Germany scores lowest in measures designed to protect shareholders.
U.S. | JAPAN | FRANCE | GERMANY | U.K. | |
Shareholders have preemptive rights when new shares are issued | No | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Judicial mechanisms to contest decisions taken by executives or at shareholder meetings | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes |
Mandatory dividends | No | No | No | No | No |
One share - one vote principle | No | Yes | No | No | No |
Compulsory separation between control and decision, generally reflected as separate chairman and CEO roles | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Proxy shareholder voting by mail | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.10 |
Labor market reforms in Germany, France and other EU states are likely to leave employees on the same footing as those in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
U.S. | JAPAN | FRANCE | GERMANY | U.K. | |
Relative strictness of laws affecting individual layoffs (OECD index with 12 indicators) | 0.2 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 0.8 |
Relative strictness of laws affecting collective layoffs (OECD index with four indicators) | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
Works Council or internal consultative groups | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
Participation plans for employees | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
Employees representation on board | No | No | No | Yes | No |
Britain and Germany offer the strongest measures to protect banks from the collapse of a business that has borrowed money.
U.S. | JAPAN | FRANCE | GERMANY | U.K. | |
Reorganization restrictions linked to creditors' agreement | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Creditors' claims have priority in bankruptcy or reorganization law | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Management cedes control during reorganization | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
Legal separation of decision and control functions, generally reflected in separation of CEO's and chairman's roles | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Percentage of firms working with just one bank (1999) | NA | NA | 4% | 15% | 23% |