I. Price or Value? What's your game?

January 2017 Aswath Damodaran

Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

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Overview	Property Details	Tour Insights	Property History	Public Records	Activity	Schools	Neighborho	od & Offer	r Insights	Similar Homes
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1 of 25					Play Vi	deo 💽	C 1 of		Agents in this	Ō

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Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

Rating Buy

Europe

Company **BB BIOTECH**

BION SW

Switzerland

Biotechnology Biotechnology Reuters BION.S

Bloomberg Exchange Ticker SWX BION

Date

13 August 2013

Forecast Change

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive

With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

BB Biotech shares remain attractive

In the first 6M of 2013, BB Biotech increased its NAV by 36%, which marks good outperformance against the Nasdag Biotech Index (NBI)'s 27%. This is a remarkable performance after 2012 when BBB's NAV increase of 45% also

Key changes

Target Price	106.50 to 164.50	t	54.5%
Source: Deutsche Ba	nk		

Price/price relative




SPI Swiss Performanc (Reba


Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4
SPI Swiss Performance IX	0.5	-1.4	26.4
Source: Deutsche Bank			

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Test 3: Are you pricing or valuing?



Price versus Value: The Set up



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Intrinsic Value: The Essence


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The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate: Value of asset = $\frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$

 The IT Proposition: If "it" does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), "it" cannot affect value.


- 2. The DUH Proposition: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
- 3. The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.

The drivers of value..




DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

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The risk in the investment is captured in the discount rate as a beta in the cost of equity and the default spread in the cost of debt.

If your job is assessing value, here are you challenges...



Twitter: Setting the table in October 2013

		Trailing 12
	Last 10K	month
Revenues	\$316.93	\$534.46
Operating income	-\$77.06	-\$134.91
Adjusted Operating Income		\$7.67
Invested Capital		\$955.00
Adjusted Operatng Margin		1.44%
Sales/ Invested Capital		0.56
Interest expenses	\$2.49	\$5.30

Twitter: Priming the Pump for Valuation

1. Make small revenues into big revenues

2. Make losses into profits

	20	11	20	12	2013	
	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$
Google	32.09%	\$27.74	31.46%	\$32.73	33.24%	\$38.83
Facebook	3.65%	\$3.15	4.11%	\$4.28	5.04%	\$5.89
Yahoo!	3.95%	\$3.41	3.37%	\$3.51	3.10%	\$3.62
Microsoft	1.27%	\$1.10	1.63%	\$1.70	1.78%	\$2.08
IAC	1.15%	\$0.99	1.39%	\$1.45	1.47%	\$1.72
AOL	1.17%	\$1.01	1.02%	\$1.06	0.95%	\$1.11
Amazon	0.48%	\$0.41	0.59%	\$0.61	0.71%	\$0.83
Pandora	0.28%	\$0.24	0.36%	\$0.37	0.50%	\$0.58
Twitter	0.16%	\$0.14	0.28%	\$0.29	0.50%	\$0.58
Linkedin	0.18%	\$0.16	0.25%	\$0.26	0.32%	\$0.37
Millennial Media	0.05%	\$0.04	0.07%	\$0.07	0.10%	\$0.12
Other	55.59%	\$48.05	55.47%	\$57.71	52.29%	\$61.09
Total Market	100%	\$86.43	100.00%	\$104.04	100.00%	\$116.82

Company	Operating Margin
Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG)	22.82%
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	29.99%
Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO)	13.79%
Netlfix	3.16%
Groupon	2.53%
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	5.18%
Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P)	-9.13%
Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP)	-6.19%
OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN)	24.90%
RetailMeNot	45.40%
Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO)	15.66%
Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z)	-66.60%
Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA)	-6.79%
Aggregate	20.40%

	N.	Annu	Annual growth rate in Global Advertising Spending					
		2.00%	2.50%	3.00%	3.50%	4.00%		
Online	20%	\$124.78	\$131.03	\$137.56	\$144.39	\$151.52		
advertising	25%	\$155.97	\$163.79	\$171.95	\$180.49	\$189.40		
share of	30%	\$187.16	\$196.54	\$206.34	\$216.58	\$227.28		
market	35%	\$218.36	\$229.30	\$240.74	\$252.68	\$265.16		
market	40%	\$249.55	\$262.06	\$275.13	\$288.78	\$303.04		

My estimate for 2023: Overall online advertising market will be close to \$200 billion and Twitter will have about 5.7% (\$11.5 billion)


My estimate for Twitter: Operating margin of 25% in year 10


3. Reinvest for growth

	Sales/ Invested Capital
Twitter (2013)	1.10
Advertising Companies	1.40
Social Media Companies	1.05

My estimate for Twitter: Sales/Capital will be 1.50 for next 10 years

Aswath Damodaran





Five simple suggestions for better intrinsic valuation

- <u>Be honest about your biases/preconceptions</u>: The biggest bogeyman in most valuations is that your preconceptions and biases will lead your choices. While you can never be unbiased, being aware of your biases is a start.
- <u>Keep it simple</u>: Less is more in valuation. While it is easy to build bigger models and you have more access to data, parsimonious valuations often do a better job than complex ones.
- 3. <u>Be flexible</u>: For every rule in valuation, there are a hundred exceptions. You need to be pragmatic and flexible.
- 4. <u>Have a narrative</u>: A valuation without a story is just a collection of numbers. A good intrinsic valuation connects a story to numbers.
- 5. <u>Face up to uncertainty</u>: Uncertainty is a feature, not a bug. Make the best estimates you can, with the information you have, recognize that everyone else faces the same uncertainty. You don't have to be right, just less wrong than everyone else.

The determinants of price

Mood and Momentum Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed).

Liquidity & Trading Ease

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price

Incremental information Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think

To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

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
Tools for Pricing: Technical Analysis &

Charting



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A more general tool: Multiples and Comparable Transactions



To be a better pricer, here are four suggestions

- Check your multiple or consistency/uniformity
 - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Look at all the data, not just the key statistics
 - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Don't forget the fundamentals ultimately matter
 - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Don't define comparables based only on sector
 - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

1. Check the Multiple

Is the multiple consistently defined?

- The consistency principle: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.
- The cost of mismatching: Assets that are not cheap(expensive) will look cheap (expensive), because your mismatch will skew the numbers.

□ Is the multiple uniformly estimated?

- The uniformity rule: The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the "comparable firm" list.
- The cost of ignoring this rule: You will be comparing non-comparable numbers and drawing all the wrong conclusions.


2. Play Moneyball: Let the numbers talk (not the analysts)

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- What is the median for this multiple?
 - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
 - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

3. Understand your "implicit" assumptions

- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
 - Proposition 1: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
 - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
 - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
 - Proposition 2: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.

The Determinants of Multiples...



4. Define "comparable" broadly & control for differences

- Given the firm that we are valuing, what is a "comparable" firm?
 - While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
 - Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
 - Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.

Pricing Twitter- October 2013

		J	ust Facebook a	nd Linkedin			
Company	EV	Market Cap	EV/Sales	EV/EBITDA	PE	Market Cap/User	Market Cap/Employee
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	\$100,017.00	\$107,909.00	16.35	36.20	193.73	\$97.22	\$20.36
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	\$28,448.50	\$29,321.90	22.87	179.26	729.40	\$130.32	\$6.91
Facebook + Linkedin	\$128,465.50	\$137,230.90	17.45	43.97	229.79	\$102.79	\$14.38
		S	ocial Media/Inte	ernet Medley			
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	\$100,017.00	\$107,909.00	16.35	36.20	193.73	\$97.22	\$20.36
Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG)	\$248,856.30	\$296,078.30	4.46	14.64	25.45	\$270.89	\$6.6
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	\$28,448.50	\$29,321.90	22.87	179.26	729.40	\$130.32	\$6.9
Netlfix	\$13,959.00	\$14,539.00	3.54	81.20	304.80	\$403.86	\$7.1 [′]
OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN)	\$1,641.70	\$1,733.70	9.45	30.35	59.99	\$15.34	\$3.02
Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P)	\$4,163.40	\$4,232.30	7.89	NA	NA	\$21.16	\$5.72
RetailMeNot	\$1,723.60	\$1,715.00	10.20	34.20	64.96	\$147.84	\$4.60
Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA)	\$1,647.39	\$1,853.10	17.75	NA	NA	\$59.02	\$3.5
Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP)	\$4,006.10	\$4,102.90	22.42	NA	NA	\$41.03	\$2.6
Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z)	\$3,419.80	\$3,589.50	22.48	NA	NA	\$78.20	\$5.22
Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO)	\$27,262.80	\$29,854.60	5.65	21.24	7.19	\$106.24	\$2.5
Groupon	\$5,857.00	\$7,039.00	2.42	44.04	NA	\$168.80	\$0.62
Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO)	\$347.20	\$421.10	2.23	12.81	23.39	\$16.20	\$0.9
Aggregate	\$441,349.79	\$502,389.40	5.82	20.43	30.76	\$151.57	\$5.9
Median			8.67	32.27	59.99	101.73	4.9
Average			10.97	47.44	159.96	121.98	5.4

Twitter's value based on revenues = \$543 million * ? Twitter's value based on # users = 237 million * ?

The market price of Twitter



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Rules for the road: Relative valuation

- <u>Be consistent</u>: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.
- 2. <u>Play Moneyball</u>: Look at the cross sectional distribution of a multiple and form judgments, based on the data, of what is cheap and what is expensive.
- 3. <u>Make your implicit assumptions explicit</u>: Multiples are standardized values, and as a consequence are driven by exactly the same variables that determine value cash flows, growth and risk.
- 4. <u>Control for differences (and go past story telling)</u>: No matter how carefully you control for differences across companies, there will still be residual differences on the fundamentals across the firms. You have to go beyond story telling and use the data to analyze how the market treats these differences.

What's your game?

- The transactors
 - Traders: Oscar Wilde's definition of a cynic: "knows the price of everything, the value of nothing".
 - Salespeople: Caveat emptor!
 - Deal intermediaries: Get the deal done (even if it is not a good deal)!
- The muddled middle
 - Academic value: The cognitive dissonance of the "efficient market"
 - Accounting value: Rule maker, rule maker, make up your mind!
 - Legal value: The bane of the expert witness!
- The investors
 - Owners of businesses: Except if you want to run it for the long term.
 - Investors in companies: With faith and patience, you can take advantage of Mr. Market.
 - Long term consultants: You have to live with the consequences of the advice that you mete out to your clients.

In the investing world, there are three views of "the gap"

	View of the gap	Investment Strategies
The Efficie Marketer	ent The gaps between price they do occur, are rand	
The "valu extremist		d fad. where value > price
The pricin extremist	•	xists (and it is securities.

The pricer's dilemma..

- 29
- No anchor: If you do not believe in intrinsic value and make no attempt to estimate it, you have no moorings when you invest. You will therefore be pushed back and forth as the price moves from high to low. In other words, everything becomes relative and you can lose perspective.
- <u>Reactive</u>: Without a core measure of value, your investment strategy will often be reactive rather than proactive.
- Crowds are fickle and tough to get a read on: The key to being successful as a pricer is to be able to read the crowd mood and to detect shifts in that mood early in the process. By their nature, crowds are tough to read and almost impossible to model systematically.

The valuer's dilemma


- Uncertainty about the magnitude of the gap:
 - Margin of safety: Many value investors swear by the notion of the "margin of safety" as protection against risk/uncertainty.
 - Collect more information: Collecting more information about the company is viewed as one way to make your investment less risky.
 - Ask what if questions: Doing scenario analysis or what if analysis gives you a sense of whether you should invest.
 - Confront uncertainty: Face up to the uncertainty, bring it into the analysis and deal with the consequences.
- Uncertainty about gap closing: This is tougher and you can reduce your exposure to it by
 - Lengthening your time horizon
 - Providing or looking for a catalyst that will cause the gap to close.

The Righteous Win: Apple – Price versus Value (my estimates) from 2011 to 2016

Apple: Stock Price versus DCF Value (My Estimates) \$140.00 \$124.43 \$130.91 \$129.80 \$118.93 \$120.00 **\$117.23** \$102.50 \$96.43 \$96.55 \$112.76 \$95.30 \$100.00 \$95.57 \$98.00 \$8<mark>8.14</mark> \$8**5**.00 \$89.57 \$97.34 \$8**6**.43 \$84.86 \$80.00 \$87.25 \$84.30 \$83.43 \$69.30 \$66.57 \$71.51 \$68.11 \$60.00 \$65.21 \$65.07 \$63.25 \$55.00 \$54.47 \$40.00 \$48.47 \$50.02 \$20.00 \$0.00)ec-10 eb-16 Apr-15 Jun-15 Aug-15 Oct-15 Jec-15 eb-11 Apr-11 -eb-12 Apr-12 lun-12 Aug-12 un-13 vug-13 lun-11 Oct-12 eb-13 Apr-13 Oct-13 Jun-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Dec-14 Feb-15 Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Dec-12 Feb-14 Apr-14 Dec-13 — Monthly price close (adj) DCF value (adi)

Where is the convergence? Amazon –

Price versus Value



The choice is yours (and there is no right

one)

- 1. <u>Play to your strengths</u>: To be a successful investor, you have to know what makes you tick and pick the approach that best fits you.
 - <u>Don't be delusional</u>: If you are pricing an asset, don't get distracted too much by fundamentals and intrinsic value concerns. If you are valuing an asset, don't let the pricing process (mood & momentum) feed back into your valuation.
 - <u>Stop being righteous</u>: Stop labeling investors as good or bad, based on how they pick stocks, how long they hold them and which direction they bet (long or short).
 - 4. <u>Don't expect to be rewarded</u>: The notion that if you do all the "right things", you will be rewarded is not only wrong but dangerous.

NUMBERS AND NARRATIVE: MODELING, STORY TELLING AND INVESTING

Aswath Damodaran

Are you a numbers person or a story person?

The side of the brain we tend to use more may determine our learning styles, not to mention instructors' teaching methods:




Linear Processes information by taking pieces, lining them up, and arranging them in a logical order to draw conclusions.




Reality-based Deals with reality the way it is. When affected by the environment, adjustment can be easily made.

LEFT SIDE



Sequence Processes information in order. This makes for easy daily planning and accomplishing tasks.



Symbolic Processing symbols is no problem such as letters, words, and mathematical notation.

RIGHT SIDE




Holistic Processes information by starting with the answer. It sees the big picture first, not the details.



Fantasy-oriented

Processes information based on what they think the answer is. Often they find the answer intuitively.







Concrete

Processing requires things to be concrete such as feeling, seeing, or touching the real object.

Bridging the Gap




The Steps



Step 1: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
 - Your company (its products, its management and its history.
 - The market or markets that you see it growing in.
 - The competition it faces and will face.
 - The macro environment in which it operates.




Low Growth

The Auto Business


Low Margins

Year 🔻	Revenues (\$) 🔻	% Growth Rate 🔻					
2005	1,274,716.60						
2006	1,421,804.20	11.54%					
2007	1,854,576.40	30.44%					
2008	1,818,533.00	-1.94%					
2009	1,572,890.10	-13.51%					
2010	1,816,269.40	15.47%					
2011	1,962,630.40	8.06%					
2012	2,110,572.20	7.54%					
2013	2,158,603.00	2.28%					
2014	2,086,124.80	-3.36%					
nded Avera	ige =	5.63%					

The Automobile Business: Pre-tax Operating Margins in 2015



High & Increasing Reinvestment



Bad Business


Cost of capital ROiC - Cost of capital ROIC 2004 6.82% 7.93% -1.11% 2005 10.47% 7.02% 3.45% 2006 4.60% 7.97% -3.37% 2007 7.62% 8.50% -0.88% 2008 3.48% -4.55% 8.03% -4.97% 2009 8.58% -13.55% 2010 5.16% 8.03% -2.87% 7.55% 2011 8.15% -0.60% 2012 7.80% 8.55% -0.75% 2013 7.83% -0.64% 8.47% 2014 6.47% 7.53% -1.06% Only once in the last 10 years have auto companies collectively earned more than their cost of capital

What makes Ferrari different?

Ferrari had a profit margin of 18.2%, in the 95th percentile, partly because of its high prices and partly because it spends little on advertising.

Ferrari sold only 7,255

cars in all of 2014



Ferrari: Geographical Sales (2014)

Ferrari sales (in units) have grown very little in the last decade & have been stable

Ferrari has not invested in new plants.

Step 2: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
 - **Rule 1: Keep it simple.**
 - Rule 2: Keep it focused.

The Uber Narrative


In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

- 1. <u>An urban car service business</u>: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
- 2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
- 3. <u>With local networking benefits</u>: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
- 4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong <u>competitive advantages</u> (from being a first mover).
- 5. And <u>its existing low-capital business model</u>, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.


The Ferrari Narrative

- Ferrari will stay an exclusive auto club, deriving its allure from its scarcity and the fact that only a few own Ferraris.
- By staying exclusive, the company gets three benefits:
 - It can continue to charge nose bleed prices for its cars and sell them with little or no advertising.
 - It does not need to invest in new assembly plants, since it does not plan to ramp up production.
 - It sells only to the super rich, who are unaffected by overall economic conditions or market crises.


Step 3: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense




The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable




Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



The Impossible: The Runaway Story





The Implausible: The Big Market Delusion

				Breakeven	% from Online	Imputed Online Ad
Company	Market Cap	Enterprise Value	Current Revenues	Revenues (2025)	Advertising	Revenue (2025)
Google	\$441,572.00	\$386,954.00	\$69,611.00	\$224,923.20	89.50%	\$201,306.26
Facebook	\$245,662.00	\$234,696.00	\$14,640.00	\$129,375.54	92.20%	\$119,284.25
Yahoo!	\$30,614.00	\$23,836.10	\$4,871.00	\$25,413.13	100.00%	\$25,413.13
LinkedIn	\$23,265.00	\$20,904.00	\$2,561.00	\$22,371.44	80.30%	\$17,964.26
Twitter	\$16,927.90	\$14,912.90	\$1,779.00	\$23,128.68	89.50%	\$20,700.17
Pandora	\$3,643.00	\$3,271.00	\$1,024.00	\$2,915.67	79.50%	\$2,317.96
Yelp	\$1,765.00	\$0.00	\$465.00	\$1,144.26	93.60%	\$1,071.02
Zillow	\$4,496.00	\$4,101.00	\$480.00	\$4,156.21	18.00%	\$748.12
Zynga	\$2,241.00	\$1,142.00	\$752.00	\$757.86	22.10%	\$167.49
Total US	\$770,185.90	\$689,817.00	\$96,183.00	\$434,185.98		\$388,972.66
Alibaba	\$184,362.00	\$173,871.00	\$12,598.00	\$111,414.06	60.00%	\$66,848.43
Tencent	\$154,366.00	\$151,554.00	\$13,969.00	\$63,730.36	10.50%	\$6,691.69
Baidu	\$49,991.00	\$44,864.00	\$9,172.00	\$30,999.49	98.90%	\$30,658.50
Sohu.com	\$18,240.00	\$17,411.00	\$1,857.00	\$16,973.01	53.70%	\$9,114.51
Naver	\$13,699.00	\$12,686.00	\$2,755.00	\$12,139.34	76.60%	\$9,298.74
Yandex	\$3,454.00	\$3,449.00	\$972.00	\$2,082.52	98.80%	\$2,057.52
Yahoo! Japan	\$23,188.00	\$18,988.00	\$3,591.00	\$5,707.61	69.40%	\$3,961.08
Sina	\$2,113.00	\$746.00	\$808.00	\$505.09	48.90%	\$246.99
Netease	\$14,566.00	\$11,257.00	\$2,388.00	\$840.00	11.90%	\$3,013.71
Mail.ru	\$3,492.00	\$3,768.00	\$636.00	\$1,676.47	35.00%	\$586.76
Mixi	\$3,095.00	\$2,661.00	\$1,229.00	\$777.02	96.00%	\$745.94
Kakaku	\$3,565.00	\$3,358.00	\$404.00	\$1,650.49	11.60%	\$191.46
Total non-US	\$474,131.00	\$444,613.00	\$50,379.00	\$248,495.46		\$133,415.32
Global Total	\$1,244,316.90	\$1,134,430.00	\$146,562.00	\$682,681.44		\$522,387.98


The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 202
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,78
% Growth	a. 196.000	52%	75%	34%	73%	43%	30%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10
Automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,55
% Growth	40,140	-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	13
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	75
Total Sales	2,478	3,361	5,655	7.095	10,072	12,768	16,736	21,648	26,403	31,416	36,959	42,087	48,017	54,355	61,296	68,055
% Growth		36%	68%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	119
EBITDA	148	417	920	1,042	1,586	2,150	3,138	4,066	4,857	5,723	6,328	7,182	8,144	9,688	10,874	12,099
% Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17.85
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	41%	79%	55%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	75%	76%	76%	76%	76%	77
EBIT	45	259	748	839	1,285	1,796	2,749	3,529	4,252	5.027	5,517	6,244	7,056	8,429	9,423	10,435
% Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14.1%	16.4%	16.3%	15.1%	15.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15.35
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(
Pretax Income	46	258	758	872	1,332	1,886	2,857	3,684	4,451	5,305	5,875	6,688	7,598	9,080	10,207	11,373
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2.028	2,323
% Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	209
Net Income	44	256	744	839	1,246	1,624	2,395	3,043	3,644	4,303	4.741	5,372	6,128	7,319	8,179	9,050
Plus																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(
Less																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376
% of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-69
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,145
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	39
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(
Unlevered Free Cash Flow	78	229	750	863	1,186	1,702	2,343	2,884	3,314	4,113	4,472	4,959	5,456	6,597	7,315	8,005
					11100	1,1 44				4,110			BITDA			12,095
												S	iales let Debt (Cas resla Diluted			68,056 (260 142
												0.0	Card Dreatou	undi Ca		14
Exit EBITDA High							12.0 x		Exit PPG High		5.0%		xit P/Sales H		180%	
Exit EBITDA Low							8.0 x		Exit PPG Low	6.5	3.0%	E	xit P/Sales L	OW	130%	

Discount Rage Low	9.0%	Month of FY End	12.0 (End of this Month)	
Discount Rate High	13.0%	FY Month of Valuation	1.0 (Beginning of this Month)	

Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value




The Uber narrative (June 2014)

Ferrari: From story to numbers

Valuation Input	The Story	Valuation Inputs
Revenues	Keep it scarce	Revenue growth of 4% (in Euro terms) a year for next 5 years, scaling down to
<i>Operating Margin & Taxes</i>		0.7% in year 10. Translates into an increase in production of about 25% in next 10 years
Operating Income	And pricey	Ferrari's pre-tax operating margin stays at 18.2%, in the 95th percentile of auto business.
Reinvestment	Little need for capacity expansion	Sales/Invested Capital stays at 1.42, i.e. every euro invested generates 1.42 euros in sales
Cash Flow		
Discount Rate (Risk)	Super-rich clients are recession-proof	Cost of capital of 6.96% in Euros and no chance of default.
Υ		

Step 4: Value the company (Uber)





Ferrari: The "Exclusive Club" Value

									Sta	ay Su	per	Excl	usiv	e: R	eve	enue g	grov	wth is	s lov	N					High Prices + No selling
	Bas	e year		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	Ter	minal year	cost =
Revenue growth rate			4.	.00%	4	.00%	4.	00%	4	.00%	4.	.00%	3.	34%	2.	.68%	2.	02%	1.	36%	0.	70%		0.70%	Preserve
Revenues	€	2,763	€	2,874	€	2,988	€ :	3,108	€	3,232	€	3,362	€ :	3,474	€	3,567	€ :	3,639	€ :	3,689	€ :	3,714	€	3,740	operating
EBIT (Operating) margin	1	18.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	8.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18.	.20%	18	.20%		18.20%	margin
EBIT (Operating income)	€	503	€	523	€	544	€	566	€	588	€	612	€	632	€	649	€	662	€	671	€	676	€	681	
Tax rate	1	33.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	3.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33.	54%	33	.54%		33.54%	Minimal
EBIT(1-t)	€	334	€	348	€	361	€	376	€	391	€	407	€	420	€	431	€	440	€	446	€	449	€	452	Reinvestment
- Reinvestment			€	78	€	81	€	84	€	87	€	91	€	79	€	66	€	51	€	35	€	18	€	22	due to low
FCFF			€	270	€	281	€	292	€	303	€	316	€	341	€	366	€	389	€	411	€	431	€	431	growth
Cost of capital			6.	.96%	6	.96%	6.	96%	6	.96%	6.	96%	6.	96%	6.	.97%	6.	98%	6.	99%	7.	00%		7.00%	
PV(FCFF)			€	252	€	245	€	238	€	232	€	225	€	228	€	228	€	227	€	224	€	220			The super
																									rich are not
Terminal value		6,835			_																				sensitive to
PV(Terminal value)	€	3,485																							economic downturns
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€	2,321																							downturns
Value of operating assets =	€	5,806																							
- Debt	€	623																							
- Minority interests	€	13																							
+ Cash	€	1,141																							
Value of equity	€	6,311																							

Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
 - Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
 - Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
 - Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
 - Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

The Uber Feedback Loop: Bill Gurley

- <u>Not just car service company</u>.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
- 2. <u>Not just urban</u>: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
- 3. <u>Global networking benefits</u>: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	Uber (Gurley)	Uber (Gurley Mod)	Uber (Damodaran)
Narrative	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service
	market substantially, bringing in	market substantially, bringing in	market moderately, primarily in
	mass transit users & non-users	mass transit users & non-users from	urban environments, and use its
	from the suburbs into the market,	the suburbs into the market, and use	competitive advantages to get a
	and use its <u>networking advantage</u>	its <u>networking</u> advantage to gain a	significant but not dominant
	to gain a dominant market share,	dominant market share, while	market share and maintain its
	while maintaining its revenue slice	cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	revenue slice at 20%.
	at 20%.		
Total	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market			
Market	40%	40%	10%
Share			
Uber's	20%	10%	20%
revenue			
slice			
Value for	\$53.4 billion + Option value of	\$28.7 billion + Option value of	\$5.9 billion + Option value of
Uber	entering car ownership market	entering car ownership market (\$6	entering car ownership market (\$2-
	(\$10 billion+)	billion+)	3 billion)

Different narratives, Different Numbers

Total Market	Growth Effect	Network Effect	Competitive Advantages	Value of Uber
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

The Ferrari Counter Narrative

	Ferrari: The	Rev-it-up Option
Valuation Input	The Story	Valuation Inputs
Revenues	Sales Push	Revenue growth of 12% (in Euro terms) a
Operating Margin & Taxes		year for next 5 years, scaling down to 0.7% in year 10. Translates into an increase in production of about 100% in next 10 years
•	With lower	Ferrari's pre-tax operating margin drops
Operating Income	priced models & selling costs	to 14.32%, in the 90th percentile of auto business.
Reinvestment	With investments in additional capacity	Sales/Invested Capital stays at 1.42, but higher sales create more reinvestment
Cash Flow		
Discount Rate (Risk)	Very rich are more sensitive to economic	Cost of capital of 8% in Euros and no chance of default
Value	conditions	

Ferrari: The "Rev-it-up" Alternative

						Ge	t le	ss ex	clu	sive	Do	buble	nu	mber	of	cars	SO	ld ove	er r	next o	dec	ade			Lower
	Ba	se year		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	Tern	ninal year	Prices + Some selling
Revenue growth rate				2.00%	12	.00%	12	.00%	12	.00%	12	2.00%	9.	74%	7.	18%	5	.22%	2	.96%	0.	70%	().70%	cost = Lower
Revenues	€	2,763	€	3,095	€	3,466	€	3,882	€	4,348	€	4,869	€	5,344	€ :	5,743	€	6,043	€	6,222	€	6,266	€	6,309	operating
EBIT (Operating) margin		18.20%	17	7.81%	17	.42%	17	.04%	16	.65%	16	5.26%	15	.87%	15.	48%	15	5.10%	14	4.71%	14	.32%	1	4.32%	margin
EBIT (Operating income)	€	503	€	551	€	604	€	661	€	724	€	792	€	848	€	889	€	912	€	915	€	897	€	904	
Tax rate		33.54%	33	3.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33.	54%	33	8.54%	33	8.54%	33	.54%	3	3.54%	
EBIT(1-t)	€	334	€	366	€	401	€	439	€	481	€	526	€	564	€	591	€	606	€	608	€	596	€	600	Reinvestment
- Reinvestment			€	233	€	261	€	293	€	328	€	367	€	334	€	281	€	211	€	126	€	31	€	35	reflects
FCFF			€	133	€	140	€	147	€	153	€	159	€	230	€	310	€	395	€	482	€	566	€	565	higher sales
Cost of capital			8	.00%	8,	00%	8.	00%	8.	00%	8	.00%	7.	.90%	7.	30%	7.	.70%	7	.60%	7.	50%	6	7.50%	
PV(FCFF)			€	123	€	120	€	117	€	113	€	108	€	145	€	181	€	215	€	244	€	266			The very
																									rich are
Terminal value	€	8,315																							sensitive to
PV(Terminal value)	€	3,906																							economic
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€	1,631																							conditions
Value of operating assets =	€	5,537																							
- Debt	€	623																							
- Minority interests	€	13																							
+ Cash	€	1,141																							
Value of equity	€	6,042																							

And the world is full of feedback.. My Ferrari afterthought!



Step 6: If the world changes, your narrative has to change with it..

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options

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Uber: The September 2015 Update

Input	June 2014	September 2015	Rationale
Total Market	\$100 billion; Urban car service	\$230 billion; Logistics	Market is broader, bigger & more global than I thought it would be. Uber's entry into delivery & moving businesses is now plausible, perhaps even probable.
Growth in market	Increase market size by 34%; CAGR of 6%.	Double market size; CAGR of 10.39%.	New customers being drawn to car sharing, with more diverse offerings.
Market Share	10% (Local Networking)	25% (Weak Global Networking)	Higher cost of entry will reduce competitors, but remaining competitors have access to capital & in Asia, the hometown advantage.
Slice of gross receipts	20% (Left at status quo)	15%	Increased competition will reduce car service company slice.
Operating margin	40% (Low cost model)	25% (Partial employee model)	Drivers will become partial employees, higher insurance and regulatory costs.
Cost of capital	12% (Ninth decile of US companies)	10% (75 th percentile of US companies)	Business model in place and substantial revenues.
Probability of failure	10%	0%	Enough cash on hand to find off threats to survival.
Value of equity	\$5.9 billion	\$23.4 billion	Value increased more than four fold.

Potential Market	Market size (in millions)	Growth Effect	CAGR (next 10 years)	Network Effects	Market Share
A1. Urban car service	\$100,000	B1. None	3.00%	C1. No network effects	E0/
A2. All car service	\$175,000	B2. Increase market by 25%	5.32%		5%
A3. Logistics	\$230,000	B3. Increase market size by 50%	7.26%	C2. Weak local network effects	10%
A4. Mobility Services	\$310.000	B4: Double market size	10.39%	C3. Strong local network effects	15%
	C4. Weak global network effects	25%			
	Increases overall market to \$			C5. Strong global network effects	40%

	Base	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Assumptions
Overall market	\$230,000	\$253 <i>,</i> 897	\$280,277	\$309,398	\$341,544	\$377,031	\$416,204	\$459,448	\$507,184	\$559,881	\$618,052	A3 & B4
Share of market (gross)	4.71%	6.74%	8.77%	10.80%	12.83%	14.86%	16.89%	18.91%	20.94%	22.97%	25.00%	C4
Gross Billings	\$10,840	\$17,117	\$24,582	\$33,412	\$43,813	\$56,014	\$70,277	\$86,900	\$106,218	\$128,612	\$154,513	
Revenues as percent of gross	20.00%	19.50%	19.00%	18.50%	18.00%	17.50%	17.00%	16.50%	16.00%	15.50%	15.00%	D3
Annual Revenue	\$2,168	\$3,338	\$4,670	\$6,181	\$7,886	\$9,802	\$11,947	\$14,338	\$16,995	\$19,935	\$23,177	
Operating margin	-23.06%	-18.26%	-13.45%	-8.64%	-3.84%	0.97%	5.77%	10.58%	15.39%	20.19%	25.00%	E2
Operating Income	-\$500	-\$609	-\$628	-\$534	-\$303	\$95	\$690	\$1,517	\$2,615	\$4,026	\$5,794	
Effective tax rate	30.00%	31.00%	32.00%	33.00%	34.00%	35.00%	36.00%	37.00%	38.00%	39.00%	40.00%	
- Taxes	-\$150	-\$189	-\$201	-\$176	-\$103	\$33	\$248	\$561	\$994	\$1,570	\$2,318	
After-tax operating income	-\$350	-\$420	-\$427	-\$358	-\$200	\$62	\$442	\$956	\$1,621	\$2,456	\$3,477	
Sales/Capital Ratio		5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	F
- Reinvestment		\$234	\$267	\$302	\$341	\$383	\$429	\$478	\$531	\$588	\$648	
Free Cash Flow to the Firm		-\$654	-\$694	-\$660	-\$541	-\$322	\$13	\$478	\$1,090	\$1 <i>,</i> 868	\$2,828	
Terminal value											\$56,258	
Present value of FCFF		-\$595	-\$573	-\$496	-\$369	-\$200	\$7	\$248	\$520	\$822	\$1,152	
Present value of terminal value											\$22,914	
Cost of capital	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	9.60%	9.20%	8.80%	8.40%	8.00%	G1

PV of cash flows during next 10 years =	\$515	
PV of terminal value =	\$22,914	
Value of operating assets	\$23,429	
Probability of failure	0.00%	G2
Adjusted value of operating assets	\$23,429	
Less Debt	\$0	
Value of Equity	\$23,429	

Expense Profile	Operating Margin
E1: Independent contractor	40%
E2: Partial employee	25%
E3: Full employee	15%

Capital Intensity F: Status Quo: Sales/Capital = 5

Competitive Advantages	Slice of Gross Receipts
D1. None	5%
D2. Weak	10%
D3. Semi-strong	15%
D4. Strong & Sustainable	20%

Risk Estimates G1. Cost of capital at 75th percentile of US companies = 10% G2. Probability of failure in next 10 years= 0%

Uber Valuation: September 2015

The End

"There is no real ending. It's just the place where you stop the story."

LIVING WITH NOISE: INVESTING IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY

Aswath Damodaran http://www.damodaran.com

Uncertainty is a feature, not a bug.









Aswath Damodaran





And we deal with uncertainty as humans always have...

- **68**
- Divine Intervention: Praying for intervention from a higher power is the oldest and most practiced risk management system of all.
- Paralysis & Denial: When faced with uncertainty, some of us get paralyzed. Accompanying the paralysis is the hope that if you close your eyes to it, the uncertainty will go away
- Mental short cuts (rules of thumb): Behavioral economists note that investors faced with uncertainty adopt mental short cuts that have no basis in reality. And here is the clincher. More intelligent people are more likely to be prone to this.
- Herding: When in doubt, it is safest to go with the crowd.. The herding instinct is deeply engrained and very difficult to fight.
- Outsourcing: Assuming that there are experts out there who have the answers does take a weight off your shoulders, even if those experts have no idea of what they are talking about.

Forecasting in the face of uncertainty. A

test:

69

In which of these two cities would you find it easier to forecast the weather?

Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	1.7°	1.2°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	67%	81%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	1.5°	2.0°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	7%	13%

Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota

Femperature	Last Month		Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high cemperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
verage change in low emperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%

But the payoff is greatest where there is the most uncertainty...

70

Temperature Average change

temperature day

temperature day

	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Monti
in high y-to-day	1.7°	1.2°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	67
in low y-to-day	1.5°	2.0°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	7

Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Further changeability analysis ×

Last

81%

13%

Weather forecast accuracy for Honolulu, Hawaii

ast Month		Last Year	
MeteoGroup	88.44%	MeteoGroup	88.50%
Persistence	81.80%	CustomWeather	85.87%
CustomWeather	78.23%	AccuWeather	81.82%
The Weather Channel	73.12%	The Weather Channel	81.56%
AccuWeather	69.89%	Persistence	80.44%
Weather Underground	62.10%	Weather Underground	67.07%
National Weather Service	48.39%	National Weather Service	59.90%
Foreca	44.35%	Foreca	57.52%
WeatherBug	32.26%	WeatherBug	37.09%



Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota


Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%


Further changeability analysis »


Weather forecast accuracy for Epping, North Dakota


Last Month		
MeteoGroup	62.50%	
Foreca	61.61%	
The Weather Channel	61.31%	
AccuWeather	60.42%	
Weather Underground	56.85%	
WeatherBug	56.17%	
National Weather Service	54.76%	
CustomWeather	54.46%	
Persistence	38.01%	


MeteoGroup The Weather Channel	66.97% 66.73%
WeatherBug	64.80%
Foreca	62.75%
CustomWeather	62.70%
National Weather Service	62.64%
Weather Underground	61.38%
Persistence	44.09%











The sources of uncertainty

Estimation versus Economic uncertainty

- <u>Estimation uncertainty</u> reflects the possibility that you could have the "wrong model" or estimated inputs incorrectly within this model.
- <u>Economic uncertainty</u> comes the fact that markets and economies can change over time and that even the best medals will fail to capture these unexpected changes.

Micro uncertainty versus Macro uncertainty

- <u>Micro uncertainty</u> refers to uncertainty about the potential market for a firm's products, the competition it will face and the quality of its management team.
- <u>Macro uncertainty</u> reflects the reality that your firm's fortunes can be affected by changes in the macro economic environment.

Discrete versus continuous uncertainty

- <u>Discrete risk</u>: Risks that lie dormant for periods but show up at points in time. (Examples: A drug working its way through the FDA pipeline may fail at some stage of the approval process or a company in Venezuela may be nationalized)
- <u>Continuous risk</u>: Risks changes in interest rates or economic growth occur continuously and affect value as they happen.

Assessing uncertainty...

- Rank the four firms in terms of uncertainty (least to most) in your estimate:
 - **3**M in 2007
 - Tata Motors in 2010
 - Amazon in 2000
 - Twitter in 2013
- With each company, specify the type of uncertainty that you face:

Company	Estimation or Economic	Micro or Macro	Discrete or Continuous	
3M (2007)				
Tata Motors (2010)				
Amazon (2000)				
Twitter (2013)				

Ten suggestions for dealing with uncertainty...

- 1. Less is more (the rule on detail....) (Revenue & margin forecasts)
- 2. Build in internal checks on reasonableness... (reinvestment and ROC)
- 3. Use the offsetting principle (risk free rates & inflation at Tata Motors)
- 4. Draw on economic first principles (Terminal value at all the companies)
- 5. Use the "market" as a crutch (equity risk premiums, country risk premiums)
- 6. Use the law of large numbers (Beta for all companies
- 7. Don't let the discount rate become the receptacle for all uncertainties.
- 8. Confront uncertainty, if you can
- 9. Don't look for precision
- 10. You can live with mistakes, but bias will kill you...

1. Less is more

- <u>The principle of parsimony</u>: When faced with uncertainty, go for less detail, rather than more. That may sound counterintuitive, but here is why it makes sense:
 - You have a better shot at estimating an aggregate number, rather than individual numbers (Examples: Forecast the operating margin rather than individual operating expenses, total working capital instead of individual working capital items)
 - Estimation requires information and trying to estimate individual items, in the absence of information, is not only frustrating but an exercise in futility.
- <u>Auto pilot rules</u>: The uncertainty you face will increase as you go forward in time (it is much more difficult to estimate year 5 than year 1). Thus, it is best to create simple algorithms that estimate year-specific numbers as you go further out in time.

The Amazon Forecasts

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Year	Revenue Growth	Sales	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)
Tr 12 mths		\$1,117	-36.71%	-\$410	-\$410
1	150.00%	\$2,793	-13.35%	-\$373	-\$373
2	100.00%	\$5,585	-1.68%	-\$94	-\$94
3	75.00%	\$9,774	4.16%	\$407	\$407
4	50.00%	\$14,661	7.08%	\$1,038	\$871
5	30.00%	\$19,059	8.54%	\$1,628	\$1,058
6	25.20%	\$23,862	9.27%	\$2,212	\$1,438
7	20.40%	\$28,729	9.64%	\$2,768	\$1,799
8	15.60%	\$33,211	9.82%	\$3,261	\$2,119
9	10.80%	\$36,798	9.91%	\$3,646	\$2,370
10	6.00%	\$39,006	9.95%	\$3,883	\$2,524
ΤY	6.00%	\$41,346	10.00%	\$4,135	\$2,688
		Pr11	ocinie of narsimon	v. Hetima	te

Use "auto pilot" approaches to estimate future years

Principle of parsimony: Estimate

fewer inputs when faced with uncertainty.

2. Build in "internal" checks for reasonableness...

Year	Revenues	Δ Revenue	Sales/Cap	Δ Investment	Inve	sted Capital	EBIT (1-t)	Imputed ROC
Tr 12 mths	\$1,117				\$	487	-\$410	
1	\$2,793	\$1,676	3.00	\$559	\$	1,045	-\$373	-76.62%
2	\$5,585	\$2,793	3.00	\$931	\$	1,976	-\$94	-8.96%
3	\$9,774	\$4,189	3.00	\$1,396	\$	3,372	\$407	20.59%
4	\$14,661	\$4,887	3.00	\$1,629	\$	5,001	\$871	25.82%
5	\$19,059	\$4,398	3.00	\$1,466	\$	6,467	\$1,058	21.16%
6	\$23,862	\$4,803	3.00	\$1,601	\$	8,068	\$1,438	22.23%
7	\$28,729	\$4,868	3.00	\$1,623	\$	9,691	\$1,799	22.30%
8	\$33,211	\$4,482	3.00	\$1,494	\$	11,185	\$2,119	21.87%
9	\$36,798	\$3,587	3.00	\$1,196	\$	12,380	\$2,370	21.19%
10	\$39,006	\$2,208	3.00	\$736	\$	13,116	\$2,524	20.39%
ΤY	\$41,346	\$2,340	NA			Assumed to	be =	20.00%

Check total revenues, relative to the market that it serves... Your market share obviously cannot exceed 100% but there may be tighter constraints. Are the margins and imputed returns on capital 'reasonable' in the outer years?

Aswath Damodaran

3. Use consistency tests...

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- While you can not grade a valuation on "correctness" (since different analysts can make different assumptions about growth and risk), you can grade it on consistency.
- For a valuation to be consistent, your estimates of cash flows have to be consistent with your discount rate definition.
 - Equity versus Firm: If the cash flows being discounted are cash flows to equity, the appropriate discount rate is a cost of equity. If the cash flows are cash flows to the firm, the appropriate discount rate is the cost of capital.
 - Currency: The currency in which the cash flows are estimated should also be the currency in which the discount rate is estimated.
 - Nominal versus Real: If the cash flows being discounted are nominal cash flows (i.e., reflect expected inflation), the discount rate should be nominal

Tata Motors: In Rupees and US dollars

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(1.125)*(1.01/1.

04)-1 = .0925

	In Indian Rupees	In US \$
Risk free Rate	5.00%	2.00%
Expected inflation rate	4.00%	1.00%
Cost of capital		
- High Growth	12.50%	9.25%
- Stable Growth	10.39%	7.21%
Expected growth rate		
- High Growth	12.01%	8.78%
- Stable Growth	5.00%	2.00%
Return on Capital		
- High Growth	17.16%	13.78%
- Stable Growth	10.39%	7.21%
Value per share	Rs 614	\$12.79/share (roughly Rs
		614 at current exchange
		rate)

4. Draw on economic first principles and mathematical limits...

- When doing valuation, you are free to make assumptions about how your company will evolve over time in the market that it operates, but you are not free to violate first principles in economics and mathematics.
- Put differently, there are assumptions in valuation that are either mathematically impossible or violate first laws of economics and cannot be ever justified.

83


And the "excess return" effect...

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Stable growth rate	3M	Tata Motors	Amazon	Twitter
0%	\$70 <i>,</i> 409	435,686₹	\$26,390	\$23,111
1%	\$70,409	435,686₹	\$28,263	\$24,212
2%	\$70,409	435,686₹	\$30,595	\$25,679
3%	\$70,409	435,686₹	\$33,594	
4%		435,686₹	\$37,618	
5%		435,686₹	\$43,334	
			\$52,148	
Riskfree rate	3.72%	5%	6.60%	2.70%
ROIC	6.76%	10.39%	20%	12.00%
Cost of capital	6.76%	10.39%	9.61%	8.00%

5. Use the market as a crutch... ERP as an illustration

0	Arithme	tic Average	Geometric Average		
1	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	
1928-2016	7.96%	6.24%	6.11%	4.62%	
Std Error	2.13%	2.28%			
1967-2016	6.57%	4.37%	5.26%	3.42%	
Std Error	2.42%	2.74%			
2007-2016	7.91%	3.62%	6.15%	2.30%	
Std Error	6.06%	8.66%			



Extending to country risk premium...

- Assume that the equity risk premium for the US and other mature equity markets is 5.8%.
- To estimate the additional risk premium for an emerging market, you can start with a country default spread, using one of two approaches:
 - Default spread, given the country's bond rating (estimated either by looking at a US\$ or Euro government bond issued by that country)
 - CDS spread for the country, from the market
- Adjusted for equity risk: The country equity risk premium is based upon the volatility of the market in question relative to U.S market.
 - Total equity risk premium = Default SpreadCountry* (? Country Equity / ? Country Bond)
 - Standard Deviation in Bovespa = 30%
 - Standard Deviation in Brazilian government bond= 20%
 - Default spread for Brazil= 1.75%
 - Additional risk premium for Brazil = 1.75% (30/20) = 2.63%

ERP: Jan 2017

Andorra	8.81%	3.12%	Jersey	6.26%	0.57%
Austria	6.26%	0.57%	Liechtenstein	5.69%	0.00%
Belgium	6.55%	0.86%	Luxembourg	5.69%	0.00%
Cyprus	12.09%	6.40%	Malta	7.40%	1.71%
Denmark	5.69%	0.00%	Netherlands	5.69%	0.00%
Finland	6.26%	0.57%	Norway	5.69%	0.00%
France	6.39%	0.70%	Portugal	9.24%	3.55%
Germany	5.69%	0.00%	Spain	8.40%	2.71%
Greece	19.89%	14.20%	Sweden	5.69%	0.00%
Guernsey	6.26%	0.57%	Switzerland	5.69%	0.00%
Iceland	7.40%	1.71%	Turkey	9.24%	3.55%
Ireland	7.40%	1.71%	UK	6.26%	0.57%
Isle of Man	6.26%	0.57%	W.Europe	6.81%	1.12%
Italy	8.40%	2.71%		3	

			11
	North America	5.69%	0.00%
	USA	5.69%	0.00%
-	Canada	5.69%	0.00%

Caribbean	13.81%	8.12%
Argentina	14.93%	9.24%
Belize	18.48%	12.79%
Bolivia	10.81%	5.12%
Brazil	9.96%	4.27%
Chile	6.55%	0.86%
Colombia	8.40%	2.71%
Costa Rica	9.24%	3.55%
Ecuador	14.93%	9.24%
El Salvador	14.93%	9.24%
Guatemala	9.24%	3.55%
Honduras	13.51%	7.82%
Mexico	7.40%	1.71%
Nicaragua	13.51%	7.82%
Panama	8.40%	2.71%
Paraguay	9.24%	3.55%
Peru	7.40%	1.71%
Suriname	12.09%	6.40%
Uruguay	8.40%	2.71%
Venezuela	19.89%	14.20%
Latin America	10.11%	4.42%


Sweden		5.69	1%	0.009	%
Switzerland	Switzerland			0.00%	
Turkey				3.55%	
UK		6.26	5%	0.579	%
W.Europe		6.81	%	1.129	6
1	Jw	8			
Angola	12.	09%	6	.40%	
Botswana	6.9	0%	1	.21%	
Burkina Fas	o 14.	93%	9	.24%	1
Cameroon	13.	51%	7	.82%	1
Cape Verde	_	51%	7	.82%	S
Congo (DR)) 14.	93%	9	.24%	
Congo (Rep) 14.	93%	9	.24%	
Côte d'Ivoir	e 10.	81%	5	.12%	
Egypt	14.	93%	9	.24%	
Ethiopia	12.	09%	6	.40%	
Gabon	12.	09%	6	.40%	
Ghana	14.	93%	9	.24%	
Kenya	12.	09%	6	.40%	
Morocco	9.2	4%	3	.55%	
Mozambiqu	e 19.	89%	14	1.20%	
Namibia	8.8	1%	3	.12%	
Nigeria	12.	09%	6	.40%	
Rwanda	13.	51%	7	.82%	
Senegal	12.	09%	6	.40%	
South Africa	a 8.4	0%	2	.71%	
Tunisia	10.	81%	5	.12%	E
Uganda	_	51%		.82%	E
Zambia	14.	93%		.24%	-
Africa	11.	98%	6	.29%	

	United Middle	Arab Emir East	rates		40% 5 0%	0.719	-
	Sharja				40%	1.719	_
	Saudi /				69%	1.00	-
		Khaimah			90%	1.219	_
	Qatar			-	40%	0.719	_
	Oman				96%	2.27	_
	Leband	on			51%	7.829	
	Kuwait	:			40%		
	Jordan				09%		_
	Israel			_	69%		6
	Iraq			14.9	94%	9.25%	6
	Bahrai	n		9.9	96%	4.279	6
	Licutope	5.0576		3.40%			
1	E.Europe	9.09%					
	Ukraine	19.89%	<u> </u>	20%			۲
	Slovenia	8.81%		1.21%		1	
	Slovakia	6.90%	<u> </u>			1	
	Serbia	12.09%	<u> </u>	0%	7	4	
1	Russia	9.24%		5%	-	L	1
	Romania	8.81%	3.12%				
1	Poland	6.90%		1.21%			
	Montenegro	12.09%	<u> </u>	6.40%			
	Moldova	14.93%		4%	1		
	Macedonia	10.81%	5.1	2%			
í	Lithuania	7.40%	1.7	1%			
	Latvia	7.40%	1.7	1%			
	Kyrgyzstan	13.51%	7.8	2%			N
	Kazakhstan	8.81%	3.1	2%		- F	L
	Hungary	8.81%	3.1	2%	1	7	L
	Georgia	10.81%	5.1	2%			K
	Estonia	6.69%	1.0	0%	2	2	lr
	Czech Republic	6.69%	1.0	0%		112	Н
,	Croatia	9.96%	4.2	7%		(G
	Bulgaria	8.40%	2.7	1%		(G
	Bosnia and He	14.93%	9.2	4%		(G
	Belarus	16.34%	10.0	65%		(G
	Azerbaijan	9.24%	3.5	5%			В
	Armenia	12.09%	6.4	0%			A
	Albania	12.09%	6.4	0%		(С

Black #: Total ERP Red #: Country risk premium AVG: GDP weighted average

	Country		ERP	CRP	Country	r	ERP	CRP
	Algeria		13.72%	7.479	Malawi		17.24%	10.99%
	Brunei		9.75%		6 Mali		13.90%	
	Gambia		13.72%		6 Myanm	ar	13.72%	7.47%
	Guinea		20.00%		6 Niger		17.24%	
	Guinea-	Bissau	12.48%	6.239	6 Sierra Lo	eone	16.61%	10.36%
	Guyana		12.48%		6 Somalia	l	20.00%	13.75%
2	Haiti		16.61%		6 Sudan		20.00%	
١	Iran		11.22%		6 Syria		20.00%	
	Korea, D).P.R.			6 Tanzani	а	13.90%	
	Liberia		17.24%				13.72%	
	Libya				6 Yemen,		17.24%	
	Madaga	scar	12.48%	6.239	Zimbab	we	17.24%	10.99%
				20	51	1		
		Bangl	adesh		10.81%	5.12%]	
		Camb	odia		13.51%	7.82%	1	
		China	L		6.55%	0.86%	1	
		Fiji			12.09%	6.40%	1	
	•	Hong	Kong		6.26%	0.57%]	
	-	India			8.81%	3.12%]	
l	/	Indon	esia		8.81%	3.12%		
١	5	Japan			6.69%	1.00%		
	5	Korea	l		6.39%	0.70%	1	
	-	Maca	o		6.55%	0.86%	1	
		Malay	/sia		7.40%	1.71%	1	
		Mauri	tius		7.95%	2.26%	1	
7	ex.	Mong	olia		16.34%	10.65%		
5	% %	Pakist			14.93%	9.24%	1	
	%		New G	uinea	13.51%		1	
	1%	Philip			8.40%	2.71%	1	
71	.%	Singa			5.69%	0.00%	h	
	%	Sri La			12.09%	6.40%	N	
	%	Taiwa			6.55%	0.86%	0	
_	.%	Thaila			7.95%	2.26%		
_	.%	Vietna			12.09%		1	
71	% .%	Asia			7.12%	1.43%		
71	.%				Austral		5.69%	0.00%
	%				Cook Is		12.09%	
					New Ze		5.69%	_
71	R P					ia & NZ	5.70%	
ERP					rastial		5.70/0	0.0170


6. Draw on the law of large numbers...



- To estimate the beta for Tata Motors
 - Unlevered beta for automobile company = 0.98
 - D/E ratio for Tata Motors = 33.87%
 - Marginal tax rate in India = 33.99%
 - Levered beta = 0.98 (1+ (1-.3399)(.3387)) = 1.20

7. Don't let the discount rate become the receptacle for all your uncertainty...

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
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Contrasting ways of dealing with survival risk...

- The Venture Capital approach: In the venture capital approach, you hike the "discount rate" well above what would be appropriate for a going concern and then use this "target" rate to discount your "exit value" (which is estimated using a multiple and forward earnings).
 - Value = (Forward Earnings in year n * Exit multiple)/ (1+ target rate)ⁿ
- □ The decision tree approach:
 - Value the business as a "going concern", with a rate of return appropriate for a "going concern".
 - Estimate the probability of survival (and failure) and the value of the business in the event of failure.
 - Value = Going concern value (Probability of survival) + Liquidation value (Probability of failure)


Exhibit 8.2: Valuing a Distressed firm: Las Vegas Sands in early 2009

Las Vegas Sands owns and operates the Venetian Casino and Sands Convention Center in Las Vegas and the Sands Macau Casino in Macau, China. While the revenues increased from \$1.75 billion in 2005 to \$4.39 billion in 2008 and it had two other casinos in development - it ran into significant financial trouble in the last quarter of 2008. Fears about whether the firm would be able to meet its debt obligations pushed down both stock prices (almost 90%) and bond prices (about 40%) in 2008.



8. Confront uncertainty, if you can...


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With the consequences for equity value...

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


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9. Don't look for precision..


- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information.
 Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.

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To illustrate: Your mistakes versus market

mistakes..



10. You can make mistakes, but try to keep bias

out..

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- When you are wrong on individual company valuations, as you inevitably will be, recognize that while those mistakes may cause the value to be very different from the price for an individual company, the mistakes should average out across companies.
 - Put differently, if you are an investor, you have can make the "law of large numbers" work for you by diversifying across companies, with the degree of diversification increasing as uncertainty increases.
- If you are "biased" on individual company valuations, your mistakes will not average out, no matter how diversified you get.
- Bottom line: You are better off making large mistakes and being unbiased than making smaller mistakes, with bias.