Pfizer is planning an acquisition of Allergan. While there is the usual talk of synergy and control, this deal seems focused on two motivations: the first is that this is a bid by Pfizer to buy Allergan's higher growth and the second is that this is a deal designed to save taxes. Each is worthy of a deeper look, but in this one, I want to focus on just the second motive and answer two questions: What is the tax rationale for this merger? And how does it show up in value?
I have vented extensively about the absurdity of US tax law and how it encourages perverse behavior in businesses and individuals. Rather than repeate myself, let me focus on the three aspects of the law that create the most damage:
To understand how exposed Pfizer is to the vagaries of US tax law, I started by looking at the geographical distribution of Pfizer revenues in 2015:
Region |
Revenues (in millions) |
% of Revenues |
Weighted Marginal Tax Rate |
US |
$14,993.00 |
43.08% |
40.00% |
Developed Europe |
$7,006.00 |
20.13% |
21.00% |
Developed Rest of the World |
$4,562.00 |
13.11% |
27.00% |
Emerging Markets |
$8,243.00 |
23.68% |
24.00% |
Pfizer |
$34,804.00 |
100.00% |
30.68% |
Note that Pfizer generated only 43.08% of its revenues in the first nine months of 2015. If Pfizer were to be taxed, at the marginal rate in each region, based on where it generated its revenues (regional tax), its tax rate in those nine months would have been 30.68%. As a US company, though, Pfizer would have to pay almost 40% of this income as taxes, translating into significantly higher taxes each period.
Pfizer, of course, took the course of not making this payment, as manifested in two numbers. The effective tax rate that Pfizer has paid over the last five years has averaged to 23.45%, well below 40%, and a significant portion (my rough estimate is $12 billion) of Pfizer’s cash balance of $20.66 billion is trapped, since bringing it back will result in a tax bill of $1.99 billion (using a differential tax rate of 16.55%, the difference between the US marginal tax rate of 40% and the effective tax rate of 23.45%).
To illustrate the impact that changing the tax code that governs Pfizer has on its value, I considered three scenarios.
The different assumptions that I make about taxes in the three scenarios are summarized below:
Marginal tax rate for cost of debt |
Effective tax rate next 10 years |
Effective tax rate after year 10 |
Trapped Cash |
|
Patriot Games |
40% |
40% |
40% |
Return immediately, pay differential taxes |
Wait-it-out |
40% |
|
40% |
Return in 10 years, pay differential taxes |
Go Irish |
40% |
23.45% |
30.68% |
Nothing to return, no differential taxes |
In the table below, I value Pfizer under each scenario, first using the conventional accounting numbers (which treat R&D as an operating expenses) and next using adjusted numbers (where I capitalize R&D):
|
Patriot Games |
Wait-it-out |
Go Irish |
Effect of Inversion: Go Irish (minus) Wait-it-out |
|
R&D treated as expense
|
Equity Value | $154,806 |
$176047 |
$209,637 |
$33,590 |
Per Share | $25.09 |
$28.53 |
$33.98 |
$5.86 |
|
R&D capitalized
|
Equity Value | $121,074 |
$135,156 |
$162,309 |
$27,153 |
Per Share | $19.62 |
$21.51 |
$26.31 |
$4.69 |
The rationale for an inversion is that it will increase Pfizer’s equity value by $27.15 billion and its share price by $4.69 per share. That increase in value does not incorporate the costs associated with inversion, some coming from how this deal has to be structured to qualify and some from the backlash that is sure that to ensue. There are senators who are already threatening Pfizer with dire consequences including restrictions on sales in the US, but it is not clear that they can carry through these threats, partly because the medications offered by Pfizer are not easily replaced and partly because given that the US Senate has a disproportionately large number of older men, they will need to carve out a Viagra exception for themselves.
Data Attachments