Emerging Markets

0. Overview

- International Diversification
- Historical Overview
- Brady Bonds
- Recent Developments
1. International Diversification: Pros and Cons

- Investments in emerging markets
  - Similar to other international investments
  - but with more extreme properties

- Advantages:
  - High expected returns
  - Risks diversify a domestic portfolio

- Disadvantages:
  - Expected returns hard to gauge in a changing world
  - Risks large, hard to quantify, and correlated
  - Risks include currency volatility
  - Transactions costs high, liquidity often low
  - Harder to enforce foreign contracts
    (Not “can they pay,” but “will they pay”)
  - Foreigner investors always vulnerable to robbery
2. Historical Overview

- 1800-1914: British (esp) financing of “colonies”
  - Huge capital flows, even by modern standards
  - Relatively easy enforcement
  - Occasional panics (Australia 1892) and defaults (Argentina in the 1920s)

- Post World War II trends
  - Gradually decreasing controls on capital flows
  - Increasing cross-border capital flows
  - Relatively recent movement intoi emerging markets

- Emerging market trends
  - Standard order of development:
    bank loans $\Rightarrow$ debt $\Rightarrow$ equity
    (Countries vary in the details)
  - Brady plan converted bank loans to debt
  - Dramatic ups and downs
2. Historical Overview (continued)

- US in 1790: Hamilton funded Revolutionary War debt
- Spread over British consols (Sylla, Wilson, and Wright):

Note spikes in spread
3. Brady Bond Overview

- 1975-81: banks loaned billions to emerging markets
  - Largely sovereign debt (countries, not companies)
  - Remember: bank customers fled to public markets

- 1979-82: Volcker initiates US rate increases to fight inflation

- August 1982: Mexico defaults, soon followed by Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, . . .

- Nine largest US banks had loans with book value more than twice bank capital

- Next seven years involved negotiations between creditors and debtors that stressed austerity and economic reform in exchange for financial assistance, on the theory that the countries would then grow out of their debts

- Nevertheless, the 80s were a lost decade in these countries
3. Brady Bond Overview (continued)

- Secondary market developed in the 1980s for loans, just as we see in (say) Russia today (last year?)

- US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady announced in March 1989 a new attempt to use markets to reduce debt burden on both debtors and creditors

- Result:
  - Banks agreed to reduce their claims in return for credit enhancements on remaining exposure: collateral to guarantee interest and principal, help from IMF and World Bank to institute economic reforms, etc

  - Many of these claims were converted to Brady bonds: dollar-denominated debt in a variety of types

  - Trading volume on emerging market debt rose from 1.5 billion in 1985 to 200 billion in 1992 to . . .

  - Spreads fell sharply, with blips in 1994-95 and 1997
3. Brady Bond Overview (continued)

- Major Brady issuers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Brady Bond Examples

• Overview
  – Dollar denominated
  – Mixture of credit exposures, guarantees
  – Fixed and floating rate
  – Call and sinking fund provisions common
  – Occasional ties to commodity prices

• Argentina Par Bond
  – Par bond (issued at face value, below-market fixed rate)
  – Matures: March 2023
  – Coupon (step-up): 4% through 1994, 4.25% in 1995, 5% in 1996, additions of 0.25% through 1999, fixed at 6% thereafter; semi-annual payments
  – Guarantees: principal (collateralized by US zeros) plus 6% (“rolling interest guarantee”)
  – Other features: callable at par
  – Ratings: Baa3, BB
4. Brady Bond Examples (continued)

- Brazil C Bond
  - C ("capitalization") bonds
  - Matures: April 2014
  - Coupon: 8%, semi-annual payments
  - Guarantees: none
  - Rating: B1, BB–

- Bulgaria IAB
  - IAB (interest arrears bond)
  - Matures: July 2011
  - Coupon: 6-month LIBOR + 81.25 BPs, grace period ends 2001; semi-annual payments
  - Guarantees: none
  - Other features: sinking fund
  - Rating: B2
5. Brady Bond Analytics

Market quotes (March 30, 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Blended Yield</th>
<th>Stripped Yield</th>
<th>Sovereign Spread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arg Par</td>
<td>77.118</td>
<td>8.132</td>
<td>10.443</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arg FRB</td>
<td>92.743</td>
<td>9.085</td>
<td>9.085</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bra C</td>
<td>84.765</td>
<td>10.277</td>
<td>10.277</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bra EI</td>
<td>75.927</td>
<td>9.328</td>
<td>9.328</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bra Par</td>
<td>90.691</td>
<td>8.181</td>
<td>10.446</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bul IAB</td>
<td>78.834</td>
<td>10.493</td>
<td>10.493</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mex Dis</td>
<td>94.821</td>
<td>7.635</td>
<td>9.799</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mex Par</td>
<td>85.593</td>
<td>7.616</td>
<td>9.769</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nig Par</td>
<td>73.219</td>
<td>9.051</td>
<td>13.195</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Par</td>
<td>49.417</td>
<td>7.720</td>
<td>9.739</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phi FLIRB</td>
<td>90.750</td>
<td>9.021</td>
<td>9.074</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ven NMB</td>
<td>92.843</td>
<td>9.484</td>
<td>9.484</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ven DCB</td>
<td>91.396</td>
<td>9.412</td>
<td>9.412</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bloomberg.

Question: What does this mean?
5. Brady Bond Analytics (continued)

- Example (courtesy of JP Morgan via Bloomberg)
  - 5% bond with annual payments
  - Maturity: 5 years
  - Guarantee: principal
  - Spot rates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity</th>
<th>US Treas</th>
<th>Sovereign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>16.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>17.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>17.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Valuation:
  - Using treasury spot rates (wrong!): 90.47
  - Using sovereign spot rates (wrong!): 60.84
  - Using each as appropriate: 85.98

\[
85.98 = \frac{5}{1 + .1600} + \frac{5}{(1 + .1650)^2} + \cdots + \frac{5}{(1 + .1740)^5} + \frac{100}{(1 + .0740)^5}
\]
5. Brady Bond Analytics (continued)

- **Blended yield**: the usual yield to maturity

\[
85.98 = \frac{5}{1 + y} + \frac{5}{(1 + y)^2} + \cdots + \frac{105}{(1 + y)^5}
\]

Solution: \( y = 8.56\% \)

Remark: mixes sovereign and guaranteed cash flows

- **Stripped yield**: yield on sovereign cash flows only

\[
\text{Value} = \frac{5}{1 + .1600} + \frac{5}{(1 + .1650)^2} + \cdots + \frac{5}{(1 + .1740)^5} = 16.00
\]

\[
16.00 = \frac{5}{1 + y} + \frac{5}{(1 + y)^2} + \cdots + \frac{5}{(1 + y)^5}
\]

Solution: \( y = 16.98\% \)

Remark: isolates pure sovereign risk

- **Sovereign spread**: spread over US spot rates on sovereign cash flows only

\[
16.00 = \frac{5}{1 + .0600 + s} + \frac{5}{(1 + .0650 + s)^2} + \cdots + \frac{5}{(1 + .0740 + s)^5}
\]

Solution: \( s = 0.1000 = 1000 \text{ BPs} \)
5. Brady Bond Analytics (continued)

- Stripped yield and sovereign spread are the obvious choices, but they require the entire spot rate curve

- Bells and whistles
  - Floating rates
  - Rolling interest guarantee: subtle

- Sensitivity to
  - US treasury rates (duration, say)
  - Spread over treasuries (spread duration)
  - Practical issue: how to hedge interest rate risk and gain pure credit exposure
Summary

• The global debt market has a large emerging market component.

• History is littered with booms and busts in emerging markets, most recently the spike in spreads of August 1998.

• Brady bonds are remnants of bad loans from the 1980s.

• We should expect to see continued interest in these markets, possibly with greater emphasis on private issues.