations over time. We will return to the interpretation of these findings when we discuss product market competition.

### 1.3 Equity Return Volatility

Real data are probably more directly relevant for macroeconomics. However, there are at least two good reasons to explore financial data as well. The first is that financial data will allow us to look at firm volatility before World War II. The second is that financial data can help us disentangle risk from predictable variations in firm dynamics.

We start by looking at equity returns. Let  $r_{i,t,m}$  be the return to shareholders of firm  $i$  in month  $m$  of year  $t$ , and let  $r_{t,m}^{VW}$  be the monthly return on the Value Weighted Index. All the returns come from CRSP. For each firm, we estimate the CAPM model over rolling windows of 36 months

$$r_{i,t,m} = \beta_{i,t} r_{t,m}^{VW} + \varepsilon_{i,t,m}, \text{ for } m = 1, \dots, 12$$

We therefore allow  $\beta_{i,t}$  to vary (smoothly) over time, as seems plausible since we use data from 1926 to 2004. We take the median across all firms/months observations in year  $t$  as our measure of idiosyncratic financial volatility

$$\sigma_t^{fin} = \text{median}_{i,m} (|\varepsilon_{i,t,m}|)$$

The nice thing about monthly data is that it allows us to construct non-overlapping annual measures of firm volatility. We define the explanatory power of the CAPM model as the share of total firm return volatility that one can explain with the market return, i.e., the  $R^2$  of the CAPM regression.

- Insert Figure 6 Here -

**Figure 6** shows the historical decline in the explanatory power of CAPM. CAPM used to explain 40% of firm returns before the 1950s, but its explanatory power is now around 10%.  $R^2$  is the ratio of two volatilities however, and we also want to know what has happened to the level of idiosyncratic volatility. **Figure 7** shows a U-shaped pattern for  $\sigma_t^{fin}$ . Firm volatility was high in the late 1920's, and it increased dramatically during the market crash and the early years of the great depression. It then declined steadily from the mid 1930's to the mid 1950's. At that point in time, we can make the link with the real data presented in the previous section. Since the mid 1950's, both real and financial volatility have increased steadily, with large spikes around the first oil shock and the rise and fall of

the internet bubble. For a discussion of the link between financial and real volatility at the firm level, see Veronesi and Pastor (2003).

- Insert Figure 7 Here -

Finally, note that our measure of firm volatility falls from 2001 to 2003. First, many firms have delisted from the stock exchanges, and delisting is more common for small, risky firms. Second, holding constant the composition of the sample, there has been a decrease in firm volatility. This is not unprecedented. The same happened in the early 1990s, and we expect firm volatility to start increasing again in the near future.

#### 1.4 Credit Ratings and Credit Spreads

If firms have really become more risky, then this should also be reflected in corporate bond spreads and corporate bond ratings. For the spread, we use Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield minus the 10-year treasury rate. For bond ratings, we use S&P long term domestic issuer credit rating from COMPUSTAT, coded from 2 for AAA to 27 for D (default). We first regress the rating on firm level characteristics (age, assets, sales, SIC code), and we then average the residuals across firms. **Figure 8** shows that the Aaa spread over treasury has increased overtime, and also that the average credit rating of firms in COMPUSTAT has deteriorated. Both trends suggest an increase in risk, consistent with the increase in cash flow volatility. For more on this topic, see Campbell and Taksler (2003).

- Insert Figure 8 Here -

Historical default rates on corporate bonds have also varied a lot over time. The average default rate from 1900 to 1943 was 1.7%. It dropped to a mere 0.1% from 1945 to 1965 (Sylla (2002)). It then increase again, to 0.64% between 1970 and 1985, and to 1.85% between 1986 and 2001 (Moody's, 2002). These evolutions are also consistent with the importance of rating agencies. These agencies played an important role before World War II, became largely irrelevant in the 1950s and 1960s, and have regained their previous importance in the past 30 years (Sylla (2002)).

*Conclusion 1: Firm level risk has increased over the past 50 years.*

*Conclusion 2: Firm level risk was higher in the 1920s and 1930s than in the 1950s and 1960s.*

## 2 Sectoral Evidence

We have established that the aggregate stabilization of the US economy has coincided with a large increase in firm level risk. However, in a statistical sense, this is only one observation. Our goal in this section is to explore sectoral dynamics and see how they relate to firm volatility. We are first going to show that the decline in aggregate volatility is accounted for by a decrease in the co-movement of the different sectors, and not by a decrease in the average volatility of each sector. Second, we are going to show that sectors in which firms have become more volatile have typically become less correlated with the aggregate.

Sectoral data comes from Jorgenson and Stiroh's 35 KLEM data set.<sup>6</sup>

### 2.1 Decomposition of Aggregate Volatility

We now perform a decomposition of the aggregate variance of the growth rate of real value added, TFP and real value added per worker into sector variances and correlations. Let  $\gamma_{s,t}$  be the growth rate of the particular variable in sector  $s$  at time  $t$ , and let  $\omega_{st}^{\text{sec}}$  be the share of sales for sector  $s$  in the aggregate sales in the economy. Also, let  $V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5})$  denote the variance of  $\{Z_{t-4}, Z_{t-3}, \dots, Z_t, \dots, Z_{t+4}, Z_{t+5}\}$  for any generic variable  $Z$  and  $Cov([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5}, [Y_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5})$  be the covariance between  $\{Z_{t-4}, Z_{t-3}, \dots, Z_t, \dots, Z_{t+4}, Z_{t+5}\}$  and  $\{Y_{t-4}, Y_{t-3}, \dots, Y_t, \dots, Y_{t+4}, Y_{t+5}\}$ . By definition, the aggregate growth rate is

$$\gamma_t = \sum_i \gamma_{s,t} \omega_{s,t}^{\text{sec}}.$$

Then, using the definition of the variance,

$$V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5}) \equiv \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \left( \sum_i \gamma_{s,\tau} \omega_{s,\tau}^{\text{sec}} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \sum_i \gamma_{s,\tau} \omega_{s,\tau}^{\text{sec}} \right)^2.$$

For simplicity, suppose that  $\omega_{s,t}^{\text{sec}} = \omega_s^{\text{sec}}$  for all the sectors  $i$  and all years  $t$ . Then,  $V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5})$  can be written as follows:<sup>7</sup>

$$V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5}) = \underbrace{\sum_s (\omega_s^{\text{sec}})^2 V([\gamma_{s,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5})}_{\text{Variance Component}} + \underbrace{\sum_s \sum_{j \neq s} \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \omega_j^{\text{sec}} Cov([\gamma_{s,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5}, [\gamma_{j,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5})}_{\text{Covariance Component}}$$



Hence, the variance of the growth rate of aggregate sales is decomposed into two terms - the first is related to the sector level variance of sales (variance component) and the second reflects the covariances between the growth rates of sales at different sectors (covariance component).

- Insert Figure 9 Here -

The first two rows in **Figure 9** show the evolution of the variance and covariance components of the variance of the growth rate of aggregate value added, aggregate value added per worker and TFP. The variance component of all three variables displays a hump-shaped pattern over time, with no obvious decline over our sample period, 1959 to 1996. On the other hand, for all three variables, we can observe that there has been a decline since the 1970's in the covariance of growth across sectors. For value added per worker and TFP there has been an important decline in the covariance of growth over our sample period, while for value added growth there has been no trend.

For the three variables, the covariance component is substantially larger than the variance component. The difference in magnitude ranges from twice larger (TFP growth) to an order of magnitude larger (value added growth). As a result, the relevant component to understand the dynamics of aggregate volatility is the covariance of growth across sectors.

The covariance component is affected by the sectoral variance and by the correlation of a sector with the others. To increase further our understanding we also compute the correlation component. Specifically, we define first the correlation of each sector with the other sectors:

$$Corr_{s,t}^{sec} = \sum_{j \neq s} \frac{\omega_j^{sec}}{\sum_{h \neq s} \omega_h^{sec}} Corr([\gamma_{s,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5}, [\gamma_{j,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5}), \quad (3)$$

Then we define aggregate correlation as a weighted average of the sectoral correlations:

$$Corr_t^a = \sum_s \omega_s^{sec} Corr_{s,t}^{sec}.$$

The third row in **Figure 9** shows a clear decline in aggregate correlation for value added, TFP and value added per worker growth over time. Hence, we conclude that, in order to understand the decline in aggregate volatility, we should try to understand what drives this decline in the correlation between sectors. The results presented in this section are based

on the KLEM sectoral data set. We have obtained similar results for the decomposition of aggregate volatility using manufacturing data from the BLS.

*Conclusion 3: The decline in aggregate volatility is mostly due to a decrease in the correlation of growth rates across sectors. The contribution of average sector volatility is less important.*

## 2.2 Firm Volatility and Sector Co-movements

We now ask if the decline in co-movement across sectors is linked to the increase in volatility within each sector. We start from our measure of idiosyncratic firm volatility  $\sigma_{i,t}$  defined in equation (2). We aggregate this measure within each sector to obtain a sector specific measure of firm volatility

$$\sigma_{s,t}^{\text{sec}} = \text{mean}_{i \in s}(\sigma_{i,t})$$

On the other hand, we have the sector specific correlation measure,  $\text{Corr}_{s,t}^{\text{sec}}$ , defined in equation (3). We run the following regressions

$$\text{Corr}_{s,t}^{\text{sec}} = \alpha_i + \beta t + \gamma \sigma_{s,t}^{\text{sec}} + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

**Table 2** shows the results when the dependent variable is the correlation of value added, employment, labor productivity and TFP. We estimate a negative  $\gamma$  in all specifications, and it is significant for the last three. Of course since both  $\sigma_{s,t}^{\text{sec}}$  and  $\text{Corr}_{s,t}^{\text{sec}}$  are autocorrelated we use Newey-West to assess the significance of  $\beta$ . As a robustness check, we estimate the relationship between sectoral correlation and firm volatility replacing the time trend by sector dummies. In this alternative specification we continue to obtain a negative estimate of  $\gamma$  that is statistically significant.

- Insert Table 2 Here -

To have a more graphical image of the relationship between firm volatility and sectoral correlation, **Figures 10a and 10b** show the change in the correlation of output per worker against the change in the volatility of firms between 1964 and 1977 (10a) and between 1978 and 1991 (10b) for the 35 sectors in our sample. In these figures, there is a clear and significant negative cross-sectional relationship between the change in firm volatility and

the change in sectoral correlation for the two periods that cover the whole time-span of our sample. In various robustness checks, we have found that the results for productivity (either value added per worker, or TFP) are robust, while the results for quantities (either employment or value added) are not always significant.

- Insert Figure 10a Here -

- Insert Figure 10b Here -

*Conclusion 4: Co-movement has decreased more in sectors where firm volatility has increased more.*

### 3 International Evidence

So far our exploration has been restricted to the US because of data availability. Some research, however, has been done on non-US data. Frazzini and Marsh (2002) do not find the same increase in firm volatility in the UK. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) show an increase in France, especially for listed firms. Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung (2004) show that the CAPM explains a larger part of firm equity returns in emerging market than in developed economies.

- Insert Table 3 Here -

Adding to this evidence we explore the evolution of firm-level volatility using a short panel of international firms in the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL data set. This sample covers publicly traded companies between 1993 and 2004 in more than 80 countries, representing over 90% of the world's market capitalization, including coverage of over 96% of European market capitalization and 88% of Asian market capitalization. Due to the short nature of the panel we compute volatility using 4-year rolling windows. Specifically, for every firm in the sample, we compute the standard deviation of the growth rate of employment on a rolling window of 4 consecutive years. Our measure of firm volatility in year  $t$  is either the mean or the median of the standard deviations across all firm in year  $t$ . **Table 3** reports the evolution of these measures of firm volatility. We can observe a clear increase in both measures of firm-level volatility during the nineties. Unfortunately, the panel is too short to see if the upward trend in firm volatility holds in the post-war period.

- Insert Figure 11a Here -

The length of the panel limits the time series exploration of firm volatility, but it does not preclude us from investigating the cross-section determinants of volatility. In particular, one interesting issue that we can address is the relationship between income per capita and volatility. At the aggregate level, **Figure 11a** shows a well known fact from, for example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Namely, that there is a negative relationship between the volatility and the initial level of income per capita. In this case, the sample contains a cross-section of 70 countries during the 1990's. At the firm-level, though, we do not see any relationship between the firm-level volatility in a country and income per capita.<sup>8</sup> In particular, **Figure 11b** illustrates this lack of association between median firm volatility of employment growth and income per capita in a cross-section of 57 countries. This result holds irrespective of whether we aggregate firm volatilities at the country level using the mean or the median.

- Insert Figure 11b Here -

Finally, we wish to explore the relationship between aggregate and firm-level volatility in the cross-section of countries. **Figure 12a** plots the scatter plot for our sample of 58 countries which includes both developed and developing economies. It is clear from this figure that when we look at all the countries in the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL there is no relationship between aggregate and firm-level volatility. This, however, may be the result of the noisiness of the data for some low income countries..

- Insert Figure 12a Here -

To mitigate this problem, we explore the sub-sample of 28 OECD economies. **Figure 12b** contains the scatter plot of aggregate and firm volatility for each of our cross-section of OECD economies during the 90's. There we can observe a statistically-significant negative relationship between aggregate and firm volatility. Interestingly, this negative relationship between aggregate and firm volatility remains significant after controlling for the log of income per capita, the log average size of firms in a country or the log number of firms in a country.

- Insert Figure 12b Here -

We do not want to push too far this relationship between aggregate and firm volatility in the cross-section of OECD countries, but, in any case, it supports the conclusions we have drawn previously while exploring the post-war panel of US sectors. Namely, that there seems to exist a negative correlation between the evolution of aggregate and firm-level volatilities.

*Conclusion 5: Aggregate volatility and income per-capita are negatively related across countries*

*Conclusion 6: Firm volatility and income per-capita are uncorrelated across countries*

*Conclusion 7: Firm and aggregate volatility are negatively related among OECD countries*

## 4 Theoretical Discussion

We are now going to discuss a few possible explanations for the facts that we have uncovered so far. In the last part of the paper, we will try to test these explanations. On the link between sectoral diversification, volatility and growth, see Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Imbs and Wacziarg (2004), and Koren and Tenreyro (2004).

The first potential explanation is that aggregate stabilization led to more risk taking by firms. The cause of the aggregate stabilization could be luck, or better monetary policy. The link with individual risk taking could be the following. Suppose that reallocation is inefficiently low in recessions. Then entrepreneurs may be reluctant to start risky ventures because of the eventuality that they fail at a time where the economy is in a bust. This applies equally to human capital (unemployment risk) or physical capital (fire sales). A decline in aggregate volatility could therefore lead to more individual risk taking.

Other explanations assume that there is a change at the firm level that drives the increase in firm volatility and leads, directly or indirectly, to a decrease in aggregate volatility. Some of these explanations start from an increase in competition in the goods market. It is easy to see how competition can drive up firm level risk. The explanations differ in how they link competition to aggregate volatility. One explanation, formalized in Philippon (2003) is

that more competition leads firms to adjust their prices faster, which reduces the impact of aggregate demand shocks. While intuitively appealing, the simple sticky price explanation cannot be complete because it also implies more volatile inflation, contrary to the evidence.<sup>9</sup>

The third explanation, formalized in Comin and Mulani (2005), is that more competition leads to a decline in the correlation of sectoral TFP shocks. To see why this could be the case, suppose that firms decide how much to invest in the development of two kinds of innovations. Idiosyncratic, R&D innovations are patentable and benefit mostly the innovator. General innovations – such as the mass production system, and other organizational innovations, improved process controls, product development, testing practices and pre-production planning, new personnel and accounting practices – are hard to patent and can potentially affect all the firms in the economy. An increase in R&D leads to market turnover and to a reduction in the value of market leaders. Since the marginal value of general innovations is proportional to the value of market leaders, an increase in R&D leads to a decline in the development of general innovations. As a result, the correlation of TFP growth across sectors declines and so does aggregate volatility.

Finally, financial innovation could explain our facts. Financial innovation can lead to more risk taking (see Arrow (1971), Obstfeld (1994)). Financial innovation can also work through the competition channel, since financial development favors entry of new competitors. On the other hand, financial innovation could prevent credit crunches, make collateral constraints less binding (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)) and lead to lower aggregate volatility.

## 5 Product Market Competition

We have already shown that turnover at the top of industries has significantly increased over time. See figures 4 and 5. Is competition behind this evolution?

### 5.1 Profit Margins

Figure 13 shows the evolution of profit margins. The profit margin for firm  $i$  at time  $t$  is defined as

$$\pi_{it} = \frac{OI_{it}}{S_{it}}$$

where  $OI_{it}$  is operating income and  $S_{it}$  is sales. The key question is how to aggregate profit margins. One way is to take the mean across all firms

$$\bar{\pi}_{It}^{non-weighted} = \text{mean}_{i \in I} (\pi_{it}) .$$

Another way is to take the sales-weighted average, or equivalently

$$\bar{\pi}_{It}^{weighted} = \frac{\sum_{i \in I} OI_{it}}{\sum_{i \in I} S_{it}}$$

- Insert Figure 13 Here -

As **figure 13** shows, the two measures have had very different evolutions. The stability of the weighted margin means that leaders are as profitable today as they were 50 years ago. However, firms are less likely to remain leaders for very long. The decline of the non-weighted margin is due to the entry of new firms (that often have negative cash flows) and the downfall of previous leaders.

*Conclusion 8: Aggregate margins have remained stable because, conditional on being an industry leader, the margins of today are just as high as the margins of yesterday. The key evolution is that firms are less likely to remain leaders now than they were 50 years ago.*

## 5.2 Evidence from Deregulation

The results presented in this section follow Irvine and Pontiff (2005) who document that return volatility increases after episodes of deregulation.

Some industries have been deregulated. For these industries, we can estimate the volatility of firms before and after deregulation, relative to firms in industries that do not experience deregulation. This is a standard difference-in-difference estimation.

For each firm, we define  $\sigma_t^i$  like in equation 2 except that we use only the past 5 years of data to make the timing more transparent.

$$\sigma_t^i = \text{std.dev}(\gamma_{i\tau})_{\tau=t-4\dots t}$$

- Insert Figure 14 Here -

We are therefore using a purely backward looking measure of volatility. For each year, we measure the volatility of firm in industry I against firms in the other industries. The deregulated industries are Airlines (1978), Entertainment (1984), Gas (1978), Trucking (1980), Banking (1994), Railroad (1980), Electricity (1978) and Telecom (1982). Figure 14 shows the evolution of the backward looking relative volatility measure around the year where deregulation happens. The increase in firm volatility is not very large (about 1.5% after 5 years), but it is statistically significant. In the underlying difference-in-difference regression, the p-value of the test that volatility at t+5 is the same as volatility at t-1 is 0.0123.

*Conclusion 9: Deregulation can account for some of the increase in firm volatility.*

## 6 R&D, Innovations and Firm Dynamics

Following the Schumpeterian tradition, Comin and Mulani (2005) argue that the observed increase in R&D-driven innovations may be responsible for the increase in the turnover in market leadership and firm volatility. Consistent, with this idea, Chun, Kim, Lee, and Morck (2004) find that firm specific stock return volatility is higher in industries that invest more in information technology. To explore this hypothesis we estimate the following regression in a panel of 35 2-digit sectors in the US during the period 1950-2003:

$$\sigma_{s,t} = \alpha_s + \beta t + \gamma RD_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t},$$

where  $\sigma_{st}$  denotes the measure of firm-level volatility in sector  $s$  at time  $t$ ,  $\alpha_s$  is a sector-specific intercept and  $RD_{s,t}$  denotes total R&D expenses over total sales in sector  $s$  during year  $t$ .

- Insert Table 4 Here -

The first four columns in **Table 4** report the estimates of  $\gamma$  for various measures of volatility. In all the cases there is a positive and statistically significant association between R&D and firm volatility. These estimates are robust to substituting the time trend for time dummies. Further, the estimated coefficient is economically significant. R&D intensity has increased by about 2 percent since the mid 50's. This implies that the increase in R&D



could account for an increase in firm volatility of between 1.5 and 6 percentage points of the total increase of approximately 10 percentage points.

Of course, there is a long way between correlation and causation. Further, the reserve causality argument is particularly plausible in this context. Namely, when it is easier to take over market leaders, and therefore there is more firm volatility, firms have more incentives to invest in R&D to materialize this possibility.

One crude way to check whether R&D has a positive effect on firm volatility consists on exploring whether the increase in firm volatility after 1980 has been larger in the sectors that invested more heavily in R&D before 1980. This is the motivation for the following specification:

$$\bar{\sigma}_{s,POST} = \alpha + \beta \bar{\sigma}_{s,PRE} + \gamma \overline{RD}_{s,PRE} + \varepsilon_s \quad (4)$$

By fixing R&D prior to 1980 we avoid the reverse effect of volatility on R&D. In this specification, this comes at the cost of reducing the initial panel to a cross-section of increments in volatility. **Table 5** reports the estimates for  $\gamma$  in equation (4) for various measures of firm volatility. For all of them, there is a positive effect of pre-1980 R&D intensity on post-1980 firm volatility. This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels for the mean of the volatility of sales and sales per worker and for the median of the volatility of sales. For the median volatility of sales per worker, the effect of R&D before to 1980 on firm volatility after 1980 becomes significant if we restrict to the non-primary economy.

- Insert Table 5 Here -

To increase our understanding of the interaction between firm volatility and R&D, we proceed to estimate the following equation:

$$\sigma_{st} = \alpha_s + \beta t + \gamma(j)RD_{s,t-j} + \epsilon_{st},$$

for values of  $j$  between 10 and -10. For concreteness, we focus now on the median volatility of sales per worker as a measure of  $\sigma_{st}$ , though the results are very robust to the other volatility measures. **Figure 15a** reports the estimate of  $\gamma$  for various lags ( $j$ ) and **figure 15b** reports the associated p-values (in an inverse scale) after computing Newey-West standard errors. In these figures it is very clear the lead-lag relationship between R&D and volatility.

As we suspected, current volatility has a significant impact on future R&D that peaks approximately at  $t + 3$ . However, there is a very apparent effect of past R&D on current volatility That peaks at  $t - 5$ . This effect is always positive, statistically significant and typically larger than the contemporaneous correlation between R&D and firm volatility.

- Insert Figure 15a Here -

- Insert Figure 15b Here -

Finally, since R&D seems to be an important determinant of firm volatility, we can explore how R&D affects the co-movement of sectoral growth. To this end, we estimate the following equation:

$$Corr_{s,t}^{sec} = \alpha_s + \beta t + \gamma RD_{s,t} + \epsilon_{st},$$

where  $Corr_{s,t}^{sec}$  is defined in expression (3). The estimates of  $\gamma$  when  $Corr_{s,t}^{sec}$  is measured by the correlations of productivity and TFP growth are  $-3$  and  $-2.4$  respectively with p-values of 2%. Hence, the increase in R&D is associated to a decline of between 5 and 6 percentage points in the sectoral correlation of TFP or productivity growth of the observed decline of between 10 and 25 percentage points. These estimates are robust to replacing the time trend by time dummies.

*Conclusion 10: Increases in R&D intensity are correlated with significant increases in firm volatility.*

*Conclusion 11: Growth in sectors with larger increases in R&D spending has become less synchronized with aggregate growth in the economy.*

## 7 Financial Development

Before the great depression, financial markets for high risk companies were very active. Corporate defaults were common, and IPOs were numerous (see above for defaults, and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) for IPOs). In the 1950's and 1960's, defaults were extremely rare, and IPOs almost disappeared. The high yield market was reinvented in the 1970's, and

IPOs reached historical highs in the 1990's. Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung (2004) find that firm specific volatility is linked to the openness of capital markets across emerging countries, but not to openness to trade. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) find that, among french firms, volatility increased more for publicly traded companies following financial deregulation.

On the macroeconomic side, there are many models, and a lot of evidence to support the idea that financial development can reduce aggregate volatility. Recently, Campello (2003) find that industry markups are more counter-cyclical when leverage ratios are high, and Braun and Larrain (2004) show that industry that rely more on external finance are more sensitive to aggregate shocks, and that the effect is stronger in countries that are less financially developed.

We were not able to find a plausible instrument for financial development, so we can only present reduced form regressions. We study if industries that use a lot of external finance also experience large increases in firm volatility

$$\sigma_{s,t} = \alpha_s + \beta t + \gamma^{RD} RD_{s,t} + \gamma^{EQ} EQ_{s,t} + \gamma^{LD} LD_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t},$$

For sector  $s$  at time  $t$ ,  $EQ_{s,t}$  is the ratio of total issues of common and preferred stocks over total sales, and  $LD_{s,t}$  is the ratio of total long term debt issues over total sales. As before,  $\sigma_{s,t}$  is the median firm volatility, measured between  $t-4$  and  $t+5$ , and  $RD_{s,t}$  is total R&D expenditures over total sales. We obtain the following results for our sample of 35 sectors between 1952 and 2002:

	$\gamma^{RD}$	$\gamma^{EQ}$	$\gamma^{LD}$
Coefficient	.974	.267	.106
St. Error	.125	.070	.024

*Conclusion 12: Increases in firm volatility are associated with significant increases in R&D intensity, and with significant increases in debt and equity issuances.*

We can also look at the link between external finance and sectoral correlations (using the correlation of the growth rate of TFP in sector  $s$  at time  $t$  with the aggregate TFP growth of the economy):

$$Corr_{s,t}^{sec} = \alpha_s + \beta t + \gamma^{RD} RD_{s,t} + \gamma^{EQ} EQ_{s,t} + \gamma^{LD} LD_{s,t} + \epsilon_{st} ,$$

and we find

	$\gamma^{RD}$	$\gamma^{EQ}$	$\gamma^{LD}$
Coefficient	-1.93	.256	.109
St. Error	.619	.322	.102

The negative link between TFP co-movement and R&D appears robust, but there is no significant link with external financing

*Conclusion 13: R&D intensity is associated with decreases in co-movement, while external financing is not.*

## 8 Conclusion

We document a widespread increase in firm level volatility, which, we argue, is primarily due to more competition in product markets. We show that competition is best viewed as an increase in the turnover of market shares, as opposed to the more traditional approach emphasizing average markups, or indexes of concentration. We find that average industry profit margins have been roughly stable over the past 50 years, because, at any point in time, industry leaders account for most of the sales, and the profit margins conditional on being a leader have not changed much. However, we show that the expected length of leadership by any particular firm has declined dramatically.

We then explore the possible causes for the increase in competition, and we find several explanations. First, we show that firm volatility increases after deregulation. Second, volatility increases more in industries that experience larger increases in R&D investment, and in industries that issue more debt and equity.

The contrast between the decline in aggregate risk and the increase in idiosyncratic firm volatility is striking, and we present evidence that the two trends are related. Stock and Watson (2002) show that most of the decline in volatility is due to smaller shocks. We bring two new pieces to the puzzle. First, we show that the decline in the volatility of aggregate shocks is primarily due to a decrease in the correlation of shocks across sectors, rather than a decline in sectoral volatility. Second, we show that the correlation of a particular sector with the rest of the economy declines more when firm volatility within this sector increases

more. Therefore, we claim that there is a *negative* relationship between firm and aggregate volatility.

Several theories can help us understand this connection, and we classify them in two broad categories. The first group takes the aggregate shocks as given and emphasizes a decline in a particular amplification mechanism, like the credit multiplier or nominal rigidities. We do not find supporting evidence for a role of the investment-financial multiplier in the decline in aggregate volatility. Our data does not allow us to explore the role of nominal rigidities. The second group of explanations argues that competition can lead to a reduction in the correlation of TFP shocks across sectors. We find evidence supportive of this hypothesis: R&D spending at the industry level predicts both an increase in firm volatility within the industry, and a decrease in the co-movement of the industry with the rest of the economy.

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## Appendix

In this appendix we derive the decomposition of the variance of aggregate growth into the variance of sectoral growth and the covariance of growth across sectors. The growth rate of the aggregate variable of interest ( $\gamma_t$ ) is related to sectoral growth ( $\gamma_{s,t}$ ) as follows:

$$\gamma_t = \sum_s \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \gamma_{s,t},$$

where  $\omega_{s,t}^{\text{sec}}$  are the relevant sectoral weights. Aggregate variance of  $\gamma_\tau$  between  $\tau = t - 4$  and  $\tau = t + 5$  can be expressed as:

$$V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5}) = \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \left( \sum_s \gamma_{s,\tau} \omega_s^{\text{sec}} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \sum_s \gamma_{s,\tau} \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \right)^2$$

Imposing the restriction that sectoral weights are constant during the interval  $[t - 4, t + 5]$ , we can express aggregate variance as:

$$V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5}) = \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \left( \sum_s \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \left( \gamma_{s,\tau} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \gamma_{s,\tau} \right) \right)^2$$

Expanding and manipulating we obtain the variance-covariance decomposition.

$$\begin{aligned} V([\gamma_\tau]_{t-4}^{t+5}) &= \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \left( \sum_s \sum_j \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \omega_j^{\text{sec}} \left( \gamma_{s,\tau} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \gamma_{s,\tau} \right) \left( \gamma_{j,\tau} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \gamma_{j,\tau} \right) \right) \\ &= \sum_s \sum_j \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \omega_j^{\text{sec}} \left( \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \left( \gamma_{s,\tau} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \gamma_{s,\tau} \right) \left( \gamma_{j,\tau} - \frac{1}{10} \sum_{\tau=t-4}^{t+5} \gamma_{j,\tau} \right) \right) \\ &= \underbrace{\sum_s (\omega_s^{\text{sec}})^2 V([\gamma_{s,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5})}_{\text{Variance Component}} + \underbrace{\sum_s \sum_{j \neq s} \omega_s^{\text{sec}} \omega_j^{\text{sec}} \text{Cov}([\gamma_{s,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5}, [\gamma_{j,\tau}]_{t-4}^{t+5})}_{\text{Covariance Component}} \end{aligned}$$

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>We have checked the robustness of our findings using BLS sectoral data.

<sup>2</sup>Another way to measure firm volatility is to estimate an auto-regressive process and compute the volatility of the innovations. The increase in volatility is the same if we measure it in that way.

<sup>3</sup>For a decomposition of firm dynamics into permanent and transitory shocks, see Franco and Philippon (2004)

<sup>4</sup>Comin and Mulani (2003) also allow for cohort-specific age and size effects, and for auto-correlated errors.

<sup>5</sup>This is not to say that M&As are not important. They do not matter much here because we use the median to aggregate across firms. If we had used the mean as our benchmark for figure 1, then some large mergers would have affected our measure, and removing these mergers would have made a difference.

<sup>6</sup>All of our results also hold using BLS manufacturing data.

<sup>7</sup>See Appendix for the derivation details.

<sup>8</sup>This lack of association between firm-level volatility and income per capita persist if we compute firm volatility after filtering firm growth from shocks to aggregate growth. Specifically, we regress firm growth on country-time specific dummies and compute the standard deviation of the residuals to measure firm volatility.

<sup>9</sup>This is because the standard sticky price model assumes a constant velocity, hence  $y = m - p$  and , for given volatility of  $m$ , the only way to decrease the volatility of  $y$  is to increase the volatility of  $p$ . Sticky price models are one example in the class of models with counter-cyclical markups. Models with real counter-cyclical markups would not make the counter-factual prediction.

Table 1: Firm Level Summary Statistics

Year	Number of Firms	Average Real Sales	Median Sales Volatility
1955	810	1.30	0.096
1956	829	1.35	0.093
1957	849	1.38	0.090
1958	927	1.22	0.084
1959	982	1.28	0.081
1960	1589	0.87	0.095
1961	1727	0.84	0.098
1962	1952	0.82	0.099
1963	2171	0.81	0.099
1964	2351	0.83	0.098
1965	2506	0.86	0.100
1966	2680	0.89	0.108
1967	2861	0.89	0.114
1968	3450	0.82	0.120
1969	3633	0.92	0.122
1970	3705	0.91	0.128
1971	3898	0.92	0.141
1972	4073	0.96	0.139
1973	4502	1.02	0.134
1974	6110	0.88	0.139
1975	6175	0.84	0.138
1976	6224	0.91	0.139
1977	6262	0.97	0.142
1978	6187	1.04	0.146
1979	6081	1.15	0.149
1980	6187	1.18	0.151
1981	6226	1.17	0.157
1982	6530	1.09	0.167
1983	6771	1.05	0.174
1984	6827	1.09	0.179
1985	7135	1.06	0.184
1986	7394	1.03	0.188
1987	7448	1.11	0.190
1988	7295	1.20	0.192
1989	7202	1.27	0.187
1990	7239	1.33	0.181
1991	7375	1.27	0.175
1992	7786	1.22	0.171
1993	8907	1.11	0.160
1994	9288	1.17	0.163
1995	10101	1.18	0.172
1996	10282	1.23	0.180
1997	10020	1.33	0.197
1998	10286	1.39	0.212
1999	10294	1.51	0.211
2000	9819	1.76	0.207

Average Sales in 2000 Billion Dollars

Table 2: Sectoral Correlation and Firm Volatility, Panel Regression, 35 Sectors

Dependent Variable	Sectoral correlation of growth in value added	Sectoral correlation of growth in employment	Sectoral correlation of growth in labor productivity	Sectoral correlation of growth in TFP
Avg. Firm Volatility	-0.036 (0.096)	-0.23 (.12)	-0.264 (.126)	-0.22 (.08)
N	1011	1011	1011	1011

Firm volatility measured in COMPUSTAT. Sector correlation measured in Jorgenson's dataset. All regressions include a time trend and sector fixed effects. Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 3: Firm Level Volatility in the World

year	Number of firms	Median Volatility	Average Volatility
1995	2685	0.0694	0.1301
1996	2752	0.0737	0.1417
1997	2762	0.0872	0.1587
1998	3429	0.0999	0.1859
1999	3652	0.1126	0.1983
2000	3711	0.1205	0.2161
2001	1831	0.1281	0.2269

Table 4: R&D and Firm Volatility, Panel Regression, 1956-1997, 35 sectors

	Dependent Variable			
	Mean Volatility of Sales	Mean Volatility of Sales per Worker	Median Volatility of Sales	Median Volatility of Sales per Worker
R&D/Sales	3 (0.93)	2.88 (0.83)	0.65 (0.29)	0.49 (0.21)
N	1260	1258	1260	1258


Newey-West Standard errors in parenthesis

All regressions include a time trend and sector dummies.

Table 5: R&D and Firm Volatility, Cross-Section of 35 sectors before/after 1980

	Dependent Variable, Mean Post 1980			
	Mean Volatility of Sales	Mean Volatility of Sales per Worker	Median Volatility of Sales	Median Volatility of Sales per Worker
Firm Vol. pre 1980	1 (.14)	1.1 (0.2)	0.94 (0.12)	1.01 (0.13)
R&D/Sales pre 1980	5.26 (2.27)	5.96 (2.15)	1.98 (1)	1.35 (0.88)
N	35	35	35	35

Fig 1: GDP versus Individual Firm Sales Volatility  
10-Year Centered Rolling Standard Deviation of Growth Rates



## Fig 2: Distribution of Firm Volatility

10-Year Centered Rolling Standard Deviation of Sales Growth




Fig 3: Firm Volatility, Alternative Measures  
10-Year Centered Rolling Standard Deviation of Sales Growth






Fig 4: Turnover of Industry Leaders  
5-Year Ahead Exit Rate from Top 20% of Industry






Fig5 : Correlation of Labor Productivity Rankings




Note: 5 and 10 years ahead correlation of within sector ranking, based on Sales per Employee

Fig 6: The Declining Explanatory Power of CAPM  
Mean R2 from CAPM on Monthly Returns




Note: For each firm/year, the CAPM-beta is estimated using 12 monthly returns

**Fig 7: The Evolution of Idiosyncratic Return Volatility**  
Median Absolute Deviation of Monthly Residual Firm Returns



Note: Firm Returns are CAPM-adjusted using betas estimated on 12 monthly returns

### Fig 8: Average Credit Ratings and Credit Spreads



Rating ranges from 2 (AAA) to 20 (CCC). Index adjusted for age, size and industry.

Figure 9: Variance-Covariance-Correlation












Fig. 10a: Firm Volatility and Sectoral Correlation 1964-1977




Fig. 10b: Firm Volatility and Sectoral Correlation 1978-1991




Fig. 11a: Aggregate Volatility in a Cross-Section of Countries




Fig. 11b: Firm Level Volatility in a Cross-Section of Countries






Fig. 12a: Aggregate and Firm Volatility  
Cross-Section of Countries




Fig. 12b: Aggregate and Firm Volatility  
Cross-Section of OECD Countries




Fig 13: Profit Margins  
Operating Income over Sales





Fig 14: Deregulation and Sales Volatility  
Relative to Non Deregulated Firms



Note: Firm Volatility is the Standard Deviation of Sales Growth over Past 5 Years

Fig. 15a: Effect of R&D at t-j on Firm Volatility at t




Fig. 15b: P-value of the Effect of R&D at t-j on Firm Volatility at t

