Germany scores lowest in measures designed to protect shareholders.
|Shareholders have preemptive rights when new shares are issued||No||No||Yes||No||Yes|
|Judicial mechanisms to contest decisions taken by executives or at shareholder meetings||Yes||Yes||No||No||Yes|
|One share - one vote principle||No||Yes||No||No||No|
|Compulsory separation between control and decision, generally reflected as separate chairman and CEO roles||No||No||No||Yes||Yes|
|Proxy shareholder voting by mail||Yes||No||Yes||No||Yes|
|Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting||0.10||0.03||0.10||0.05||0.10|
Labor market reforms in Germany, France and other EU states are likely to leave employees on the same footing as those in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
|Relative strictness of laws affecting individual layoffs (OECD index with 12 indicators)||0.2||2.7||2.3||2.8||0.8|
|Relative strictness of laws affecting collective layoffs (OECD index with four indicators)||2.9||1.5||2.1||3.1||2.9|
|Works Council or internal consultative groups||No||Yes||Yes||Yes||No|
|Participation plans for employees||Yes||Yes||Yes||No||Yes|
|Employees representation on board||No||No||No||Yes||No|
Britain and Germany offer the strongest measures to protect banks from the collapse of a business that has borrowed money.
|Reorganization restrictions linked to creditors' agreement||No||No||No||Yes||Yes|
|Creditors' claims have priority in bankruptcy or reorganization law||No||No||No||Yes||Yes|
|Management cedes control during reorganization||No||Yes||No||No||Yes|
|Legal separation of decision and control functions, generally reflected in separation of CEO's and chairman's roles||No||No||No||Yes||Yes|
|Percentage of firms working with just one bank (1999)||NA||NA||4%||15%||23%|