For those reported for use in China and listed on pages 386–387, a distinction is made between those that have been merely translated and those that have been revised—at least with the development of Chinese norms. Tests that are listed for use in Russia (pp. 392–393) are divided between original tests in Russian and adapted tests. It is the tests that are administered to and interpreted for Spanish-speaking people that cause most of the misconceptions. This is true mainly for Spanish-speaking testees in North America. Most of the tests listed in Table 20 (pp. 396–397) are indicated as being both translated and adapted. I know for a fact that many of these tests have merely been translated but not formally or properly adapted according to psychometric principles and standards (Hambleton, 2001). And even the translations in most, if not all, of the cases have not taken into account the distinctions between Spanish as it is spoken in Spain and as it is spoken in the southwestern and in the southeastern United States.

Students and other readers who are interested in learning the details of international psychology from 1889 to the present will find Chapter 1, by the editors, Kurt Pawlik and Mark Rosenzweig, and Chapter 30, by Quicheng Jing, of particular significance. Within 10 years of the establishment of psychology as a formal discipline in Leipzig by Wilhem Wundt, the first international congress of psychology was held in Paris.

Overall Evaluation

This text is a much improved version of the earlier book (Rosenzweig, 1992). It is greatly expanded with broad coverage of salient topics in psychology, and has been brought up-to-date to the year 2000. The Handbook should be a valuable and sought-after tool for the acquisition of psychological knowledge and research, as declared by the editors in the Preface. It is highly recommended for acquisition by libraries in universities on a worldwide scale, especially those that offer degree programs in

the discipline. The Handbook is well organized and informative. It can well serve both as a text and a resource book for students of psychology and the social sciences as well as for individuals in the general public, internationally, who are curious about psychological science. ❑

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A Social Science Perspective to Understanding Ethics in Organizations

Social Influences on Ethical Behavior in Organizations
by John M. Darley, David M. Messick, and Tom R. Tyler (Eds.)
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2001. 246 pp. ISBN 0-8058-3330-7. $49.95

Review by Dolly Chugh and Max H. Bazerman

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*S*ocial Influences on Ethical Behavior in Organizations, John Darley, David Messick, and Tom Tyler's edited work, offers a fascinating array of articles that highlight a new direction in the study of ethics in organizations. At a time when corrupted audits may have played a major role in the fall of Enron and airline political influence may have opened up the skies for the September 11 terrorist strike, we clearly need new ethical guidance. The written account of a conference at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, this book continues a dialogue that has carried over a set of scholarly meetings hosted and compiled by David Messick (Bazerman, Messick, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1997; Messick & Tenbrunsel, 1996).

The Social Science of Ethical Behavior

The study of the social science of ethical behavior in organizations has harnessed the energies of many leading scholars (including John Darley, Tom Tyler, Herbert Kelman, Art Brief, Ann Tenbrunsel, Robert Cialdini, Rod Kramer, and others) to strengthen the study of ethics in professional

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schools. Prior to Messick's appointment as Kaplan Distinguished Professor of Ethics at the Kellogg School in 1991, ethics was largely the domain of philosophers. Today, in top professional schools worldwide, new courses, student organizations, and chaired professorships in ethics and the environment

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abound. We believe that much of this transformation results from the integration of the social science of ethical behavior into the ethical domain of applied philosophy.

A fundamental contribution of social science perspectives to ethics is an understanding of how people actually behave, rather than a set of normative principles. When social science is at its best, these descriptions show behaviors inconsistent with self-perception and common intuition. For example, Messick and Sentis's (1983) early work on self-serving behavior resulting from biased judgment, rather than intentional selfishness, fundamentally shifted the conventional view on creating more ethical behavior. Preaching will not work if people are unaware of their guilt; the elimination of unintentional self-serving behavior requires a cognitive change in perspective, rather than the acceptance of a different normative standard. This distinction between philosophy and social science has been key to the transformation of the study of ethics among business professionals over the last dozen years.

Provocative Questions

Social Influences on Ethical Behavior in Organizations is divided into three sections: Social Influence in Hierarchies (chapters by Kelman; Peterson; Darley; Roloff and Paulson; Tyler; and Hamilton); Awareness of and Resistance to Social Influence (chapters by Miceli, Scotter, Near, and Rehg; Cialdini, Sagarin, and Rice; and Strudler and Warren); and Social Influences in Groups, Networks, and Markets (work by Kramer, Wei, and Bendor; Tenbrunsel and Messick; and Dunfee). Cutting across these divisions, contributions focus on the ethical behavior of those who influence others (Kelman, Peterson, Tyler, Hamilton, and Tenbrunsel and Messick), on the behavior of those being influenced (Cialdini et al.; Strudler and Warren), and on those who witness unethical behavior (Roloff and Paulson; Miceli et al.).

We predict that this volume will trigger the type of self-reflection now commonplace among biologists, geneticists, and nuclear engineers: Should we, do we, and how might we think about the ways in which our research might be used toward unethical ends? Several contributors take on the ethics of social influence (such as procedural justice, expert authority, and leadership), examining the conditions under which researchers' findings might be misused. For example, Tyler challenges researchers to consider that, on the basis of the influence of fairness concerns, the dignified and respectful treatment of others might, under certain conditions, actually be less than ethical.

In this chapter "A More Deontological Approach," Peterson argues that "a dominant theme [in the literature] . . . is the suggestion that the most ethical use of social influence is not to exercise direct social influence at all" (pp. 21–22). But he and we know that social influence can be both deliberate and inadvertent, and that the forces of group membership and leadership are best exercised ethically, rather than not at all. Peterson proposes that negative effects of leadership are due to process, not outcome, directiveness.

Cialdini et al. consider a similar "under what conditions" question in the realm of television advertising, focusing on one of Cialdini's universals of influence: expert authority. They distinguish the ethical use of genuine expertise (e.g., an ad in which four out of five dentists recommend Trident gum) from the unethical use of implied expertise by nonexperts (e.g., an ad in which Robert Young, the actor who played Marcus Welby, MD, promotes the health benefits of Sanka). Students trained to make this distinction predictably discounted dishonest ads appropriately and, unexpectedly, also viewed honest ads as more persuasive.

The Kramer et al. chapter provides a perfect test of this "under what conditions" theme (albeit, probably not by design). This chapter explores the famous "tit-for-tat" decision rule for the prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1984) in the form of a new "noisy" tournament, where social uncertainty exists and cooperation is a continuous (not dichotomous) variable. The "nice and forgiving" strategy rises to the top performance slot, a finding made all the more provocative by questions raised in previous chapters. Is it ethical to be nice and forgiving if one is partially motivated by one's own long-term success?

Understanding Recent Tragedies

The social science perspective developed in this volume offers an extremely useful approach to understanding our recent tragedies. The 1997 Gore Commission report on aviation security described the very weaknesses in the U.S. aviation security system that enabled the September 11 terrorists to use airplanes as weapons. The report also noted that, in recent years, terrorists had bombed the World Trade Center, hijacked an Air France airplane and attempted to fly it into the Eiffel Tower, and tried to simultaneously hijack 12 U.S. commercial airplanes in Asia. Given these warning signs, why did the Gore Commission fail to recommend meaningful aviation security reforms? Is it possible that massive contributions from the airline industry to the 1996 Clinton/Gore reelection campaign distorted the administration's judgment? Cor-

rupt motives are one possible explanation. Alternatively, chapters by Darley, Cialdini et al., and Tenbrunsel and Messick lead us to consider the possibility that actors engage in unethical conduct without awareness of the unethical nature of their behaviors. Is it possible that Clinton and Gore were not even aware of the degree to which they where influenced by the airline industry?

Meanwhile, at the heart of the Enron debacle is a conflict of interest that scholars have been warning about for years (Bazerman, Morgan, & Loewenstein, 1997). In 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) heard testimony that the rapid growth of consulting divisions in the Big Five accounting firms had made impartial financial audits impossible. With the firms relying on consulting work for much of their income, they found themselves in the compromised position of profiting from the very companies whose books they were expected to judge without bias. The dramatic rise in fraud cases investigated by the SEC—up 41 percent from 1998–2001—was one sign of the growing problem. Greater separation between the Big Five firms' auditing and consulting functions, many advised, was needed to head off disaster. However, faced with vociferous opposition from auditors and industry, including Arthur Andersen CEO Joseph Berardino, the SEC backed down. The predictable result was the bankruptcy of Enron, the downfall of Arthur Andersen, and the loss of thousands of employees' jobs and retirement savings. If the SEC had absorbed the lessons of the psychology of unethical behavior, they may have understood that even if Berardino believed what he said, impartiality was still unlikely.

Relevance of Implicit Social Cognition

Other chapters in the book analyze everyday unethical behaviors at the level of explicit cognition, opening up rich possibilities for connection with recent work in implicit social cognition. Psychologists are recategorizing and redefining the tra

ditional constructs of social cognition as explicit attitudes, stereotypes, and beliefs and their implicit counterparts (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). On the basis of methodological innovations, particularly the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001), researchers have demonstrated the distinction between attitudes that are controllably expressed and endorsed (explicit) versus attitudes that appear to be automatic and outside the individual's awareness (implicit). Importantly, implicit attitudes sometimes diverge from their explicit counterparts, particularly in the domain of social categories.

The relative influence of explicit and implicit attitudes on behavior remains under study. Assuming that they each play some role, this literature may help bridge the disconnect between people who sense prejudice and those who "don't get it"; between those who pledge objectivity and those who declare a conflict of interest; and between those who claim neutrality and those who dispute that such a stance is possible.

When Good People Do Bad Things

The Kahneman and Tversky heuristic tradition echoes with ethical force in the new work on implicit social cognition. Both literatures point to the automatic nature of some cognitive processes, leaving us to consider the ethics of processes that are both prevalent and difficult to control. Kahneman and Tversky highlighted how smart people unknowingly do stupid things. What about when good people do bad things? Strudler and Warren question whether we should blame managers or heuristics for overweighting salient information while making an ill-fated decision. Does unwitting reliance on a heuristic, or disavowed possession of a stereotype, excuse foolish or unethical behavior? This volume considers ways in which good people might unethically influence others or unwittingly behave unethically. We are left

with the uncomfortable reality that coercion, deception, and manipulation are sometimes unintentional. Intentional bad behavior is easy to condemn, but how do we cope with our self-serving biases and implicit stereotypes, particularly when the stakes are high? This slope is slippery in both directions, regardless of whether we are inclined to excuse or to condemn behavior that is situationally driven, prevalent, or hard to control. The collection leaves the reader pondering the delicate challenge for researchers in this field, whose work will undoubtedly raise these issues.

The political and scholarly communities currently face the challenge of preparing for future disasters, many of which will have roots in both intentionally and unintentionally unethical behavior. The current work's social science perspective provides hints on how to anticipate and avoid such disaster. Thus, we recommend this edited volume for psychologists, sociologists, ethicists, and other scholars interested in decision making, ethics, cooperation, competition, groups, and leadership. The book is provocative on both professional and personal levels, offering keen insights into the scholarly lines of inquiry pursued, and also triggering self-examination of our own daily strivings to be ethical human beings. ❏

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The Modern Growth of Handbooks: The Persistent Shrinking Perception

Blackwell Handbook of Perception
by E. Bruce Goldstein (Ed.)
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001. 788 pp. ISBN 0-631-20683-3. $124.95

Review by Carol Fowler

As an amateur linguist, I am intrigued by the fact that some words undergo semantic drift. When this occurs, a word's meaning comes to differ from the meaning it had when it was coined. Examples are *terrific* and *awful,* which no longer relate closely in meaning to their roots, *terror* and *awe,* respectively. Another example, it seems, is *handbook.* Hefting the substantial *Blackwell Handbook of Perception,* I wondered why *hand* should be part of the title of a book such as this. *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* (1966) reveals that handbook is a literal translation of the Latin *manuālis liber* from whence also comes our word *manual.* The online *Oxford English Dictionary* Web site (n.d.) defines handbook as "a small book or treatise such as may conveniently be held in the hand; a manual"; or "a compendious book or treatise for guidance in any art, occu-

pation, or study." This part of the title is not a misnomer by the second definition. The chapters are compendious; it is just that the field being covered is very large. In any case, a search on the Amazon.com Web site for books with handbook in the title revealed many as substantial as the nearly 800-page *Blackwell Handbook of Perception.* The hand sense of handbook apparently is giving way to the *guidance* sense. For its part in the title, as I will suggest below, the word *perception* has not drifted enough semantically. A more apt title for the book might be *Blackwell's Guide to the Anatomical, Physiological, and Psychophysical Support for Sensation and Perception.*

The goal of the writers of the 23 chapters that compose the handbook, according to the editor E. Bruce Goldstein, was "to write introductions to their areas that will be useful to researchers and teachers who are

familiar with the field but who want succinct, state-of-the-art overviews of areas outside their speciality" (p. vii). Assuming that "the field" is perception, the handbook is meant to be useful to perception researchers and teachers who want to learn something about perception outside their own area of expertise. As a perception researcher with expertise only in speech perception, I can judge whether 22 of the 23 chapters achieve this particular goal. In general, they do, at least given the authors' view of the scope of the term *perception.*

However, consider the scope of perception in the handbook. Although no definition is provided either in the Preface or in the editor's contribution to the handbook in the first chapter, one may be inferred. My understanding of perception, heavily influenced by Gibson's (1966, 1979) contributions to the field, is that it is an achievement of an animal, not, as in the handbook, of a brain. It is detection of information about environmental events that guides exploratory or performatory action. This, very clearly, is not what Goldstein or his contributors mean by perception. They mean something more like the achievements of receptor systems wired to a brain. In the first chapter of the book, Goldstein outlines the synergistic relation than can be obtained between psychophysical and physiological investigations into perception. Psychophysical findings can lead to a search for the mechanism behind behavioral patterns—as, for example, findings by Wheatstone (1838) that binocular disparity provides information for depth-stimulated searches for the mechanisms whereby disparities can be detected. Or, discoveries of mechanism (e.g., the separate dorsal and ventral processing streams in the brain; see the chapter by Goodale and Humphrey), can stimulate a

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