September 12 to October 16
Five weeks from Hell!
And the lessons we have learned…

Aswath Damodaran
The way things were..
Before the “troubles”

Innocents led to the slaughter…
Treasuries were riskless... and rates were stable
And risk premiums did not change over short periods...
And only gradually over longer periods…

Figure 9: Equity Risk Premiums and Bond Default Spreads
Real Economic Growth, Earnings Growth and Inflation

- While we accepted the reality of recessions, we viewed them as bumps in the road to a bigger and better economy. In other words, recessions caused minor blips in real economic growth that would be reversed in future recoveries. And there was always China and India…

- We were even more optimistic about earnings growth. Companies could use financial leverage, stock buybacks and financial engineering tools to keep earnings growing faster than the overall economy.

- Inflation was a minor problem, because central banks had learned their lessons from the 1970s and would figure out ways to keep inflation in check.
Current Cashflow to Firm

\[
\text{EBIT}(1-t) = 5344 \times (1-0.35) = 3474 \\
- \text{Nt CpX} = 350 \\
- \text{Chg WC} = 691 \\
= \text{FCFF} = 2433 \\
\text{Reinvestment Rate} = \frac{1041}{3474} = 29.97\% \\
\text{Return on capital} = 25.19\% \\
\]

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)

\[
0.30 \times 0.25 = 0.075 \\
7.5\% \\
\]

Return on Capital

25\%

Stable Growth

\[
g = 3\%; \ Beta = 1.10; \\
\text{Debt Ratio} = 20%; \ Tax rate = 35\% \\
\text{Cost of capital} = 6.76\% \\
\text{ROC} = 6.76\%; \\
\text{Reinvestment Rate} = \frac{3}{6.76} = 44\% \\
\]

Terminal Value

\[
2645 / (0.0676 - 0.03) = 70,409 \\
\]

Value/Share $83.55

Cost of capital = 8.32\% (0.92) + 2.91\% (0.08) = 7.88\%

On September 12, 2008, MMM was trading at $70/share
And then came the troubles…
We discovered stocks are risky.. And the reason for demanding an equity risk premium..
Figure 7A: Implied Equity Risk Premium - 9/12-10/16

Historical ERP: 1928-2007 = 4.79%

Average implied ERP: 1960-2007 = 4.00%
Not just the S&P 500…
Going Global with the crisis…

The flip side of globalization!!

Aswath Damodaran
While treasuries started behaving in odd ways…
Short term corporate borrowing markets froze..
And corporate bond default spreads widened…
Commodities were no safe haven…

No safe haven in commodities?

- Gold
- Oil
- Livestock
- Industrial metals
- Agricultural
Currencies moved… with a flight to what?
Now what?

Consequences for investing and valuation
Discount Rates

- Equity risk premiums have increased at least for the near term. For the next couple of years, an equity risk premium of 5-6% is more realistic. In the long term (5 years), we should revert back to historical risk premiums of 4-4.5%.

- Default spreads have also increased in the near term. The spreads have doubled over the last few weeks. While they will decline somewhat, as markets settle down, it is unlikely that they will return to pre crisis levels for the next year or so.

- Firms will be more reluctant to borrow money. For firms with low debt ratios, it is likely that these ratios will stay low for the near term.

- The net effect of these changes is that the cost of capital will rise for all firms, and especially for firms with high debt ratios and high degrees of operating risk.
Cash Flows & Growth

- The prospect of an economic slowdown will reduce earnings next year, and more so for cyclical firms.
- The bounce back from a recession will be slower and more long drawn out than has been in the case in past recessions.
  - Firms will be more cautious and reinvest less, leading to lower earnings growth in the recovery.
  - The consequences for future return on capital are more murky. If smaller firms have difficulty accessing capital, it is possible that the returns on capital at large firms will remain higher for longer periods.
  - Firms cannot use the “globalization” argument for higher growth. The reduction in growth will be global.
### Current Cashflow to Firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EBIT(1-t)= 3544 (1-.35)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nt CpX=</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chg WC</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= FCFF</td>
<td>2139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinvestment Rate</td>
<td>1041/3180 = 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on capital</td>
<td>23.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reinvestment Rate**

- 25%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**

- .25*.20=.05 5%

**Return on Capital**

- 20%

**Stable Growth**

- g = 3%; Beta = 1.00; ERP = 4%
- Debt Ratio = 8%; Tax rate = 35%
- Cost of capital = 7.55%
- ROC = 7.55%
- Reinvestment Rate = 3/7.55 = 40%

**Terminal Value**

- \( \frac{2645}{.0755-.03} = 70,409 \)

**On October 16, 2008, MMM was trading at $57/share.**

**Cost of capital**

- 10.86% (0.92) + 3.55% (0.08) = 10.27%

**Higher default spread for next 5 years**

**Cost of Equity**

- 10.86%

**Cost of Debt**

- (3.96% + 1.5%)(1-.35) = 3.55%

**Weights**

- E = 92% D = 8%

**Increased risk premium to 6% for next 5 years**

**Beta**

- 1.15

**Risk Premium**

- 6%

**Unlevered Beta for Sectors**

- 1.09

**D/E**

- 8.8%
The Bottom Line

- The fundamentals of value do not change in a crisis. The estimated value, though, will change as the inputs change.
- Valuations have to be updated more frequently when macro economic variables are in flux.
  - Equity risk premiums and default spreads have to be constantly monitored and updated. For the near term, they will have much bigger effects on the values of companies that company-specific data.
  - As we find out more about how much economies will slow, we have to revisit earnings estimates for individual companies.