LEARNING
BY KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE FIRMS
New York University
The General Manager of the Garden Company (a pseudonym)
invited John Dutton and me to advise him about what he called their 'lot‑size
problem.' He was wondering, he said,
whether Garden was making products in economically efficient quantities.
We had no idea what a
strange but memorable experience this would be!
The General Manager
proposed that we start with a tour of their largest plant, and assigned someone
to guide us. Our guide took us first to
the model shop, which produced jigs and patterns for use in the main plant. In the model shop, a skilled craftsman would
start with a raw piece of metal, work on it with several different machine
tools, and end with a finished component.
Each successive component differed from those produced before and after,
and each craftsman's tasks were shifting continually.
Then our guide took us
into the plant itself. To our
amazement, we found little difference from the model shop. Many workers were using several different
machine tools in succession. Since each
worker had several machines, most of the machines were idle at any moment.
Some workers chose to
decorate castings' non-functional insides with patterns such as one sees on the
doors of bank vaults, each worker inscribing his personal pattern. Quality standards were incredibly high, for
the workers saw themselves as artisans who were putting their personal
signatures on their products.
In the middle of the
plant stood a wooden shack. Nails on
the wall of this shack represented the distinct areas of the plant. Hanging on each nail were the production orders
awaiting work in one area. We saw
workers enter the shack, leaf through the orders, and choose orders to work
on. Our guide said orders got processed
promptly if they called for tasks the workers enjoyed, whereas orders might
hang on the nails for weeks if they called for tasks the workers disliked.
Hoppers of partly finished components jammed the aisles. This, our guide explained, reflected raw-materials shortages, misplaced jigs and patterns, and missing components. After work began on an order, a worker would discover that needed raw material was out-of-stock -- the order would have to wait while purchasing got the raw material. Or, a worker would be unable to find a needed jig, and a search would reveal that a subcontractor had borrowed the jig and not returned it -- the order would have to wait while the jig was retrieved or replaced. Or, a product would be partly assembled and then the assemblers would discover that a component was missing -- the incomplete assemblies would have to wait until the missing component emerged from production. Any of these problems might arise more than once during production of a single order. As one result, Garden was taking an average of nine months to deliver standard products that incorporated only a few hours of direct labour.
The plant tour left John
and me rolling our eyes in wonder. We
could not have imagined less efficient methods or greater disorder. It was hard to believe that Garden could
even be making a profit! Yet the main
building appeared in good condition, the office areas looked clean, and the
General Manager's office had luxurious furnishings.
We told the General
Manager that the plant had no lot-size problem, but we wondered whether he
would not prefer to have one. A lot-size
problem implied that machines would be set up for mass production and that
workers would repeat specialized tasks.
We suggested, however, that Garden would gain more direct benefit from
production and inventory control than from mass production. A computer-based control system could keep
raw materials in stock, monitor the progress of production, reduce delays, and
make sure that jigs and patterns were available. Inventories could be much lower, machine usage could be much
higher, and customers could receive their orders much more quickly.
The General Manager
asked for estimates. We told him a
control system would have a payback period of roughly two years and the
inventory savings alone would cut production costs by at least ten per
cent. To this, he responded, 'Why
should we want to do that? Ten per cent
of our production costs is only one per cent of our revenues.' He then produced Garden's financial
statements for the previous year. After-tax
profits had been $40 million on sales of $83.5 million. 'And that,' he crowed, 'was a year in which
we had a strike for ten months!'
He went on to explain
that Garden made every effort to avoid direct competition. Over a third of Garden's personnel were engineers
who were good at designing new products that no other firm was producing. Garden's policy was to continue making a
product only as long as its gross margin exceeded 75 per cent of sales. When competition drove a gross margin below
75 per cent, Garden would stop offering that product for sale. The average gross margin across all products
exceeded 90 per cent.
Allowing for the
corporate tax rate of 52 per cent, we surmised that Garden employed expert tax
accountants as well as expert engineers.
John and I had received several
lessons in business . . . and the General Manager had not even charged us
tuition!
Garden's high profits
did not arise from fine steel, unusually skilled craftsmen, or exceptional
capital equipment. Its marketing was
ordinary. Although Garden delivered
high quality, it used no esoteric production technologies, and it often
subcontracted production to a broad array of machine shops. It was this subcontracting that had enabled
Garden to earn high profits despite a long strike. The profits also did not come from managerial competence of the
sort most production firms cultivate.
In that domain, Garden appeared utterly incompetent.
The remarkable profits
sprang from technical and strategic expertise.
The key labour inputs came not from the machinists in the plant, but
from the engineers and managers in the office building. These people had created monopolistic
opportunities for Garden over and over again.
Garden was the only producer of many of its products, and the dominant
producer of all of them.
Garden's key input was
expertise. It was a knowledge-intensive
firm (KIF).
Knowledge intensity has
diverse meanings, partly because people use different definitions of
knowledge. The next section of this
article gives my conclusions about such issues. Two following sections then make empirically based observations
about the activities inside KIFs. The
first of these sections reviews the kinds of work experts do, and explains why
experts find learning hard. The ensuing
section then describes organizational learning: KIFs learn by managing training and personnel turnover, and by
creating physical capital, routines, organizational culture, and social
capital. To see the results of
learning, the fifth section looks at KIFs' long-term strategic development,
including multinational expansion.
The term knowledge-intensive imitates
economists' labelling of firms as capital-intensive or labour-intensive. These labels describe the relative
importance of capital and labour as production inputs. In a capital-intensive firm, capital has
more importance than labour; in a labour-intensive firm, labour has the greater
importance. By analogy, labelling a
firm as knowledge-intensive implies that knowledge has more importance than
other inputs.
Although the terms
capital-intensive, labour-intensive, and knowledge-intensive refer to inputs,
capital, labour, and knowledge also may be outputs. Why is it useful to classify firms by their inputs? A study of office-equipment or software
companies groups firms by their outputs.
Such a study emphasizes similarities and differences across customers
and distribution channels, and it makes a good basis for analysing relations
with customers or competitors. By
contrast, a study of meat packers or machine shops groups firms by their
inputs. By emphasizing similarities and
differences across raw materials and personnel, such a study makes a good basis
for analysing internal structure and operations. Input classes highlight the effects of resource availabilities,
and their determinants, such as governmental policies. As well, Sveiby and Risling (1986) argued
that KIFs call for new definitions of ownership and new ways of controlling the
uses of capital. Traditional notions of
ownership, they said, assume that financial or physical capital dominates
labour, whereas human capital dominates in KIFs.
Assessing the importance
of knowledge is harder than comparing capital and labour, however. Economists compare capital and labour by expressing
them in monetary units, but market prices mainly reflect values that many firms
share. At best, prices reflect those
aspects of inputs that could transfer readily from one firm to another. Prices ignore inputs' importance for
intrafirm activities or for activities that are idiosyncratic to a single
firm. Since much knowledge has
disparate values in different situations, monetary measures of knowledge are
elusive and undependable.
Knowledge itself is
nearly as ambiguous an idea as value or importance, and it has many guises
(Winter, 1987). During a dozen seminars
aimed at research about knowledge-intensive firms, almost every speaker devoted
time to his or her preferred definition of knowledge. Such discussions have led me to five conclusions.
1. A KIF may not be
information-intensive. Knowledge is a
stock of expertise, not a flow of information.
Thus, knowledge relates to information in the way that assets relate to
income (Machlup, 1962, took another view).
Some activities draw on extensive knowledge without processing large
amounts of current information -- management consulting, for example. Conversely, a firm can process much
information without using much knowledge.
For instance, Automatic Data Processing (ADP) produces payroll
checks. ADP processes vast amounts of
information, but it is probably more capital-intensive than knowledge-intensive. Producing a payroll check requires little
expertise, and many people have this expertise.
The distinction between
a KIF and an information-intensive firm can be hard to draw. From one
perspective, ADP merely processes data for other firms, using mainly capital in
the forms of computers and software.
From another perspective, ADP succeeds because it does its specialized
task better than its customers can do it themselves. This superior performance likely comes from both expertise and
returns to scale, so expertise and large scale reinforce each other.
2. In deciding whether a
firm is knowledge-intensive, one ought to weigh its emphasis on esoteric
expertise instead of widely shared knowledge.
Everybody has knowledge, most of it widely shared, but some
idiosyncratic and personal. If one
defines knowledge broadly to encompass what everybody knows, every firm can appear
knowledge-intensive. One loses the
value of focusing on a special category of firms. Similarly, every firm has some unusual expertise. To make the KIF a useful category, one has
to require that exceptional expertise make important contributions. One should not label a firm as knowledge-intensive
unless exceptional and valuable expertise dominates commonplace knowledge.
Some forms of expertise
may be hard to measure separately from their effects. Why, for example, does one attribute strategic expertise to the
Garden Company? One might label Garden
a KIF because it employed so many engineers.
But many firms employ more engineers with less remarkable results, and
Garden's products embodied no technological miracles. These engineers were unusual because they were using their
knowledge in ways that gave Garden extraordinary strategic advantages.
Managerial expertise may
pose special problems in this regard.
It would make no sense to measure managerial expertise by the fraction
of employees who are managers or by the wages paid to managers. To judge managers expert, one has to look
either at the managers' behaviours or at the results of their behaviours. Do their firms produce unusually high
profits? Do the managers show
interpersonal skill?
3. Even after excluding
widely shared knowledge, one has to decide how broadly to define expertise. One can define expertise broadly, recognize
many people as experts, and see the expertise imbedded in many machines and
routines. This strategy makes KIFs less
special, but it removes some blinders caused by stereotypes about expertise,
and it increases the generality of findings about KIFs. Alternatively, one can acknowledge only the
legitimated expertise of people who have extensive formal educations, and can
emphasize high-tech machines and unusual routines. This second strategy makes KIFs appear more special, but produces
findings that generalize only to the few firms that use such expertise
intensively. It also accepts
stereotypes about expertise.
These definitional
strategies have political overtones. A
broad definition of expertise obscures the influence of social class and social
legitimacy, whereas a narrow definition highlights the influence of social
class and social legitimacy.
Legitimated expertise is normally an upper-middle-class possession. Legitimated experts usually earn wages high
enough to put them into the upper-middle class. They normally gain their expertise through formal higher
education, which entails at least the expense of foregone income. Higher education also may give experts entry
into recognized professions.
Even jobs widely
regarded as unskilled may entail much knowledge (Kusterer, 1978). Skilled trades may be as esoteric and
difficult to enter as the professions (Ekstedt, 1989). Yet, people put other labels -- such as know-how
or skill or understanding -- on expertise learned through primary school or on-the-job
experience.
Sweden has spawned much
of the public discussion and research about KIFs. In 1983, Sveiby started writing about 'knowledge companies' in
one of Sweden's most prominent periodicals, and Swedish business executives
expressed strong interest in this topic.
Sveiby and Risling followed with a 1986 book that became a non-fiction
best seller. Probably this interest
reflects Sweden's high incomes and high educational levels.
4. An expert may not be
a professional, and a KIF may not be a professional firm. Professionals have specialized expertise
that they gain through training or experience, and KIFs may employ people who
have specialized expertise. Thus, KIFs
may be professional firms.
Many KIFs are not
professional firms, however. One reason
is that not all experts belong to recognized professions. A profession has at least four properties
besides expertise: an ethical code, cohesion, collegial enforcement of
standards, and autonomy (Schriesheim et al., 1977). Professionals' ethical codes require them to
serve clients unemotionally and impersonally, without self-interest. Professionals identify strongly with their
professions, more strongly than with their clients or their employers. They not only observe professional
standards, they believe that only members of their professions have the
competence and ethics to enforce these standards. Similarly, professionals insist that outsiders cannot properly
supervise their activities.
Management consulting
and software engineering, for example, do not qualify as recognized
professions. Without doubt, those who
do these jobs well have rare expertise.
Nevertheless, the ultimate judges of their expertise are their clients
or their supervisors, and their employers set and enforce their ethical codes
and performance standards. Similarly,
despite talk about professional management, managers do not belong to a
professional body that enforces an ethical code and insists that its values and
standards supersede those of managers' employers. Employers appoint managers without regard for the candidates'
memberships in external bodies. Strong
loyalty to a professional body would contradict managers' roles as custodians
of their employing firms.
Sveiby and Lloyd (1987)
divided 'knowhow companies' into categories reflecting their managerial or
technical expertise. They pointed to
law firms as examples of high technical expertise but low managerial
expertise. To illustrate firms with
high managerial expertise and low technical expertise, they cited McDonald's
fast-food chain. On the other hand,
Ekstedt (1988; 1989, pp. 3-9) contrasted 'knowledge companies' with industrial
companies, high-technology companies, and service companies 'such as hamburger
chains'. In his schema, both high-technology
companies and knowledge companies have high knowledge intensity, but high‑technology
companies have higher intensity of real capital than do knowledge companies.
Professional firms can
exploit and must allow for all five properties of professions, not merely
expertise. Health-maintenance
organizations, for instance, must accept doctors' codes of ethics and must
allow medical societies to adjudicate some issues. KIFs form a broader category, in which many issues reflect labour
markets, interpersonal networks, and experts' individuality, self-interest, and
social standing.
Yet, it
could be that most KIFs have nearly all the properties that authors have
assigned to professional firms. For
example, Hinings et al. (1991, pp. 376, 390) wrote:
Bucher and Stelling
(1969) suggested that organizations dominated by professionals had a number of
special characteristics, including professionals building their own roles
rather than fitting into preset roles, spontaneous internal differentiation
based on work interests, competition and conflict for resources and high levels
of political activity. . . . The distribution
of authority has long been identified as unique in an autonomous
professional organization because of its emphasis on collegiality, peer
evaluation and autonomy, informality, and flexibility of structure (Bucher and
Stelling, 1969; Montagna, 1968; Ritzer and Walczak, 1986).
Professionals are not the only experts who build
their own roles, divide work to suit their interests, compete for resources, or
emphasize autonomy, collegiality, informality, and flexible structures. Other occupations share these traditions,
and some experts have enough demand for their services that they can obtain
autonomy without support from a recognized profession.
There is another reason
KIFs may not be professional firms.
5. KIFs' knowledge may
not be in individual people. Besides
the knowledge held by individual people, one can find knowledge in: (a) capital
such as plant, equipment, or financial instruments; (b) firms' routines and
cultures; and (c) professional cultures.
People convert their
knowledge to physical forms when they write books or computer programs, design
buildings or machines, produce violins or hybrid corn, or create financial
instruments such as mutual-fund shares (Ekstedt, 1988; 1989). Conversely, people may gain knowledge by
reading books, studying buildings, buying shares, or running computer programs.
People also translate
their knowledge into firms' routines, job descriptions, plans, strategies, and
cultures. Nelson and Winter (1982)
treated behavioural routines as the very essence of organizations -- the means
by which firms can produce predictable results while adapting to social and
technological changes. Simultaneously,
Deal and Kennedy (1982) and Peters and Waterman (1982) were saying it is
cultures that perform these functions.
Describing McDonald's as
a firm with low technical expertise overlooks the expertise in McDonald's
technology and organization. McDonald's
success stems from its ability to deliver a consistent quality in diverse environments
and despite high turnover of low-skilled people. To get such results, the firm operates extensive training
programs and conducts research about production techniques and customers'
tastes. Although training at Hamburger
University may give McDonald's managers more skill than those at most
restaurants, McDonald's managers may have no more skill than those in most
production firms. Ceaseless expansion
forces McDonald's to concentrate training on new managers. Also, McDonald's substitutes technology and
routines for in-person management.
Professional cultures
too carry valuable knowledge. For
instance, lawyers live amid conflict.
Lawyers' culture not only supports conflict, it shows them how to
conflict to maximum effect and minimum damage to their egos and
reputations. Lawyers strive to advocate
their clients' interests even when this might produce injustice, and they
depend on conflict to foster justice by exposing all sides. Lawyers try to keep their roles as advocates
for their clients separate from their interpersonal relations as members of the
legal profession. They observe
behavioural codes strictly, and much of their conflict concerns interpretations
of and conformity to behavioural codes.
When lawyers cannot themselves resolve disagreements, they seek help
from above -- judges in courts or superiors in law firms. The legal profession also serves as micro
environments in which lawyers can cultivate long-term reputations. Some lawyers seek reputations as tough
negotiators who yield little and demand much.
To nurture such reputations, they may refuse to make concessions that
their clients want to make.
Debates about how KIFs differ from other firms
persuaded me to focus on firms that would be knowledge-intensive by almost
anyone's definition. As a starting
point, I defined an expert as someone with formal education and experience
equivalent to a doctoral degree, and a KIF as a firm in which such experts are
at least one-third of the personnel.
Later, Lawrence Rosenberg pointed out that some expertise takes
non-human forms. Some KIFs may even
hold most of their expertise in non-human forms, but I have not studied such
firms.
I have not been
distinguishing firms from other organizations because many KIFs operate at the
boundary between government and private enterprise. They are not-for-profit firms that work mainly or exclusively for
government agencies.
Although I have
interviewed in eight firms satisfying the above criteria, three stand out as
excellent examples.
The Rand Corporation and
Arthur D. Little are the two firms that came immediately to mind when I first
began thinking about the knowledge-intensive firm. The Rand Corporation is the prototypic think
tank, located near the beach in Santa Monica.
Staffed by Ph.D.s, Rand mainly makes policy studies: Rand's personnel
evaluate current policies and generate policy alternatives. Rand holds long-term contracts from the US
Air Force and the US Army, and it receives short-term grants or contracts from
many Federal agencies. Its reports are
ubiquitous in Washington, DC.
On the other coast, in a
wooded campus near Harvard and MIT, Arthur D. Little is the oldest American
consulting firm and an exemplary one.
A. D. Little has 21 offices and roughly 1500 consultants. In a typical year, they complete over 5000
projects in 60 countries. The project
topics range from product technology, to operations management, to economic
development and strategic planning.
Partners in Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen and Katz make more money than those in any other American law
firm: it is to Wachtell, Lipton that other lawyers turn when they need the very
best and they do not care how much it costs.
Moreover, not only the partners do well at Wachtell, Lipton: surveys of
junior lawyers have repeatedly said Wachtell, Lipton is the best place to work.
Although quite unlike
each other, all three firms share similarities, as do the other firms I have
studied. Large fractions of their
people have advanced degrees. They
process information slowly in comparison to information-intensive firms. Their capital equipment is mainly general-purpose
office space, office machines, and computers, although A. D. Little also has
laboratories.
My observations come
mainly from interviews. Indeed, 'interview'
seems an inadequate label for fascinating conversations with very intelligent,
perceptive, articulate people. I had
only to point to a few issues that interested me, and they would begin to
extrapolate -- telling me who else I should interview, what issues ought
to interest me, where my assumptions seemed wrong, and how their worlds look to
them. I often found myself discussing
topics or trying frameworks I had not considered before walking into a room.
One critic complained that all my examples
describe peculiar firms that exist solely because their environments have
uncorrectable problems. An answer to
this charge has three parts.
First, all firms are
peculiar: we should look for and celebrate their individuality. There are many ways to solve most problems,
more opportunities than anyone can pursue, many criteria for judging what is
best. It is as important to see how individuals
differ -- whether individual people, or individual organizations, or individual
societies -- as to see what they have in common. It is as important to understand complexities as simplicities.
Second, successful firms
cause their environments to have uncorrectable problems. Firms and their environments change
symbiotically. Not only must an
environment be hospitable to a KIF, but the existence of a KIF induces its
environment to assume that it exists. For
example, US military services reassign personnel every two or three years. As a result, military personnel have little
experience in their successive jobs, know little of tasks' histories or
traditions, and cannot manage long-term projects effectively. Long-term projects would founder if they
depended on military personnel. By providing
civilian specialists who can have long tenures, the Rand Corporation and the
Aerospace Corporation help the military to manage long-term projects, and they
reduce the costs of retraining. Yet,
having the services of Rand and Aerospace may have kept the military from
developing other ways to manage long-term projects and other personnel
policies.
Third, I have sought out
the most successful firms, and all exceptionally successful firms exploit
peculiarities. A modal firm in a
competitive industry makes low profits, and it does not survive long. High profits and long survival come from
monopolistic competition. Monopolistic
competition arises from firms' developing distinctive competencies and
mirroring their environments' unusual needs and capabilities.
Wachtell, Lipton shows
how exceptional success may feed on peculiarities. The firm's founding partners had disliked their experiences in
other law firms: they agreed to follow some unusual policies that would produce
a better work environment. These
policies have fostered collaboration and given the firm an edge in attracting
new lawyers. The founding partners came
from a less-well-known law school whose graduates had restricted job
opportunities: much better than its reputation, this school supplied highly
talented lawyers during the early years.
A crisis during the firm's second year led the partners to adopt an
unusual policy: Wachtell, Lipton never agrees to represent clients for long
periods. This policy has had unforeseen
long-term consequences for the types of cases the firm handles.
Success reinforces
success, and excellence itself fends off competition. Today, with elegant offices on New York's Park Avenue, Wachtell,
Lipton can choose among the top graduates from law schools across America. Potential clients offer the firm four to
eight times as many cases than it can handle: it can pick the cases that look
most interesting and best suit its abilities.
The cases that potential clients bring are non-routine ones that involve
large sums, and they often concern immediate threats. Such cases draw attention, as do Wachtell, Lipton's legal
innovations.
The experts in KIFs gather information through
interviews or reading; they analyse and interpret this information; and they
make written and oral reports to clients and colleagues (Rhenman, 1973, p.
161). An observer cannot overlook the
strong, overt similarities across people, sites, and projects.
Nevertheless, experts themselves
describe their activities diversely.
Some say that they are applying old knowledge to new problems, others
that they are creating new knowledge, and still others that they are preserving
knowledge that already exists. Experts
who see themselves as producing new knowledge emphasize the recency or
originality of their data and the differences between their findings and those
of predecessors. They may classify such
work either as basic scientific research or as applied research on markets,
products, or processes. Other experts
see their work mainly as applying existing knowledge to current problems. For instance, when most lawyers do research,
they analyse and interpret previous cases and they emphasize the continuity
over time of knowledge and its meaning.
To gain acceptance of their rulings, most judges deemphasize the
innovative quality of their reasoning.
The distinction between
creating knowledge and applying it is often hard to make. Lawyers may be more successful if they
reinterpret precedent cases imaginatively, or if they conceive original
strategies. The Garden Company's
engineers were applying known techniques, but they were applying them to
products no one else had imagined.
Basic research may have direct applicability, and applied research may
contribute fundamental knowledge. When
it comes to systems as complex as a human body or an economy, people may only
be able to create valid knowledge by trying to apply it (Starbuck, 1976, pp.
1100-1103).
To my surprise, several
experts described themselves as memory cells.
They said their jobs are to preserve information that their clients have
difficulty preserving. As mentioned
above, because the US military services rotate assignments frequently, military
personnel lack job experience and cannot manage long-term projects. Also, military wage scales are too low to
attract and retain highly educated experts.
To compensate, the military services sign contracts with KIFs that
provide long-term continuity of management and expertise. These KIFs employ civilian experts who do
not rotate assignments frequently and who either manage long-term projects
directly or advise military managers.
There may be enough of these KIFs to make up a distinct, long-term-memory
industry.
Creating, applying, and
preserving intertwine and complement each other. At least over long periods, merely storing knowledge does not
preserve it. For old knowledge to have
meaning, people must relate it to their current problems and activities. They have to translate it into contemporary
language and frame it within current issues.
Effective preserving looks much like applying. As time passes and social and technological changes add up, the
needed translations grow larger, and applying knowledge comes to look more like
creating knowledge.
For new knowledge to
have meaning, people must fit it into their current beliefs and perspectives,
and familiarity with existing knowledge signals expertise. Evaluators assess completed research partly by
its applicability, and they judge research proposals partly by the researchers'
mastery of past research. Thus, Rand
Corporation, which depends on research grants for some of its income, makes
elaborate literature searches before writing proposals. Rand also employs public-information staff,
who highlight the relevance of research findings. Similarly, A. D. Little's executives believe that having
credibility with clients requires their firm to specialize in certain
industries, technologies, and functions.
They want new experts to have had several years experience in one of
these industries and functions or technologies.
Ambiguity about the
meaning of knowledge creation implies a weak tie, if any, between knowledge
creation and knowledge intensity. Clearly,
more input does not always produce more output. For example, Brooks (1975) pointed out how rare are the skills
needed to create operating systems for computers. Adding more people to such a programming project does not
accelerate it. On the contrary, more
people may slow a project down, by forcing the experts with rare skills to
spend more time co-ordinating, communicating, and observing bureaucratic
routines. An example of another kind
concerns R&D by a large chemical firm.
As Figure 1 shows, this firm has spent more and more on R&D, but
incremental dollars have yielded fewer and fewer patent filings.
Because experts are learned, one expects them to
value learning highly. Nonetheless,
many experts resist new ideas.
Such resistance has
several bases. First, clients or even
other experts may interpret experts' need to learn as evidence of deficient
knowledge. Thus, experts find it risky
to discuss their learning needs with clients or colleagues. Second, many experts get paid by the hour,
and many others have to account carefully for their uses of time. Explicit learning reduces the time available
for billable services. Third, expertise
implies specialization, which reduces versatility and limits flexibility. To become experts, people must specialize
and move into distinct occupational niches.
Required years of education limit entry to these niches; and many
experts belong to recognized professions that restrict entrance through
licences and examinations. These
niches, however, could become evolutionary deadends (Beyer, 1981). Fourth, experts' niches are partial
monopolies. Like other monopolists,
experts hold favourable positions that confer high incomes and social
statuses. These positions also give
experts much to lose from social and technological changes. Fifth, expertise entails perceptual filters
that keep experts from noticing some social and technological changes
(Armstrong, 1985; Starbuck and Dutton, 1973).
Even while they are gaining knowledge within their specialties, experts
may overlook exciting and relevant events just outside their domains.
Knowledge creation
accelerates the social and technological changes in experts' domains (Wolff and
Baumol, 1987). Because employers or
clients often seek expertise to help them understand rapid social and
technological changes, experts tend to find employment in rapidly changing
domains. Thus, most experts are all too
aware that expertise needs updating: they have to seek a dynamic stability in
which their apparent knowledge evolves while they retain their favourable
positions.
Besides, experts'
scepticism about new ideas can enhance their learning. Learning is not adaptation, and it requires
more subtlety and complexity than mere change.
People can change without learning, and too much readiness to discard
current knowledge undermines learning.
To learn, one must build up knowledge like layers of sediment on a river
bottom. To learn effectively, one must
accumulate knowledge that has long-term value while replacing the knowledge
that lacks long-term value.
The key issue that
experts, like other learners, confront is how to sift out knowledge that will
have little value in the future. For
this winnowing, expertise itself evidently confers no advantages. Studies of many fields have consistently
found that renowned experts predict future events no more accurately than
somewhat informed people (Armstrong, 1985; Ascher, 1978; Camerer and Johnson,
1991). Still, few experts know about such
studies, and many experts overestimate their abilities as oracles.
Learning generally poses different issues for
firms than for individual experts. For
example, the need to update leads individual experts to spend time reading or
attending conferences or courses. By
contrast, senior people in a firm see updating as an activity to manage more
than to do. Senior people may assign
their juniors to take certain courses, or to read certain journals and to
summarize what they read. Senior people
sometimes deny certain juniors permission to attend conferences and tell others
that they must attend and report what they heard.
What individuals find
hard, firms may find easy, and vice versa.
In particular, individual experts learn little from changing firms,
whereas organizational learning readily takes the form of personnel
changes. KIFs aggressively pursue new
experts with wanted knowledge, and they limit the job security of continuing
experts. Since most consulting or
research projects have short terms, experts must repeatedly renegotiate their
relations with their firms and adapt their knowledge and skills to current
tasks. Some small consulting firms give
new consultants just three months in which to start bringing in enough business
to cover their salaries. A would-be
consultant who does not meet this target has to seek other employment. Large consulting firms may not treat each
consultant as a separate profit centre, but they do ask consultants to account
strictly for their time. A. D. Little,
for example, expects most consultants to spend 70-75 per cent of their time on
activities for which clients are paying, and 20-25 per cent of their time on
personal betterment or soliciting new business.
Such development and
personnel policies keep expertise closely aligned with environmental
opportunities, so rigidity and blind spots may be more troublesome for
individual experts than for KIFs.
Indeed, such policies make KIFs faddish; and efforts to stay on the
cutting edges of rapid technological and social changes accentuate this
faddishness.
The policies also make
boundaries porous. Just as KIFs may
hire experts from their clients or customers, KIFs' clients or customers may
add expertise by hiring KIFs' personnel (Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1988). Experts at the forefront of social or
technological change usually have many job opportunities. Replacing experts solely to update expertise
weakens loyalty to the firm and adds variance to organizational culture. The social networks that make it easy to
adopt new ideas also make in-house ideas accessible to other firms, as does the
ease of transmitting information. Thus,
KIFs find it hard to keep unique expertise exclusive.
Stinchcombe and Heimer
(1988) described successful software firms as 'precarious monopolies.' They are monopolies insofar as they exhibit
unusual abilities. Niches evolve
naturally as individuals and small groups concentrate on specific streams of
innovation. The firms also strive
explicitly to develop and maintain unusual abilities. Unusual abilities help the firms to market their services and to
avoid head-on competition.
Stinchcombe and Heimer
pointed out that these partial monopolies are constantly at risk, both because
technological changes may make unusual abilities obsolete and because key
experts may depart. Computer technology
has been changing especially rapidly, and the software firms' relations with
clients and computer manufacturers repeatedly expose their experts to job
offers. To sell their services to clients,
software firms have to publicize the talents of their key experts, and this
publicity creates job opportunities for the touted experts.
Not all KIFs control
distinctive domains of knowledge.
Professional firms find it especially hard to sustain monopolistic
positions. The recognized professions
work at keeping their control of knowledge and at preserving their members'
autonomy: firms would run into strong opposition if they would try to convert
professional expertise to organizational property. Moreover, many products of professional firms are easy to
imitate. For example, Martin Lipton
invented the 'poison pill' defence against unfriendly corporate takeovers; but,
after other law firms saw a few examples, Wachtell, Lipton was no longer the
sole source for poison pills (Powell, 1986).
Several modes of
organizational learning do convert individual expertise into organizational
property. These conversion processes
produce at least three types of organizational property: physical capital,
routines, and organizational culture.
The creation of social capital, such as mutual trust with clients or
customers, tends to convert organizational experience into the property of
individuals.
Both KIFs and individuals can gain new expertise
by buying capital goods. Computer
software affords obvious examples.
Not long ago, expertise
was uneven across accountants who handled income taxes. Now, every accountant has low‑cost
access to software that makes no arithmetical errors, omits nothing, incorporates
the latest changes in tax codes, and warns of conditions that might trigger
audits by tax authorities.
Lawyers have recently
begun to use a computer program, CLARA, to help them do legal research. CLARA helps small law firms compete more effectively
against large firms, and helps novice lawyers produce results comparable to
experienced lawyers (Laudon and Laudon, 1991, chapter 4). Although unfinished, CLARA does research
nearly as well as law professors. On
reading of this achievement, one practicing lawyer sniffed: 'Too bad; maybe it
will get better someday.'
In the short term, KIFs
may be able to turn expertise into concrete capital. For instance, decades of experience enabled the large public
accounting firms to create systematic auditing procedures. The firms then turned these procedures into
checklists that novice accountants and clerical staff can complete. Similarly, Rand Corporation's research
occasionally produces databases that have value beyond the projects that
created them. Rand tries to exploit
these databases by proposing new projects that would draw upon them.
Physical capital may be
even harder to protect and retain than are people, however. Physical capital also may be less flexible
than either the technologies it uses or the markets it serves. The auditing checklists created by firm A
work just as well for firm B, so B can easily take advantage of A's experience.
IntelligenceWare wrote
superior programs for artificial‑intelligence applications. The firm has been seeking to exploit these
programs by adapting them to diverse uses.
Over the longer term, competing firms can analyse and imitate
IntelligenceWare's programs. Also,
because IntelligenceWare's programs are too complex for incremental evolution,
experience will eventually force the firm to undertake a drastic rewrite.
Databases can be updated
piecemeal, but they too gain or lose currency.
At Rand Corporation, Brian Jenkins has compiled a database on
terrorism. He began this on his own
initiative, but the database became a more general asset when terrorist acts
escalated and Rand began receiving inquiries about terrorism from the
press. Although the press's interest in
terrorism fluctuates with the incidence of terrorism, such a database requires
continual maintenance.
Orlikowski (1988, pp.
179-267) detailed a consulting firm's efforts to capture its experience as
software. Over ten years and many
projects, consultants built various software 'tools' that help them plan
projects and carry them out efficiently.
The tools originated separately when consultants saw needs or
opportunities, but the firm's general production philosophy implicitly guided
these developments and rendered the tools mutually compatible. Also, at first, isolated people used these
tools voluntarily, but informal norms gradually made their use widespread and
mandatory. Thus, the tools both
expressed the firm's culture in tangible form, and reinforced the culture by
clarifying its content and generalizing its application. Generalization made the differences among
clients' problems less and less important, and it weakened the contributions
that clients could make to problem solving.
Generalization also reduced the influence of more-technical consultants
and increased the influence of less-technical consultants. In their interviews, the consultants
stressed the tools' strong influence on their perceptions of problems and their
methods of solving them. Eventually,
the firm started to sell the tools to other firms. At that point, the firm's culture, methods, and experience became
products that other firms could buy.
The ease of distributing
it makes physical capital an effective way to build organizational culture, and
it offers firms opportunities to expand their markets. Easy distribution also can cost firms their
competitive advantages. Departing
employees can easily take forms, manuals, or floppy disks with them. When firms turn physical capital into products
that they sell to competitors, knowledge-intensive capital loses the character
of being esoteric and advantageous. In
this sense, a portable expert system is self-contradictory. Distributing an expert system renders its
knowledge no longer esoteric, and thus no longer expert. It is not only tax accountants who now have
low-cost access to programs for filing income taxes; millions of non‑accountants
are using these programs to file their business or personal taxes.
Firms also learn by creating routines (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Starbuck, 1983), but formalized routines look
bureaucratic. Highly educated experts
dislike bureaucracy: conflicts between professions and bureaucracies have
attracted much research (Schriesheim et al., 1977), and some of these
conflicts apply to expertise in general.
Most experts want autonomy, they want recognition of their
individuality, and they want their firms to have egalitarian structures.
Some experts derive
independent power from their close ties with clients, so service KIFs with
multiple clients look more like loose confederations than bureaucracies. Among the service KIFs, only those having
long-term contracts with a very few clients seem able to bureaucratize. Even such KIFs must bureaucratize
cautiously, for their expert employees have external job opportunities. Of course, a product KIF such as the Garden
Company does not run into such problems because its experts have little contact
with customers.
The KIFs that can
enforce bureaucratic routines can draw benefits from them. Impersonal roles make programmes for
personnel development possible, and they ease transfers of people to meet
shifting tasks. Consistent quality is
essential to keeping long-term clients or customers. Bureaucratic clients or customers expect the KIFs they hire to
look and behave as they do. For
example, the Aerospace Corporation has a seven-layer managerial hierarchy
because this structure matches the hierarchy of the US Air Force.
Bhargava (1990) observed
that the software firms in which developers interact closely with clients
emphasize formalized documentation.
These firms devote more effort to planning and systems analysis, to
writing user manuals, and to recording the activities carried out and times
spent on specific projects. These
documents contribute to better client relations and reduce the firms'
dependence on developers who might depart.
The Rand Corporation
illustrates effective bureaucratization by a KIF. Rand's library staff watches for opportunities to submit
proposals, and it produces bibliographies to aid technical experts' proposal
writing. Some of Rand's experts review
others' proposals and reports to assure that they meet Rand's standards for
data gathering and statistical analysis.
Copy editors suggest ways to make proposals and reports more
intelligible. These activities
undoubtedly improve final reports' acceptability and the odds of proposals'
winning funds. Rand's research
proposals have a far‑above‑average success rate.
Larger KIFs are better
able and more inclined to bureaucratize, and larger KIFs can better tolerate
and balance the opposing forces in their work.
For instance, Brooks (1975) argued that 'conceptual integrity' is the
key to high quality in systems design.
Attaining conceptual integrity, he said, probably requires centralized
control by a few key experts, whereas programming and testing a designed system
may require many experts. Such work can
be troublesome for KIFs with experts who see themselves as equals and
substitutes. Large KIFs mitigate these
problems by dividing work into projects and allowing experts to specialize in
either design or implementation (Bhargava, 1990). Creating routines requires persistence, and both persistence and
learning may benefit from specializing with respect to technologies, markets,
functions, or locations.
On the other hand, large
KIFs may lack knowledge intensity. KIFs
are prone to grow by adding support staff instead of experts. Adding support staff promises to increase
profitability per expert by using experts more efficiently, whereas growth by
adding experts may use experts less efficiently. KIFs also grow by adding activities, products, or services that
promise to extract more value from the expertise already in-house. Thus, KIFs tend to lose knowledge intensity
as they grow.
Some experts see this
loss of knowledge intensity as desirable -- a sensible way to get the maximum
value from current staff. Other experts
see growth as a necessity demanded by large clients or numerous customers. Still other experts see this loss of
knowledge intensity as a danger to be combated -- by avoiding growth,
diversification, and geographic dispersion.
Routinization helps to
make knowledge intensity unstable. As
with physical capital, converting expertise to routines is risky. Routines may become targets of imitation,
spread, and gradually lose the character of being esoteric and
advantageous. A routine used by many
firms confers small comparative advantages on its users.
Cultures have to be built gradually because they
are delicate and poorly understood.
Building a special organizational culture takes much effort as well as
imagination. Imitating another firm's
culture is quite difficult, if even possible, because every culture involves
distinctive traditions.
Maister (1985, p. 4)
wrote admiringly of 'one-firm firms', which stress 'institutional loyalty and
group effort.' 'In contrast to many of
their (often successful) competitors who emphasize individual entrepreneurship,
autonomous profit centers, internal competition and/or highly decentralized
independent activities, one-firm firms place great emphasis on firmwide
coordination of decision making, group identity, cooperative teamwork, and
institutional commitment.' According to
Maister, one-firm firms:
take very seriously
their missions (usually service to clients),
grow slowly while
choosing clients and tasks carefully,
devote much effort to
selecting and training personnel,
do R&D beyond the
requirements of revenue-producing projects,
encourage free communication
among personnel, and
give information freely
to their personnel, including financial information.
Maister also warned that one-firm firms may
become complacent, lacking in entrepreneurship, entrenched in their ways of
doing things, and inbred.
Orlikowski (1988, pp.
152-160) said Maister's idealization accurately describes the consulting firm
she studied, except that her firm discourages R&D beyond the needs of
current clients. The firm devotes seven
per cent of its revenue to a training programme, and each consultant spends
over 1500 hours in training during the first six years with the firm. Overtly technical in content, this training
involves both self-study and classes at the firm's school. The consultants measure their career
progress by their progress through this programme. Nevertheless, most consultants seem to agree with the one who
said: 'The biggest advantage of the school is the networking and socializing it
allows. It really is not that important
as an educational experience.'
Alvesson (1991; 1992)
too described a consulting firm that spent much effort on formal
socialization. The top managers ran a
'project philosophy course.' They also
sought 'to sell the metaphor the company as a home to the
employees.' Designed to foster informal
interaction, the building has a kitchen, sauna, pool, piano bar, and large
lounge area. The firm supports a
chorus, art club, and navigation course.
All personnel in each department meet together every second week. Every third month, each department
undertakes a major social activity such as a hike or a sailing trip. The firm celebrated its tenth anniversary by
flying all 500 employees to Rhodes for three days of group activities.
Interviews with software
developers convinced Bhargava (1990) that larger firms work harder to build
cultures. They use their cultures to
promote free communication, to make them less dependent on key experts, and to
ease personnel transfers. He found
fewer communication problems and fewer personnel transfers in smaller firms.
Van Maanen and Kunda
(1989) vividly described people's ambivalence toward culture-building efforts
in a computer firm. Most people readily
adopt corporate language and enjoy belonging to a supportive collectivity. Some embrace corporate values and rituals
enthusiastically; more do so cynically.
Most people also hold themselves aloof from group membership and protect
their individual identities.
All the KIFs I have
studied select experts carefully, they use teams extensively, they take their
missions seriously, they manage growth cautiously, and their people talk
openly. Only Wachtell, Lipton, however,
comes close to the one-firm model in discouraging internal competition,
emphasizing group work, disclosing information, and eliciting loyalty to the
firm. The other KIFs depart from the
one-firm model in having multiple profit centres, assessing the productivities
of individual experts, and revealing only the financial information that laws
require. All the KIFs, including
Wachtell, Lipton, depart from the one-firm model in decentralizing activities,
encouraging entrepreneurship, and not involving everyone in decision-making.
KIFs do downplay formal
structures, and they achieve co-ordination through social norms and reward
systems instead of hierarchical controls (Nelson, 1988; Van Maanen and Kunda,
1989, pp. 70-93). One reason is
experts' sense of their importance as individuals and their desires for
autonomy: Close control would induce
exits. Another reason is common values
and norms that result from many years of formal education. KIFs appear to derive some of their
properties from universities, and some KIFs employ many who could be university
faculty. Third, experts have to work
independently because projects involve just a few people (Alvesson, 1992). The instability of projects and services
provides a fourth reason: to absorb variations in demands for their services,
KIFs need fluidity and ambiguity.
Matrix structures are prevalent, and organization charts sketchy. Supervisors counsel non-directively. Experts form liaisons across formal
boundaries. Indeed, the Rand
Corporation designed its building to foster unplanned encounters.
Still, social norms and
reward systems are not equivalent to cultures.
KIFs confront serious obstacles to creating and maintaining unusual
cultures, especially cultures that embody organizational learning. The attributes that make hierarchical
controls troublesome -- autonomy, mobility, professionalization, uncertain
funding -- also make it hard for KIFs to integrate people and to socialize them
into unusual organizational cultures.
When experts join new firms, they bring with them well-developed values,
standards, habits, mental frameworks, and languages. Although they have much in common with their colleagues, the
culture they share is supra-organizational.
The Garden Company's customers can easily see
whether Garden's products do what the maker claims. The customers do not buy Garden's expertise directly. One result is that Garden's relations with
customers are impersonal. Another
result is that these relations may be fleeting. The customers readily switch to other suppliers, and Garden
itself cuts off relations with customers when it stops making products that are
less profitable.
Buyers of expertise
itself, by contrast, often have difficulty assessing their purchases. Clients often consult experts because they
believe their own knowledge inadequate, so they cannot judge the experts'
advice or reports mainly on substance.
Clients may be unable to assess experts' advice by acting on it and
watching the outcomes: the clients do not know what would have happened if they
had acted otherwise, and it is frequently obvious that outcomes reflect uncontrollable
or unpredictable influences. Clients
may not even understand what their expert advisors are saying. Many experts -- with awareness -- use jargon
that obscures their meaning. As a
result, clients have to base their judgements on familiar, generic symbols of
expertise. Do the experts speak as
persons with much education? Have the
experts used impressive statistical computations? Are the experts well dressed?
Did the experts use data of good quality? Do the experts' analyses seem logical and credible? Do the experts act confident?
Successful service KIFs,
therefore, pay attention to their symbolic outputs. For example, as mentioned above, the Aerospace Corporation uses
seven managerial levels that match the Air Force's hierarchy. Aerospace also asks technical experts to
practice briefings in-house before presenting them to Air Force officers, and
it provides strong support for writing, graphics, and artwork.
Clients also hire
experts to obtain legitimacy instead of expertise. In such circumstances, the client-expert relationship is a
charade: the clients choose advisors who will give wanted advice. Such selection can be unconscious. For instance, when the Facit Company was in
serious trouble, the board listened to presentations by several would-be
advisors (Starbuck, 1989). They then
hired McKinsey & Company because that proposal had sounded most sensible:
McKinsey's proposal had endorsed the general strategy the board had been
pursuing. One result was that the board
found it easy to take McKinsey's advice.
Another result was that following McKinsey's advice only made the
situation worse.
Rhenman
(1973, pp. 160-171) has commented perceptively from his experience:
. . . there is in the
consultant-client relationship an element of conflict. A game is played with all the usual
trappings: negotiations, opposing strategies, etc. The client likes to 'sound out' the consultant. The client wavers between consultant A and
consultant B. He also considers the
cost of a particular consultant: will the organization really benefit? Has the consultant perhaps other purposes in
mind, beyond his duty to the client?
Perhaps he is seeking an opportunity for research or financial
reward? The consultant may be particularly
anxious to get this assignment. How can
he persuade the client to engage him?
Or he may be temporarily hard pressed for time. Can he persuade the client to postpone the
assignment, or some particularly time-consuming part of it? And during the assignment the consultant is
often sure to feel that the client is blind to his own best interests, or that
he, as consultant, is becoming involved in internal conflicts. . . .
We have already
intimated that political groups may well try to use the engagement of the
consultant for their own ends. Other
groups may suspect and oppose the engagement on similar grounds; a long and
heated struggle can easily develop. The
consultant may be aware of what has been going on, or he may realize it only
when he discovers that his engagement is tied to certain definite conditions. .
. .
But the political system
is not simply a part of the background.
Soon, whether he realizes it or not, the consultant will become a pawn
in the political game: his presence will always have some effect on the balance
of power, sometimes perhaps a good deal.
If he is not politically aware, various interest groups will almost
certainly try to use him for their own purposes.
Over the long term,
service KIFs try to convert clients' satisfaction with specific projects into
long-term relations. Even in contexts
that are initially impersonal, repeated interactions between specific people
create bonds. Firm-to-firm ties
gradually evolve into person-to-person ties.
An expert who repeatedly serves the same client begins to perceive 'my'
client, and the client comes to think of 'my' expert.
Such personalizing can
happen with any expert, but the experts having the strongest social skills are
not normally those with the greatest technical expertise. Those with superb abilities in both
dimensions are rare: one interviewee estimated that only ten people in the US
are 'great technical lawyers who work well with colleagues, are effective with
clients, and show good judgement.'
Thus, KIFs use internal
specialization, in which socially skilful experts work on building ties with a
few specific clients, and technically superior experts provide specialized
expertise to many clients. The KIFs offer
clients familiar contact persons, who then draw upon ad hoc teams with
expertise fitting specific projects. To
a client, a KIF looks like a single source of diverse expertise that gives high
priority to that client's problems.
Formally, American
lawyers call the persons whom clients choose to contact 'originating
attorneys.' Informally, they call them
'rainmakers.' Rainmaking is mysterious
and magical, and rainmakers wield power.
Their personal and lasting ties with clients give the contact persons
divided loyalties as well as power. The
divided loyalties serve a quality-control function that nurtures continuing
ties between KIFs and clients. The
power is a central fact-of-life that KIFs have to appreciate or risk losing
long-term clients.
Keith Uncapher once
worked at the Rand Corporation, designing information systems for the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
Rand's top managers declared that the firm should no longer build
hardware, but Uncapher believed that DARPA's goals demanded special-purpose
hardware. He made a fifteen-minute oral
proposal to DARPA, received an initial grant of $10 million, and started a new
organization, the Information Science Institute.
As the foregoing implies
they should, service KIFs favour client relations over technical
expertise. If KIFs allow client
relations to dominate too strongly, however, they may lose key technical
experts. Instead of thinking that they
work for firms, technical experts may think firms exist for their benefit and
should be working for them. To remain
stable, KIFs have to reconcile their client-relations specialists and technical
specialists. Each of these needs the
other over the long term, but their mutual dependencies may seem obscure at any
moment.
This article's second section asserts:
'Knowledge is a stock of expertise, not a flow of information.' Ironically, firms' stocks of expertise come
from the flows in complex input-output systems. Knowledge flows in through hiring, training, and purchases of
capital goods. Some knowledge gets
manufactured internally, through research, invention, and culture
building. Knowledge flows out through
personnel departures, imitated routines, and sales of capital goods. Some knowledge becomes obsolete. Fluid knowledge solidifies when converted into
capital goods or routines. The
sequences of events resemble random walks, and the net outcomes are difficult
to foresee. Thus, strategies do not
evolve coherently (Greenwood et al., 1990).
Diversification
For product KIFs,
strategic development calls for regulating numbers of customers and numbers of
product lines. Similarly, service KIFs
need to regulate numbers of clients and numbers of topical foci. As with other specialization-diversification
problems, high risks come from having very few clients or customers and very
few topics or product lines. A KIF with
very few topical foci must perform superbly in those areas, and a KIF with very
few customers cannot afford customer dissatisfaction. The issues, however, do not all lie in the realms of expertise or
social skills.
For a year and a half
after Wachtell, Lipton began, one client accounted for 75 per cent of its
revenue. Then, this client asked
Wachtell, Lipton to do something unethical.
They replied that they could not take the wanted action. The client countered that Wachtell, Lipton
must either do its bidding or lose its business. The partners refused . . . and gave up 75 per cent of their
revenue. At that point, unsure their
firm could survive, the partners adopted a policy that has had profound
consequences: Wachtell, Lipton would work only one-case-at-a-time. It would never again make a long-term
commitment to a client.
If Wachtell, Lipton had
been more ordinary, this policy might have been deadly. But the firm became one of the rare ones to
which corporations turn when their normal legal resources seem inadequate -- at
least, when corporations don't want to find out whether their normal legal
resources would be adequate. In this
status, having no long-term clients becomes an asset, for Wachtell, Lipton can
be hired by whoever calls first.
Some KIFs serve a few
clients contentedly. Keith Uncapher
said, 'I wouldn't know how to look good to two clients.' He designed the Information Science
Institute to serve only DARPA, and no other client. The Aerospace Corporation derives 99 per cent of its revenues
from a single long-term contract and makes no effort to change this situation.
Most KIFs that begin
with narrow foci try to diversify. Like
Aerospace, the Rand Corporation initially served a single client, the US Air
Force. At the Air Force's urging and
with its help, Rand began making strenuous efforts to gain broader support and
greater autonomy. These efforts have
had partial success. Rand has raised an
endowment exceeding $40 million, and it does research for over 80 sponsors
annually. Nevertheless, three military
sponsors still account for 70 per cent of Rand's revenues, and 80 per cent of
its research deals with national security.
A. D. Little has
attained broad diversification after developing incrementally for over a
century. A. D. Little's precursor,
Griffin & Little, began in 1886 as specialists in the chemistry of paper
making. In 1909, when the current firm
incorporated, its expertise encompassed paper-making, forest products,
textiles, plastics, and sugar. These
industries were central to the economy of New England, the firm's home.
Over the years, as the
firm expanded its geographic reach, it added a wide range of physical and
biological sciences and expertise on a wide spectrum of manufacturing
technologies. A. D. Little first
studied regional economics in 1916, began financial studies in the 1930s, and
moved into management consulting broadly in the 1950s.
These expansions sprang
partly from the firm's standards about conflict of interest. After advising a client about a topic, A. D.
Little will not advise a different client from the same industry about the same
topic. Future projects must change
either the industry or the topic.
Just as diversification
regarding clients may erode a KIF's ties with its long‑standing clients,
topical diversification may undermine a KIF's credibility. A few years ago, A. D. Little's senior
managers concluded that their firm had become too amorphous. Hiring had become hard because the firm had
so few experts in any single specialty.
Covering too many specialties for too many dissimilar clients was
yielding neither enough profit nor enough client satisfaction. A survey revealed that clients were turning
to other consultants to get 'focused depth of resources.'
Thus, the firm went
through a major planning effort, and began to focus on half-a-dozen functions
in a handful of industries -- mainly chemicals, financial services, health
care, and telecommunications. Alfred
Wechsler explained, 'We try to define our expertise with verb-noun-adverb
combinations. For example: we know how to
manufacture a paper cup inexpensively.'
A. D. Little's strategic
development has generally paralleled the developments in its client population --
large industrial enterprises. Chandler
(1962) described how single-product firms grew into multiple-product,
divisionalized firms during the first half of the century: in the same period,
A. D. Little was adding many product lines and decentralizing. In the 1970s and 80s, conglomerates such as
ITT decided to retrench into a few core businesses: A. D. Little was making
analogous changes at the same time.
After 1950, many American firms expanded overseas, and A. D. Little too
became multinational.
Its initial foreign
venture was an office in Zurich that opened in 1957 to serve American firms
that were expanding into Europe. To
their surprise, the consultants discovered that European firms also wanted their
services. They now have offices in six
European cities and in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Japan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In
1972, they added laboratories in England; these later expanded to Germany.
Multinational KIFs
For KIFs, multinationality poses challenging
issues that differ from those facing industrial firms. Many industrial firms use authority and
steep hierarchies, and they can often use formal controls or hardware
technology to reach performance standards.
Consulting firms and other KIFs dare not resort to authority or formal
controls, and they lack technological wonder pills. They have to depend on autonomous small teams to act ethically
and to meet performance standards.
This, in turn, means that they need cultural homogeneity.
Nonetheless, A. D.
Little has found national differences to be minor problems. One reason may be careful selection of
experts. Another reason may be the
homogeneity arising from education.
Haire et al. (1966) found that managers with similar educations
espouse similar values no matter what their nationalities. Wuthnow and Shrum (1983) discovered that
education erases the ideological differences between managers and professional-technical
workers. After much education, managers
and professionals espouse similar values.
Perhaps because they use
authority, formal controls, and technology to produce homogeneity, many
industrial firms have shown insensitivity toward local values or treated host-country
personnel less well than home-country personnel. Yet, insensitivity and inequity have not prevented industrial
firms from operating successfully in foreign lands. Consulting firms, on the other hand, would fail if they did allow
for local values, and they are apt to treat host-country consultants more than
equally.
For instance, A. D.
Little is trying to deliver reliable quality across diverse sites, but its
clients want services tailored to their individual needs and contexts. Tailoring calls for consultants to act differently,
whereas reliable quality and teamwork call for them to act similarly. A. D. Little began its multinational
expansion by exporting American experts.
Experience promptly convinced the firm that a foreign office must hire
primarily experts native to that country.
First, devising effective solutions for problems usually requires
thorough understanding of the contexts in which those solutions will be
tried. Second, clients do not want to
waste time explaining basic economic, sociological, or political facts to
expensive foreign consultants. Thus,
the consultants who staff a foreign office tend to have strong social skills
and close ties with their clients.
These assets, in turn, tend to give the host-country consultants high
statuses within the firm.
Because everyone defines knowledge differently,
discussions of KIFs evoke debates about proper definition. Such debates have led me (a) to emphasize
esoteric expertise instead of widely shared knowledge, (b) to distinguish an
expert from a professional and a knowledge-intensive firm from a professional
firm, (c) to differentiate a knowledge-intensive firm from an information-intensive
firm, and (d) to see knowledge as a property of physical capital, social
capital, routines, and organizational cultures as well as individual people.
Highly successful KIFs
exhibit uniqueness, and they reflect and exploit the peculiarities of their
environments. Since they and their
environments change symbiotically, their environments reflect and exploit these
KIFs.
Whereas experts
distinguish between preserving, creating, and applying knowledge, their daily
work obscures these distinctions. Not
only do preservers, creators, and appliers behave similarly, but preserving,
creating, and applying are interdependent.
Furthermore, experts resist new ideas -- even the experts who describe
themselves as creators of knowledge.
Such resistance arises from self-interest and narrow perspectives. Yet, it may improve learning -- by both
individual experts and their firms -- by making people ask whether knowledge
has lasting value.
KIFs learn by hiring,
training, and dismissing personnel.
They also convert ideas into physical capital, routines, organizational
culture, and social capital. Personnel
changes and purchases of capital goods generally offer fast ways to pick up new
ideas. Training, physical capital,
routines, and organizational cultures can turn individuals' knowledge into
collective property. Knowledge in
people or in physical capital is easy to lose, and KIFs have difficulty using
routines and building special cultures.
Social capital transforms a series of successful relations with a client
into a long-term relation, but it also converts collective successes into
individual property. One consequence is
that hierarchies within KIFs reflect social skills as well as technical
expertise.
Three themes afford a
framework for interpreting KIFs' strategic development. First, complex input-output systems for
knowledge make KIFs' strategic development look erratic. Second, KIFs have to regulate numbers of
customers or clients, and numbers of product lines or topical foci. Some KIFs focus on small numbers of clients,
customers, product lines, or topics; but most KIFs try to diversify. Third, service KIFs often mirror prominent
characteristics of their clients. These
similarities are loosely qualitative, however, for KIFs differ from their
clients in many ways.
One cliché prediction says: future societies
will have ever higher proportions of service workers, because machines will
replace blue collars much more often than white collars. Perhaps KIFs are also growing more prevalent. But the future is always moot, and more
interesting than the general trends are the swirling currents within them.
First, KIFs tend to grow
by becoming less specialized and by adding support staff rather than
experts. It nearly always seems
that additional support staff, products, or services will extract more value
from the experts already in-house.
Individual experts, too, think about broadening their domains as they
update their knowledge and see social and technological changes opening new opportunities. But when support staff come to outnumber
experts greatly, or when KIFs claim expertise in too many domains, KIFs lose
their halos of expertise and their credibility.
Second, all kinds of
expertise become less profitable as they grow more prevalent. Esoteric expertise has monopoly power, and
this power erodes as expertise becomes less esoteric. Neither experts nor KIFs nor KIFs' industry associations should
seek proliferation. Yet, experts resist
control and they have strong penchants to start new firms. Very small firms can compete successfully if
they take advantage of their peculiarities and the peculiarities of their
environments. The Garden Company could
easily lose out to competitors with better ideas.
Third, some kinds of
expertise attract consumers even though their benefits are obscure. Examples include crisis intervention,
economic forecasts, investment advice, psychotherapy . . . and management
science. Some obscure‑benefit
expertise seems to have high value partly because the experts are unusual. Such expertise may lose value as the experts
come to make up higher proportions of the work force. On the other hand, such an outcome is not obvious. Placebos make effective treatments although
they are very common. Mystery can be routinized. People need help with their problems even
when the problems have no solutions perhaps, especially then.
Obscure-benefit domains
may be either more or less stable than the domains in which expertise yields
clear benefits. Obscure-benefit domains
are stable if they satisfy perennial human needs and no alternatives
appear. There were probably economic
forecasters before there were humans; even in recent times, the demand for
economic forecasts has mounted as organizations have grown larger and more
rigid. Obscure-benefit domains can be
unstable if beliefs change, if human needs shift, or if more effective
substitutes appear. Astrology is a case
in point. Clear-benefit domains may
themselves wither -- as dentists are discovering.
Fourth, physical capital
will displace some of experts' activities.
Similar, changes are occurring across the economy, within firms, and in
the work of individual experts. Several
new industries are distributing expertise in the form of physical capital. Both firms and individual experts are
creating databases and expert systems, and they are buying or building tools to
amplify experts' productivity by replacing some of their activities.
These substitutions will
enable fewer experts to serve more clients or customers or to invent more
products. They also will mean that many
clients or customers no longer need experts, or that they can make the products
they have been buying. Millions of
people are already using software to do accounting, to file income taxes, to
write wills, to construct leases, or to help them write articles. Computers are revolutionizing product
design, manufacturing control, and computer programming. Spiraling medical costs may yet compel the
use of software that diagnoses diseases and issues medical prescriptions.
To appreciate the beauty
and intricacy of such currents, social scientists need to stop averaging across
large, diverse categories. The average
painting is flat gray, the average day is neither hot nor cold and has twelve
hours of daylight, the average firm is mediocre and short‑lived, and the
average expert knows little about any field.
In the social sciences, broad patterns oversimplify and capture only
small fractions of what is happening.
They leave scientists in worlds that look random. Broad patterns also tend to emphasize what
is consistent with the past and to overlook subtle changes.
There is also a world of
bright colours, sizzling days, exceptional firms, rare experts, and peculiar
KIFs.
NOTE
I owe thanks to many who contributed generously
their time, ideas, insights, and contacts.
This article reflects help from Mats Alvesson, Tora Bikson, Andrew
Brownstein, Mark Chignell, Jess Cook, Joan Dunbar, Roger Dunbar, Tamara
Erickson, James Fogelson, Charles Fombrun, Ari Ginsberg, John Jermier, Charles
LaMantia, Kenneth Laudon, Martin Lipton, Henry Lucas, Frances Milliken, Louis
Miller, Theodore Mirvis, Harold Novikoff, Paul Nystrom, Anthony Pascal,
Lawrence Pedowitz, Fioravante Perrotta, Joseph Post, Lewis Rambo, Donald Rice,
Harland Riker, James Ringer, Stephen Robinson, David Ronfeldt, Lawrence
Rosenberg, Roberta Shanman, Lee Sproull, Serge Taylor, Jon Turner, Keith
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