Wall Street Journal January 5, 1998
The biggest economic news of 1997 was the turmoil
in Asia. The biggest question for 1998 is whether
the Asian crisis will trigger a significant world-wide deflation, or
possibly even a depression. With this in mind, the Journal's editorial
page asked a number of distinguished analysts and business leaders to
answer two questions: How will the current Asian economic turmoil
affect the United States? And what should American leaders do in
response?
Here are their replies:
Barton Biggs is chairman of Morgan Stanley Asset Management:
Most Americans are grossly underestimating the recessionary and
disinflationary-deflationary forces of what is happening in Asia. By
competitively depreciating its currencies, Asia is exporting its deflation,
its
overcapacity and its lack of growth to the West, particularly to the U.S.
Initially the effect on inflation and interest rates is benign, since the
U.S.
economy is operating at full capacity, although the loss of pricing power
will
result in profit margin pressures and earnings disappointments. But with
the
dollar the strongest currency in the world, the U.S. economy inevitably
will
begin to be hollowed out and the protectionist outcry will begin. If trade
barriers result, it will be an impoverishing step backward for free markets
and global prosperity.
World-wide competitive devalutions, trade wars and deflationary tendencies
could result in a synchronized global slowdown-recession and a simultaneous
bear market in Western stock markets. If capital flows were to collapse,
disillusionment and unrest could appear in the developing world. A vicious
circle could develop.
None of this needs to happen if the U.S. and the other great powers act
promptly and wisely. U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin is right to keep
urging the Japanese to be bold, and we should pressure the International
Monetary Fund to forsake its "tough love" fiscal and monetary austerity
remedies for Asia. Instead the IMF should implement programs that enable
the Asian countries to grow out of harm's way. These should include tax
cuts, deregulation, more transparency and improved bank supervision. The
Greenspan Fed and Germany's Bundesbank should become less manic
about inflation and worry more about deflation. The next move in official
interest rates should be down, not up.
Eventually measures will have to be taken to control macro traders (hedge
funds' proprietary traders), who today almost rule the world.
***
Jim Cantalupo is president and CEO of McDonald's International:
We've been in Asia for more than 25 years, and our operations there are
strong and diverse, with more than 3,400 restaurants in 20
countries--including 2,000 in Japan, McDonald's largest market outside
the
U.S.
We remain very bullish on Asia as a market for continued profitable growth.
There's no question that some Asian economies have suffered a setback,
but we believe they ultimately will continue to thrive.
We've been through similar situations before in Latin America, with periods
of hyperinflation, devaluation and currency crises, and we've learned that
you have to stay the course. Our operations in Brazil are a good example.
McDonald's opened there in 1979. Since then, we've survived seven
economic reform plans, five currencies, five presidents, two constitutions
and 14 finance ministers. Today in Brazil, McDonald's is the unchallenged
market leader. In the past three years, our same-store sales have
doubled--in an economy that very recently was described in the same dire
terms used to characterize conditions in some Asian markets today.
So, if you're doing business in Asia, stay there. You can't go in and out
with
every rise and fall of the business cycle. Manage for the long term and,
if
you can, look at economic downturns as opportunities rather than crises.
***
Rudi Dornbusch is a professor of economics and international
management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
Can the Asian disease spread to the U.S. and not just take away a half
percentage point of gross domestic product but truly damage our prosperity
and performance? Yes, if Japan sinks further and its stock market collapses,
if a deepening spiral draws in Asia and the rest of the world's economy.
True, with a balanced budget and no inflation, the U.S. has both hands
free
to pursue a prosperity policy; interest rates can be cut and so can taxes,
if
need be. Europe, too, can expect to weather the storm: The coming
monetary union instills confidence. and for once there is some growth in
the
past year.
Whatever confidence there is for growth, it does not apply to stock prices.
For companies engaged in international trade the overriding impression
will
be cutthroat competition and deflation. In Europe and the U.S., we are
only
a foot away from outright deflation in consumer prices. At the level of
producers' prices, we are already there--and with huge Asian depreciation
and deep recession, competition and deflation pressures will grow.
The other way to catastrophe, closer to home, is Rep. Dick Gephardt and
his protectionist ilk. If they succeed in erecting significant trade barriers,
depression 1930s-style would be around the corner.
***
Barry Eichengreen is a senior policy adviser at the International Monetary
Fund and a professor of economics and political science at the University
of
California, Berkeley:
A ballpark estimate is that Asia's current financial turmoil will reduce
U.S.
growth by a percentage point in 1998. But the precise effect will depend
on
three factors that no one is in a position to predict.
First, the speed of Asia's recovery. The resumption of growth, particularly
in
Korea, requires restructuring as well as reflation. Public funds must be
provided to prevent bank runs and to supply companies with working capital.
But pumping in liquidity alone will not suffice; insolvent entities must
be
restructured using the applicable bankruptcy procedures. Otherwise, liquidity
will leak back out as fast as it is injected.
Second, Japan's fiscal policy, and bank restructuring to keep that stimulus
from disappearing down a black hole, will determine whether that country
recovers or stagnates.
Third, whether American policy makers resist the protectionist temptation.
An Asia that finds it more difficult to finance its imports with capital
inflows
has no choice but to export more. Depreciation of its currencies against
the
dollar is the market mechanism for bringing this about. But it will work
only
if the U.S. resists the protectionist pressure that will accompany the
rise in
American imports. A protectionist backlash would leave Asia no way out.
Its consequent difficulties would drag down other regions.
***
Steve Forbes is chairman of Americans for Hope, Growth and
Opportunity:
The Clinton-Gore administration and the IMF are prescribing remedies
based on a bogus theory that substantial devaluations are good for getting
a
country back on its feet. But devaluations are disaster. They trigger
enormous domestic inflation, sharply reduce people's standard of living,
hobble domestic capital creation, scare away foreign investment. The
ultimate result, if unchecked, is economic anarchy.
Encouraged by Mr. Clinton and the IMF, Mexico went the devaluation route
in 1994, and interest rates soared to 100%. Unemployment rose rapidly.
Workers' salaries were effectively cut some 50%. The majority of
Mexicans are worse off today, which is why the governing party routinely
loses honest elections. By bailing out investors and speculators, Mr. Clinton
unwittingly encouraged speculative money flows elsewhere.
The U.S. should:
help Asian nations stabilize their distressed currencies by repegging
them to the U.S. dollar at higher rates than they are now, perhaps
through a Hong Kong-style currency board;
pressure the Bank of Japan to cease its on-and-off eight-year
deflation;
urge these nations to set up independent entities to take over bad
banking loans, just as we did with our savings-and-loans;
urge nations to lower trade barriers, simplify taxes, reduce tax rates
and remove excessive regulations on starting and expanding
businesses; and
tell IMF officials to take a hike.
***
Yoichi Funabashi is chief diplomatic correspondent of the Japanese
newspaper Asahi Shimbun:
A Japanese financial meltdown, if it should occur, would change the
geopolitical picture of the Asian-Pacific region for years to come. Without
Japan's vast investment, aid, loans and markets, Asian nations' growth
rates
will likely sink to levels around 2% to 3%. Massive unemployment would
lead to eruptions of ethnic tension in Southeast Asia and abrupt political
changes in Northeast Asia. These factors in combination would raise
fundamental questions about U.S. foreign policy toward the region.
American leaders should take the following steps to prevent any Japanese
meltdown and its inescapable side effects:
Prepare to play a decisive role as "importer of last resort." Only the
U.S. is capable of absorbing the exports of Asian nations now, and it
will remain the sole absorber until the Japanese economy begins to
recover. This is the most effective shock therapy for Asia right now.
Help Japan turn its economy around by strengthening macroeconomic
policy coordination. Quieter, but stronger, foreign pressure on Japan's
leadership is necessary to overcome the kamikaze-style fiscal
coordination that Japan's Ministry of Finance is blindly pursuing amid
the most depressed markets Japan has experienced since World War
II. Japan cannot be allowed to trigger another Great Depression.
Stop further yen depreciation and preferably stabilize the yen-dollar
exchange rate at around 115 to 125 so that the trade imbalance
caused by a cheaper yen does not balloon to a point where it upsets
the U.S.'s vital role as importer of last resort.
Persuade European leaders not to implement the European Monetary
Union and its currency, the euro, which would put additional
deflationary pressures on the world economy.
Treat South Korea's bailout differently from the bailouts of Southeast
Asia. The U.S. needs to show a firm determination to rescue South
Korea, since any perception that Washington is not fully committed to
helping Seoul could send the wrong signal to North Korea.
Encourage China to maintain the value of its currency. Renminbi
devaluation would likely touch off another round of competitive
devaluations among Asian countries.
***
Jeffrey E. Garten is dean of the Yale School of Management:
Recessionary conditions from Japan to Indonesia, together with a dollar
that
is increasingly strong when measured in Asian currencies, mean a
slowdown in American exports and more pressure on corporate profits. We
can also expect a dramatic increase in imports from Asia. Aside from fierce
foreign competition for U.S. firms, look for rising American trade deficits,
perhaps 50% higher than 1997 levels, and downward pressure on U.S.
prices and wages.
While recession and deflation cannot, therefore, be ruled out, wise
leadership can ensure that neither happens. Tokyo must come up with a
much bolder government package to let banks fail while insuring depositors'
savings, and stimulate the economy through big tax cuts. The U.S. Treasury,
together with the Fed and top American bankers, will need to continue to
fashion debt restructurings for big Korean firms for many months to come,
thereby avoiding a financial collapse in the world's 11th-largest economy.
The Fed will have to be ready to lower interest rates if too many clouds
form over the U.S. economic landscape.
Big American firms ought to stay the course in Asia, taking advantage of
unprecedented opportunities to buy assets cheaply in industries that have
been closed to significant foreign investment. Asia needs the capital and
know-how, and, for the longer term, we need their markets, which will
undoubtedly rebound very strongly after a few years.
***
James Grant is the editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer:
Vis-à-vis the U.S., Asia has overnight become a stronger competitor
and a
weaker customer.
Busts are not only preceded by booms; fundamentally, they are caused by
them. An excess of credit promotes overdoing it; and the subsequent
contraction of credit contributes to underdoing it. The hallmark of finance
in
the postwar era has been governmental intolerance of the underdoing-it
portion of the cycle. The unintended consequence of a succession of crisis
interventions, dating back to the 1970s, has been the subsidy of lending
practices that virtually guarantee the recurrence of speculative bubbles.
As
the booms have gotten bigger, so has the budget of the IMF.
What now? First, do no harm. Markets should be allowed to clear and the
prospective winners and losers to sort things out for themselves. And the
moral basis for allowing markets to clear is that the private financial
establishment should not be bailed out by the public one.
The South Korean crisis, in particular, is mainly a corporate-finance crisis--a
shortage of earnings in relation to interest expense. How the IMF, by
imposing a 3% limit on the growth of Korean GDP, intends to do anything
except increase insolvencies, is a question that the U.S. Congress should
investigate at once.
***
M.R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of American International Group:
The current financial situation in Asia should not have a devastating impact
on the world economy, but only if the IMF and the G-7 countries assist
the
Asian countries to take prompt concerted corrective action. Our export
industries have been the most vibrant part of the U.S. expansion, and a
reduction in their ability to sell to Southeast Asia will threaten continued
U.S.
growth. Several years ago Mexico faced a similar problem to that of Asia
today. The U.S. stepped in and provided significant help in the short term
but was repaid in the long term. The adjustment was painful, but today
Mexico is again enjoying renewed growth.
But this is not just a U.S. problem; it is an international problem. Left
unchecked, this financial problem could lead to social unrest and political
instability. The IMF should take the lead. But the participation of all
major
countries, including the U.S. and especially Japan, is necessary to prevent
the liquidity crisis in these Asian countries from turning into a world-wide
economic downturn. Prompt action will prevent illiquid but otherwise sound
companies from becoming insolvent. Some companies will not survive, but
the Asian economies must undergo this catharsis in order to stabilize and
once again grow. The U.S. must demonstrate strong leadership--not only
for
our own economic self-interest but to stabilize the world trading system.
***
Arthur B. Laffer is chairman of Laffer Associates, financial consultants
in
San Diego:
There are four--and only four--macroeconomic policy killers of healthy
economies, to wit: taxes, restrictions on international trade,
government-imposed income redistribution, and bad monetary policy. Unless
Asia's continuing gyrations cause our government to do something dumb in
one of these areas, we will avoid most of the harmful consequences of the
mess in Asia. True, avoiding doing something dumb is not always so easy
for government. Nonetheless, it doesn't look as though there are any major
tax increases in our future, major protectionist measures on the horizon,
or
any more proposed income policies lurking just offstage. Most important
of
all, Greenspan & Co. are doing a great job.
The stock market, as opposed to the underlying economy, will be affected
by the turmoil in Asia, and that impact could be substantial--but not serious.
Some 30% of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies' profits are derived
from foreign operations. Any impact on those profits will hurt our stock
market. But here perspective is needed. Even Japan's stock market crash
couldn't stop the U.S. bull market of the '90s. In late 1989, Japan's Nikkei
stock index peaked at 38900 and now is at 14800--while the Dow Jones
Industrial Average went from 2700 to 7700 over the same period.
All in all, we in the U.S. are in pretty good shape. My advice: Don't just
do
something, stand there.
***
David Malpass is chief international economist at Bear Stearns:
Asia's collapse could be stopped tomorrow if the U.S. government declared
that its policy would be promote strong currencies, not weak ones, in Asia.
The day the U.S. announced this radically new policy, capital would flood
back into Asia as currencies and stock markets there soared. Within weeks,
Asia would be able to borrow again from world capital markets, stop
drawing on IMF bailout funds, and begin the long recovery process. The
new policy would require no capital, no more grand negotiating sessions.
All
the better if Treasury and the IMF expressed support for the dollar-linked
currencies in Brazil, China and Russia, and if the IMF produced an all-new
mission statement based on fostering currency stability.
Japan's devastating seven-year deflation could be stopped within months
if it
revised monetary policy. Instead, Japan is still relying on U.S.-inspired
fiscal
packages, a process that has failed repeatedly. The U.S. could cause a
suitable policy improvement with a telephone call to Japan--"why don't
you
try printing yen?"--but is still using currency policy to fight Japan's
trade
surplus. A better monetary policy would actually allow Japan's trade surplus
with the U.S. to narrow sharply as Japan's imports rose. It would break
deflation's spell over Japanese consumers and allow Japan's immense
wealth to start circulating again. Japan's economy would become an engine
of Asian growth rather than a dead weight.
***
Edward Yardeni is chief economist and managing director of Deutsche
Morgan Grenfell:
As a result of the Asian financial and economic crisis, I lowered my 1998
forecast for real U.S. GDP growth by a full percentage point to 2%, and
I
slashed my profit growth outlook in half, to 5%. I lowered my year-ahead
consumer price inflation forecast to 1% from 1.5% because imports from
Asia are much cheaper following the dramatic currency devaluations in the
region, which accounts for about one-third of U.S. imports.
U.S. consumers will clearly benefit from cheaper imports and lower interest
rates, which might provide them with another mortgage-refinancing windfall.
But more of their spending will be on imports, and exports will be depressed
because most Asian economies will be in recessions over the next 12
months.
Real GDP growth will be depressed in the U.S. not only by a widening trade
deficit, but also by weaker profits growth, which could weaken the growth
of capital spending and even employment. The biggest problem for profits
is
the deflationary consequences of the Asian turmoil on corporate revenues
at
a time when wage costs seem to be rising more rapidly because labor
markets are so tight. This could trigger another round of corporate
restructuring, which could then revive job insecurity and weaken consumer
spending. Consumer confidence could also erode if the Asian crisis worsens,
depressing profits so much that even lower interest rates won't stop U.S.
stock prices from falling.