




**THE CORPORATE LIFE
CYCLE: GROWING UP IS
HARD TO DO!**


Aswath Damodaran

The Corporate Life Cycle



The determinants of the life cycle

The Corporate Life Cycle: Drivers and Determinants



Tech versus Non-tech life cycles

Tech firm life cycle

Tech companies don't have long "mature" periods, where they get to live off the fat, because disruption is always around the corner.

Tech companies are able to climb the growth ladder faster because their growth requires less investment and their products are more likely to be accepted quickly by consumers.


Tech companies also have more precipitous declines from grace, for the same reason that they climbed so fast, i.e., new companies rise faster to take their business.

Non-tech firm life cycle


Non-tech companies get longer "mature" period, where they get to milk their cash cows.

Non-tech companies take longer to grow, partly because they need more investment to grow and partly because consumer inertia (attachment to existing products) is more deeply set.


Non-tech companies decline over long periods and may even find ways to live on as smaller, more focused versions of their original selves.



Value = Story + Numbers



Narrative versus Numbers



Narrative to Numbers for companies

- With a young company, narrative is central, divergent and volatile.
 - ▣ It is central because it is the only thing that you are offering investors, since you have no history.
 - ▣ It is divergent because you can still offer widely different narratives, since it is early in the game.
 - ▣ It is volatile, because the real world will deliver surprises that will require you to adjust your narrative.
- As companies age, their narratives get narrower as their histories, size and culture start to become binding. The numbers often drive the narrative, rather than the other way around.

Lyft, The US Car Service Company (March 2019)

The Story

Lyft is a company focused on the transportation business in the US, taking advantage of a shift away from not just taxi service but also from private cars and public transportation. With strong networking benefits, it will end up as one of the two or three dominant players in the market, with high market share but a shaky transition to profitability, fending off competitors and also dealing with legal and regulatory changes that increase costs. While there is a clear pathway to being a going concern, the cash burn over the next 3-5 years exposes the firm to failure risk.

The Assumptions

	Base year	Years 1-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Story link
Total Market	\$120,000	Grow 10.39% a year		Grows 2.75% a year	US car service
Gross Market Share	6.71%	6.71% > 40%		40%	Network benefits winner
Revenue Share	26.77%	26.77% -> 20%		20.00%	Market dominance keeps billing share high.
Operating Margin	-42.25%	-42.25% -> 20%		15.00%	Legal & regulatory changes
Reinvestment	NA	Sales to capital ratio of 3.00		Reinvestment rate = 7.5%	Low capital investment model
Cost of capital	NA	9.97%	10% -> 8.00%	8.24%	At 75th percentile of US firms
Risk of failure	10% chance of failure, if pricing meltdown leads to capital being cut off				Cash on hand + Capital access

The Cash Flows


	Total Market	Market Share	Revenues	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$ 132,468	10.04%	\$ 3,470	\$ (887)	\$ 526	\$ (1,413)
2	\$ 146,231	13.37%	\$ 4,969	\$ (965)	\$ 599	\$ (1,564)
3	\$ 161,425	16.70%	\$ 6,668	\$ (886)	\$ 680	\$ (1,566)
4	\$ 178,197	20.03%	\$ 8,587	\$ (614)	\$ 767	\$ (1,382)
5	\$ 196,712	23.36%	\$ 10,744	\$ (109)	\$ 863	\$ (972)
6	\$ 217,150	26.68%	\$ 13,158	\$ 673	\$ 966	\$ (293)
7	\$ 239,712	30.01%	\$ 15,850	\$ 1,783	\$ 1,077	\$ 706
8	\$ 264,618	33.34%	\$ 18,840	\$ 2,120	\$ 1,196	\$ 923
9	\$ 292,112	36.67%	\$ 22,149	\$ 2,492	\$ 1,324	\$ 1,168
10	\$ 322,462	40.00%	\$ 25,797	\$ 2,902	\$ 1,459	\$ 1,443
Terminal year	\$ 331,330	40.00%	\$ 26,506	\$ 2,982	\$ 410	\$ 2,572

The Value


Terminal value	\$ 46,848		
PV(Terminal value)	\$ 18,992		
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ (3,567)		
Value of operating assets =	\$ 15,425		
Probability of failure	10%		
Value in case of failure	\$ -		
Adjusted Value for operating assets	\$ 13,883		
+ Cash on hand	\$ 518		
+ IPO Proceeds	\$ 2,000		
Value of equity	\$ 16,401		
Value per share	\$ 58.78		

Divergent Stories? Tesla Story Choices in 2016

The Tesla Story Choices



And how they translate to numbers



As companies mature, their stories become bounded..

Levi Strauss (IPO)						
The Story						
In its return to public markets, Levi Strauss is riding its iconic brand name to moderate growth and solid operating margins. It's brand name will persist, while the company pursues global growth while holding on to current operating margins, which are higher than the rest of the apparel business.						
The Assumptions						
	Base year	Years 1-5	Years 6-10		After year 10	Link to story
Revenues (a)	\$ 5,575	8.00%	→ 2.45%		2.45%	Global growth opportunities
Operating margin (b)	11.60%	11.60%	→ 11.60%		11.60%	Brand name allows margin preservation
Tax rate	18.41%	18.41%	→ 25.00%		25.00%	Tax rate converges on global average
Reinvestment (c)		Sales to capital ratio 3.11		RIR =	24.50%	Hold to current investment efficiency
Return on capital	29.46%	Marginal ROIC = 36.11%			10.00%	Earn excess returns in long term
Cost of capital (d)		6.78%	→ 6.95%		6.95%	Low cost of capital
The Cash Flows						
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$ 6,021	11.60%	\$ 698	\$ 570	\$ 143	\$ 427
2	\$ 6,503	11.60%	\$ 754	\$ 615	\$ 155	\$ 461
3	\$ 7,023	11.60%	\$ 815	\$ 665	\$ 167	\$ 498
4	\$ 7,585	11.60%	\$ 880	\$ 718	\$ 180	\$ 537
5	\$ 8,192	11.60%	\$ 950	\$ 775	\$ 195	\$ 580
6	\$ 8,757	11.60%	\$ 1,016	\$ 815	\$ 181	\$ 634
7	\$ 9,263	11.60%	\$ 1,074	\$ 848	\$ 163	\$ 686
8	\$ 9,695	11.60%	\$ 1,124	\$ 873	\$ 139	\$ 734
9	\$ 10,040	11.60%	\$ 1,164	\$ 889	\$ 111	\$ 778
10	\$ 10,286	11.60%	\$ 1,193	\$ 895	\$ 79	\$ 816
Terminal year	\$ 10,538	11.60%	\$ 1,222	\$ 917	\$ 225	\$ 692
The Value						
Terminal value			\$ 15,380			
PV(Terminal value)			\$ 7,944			
PV (CF over next 10 years)			\$ 4,189			
Value of operating assets =			\$ 12,132			
Adjustment for distress			\$ -		Probability of failure = 0.00%	
- Debt & Mnority Interests			\$ 2,324			
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets			\$ 713			
Value of equity			\$ 10,522			
- Value of equity options			\$ 284			
Number of shares			376.03			
Value per share			\$ 27.23		Stock was trading at = \$22.00	

And in decline, they can be depressing..

JC Penney in 2016: Road to Nowhere?

Declining business: Revenues expected to drop by 3% a year for next 5 years

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenue growth rate		-3.00%	-3.00%	-3.00%	-3.00%	-3.00%	-2.00%	-1.00%	0.00%	1.00%	2.00%
Revenues	\$ 12,522	\$12,146	\$11,782	\$11,428	\$11,086	\$10,753	\$10,538	\$10,433	\$10,433	\$10,537	\$10,748
EBIT (Operating) margin	1.32%	1.82%	2.31%	2.80%	3.29%	3.79%	4.28%	4.77%	5.26%	5.76%	6.25%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 166	\$ 221	\$ 272	\$ 320	\$ 365	\$ 407	\$ 451	\$ 498	\$ 549	\$ 607	\$ 672
Tax rate	35.00%	35.00%	35.00%	35.00%	35.00%	35.00%	36.00%	37.00%	38.00%	39.00%	40.00%
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 108	\$ 143	\$ 177	\$ 208	\$ 237	\$ 265	\$ 289	\$ 314	\$ 341	\$ 370	\$ 403
- Reinvestment		\$ (188)	\$ (182)	\$ (177)	\$ (171)	\$ (166)	\$ (108)	\$ (53)	\$ -	\$ 52	\$ 105
FCFF		\$ 331	\$ 359	\$ 385	\$ 409	\$ 431	\$ 396	\$ 366	\$ 341	\$ 318	\$ 298
Cost of capital		9.00%	9.00%	9.00%	9.00%	9.00%	8.80%	8.60%	8.40%	8.20%	8.00%
PV(FCFF)		\$ 304	\$ 302	\$ 297	\$ 290	\$ 280	\$ 237	\$ 201	\$ 173	\$ 149	\$ 129
Terminal value	\$ 5,710										
PV(Terminal value)	\$ 2,479										
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 2,362										
Sum of PV	\$ 4,841										
Probability of failure =	20.00%	High debt load and poor earnings put survival at risk. Based on bond rating, 20% chance of failure and liquidation will bring in 50% of book value									
Proceeds if firm fails =	\$2,421										
Value of operating assets =	\$4,357										

Margins improve gradually to median for US retail sector (6.25%)

As stores shut down, cash released from real estate.

The cost of capital is at 9%, higher because of high cost of debt.

The Bottom Line for Investors



- To be a successful investor in early-stage businesses, you need to be a good judge of narrative.
 - Not only do you need to be able to find good stories to invest in, but you also have to be able to separate impossible stories (fairy tales) from plausible stories, and then providing support (financial or management) to make the plausible into the probable.
 - You will also get much bigger disagreements about value and story, across investors.
- To be a successful in mature businesses, you need to be able to use the numbers that the business has already produced to decide on a narrative that is right for it, and then invest in companies where (you believe) the market has a mistaken narrative.

Price versus Value: The Set up


14

- Drivers of intrinsic value
- Cashflows from existing assets
 - Growth in cash flows
 - Quality of Growth


- Drivers of price
- Market moods & momentum
 - Surface stories about fundamentals



Multiples and Comparable Transactions




The Evolution of Uncertainty



Why valuation is hard at young companies...

Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.



Twitter: Priming the Pump for Valuation

1. Make small revenues into big revenues

	2011		2012		2013	
	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$
Google	32.09%	\$27.74	31.46%	\$32.73	33.24%	\$38.83
Facebook	3.65%	\$3.15	4.11%	\$4.28	5.04%	\$5.89
Yahoo!	3.95%	\$3.41	3.37%	\$3.51	3.10%	\$3.62
Microsoft	1.27%	\$1.10	1.63%	\$1.70	1.78%	\$2.08
IAC	1.15%	\$0.99	1.39%	\$1.45	1.47%	\$1.72
AOL	1.17%	\$1.01	1.02%	\$1.06	0.95%	\$1.11
Amazon	0.48%	\$0.41	0.59%	\$0.61	0.71%	\$0.83
Pandora	0.28%	\$0.24	0.36%	\$0.37	0.50%	\$0.58
Twitter	0.16%	\$0.14	0.28%	\$0.29	0.50%	\$0.58
Linkedin	0.18%	\$0.16	0.25%	\$0.26	0.32%	\$0.37
Millennial Media	0.05%	\$0.04	0.07%	\$0.07	0.10%	\$0.12
Other	55.59%	\$48.05	55.47%	\$57.71	52.29%	\$61.09
Total Market	100%	\$86.43	100.00%	\$104.04	100.00%	\$116.82

2. Make losses into profits

Company	Operating Margin
Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG)	22.82%
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	29.99%
Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO)	13.79%
Netlfix	3.16%
Groupon	2.53%
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	5.18%
Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P)	-9.13%
Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP)	-6.19%
OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN)	24.90%
RetailMeNot	45.40%
Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO)	15.66%
Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z)	-66.60%
Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA)	-6.79%
Aggregate	20.40%

		Annual growth rate in Global Advertising Spending				
		2.00%	2.50%	3.00%	3.50%	4.00%
Online advertising share of market	20%	\$124.78	\$131.03	\$137.56	\$144.39	\$151.52
	25%	\$155.97	\$163.79	\$171.95	\$180.49	\$189.40
	30%	\$187.16	\$196.54	\$206.34	\$216.58	\$227.28
	35%	\$218.36	\$229.30	\$240.74	\$252.68	\$265.16
	40%	\$249.55	\$262.06	\$275.13	\$288.78	\$303.04

My estimate for Twitter: Operating margin of 25% in year 10

3. Reinvest for growth

	Sales/ Invested Capital
Twitter (2013)	1.10
Advertising Companies	1.40
Social Media Companies	1.05

My estimate for 2023: Overall online advertising market will be close to \$200 billion and Twitter will have about 5.7% (\$11.5 billion)

My estimate for Twitter: Sales/Capital will be 1.50 for next 10 years

Starting numbers

	Last 10K	Trailing 12 month
Revenues	\$316.93	\$534.46
Operating income	-\$77.06	-\$134.91
Adjusted Operating Income		\$7.67
Invested Capital		\$955.00
Adjusted Operatng Margin		1.44%
Sales/ Invested Capital		0.56
Interest expenses	\$2.49	\$5.30

Twitter Pre-IPO Valuation: October 27, 2013

Revenue growth of 51.5% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 25% over the next 10 years

Sales to capital ratio of 1.50 for incremental sales

Stable Growth
 $g = 2.5\%$; $\text{Beta} = 1.00$;
 Cost of capital = 8%
 $\text{ROC} = 12\%$;
 $\text{Reinvestment Rate} = 2.5\%/12\% = 20.83\%$


Terminal Value₁₀ = $1466 / (.08 - .025) = \$26,657$

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Operating assets	\$9,705										
+ Cash	321										
+ IPO Proceeds	1295										
- Debt	214										
Value of equity	11,106										
- Options	713										
Value in stock	10,394										
/ # of shares	582.46										
Value/share	\$17.84										
Revenues		\$ 810	\$1,227	\$1,858	\$2,816	\$4,266	\$6,044	\$7,973	\$9,734	\$10,932	\$11,205
Operating Income		\$ 31	\$ 75	\$ 158	\$ 306	\$ 564	\$ 941	\$1,430	\$1,975	\$ 2,475	\$ 2,801
Operating Income after tax		\$ 31	\$ 75	\$ 158	\$ 294	\$ 395	\$ 649	\$ 969	\$1,317	\$ 1,624	\$ 1,807
- Reinvestment		\$ 183	\$ 278	\$ 421	\$ 638	\$ 967	\$1,186	\$1,285	\$1,175	\$ 798	\$ 182
FCFF		\$(153)	\$(203)	\$(263)	\$(344)	\$(572)	\$(537)	\$(316)	\$ 143	\$ 826	\$ 1,625

Terminal year (11)
 EBIT (1-t) \$ 1,852
 - Reinvestment \$ 386
 FCFF \$ 1,466

Cost of capital = $11.12\% (.981) + 5.16\% (.019) = 11.01\%$

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10



Pricing Twitter: Start with the “comparables”

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Company	Market Cap	Enterprise value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	Number of users (millions)	EV/User	EV/Revenue	EV/EBITDA	PE
Facebook	\$173,540.00	\$160,090.00	\$7,870.00	\$3,930.00	\$1,490.00	1230.00	\$130.15	20.34	40.74	116.47
Linkedin	\$23,530.00	\$19,980.00	\$1,530.00	\$182.00	\$27.00	277.00	\$72.13	13.06	109.78	871.48
Pandora	\$7,320.00	\$7,150.00	\$655.00	-\$18.00	-\$29.00	73.40	\$97.41	10.92	NA	NA
Groupon	\$6,690.00	\$5,880.00	\$2,440.00	\$125.00	-\$95.00	43.00	\$136.74	2.41	47.04	NA
Netflix	\$25,900.00	\$25,380.00	\$4,370.00	\$277.00	\$112.00	44.00	\$576.82	5.81	91.62	231.25
Yelp	\$6,200.00	\$5,790.00	\$233.00	\$2.40	-\$10.00	120.00	\$48.25	24.85	2412.50	NA
Open Table	\$1,720.00	\$1,500.00	\$190.00	\$63.00	\$33.00	14.00	\$107.14	7.89	23.81	52.12
Zynga	\$4,200.00	\$2,930.00	\$873.00	\$74.00	-\$37.00	27.00	\$108.52	3.36	39.59	NA
Zillow	\$3,070.00	\$2,860.00	\$197.00	-\$13.00	-\$12.45	34.50	\$82.90	14.52	NA	NA
Trulia	\$1,140.00	\$1,120.00	\$144.00	-\$6.00	-\$18.00	54.40	\$20.59	7.78	NA	NA
Tripadvisor	\$13,510.00	\$12,860.00	\$945.00	\$311.00	\$205.00	260.00	\$49.46	13.61	41.35	65.90
						Average	\$130.01	11.32	350.80	267.44
						Median	\$97.41	10.92	44.20	116.47

Read the tea leaves: See what the market cares about

21

	<i>Market Cap</i>	<i>Enterprise value</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>Net Income</i>	<i>Number of users (millions)</i>
<i>Market Cap</i>	1.					
<i>Enterprise value</i>	0.9998	1.				
<i>Revenues</i>	0.8933	0.8966	1.			
<i>EBITDA</i>	0.9709	0.9701	0.8869	1.		
<i>Net Income</i>	0.8978	0.8971	0.8466	0.9716	1.	
<i>Number of users (millions)</i>	0.9812	0.9789	0.8053	0.9354	0.8453	1.


Twitter had 240 million users at the time of its IPO. What price would you attach to the company?

Use the “market metric” and “market price”

22

- The most important variable, in late 2013, in determining market value and price in this sector (social media, ill defined as that is) is the number of users that a company has.
- Looking at comparable firms, it looks like the market is paying about \$100/user in valuing social media companies, with a premium for “predictable” revenues (subscriptions) and user intensity.
- Twitter has about 240 million users and can be valued based on the \$100/user:
- Enterprise value = $240 * 100 = \$24$ billion

And the focus changes.... And so does the right CEO for the company



As emphasis shifts, managers can resist, adapt or move on

- As young start-ups succeed and start moving into the growth, the managers who were instrumental in their success have three choices:
 - Adapt and adjust their focus to include numbers, without giving up their narrative.
 - Stay completely focused on narrative and ignore numbers.
 - Hand over control of the operating details of the company to a numbers person while handling the narrative part.
- With investors, the transition is made easier by the existence of public markets. As companies go public, these investors can cash out and go back to their preferred habitat.



“Growing old is mandatory, Growing up is optional”