
## NUMBERS AND NARRATIVE: MODELING, STORY TELLING AND INVESTING

Aswath Damodaran

## Bridging the Gap




## From Story to Numbers: The Steps

┍►	Step 1: Develop a narrative for the business that you are valuing In the narrative, you tell your story about how you see the business evolving over time.
	Step 2: Test the narrative to see if it is possible, plausible and probable There are lots of possible narratives, not all of them are plausible and only a few of them are probable.
	Step 3: Convert the narrative into drivers of value Take the narrative apart and look at how you will bring it into valuaton inputs starting with potential market size down to cash flows and risk. By the time you are done, each part of the narrative should have a place in your numbers and each number should be backed up a portion of your story.
	Step 4: Connect the drivers of value to a valuation Create an intrinsic valuation model that connects the inputs to an end-value the business.
	Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open Listen to people who know the business better than you do and use their suggestions to fine tune your narrative and perhaps even alter it. Work out the effects on value of alternative narratives for the company.


## Step 1: Survey the landscape


- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
  - Your company (its products, its management and its history.
  - The market or markets that you see it growing in.
  - The competition it faces and will face.
  - The macro environment in which it operates.




### The Banking Business

The Banking Business: 2007 to 2016






## In October 2015: Deutsche Bank's not so good, very bad, horrible decade



7

#### **The Market's Crisis Reaction**



### Step 2: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
  - **Rule 1: Keep it simple.**
  - Rule 2: Keep it focused.

## The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be


- 1. <u>An urban car service business</u>: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
- 2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
- 3. <u>With local networking benefits</u>: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
- 4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong <u>competitive advantages</u> (from being a first mover).
- 5. And <u>its existing low-capital business model</u>, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

## The Deutsche Bank Narrative


- Growth and Profits: Deutsche Bank is a very low growth bank, with risk-adjusted assets at the inflation low and a return on equity that will stay low for the near term, as it faces regulatory pressures and reputation shocks.
- Regulatory Capital: To recover, the company will have to issue massive amounts of new equity and in steady state, it will be remain both high risk and require high regulatory capital to sustain itself.
- A Stable Bank that runs in place: Once recovered, the bank will generate a return on equity roughly equal to its cost of equity.
- Failure risk: There is a very real chance that the bank may need to saved, in which case the equity will be wiped out.

11


# Step 3: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense




# The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable



## Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



### The Impossible: The Runaway Story




### The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

#### Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

			,	<b>1</b>					,							
	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 20
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,7
6 Growth		52%	75%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	1
automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,
6 Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,9
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	
Total Sales	2,478	3,361	5,655	7,095	10,072	12,768	16,736	21,648	26,403	31,416	36,959	42,087	48,017	54,355	61,296	68,0
6 Growth		36%	68%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	1
EBITDA	148	417	920	1,042	1,586	2,150	3,138	4,066	4,857	5,723	6,328	7,182	8,144	9,688	10,874	12,0
6 Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17
Að	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,
6 of Capex	41%	79%	55%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	75%	76%	76%	76%	76%	1
EBIT	45	259	748	839	1,285	1,796	2,749	3,529	4,252	5,027	5,517	6,244	7,056	8,429	9,423	10,4
16 Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14,1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	16.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	5
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Pretax Income	46	258	758	872	1,332	1,886	2,857	3,684	4,451	5,305	5,875	6,688	7,598	9,080	10,207	11,3
ncome Taxes 6 Effective Rate	3	2	14	34 4%	86 6%	262 14%	462 16%	641 17%	807 18%	1,003	1,134 19%	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,3
let Income	44	256	2% 744	839	1,246	1,624	2,395	3,043	3,644	4,303	4,741	20% 5,372	6,128	7,319	8,179	9,0
<u>Plus</u> After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(5
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,6
Ther	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0
.ess																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	6
6 of Change in Sales	(100)	-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	
		2.10		12.10		12.10										
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	-3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Inlevered Free Cash Flow	78	229	750	863	1,186	1,702	2,343	2,884	3,314	4,113	4,472	4,959	5,456	6,597	7,315	8,0
													EBITDA			12,
													Sales			68
													Net Debt (Cas	sh)		0
													Tesla Diluted			
xit EBITDA High							12.0	x	Exit PPG Hig	h	5.0%		Exit P/Sales H	ligh	180%	
Exit EBITDA Low							8.0 1	x	Exit PPG Low	r	3.0%		Exit P/Sales L	ow	130%	
							Discourse Days	a LEak	10.05			Valuation	10.0	De sie sie se sta	the Marsha	
							Discount Rat Discount Ray		13.0%		FY Month of Month of FY			Beginning of t End of this M		
							onsecond roas	10 100	0.074		10/10/01/1		18.0 0	card of and my	analy .	

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
# Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



#### The Uber narrative (June 2014)

## Value the company (Uber)





Adust for probability of failure (10%) Expected value = \$6,595 (.9) = \$5,895 Cost of capital for first 5 years = Top decile of US companies = 12% Cost of capital declines from 12% to 8% from years 6 to 10.

Aswath Damodaran

## The Deutsche Bank Inputs

#### My story for Deutsche Bank

	Risk Adjusted Assets	Slow growing: The growth in risk adjusted assets will be 1% a
L		year for the next 10 years.
	Return on Equity	Clawback to profitability: After losses in next 2 years, ROE will improve to 5.85% (25th percentile of banks) in year 5 and 9.44% (Deutsche Bank's cost of equity in stable period) in year 10
[	Tier 1 Capital	<b>Regulatory Capital Shock/Reaction</b> : After paying DOJ fine, Deutsche will be severely undercapitalized. It will have to raise new equity and will shoot to reach 15.67% (75th percentile of banks) in year 10.
	Cost of Equity	<b>Risky Bank</b> : The cost of equity for Deutsche initially will be 10.2% (75th percentile of banks) but will decrease gradually to 9.44% (the median cost of equity for banks) in 10 years.
	Catastrophic Failure	Failure Risk: There is a 10% chance that the German government will have to bailout the bank, leading to the wiping out of equity.

	l assets grows at 1% a year forever.	tsche	Dama		010 74	luutio	روي ا		capital					he 75th
L										percent	ile for a	ll banks		
		Current	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
¥	Risk Adjusted Assets		-	\$ 454,526	\$ 459,071	\$ 463,662	\$ 468,299		\$ 477,711	\$ 482,488	-	\$ 492,186		
Expected DOJ	Tier 1 Capital Ratio	12.41%	13.74%	13.95%	14.17%	14.38%	14.60%	14.81%	15.03%	15.24%	15.46%	15.67%	4	
	Tier 1 Capital (Risk Adjusted Assets * 1	\$55,282	\$61,834	\$63,427	\$65,045	\$66,690	\$68,361	\$70,059	\$71,784	\$73,537	\$75,317	\$77,126		
billions lower	Change in regulatory capital (Tier 1)	11	\$6,552	\$1,593	\$1,619	\$1,645	\$1,671	\$1,698	\$1,725	\$1,753	\$1,780	\$1,809		
Tier 1 capital	Book Equity	\$64,609	\$71,161	\$72,754	\$74,372	\$76,017	\$77,688	\$79,386	\$81,111	\$82,864	\$84,644	\$86,453		
today														
/	Expected ROE	-13.70%	-7.18%	-2.84%	0.06%	1.99%	5.85%	6.568%	7.286%	8.004%	8.722%	9.440%	•	
	Net Income (Book Equity * ROE)	\$ (8,851)	\$ (5,111)	\$ (2,065)	\$ 43	\$ 1,512	\$ 4,545	\$ 5,214	\$ 5,910	\$ 6,632	\$ 7,383	\$ 8,161		
Common	- Investment in Regulatory Capital		\$ 6,552	\$ 1,593	\$ 1,619	\$ 1,645	\$ 1,671	\$ 1,698	\$ 1,725	\$ 1,753	\$ 1,780	\$ 1,809		
Equity	FCFE		\$ (11,663)	\$ (3,658)	\$ (1,576)	\$ (133)	\$ 2,874	\$ 3,516	\$ 4,185	\$ 4,880	\$ 5,602	\$ 6,352		
increases in	Terminal value of equity											\$87,317		
tandem with	Present value		\$ (10,583)	\$ (3,012)	\$ (1,178)	\$ (90)	\$ 1,768	\$ 1,966	\$ 2,129	\$ 2,262	\$ 2,370	\$ 36,207		
Tier 1 capital	Cost of equity	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.048%	9.896%	9.744%	9.592%	9.440%		
/	Cumulative Cost of equity		1.1020	1.2144	1.3383	1.4748	1.6252	1.7885	1.9655	2.1570	2.3639	2.5871		
/	Value of equity today =	\$31,838.74						L						
Cost of equity	Number of shares outstanding =	1386.00		Value n	er shar	e adjus	ted for							
starts at 10 2%	DCF Value per share =	\$ 22.97				catastro								
(75th percentile	Probability of equity wipeout	10.00%				t) result			Return		iv inoro	acon to	5 <b>9</b> 5 0	( (25th
of banks) &	Adjusted value per share =	\$ 20.67			•	ss of eq	-					n year 5		
decreases after	Stock price on October 3, 2016=	\$ 13.33							percer			) in yea		7,4470
year 5 to 9.44%										(00510	equity	) iii yea	10	
(median across banks).								_						

#### Deutsche Bank: A Crisis Valuation (October 2016)

## Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
  - Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
  - Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
  - Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
  - Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

## The Uber Feedback Loop: Bill Gurley

- 22
- 1. <u>Not just car service company</u>.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
- 2. <u>Not just urban</u>: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
- 3. <u>Global networking benefits</u>: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.


## Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	Uber (Gurley)	Uber (Gurley Mod)	Uber (Damodaran)
Narrative	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service
	market substantially, bringing in	market substantially, bringing in	market moderately, primarily in
	mass transit users & non-users	mass transit users & non-users from	urban environments, and use its
	from the suburbs into the market,	the suburbs into the market, and use	<u>competitive advantages</u> to get a
	and use its <u>networking</u> advantage	its <u>networking</u> advantage to gain a	significant but not dominant
	to gain a dominant market share,	dominant market share, while	market share and maintain its
	while maintaining its revenue slice	cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	revenue slice at 20%.
	at 20%.		
Total	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market			
Market	40%	40%	10%
Share			
Uber's	20%	10%	20%
revenue			
slice			
Value for	\$53.4 billion + Option value of	\$28.7 billion + Option value of	\$5.9 billion + Option value of
Uber	entering car ownership market	entering car ownership market (\$6	entering car ownership market (\$2-
	(\$10 billion+)	billion+)	3 billion)

## Different narratives, Different Numbers

Total Market	Growth Effect	Network Effect	Competitive Advantages	Value of Uber
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

# Why narratives change: Because the world changes around you...



## How narratives change

26				
	Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)	
	Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.	
	Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.	
	Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options	

## Uber: The September 2015 Update

_				
-[	Input	June 2014	September 2015	Rationale
_[	Total	\$100 billion; Urban	\$230 billion;	Market is broader, bigger & more
	Market	car service	Logistics	global than I thought it would be.
				Uber's entry into delivery & moving
				businesses is now plausible, perhaps
				even probable.
	Growth in	Increase market size	Double market size;	New customers being drawn to car
-1	market	by 34%; CAGR of 6%.	CAGR of 10.39%.	sharing, with more diverse offerings.
	Market	10% (Local	25% (Weak Global	Higher cost of entry will reduce
	Share	Networking)	Networking)	competitors, but remaining
				competitors have access to capital &
				in Asia, the hometown advantage.
	Slice of	20% (Left at status	15%	Increased competition will reduce car
	gross	quo)		service company slice.
	receipts			
_	Operating	40% (Low cost	25% (Partial	Drivers will become partial
	margin	model)	employee model)	employees, higher insurance and
				regulatory costs.
	Cost of	12% (Ninth decile of	10% (75 <sup>th</sup>	Business model in place and
	capital	US companies)	percentile of US	substantial revenues.
			companies)	
	Probability	10%	0%	Enough cash on hand to find off
	of failure			threats to survival.
	Value of	\$5.9 billion	\$23.4 billion	Value increased more than four fold.
	equity			

## The End

"There is no real ending. It's just the place where you stop the story."