Is Science Marketing?
J. Paul Peter & Jerry C. Olson
(Published in the Journal of Marketing,
Fall 1983, pp. 111-125)
Abstract
Science is
analyzed as a special case of marketing-the marketing of ideas in the form of
substantive and methodological theories. The marketing mix, target markets, and
marketing objectives are developed for the scientific arena, and a formal
analysis of a relativistic/constructionist view of science is used to support
the approach. This view is contrasted with the positivistic/empiricist
perspective of science currently dominant in marketing and other social
sciences. Recommendations are offered for improved methods of developing
knowledge.
For more than 30 years, marketing scholars have debated whether or
not marketing is a science (e.g., Alderson and Cox 1948, Bartels 1951, Baumol
1957, Buzzell 1963, Converse 1945, Hunt 1976, O'Shaughnessy and Ryan 1979,
Taylor 1965). The typical approach has been to offer a formal definition of
science or describe prototypic methods used in science and then compare
marketing's key features and/or its developmental progress against these
standards. Despite these fairly intense analyses, a consensus regarding the
scientific status of marketing has not yet been achieved. Some believe that marketing
is a science, while others believe that although scientific procedures are
employed in marketing, on the whole, marketing is an art. In contrast to these
two segments, many other marketing scholars seem to be withholding judgment,
perhaps awaiting more compelling arguments one way or the other.
Although well intentioned, we believe the debate regarding whether
or not marketing is a science has been largely unproductive. For the most part,
we attribute the current confusion to the somewhat naive conceptions of science
that have informed the controversy. In particular, we consider the typical
beliefs about how scientists do scientific work and how scientific progress is
achieved to be inconsistent with current views about such issues in the
disciplines of philosophy, sociology, and history of science. That is, in
asking, "Is marketing a science?" marketing scholars have been
comparing theory development and testing in marketing to inappropriate
standards that have little to do with the conduct of scientific inquiry in any
field.
This article presents a relatively new and more useful conception
of science than has been considered to date in the debates regarding
marketing's scientific status. To do so, we turn the tables in this
long-standing debate by asking the more fundamental and interesting question.
"Is science marketing?" In this article we consider whether science
can be effectively analyzed as a special case of marketing-the marketing of
ideas. (For this purpose, we adopt the currently popular definition of
marketing as "human activity directed as satisfying needs and wants
through exchange processes" (Kotler 1980). This is consistent with the
arguments of Bagozzi (1975) and Hunt (1983) that exchange is a key unifying
concept for the field. We suspect that most marketing scholars accept this
definition.)
The article has two major sections. In the first we analyze common
scientific practices in terms of conventional elements of marketing strategy.
Specifically, we consider the elements in the marketing mix, market targets,
and marketing objectives. Although we can consider only a few of the major
concepts in marketing, the examples in this brief analysis provide support for
our contention that science can be viewed as a special case of marketing. In
the second section, we discuss a relativistic/constructionist perspective
derived from recent work in science studies that provide a conceptual rationale
for analyzing science from a marketing perspective. We point out key
differences between this emerging approach to science and the traditional
positivistic/empiricist view that still pervades marketing (see Hunt 1983) and
other social sciences (see Koch 1981). Again, due to space restrictions, we
focus only on major points of departure from the traditional view and cite
major works to which readers can refer for additional information.
Marketing Scientific Theories
What makes a scientific theory successful? Simply stated, a
successful theory is one that is treated seriously and studied by a significant
portion of a research community. Practitioners may even employ such theories as
frameworks for analyzing important problems. In other words, a successful
theory is-one that has been adopted by a substantial market segment, just as is
the case of a successful consumer good. We argue that to successfully achieve
an adequate level of adoption, scientists must (at least implicitly) develop
and carry out a marketing strategy to promote their theories. In this section,
we consider some of the concepts and strategies involved in this process.
First, we describe scientific theories in terms of the four basic elements of
the marketing mix-product, channels of distribution, promotion, and price. Then
we discuss the idea of market segmentation for theories. Finally, we consider
the marketing objectives for scientific work.
Theories
as Products
In the broadest sense, the major products of science are ideas.
Scientific ideas consist of invented constructs and hypothesized relationships
among them. A system of such ideas about a phenomenon may be called a
substantive theory. Scientists also create ideas about methods of obtaining,
analyzing, and interpreting data. These are methodological theories of
measurement, sampling, and data analysis. Regardless of the type of idea or
theory, it should not be forgotten that the entire theory product is invented
or constructed by one or more scientists, just as ideas for consumer products
are invented or constructed. Like ideas for consumer products and the products
themselves, substantive and/or methodological theory products must also be
marketed. (Clearly, an understanding of the processes and/or accidents by which
new theories are created is critical for an understanding of science. While we
will not review the extant literature on the creation of scientific or other
products, i.e. "marketing R&D," interested readers should see
Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring (1982) and Stein (1974, 1975).)
At some point in the development of a theory the scientist usually
produces a manuscript that describes the idea. The manuscript may also present
empirical data that illustrate the idea and/or provide tentative support. A
manuscript is a tangible representation of the invented system of ideas.
Marketing a theory as a tangible manuscript is both easier and more effective
than promoting an intangible set of ideas, for at least four reasons. First,
potential adopters can easily store the theory product for use (study) at a
more convenient time. Second, because the manuscript is always available,
potential adopters can reexamine and reflect on the theory and possibly come to
appreciate its value. Third, the relative permanence of a manuscript allows
wider dissemination of the theory to a secondary, pass-along audience (e.g.,
students). Finally, a tangible manuscript may be used to establish the
scientist/marketer as the inventor of the theory or as the first to borrow the
theory from another area and apply it in a new field.
Over its life cycle a theory may undergo a number of modifications
in response to a variety of potential marketing problems. Customer complaints
regarding measurement difficulties or lack of conceptual clarity, and
competitive theory products marketed by other scientists, are among the many
problems a new theory may face in trying to capture a viable market share of
scientists. Perhaps the most serious problem occurs when a test of a theory
fails to predict adequately. This means that the theory is not meeting the
needs of the largest segment of researchers-those concerned with prediction and
methodological and empirical rigor. If the research community cannot be
convinced that the empirical test procedures were faulty, either the inventor
scientist or another scientist who has adopted the theory may change specific
characteristics of the theory product in response to such problems. However,
the modified theory is seldom renamed, as this might lose loyal customers. Many
of these modifications are made to seem minor and the change process may be
quite gradual, often so much so that the target market of scientists does not
always recognize the changes. However, it should be emphasized that any change
in a theory creates a modified product-i.e., a different theory. For instance,
researchers made a number of seemingly minor conceptual changes in the
Fishbein-type expectancy-value models during the period of major interest in
the marketing literature (1969-1975), yet only the most knowledgeable consumers
were aware that these changes created different theories (e.g., Cohen,
Fishbein, and Ahtola 1972).
Product Attributes. As with consumer products, several key attributes of a theory
have a large effect on marketing success. A major characteristic concerns the
topic, issue, problem, or phenomenon that is addressed. A theory may concern an
issue of major importance, a "big" problem, or a relatively
"small" issue of little theoretical or practical importance (Olson
1982). In some ways it may be easier to market the latter type of theory. For
instance, the most widely adopted theories tend to be those that are easiest to
understand and research empirically, especially in long periods of normal
science (Kuhn 1970). If research on a theory requires special equipment (e.g..
polygraphs for the study of brain waves) or special subject populations (e.g.,
managers or purchasing agents), that theory is not likely to be widely
researched. In contrast, theories that are easily researched with conventional
measurement procedures (e.g., self-report rating scales) and easily accessible
samples (e.g., students) are more likely to achieve higher adoption rates.
A second important attribute of a theory concerns the professional
credentials and status of the inventor or the borrower. Scientists who are well
known and respected, based on their previous contributions to a field, have
better chances of successfully introducing new theories than do less well-known
researchers. The credibility of the scientist/marketer may add a halo effect to
the theory product. Inventors or borrowers who do not enjoy a strong reputation
in their fields (e.g., doctoral students) may need to attract established
researchers ("celebrity scholars") to help market their theories.
Third, theories that are borrowed and adapted from more
established, familiar fields seem to be more easily marketed than theories
gleaned from unconventional areas or that are constructed "from
scratch." For example, it is probably easier to promote theories for use
in marketing that are borrowed from psychology and economics rather than from
areas such as anthropology, religion, or art.
Fourth, theories which contain familiar, common, everyday
concepts, words, meanings, and relationships (e.g., needs, attitudes,
personality) may be easier to market successfully than theories which require
learning new words, meanings, and relationships (e.g., shaping, aesthetic
response, semantic relatedness, coherence analysis, negative reinforcement).
Familiar concepts that are learned in childhood and are frequently used in
everyday language may be considered as highly important concepts to be
researched and understood. However, in other cases, new words and meanings can
be useful for marketing theories, since knowledge of them may give a scientist
admission to the cognoscenti of a research community.
Fifth, theories that are consistent with current political and
social values are easier to market (Barnes 1977, Gould 1982). For example, a
theory advocating gender differences in cognitive abilities is difficult to
market in the current environment, even with impressive empirical support (see
Stanley and Benbow 1982). In addition, since political and social values often
determine funding priorities, theories dealing with problems for which ample
research support is available are more easily marketed to potential scientist
adopters.
The sixth (and purposefully last) product attribute is the
preliminary empirical evidence that can be marshaled to support a theory.
Strong empirical support is a highly desirable attribute that will enhance the
marketability of a theory. However, strong empirical evidence is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the successful dissemination of a theory. A number
of theories have been fairly widely adopted, despite poor (or even no) initial
empirical support (e.g., early atomic theory or Freudian personality theory).
Of course scientists differ in the extent to which they are concerned about the
"fit" between data and theory; thus, the importance of empirical
support for a theory is likely to vary for different scientists (see Mitroff
and Kilmann 1978).
Test Marketing. Quite often, scientists test market their theories before
attempting a full-scale introduction via journal publication. Their major goal
is to gauge the reactions of potential adopters of the theory and to identify
and correct any glaring flaws before the theory is introduced on a major scale.
One way to do this is by circulating working papers among colleagues and
friends in the "invisible college" (see Crane 1972). In addition,
colloquia and seminars may be presented to colleagues and students and their
reactions sought. At least three results are possible. First, and least likely,
listeners may judge the theory product to be irretrievably flawed. This seldom
occurs, since the listeners at most test-market presentations are other
scientists who not only share the same worldview as the inventor, but also are
social friends who respect the inventor. Normally, such groups are reluctant to
totally reject the theory product. However, test market presentations to less
hospitable groups occasionally do produce such an extreme rejection. Second, in
equally rare cases, the product may be viewed as a major accomplishment with no
serious problems and judged to be ready for introduction.
Instead, the results of test marketing are likely to suggest a variety
of modifications to the theory. These may involve adding or deleting
constructs, clarifying and redefining constructs, or changing the theoretical
relationships between constructs. At a minimum, cosmetic changes may be made in
the theory's packaging (words and labels used) or suggestions may be made for
repositioning the product. As with traditional consumer products, the
scientist/marketer must consider whether changing the theory according to the
recommendations derived from test marketing will improve the chances of
successfully marketing the product.
Channels
of Distribution for Theories
There are many channels by which scientific theories may be
disseminated to potential adopters. The various channels of distribution have
different levels of effectiveness and may be differentially appropriate at
different stages in the development and testing of the theory. In the early
stages of development, most theories are disseminated via presentations at
colloquia and conferences, and through informally distributed working papers.
While conference and colloquia presentations are especially valuable in that
they provide direct feedback to the scientist/marketer, not many scholars are
likely to adopt a theory distributed in this way. For one thing, relatively few
scholars can be exposed to the theory through these inefficient channels.
Before widespread adoption can be anticipated, most theories must pass the
muster of the gatekeepers in the discipline (the reviewers and editors of
prestigious journals) and thereby achieve both legitimization and widespread
exposure. A theory that is evaluated poorly in test marketing may go no further
than being published in a conference proceedings, if at all. The theory may
languish there for several years before finally fading away or being
resurrected by another scientist who happens to stumble across it.
Occasionally, a theory is published first in a proceedings and later in a
journal, but this is generally considered bad form unless major changes have
occurred in the manuscript.
Some marketers begin the dissemination process by submitting the
manuscript directly to the key channel, a major journal. If the manuscript is
rejected from a number of major journals, the inventor/marketer may attempt to
disseminate the theory through other channels, perhaps less prestigious or
highly specialized journals. Using these channels to distribute a theory
reduces the probability that the theory will enjoy rapid acceptance, although
publication per se does enhance the chances for eventual success. Publication
in even an obscure or specialized journal may still reach the most interested
target market of researchers who may then be influential in further
disseminating the theory throughout the research community. Alternatively, if
the theory cannot be published in a major journal, some marketers may try to
publish the theory in book form or as a chapter in a book. However, this
channel is not readily or equally available to all scientists. Thus, the more
likely outcome is that the marketer will present the theory at one or more
conferences and publish a paper in a proceedings, if available. Of course, the
chances of successfully marketing the theory decrease with the use of more
restricted, less prestigious channels of distribution.
Promotion
of Theories
Throughout the life cycle of a theory, from creation to test
marketing to publication in a major journal to the widespread adoption and use
of a theory by the research community, promotion is a key factor in
successfully marketing a theory. As with consumer goods, a variety of
promotional techniques can be used. Interestingly, and contrary to popular
beliefs, theories that do not provide impressive empirical results, produce a
potential resolution to a major problem in the field (Kuhn 1970, Popper 1959),
or generate novel predictions (Lakatos 1978), can still be marketed
successfully.
Although strong empirical results are very useful in promoting a
theory, they are not absolutely necessary. For example, personality research in
marketing in the 1960s and early 1970s seldom surpassed the relatively trivial
hurdle of obtaining statistically significant correlations between measures of
personality and a variety of other factors (Kassarjian 1971). Yet personality
theory enjoyed wide popularity. Because the weak empirical results were usually
attributed to methodological problems, most researchers did not conclude that
the underlying theory was wrong. In fact, many marketing researchers still
believe in personality theory despite the generally disappointing empirical
results. Recently, new methods have produced more impressive empirical support
for personality theory (see Epstein 1979, 1980), although a resurgence of
interest has not yet occurred in marketing.
It is also possible to successfully market a theory that makes no
unusual or novel predictions and is in fact quite similar to other theories. Of
course, a scientist's promotion task will be easier if the theory product has
unique features (e.g., it generates novel predictions) or it has desirable
attributes of a compelling logic coupled with strongly supportive data.
However, as long as the new theory is relatively consistent with the worldview
of at least a segment of the field, it can be successfully promoted. A new
theory that is based on a different set of metatheoretical assumptions than
those held by most members of a research community can be difficult to
successfully promote and market. This is similar to situations in consumer
goods marketing in which discontinuous innovations that are inconsistent with
consumers' social values and behavior patterns are often hard to sell.
(Strictly speaking, no scientific theory is constructed of totally new concepts
created in isolation from earlier concepts and theories. Previous research and
theorizing certainly has an impact on the scientist/ inventor who is trying to
create a "new" theory. However, some new theories are seen as more
creative and less continuous with previous work than are others. We are merely
arguing that it is more difficult to market the more discontinuous theories.
This discussion should not be taken to imply that scientific work is cumulative
in the sense that a sequence of theories will ultimately lead to a valid
general theory.)
In addition to "direct advertising" via publication in
journals, books, and proceedings, a theory can also be promoted through
publicity and personal selling. Publicity for a theory includes notices of
forthcoming articles in journals, abstracts of published articles printed in
other journals, and notices of working papers in association newsletters.
Occasionally, a scientist/marketer can get other scientists to cite the new
theory, perhaps while still in working paper form. Scientists may be able to
generate discussion of their theory in nonscholarly publications such as
Marketing News or Psychology Today. Finally, if dissertation research testing
the theory wins awards or other recognition, the resulting publicity can be
very helpful in the overall marketing effort. Publicity may perform a useful informational
or reminder role, but is likely to be less persuasive than other forms of
promotion. However, a "bandwagon effect" for a theory might be
enhanced through this kind of promotion.
Personal selling is an important element of the promotional
strategy for theories. Personal selling occurs during formal or informal
presentations of the theory as well as in direct one-on-one discussions with
potential adopters. Moreover, salesmanship is an important aspect of dealing
with editors and reviewers in the revision process. Direct selling can be an
effective method of persuasion since the scientist/marketer can address
counter-arguments of the potential buyer head on and can offer ad hoc
hypotheses to cover many of the perceived weaknesses in the theory. Finally, a
personal selling strategy can be particularly effective with one's doctoral
students.
Price
of Theories
The scientist who adopts a new theory must pay a price that
involves time and money as well as psychological and behavioral costs. Part of
the price of adopting a new theory involves the time spent learning the new
theory and its methods, as well as the associated opportunity costs. The
adopter of a new theory may also incur financial costs in purchasing new
equipment (e.g., a physiology lab) or in education/training costs (e.g.,
attending seminars on causal modeling). Other costs include the psychological
effort and disruption involved in changing one's existing beliefs and
established research behaviors. A major component of the price of adopting a
new theory involves the behavioral effort of actively researching the theory,
writing about it, and performing the behaviors necessary to get the results
published in major journals.
Like consumer products, theories vary in price. Low-priced
theories are those that are consistent with the worldview and existing research
skills of the target market of scientists. Adopting such theories is relatively
inexpensive, as learning time is short and belief and behavior changes are
minimal. That is, the price is within easy reach of many potential consumers.
Thus, the scientist/marketer who prices his/her theory at the low end enhances
the chances that the theory will penetrate the mass market.
In contrast, theories that are radically different from the
established worldview of the research community and/or from the research
procedures common in a field carry a higher price tag. Adopting such theories
may require considerable learning time, extensive belief changes, and major
changes in research behavior. Therefore, such high priced theories need to be
marketed carefully and well. The marketing effort is facilitated if the
scientist can articulate the benefits to be provided by the new theory. Because
these benefits have to be perceived as substantial to justify the high price,
some scientists substantially oversell their substantive or methodological
theories in order to attract consumers (see Churchill and Perrault 1982). For
example, it appears that structural equations methodology has been
substantially oversold in the social sciences (see Cliff 1983, Fornell 1983).
A variety of situational factors can influence the success of a
high priced theory, primarily by making it seem worth the cost to early
adopters. First, it is helpful if the worldview incorporated in established
theories is recognized as problematic by a segment of the research community.
In fact, Kuhn (1970) argues that a scientific revolution cannot take place
unless the traditional view is recognized as failing and an alternative theory
is available. Second, the availability of research funds to investigate the new
theory is a powerful motivator for pursuing a new theory product. For example,
funding for research on the effects of advertising on children lowered the
price of entering this new area. Third, in some situations researchers may be
bored with the traditional approach and, therefore, are willing to incur the
cost of adopting more provocative theories. Similarly, some researchers may
simply feel they can make little marginal contribution to the traditional view
and are seeking to invest in new theories with greater payoff potential. In'
sum, there are particular situations when high priced theories are more likely
to be adopted by a research community. From a marketing strategy perspective,
these situations are strategic windows that the scientist/marketer can use to
advantage in introducing an expensive theory product.
A final consideration regarding the price of a theory concerns the
fact that not all researchers can afford to pay the price required for adoption
of a new theory. A prime determinant of what price an individual scientist can
afford to pay is his/her place in the tenure decision process. Younger
pre-tenure scholars may not feel they can afford a high priced theory. They may
need less expensive theories that have a fairly high probability of producing
rapid benefits, such as easily publishable journal articles. High priced
theories, by their very nature, tend to offer benefits with a longer time
horizon. Moreover, a fairly high degree of risk is associated with most high
priced theories, and many pre-tenure Scientists may not wish to incur such
risks. Therefore, more senior, post-tenure scholars may be more willing to
invest in higher priced theories. Occasionally, beginning scholars, such as
doctoral students, who have relatively little time and effort invested in
traditional theories and methods, may adopt higher priced theories, especially
if encouraged to do so by their post-tenure mentors. However, in these cases,
the theory is probably already in the growth stage of the product life cycle,
or at least appears to be a theory with a high probability of success, based on
its attributes.
Target
Markets for New Theories
A research community can be segmented in a number of ways. As just
discussed, scientists can be divided in terms of their position in the career
life cycle. Three distinct groups can be identified: doctoral students,
pie-tenure scholars, and post-tenure scholars. The latter group might be
further divided by rank into associate and full professors. Theory products
will differentially appeal to these groups and, as noted, these groups can
afford to pay different prices for theories and are willing to incur different
levels of risk. Of course, different marketing strategies may be required for
each of these segments.
A prime target market for a scientist's theory is his/her own
doctoral students, although the students of other scholars are of interest as
well. Usually these potential customers are seeking exactly what the marketer
has to offer a new theory or method in need of empirical research in a
discipline-related context. Ideally, the theory should be somewhat new in order
to establish that the dissertation is a "contribution" to the field.
As mentioned above, this target market may react less negatively if the theory
deviates substantially from the accepted view in the field, partly because its
members have not yet become fully committed to that perspective. Additionally,
doctoral students constitute an important target market because they (I) often
become apostles for the theory once they have invested the time to learn it and
begin to research it, (2) are entering the most active stage of their research
careers and may help market the theory through their writings, and (3) may be
more easily persuaded as they have little investment in competing theories.
The second important target market for a new theory is the group
of active research scholars in the field. This group can be further segmented
into pre- and post-tenure researchers, and each of these segments can be
further divided into adopter categories of opinion leaders, followers, and
laggards. Of these, the opinion leaders are critically important. A single
study on a new theory by an opinion leader may be sufficient to create
widespread interest. Opinion leader scientists are also likely to be mentors
for high quality doctoral students who can be encouraged to research the
theory. In addition, opinion leaders can often directly influence other active
researchers to consider studying and using the theory, thereby increasing its
adoption rate and eventual market share. Finally, studies by opinion leaders
are more likely to be featured in textbooks, which also helps to establish the
theory. (Once a theory has achieved "textbook status," it tends to
become part of the discipline's body of "knowledge." Regardless of
whether the measures are subsequently invalidated or empirical results ever
show impressive relationships, such theories are seldom purged entirely from
the literature. Over time the theory may lose followers and interest as new
theories are offered which are perceived to be better or deal with what seem to
be more important or interesting problems. Although some laggard researchers
will continue to investigate the old theory, only occasionally will this work
be published in a major outlet. When it is, it may still be employed in
textbooks for the purpose of giving a fresh reference to an old chapter and for
exemplifying the supposedly cumulative nature of scientific inquiry. In fact,
Kuhn (1970) argues that textbooks rewrite the history of theories in order to
make science appear to be cumulative.)
The scholars least likely to adopt a new theory are those who
remain loyal to a previous theory, particularly if it is their own or one in
which they have invested heavily. In fact, members of this group are more
likely to criticize the new theory and attempt to remove it from the market.
Such attempts may well take the form of "replications" which are intended
to discredit the new theory. Often these attempts are partly successful since
most theories have numerous problems in the early stage of development. For
example, because constructs used in the theory have surplus meaning, parts of
the theory can be interpreted in a manner that reveals inconsistencies and
ambiguities. It may be fairly easy to show that the theoretical concepts have
different meanings than intended by the inventor/marketer, thus adding to the
confusion regarding the theory. Second, since the skeptical researcher now
controls the method in a replication, he/she can usually generate results
inconsistent with the new theory. For example, the design could include too few
subjects to allow sufficient statistical power to detect the effect, or a
research setting involving many uncontrolled sources of variance could be used
to "wash out" an effect. In sum, an antagonistic scientist can often
demonstrate that a new theory's predictions are poorer than previously
reported, or even that "disconfirming" effects are obtained. Finally,
because all research requires a myriad of subjective decisions, the competitor
scientist can usually argue that at least some of the original methodological
decisions were inappropriate and thus produced data that were biased in favor
of the theory. In such controversies, comments, replies, and rejoinders can
continue back and forth to the limits of the tolerance of editors, reviewers,
and the research community.
The market for a new theory can also be segmented in terms of
psychological characteristics. Scientists have differing views about what
counts as important, interesting theory, and these values and beliefs influence
their evaluations of a new theory. Based on such attributes, Mitroff and
Kilmann (1978) have identified four types of scientists. Two of these are
particularly relevant for segmenting scientific markets. The analytical
scientist (AS) is mainly concerned with tightly controlled, highly rigorous
research designs intended to test well-specified hypotheses deduced from
theory. This group seems to be the largest segment in marketing and in most
other fields~ In contrast, the conceptual theorist (CT) is more concerned with
abstract ideas, how they fit logically together, and with their heuristic,
generative power for creating other ideas. This group is small in both
marketing and in most other disciplines. Obviously, the characteristics of a
new theory will strongly influence which of these groups will be more
attracted. The CT group may be more likely to adopt a new theoretical
perspective if it is quite different from existing perspectives and offers
promise for dealing with important, complex phenomena and problems. CT's tend
not to be concerned about a lack of empirical support, especially early in a
theory's development. On the other hand, an AS is not likely to adopt a new
theory until it has been developed to the stage where methods and measures can
be relatively unambiguously applied to test specific aspects of the theory.
Moreover, the preliminary data should look promising.
Marketing
Objectives
Although the marketer of a scientific theory probably has
objectives or goals in mind for that theory, and for his/her career as a
scientist, these goals are not often explicit. For purposes of discussion, we
have roughly categorized scientists' objectives into three groups: noble,
curiosity, and self-serving goals. Conceptually, these three classes are
mutually exclusive; however, more than one type of objective can be achieved
with the same marketing strategy.
Noble objectives are those most commonly associated with science.
Included are such lofty goals as seeking knowledge, attempting to understand a
phenomenon, and contributing to a discipline or to society as a whole. Normally
such goals are considered to be beyond reproach. Note, however, that to
accomplish these goals, a scientist must market his/her work to the scientific
community (or get someone else to do the marketing). A theory can make no
contribution if the work is kept hidden in a file drawer. Thus, scientists must
market their theories to achieve even noble goals.
Curiosity objectives refer to seeking answers to one's personal
questions about the subject of inquiry. Curiosity goals are closely related to
noble goals, and they differ primarily in the degree to which the work is
performed for self versus others. Doing research for the fun of it and the
sheer joy of learning new things are not unknown as motivators in science.
However, if the scientist needs no cooperation from others, contents him-/herself
with the findings, needs no cooperation from others, and shares them with no
one, marketing is not involved. Only when the theory and the findings are
exchanged with someone else does the marketing process for the theory become
relevant.
Self-serving objectives are well known within scientific
communities but are not widely recognized among the general public, nor do
professional philosophers of science usually consider them. Self-serving goals
lead researchers to perform scientific work primarily for the purpose of
personal gain. The rewards for being a successful scientist can be substantial:
promotions, job security, money (in the form of salary, grants, and consulting
fees), release time from other duties, prestige and recognition in the field,
and specific awards and honors. While these gains are usually intended for
scientists who pursue noble goals, they often are awarded to those who seek
mainly self-serving goals. Occasionally, the research community may deny at
least some of the sought rewards to scientists who pursue only self-serving
goals, especially in a blatant manner. The research community may infer that a
particular researcher is seeking only self-serving goals based on the
researcher's verbal reports of objectives, and from practices such as producing
a large number of marginal theory/research papers, or relabeling and publishing
the same paper in multiple channels.
Clearly, different goals may lead researchers to adopt different
marketing strategies. For instance, some scientists who pursue noble goals may
naively believe that overt marketing effort is unnecessary and even demeaning,
since an obviously superior theory will "sell itself." Of course,
sophisticated marketers can easily recognize this perspective as a sign of a
strong product orientation and not a particularly viable strategy for long-term
success. It is also clear that different goals may lead to the same strategy,
i.e., development and marketing of a high quality theory product with a high
quality marketing plan. Moreover, scientists may have multiple goals that are
consistent. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to study scientists' goals, their
hierarchical relationships, and their impact on scientific progress. However,
the main point here is that accomplishing scientific objectives depends on the
quality of the marketing strategy and the effort exerted.
Summary
In the first part of this article we have demonstrated that basic
marketing concepts and principles can account for many aspects of scientific
activity. Thus far our arguments that science is marketing have been informal.
We have shown that many aspects of science involve social exchanges, and in
particular, the exchange of ideas in the form of theories. Therefore, as the
discipline most concerned with exchange processes, marketing provides a
relevant perspective for understanding science. In addition, we have shown how
certain marketing concepts are or could be used by scientists to develop
effective marketing strategies that could influence other scientists to adopt
their theories.
In the remainder of the article we develop our claim that science
is marketing along more formal lines. We attempt to show how current views on
the nature of science also lead to the conclusion that much of the activity of
science involves marketing processes. The key theoretical ideas used in our
arguments constitute a set of metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of
scientific knowledge and how that knowledge is achieved. Many of these ideas
are radically different from those that underlie the philosophical perspective
currently prominent in marketing and other social sciences.
Metatheoretical Assumptions about Science
Scholars have proposed a variety of philosophical perspectives
regarding science (see Brown 1977, Suppe 1977). These points of view are
characterized by major as well as subtle differences and by a profusion of
terminology (logical positivism, logical empiricism, instrumentalism, realism,
falsificationism, relativism, etc.). We attempt to sidestep much of the
resulting controversy and semantic confusion in the remainder of this article.
First, we briefly describe the reigning philosophical approach in marketing
which we call the Positivistic/Empiricist (P/E) perspective (see Anderson 1983
for a more detailed review). Then, we contrast this view with a newer, more
useful philosophy of science, which we call the Relativistic/Constructionist
approach (R/C). Our intent is to introduce these ideas at a broad, general
level and avoid becoming mired in technical jargon and subtle details. Thus our
coverage of these issues is necessarily an overview.
The
Positivistic/Empiricist Approach
The philosophy of science that presently dominates marketing is a
descendent of logical positivism, commonly called logical empiricism (cf.
Brodbeck 1982, Hunt 1983). (Suppe (1977) and Brown (1977) provide thorough
historical analyses of how these positions have evolved.) The term
"positivism" usually refers to a type of strict empiricism in which
only those knowledge claims that are based directly on experience (i.e.,
empirical observations) are considered important, useful, and/or scientifically
meaningful. Coupled with this strong emphasis on empirical data, positivism
relies heavily on formal symbolic logic as a tool of analysis. Thus,
positivists claim that through formal logical analysis of theories and by means
of unbiased observations, the truth of any (meaningful) proposition can be
determined absolutely.
Logical empiricism is a somewhat more moderate version of
positivism developed to avoid the induction problem-namely that no universal
proposition can be conclusively verified by any set of observations, no matter
how large. Thus logical empiricism tends to favor a view that although
scientific propositions cannot be conclusively verified, they can be
"increasingly confirmed," again using careful observations (e.g., in
experiments) and the rules of formal logic. In this view, for instance,
theoretical terms derive their meanings through "correspondence rules"
that "connect" them to direct experience (empirical observations).
These observations give meaning to the theoretical terms. The logical
empiricist point of view dominates current marketing research in that much of
our research methodology and approach are based on these philosophical
assumptions.
Popper (1959) proposed a "falsification" strategy to
avoid the inductive problems of the confirmation approach of logical
empiricism. However, as interpreted by many philosophers and marketing
scholars, falsification is merely a somewhat more sophisticated brand of
logical empiricism (cf. Calder, Phillips. and Tybout 1981, 1982; Lynch 1982).
(However, other, less well-recognized aspects of Popper's thinking are fairly
consistent with the perspective we are advocating (see Brown 1977, Chapter 5).)
This approach to science, termed "naive falsificationism" by Likatos
(1970), requires that a researcher consider a theory as false if a key
deductively derived hypothesis is rejected by empirical observations. (It
should be noted that Laudan (1965) clearly demonstrates the impossibility of
falsification.)
In sum, the P/E approach that currently underlies research in
marketing emphasizes (a) the development of axiomatic theory through the use of
deductively-derived hypotheses which are manipulated via formal rules of
symbolic logic, and especially (b) objective empirical observations that give
meaning to the theoretical propositions and are used to rigorously test them,
perhaps even falsify them. Thus, many people consider the P/E approach to be
rational (in the formal logical sense).
The
Relativistic/Constructionist Approach
In the P/E perspective of science, certain factors are excluded
from consideration, including the effects of (a) social interaction and
influence among scientists, (b) the idiosyncratic beliefs and values of
individual scientists, and (c) scientists' subjective interpretations of
observational data. These factors are not a part of the unbiased observations
and formal symbolic logic of the P/E approach; thus they are usually rejected
from consideration as irrelevant for an understanding of scientific progress.
However, in terms of the R/C perspective advocated below, these factors are of
critical importance in understanding how scientific knowledge develops. (We
cast the differences between these approaches in simple dichotomous terms in
order to distinguish them and make our points more clearly. However, a variety
of finer, mom subtle distinctions can be drawn. See Brown (1917) for a review
of the issues involved in this controversy.)
This article is not the place to present a complete discussion and
defense of the R/C approach to science. Others have done so effectively (see
Collins and Cox 1976, Feyerabend 1975, Knorr-Cetina 1981, Kunn 1970, Munévar
1981). Instead, in the rest of the article we identify and briefly discuss some
key distinctions between the P/E view of science and the R/C perspective. A
summary of these distinctions is provided in Table 1.
TABLE 1 |
|
Positivistic/Empiricist
Science |
Relativistic/Constructionist Science |
Science discovers the true nature of reality. |
Science creates many realities. |
Only the logic of justification is needed to
understand science. |
The processes by which theories are created,
justified, and diffused throughout a research community are needed to understand
science. |
Science can be understood without considering
cultural, social, political, and economic factoras. |
Science is a social process and cannot be
understood without considering cultural, social, political, and economic
factors. |
Science is objective. |
Science is subjective. |
Scientific knowledge is absolute and cumulative. |
Scientific knowledge is relative to a particular
context and period of time in history. |
Science is capable of discovering universal laws
that govern the external world. |
Science creates ideas that are context-dependent,
i.e., relative to a frame of reference. |
Science produces theories that come closer and
closer to absolute truth. |
Truth is a subjective evaluation that cannot be
properly inferred outside of the context provided by the theory. |
Science is rational since it follows formal rules
of logic, |
Science is rational to the degree that it seeks to
improve individual and societal well being by following whatever means are
useful for doing so. |
There are specific rules for doing science validly
(e.g.. falsification), |
There are many ways of doing science validly that
are appropriate in different situations. |
Scientists subject their theories to potential
falsification through rigorous empirical testing. |
Scientists seek supportive, confirmatory evidence
in order to market their theories. |
Measurement procedures do not influence what is
measured. |
Nothing can be measured without changing it. |
Data provide objective, independent benchmarks for
testing theories, |
Data are created and interpreted by scientists in
terms of a variety of theories, and thus are theory laden. |
Reality
Is Relative
A key difference between the two approaches to science concerns
the assumed nature of reality and how scientists relate to reality through
their theories and observational evidence (see Hooker 1975). Researchers with a
PIE orientation usually take a realist point of view. Although there are
various types of realism, most P/E researchers appear to believe that an
external world exists (usually one world in one way), and that it is possible
to come closer to knowing the true nature of that world through empirical observations
obtained through rigorous methods and analyses. Theories, then, are treated as
general statements about the real world. The goal is to develop theories that
come increasingly closer to being true statements about reality. Alternatively,
researchers with an R/C orientation conceive of many possible realities, each
of which is relative to a specific context or frame of reference. According to
this view, scientists construct "realities" by developing a degree of
social agreement about the meanings of their theories and empirical
observations (e.g., Collins 1975, Collins and Cox 1976, Elkana 1978, Feyerabend
1975, Gilbert 1976, Munévar 1981).
Science
Is a Social Process
Science is an activity performed by interacting human beings, and
thus obviously is a social process: We believe these social interaction
processes are very important for understanding science. In fact, the exchanges
that take place during these social processes constitute a major reason for our
contention that science is marketing.
Until recently, few philosophers of science have considered the
social interaction and social influence processes involved in scientific
progress. P/E philosophers tend to ignore such social factors or even claim
that such processes are unimportant (or "irrational") and, thus, not
worthy of study. Instead they continue to be concerned with rather formal
logical models for the justification or testing of theories. That is, P/E
philosophers have focused on the formal presumptions about how theories are verified,
corroborated, or falsified, and converted to scientific knowledge.
In contrast, philosophers with an R/C orientation have been
willing to consider the (less formal) social processes in science. For example,
Kuhn (1970) noted the importance of social influence in evaluating alternative
theories: "The superiority of one theory to another is something that
cannot be proved in debate. Instead, I have insisted, each party must try, by
persuasion, to convert the other" (p. 198, emphasis added). Mitroff (1974),
in his analysis of the Apollo moon scientists, found that certain scientists
are so highly committed to their theories that• they resist all persuasive
attempts to change their beliefs and continually try to convert other
scientists to their point of view. Recently, sociologists of science have been
actively investigating how social interaction processes affect the development
of social consensus regarding a scientific method, a theory, or even the
appropriate interpretation of empirical evidence (e.g., Collins 1981, Latour
1980, Pinch 1981). Developing a high degree of social consensus among
scientists is a major objective of marketing strategies for scientific
theories.
Science
Is Subjective
The presumed objectivity of science is a key characteristic of the
P/E approach that currently dominates marketing and related social science
disciplines. However, this aura of objectivity has been steadily eroding for
years across all sciences, including physics (see Zukav 1979). All pretensions
to objectivity (in this narrow sense) disappear on adopting an R/C perspective
on science.
P/E approaches tend to treat scientists' perceptions or sense
impressions naively as providing objective, unbiased representations of the
real world. Thus, empirical observations (manifestations of scientists' sense
impressions) are treated as objective data that are independent of any theory.
In contrast, the R/C perspective recognizes that even so-called direct
perceptions are not objective but are influenced by a multitude of factors,
including relevant past experiences and training. For this reason different
scientists may examine the same data and perceive entirely different meanings
(Stent 1975).
Here we consider the process by which scientific meaning is
developed. There are two aspects of this process, one psychological and the
other sociological. No less a scientist than Einstein (1936) has noted the
psychological aspects quite clearly:
Out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take, mentally
and arbitrarily, certain repeatedly occurring complexes of sense impressions .
. . and we attribute to them a meaning-the meaning of the bodily object.
Considered logically this concept is not identical to the totality of sense
impressions referred to; but it is an arbitrary creation of the human (or
animal) mind . . .. The second step . . . we attribute to this concept of the
bodily object a significance, which is to a high degree independent of the
sense impression that originally gives rise to it. This is what we mean when we
attribute to the bodily object 'a real existence' (p. 60, emphasis added).
The sociological aspect refers to the social interaction and
persuasion processes used to generate a degree of social consensus regarding
the scientific meaning of an observation or a theory. Marketing strategies are
used to influence both the psychological (individual level) and social (group
level) aspects of the meaning development process.
Our point here is that all meanings-including the specific,
technical meanings that constitute much of scientific knowledge-are
subjectively determined. Moreover, an R/C approach to science explicitly
recognizes that meaning is never absolute. Meaning is always meaning in
context, i.e., relative to some frame of reference (Mischler 1979). In science,
theories are an important source of context. If the context changes (perhaps
because the theory is changed during a paradigm shift), so does the meaning of
the relevant empirical observations. P/E approaches tend to deny this
subjective aspect of science by claiming that the rules and procedures for
doing science produce objective, absolute meanings. The R/C perspective
recognizes the inherent subjectivity in science and accounts for it in a
relativistic, context-dependent manner.
Science
Is Rational
Contrary to the protests in the P/E literature (e.g., Suppe 1977),
the preceding discussion does not lead to the conclusion that science is
irrational. Individual scientists can reasonably be assumed to attempt to
achieve their objectives in a rational way. That is, scientists borrow or
create those theories that they believe can accomplish their noble, curiosity,
or self-serving goals. Their beliefs may be found on the basis of what the
"hot topic" is in a discipline, whether a particular theory fits well
with their values and predilections, or how easily a theory can be marketed,
among other factors,
Rationality in science does not require the use of formal rules of
symbolic logic. Nor must the objectives and standards for judging progress be
absolute and fixed. In fact, it is quite clear from the history of science that
standards and objectives vary across time and across research communities.
Similarly, scientific rationality does not require that research be conducted
under the guidelines of a single scientific method such as falsification.
Feyerabend (1975) argues that many major discoveries in science could not have
occurred by following "the" scientific method and persuasively argues
against a single approach to science. In fact, Feyerabend recommends that
"anything goes"-i.e., any methodology or theory, no matter how
unconventional, can contribute to scientific progress. (The problem, of course,
comes in marketing unconventional methods and theories to an unappreciative
audience. Many researchers may be committed to a PIE perspective and major
journals may reject Unusual approaches to developing knowledge. Generating
acceptance of new methods that challenge engrained beliefs and established
research procedures is often difficult. In fact, this problem may generate the
need for new channels (journals or books) to provide outlets for such radical
work.)
Theories
Are Not Universal
A theory has meaning only within its own context, i.e., within its
own set of metatheoretical assumptions (Hooker 1975, Mischler 1979). As these
presuppositions change, so does the meaning of the theory. Moreover, a
completely valid, causal explanation of a phenomenon (i.e., a true theory)
cannot be produced since all rival alternative hypotheses can never be eliminated
(i.e., falsified). In fact, scientists are seldom aware of all the existing
hypotheses that could be used to explain a phenomenon, and, of course,
scientists cannot know of hypotheses and explanations yet to be invented.
Much of the logic underlying the extensive use of experimentation,
representative sampling, and inferential statistics in marketing research is
based on the P/E goal of developing universal theories and laws. However, even
statistical inferences drawn by scientists who believe in statistical theory
are relative to the assumed populations of people, stimuli, measures, etc.,
being sampled. It is also clear from the history of science that no universal
laws or theories have ever been advanced that meet strict P/E requirements (see
Feyerabend 1975, Munévar 1981). In marketing, even simple strategic planning
models have been shown to be restricted to particular situations (see Day 1977,
Wensley 1981). Thus, the P/E view of science that pursues objectives, such as
universal laws, seems misguided. In contrast, the R/C perspective explicitly
recognizes the "boundedness" of theories and the relativistic meaning
of observations, and seeks to specify the limits of their generalizability. In
sum, theories are limited to (relative to) specific times and particular
contexts.
Usefulness
of Theories
Theories can be evaluated in terms of their truth con-tent or
their usefulness. P/E approaches usually focus on truth content. However, no
defensible method for establishing the truth of a theory has ever been advanced
(Peter 1983). Therefore, from an R/C perspective, usefulness seems to be a more
appropriate criterion for evaluating a theory. Usefulness is a pragmatic
criterion concerned with the difference it makes to follow the theory's
recommendations. Here the emphasis is on the performance, or potential
performance of a theory (Munévar 1981). Usefulness can be judged in terms of
how effectively a theory enables the user to "get along" in the world
or accomplish some specific task. For example, if application of a marketing
theory leads to an increase in long run profits for a firm, then it may be
inferred that the theory was a good one; that is, it was useful in that
situation and context, given that objective. Note that the usefulness criterion
of the R/C approach provides no direct evidence of the truth content of the
theory; in fact, truth content is basically irrelevant from an R/C perspective
(Olson 1982).
Theories can be useful in a variety of ways. For example, theories
may include new concepts that offer more interesting or precise descriptions of
phenomena than previously popular constructs. Descriptions of certain consumer
behaviors in terms of "attributions" or "semantic
processing" seem so much more precise than "attitudes" or
"perceptions." In fact, within the context of current cognitive
theory, these are more precise terms. Theories can also be useful in a
heuristic sense for generating other theories or ideas (Gergen 1978).
Ultimately, though, a pragmatic humanist criterion seems critical, i.e., what
does the theory do to increase societal welfare? Humanistic cr1-teria are much
more easily integrated into science from an R/C than from a P/E perspective.
Data
Never Speak for Themselves
Many P/E philosophers and scientists seem to believe that data are
independent of the theories they are used to test. That is, empirical
observations are assumed to provide an objective benchmark against which to
test and compare theories. Yet, philosophers of science have repeatedly shown
that there is no pure observational language, i.e., all data are theory-laden
(see Feyerabend 1975, Kuhn 1970, Lakatos 1978, Popper 1959, among others). This
point is made clearer if we remember that data (empirical observations) are
constructed just as theories are. Data do not exist in the "real
world" waiting to be gathered. Rather, data are created through the
measurement operations used by scientists to produce them. Clearly, the
scientist selects the theory, hypotheses, research setting, test stimuli,
subjects, measures, and statistics to be used. In fact, the scientist controls
the entire production of research data (Peter, in press).
The point is that scientists control the process of generating
research data, and almost always have biases about what they want to find and
how the data are interpreted. If "negative results" are found that
are unpublishable, a new study nearly always can be conducted to produce
"appropriate" results. Although such attempts will not always be
successful in the short run, we suspect that long-term perseverance often
yields the desired results, especially if combined with an effective marketing
strategy to generate at least a minimum level of consensus as to the value of
the work. However, if, after a number of trials, a researcher still cannot
generate empirical support for a theory, the researcher rather than the theory
may warrant condemnation. Alternatively, it may be that the methods required to
provide the desired empirical observations and results are not yet available.
Recommendations
Our R/C view of science as the marketing of ideas conflicts
sharply with what Mitroff (1972) calls the "fairytale description of
science" (i.e., the P/E view) frequently advocated and apparently believed
by many marketing scholars. We view the P/E accounts of objective theory
testing and the reliance on strict methodological rules such as falsification
as stifling creative science rather than facilitating it. The following
recommendations are offered in the hope that the outdated P/E approach to science
can be replaced by more creative, insightful, and useful styles of inquiry
consistent with the R/C perspective.
Scientific
Training
It is clear that far more effort is exerted in training scientists
in methods of testing hypotheses rather than encouraging them to create
important, provocative, meaningful, or useful theories. The typical doctoral
program in marketing contains many courses intended to prepare students to test
hypotheses, yet embarrassingly little attention is given to how to create hypotheses
and evaluate their merits. In fact, creativity may be stifled in the rush to
ensure that students have the requisite methodological and statistical skills
to produce the empirical demonstrations demanded by the P/E approach to
science. While it seems unlikely that creativity can be taught directly, more
hospitable environments could facilitate such learning. Various scholars,
including Davis (1971), McGuire (1973), Webb (1961) and Zaltman, LeMasters, and
Heffring (1982), have suggested a number of ideas for generating interesting,
insightful, useful research questions.
In essence, creative insights are a function of the amount,
quality, and content of what the individual scientist thinks and does. (For
example. see Gruber's' (1981) fascinating account of Charles Darwin's
creativity.) At present, the major efforts in marketing are devoted to
designing research to test ideas borrowed from other disciplines, rather than
creating and developing theoretical ideas about marketing phenomena and
problems (Sheth 1982). Clearly, "replications" in a marketing context
of research ideas gleaned from other fields has some value. However, it is
unlikely that marketing will advance very rapidly or very far as long as we
depend on other scientists, uninterested in our field, to carry the major
responsibility for creating and developing the theories we use. We need to
adapt and further develop the theories we borrow.
In addition, rather than starting research with a borrowed theory
or construct, it may be more useful to begin with a marketing phenomenon or
problem in which we are interested, and then attempt to develop our own
theories about it. While insights from other fields may aid in investigating
the phenomenon or problem, we should guard against letting them dominate any
ideas we have on our own. Further, we should not constrain our search for
additional insights to traditional areas of borrowing, such as economics,
social and cognitive psychology, and statistics. Many disciplines such as
history, anthropology, sociology, and clinical psychology have useful ideas to
offer.
Values
in Science
We must stop deluding ourselves and others that as empirical
scientists, we are impartial to the outcomes of our research, that our research
is objective, and that we are dealing with established facts rather than
inferences of varying quality. Clearly, scientists are advocates for their
theories, hypotheses, and data. Usually "positive findings" must be
produced to persuade others and to successfully market scientific work. To
argue that all "scientific" research should be designed to falsify
specific hypotheses is misleading and dysfunctional for our progress. Empirical
research is certainly valuable. However, data should not be viewed as providing
an objective test of a theory's truth value. Empirical evidence may be more
appropriately viewed as demonstrating the usefulness of a theoretical idea in a
particular context.
Scientific
Behavior
It should be clear that studying science as a social activity can
produce new knowledge, not only about science but also about the behavior of
scientists as well. For example, Mitroff's (1974) classic study of the Apollo
moon scientists, Knorr-Cetina's (1981) investigation of laboratory physicists,
Latour and Woolgar's (1979) description of biology scientists at the Salk
Institute, and Zukav's (1979) insights into the conduct of research on quantum
mechanics provide detailed descriptions of the social nature of science. These
analyses clearly show that scientists are social beings with social needs, not
automatons following a program of formal logical analysis. In addition,
investigations of collaborative research practices (Over 1982), secretiveness
and competitiveness for priority of discovery by researchers (Gaston 1971),
referencing behavior (Gilbert 1977), and outright fudging of research results,
such as the case of Cyril Burt and J. B. Watson (see Samelson 1980), provide
insights about scientific progress and the social behavior of the scientists
involved. Finally, studying the marketing plans of successful scientists could
improve our knowledge of the effectiveness of various marketing strategies and
tactics in producing scientific progress. (For example, see Feyerabend's (1975)
analysis of the strategies followed by Galileo in marketing his radical views
on astronomy.)
Context-Specific
Meaning
We need to investigate meaning in context rather than strive to
produce universal laws and theories. Mischler (1979) and Morgan and Smircich
(1980) suggested some procedures for such research. In fields such as sociology
and organizational behavior, considerable work is currently being done on the
development of new methods of context-specific inquiry (e.g., Knorr-Cetina and
Mulkay 1983, Morgan 1983). At a minimum, consideration of these works points to
the need to more fully observe and report research details in current
approaches to research and to critically evaluate current research methods that
were designed for seeking universal generalizations. In general, less emphasis
on following normative rules of research conduct garnered from P/E accounts of
science may aid in the development of better methods and theories.
Summary
and Conclusions
We have shown that many aspects of scientific activity are
consistent with basic marketing concepts and processes. We have implied that
astute scientists could make good use of basic marketing principles to develop
effective strategies for promoting their theories, In addition, we have shown
that the "science is marketing" perspective is more consistent with
the "new" R/C philosophy of science than with the outdated P/E
orientation that currently dominates marketing research. We have also argued
that adopting an R/C approach in marketing could produce more creative and
useful theories.
While we believe that marketing provides a useful perspective for
analyzing science, other views of science are useful as well. For example,
science can also be analyzed as art and theater (Feyerabend 1968), rhetoric
(Gusfield 1976), communication (Edge 1979), and cognitive psychology (Tweney,
Doherty, and Mynatt 1981). Moreover, aspects of science are similar to
mysticism (Capra 1975) as well as more formally organized religion (Feyerabend
1968). In some situations, even the positivistic/empiricist perspective may offer
useful ideas about science. Future research on science might identify and
create new perspectives, combine and compare alternative perspectives, and
specify the contexts and situations under which one perspective may be more
useful than another.
Finally, it is reasonable to ask what we have learned about the
question, "Is marketing a science?" While we recognize that no
defensible criterion for distinguishing science from nonscience has ever been
found (Laudan 1982), we believe that the main task of science is to create
useful knowledge. To the degree that marketing has done so, then it can be
labeled a science. As marketing scientists we should be concerned to make our
discipline more effective in creating useful knowledge about our subject
matter. We believe that such improvements are best achieved by adopting the
relativistic/constructionist approach to science advocated here. Recognizing
the social processes of science, the context specificity of scientific
knowledge, and other features of the R/C program can give marketing scholars
the freedom and confidence to create new conceptual schemes and perspectives.
This is in contrast to following the outdated rules of the P/E approach that
focus only on testing theories we already have. A creative science of marketing
is more likely to flourish by taking a relativistic/constructionist approach.
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