What's the best way to compare
valuations of Internet stocks? One measure has gained more or less universal
acceptance: the ratio of stock price to annualized sales, or revenue per share.
The popularity of the PSR (price/sales ratio) reflects investor belief that
it's more important for Internet companies to grow revenue than profit, and
that revenue is proxy for marketplace acceptance and market share. Without this
acceptance and market share, profit potential is limited. PSR creates a common
measure for comparing companies and their investors' expectations on that basis.
But PSR is trickier than the more traditional price/earnings ratios. A penny
of earnings means essentially the same thing regardless of industry or sector.
Revenue, however, demands closer consideration of the nature of the basic business.
Comparing Yahoo
(YHOO) to Amazon.com
(AMZN) and to America
Online (AOL) offers an illustration
-- and suggests a better measure.
GROSS
PROFIT
Yahoo trades at 130 times sales. But few would say that Amazon, which trades
at 20 times sales, is only one-third as richly valued as Yahoo.
Retailers' revenues are different from those of service companies.
Amazon immediately pays out of revenue the cost of merchandise and shipping.
Yahoo doesn't itself sell merchandise. Its revenue comes mainly from selling
ad space to those who do. The incremental physical costs of supporting additional
content, advertisers, and usage on a Web site is small compared to paying for
books and CDs. It's similar to the software business, where gross margins, such
as those of Microsoft
(MSFT), are 80 to 90 percent.
The cost of stamping and boxing CDs is a small part of product price.
That perspective makes it clear why Yahoo's PSR is six times that of Amazon.
Though Amazon's $253 million sales in the last quarter were three times Yahoo's
$76 million, gross profit was much closer -- $53 million vs. $69 million. From
that point on, the types of activities and expenses of Amazon and Yahoo are
nearly identical: marketing, product development, and administration.
Much of Yahoo's higher PSR essentially rebalances the lopsided revenue ratio
by compensating for the fundamental difference between Amazon's and Yahoo's
businesses.
And in practice, price/sales ratio really is a measure of gross margin leverage.
So a more direct starting point for comparing e-tailers to Yahoo et al. is a
price to gross profit ratio (PGPR).
Using price/gross profit instead of price/sales narrows the valuation gap of
Yahoo vs. Amazon to 30 percent from 85 percent. Given the volatility of Internet
stocks, that 30 percent difference can be considered nearly a dead heat.
Comparing valuation measures:
|
Q4 1998 |
|
Price/sales |
Price/gross profit |
Sales (mil.) |
Gross profit (mil.) |
Amazon.com |
20 |
94 |
$253 |
$53/20% |
Yahoo |
130 |
140 |
$76 |
$69/90% |
AOL |
30 |
64 |
$960 |
$370/38% |
Price/sales = (4 x Dec '98 quarter)/(diluted shares out x
stock price) |
AOL
VS. YAHOO
It is often observed that AOL's price/sales ratio is only one-quarter that of
Yahoo (currently 30 versus 130). That seems to say AOL stock is the better value.
But look more closely.
Commerce-related advertising and direct marketing are the chief sources of
profit for both Yahoo and AOL. Yet Yahoo's gross margin is 90 percent and AOL's
is only 38 percent. That's because advertising is 100 percent of Yahoo's revenue
but only 19 percent of AOL's. Eighty percent of AOL's revenue comes from providing
dialup access, which has much lower gross margins due to the costs of telephone
lines, modems, and customer service personnel.
As with the Yahoo-Amazon example, price/gross profit filters out major irreconcilable
characteristics of the basic businesses, enabling comparison that is closer
to apples-to-apples than provided by price/sales. On that basis, Yahoo and AOL
are dead even.
APPLES
+ ORANGES
Finally, here's another method of evaluating AOL on comparative price/sales
basis. (For now, forget about price/gross profit).
Normally, price/sales for AOL is based upon AOL's total sales, or revenue.
But as we noted, AOL's revenue comes from two very different businesses -- dialup
access and advertising/commerce. This makes it difficult to use PSR to compare
AOL to pure plays in either business.
However, AOL's financial reports break out revenue according to access and
ad/commerce. This enables an apples-to-apples comparison -- but with a twist.
MindSpring (MSPG),
the most richly valued pure-play consumer ISP, trades at 16 times revenue. So
we can apply MindSpring's PSR to AOL's dialup access revenue, and Yahoo's PSR
to AOL's ad/commerce revenue. Then we add the two results and divide by AOL's
number of shares outstanding.
Combining valuation metrics for AOL:
AOL sales components |
|
12/98Q |
Annualized |
Comparable PSR |
|
Access |
$779m |
$3.1b x |
16 (MindSpring's) = |
$50b |
Ad/commerce |
$181m |
$0.7b x |
90 (Yahoo's) = |
$60b |
|
$110b |
divided by 1.1b shares outstanding = $100/share |
This shows that if each of AOL's two main revenue streams are valued at the
same multiples as the most highly regarded pure-play counterparts, MindSpring
and Yahoo, AOL is worth $100 per share.
Of course, the exercise shouldn't be taken per se as a measure of value, but
as an element of perspective.
THE
PSYCHE OF STOCKS
In addition, simply comparing Internet stocks against each other says nothing
about intrinsic value. When there's a major correction in the overall stock
market, or just in the Internet sector, net stocks that appear undervalued relative
to their peers can be hammered just as much, if not more.
Most importantly, the news and psychology that so heavily influences Internet
stocks can swamp empirical measures of valuation. So one Internet stock appearing
undervalued or overvalued relative to others doesn't mean as much as with traditional
stocks. And, of course, as with all stocks, appearances are just a starting
point for analysis and selection.