Aswath Damodaran

VALUATION: IT'S NOT THAT COMPLICATED!

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
The Big Picture

Just because you have a D and a CF does not mean you have a DCF!

Some Initial Thoughts

" One hundred thousand lemmings cannot be wrong"


Graffiti




Theme 1: Characterizing Valuation as a discipline

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. Valuation is not a science.
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. Valuation is not an art.
- A craft is a skill that you learn <u>by doing</u>. The more you do it, the better you get at it. Valuation is a craft.

Theme 2: Valuing an asset is not the same as pricing that asset



Theme 3: Good valuation = Story + Numbers



Theme 4: If you value something, you should be willing to act on it..

- There is very little theory in valuation and I am not sure what an academic valuation would like like and am not sure that I want to find out.
- Pragmatism, not purity: The end game is to estimate a value for an asset. I plan to get there, even if it means taking short cuts and making assumptions that would make purists blanch.
- To act on your valuations, you have to have faith in
 In your own valuation judgments.
 In markets: that prices will move towards your value estimates.
 - That faith will have to be earned.

Misconceptions about Valuation

- Myth 1: A valuation is an objective search for "true" value
 - Truth 1.1: All valuations are biased. The only questions are how much and in which direction.
 - Truth 1.2: The direction and magnitude of the bias in your valuation is directly proportional to who pays you and how much you are paid.
- Myth 2.: A good valuation provides a precise estimate of value
 - **Truth 2.1: There are no precise valuations**
 - Truth 2.2: The payoff to valuation is greatest when valuation is least precise.
- □ Myth 3: . The more quantitative a model, the better the valuation
 - Truth 3.1: One's understanding of a valuation model is inversely proportional to the number of inputs required for the model.
 - Truth 3.2: Simpler valuation models do much better than complex ones.

Approaches to Valuation

- Intrinsic valuation, relates the value of an asset to the present value of expected future cashflows on that asset. In its most common form, this takes the form of a discounted cash flow valuation.
- Relative valuation, estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing of 'comparable' assets relative to a common variable like earnings, cash flows, book value or sales.
- Contingent claim valuation, uses option pricing models to measure the value of assets that share option characteristics.

Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

- What is it: In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on the asset.
- Philosophical Basis: Every asset has an intrinsic value that can be estimated, based upon its characteristics in terms of cash flows, growth and risk.
- Information Needed: To use discounted cash flow valuation, you need
 - to estimate the life of the asset
 - to estimate the cash flows during the life of the asset
 - to estimate the discount rate to apply to these cash flows to get present value
- Market Inefficiency: Markets are assumed to make mistakes in pricing assets across time, and are assumed to correct themselves over time, as new information comes out about assets.


Risk Adjusted Value: Three Basic Propositions

The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:


Value of asset = $\frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$


- *The IT Proposition*: If "it" does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), "it" cannot affect value.
- The DUH Proposition: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
- 3. The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.

DCF Choices: Equity Valuation versus Firm Valuation





The Drivers of Value...





Adjust for operating risk in cashflows






Henkel: October 2016 (in Euros)

					110		. 00				in Eur	031						
С	ash flo	ws from	existing assets	6					The Pay					Mat	turty and	Closure		
		LTM	Last 10 ye	pars				_									_	
Revenues	\$	18,074	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			venues w 4.2% a y		Op	peratng m	nargin	Salas	Invested		Stable Gro	owth			
		5.25%	Average = 12.			ext 5 yea			(per-tax) will			will stay	_	g = 0.03%	%;		-	_
Sales/Invested Capital 1.33		Average = 1.52			tapering down to			revert to ten-year average of		at ten-year			Cost of capital = 7%					
				0.1% growth i		in	in 12.80%			average of 1.52			ROC= 7%; Reinvestment Rate=g/ROC					
Return on Invested Capital	_	5.26%	Average = 14.			year 10			,	-		_		=03%/7%		-g/NOC		
Effective Tax Rate	2	4.20%	Average = 25.	.00%														
						+			+			<u> </u>		•				
V(Terminal value)	€	16,316						Euro Ca	ashflows			-	Ferminal	Value = 2	2,292/(.07	'0003)	= 33,2	214
V (CF over next 10 years)	€	12,741		_	Base year	1		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		erminal
alue of operating assets =	€	29,057	Revenue growth	rate	buse year	4.20%			4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	3.38%	2.56%	1.74%	0.92%			0.1
Debt	€	2,048	Revenues		€ 18,074				€ 20,448	€ 21,30	7 € 22,202	€ 22,952	€ 23,540					
Minority interests	€	138	EBIT (Operating		15.259				14.51%	14.27%		13.78%	13.53%	13.29%	13.049			12.8
Cash	€	2,305	EBIT (Operating	g income)					€ 2,968 25.00%	€ 3,04 25.00%		€ 3,163 25.00%	€ 3,186 25.00%	€ 3,183 25.00%	3 € 3,1: 25.009			
alue of equity	€	29,176	Tax rate EBIT(1-t)		25.009 € 2,067	-			€ 2,226	€ 2,28		€ 2,372	25.00% € 2,390				0% ,323 €	25.0
umber of shares		399.83	- Reinvestment		6 2,007	€ 49			€ 542			€ 494	€ 387				16 €	2,5
timated value /share	€	72.97	FCFF								5 € 1,746		€ 2,003				,307 €	
ice	€																	
		118.22 162.01%		Di	scount at	Euro Cost	t of Capi	ital (W/	ACC) = 7.7	78% (.95	3) + 0.72% (().042) = 7.4	8%	The	e Risk in t	he Casł	n flows	
	6,		Cost of Equity 7.78%	_	Со	st of Deb	t		^	We	3) + 0.72% ((eights 95.8% D = 4		8%	The	Risk in t	he Cash	n flows	
On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate =		Co (0.	st of Deb 03%+1%)	t (12965		^	We	eights 95.8% D = 4	1.2% E	:RP = 7.7	71%			n flows	
ice as % of value On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate =		Co (0.	st of Deb	t (12965	5) = 0.7	^	E =	eights 95.8% D = 4 <i>Re</i>	1.2%	RP = 7.7 <i>Rev</i>	71% venues	Weight	ERP	n flows	
ice as % of value On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate =		Co (0.	st of Deb 03%+1%)	t (12965	5) = 0.7	^	E =	eights 95.8% D = 4 85.8% Re 86	1.2% E	RP = 7.7 <i>Rev</i> €	71% venues 600	Weight 3.34%	ERP 11.76%	n flows	
On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate =		Co (0.	st of Deb 03%+1%)	t (12965	5) = 0.7	72%	E =	eights 95.8% D = 4 Re Africa Asia	4.2% E gion	ERP = 7.7 Rev € €	71% venues 600 3,134	Weight 3.34% 17.45%	ERP 11.76% 7.49%	n flows	
On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate =		Co (0.	st of Deb 03%+1%)	t (12965	5) = 0.7 X	72%		eights 95.8% D = 4 Prica Africa Asia Central and	4.2% E gion South Amer	$RP = 7.7$ Rev ϵ ϵ	71% venues 600 3,134 1,110	Weight 3.34% 17.45% 6.18%	ERP 11.76% 7.49% 10.42%	n flows	
On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate =		Co (0.	st of Deb 03%+1%)	t (12965	5) = 0.7 X	72%		eights 95.8% D = 4 Sia Asia Central and Eastern Euro	4.2% Egion South Amel	$RP = 7.7$ Rev ϵ ϵ $rica \epsilon$	71% //enues 600 3,134 1,110 2,695	Weight 3.34% 17.45% 6.18% 15.00%	<i>ERP</i> 11.76% 7.49% 10.42% 9.65%	n flows	
On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78%		+ E	st of Deb 03%+1%) Beta = 1.0	t (12965	5) = 0.7 X Firr Rat	72%		eights 95.8% D = 4 95.8% D = 4 Re Africa Asia Central and Eastern Euro Middle East	1.2% Egion South Amer	$RP = 7.7$ Rev ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ	71% venues 600 3,134 1,110 2,695 729	Weight 3.34% 17.45% 6.18% 15.00% 4.06%	ERP 11.76% 7.49% 10.42% 9.65% 7.11%	n flows	
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ice as % of value On October 25, 2016 Henkel was trading a	6,	162.01%	7.78% Free Rate: Risk free rate = % Business Chemical (Specialty	+ E Estimat	st of Deb 03%+1%) seta = 1.0 red Value 16,276	t (12965)1 Weigh i 35.62	5) = 0.7 X Firr Rat ht Un 1%	72% m's D/E tio: 4.4%	We E = eta 1.03	eights 95.8% D = 4 95.8% D = 4 Africa Africa Asia Central and Eastern Euro Middle East North Ameri Western Euro	4.2% Egion South Amer ope & Russia	$RP = 7.7$ Rev ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ	71% /enues 600 3,134 1,110 2,695 729 3,648 6,045	Weight 3.34% 17.45% 6.18% 15.00% 4.06% 20.31% 33.66%	<i>ERP</i> 11.76% 7.49% 10.42% 9.65% 7.11% 6.00% 7.16%	n flows	
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I. The Nuts and Bolts of D & CF

The details matter, but never as much as you think they do...

I. Measure earnings right..



Operating Leases at Amgen in 2007

Amgen has lease commitments and its cost of debt (based on it's A rating) is 5.63%.

Year	Commitment	Present Value
1	\$96.00	\$90.88
2	\$95.00	\$85.14
3	\$102.00	\$86.54
4	\$98.00	\$78.72
5	\$87.00	\$66.16
6-12	\$107.43	\$462.10 (\$752 million prorated)

Debt Value of leases =

\$869.55

- Debt outstanding at Amgen = \$7,402 + \$870 = \$8,272 million
- □ Adjusted Operating Income = Stated OI + Lease expense this year Depreciation

= 5,071 m + 69 m - 870/12 = \$5,068 million (12 year life for assets)

- □ Approximate Operating income= stated OI + PV of Lease commitment * Pre-tax cost of debt
- = \$5,071 m + 870 m (.0563) = \$5,120 million


Capitalizing R&D Expenses: Amgen

R & D was assumed to have a 10-year life.

Year	R&D Expense	Unamortiz	ed portion	Amortization this year		
Current	3366.00	1.00	3366.00			
-1	2314.00	0.90	2082.60	\$231.40		
-2	2028.00	0.80	1622.40	\$202.80		
-3	1655.00	0.70	1158.50	\$165.50		
-4	1117.00	0.60	670.20	\$111.70		
-5	865.00	0.50	432.50	\$86.50		
-6	845.00	0.40	338.00	\$84.50		
-7	823.00	0.30	246.90	\$82.30		
-8	663.00	0.20	132.60	\$66.30		
-9	631.00	0.10	63.10	\$63.10		
-10	558.00		0.00	\$55.80		
Value of Research Ass	et =		\$10,112.80	\$1,149.90		

Adjusted Operating Income = \$5,120 + 3,366 - 1,150 = \$7,336 million

Henkel's Operating History



II. Get the big picture (not the accounting one) when it comes to cap ex and working capital

Capital expenditures should include

- Research and development expenses, once they have been recategorized as capital expenses.
- Acquisitions of other firms, whether paid for with cash or stock.
- Working capital should be defined not as the difference between current assets and current liabilities but as the difference between non-cash current assets and nondebt current liabilities.
- On both items, start with what the company did in the most recent year but do look at the company's history and at industry averages.

Amgen's Net Capital Expenditures

- □ The accounting net cap ex at Amgen is small:
 - Accounting Capital Expenditures =
 - Accounting Depreciation =
 - Accounting Net Cap Ex =
- We define capital expenditures broadly to include R&D and acquisitions:
 - Accounting Net Cap Ex =
 - Net R&D Cap Ex = (3366-1150) =
 - Acquisitions in 2006 =
 - Total Net Capital Expenditures =

\$ 255 million
\$2,216 million
\$3,975 million
\$ 6,443 million

\$1,218 million

\$ 963 million

\$ 255 million

 Acquisitions have been a volatile item. Amgen was quiet on the acquisition front in 2004 and 2005 and had a significant acquisition in 2003.

III. The government bond rate is not always the risk free rate


- When valuing Amgen in US dollars, the US\$ ten-year bond rate of 4.78% was used as the risk free rate. We assumed that the US treasury was default free.
- When valuing Tata Motors in Indian rupees in 2010, the Indian government bond rate of 8% was not default free. Using the Indian government's local currency rating of Ba2 yielded a default spread of 3% for India and a riskfree rate of 5% in Indian rupees.

Risk free rate in Indian Rupees = 8% - 3% = 5%


To value Henkel in Euros, you need a risk free rate in Euros. Finding a ten-year government bond denominated in Euros is not the problem.. But choosing which one to use might be.

Euro Risk Free Rate?


Euro Government Bond Rates in 2017



Risk free rates will vary across currencies!



And across time...




And can be estimated even when you don't have government bonds...

- There are no traded long term Government bonds in some currencies. Hence, you have to improvise.
- One simple technique is to use differential inflation and the US dollar risk free rate. Using this technique on the Egyptian pound, here is what you get:
 - Risk free rate in US dollars on 12/31/15 = 2.27%
 - Expected inflation rate in the US = 1.50%
 - Expected inflation rate in Egypt = 9.70% (last year's estimate)
 - Risk free rate in EGP = (1.0227) * (1.097/1.015) -1 = 10.53%
- In the Middle East, where many currencies are pegged to the US dollar, it has become conventional wisdom to use the US T Bond rate as the risk free rate.
 - a. When is this practice justified?
 - b. When will this practice get you into trouble?


But valuations should not!

	In Indian Rupees	In US \$
Risk free Rate	5.00%	2.00%
Expected inflation rate	4.00%	1.00%
Cost of capital		
- High Growth	12.50%	9.25%
- Stable Growth	10.39%	7.21%
Expected growth rate		
- High Growth	12.01%	8.78%
- Stable Growth	5.00%	2.00%
Return on Capital		
- High Growth	17.16%	13.78%
- Stable Growth	10.39%	7.21%
Value per share	Rs 614	\$12.79/share (roughly Rs
		614 at current exchange
		rate)

Heineken: September 2019 (in Euros)



IV. Betas do not come from regressions... and are noisy...



But should not be trusted, even when they look great... <HELP> for explanation, <MENU> for similar functions. P255 Equity BETA Screen Printed HISTORICAL BETA NOK1V FH Equity NOKIA OVI Relative Index HEX HEX GENERAL INDEX *Indentifies latest observation Period 🛛 Weekly 40.00 Range 8/14/98 To 8/ 4/00 Y = 1.27 X + 0.42 Market I Trade 20.00 ADJ BETA 1.18 NO RAW BETA 1.27 Alpha(Intercept) 00 0.42 R2 (Correlation) 0.94 Std Dev of Error 1.87 Std Error of Beta 0.03 -20.00 Number of Points 103 -40.00 -20.00 ADJ BETA = (0.67) * RAW BETA -10.00 .00 10.00 20.00 + (0.33) * 1.0 Copyright 2000 BLOOMBERG L.P. Frankfurt:69-920410 Hong Kong:2-977-6000 London:207-330-7500 New York:212-318-2000 Princeton:609-279-3000 Singapore:226-3000 Sydney:2-9777-8686 Tokyo:3-3201-8900 Sao Paulo:11-3048-4500 1653-197-0 11-Aug-00 14:56:13

Aswath Damodaran


Bloomberg


33

And subject to game playing


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
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60-5 Y = 1.704 X -0.518					X = S&P 500 INDEX		
50 -					Linear Beta		Range 1
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treared with the second s					Adjusted BETA		1.470
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-30-					Significance		0.002
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1999	2004	2009		2014			
	tran						





Determinants of Betas





Three examples...

Amgen

- The unlevered beta for pharmaceutical firms is 1.59. Using Amgen's debt to equity ratio of 11%, the bottom up beta for Amgen is
- Bottom-up Beta = 1.59 (1+ (1-.35)(.11)) = 1.73
- Tata Motors
 - The unlevered beta for automobile firms is 0.98. Using Tata Motor's debt to equity ratio of 33.87%, the bottom up beta for Tata Motors is
 - Bottom-up Beta = 0.98 (1+ (1-.3399)(.3387)) = 1.20

Henkel

Business	Estimated Value	Weight	Unlevered Beta
Chemical (Specialty)	€ 16,276	35.61%	1.03
Household Products	€ 14,486	31.69%	0.96
Cosmetics/Toileries	€ 14,949	32.70%	0.93
Henkel	€ 45,711		0.98

Aswath Damodaran

Levered Beta = 0.98 (1 + (1 - .2965)(.044)) = 1.01

V. And the past is not always a good indicator of the future.


	Arithmet	tic Average	Geometric Average		
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	
1928-2020	8.28%	6.43%	6.47%	4.84%	
Std Error	2.06%	2.18%			
1971-2020	7.67%	4.90%	6.35%	3.91%	
Std Error	2.38%	2.70%			
2011-2020	13.83%	9.70%	13.24%	9.35%	
Std Error	3.88%	4.87%			

If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it

- Long term (because of the standard error)
- Consistent with your risk free rate
- A "compounded" average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias


But in the future..

39



Implied ERP for the S&P 500: History


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
Aswath Damodaran

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The Price of Risk: The 2008 Crisis



The Price of Risk: The COVID crisis



42

Implied Premium for India using the Sensex: April 2010

- \Box Level of the Index = 17559
- FCFE on the Index = 3.5% (Estimated FCFE for companies in index as % of market value of equity)
- Other parameters
 - Riskfree Rate = 5% (Rupee)
 - Expected Growth (in Rupee)
 - Next 5 years = 20% (Used expected growth rate in Earnings)
 - After year 5 = 5%
- Solving for the expected return:
 - Expected return on Equity = 11.72%
 - Implied Equity premium for India =11.72% 5% = 6.72%


Global Equities?

						Growth	Growth	Cost of		
Start of	PBV	PBV	ROE	ROE	US T.Bond	Rate	Rate	Equity	Cost of Equity	
year	(Developed)	(Emerging)	(Developed)	(Emerging)	Rate	(Developed)	(Emerging)	(Developed)	(Emerging)	Differential
2004	2.00	1.19	10.81%	11.65%	4.25%	3.75%	4.75%	7.28%	10.55%	3.27%
2005	2.09	1.27	11.12%	11.93%	4.22%	3.72%	4.72%	7.26%	10.40%	3.14%
2006	2.03	1.44	11.32%	12.18%	4.39%	3.89%	4.89%	7.55%	9.95%	2.40%
2007	1.67	1.67	10.87%	12.88%	4.70%	4.20%	5.20%	8.19%	9.80%	1.60%
2008	0.87	0.83	9.42%	11.12%	4.02%	3.52%	4.52%	10.30%	12.47%	2.17%
2009	1.20	1.34	8.48%	11.02%	2.21%	1.71%	2.71%	7.35%	8.91%	1.56%
2010	1.39	1.43	9.14%	11.22%	3.84%	3.34%	4.34%	7.51%	9.15%	1.64%
2011	1.12	1.08	9.21%	10.04%	3.29%	2.79%	3.79%	8.52%	9.58%	1.05%
2012	1.17	1.18	9.10%	9.33%	1.88%	1.38%	2.38%	7.98%	8.27%	0.29%
2013	1.56	1.63	8.67%	10.48%	1.76%	1.26%	2.26%	6.01%	7.30%	1.29%
2014	1.95	1.50	9.27%	9.64%	3.04%	2.54%	3.54%	5.99%	7.61%	1.62%
2015	1.88	1.56	9.69%	9.75%	2.17%	1.67%	2.67%	5.94%	7.21%	1.27%
2016	1.99	1.59	9.24%	10.16%	2.27%	1.77%	2.77%	5.52%	7.42%	1.89%
2017	1.76	1.48	8.71%	9.53%	2.68%	2.18%	3.18%	5.89%	7.47%	1.58%
2018	1.98	1.66	11.23%	11.36%	2.68%	2.18%	3.18%	6.75%	8.11%	1.36%
2019	1.64	1.31	12.09%	11.35%	2.68%	2.18%	3.18%	8.22%	9.42%	1.19%

VI. There is a downside to globalization...

- Emerging markets offer growth opportunities but they are also riskier. If we want to count the growth, we have to also consider the risk.
- Two ways of estimating the country risk premium:
 - Sovereign Default Spread: In this approach, the country equity risk premium is set equal to the default spread of the bond issued by the country.
 - Equity Risk Premium for mature market = 6.00%
 - Default Spread for India = 2.00% (based on rating)
 - Equity Risk Premium for India = 6.00% + 2.00% = 8.00%
 - Adjusted for equity risk: The country equity risk premium is based upon the volatility of the equity market relative to the government bond rate.
 - Country risk premium = Default Spread* Std Deviation_{Country Equity} / Std Deviation_{Country Bond}
 - Standard Deviation in Sensex = 21%
 - Standard Deviation in Indian government bond= 14%
 - Default spread on Indian Bond= 2%
 - Additional country risk premium for India = 2% (21/14) = 3.00%
 - Total equity risk premium = US equity risk premium + CRP for India
 - = 6.00% + 3.00% = 9.00%

A Template for Estimating the ERP: Jan 1, 2021



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	Denma	ark	Aaa	0	.00%		4.72%	Μ	alta	1	12	0.3
2	Finlan	d	Aal	0	.38%		5.10%	N	etherlands	A	aa	0.0
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Caal 7.26% 11.98% Italy

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		_	Azerbaijan	Ba2	-	91%		3%
00%	4.72%	-	Belarus	B3	-	30%	11.0	-
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		11	Kyrgyzstan	B2	5.	33%	10.0	5%
00%	4.729	0	Latvia	A3	1.	16%	5.8	8%
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	5	-	Poland	A2	0.	82%	5.5	4%
		5	Romania	Baa3	2.	13%	6.8	5%
	7		Russia	Baa3	2.	13%	6.8	5%
	1		Serbia	Ba3	_	49%	8.2	1%
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CRF	ERP		Slovenia	A3	1.	16%	5.8	8%
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3.499	_	_	Kuwait	A	1	0.6	8%	5.
6.309 5.339			Lebanon	C		19.1	8%	23.
5.339	_	_	Oman	Ba	3	3.4		8.
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4.94	9.66	6						

4.72%

5.40%

6.56%

5.20%

6.25%

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_				_		-		-		
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,	Rlue · Mo	ady's	Ratina	
,	Australia & NZ		0.00%	4.72%
	New Zealand	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
2	Cook Islands	B1	4.36%	9.08%
2	Australia	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%

Blue: Moody's Rating Red: Added Country Risk Green #: Total ERP

VII. And it is not just emerging market companies that are exposed to this risk..

- Location-based ERP make no sense: The "default" approach in valuation has been to assign country risk based upon your country of incorporation. Thus, if you are incorporated in a developed market, the assumption has been that you are not exposed to emerging market risks. If you are incorporated in an emerging market, you are saddled with the entire country risk.
- And creates significant biases: As companies globalize and look for revenues in foreign markets, this practice will under estimate the costs of equity of developed market companies with significant emerging market risk exposure and over estimate the costs of equity of emerging market companies with significant developed market risk exposure.

Henkel: Equity Risk Premium in 2021

Region	Revenues in LTM	Weight	ERP
Africa	€ 600	3.34%	11.76%
Asia	€ 3,134	17.45%	7.49%
Central and South America	€ 1,110	6.18%	10.42%
Eastern Europe & Russia	€ 2,695	15.00%	9.65%
Middle East	€ 729	4.06%	7.11%
North America	€ 3,648	20.31%	6.00%
Western Europe	€ 6,045	33.66%	7.16%
Henkel	€ 17,961	100.00%	7.71%

Natural Resource Twists? Royal Dutch

Country	Oil & Gas Production	% of Total	ERP
Denmark	17396	3.83%	6.20%
Italy	11179	2.46%	9.14%
Norway	14337	3.16%	6.20%
UK	20762	4.57%	6.81%
Rest of Europe	874	0.19%	7.40%
Brunei	823	0.18%	9.04%
Iraq	20009	4.40%	11.37%
Malaysia	22980	5.06%	8.05%
Oman	78404	17.26%	7.29%
Russia	22016	4.85%	10.06%
Rest of Asia & ME	24480	5.39%	7.74%
Oceania	7858	1.73%	6.20%
Gabon	12472	2.75%	11.76%
Nigeria	67832	14.93%	11.76%
Rest of Africa	6159	1.36%	12.17%
USA	104263	22.95%	6.20%
Canada	8599	1.89%	6.20%
Brazil	13307	2.93%	9.60%
Rest of Latin America	576	0.13%	10.78%
Royal Dutch Shell	454326	100.00%	8.26%

An alternate way: Estimating a company's exposure to country risk (Lambda)


- Just as beta measures exposure to macro economic risk, lambda measures exposure just to country risk. Like beta, it is scaled around one.
- The easiest and most accessible data is on revenues. Most companies break their revenues down by region. One simplistic solution would be to do the following:

Lambda = % of revenues domestically _{firm}/ % of revenues domestically _{average firm}

- In 2008-09, Tata Motors got about 91.37% of its revenues in India and TCS got 7.62%. The average Indian firm gets about 80% of its revenues in India:
 - Lambda _{Tata Motors} = 91%/80% = 1.14
 - The danger of focusing just on revenues is that it misses other exposures to risk (production and operations).


Tata Motors	TCS
High	High
Estimated 70% (in 2010)	7.62%
0.80	0.20
Low. Significant physical	
assets.	High. Human capital is mobile.
	High 91.37% (in 2009) Estimated 70% (in 2010) 0.80

VIII. Growth has to be earned (not endowed or estimated): Sustainable Growth



- 1. <u>No free growth</u>: In the long term, to grow, you have to reinvest.
- 2. <u>Growth Quality</u>: For a given reinvestment, the higher the return you generate on your reinvestment, the faster you can grow.
- 3. <u>Scaling up is hard to do:</u> As companies get larger, it gets more difficult to sustain value-adding growth.

Measuring Returns: The Quandary



Earn at least your cost of capital! But companies seem to have trouble in practice




Return Spreads in 2020: Global Breakdown


A More General Way to Estimate Growth: Top Down Growth

- All of the fundamental growth equations assume that the firm has a return on equity or return on capital it can sustain in the long term.
- When operating income is negative or margins are expected to change over time, we use a three step process to estimate growth:
 - Estimate growth rates in revenues over time
 - Determine the total market (given your business model) and estimate the market share that you think your company will earn.
 - Decrease the growth rate as the firm becomes larger
 - Keep track of absolute revenues to make sure that the growth is feasible
 - Estimate expected operating margins each year
 - Set a target margin that the firm will move towards
 - Adjust the current margin towards the target margin
 - Estimate the capital that needs to be invested to generate revenue growth and expected margins
 - Estimate a sales to capital ratio that you will use to generate reinvestment needs each year.

Value: The Drivers



IX. All good things come to an end..And the terminal value is not an ATM...




Terminal Value and Growth

Stable Growth Rate	Amgen	Tata Motors	Henkel	Heineken
0%	\$150,652	₹ 435,686	€ 33,214	€59,438
1%	\$154,479	₹ 435,686	€ 33,214	€59,438
2%	\$160,194	₹ 435,686		€59,438
3%	\$167,784	₹ 435,686		
4%	\$179,099	₹ 435,686		
5%		₹ 435,686		
10%				
Risk free Rate	4.78%	5.00%	0.03%	-0.50%
ROIC	10.00%	10.39%	7.00%	5.00%
Cost of capital	8.08%	10.39%	7.00%	5.00%

II. The loose ends in valuation...

A premium here, a discount there, and soon you are where you wanted to be in the first place..

Getting from DCF to value per share: The Loose Ends




1. The Value of Cash An Exercise in Cash Valuation

	Company A	Company B	Company C
Enterprise Value	\$1 billion	\$1 billion	\$1 billion
Cash	\$ 100 mil	\$ 100 mil	\$ 100 mil
Return on Capital	10%	5%	22%
Cost of Capital	10%	10%	12%
Trades in	US	US	Argentina

In which of these companies is cash most likely to trade at face value, at a discount and at a premium?

Cash: Discount or Premium?

Market Value of \$ 1 in cash: Estimates obtained by regressing Enterprise Value against Cash Balances



2. Dealing with Holdings in Other firms

Holdings in other firms can be categorized into

- Minority passive holdings, in which case only the dividend from the holdings is shown in the balance sheet
- Minority active holdings, in which case the share of equity income is shown in the income statements
- Majority active holdings, in which case the financial statements are consolidated.
- We tend to be sloppy in practice in dealing with cross holdings. After valuing the operating assets of a firm, using consolidated statements, it is common to add on the balance sheet value of minority holdings (which are in book value terms) and subtract out the minority interests (again in book value terms), representing the portion of the consolidated company that does not belong to the parent company.


How to value holdings in other firms.. In a perfect world..

- In a perfect world, we would strip the parent company from its subsidiaries and value each one separately. The value of the combined firm will be
 - Value of parent company + Proportion of value of each subsidiary
- To do this right, you will need to be provided detailed information on each subsidiary to estimate cash flows and discount rates.

Two compromise solutions...

- The market value solution: When the subsidiaries are publicly traded, you could use their traded market capitalizations to estimate the values of the cross holdings. You do risk carrying into your valuation any mistakes that the market may be making in valuation.
- The relative value solution: When there are too many cross holdings to value separately or when there is insufficient information provided on cross holdings, you can convert the book values of holdings that you have on the balance sheet (for both minority holdings and minority interests in majority holdings) by using the average price to book value ratio of the sector in which the subsidiaries operate.

Tata Motor's Cross Holdings



3. Other Assets that have not been counted

yet..

- Unutilized assets: If you have assets or property that are not being utilized (vacant land, for example), you have not valued it yet. You can assess a market value for these assets and add them on to the value of the firm.
- <u>Overfunded pension plans</u>: If you have a defined benefit plan and your assets exceed your expected liabilities, you could consider the over funding with two caveats:
 - Collective bargaining agreements may prevent you from laying claim to these excess assets.
 - There are tax consequences. Often, withdrawals from pension plans get taxed at much higher rates.
- Do not double count an asset. If you count the income from an asset in your cash flows, you cannot count the market value of the asset in your value.

The "real estate" play

- Assume that Accor Hotels, a hotel company, has real estate investments underlying its operations. Assume that you estimate a real estate value of \$1.5 billion for the real estate. Can you add this value on to your DCF value that you get for the hotel business?
- a. Yes.
- b. No.
- c. Depends
- What would you do if the value of the land exceeds the present value that you have estimated for them as operating assets?
 - a. Nothing
 - b. Use the higher of the two values
 - c. Use the lower of the two values
 - d. Use a weighted average of the two values

An Uncounted Asset?



The longtime home of Playboy magazine founder Hugh Hefner is to be sold to Daren Metropoulos, a principal at private-equity firm Metropoulos & Co. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

4. A Discount for Complexity: An Experiment

	Company A	Company B		
Operating Income	\$1 billion	\$1 billion		
Tax rate	40%	40%		
ROIC	10%	10%		
Expected Growth	5%	5%		
Cost of capital	8%	8%		
Business Mix	Single	Multiple Businesses		
Holdings	Simple	Complex		
Accounting	Transparent	Opaque		
Which firm would you value more highly?				

Measuring Complexity: Volume of Data in Financial Statements

Company	Number of pages in last 10Q	Number of pages in last 10K
General Electric	65	410
Microsoft	63	218
Wal-mart	38	244
Exxon Mobil	86	332
Pfizer	171	460
Citigroup	252	1026
Intel	69	215
AIG	164	720
Johnson & Johnson	63	218
IBM	85	353

Measuring Complexity: A Complexity Score

tem	Factors	Follow-up Question	Answer	Weighting factor	Gerdau Score	GE Score
Operating Income 1. Multiple Businesses 2. One-time income and expenses 3. Income from unspecified sources 4. Items in income statement that are volatil	1. Multiple Businesses	Number of businesses (with more than 10% of				
	revenues) =	1	2.00	2	30	
	Percent of operating income =	10%	10.00	1	0.8	
	Percent of operating income =	0%	10.00	0	1.2	
	Percent of operating income =	15%	5.00	0.75	1	
ax Rate	1. Income from multiple locales	Percent of revenues from non-domestic locales =	70%	3.00	2.1	1.8
 Different tax and reporting books Headquarters in tax havens Volatile effective tax rate 	1 0	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0	
	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	0	
Capital Expenditures 1. Volatile capital expenditures	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2	
	2. Frequent and large acquisitions	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=4	4	4
	3. Stock payment for acquisitions and		105	105-1		
investments		Yes or No	No	Yes=4	0	4
Working capital 1. Unspecified current assets and current	-					
		Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
2. Volatile working capital items	. .	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
 Expected Growth rate 1. Off-balance sheet assets and liabilities (operating leases and R&D) 2. Substantial stock buybacks 3. Changing return on capital over time 4. Unsustainably high return 						
		Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	-	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Changing return on capital over time	Is your return on capital volatile?	Yes	Yes=5	5	5
	4. Unsustainably high return	Is your firm's ROC much higher than industry average?	No	Yes=5	0	0
Cost of capital	1. Multiple businesses	Number of businesses (more than 10% of revenues) =	1	1.00	1	20
 2. Operations in emerging markets 3. Is the debt market traded? 4. Does the company have a rating? 5. Does the company have off-balance she debt? 	2. Operations in emerging markets	Percent of revenues=	50%	5.00	2.5	2.5
	3. Is the debt market traded?	Yes or No	No	No=2	2	0
	4. Does the company have a rating?	Yes or No	Yes	No=2	0	0
	5. Does the company have off-balance sheet		105	110-2	0	0
		Yes or No	No	Yes=5	0	5
o-operating assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	0%	20.00	0	0.8
irm to Equity value	Consolidation of subsidiaries	Minority interest as percent of book value of equity	63%	20.00	12.6	1.2
er share value ASWATH DAN	Shares with different voting rights	Does the firm have shares with different voting rights?	Yes	Yes = 10	10	0
ASWain Dan	Equity options outstanding	Options outstanding as percent of shares	0%	10.00	0	0.2
		Complexity Score =	070	10.00	48.95	90.55


Dealing with Complexity

In Discounted Cashflow Valuation

- The Aggressive Analyst: Trust the firm to tell the truth and value the firm based upon the firm's statements about their value.
- The Conservative Analyst: Don't value what you cannot see.
- **The Compromise: Adjust the value for complexity**
 - Adjust cash flows for complexity
 - Adjust the discount rate for complexity
 - Adjust the expected growth rate/ length of growth period
 - Value the firm and then discount value for complexity
- In relative valuation
 - In a relative valuation, you may be able to assess the price that the market is charging for complexity:
 - With the hundred largest market cap firms, for instance:

PBV = 0.65 + 15.31 ROE – 0.55 Beta + 3.04 Expected growth rate – 0.003 # Pages in 10K

5. The Value of Synergy



Valuing Synergy

(1) the firms involved in the merger are valued independently, by discounting expected cash flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm.

(2) the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, is obtained by adding the values obtained for each firm in the first step.

(3) The effects of synergy are built into expected growth rates and cashflows, and the combined firm is re-valued with synergy.

Value of Synergy = Value of the combined firm, with synergy - Value of the combined firm, without synergy

Inbev + SAB Miller: Where's the synergy?

			<i>Combined</i> <i>firm (status</i>	Combined firm
	Inbev	SABMiller	quo)	(synergy)
Levered Beta	0.85	0.8289	0.84641	0.84641
Pre-tax cost of debt	3.0000%	3.2000%	3.00%	3.00%
Effective tax rate	18.00%	26.36%	19.92%	19.92%
Debt to Equity Ratio	30.51%	23.18%	29.71%	29.71%
Revenues	\$45,762.00	\$22,130.00	\$67,892.00	\$67,892.00
Operating Margin	32.28%	19.97%	28.27%	30.00%
Operating Income (EBIT)	\$14,771.97	\$4,419.36	\$19,191.33	\$20.368
After-tax return on capital	12.10%	12.64%	11.68%	12.00%
Reinvestment Rate =	50.99%	33.29%	43.58%	50.00%
Expected Growth Rate	6.17%	4.21%	5.09%	6.00%

The value of synergy

	Inbev	SABMiller	Combined firm (status quo)	Combined firm (synergy)
Cost of Equity =	8.93%	9.37%	9.12%	9.12%
After-tax cost of debt =	2.10%	2.24%	2.10%	2.10%
Cost of capital =	7.33%	8.03%	7.51%	7.51%
After-tax return on capital =	12.10%	12.64%	11.68%	12.00%
Reinvestment Rate =	50.99%	33.29%	43.58%	50.00%
Expected growth rate=	6.17%	4.21%	5.09%	6.00%
	Value oj	f firm		
PV of FCFF in high growth =	\$28,733	\$9,806	\$38,539	\$39,151
Terminal value =	\$260,982	\$58,736	\$319,717	\$340,175
Value of operating assets =	\$211,953	\$50,065	\$262,018	\$276,610

Value of synergy = 276,610 – 262,018 = 14,592 million 77

6. Brand name, great management, superb product ... Are we short changing intangibles?

- There is often a temptation to add on premiums for intangibles. Here are a few examples.
 - Brand name
 - Great management
 - Loyal workforce
 - Technological prowess
- There are two potential dangers:
 - For some assets, the value may already be in your value and adding a premium will be double counting.
 - For other assets, the value may be ignored but incorporating it will not be easy.

Valuing Brand Name

	Coca Cola	With Cott Margins
Current Revenues =	\$21,962.00	\$21,962.00
Length of high-growth period	10	10
Reinvestment Rate =	50%	50%
Operating Margin (after-tax)	15.57%	5.28%
Sales/Capital (Turnover ratio)	1.34	1.34
Return on capital (after-tax)	20.84%	7.06%
Growth rate during period (g) =	10.42%	3.53%
Cost of Capital during period =	7.65%	7.65%
Stable Growth Period		
Growth rate in steady state =	4.00%	4.00%
Return on capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Reinvestment Rate =	52.28%	52.28%
Cost of Capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Value of Firm =	\$79,611.25	\$15,371.24

Valuing a Franchise: Star Wars

		Add-on \$ per Box Office \$	St	Star Wars Franchise Valuation: December 2015										
Streamin	ng/Video	\$1.20												
Toys & N	Nerchandise	\$2.00												
Books/el	Books	\$0.20			Δ.	Main Movies			[Spin Off Mov World Box office is main movies				
Gaming		\$0.50		World B		coffice of \$1.	5 hill	ion						
Other		\$0.50				ed for 2% infl		· ·						
	Add on \$			Mai	in S	Star Wars Mo	vies			Sta	r Wai	rs Spin d	offs	
	per box			Star Wars VII	-	tar Wars VIII	Star Wars IX 4.0		Ro	gue One		Solo?		a Fett?
	office \$	Years from now		0.0		2.0			1.0		3.0		5.0	
		Movies - Revenues		\$2,000		\$2,081	\$	2,165	\$1,020		\$1,061		\$1,104	
		Streaming/Video - Revenue	es	\$2,400		\$2,497	\$2,598		\$1,224		\$1,273		\$1,325	
		Toys & Merchandise - Reve	Merchandise - Revenues			\$4,162	\$4,330		\$2,040		\$2,122		\$2,208	
ļ		Books/eBooks - Revenues	\$400		\$416	\$433		\$204		\$212		\$221		
•		Gaming - Revenues	\$1,000		\$1,040	\$1,082		\$510		\$531		\$552		
		Other - Revenues	\$1,000		\$1,040		\$1,082		\$510	\$531		\$552		
Operatir	ng Margin	Total - Revenues	\$10,800		\$11,236		1,690	\$5,508		\$5,731		\$5,962		
	for movies													
	non-movies	After-tax Operating Income	e (movies)	\$ 282	\$	293	\$	305	\$	144	\$	150	\$	156
30% t	tax rate	After-tax Operating Income	e (non-movies)	\$ 924	\$	961	\$	1,000	\$	471	\$	490	\$	510
	► ►	Present Value		\$ 1,206	\$	5 1,083	\$	973	\$	572	\$	514	\$	461
		Value of new Star Wars mo	wies -	\$4,809	-									
Discou	unted back			\$4,809	-				-					
@ 7.61% cost of		Value of continuing income Value of Star Wars =	2 =	\$9,972	-				-					
	pital of	value of Star wars =		\$9,972										
	rtainment				[Assume	es tha	at revenu	les	from add	ons			
COL	npanies	J				continue a						ar,		
								% opera		•				

7. Be circumspect about defining debt for cost of capital purposes...


- General Rule: Debt generally has the following characteristics:
 - Commitment to make fixed payments in the future
 - The fixed payments are tax deductible
 - Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the firm to the party to whom payments are due.
- Defined as such, debt should include
 - All interest bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term
 - All leases, operating as well as capital
- Debt should not include
 - Accounts payable or supplier credit


But should consider other potential liabilities when getting to equity value...


- If you have under funded pension fund or health care plans, you should consider the under funding at this stage in getting to the value of equity.
 - If you do so, you should not double count by also including a cash flow line item reflecting cash you would need to set aside to meet the unfunded obligation.
 - You should not be counting these items as debt in your cost of capital calculations....
- If you have contingent liabilities for example, a potential liability from a lawsuit that has not been decided - you should consider the expected value of these contingent liabilities
 - Value of contingent liability = Probability that the liability will occur * Expected value of liability

8. The Value of Control

- The value of the control premium that will be paid to acquire a block of equity will depend upon two factors -
 - Probability that control of firm will change: This refers to the probability that incumbent management will be replaced. this can be either through acquisition or through existing stockholders exercising their muscle.
 - Value of Gaining Control of the Company: The value of gaining control of a company arises from two sources - the increase in value that can be wrought by changes in the way the company is managed and run, and the side benefits and perquisites of being in control
 - Value of Gaining Control = Present Value (Value of Company with change in control - Value of company without change in control) + Side Benefits of Control







Value of Control and the Value of Voting Rights

- Adris Grupa has two classes of shares outstanding: 9.616 million voting shares and 6.748 million non-voting shares.
- To value a non-voting share, we assume that all non-voting shares essentially have to settle for status quo value. All shareholders, common and preferred, get an equal share of the status quo value.

Status Quo Value of Equity = 5,484 million HKR

Value for a non-voting share = 5484/(9.616+6.748) = 334 HKR/share

 To value a voting share, we first value control in Adris Grup as the difference between the optimal and the status quo value: Value of control at Adris Grupa = 5,735 – 5484 = 249 million HKR
 Value per voting share =334 HKR + 249/9.616 = 362 HKR

III. The Dark Side of Valuation

Valuing difficult-to-value companies!

The fundamental determinants of value...

What are the	What is the value added by growth as Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cas Firm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows		
cashflows from existing assets? - Equity: Cashflows after debt payments - Firm: Cashflows before debt payments	How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets? Equity: Risk in equity in the company Firm: Risk in the firm's operations	h	When will the firm become a mature firm , and what are the potential roadblocks?

The Dark Side of Valuation...

- Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.
- The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value "difficult" companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:
 - Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses
 - Companies that don't fit the accounting mold
 - Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or nationalization risk)

Difficult to value companies...

□ Across the life cycle:

- Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.
- Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change, history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.
- Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.

Across sectors

- Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what's going on.
- Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.
- **•** Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.
- Across the ownership cycle
 - Privately owned businesses: Exposure to firm specific risk and illiquidity bedevil valuations.
 - Venture Capital (VC) and private equity: Different equity investors, with different perceptions of risk.
 - Closely held public firms: Part private and part public, sharing the troubles of both.

I. The challenge with young companies...


Figure 5.2: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult becaue you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/ service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.


Cash flows from existing assets non-existent or negative.	What is the value a assets?	added by growth	\bigcirc	
What are the cashflows from existing assets? Different claims on cash flows can affect value of equity at each stage.	existing assets and Limited historical	l data on earnings, rices for securities		When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?Will the firm make it through the gauntlet of market demand and competition? Even if it does, assessing when it will
What is the value of equity in the firm?				become mature is difficult because there is so little to go on.

Upping the ante.. Young companies in young businesses...

- □ When valuing a business, we generally draw on three sources of information
 - **D** The firm's current financial statement
 - How much did the firm sell?
 - How much did it earn?
 - **The firm's financial history, usually summarized in its financial statements.**
 - How fast have the firm's revenues and earnings grown over time?
 - What can we learn about cost structure and profitability from these trends?
 - Susceptibility to macro-economic factors (recessions and cyclical firms)
 - The industry and comparable firm data
 - What happens to firms as they mature? (Margins.. Revenue growth... Reinvestment needs... Risk)
- It is when valuing these companies that you find yourself tempted by the dark side, where
 - "Paradigm shifts" happen...
 - New metrics are invented ...
 - The story dominates and the numbers lag...



Lesson 1: Don't trust regression betas....




Lesson 2: Work backwards and keep it simple...

Year	Revenue Growth	Sales	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)
Tr 12 mths		\$1,117	-36.71%	-\$410	-\$410
1	150.00%	\$2,793	-13.35%	-\$373	-\$373
2	100.00%	\$5,585	-1.68%	-\$94	-\$94
3	75.00%	\$9,774	4.16%	\$407	\$407
4	50.00%	\$14,661	7.08%	\$1,038	\$871
5	30.00%	\$19,059	8.54%	\$1,628	\$1,058
6	25.20%	\$23,862	9.27%	\$2,212	\$1,438
7	20.40%	\$28,729	9.64%	\$2,768	\$1,799
8	15.60%	\$33,211	9.82%	\$3,261	\$2,119
9	10.80%	\$36,798	9.91%	\$3,646	\$2,370
10	6.00%	\$39,006	9.95%	\$3,883	\$2,524
ΤY	6.00%	\$41,346	10.00%	\$4,135	\$2,688

Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do...

Typically, the revenue growth rate of a newly public company outpaces its industry average for only about five years.



Lesson 4: Don't forget to pay for growth...

Year	Revenues	Δ Revenue	Sales/Cap	Δ Investment	Invested Capital		EBIT (1-t)	Imputed ROC
Tr 12 mths	\$1,117				\$	487	-\$410	
1	\$2,793	\$1,676	3.00	\$559	\$	1,045	-\$373	-76.62%
2	\$5,585	\$2,793	3.00	\$931	\$	1,976	-\$94	-8.96%
3	\$9,774	\$4,189	3.00	\$1,396	\$	3,372	\$407	20.59%
4	\$14,661	\$4,887	3.00	\$1,629	\$	5,001	\$871	25.82%
5	\$19,059	\$4,398	3.00	\$1,466	\$	6,467	\$1,058	21.16%
6	\$23,862	\$4,803	3.00	\$1,601	\$	8,068	\$1,438	22.23%
7	\$28,729	\$4,868	3.00	\$1,623	\$	9,691	\$1,799	22.30%
8	\$33,211	\$4,482	3.00	\$1,494	\$	11,185	\$2,119	21.87%
9	\$36,798	\$3,587	3.00	\$1,196	\$	12,380	\$2,370	21.19%
10	\$39,006	\$2,208	3.00	\$736	\$	13,116	\$2,524	20.39%
ΤY	\$41,346	\$2,340	NA			Assumed to	20.00%	

Lesson 5: There are always scenarios where the market price can be justified...

		Target pre-tax Operating Margin									
Ð			6%	8%		10%		12%		14%	
annual ⁄th rate	30%	\$	(1.94)	\$	2.95	\$	7.84	\$	12.71	\$	17.57
anr th	35%	\$	1.41	\$	8.37	\$	15.33	\$	22.27	\$	29.21
<	40%	\$	6.10	\$	15.93	\$	25.74	\$	35.54	\$	45.34
C	45%	\$	12.59	\$	26.34	\$	40.05	\$	53.77	\$	67.48
nou	50%	\$	21.47	\$	40.50	\$	59.52	\$	78.53	\$	97.54
Compounded Revenue Grov	55%	\$	33.47	\$	59.60	\$	85.72	\$	111.84	\$	137.95
Cc Re	60%	\$	49.53	\$	85.10	\$	120.66	\$	156.22	\$	191.77

Lesson 6: You will be wrong 100% of the time... and it really is not (always) your fault...

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- A test: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least over time).

And the market is often "more wrong"....

Amazon: Value and Price

\$90.00 \$80.00 \$70.00 \$60.00 \$50.00 ■ Value per share Price per share \$40.00 \$30.00 \$20.00 \$10.00 \$0.00-2000 2002 2001 2003 Time of analysis

Valuing an IPO


Valuation issues:

- Use of the proceeds from the offering: The proceeds from the offering can be held as cash by the firm to cover future investment needs, paid to existing equity investors who want to cash out or used to pay down debt.
- Warrants/ Special deals with prior equity investors: If venture capitalists and other equity investors from earlier iterations of fund raising have rights to buy or sell their equity at pre-specified prices, it can affect the value per share offered to the public.

Pricing issues:

- Institutional set-up: Most IPOs are backed by investment banking guarantees on the price, which can affect how they are priced.
- Follow-up offerings: The proportion of equity being offered at initial offering and subsequent offering plans can affect pricing.

Alibaba: Pre-IPO valuation - September 2, 2014 (in US \$)



II. Dealing with decline and distress...

Historial data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.

Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.

What is the value added by growth assets?

change.

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

> Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity

What is the value of equity in the firm?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?


Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestuture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.

Dealing with the "downside" of Distress

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will understate the value of the firm.
- Value of Equity= DCF value of equity (1 Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- □ There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
 - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
 - **E** Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
 - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).




Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..

In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at \$529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:

$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^{t}}{(1.03)^{t}} + \frac{1000(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^{7}}{(1.03)^{7}}$$

- □ Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:
- \Box π_{Distress} = Annual probability of default = 13.54%
 - Cumulative probability of surviving 10 years = $(1 .1354)^{10} = 23.34\%$
 - Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years = 1 .2334 = .7666 or 76.66%
- If LVS is becomes distressed:
 - Expected distress sale proceeds = \$2,769 million < Face value of debt</p>
 - Expected equity value/share = \$0.00
- □ Expected value per share = \$8.12 (1 .7666) + \$0.00 (.7666) = \$1.92

The upside of distress: Equity as a call option to liquidate the firm



Application to valuation: A simple example

- Assume that you have a firm whose assets are currently valued at \$100 million and that the standard deviation in this asset value is 40%.
- Further, assume that the face value of debt is \$80 million (It is zero coupon debt with 10 years left to maturity).
- □ If the ten-year treasury bond rate is 10%,
 - how much is the equity worth?
 - What should the interest rate on debt be?

Model Parameters & Valuation

□ The inputs

- Value of the underlying asset = S = Value of the firm = \$ 100 million
- Exercise price = K = Face Value of outstanding debt = \$80 million
- Life of the option = t = Life of zero-coupon debt = 10 years
- Variance in the value of the underlying asset = σ² = Variance in firm value = 0.16
- Riskless rate = r = Treasury bond rate corresponding to option life = 10%

□ The output


- The Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
 - d1 = 1.5994 N(d1) = 0.9451
 d2 = 0.3345 N(d2) = 0.6310
- □ Value of the call = 100 (0.9451) 80 exp^{(-0.10)(10}) (0.6310) = \$75.94 million
- Value of the outstanding debt = \$100 \$75.94 = \$24.06 million
- Interest rate on debt = $(\$ 80 / \$24.06)^{1/10} 1 = 12.77\%$

Firm value drops..

- Assume now that a catastrophe wipes out half the value of this firm (the value drops to \$ 50 million), while the face value of the debt remains at \$ 80 million.
- □ The inputs
 - Value of the underlying asset = S = Value of the firm = \$50 million
 - All the other inputs remain unchanged
- □ The output
 - Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
 - d1 = 1.0515 N(d1) = 0.8534
 - d2 = -0.2135 N(d2) = 0.4155
 - □ Value of the call = 50 (0.8534) 80 $exp^{(-0.10)(10)}$ (0.4155) = \$30.44 million
 - Value of the bond= \$50 \$30.44 = \$19.56 million

Equity value persists .. As firm value declines..

Value of Equity as Firm Value Changes



Aswath Damodaran

III. Valuing Financial Service Companies

Existing assets are usually financial assets or loans, often marked to market. Earnings do not provide much information on underlying risk.	Defining capital expenditures and working challenge.Growth can be strongly influence regulatory limits and constraints. Both the a new investments and the returns on these can change with regulatory changes. What is the value added by growth assets?	ed by amount of
What are the cashflows from existing assets?Preferred stock is a significant source of capital.What is the value of equity in the firm?	How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets? For financial service firms, debt is raw material rather than a source of capital. It is not only tough to define but if defined broadly can result in high financial leverage, magnifying the impact of small operating risk changes on equity risk.	When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?In addition to all the normal constraints, financial service firms also have to worry about maintaining capital ratios that are acceptable ot regulators. If they do not, they can be taken over and shut down.

Lesson 1: Financial service companies are

opaque...

- With financial service firms, we enter into a Faustian bargain. They tell us very little about the quality of their assets (loans, for a bank, for instance are not broken down by default risk status) but we accept that in return for assets being marked to market (by accountants who presumably have access to the information that we don't have).
- In addition, estimating cash flows for a financial service firm is difficult to do. So, we trust financial service firms to pay out their cash flows as dividends. Hence, the use of the dividend discount model.

Lesson 1: Debt to a bank is raw material, not a source of capital

- With conventional firms, you often face a choice of either valuing the entire business (using cash flows to the firm and a cost of capital) or valuing equity.
 Often, valuing the firm is both easier and more robust, and you subtract out debt to get to value of equity.
- With financial service firms, valuing the firm is often a non-starter, since debt to a bank is not a source of capital but raw material.


Status Quo 1: When you value a bank, it is almost always on an equity basis.

Lesson 2: Estimating cash flows for a bank is difficult to do..

- Assuming that you want to go down the road of valuing equity using a DCF, the standard definition of cash flows is
 - FCFE = Net Income + Depreciation Cap Ex Change in Noncash Working Capital
- Defining cap ex and working capital for a bank is close to impossible. Consequently, most analysts give up and make one of the two following choices:
 - The indefensible: Discount earnings at the cost of equity, which gives you basically nothing.
 - The defensible: Discount dividends at the cost of equity

Status Quo 2: The dividend discount model's last stand was with financial service companies.

CIB Egypt in December 2015 Valuation in Egyptian Pounds



Lesson 3: For financial service companies, book value matters...

- The book value of assets and equity is mostly irrelevant when valuing non-financial service companies. After all, the book value of equity is a historical figure and can be nonsensical. (The book value of equity can be negative and is so for more than a 1000 publicly traded US companies)
- With financial service firms, book value of equity is relevant for two reasons:
 - Since financial service firms mark to market, the book value is more likely to reflect what the firms own right now (rather than a historical value)
 - The regulatory capital ratios are based on book equity. Thus, a bank with negative or even low book equity will be shut down by the regulators.
- From a valuation perspective, it therefore makes sense to pay heed to book value. In fact, you can argue that reinvestment for a bank is the amount that it needs to add to book equity to sustain its growth ambitions and safety requirements:
 - FCFE = Net Income Reinvestment in regulatory capital (book equity)

Deutsche Bank: A Crisis Valuation (October 2016)

-	d assets grows at f 1% a year forever.						[Tier 1	•			to 15.6 Il banks	67%, the 75th
\backslash													
		Current	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
`	Risk Adjusted Assets	\$ 445,570	\$ 450,026	\$ 454,526	\$ 459,071	\$ 463,662	\$ 468,299	\$ 472,982	\$ 477,711	\$ 482,488	\$ 487,313	\$ 492,186	
Expected DOJ	Tier 1 Capital Ratio	12.41%	13.74%	13.95%	14.17%	14.38%	14.60%	14.81%	15.03%	15.24%	15.46%	15.67%	•
fine of \$10	Tier 1 Capital (Risk Adjusted Assets * 7	\$55,282	\$61,834	\$63,427	\$65,045	\$66,690	\$68,361	\$70,059	\$71,784	\$73,537	\$75,317	\$77,126	
billions lower	Change in regulatory capital (Tier 1)		\$6,552	\$1,593	\$1,619	\$1,645	\$1,671	\$1,698	\$1,725	\$1,753	\$1,780	\$1,809	
Tier 1 capital	Book Equity	\$64,609	\$71,161	\$72,754	\$74,372	\$76,017	\$77,688	\$79,386	\$81,111	\$82,864	\$84,644	\$86,453	
today													
/	Expected ROE	-13.70%	-7.18%	-2.84%	0.06%	1.99%	5.85%	6.568%	7.286%	8.004%	8.722%	9.440%	
	Net Income (Book Equity * ROE)	\$ (8,851)	\$ (5,111)	\$ (2,065)	\$ 43	\$ 1,512	\$ 4,545	5 \$ 5,214	\$ 5,910	\$ 6,632	\$ 7,383	\$ 8,161	
Common	- Investment in Regulatory Capital		\$ 6,552	\$ 1,593	\$ 1,619	\$ 1,645	\$ 1,671	\$ 1,698			\$ 1,780	\$ 1,809	
Equity	FCFE		\$ (11,663)	\$ (3,658)	\$ (1,576)	\$ (133)	\$ 2,874	\$ 3,516	\$ 4,185	\$ 4,880	\$ 5,602	\$ 6,352	
increases in	Terminal value of equity											\$87,317	
tandem with	Present value		\$ (10,583)	\$ (3,012)	\$ (1,178)	\$ (90)	\$ 1,768	3 \$ 1,966	\$ 2,129	\$ 2,262	\$ 2,370	\$ 36,207	
Tier 1 capital	Cost of equity	10.20%	10.20%			6 10.20%	10.20%	6 10.048%	9.896%	9.744%	9.592%	9.440%	
/	Cumulative Cost of equity		1.1020	1.2144	1.3383	1.4748	1.6252	2 1.7885	1.9655	2.1570	2.3639	2.5871	
/	Value of equity today =	\$31,838.74											
Cost of equity	Number of shares outstanding =	1386.00		Value r	er shar	re adjust	ted for						
starts at 10.2%	DCF Value per share =	\$ 22.97				catastro							
(75th percentile	Probability of equity wipeout	10.00%				it) result			Doturn		in inoro	anon to	5 05% (05th
of banks) &	Adjusted value per share =	\$ 20.67			•	ss of eq	-				-		5.85% (25th
decreases after	Stock price on October 3, 2016=	\$ 13.33				50 0. 04	uniy.		percen			in year 5	and 9,44%
year 5 to 9.44%										(COSI O	equity) III yea	
(median across													
banks).													
Dariks).													

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IV. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies

Company growth often comes from movements in the economic cycle, for cyclical firms, or commodity prices, for commodity companies.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Historial revenue and earnings data are volatile, as the economic cycle and commodity prices change. How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Primary risk is from the economy for cyclical firms and from commodity price movements for commodity companies. These risks can stay dormant for long periods of apparent prosperity. When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?


For commodity companies, the fact that there are only finite amounts of the commodity may put a limit on growth forever. For cyclical firms, there is the peril that the next recession may put an end to the firm.

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Lesson 1: With "macro" companies, it is easy to get lost in "macro" assumptions...

- With cyclical and commodity companies, it is undeniable that the value you arrive at will be affected by your views on the economy or the price of the commodity.
- Consequently, you will feel the urge to take a stand on these macro variables and build them into your valuation. Doing so, though, will create valuations that are jointly impacted by your views on macro variables and your views on the company, and it is difficult to separate the two.
- The best (though not easiest) thing to do is to separate your macro views from your micro views. Use current market based numbers for your valuation, but then provide a separate assessment of what you think about those market numbers.

Shell's Revenues & Oil Prices



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Shell: A "Oil Price" Neutral Valuation: March 2016


Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of \$40/barrel in March 2016 Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*\$40 = \$201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

		Base Year	1		2	_	3		4		5	Ter	rminal Year		
Revenues	\$	201,569	\$ 209,450	\$	217,639	\$	226,149	\$	234,991	\$	244,180	\$	249,063	Г	Operating
Operating Margin		3.01%	6.18%		7.76%		8.56%		8.95%		9.35%		9.35%	1	margin
Operating Income	\$	6,065.00	\$ 12,942.85	\$	16,899.10	\$	19,352.39	\$	21,040.39	\$	22,830.80	\$	23,287.41	1	converges on
Effective tax rate	_	30.00%	30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		Shell's historical
AT Operating Income	\$	4,245.50	\$ 9,060.00	\$	11,829.37	\$	13,546.68	\$	14,728.27	\$	15,981.56	\$	16,301.19		average margin
+ Depreciation	\$	26,714.00	\$ 27,759	\$	28,844	\$	29,972	\$	31,144	\$	32,361			1	of 9.35% from
- Cap Ex	\$	31,854.00	\$ 33,099	\$	34,394	\$	35,738	\$	37,136	\$	38,588				200-2015
- Chg in WC	_		\$ 472.88	\$	491.37	\$	510.58	\$	530.55	\$	551.29	_			200 2010
FCFF			\$ 3,246.14	\$	5,788.19	\$	7,269.29	\$	8,205.44	\$	9,203.68	\$	13,011.34		
Terminal Value										\$	216,855.71				
Return on capital	_												12.37%		
Cost of Capital	_		9.91%		9.91%		9.91%	_	9.91%		9.91%	_	8.00%	-	Return on
Cumulated Discount Factor			1.0991		1.2080		1.3277		1.4593		1.6039			_	capital reverts
Present Value			\$ 2,953.45	\$	4,791.47	\$	5,474.95	\$	5,622.81	\$	140,940.73				and stays at
Value of Operating Assets	\$	159,783.41													Shell's historic
+ Cash	\$	31,752.00												-	average of
+ Cross Holdings	\$	33,566.00			-		stments in	-						_	12.37% from
- Debt	\$	58,379.00	subtracted out minority interest in consolidated 200-2015									200-2015			
- Minority Interets	\$	1,245.00	holdings.												
Value of Equity	\$	165,477.41													
Number of shares		4209.7													
Value per share	\$	39.31													


Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a function of macro variables...


- If there is a key macro variable affecting the value of your company that you are uncertain about (and who is not), why not quantify the uncertainty in a distribution (rather than a single price) and use that distribution in your valuation.
- That is exactly what you do in a Monte Carlo simulation, where you allow one or more variables to be distributions and compute a distribution of values for the company.
- With a simulation, you get not only everything you would get in a standard valuation (an estimated value for your company) but you will get additional output (on the variation in that value and the likelihood that your firm is under or over valued)






Percentiles:	Forecast values
0%	\$6.55
1 0%	\$23.90
20%	\$27.73
30%	\$30.89
40%	\$33.88
50%	\$36.99
60%	\$40.28
70%	\$44.22
80%	\$49.24
90%	\$57.49
1 00%	\$197.11





The optionality in commodities: Undeveloped reserves as an option



Implications

- Optionality Premium: Undeveloped reserves have option value that will give them a premium over their DCF value. Put simply, even non-viable reserves have value, because commodity prices can bounce back.
 - The option premium will be greater when commodity prices are low, rather than when oil prices are high.
 - The option premium will increase if commodity prices are expected to become more volatile.
- Level + Variance: The value of a commodity company is affected by both the level of oil prices, as well as the volatility in that level. The former affects your DCF and the latter the optionality.

V. Valuing Companies across the ownership cycle

Reported income and balance sheet are heavily affected by tax considerations rather than information disclosure requirements. The line between the personal and business expenses is a fine one.

What are the cashflows from existing assets? - Equity: Cashflows after debt payments - Firm: Cashflows before debt payments

> Reversing investment mistakes is difficult to do. The need for and the cost of illiquidity has to be incorporated into current


What is the **value added** by growth assets?[\] Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflows Firm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows

How **risky are the cash flows** from both existing assets and growth assets? Equity: Risk in equity in the company Firm: Risk in the firm's operations

Different buyers can perceive risk differently in the same private business, largely because what they see as risk will be a function of how diversified they are. The fall back positions of using market prices to extract risk measures does not When will the firm become a **mature fiirm**, and what are the potential roadblocks?

Many private businesses are finite life enterprises, not expected to last into perpetuity

Aswath Damodaran




Lesson 1: In private businesses, risk in the eyes of the "beholder" (buyer)

Private business owner with entire wealth invested in the business

Venture capitalist, with multiple holdings in the sector.

Public company investor with diversified portfolio

Exposed to all risk in the company. Total beta measures exposure to total risk. Total Beta = Market Beta/ Correlation of firm with market Partially diversified. Diversify away some firm specific risk but not all. Beta will fall berbetween total and market beta. Firm-specific risk is diversified away. Market or macro risk exposure captured in a market beta or betas.



Aswath Damodaran

Total Risk versus Market Risk

- Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is a relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the proportion of the risk that is market risk.
 - Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
- To estimate the beta for Kristin Kandy, we begin with the bottom-up unlevered beta of food processing companies:
 - Unlevered beta for publicly traded food processing companies = 0.78
 - Average correlation of food processing companies with market = 0.333
 - Unlevered total beta for Kristin Kandy = 0.78/0.333 = 2.34
 - Debt to equity ratio for Kristin Kandy = 0.3/0.7 (assumed industry average)
 - □ Total Beta = 2.34 (1- (1-.40)(30/70)) = 2.94
 - **•** Total Cost of Equity = 4.50% + 2.94 (4%) = 16.26%

Lesson 2: With financials, trust but verify..

- Different Accounting Standards: The accounting statements for private firms are often based upon different accounting standards than public firms, which operate under much tighter constraints on what to report and when to report.
- Intermingling of personal and business expenses: In the case of private firms, some personal expenses may be reported as business expenses.
- Separating "Salaries" from "Dividends": It is difficult to tell where salaries end and dividends begin in a private firm, since they both end up with the owner.
- The Key person issue: In some private businesses, with a personal component, the cashflows may be intertwined with the owner being part of the business.

Lesson 3: Illiquidity is a clear and present danger..

In private company valuation, illiquidity is a constant theme. All the talk, though, seems to lead to a rule of thumb. The illiquidity discount for a private firm is between 20-30% and does not vary across private firms.

But illiquidity should vary across:

- Companies: Healthier and larger companies, with more liquid assets, should have smaller discounts than money-losing smaller businesses with more illiquid assets.
- Time: Liquidity is worth more when the economy is doing badly and credit is tough to come by than when markets are booming.
- Buyers: Liquidity is worth more to buyers who have shorter time horizons and greater cash needs than for longer term investors who don't need the cash and are willing to hold the investment.


And it is not just in private businesses..

- Assume that you are valuing a closely held company in a lightly traded market. Will the possibility of illiquidity affect your valuation of the company?
- a. Yes
- b. No
- If it will affect your valuation, how will it show up?
 If it will not affect your valuation, how would it show up in your investment process?

VI.Valuation in the midst of a crisis

- If your concept of valuation is downloading last year's financials for a company into a spread sheet and then using historical growth rates, with some mean reversion thrown in, to forecast future numbers, you are probably feeling lost right now, and with good reason.
- It is also not a time to wring our hands, complain that there is too much uncertainty and argue that the fundamentals don't matter.
 - If you do so, you will be drawn to the dark side of investing, where fundamentals don't matter (paradigm shifts, anyone?), new pricing metrics get invented and you are at the mercy of mood and momentum.
- Ironically, it is precisely at times like these that you need to go back to basics.

A Post-Corona Version



		5/11/20						
The Story								
Zoom is poised to take advantage of an explosion in the online meeting/seminar market, as the crisis changes behavior for the long term on both fronts. While there will be multiple players in the markets, some with deep pockets (Cisco's Webex, Microsoft's team and Google's whatever), Zoom will grab a dominant market shares, both because of its first mover advantages and networking benefits. As it grows, it will benefit from economies of scale and its margins will converge on those of software companis collectively. Its cost of capital reflects its business services model, but since it is young and not fully formed, there remains a chance of failure.								
			The	e Assumptions				
	Base year	Base year Years 1-5 Years 6-10 After year 10 Link to story						
Revenues (a)	\$ 623	55.00%	2.00%		2.00%	Growing online market + Mkt share		
Operating margin (b)	9.70%	9.70%	22.25%		22.25%	Software company margins		
Tax rate	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%		25.00%	Global/US marginal tax rate		
Reinvestment (c)		Sales to capital ration	o 2.25	RIR =	29.34%	Drop from current level + higher than industry		
Return on capital	23.64%	Marginal ROIC =	51.27%		6.82%	Low capital intensity + High margin model		
Cost of capital (d)		7.72% 6.82% 6.82% 6.82% Close to average company's cost of capital						

						The C	ash Flows			
	Reve	enues	Operating Margin	EBIT		EBIT	(1-t)	Re	einvestment	FCFF
1	\$	965	12.21%	\$	118	\$	88	\$	152	\$ (64)
2	\$	1,496	14.72%	\$	220	\$	165	\$	236	\$ (71)
3	\$	2,319	17.23%	\$	400	\$	300	\$	366	\$ (66)
4	\$	3,594	19.74%	\$	710	\$	532	\$	567	\$ (35)
5	\$	5,571	22.25%	\$	1,240	\$	930	\$	879	\$ 51
6	\$	8,045	22.25%	\$	1,790	\$	1,342	\$	1,099	\$ 243
7	\$	10,764	22.25%	\$	2,395	\$	1,796	_	1,208	\$ 588
8	\$	13,261	22.25%	\$	2,951		2,213	_	1,110	\$ 1,103
9	\$	14,932	22.25%	\$	3,322	\$	2,492	_	743	\$ 1,749
10	\$	15,230	22.25%	\$	3,389	\$	2,542	\$	133	\$ 2,409
Terminal year	\$	15,535	22.25%	\$	3,457	\$	2,593	\$	761	\$ 1,832
						Th	e Value			
Terminal value				\$	38,036					
PV(Terminal value)				\$	18,541					
PV (CF over next 10 ye	· ·			\$	3,043					
Value of operating ass				\$	21,583					
Adjustment for distre				\$	1,727				Probability of failure =	10.00%
·	- Debt & Mnority Interests			\$	119					
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets			\$	855						
Value of equity				\$	20,593					
- Value of equity opti	ons			\$	1,121					
Number of shares					276.40					
Value per share				\$	70.45				Stock was trading at =	\$146.48

Company	Base Year Numbers	Valuation Story	Valuation Inputs	Value per	Share	(Simulation)	Pricing per share		
	Revenues = \$75 B	User Base pays off:	Rev Growth = 10%	10th:	\$	267.77			
	EBIT = \$27.9 B	Immense & Intense user	Target Margin = 40%	25th:	\$	293.89	Price =	\$262.59	
Facebook	Oper. margin =44.3%	base allows for continued	Sales to capital = 2.64	Median:	\$	327.68	Under/Over =	Under valued	
	Rev Growth (LTM) = 13.02%	ad growth & new business	Cost of capital = 6.08%	75th:	\$	364.79	% under/over	-19.86%	
		potential.		90th:	\$	398.85	IRR	7.16%	
	Revenues = \$ 322 B	Disruption Platform rolls	Rev Growth = 20%	10th:		\$1,479.65			
	EBIT = \$16.7 B	on: Continue to expand	Target Margin = 12%	25th:	\$	1,969.46	Price =	\$3,260.48	
Amazon	Oper. margin = 7.99%	into new businesses,	Sales to capital = 1.94	Median:	\$	2,778.22	Under/Over =	Over valued	
	Rev Growth (LTM) = 31.58%	delaying profitability to	Cost of capital = 6.11%	75th:	\$	3,617.74	% under/over	17.36%	
		deliver higher growth.		90th:	\$	4,295.58	IRR	5.77%	
	Revenues = \$ 22.6 B	Streaming Player: Wiith	Value/Existing Subscriber = \$446.	10th:	\$	312.79			
	# Subscribers = 192.3 mil	new competitors, will	Growth in Subscribers = 12%	25th:	\$	372.49	Price =	\$484.53	
Netflix	Growth in LTM = 27.3%	continue to add	Growth in Content Costs = 5%	Median:	\$	445.53	Under/Over =	Over valued	
	Cost/New Subscriber = \$103	subscribers, but struggle	Cost of capital (Existing)= 6.5%	75th:	\$	519.34	% under/over	8.75%	
	Content Cost = \$9.95 B	to control content costs.	Cost of capital (New) = 7.5%	90th:	\$	585.58	IRR	6.16%	
	Revenues = \$166 B	More than a Search	Rev Growth = 8%	10th:	\$	1,165.57			
	EBIT = \$33.4 B	Engine: While the search	Target Margin = 24%	25th:	\$	1,267.31	Price =	\$1,544.61	
Google/	Oper. margin = 23.8%	box will continue to be the	Sales to capital = 2.64	Median:	\$	1,406.96	Under/Over =	Over valued	
Alphabet	Rev Growth (LTM) = 5.22%	money-maker, other bets will start to pay off in	Cost of capital = 6.25%	75th:	\$	1,551.26	% under/over	9.78%	
		growth.		90th:	\$	1,676.02	IRR	5.87%	
	Revenues = \$274 B	Cash Machine revs up:	Rev Growth = 8%	10th:	\$	285.67			
	EBIT = \$52.6 B	The iPhone will keep the	Target Margin = 26%	25th:	\$	312.28	Price =	\$462.83	
Apple	Oper. margin = 25.9%	cash machine going up,	Sales to capital =4.00	Median:	\$	350.22	Under/Over =	Over valued	
	Rev Growth (LTM) = 7.07%	but services business will	Cost of capital = 6.58%	75th:	\$		% under/over	32.15%	
		be growth driver.		90th:	\$	425.04	IRR	5.30%	
	Revenues = \$143 B	Old company Reborn:	Rev Growth = 12%	10th:	\$	143.98			
	EBIT = \$52.6 B	Cloud/software business	Target Margin = 40%	25th:	\$	157.81	Price =	\$209.70	
Microsoft	Oper. margin =40.1%	mix will continue to	Sales to capital = 1.44	Median:	\$	176.66	Under/Over =	Over valued	
	Rev Growth (LTM) = 13.65%	deliver growth with high	Cost of capital = 7.11%	75th:	\$	196.77	% under/over	18.70%	
		margins.		90th:	\$	214.83	IRR	6.32%	


NARRATIVE AND NUMBERS: VALUATION AS A BRIDGE

Work on your weak side...

Valuation as a bridge

Number Crunchers

Story Tellers




From story to numbers and beyond..

Step 1: Develop a narrative for the business that you are valuing In the narrative, you tell your story about how you see the business evolving over time. Keep it <u>simple</u> & <u>focused</u> .
Step 2: Test the narrative to see if it is possible, plausible and probable There are lots of possible narratives, not all of them are plausible and only a few of them are probable. No <u>fairy tales</u> or <u>runaway stories</u> .
Step 3: Convert the narrative into drivers of valueTake the narrative apart and look at how you will bring it into valuaton inputs starting with potential market size down to cash flows and risk. By the time you are done, each part of the narrative should have a place in your numbers and each number should be backed up a portion of your story.
Step 4: Connect the drivers of value to a valuation Create an intrinsic valuation model that connects the inputs to an end-value the business.
Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open Listen to people who know the business better than you do and use their suggestions to fine tune your narrative and perhaps even alter it. Work out the effects on value of alternative narratives for the company.

Aswath Damodaran

Step 1a: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
 - Your company (its products, its management and its history.
 - The market or markets that you see it growing in.
 - The competition it faces and will face.
 - The macro environment in which it operates.




Low Growth

The Auto Business


Low Margins

Year 🔻	Revenues (\$) 🔻	% Growth Rate 🔻
2005	1,274,716.60	
2006	1,421,804.20	11.54%
2007	1,854,576.40	30.44%
2008	1,818,533.00	-1.94%
2009	1,572,890.10	-13.51%
2010	1,816,269.40	15.47%
2011	1,962,630.40	8.06%
2012	2,110,572.20	7.54%
2013	2,158,603.00	2.28%
2014	2,086,124.80	-3.36%
unded Avera	ige =	5.63%



Bad Business

High & Increasing Reinvestment



	ROIC	Cost of capital	ROiC - Cost of capital
2004	6.82%	7.93%	-1.11%
2005	10.47%	7.02%	3.45%
2006	4.60%	7.97%	-3.37%
2007	7.62%	8.50%	-0.88%
2008	3.48%	8.03%	-4.55%
2009	-4.97%	8.58%	-13.55%
2010	5.16%	8.03%	-2.87%
2011	7.55%	8.15%	-0.60%
2012	7.80%	8.55%	-0.75%
2013	7.83%	8.47%	-0.64%
2014	6.47%	7.53%	-1.06%

Only once in the last 10 years have auto companies collectively earned more than their cost of capital


The Automobile Business: Pre-tax Operating Margins in 2015

What makes Ferrari different?

Ferrari had a profit margin of 18.2%, in the 95th percentile, partly because of its high prices and partly because it spends little on advertising.

Ferrari sold only 7,255

cars in all of 2014



Ferrari: Geographical Sales (2014)

Ferrari sales (in units) have grown very little in the last decade & have been stable

Ferrari has not invested in new plants.

Step 1b: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
 - Rule 1: Keep it simple.
 - Rule 2: Keep it focused.

The Uber Narrative


In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

- 1. <u>An urban car service business</u>: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
- 2. Which <u>would expand the business moderately (about 40%</u> over ten years) by bringing in new users.
- 3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
- 4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong <u>competitive advantages</u> (from being a first mover).
- 5. And <u>its existing low-capital business model</u>, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.


The Ferrari Narrative

- Ferrari will stay an exclusive auto club, deriving its allure from its scarcity and the fact that only a few own Ferraris.
- By staying exclusive, the company gets three benefits:
 - It can continue to charge nose bleed prices for its cars and sell them with little or no advertising.
 - It does not need to invest in new assembly plants, since it does not plan to ramp up production.
 - It sells only to the super rich, who are unaffected by overall economic conditions or market crises.


Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense



The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable



Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



The Runaway Story: When you want a story to be true...

- With a runaway business story, you usually have three ingredients:
 - 1. <u>Charismatic, likeable Narrator</u>: The narrator of the business story is someone that you want to see succeed, either because you like the narrator or because he/she will be a good role model.
 - <u>Telling a story about disrupting a much business, where you</u> <u>dislike the status quo</u>: The status quo in the business that the story is disrupting is dissatisfying (to everyone involved)>
 - 3. <u>With a societal benefit as bonus</u>: And if the story holds, society and humanity will benefit.
- Since you want this story to work out, you stop asking questions, because the answers may put the story at risk.

The Impossible: The Runaway Story

92

88

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NA

The Checks (?) The Story Designation Age Board Member Former Secretary of State Transis Henry Kissinger la si si s Late Bright Bill Perry Former Secretary of Defense ب بالنبا في 21 George Schultz Former Secretary of State an thursday **Bill Frist** Former Senate Majority Leader 63 Sam Nunn Former Senator Gary Roughead Former Navy Admiral James Mattis Former Marine Corps General 65 Dick Kovocovich Former CEO of Wells Fargo **Riley Bechtel** Former CEO of Bechtel William Foege Epidemologist Elizabeth Holmes Founder & CEO, Theranos Sunny Balwani President & COO, Theranos Money Companies valued at \$1 billion or more by venture-capital firms Theranos valued at \$9 billion COMPANIES \$10 billion \$1 billion \$40 billion

Valuations as of October 2015

Select companies from the chart or table for more detail.

The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

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	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 202
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,78
% Growth		52%	75%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10
Automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,55
% Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	19
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	79
Total Sales	2,478	3,361	5,655	7,095	10,072	12,768	16,736	21,648	26,403	31,416	36,959	42,087	48,017	54,355	61,296	68,059
% Growth	100 d 2006	36%	68%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	11%
EBITDA	148	417	920	1,042	1,586	2,150	3,138	4,066	4,857	5,723	6,328	7,182	8,144	9,688	10,874	12,099
% Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17.8%
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	41%	79%	55%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	75%	76%	76%	76%	76%	779
EBIT	45	259	748	839	1,285	1,796	2,749	3,529	4,252	5,027	5,517	6,244	7,056	8,429	9,423	10,439
% Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14.1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	16.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15.3%
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pretax Income	46	258	758	872	1,332	1,886	2,857	3,684	4,451	5,305	5,875	6,688	7,598	9,080	10,207	11,373
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,323
% Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	20%
Net Income	44	256	744	839	1,246	1,624	2,395	3,043	3,644	4,303	4,741	5,372	6,128	7,319	8,179	9,050
Plus																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Less																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376
% of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-6%
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,149
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	396	3%	3%	3%	3%	396	39
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlevered Free Cash Flow	78	229	750	863	1,186	1,702	2,343	2,884	3,314	4,113	4,472	4,959	5,456	6,597	7,315	8,005
													EBITDA			12,099
													Sales			68,059
													Net Debt (Cas	(d)		(260
													Tesla Diluted			142
Exit EBITDA High							12.0 x		Exit PPG High	6	5.0%		Exit P/Sales H		180%	
Exit EBITDA Low							8.0 x		Exit PPG Low		3.0%		Exit P/Sales L	diam'r a chanal a cha	130%	


Discount Rage Low

9.0%

Month of FY End

12.0 (End of this Month)

Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value




Ferrari: From story to numbers

Valuation Input	The Story	Valuation Inputs
Revenues	Keep it scarce	Revenue growth of 4% (in Euro terms) a year for next 5 years, scaling down to
Operating Margin & Taxes		0.7% in year 10. Translates into an increase in production of about 25% in next 10 years
Operating Income	And pricey	Ferrari's pre-tax operating margin stays at 18.2%, in the 95th percentile of auto business.
Reinvestment	<i>Little need for capacity expansion</i>	Sales/Invested Capital stays at 1.42, i.e. every euro invested generates 1.42 euros in sales
Cash Flow		
Discount Rate (Risk)	Super-rich clients are recession-proof	Cost of capital of 6.96% in Euros and no chance of default.

Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

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Ferrari: The "Exclusive Club" Value

									Sta	ıy Su	per	Excl	usiv	/e: R	eve	enue g	gro	wth is	s lov	v						High Prices + No selling
	Ba	se year		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	Terr	ninal y	ear	cost =
Revenue growth rate			4.	.00%	4	.00%	4.	00%	4	.00%	4.	.00%	3.	34%	2.	.68%	2.	.02%	1.	36%	0.	.70%	(0.70%		Preserve
Revenues	€	2,763	€	2,874	€	2,988	€ :	3,108	€	3,232	€	3,362	€ :	3,474	€	3,567	€	3,639	€ 3	3,689	€	3,714	€	3,7	740	operating
EBIT (Operating) margin		18.20%	18	.20%	18	8.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	.20%	18	3.20%	18	.20%	18	20%	18	.20%	1	8.20%	, 2	margin
EBIT (Operating income)	€	503	€	523	€	544	€	566	€	588	€	612	€	632	€	649	€	662	€	671	€	676	€	6	581	
Tax rate		33.54%	33	.54%	33	3.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	3.54%	33	.54%	33.	54%	33	.54%	3	3.54%	, >	Minimal
EBIT(1-t)	€	334	€	348	€	361	€	376	€	391	€	407	€	420	€	431	€	440	€	446	€	449	€	4	452	Reinvestment
- Reinvestment			€	78	€	81	€	84	€	87	€	91	€	79	€	66	€	51	€	35	€	18	€		22	due to low
FCFF			€	270	€	281	€	292	€	303	€	316	€	341	€	366	€	389	€	411	€	431	€	4	431	growth
Cost of capital			6.	.96%	6	.96%	6.	96%	6	.96%	6.	.96%	6.	96%	6.	.97%	6.	98%	6.	99%	7.	.00%	,	7.00%		
PV(FCFF)			€	252	€	245	€	238	€	232	€	225	€	228	€	228	€	227	€	224	€	220				The super
																										rich are not
Terminal value	€	6,835																								sensitive to
PV(Terminal value)	€	3,485																								economic downturns
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€	2,321																								downlums
Value of operating assets =	€	5,806																								
- Debt	€	623																								
- Minority interests	€	13																								
+ Cash	€	1,141																								
Value of equity	€	6,311																								

Step 5: Keep the feedback loop

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- <u>Not just car service company.</u>: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
- <u>Not just urban</u>: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
- 3. <u>Global networking benefits</u>: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	Uber (Gurley)	Uber (Gurley Mod)	Uber (Damodaran)
Narrative	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service
	market substantially, bringing in	market substantially, bringing in	market moderately, primarily in
	mass transit users & non-users	mass transit users & non-users from	urban environments, and use its
	from the suburbs into the market,	the suburbs into the market, and use	competitive advantages to get a
	and use its networking advantage	its networking advantage to gain a	significant but not dominant
	to gain a dominant market share,	dominant market share, while	market share and maintain its
	while maintaining its revenue slice	cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	revenue slice at 20%.
	at 20%.		
Total	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market			
Market	40%	40%	10%
Share			
Uber's	20%	10%	20%
revenue			
slice			
Value for	\$53.4 billion + Option value of	\$28.7 billion + Option value of	\$5.9 billion + Option value of
Uber	entering car ownership market	entering car ownership market (\$6	entering car ownership market (\$2-
	(\$10 billion+)	billion+)	3 billion)

Different narratives, Different Numbers

Total Market	Growth Effect	Network Effect	Competitive Advantages	Value of Uber
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

The Ferrari Counter Narrative

	Ferrari: The I	Rev-it-up Option				
Valuation Input	The Story	Valuation Inputs				
Revenues Operating Margin & Taxes	Sales Push	Revenue growth of 12% (in Euro terms) a year for next 5 years, scaling down to 0.7% in year 10. Translates into an increase in production of about 100% in next 10 years				
Operating Income	With lower priced models & selling costs	Ferrari's pre-tax operating margin drops to 14.32%, in the 90th percentile of auto business.				
Reinvestment	With investments in additional capacity	Sales/Invested Capital stays at 1.42, but higher sales create more reinvestment				
Cash Flow						
Discount Rate (Risk)	Very rich are more sensitive to economic	Cost of capital of 8% in Euros and no chance of default				
Value	conditions					

Ferrari: The "Rev-it-up" Alternative

	Get less exclusive: Double number of cars sold over next decade															Lower										
	Ba	se year		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9	1	0	Terr	minal year		Prices + Some selling
Revenue growth rate			12	2.00%	12	.00%	12	.00%	12	.00%	12	.00%	9.	.74%	7.	48%	5.	22%	2.	96%	0.7	70%		0.70%		cost = Lower
Revenues	€	2,763	€	3,095	€	3,466	€	3,882	€	4,348	€	4,869	€	5,344	€	5,743	€	6,043	€	6,222	€ (6,266	€	6,309		operating
EBIT (Operating) margin		18.20%	17	.81%	17	.42%	17	.04%	16	.65%	16	.26%	15	.87%	15	.48%	15	.10%	14	.71%	14.	32%	1	14.32%		margin
EBIT (Operating income)	€	503	€	551	€	604	€	661	€	724	€	792	€	848	€	889	€	912	€	915	€	897	€	904	L	
Tax rate		33.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33	.54%	33.	54%	3	33.54%		
EBIT(1-t)	€	334	€	366	€	401	€	439	€	481	€	526	€	564	€	591	€	606	€	608	€	596	€	600		Reinvestment
- Reinvestment			€	233	€	261	€	293	€	328	€	367	€	334	€	281	€	211	€	126	€	31	€	35		reflects
FCFF			€	133	€	140	€	147	€	153	€	159	€	230	€	310	€	395	€	482	€	566	€	565		higher sales
Cost of capital			8.	.00%	8.	.00%	8.	00%	8.	00%	8.	.00%	7.	.90%	7.	80%	7.	70%	7.	60%	7.5	50%		7.50%		
PV(FCFF)			€	123	€	120	€	117	€	113	€	108	€	145	€	181	€	215	€	244	€	266				The very
																										rich are
Terminal value	€	8,315																								more sensitive to
PV(Terminal value)	€	3,906																								economic
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€	1,631																								conditions
Value of operating assets =	€	5,537																								
- Debt	€	623																								
- Minority interests	€	13																								
+ Cash	€	1,141																								
Value of equity	€	6,042																								

And the world is full of feedback.. My Ferrari afterthought!



Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options

<u>^</u>						Henke	el			
<u> </u>					1	The Sto	ny			
									name power in each of its t ness-wise) from its existing	hree markets (industrial adhesives, laundr g domains.
8					The	Assum	ptions			
8	B	ase year	Years 1-5	Ye	ars 6-10	·	8		After year 10	Link to story
Revenues (a)	\$	18,074	4.20%	4.2	2%->2.2%		2		0.03%	Solid and slow growth
Operating margin (b)		15.25%	15.25%		12.80%		2		12.80%	Strong presence and brand name
Tax rate		25.00%	25.00%		25.00%	·	2		25.00%	Not a risk taker when it comes to taxes
Reinvestment (c)		2	Sales to capital ratio	1.52	5	·	RIR =		0.43%	Nor with reinvestment
Return on capital	1	15.26%	Marginal ROIC =	8.37%					7.00%	Global competition will wear on returns
Cost of capital (d)		2	7.48%	1	7.00%				7.00%	Or with business & leverage risk
j.				200	The	Cash I	Flows			
	Rev	enues	Operating Margin	EBIT		EBIT ('1-t)	Re	investment	FCFF
1	€	18,833	15.00%	€	2,826	€	2,119	€	499	€ 1,620
2	€	19,624	14.76%	€	2,896	€	2,172	€	520	€ 1,652
3	€	20,448	14.51%	€	2,968	€	2,226	€	542	€ 1,684
4	€	21,307	14.27%	€	3,040	€	2,280	€	565	€ 1,715
5	€	22,202	14.02%	€	3,114	€	2,335	€	202	ء 1,746
6	€	22,949	13.78%	€	3,162	€	2,372	€	492	€ 1,880
7	€	23,530	13.53%	€	3,185	€	2,389	€	382	€ 2,006
8	€	23,930	13.29%	€	3,180	€	2,385	€	263	€ 2,122
9	€	24,137	13.04%	€	3,149	€	2,361	€	136	€ 2,225
10	€	24,144	12.80%	€	3,090	€	2,318	€	5	€2,313
Terminal year	€	24,151	12.80%	€	3,091	€	2,319	€	10	€ 2,309
					1	he Val	ue			
Terminal value				€	33,122					
PV(Terminal value)				€	16,316					
PV (CF over next 10 yea	rs)			€	12,741					
Value of operating asse	ts =			€	29,057					
Adjustment for distress				€	-			_	Probability of failure =	0.00%
- Debt & Mnority Intere	ests			€	2,186					
+ Cash & Other Non-op	erati	ng assets		€	2,305					
Value of equity				€	29,176					
- Value of equity option	าร			€						
Number of shares					399.83					
Value per share				€	72.97				Stock was trading at =	\$118.22

Valuation as a Craft

You can never master a craft... just keep working on it..

			Uber									
			Uber: Personal Mobility	Player?								
Uber is primarily a ride	sharing compa	iny, with ambti	ons of being a global logistic	cs player. Its revenue growth h	nas been astonis	hing, though it is						
starting to slow, but it	remains a big n	noney loser, as	it searches for a business m	nodel that delivers more sticki	ness. In this sto	ry, Uber uses a						
combination of econom	nies of scale an	d a more capita	I intensive business model	to create a pathway to profita	bility. Along the	way, it will become						
a less risky company, t	hough its losses	leave it expose	ed to a 5% chance of failure	•								
			The Assumption	\$								
2	Base year	Years 1-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Story link							
Total Market	\$400,000	Gro	w 10.39% a year	Grows 2.75% a year	Global logistic	s						
Gross Market Share	12.45%		6.71%>30%	30%	Global Networ							
					Market domina	ance keeps billing						
Revenue Share	20.13%		Unchanged	20.13%	share high.							
Operating Margin	-24.39%	1	24.39% ->20%	15.00%	Full employee	& more regulations						
Reinvestment	NA	Sales to	capital ratio of 4.00	Reinvestment rate = 7.5%	Low capital inv	vestment model						
Cost of capital	NA	9.97%	9,97%->8.24%	8.24%	At 75th percen	tile of US firms						
Risk of failure	5% cł	nance of failure	, if pricing meltdown leads t	to capital being cut off	Cash on hand +	Capital access						
91			The Cash Flows									
8	Total Market	Market Share	Revenues	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF						
1	\$ 441,560	14.20%	\$ 12,627	\$ (2,369)	\$ 650	\$ (3,019						
2	\$ 487,438	15.96%	\$ 15,661	\$ (2,057)	\$ 759	\$ (2,816						
3	\$ 538,083	17.71%	\$ 19,189	\$ (1,441)	\$ 882	\$ (2,323						
4	\$ 593,990	19.47%	\$ 23,281	\$ (438)	\$ 1,023	\$ (1,461						
5	\$ 655,705	21.22%	\$ 28,017	\$ 1,050	\$ 1,184	\$ (134						
6	\$ 723,833	22.98%	\$ 33,485	\$ 3,139	\$ 1,367	\$ 1,771						
7	\$ 799,039	24.73%	\$ 39,787	\$ 5,292	\$ 1,576	\$ 3,716						
8	\$ 882,059	26.49%	\$ 47,037	\$ 5,292	\$ 1,813	\$ 3,479						
9	\$ 973,705	28.24%	\$ 55,365	\$ 6,229	\$ 2,082	\$ 4,147						
10	\$1,074,873	30.00%	\$ 64,915	\$ 7,303	\$ 2,387	\$ 4,915						
Terminal year	\$1,101,745	30.00%	\$ 66,537	\$ 7,485	\$ 936	\$ 6,550						
			The Value		•							
Terminal value		144	\$ 114,108		8-2							
PV(Terminal value)		200	\$ 46,258		S							
PV (CF over next 10 ye	ears)	200	\$ 501									
Value of operating asse	ts =	200	\$ 46,759									
Probability of failure		200	5%									
Value in case of failure		200	s -									
Adjusted Value for ope	rating assets		\$ 44,421									
+ Cash on hand		200	\$ 6,406									
+ Cross holdings		200	\$ 8,700									
+ IPO Proceeds		100	\$ 9,000									
- Debt			\$ 6,869									
Value of equity			\$ 61,658		ite is							
Value per share			\$ 27.67									

Push back on Uber Valuation

- <u>Input disagreement</u>: Lots of inputs and assumptions and I could be wrong on any or all of them..
- Model debate: DCF was designed for old economy companies and not suited to new economy firms that are more focused on accumulating users & subscribers, making them stick with the firm and sell them products & services over long periods.
- DCF is flexible: DCF models are much more flexible than most people give them credit for, and that they can be modified to reflect other frameworks. If you have a problem with a DCF value, it should not be with the model but with the person using that model.


User/ Subscriber/Member Based Valuation

- A user, subscriber or member has value only because he/she generates revenues for the company. The key to valuing a unit then becomes identifying the link to cash flows and value.
- To value users, you have to value an individual user first and then estimate the cost of acquiring new users.
 - The value of an existing user is the present value of the expected cash flows that you will generate from that user, over the lifetime that he or she remains a user.
 - The value of a new user will be the value of a user, net of the cost of acquiring a user.
 - The aggregate value of users will be the sum of the values of existing and new users.
- To get to the value of a company, you have to net out the other centralized/non-user specific costs that it will face.

Uber User Economics

Figure 4: The Mechanics of Uber's Business

User uses Uber app to get services (ride sharing, moving, delivery etc)



Uber's Income Statement (from Prospectus)

		Year	Ende	d December	31,		
		2016	19	2017	2018		
Revenue	\$	3,845	\$	7,932	\$	11,270	
Costs and expenses							
Cost of revenue, exclusive of depreciation and amortization shown separately below		2,228		4,160		5,623	
Operations and support		881		1,354		1,516	
Sales and marketing		1,594		2,524		3,151	
Research and development		864		1,201		1,505	
General and administrative		981		2,263		2,082	
Depreciation and amortization	10 m	320	12	510	Ø	426	
Total costs and expenses		6,868		12,012		14,303	

Uber: Deconstructing the Financials

Costs of Servicing Existing Users

				0	perating	Net Revenue/Gross	Operating Expense/Net
Year	Gross Billings	Net Revenue		Ε	xpenses	Billings	Revenue
2016	\$ 19,236.00	\$	3,219.00	\$	3,109.00	16.73%	96.58%
2017	\$ 34,409.00	\$	7,191.00	\$	5,514.00	20.90%	76.68%
2018	\$ 49,799.00	\$	10,025.00	\$	7,139.00	20.13%	71.21%

Costs of Adding New Users

_	Year	# Users added	Selling Expenses	Cost	/New user
	2016	21	1594	\$	75.90
	2017	23	2524	\$	109.74
	2018	23	3151	\$	137.00

Corporate Expenses

Year	R&D	G&A	Dep	reciation	Total	As % of Net Revenue			
2016	\$ 864.00	\$ 981.00	\$	320.00	\$ 2,165.00	67.26%			
2017	\$ 1,201.00	\$ 2,263.00	\$	510.00	\$ 3,974.00	55.26%			
2018	\$ 1,505.00	\$ 2,082.00	\$	426.00	\$ 4,013.00	40.03%			

Uber's Existing User Value

Growth rate in Operating Expenses

Assumed that 90% of operating expenses are variable, growing at revenue growth rate. Overall expenses grow 10.95%/year

Growth rate in Revenues

Assumed 12% growth in annual revenues/user over next 15 years

User Lifetime Assumed to be 15 years, with an annual renewal probability of 95%.


																					X
	Bas	e Year	1	2	3	4	5	6		7	8	8	9	10	11		12	13	14		15
Membership Survival		1.0000	0.9500	0.9025	0.8574	0.8145	0.7738	0.7351	0).6983	0.6	634	0.6302	0.5987	0.5688	0).5404	0.5133	0.48	17	0.4633
Gross Billings	\$	547.24	\$612.91	\$686.46	\$768.84	\$861.10	\$964.43	\$1,080.16	\$1	.,209.78	\$1,3	54.95	\$1,517.54	\$1,699.65	\$1,903.61	\$2	,132.04	\$ 2,387.89	\$ 2,674	.43	\$2,995.36
Net Revenues	\$	110.16	\$123.38	\$138.19	\$154.77	\$173.35	\$194.15	\$ 217.45	\$	243.54	\$ 2	72.76	\$ 305.50	\$ 342.16	\$ 383.21	\$	429.20	\$ 480.70	\$ 538	3.39	\$ 602.99
Operating Expenses	\$	65.12	\$ 72.25	\$ 80.16	\$ 88.94	\$ 98.67	\$109.48	\$ 121.47	\$	134.77	\$ 14	49.52	\$ 165.90	\$ 184.06	\$ 204.22	\$	226.58	\$ 251.39	\$ 278	3.92	\$ 309.46
Operating Profit/user	\$	45.05	\$ 51.14	\$ 58.03	\$ 65.84	\$ 74.67	\$ 84.67	\$ 95.98	\$	108.77	\$ 1	23.24	\$ 139.60	\$ 158.09	\$ 179.00	\$	202.62	\$ 229.31	\$ 259	.47	\$ 293.54
Survival adjusted Operating Profit			\$ 48.58	\$ 52.37	\$ 56.45	\$ 60.82	\$ 65.52	\$ 70.55	\$	75.96	\$ 8	81.76	\$ 87.98	\$ 94.66	\$ 101.81	\$	109.49	\$ 117.72	\$ 126	54	\$ 135.99
After-tax Operating Profit/user	\$	33.79	\$ 36.44	\$ 39.28	\$ 42.34	\$ 45.62	\$ 49.14	\$ 52.92	\$	56.97	\$	61.32	\$ 65.99	\$ 70.99	\$ 76.36	; \$	82.12	\$ 88.29	\$ 94	.90	\$ 101.99
Present Value			\$ 33.66	\$ 33.53	\$ 33.38	\$ 33.23	\$ 33.07	\$ 32.90	\$	32.73	\$ 3	32.55	\$ 32.36	\$ 32.16	\$ 31.96	i \$	31.75	\$ 31.54	\$ 31	.32	\$ 31.10
Annual Growth Rate (Revenues)		12.00%																			
Annual Growth Rate (Op Exp)		10.95%											Ris	sk Adju	sted D	Disc	coun	t Rate		;	1
Risk-adjusted discount rate		8.24%	•						_			l		8.24%					the		
Life of user =		15.00		i		İ		ĺ	Î			m		cost of					nies,		
Value per existing user =	\$	487.25		S	urviva	al-adju	usted	PV					adj	usted fo	or inflat	tion	n diffe	erence.		_	
Number of existing users =		91.00				•		income	-												
Value of Existing Users	\$4	4,339.77	a	adjusted for drop out rate over time.																	

Uber's New User Value

Value Added by New Users at Uber

Base year Value/ New Value of User = \$487.2		ser											
Cost of adding New Us Value added by new us		-											
			Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
User Growth rates		Total Users	91.00	101.92	114.15	127.85	143.19	160.37	170.00	180.20	191.01	202.47	214.62
Years 1-5: 12%	-	New Users	8.00	15.47	17.33	19.41	21.73	24.34	17.64	18.70	19.82	21.01	22.27
Years 6-10: 6%		Value per new user	\$373.54	\$379.14	\$384.83	\$390.60	\$396.46	\$402.40	\$408.44	\$414.57	\$420.78	\$427.10	\$433.50
	-	Value added by new users		\$5,865.27	\$6,667.64	\$7,579.77	\$8,616.68	\$9,795.45	\$7,205.30	\$7,752.18	\$8,340.57	\$8,973.62	\$9,654.72
Cost of capital		Terminal Value (new users)											\$31,603.73
Used 9.97%, the 75th	-	Present Value		\$ 5,333.52	\$ 5,513.45	\$ 5,699.46	\$ 5,891.74	\$ 6,090.50	\$ 4,073.87	\$ 3,985.70	\$ 3,899.44	\$ 3,815.05	\$ 15,950.37
percentile of US companies	E	Value Added by New Users	\$ 60,253.08							Beyond	year 10		
	-									User g ontinues	growth s at 2.5%	6	
									_	a y	ear		

Uber Corporate Expense Value (Drag)



Uber Valuation

Existing Users	5		New Users			Corporate Expen	ses				
Inputs			Inputs			Inputs					
Net Revenue/User =	\$ 110.16		Cost of acquiring user =	\$ 113.71		Corporate Expenses	\$ 2,812.72				
Operating Expense/User=	\$ 65.12		Value of new user =	\$ 373.54		CAGR - Next 10 years	7.00%				
Operating Profit/User =	\$ 45.05		Growth rate in net users (1-5)	12.00%		Discount Rate =	8.24%				
CAGR in Revenue/User	12.00%		Growth rate in net users (6-10)	6.00%			-				
Annual Renewal Rate =	95.00%		Discount Rate	9.97%							
User Life =	15										
Discount Rate =	8.24%										
Output			Output			Output					
Value/User =	\$ 487.25		# Users in year 10 =	214.62							
# Existing Users =	91.00		# Net New Users (10 years)	123.62							
Value of Existing Users =	\$44,339.77	+	Value of New Users =	\$60,253.08	-	PV of Corporate Expenses	\$(63,216.48)	=	Value of Operating	\$	41,376.37
									+ Cash	\$	15,407.00
Existing users will stick with	h Uber and		Uber will continue to add new use	ers, but at a		Uber's corporate expenses will	continue to		+ Cross Holdings	\$	8,700.00
increase how much they sp	end on its		decreasing pace, with a cost of a	cquiring a		grow, notwithstanding econom	ies of scale, as		- Debt	\$	6,869.00
services, the longer they st	ay.		new user staying stable (with the	current cost		the company increases spendi	ng moderately		Value of equity	\$	58,614.37
Operating expenses are mo	ostly		incrteasing at the inflation rate).	The new user		on autonomous cars.	52,26		# Shares		2235.26
variable, but there will be	mild		spending profile will mirror existi	ng users.		1					
econmies of scale.	1947 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 - 1949 -		n ar ean ann an an Aird Airte anna airtean ar ean ann an Airtean an Airtean an Airtean Airtean Airtean Airtean An Airtean						Value/Share	\$	26.22

Buzz Words and Magic Bullets!

- In my four decades in corporate finance and valuation, I have seen many "new and revolutionary" ideas emerge, marketed as the solution to all of the problems in business decision making.
- Most of the time, these ideas represent either a repackaging of existing concepts, with a healthy dose of marketing and selling, usually by consultants and bankers, and their magic fades quickly once their limitations come to the surface, as they inevitably do.
- The latest entrant in this game is ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance), and the sales pitch is wider and deeper. Companies that improve their social goodness standing will not only become more profitable and valuable over time, we are told, but they will also advance society's best interests, thus resolving one of the fundamental conflicts of private enterprise, while also enriching investors.

Measuring ESG: Challenges

- It is fuzzy: The first is that much of social impact is qualitative and developing a numerical value for that impact is difficult to do.
- <u>And entirely subjective</u>: The second is even trickier, which is that there is little consensus on what social impacts to measure, and the weights to assign to them.
- But it is still being measured: If your counter is that there are multiple services now that measure ESG at companies, you are right, but the lack of clarity and consensus results in the companies being ranked very differently by different services.

What's "good" for you?


 As an investor, rank the following companies from best to worst purely on goodness:

	Your Rank (1 = Best on ESG, 2
Company	(Worst on ESG)
Exxon Mobil	
Tesla	
Altria	
Facebook	
Microsoft	
Coca Cola	
Apple	


What ESG Services think...

ISS ESG Ranking	MSCI ESGI Rating	S&P ESG Score
High Score = More ESG Risk	Higher Rating = Better on ESG	High Score = Less ESG Risk
Microsoft (15)	Microsoft (AAA)	Microsoft (58)
Apple (17)	Coca Cola (AA)	Altria (37)
Altria (25)	Tesla (A)	Exxon Mobil (36)
Facebook (25)	Exxon Mobil (BBB)	Coca Cola (33)
Coca Cola (25)	Apple (BBB)	Apple (29)
Tesla (31)	Altria (BB)	Tesla (15)
Exxon Mobil (35)	Facebook (B)	Facebook (14)


Value Issues for Investors



ESG Services disagree...




Even on high profile companies...




The ESG Promises: Cake for all, with no calories!

- For companies, the promise is that being "good" will generate higher profits for the company, at least in the long term, with lower risk, and thus make them more valuable.
- For investors in these companies, the promise is that investing in "good" companies will generate higher returns than investing in "bad" or middling companies.
- For society, the promise is that not only would good companies help <u>fight problems directly related to ESG</u>, like climate change and low wages, but also counter more general problems like income inequality and healthcare crises.

ESG and Value




The Good shall be rewarded




Examples and counters: Patagonia and Etsy

- A company that is often used as an example of "goodness" is Patagonia, and the company has stayed true to its mission by:
 - Remaining an annual benefit corporation
 - Being willing to pay to do the "right" thing (at least as it sees them)
 - But is has paid the price (lower revenues, less in profits)
- Etsy went public as a benefit corporation, but that mission clashed with its endgame of being a much larger player in online merchandising. It eventually abandoned its benefit corporation status, so as to be able to access more capital, and is now embroiled in public fights with the craftsmen who provide its merchandise.


The Bad shall be punished



ESG's biggest success? Fossil Fuel



The Bad Guys win: Hell on Earth?



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RELATIVE VALUATION (PRICING)

Relative valuation is pervasive...

- Most asset valuations are relative.
- Most equity valuations on Wall Street are relative valuations.
 - Almost 85% of equity research reports are based upon a multiple and comparables.
 - More than 50% of all acquisition valuations are based upon multiples
 - Rules of thumb based on multiples are not only common but are often the basis for final valuation judgments.
- While there are more discounted cashflow valuations in consulting and corporate finance, they are often relative valuations masquerading as discounted cash flow valuations.
 - The objective in many discounted cashflow valuations is to back into a number that has been obtained by using a multiple.
 - The terminal value in a significant number of discounted cashflow valuations is estimated using a multiple.

The Reasons for the allure...

"If you think I'm crazy, you should see the guy who lives across the hall"

Jerry Seinfeld talking about Kramer in a Seinfeld episode


A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation

H.H. Munro

If you are going to screw up, make sure that you have lots of company

Ex-portfolio manager

Pricing versus Valuation



Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

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5369 La Jolla I La Jolla, CA 92037 Status: Active	Mesa Dr	\$995,00 Price Built: 1955	Beds	2.5 Baths 00 Sq. Ft. 0	1,440 Sq. Ft. \$691 / Sq. Ft. n Redfin: 12 days	Favorite	X-Out	Share	Tour Home
Overview Property Details	Tour Insights Proper	ty History Publi	c Records	Activity	Schools	Neighborho			Similar Home
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Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

Europe Switzerland

Biotechnology Biotechnology Reuters BION.S Bloomberg Exchan BION SW SWX

Exchange Ticker SWX BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares

 Key changes

 Target Price
 106.50 to 164.50 † 54.5%


 Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



The tool for pricing: A multiple

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The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

Define the multiple

In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated

Describe the multiple

- Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
 - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
 - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

Definitional Tests

□ Is the multiple consistently defined?

Proposition 1: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.

Is the multiple uniformly estimated?

- The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the "comparable firm" list.
- If earnings-based multiples are used, the accounting rules to measure earnings should be applied consistently across assets. The same rule applies with book-value based multiples.

Example 1: Price Earnings Ratio: Definition

PE = Market Price per Share / Earnings per Share

- There are a number of variants on the basic PE ratio in use. They are based upon how the price and the earnings are defined.
- Price: is usually the current price

is sometimes the average price for the year

EPS: EPS in most recent financial year
EPS in trailing 12 months (Trailing PE)
Forecasted EPS for next year (Forward PE)
Forecasted EPS in future year


Example 2: Enterprise Value / EBITDA Multiple

- The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple is obtained by netting cash out against debt to arrive at enterprise value and dividing by EBITDA.
 - $\frac{\text{Enterprise Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{\text{Market Value of Equity} + \text{Market Value of Debt} \text{Cash}}{\text{Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation}}$
- Why do we net out cash from firm value?
- What happens if a firm has cross holdings which are categorized as:
 - Minority interests?
 - Majority active interests?

Descriptive Tests

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- □ What is the median for this multiple?
 - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
 - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

1. Multiples have skewed distributions...



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
2. Making statistics "dicey"

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
	Current PE	Trailing PE	Forward PE
Total Number of firms	7584	7584	7584
Firms with PE	2780	2481	2354
Average	109.79	103.25	79.74
Median	18.15	20.30	18.89
10th Percentile	6.95	7.68	8.96
First Quartile	10.41	11.50	12.36
Third Quartile	37.26	40.79	33.20
90th Percentile	95.44	96.80	69.40
Maximum	36157.14	25020.00	42390.00

3. Markets have a lot in common : Comparing Global PEs

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
4. Simplistic rules almost always break down...6 times EBITDA was not cheap in the US in 2010



But it may be in 2021, unless you in Japan or

Russia...

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Henkel: A Relative Valuation

	Exchange:Ticke					EV/ Invested
Company Name	<u>r</u>	<u>PE</u>	<u>PBV</u>	<u>EV/Sales</u>	EV/EBITDA	Capital
The Procter & Gamble Company	NYSE:PG	21.14	3.81	3.73	13.96	3.20
Colgate-Palmolive Co.	NYSE:CL	45.20	NA	4.45	15.89	NA
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc	LSE:RB.	29.87	6.47	5.31	18.21	5.38
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA	DB:HEN3	22.88	3.38	2.54	13.66	3.46
Kimberly-Clark Corporation	NYSE:KMB	20.46	136.45	2.63	11.53	6.72
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA	OM:SCA B	31.56	2.52	1.79	10.88	2.04
The Clorox Company	NYSE:CLX	23.73	51.77	3.00	14.42	7.80
Church & Dwight Co. Inc.	NYSE:CHD	26.85	6.06	3.77	15.96	4.53
Spectrum Brands Holdings, Inc.	NYSE:SPB	27.37	4.58	2.33	13.54	2.15
HRG Group, Inc.	NYSE:HRG	NA	5.48	1.87	9.01	1.60
Energizer Holdings, Inc.	NYSE:ENR	23.42	NA	2.16	11.83	NA
PZ Cussons Plc	LSE:PZC	18.03	2.42	1.68	10.88	2.13
WD-40 Company	NasdaqGS:WDF	28.86	10.81	4.02	19.68	9.95
Central Garden & Pet Company	NasdaqGS:CEN	26.86	2.21	0.88	9.63	1.74
McBride plc	LSE:MCB	18.93	4.70	0.60	7.70	2.55
Orchids Paper Products Company	AMEX:TIS	16.66	2.01	2.10	10.52	1.59
Oil-Dri Corp. of America	NYSE:ODC	17.80	2.09	0.87	8.29	2.24
Suominen Oyj	HLSE:SUY1V	11.69	1.43	0.52	4.78	1.32
Accrol Group Holdings Plc	AIM:ACRL	17.74	NA	1.28	9.29	NA
Median		23.15	4.20	2.16	11.53	2.39
Henkel versus Median (Under or Over		-1.16%	-19.54%	17.57%	18.45%	44.70%

Henkel: Controlling for differences

					Nut	F	
	Operating				<u>Net</u> Debt/Market	<u>Expected</u> Growth in	<u>Revenue</u> CAGR (Last 5
Company Name	<u>Operating</u> Margin	Net Margin	ROIC	ROE	Cap	EPS	vears)
The Procter & Gamble Company	22.00%	16.27%	14.23%	18.02%	7.60%	6.30%	-4.57%
Colgate-Palmolive Co.	25.17%	9.04%	53.52%	NA	8.40%	<u> </u>	-0.75%
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc	27.45%	<u> </u>	21.34%	21.67%	3.79%	11.00%	0.17%
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA	16.11%	11.15%	16.66%	14.75%	-0.91%	8.96%	3.17%
Kimberly-Clark Corporation	18.92%	10.96%	33.53%	666.89%	16.74%	7.20%	-2.59%
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA	11.20%	4.62%	7.49%	8.00%	20.54%	8.04%	10.80%
The Clorox Company	18.23%	11.25%	31.23%	218.18%	12.48%	7.05%	1.95%
Church & Dwight Co. Inc.	20.64%	13.12%	16.21%	22.57%	7.15%	9.41%	5.64%
Spectrum Brands Holdings, Inc.	13.58%	5.78%	9.72%	16.74%	46.63%	12.20%	10.10%
HRG Group, Inc.	16.19%	-6.49%	9.37%	-60.24%	179.41%	0.00%	13.00%
Energizer Holdings, Inc.	15.97%	8.07%	45.82%	NA	14.16%	5.77%	NA
PZ Cussons Plc	12.82%	8.24%	13.49%	13.44%	12.05%	0.00%	0.01%
WD-40 Company	18.73%	13.82%	33.50%	37.46%	0.89%	10.00%	2.50%
Central Garden & Pet Company	6.80%	2.54%	8.73%	8.24%	28.87%	11.00%	2.42%
McBride plc	5.03%	2.50%	14.15%	24.81%	28.23%	0.00%	-3.47%
Orchids Paper Products Company	12.85%	9.32%	6.48%	12.09%	35.53%	14.30%	13.60%
Oil-Dri Corp. of America	5.87%	5.18%	14.29%	11.76%	-5.53%	0.00%	2.96%
Suominen Oyj	6.71%	3.69%	11.07%	12.19%	21.64%	-0.20%	19.80%
Accrol Group Holdings Plc	10.52%	4.83%	NA	NA	NA	0.00%	NA
Median	15.97%	8.24%	14.26%	15.75%	13.32%	7.05%	2.50%
Henkel versus Median (Under or Over)	0.84%	35.37%	16.81%	-6.32%	-106.83%	27.09%	26.80%

Analytical Tests

- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
 - Proposition 2: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
 - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
 - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
 - Proposition 3: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.

A Simple Analytical device

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	Start with a basic intrinsic value model.	Divide both sides of value equation by the denominator of the multiple that you are trying to deconstruct.	You should end up with an intrinsic version of your multiple which relates the multiple to fundamentals that vary across firms.
If Equity Multiple	Start with a dividend or FCFE model, preferably siimple.	For example, if you are trying to deconstruct the Price to Book ratio, divide both sides by book value of equity.	Intrinsic version of PE
If enterprise	Start with a firm or	For example, if you are trying to deconstruct the EV to Sales ratio, dividen	Intrinsic version of EV/

value both sides oby total operating asset model:. multiple sales.

Sale ratio.

PE Ratio: Understanding the Fundamentals

To understand the fundamentals, start with a basic equity discounted cash flow model.

□ With the dividend discount model,

$$P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$$

Dividing both sides by the current earnings per share,

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{Payout Ratio * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$


If this had been a FCFE Model,

$$P_{0} = \frac{FCFE_{1}}{r - g_{n}}$$
$$\frac{P_{0}}{EPS_{0}} = PE = \frac{(FCFE/Earnings)*(1 + g_{n})}{r - g_{n}}$$

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The Determinants of Multiples...



Application Tests

Given the firm that we are valuing, what is a "comparable" firm?

- While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
- Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
 - Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.

An Example: Comparing PE Ratios across a Sector: PE

Company Name	PE	Growth
PT Indosat ADR	7.8	0.06
Telebras ADR	8.9	0.075
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ADR	11.2	0.11
Telecom Argentina Stet - France Telecom SA ADR B	12.5	0.08
Hellenic Telecommunication Organization SA ADR	12.8	0.12
Telecomunicaciones de Chile ADR	16.6	0.08
Swisscom AG ADR	18.3	0.11
Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings ADR	19.6	0.16
Portugal Telecom SA ADR	20.8	0.13
Telefonos de Mexico ADR L	21.1	0.14
Matav RT ADR	21.5	0.22
Telstra ADR	21.7	0.12
Gilat Communications	22.7	0.31
Deutsche Telekom AG ADR	24.6	0.11
British Telecommunications PLC ADR	25.7	0.07
Tele Danmark AS ADR	27	0.09
Telekomunikasi Indonesia ADR	28.4	0.32
Cable & Wireless PLC ADR	29.8	0.14
APT Satellite Holdings ADR	31	0.33
Telefonica SA ADR	32.5	0.18
Royal KPN NV ADR	35.7	0.13
Telecom Italia SPA ADR	42.2	0.14
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone ADR	44.3	0.2
France Telecom SA ADR	45.2	0.19
Korea Telecom ADR	71.3	0.44

PE, Growth and Risk

Dependent variable is: PE

□ R squared = 66.2% R squared (adjusted) = 63.1%

Variable		Coefficie	ent	SE	t-ratio	Probability
Constant	13.1151		3.471	3.78	0.0010	
Growth rate		121.223		19.27	6.29	≤ 0.0001
Emerging Market	-13.853	1	3.606	-3.84	0.0009	
Emerging Market	is a dumn	ny:	1 if eme	rging mar	rket	
				0 if not		

Is Indosat cheap?
 PE = 13.13 + 121.22 (.06) -13.85 (1) = 6.55
 At 7.8 times earnings, Indosat is over valued.

Pricing across the entire market: Why not?

- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

PE Ratio: Standard Regression for US stocks -January 2021

	Model Summary ^a								
	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	1 8			
•	1	.629 ^b	.396	.394	4035.87822	a			

The regression is run with growth and payout entered as absolute, i.e., 25% is entered as 25)

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Predictors: (Constant), Expected growth rate in EPS-Next 5 years, Beta, Payout ratio

Coefficients^{a,b,c}

		Unstandardize	d Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients		
Model		В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	4.104	2.828		1.451	.147
	Payout ratio	.174	.017	.259	10.087	.000
	Beta	1.714	2.709	.015	.633	.527
	Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years	2.304	.087	.681	26.512	.000

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE

c. Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

PE ratio regressions across markets – January 2021

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Region	Regression – January 2021	R ²
US	$PE = 4.10 + 1.71 Beta + 17.40 Payout + 230.4 g_{EPS}$	39.4%
Europe	$PE = 16.69 + 4.65 Beta + 15.30 Payout + 91.80 g_{EPS}$	14.5%
Japan	$PE = 20.89 - 7.63 Beta + 14.30 Payout + 149.30 g_{EPS}$	23.8%
Emerging Markets	$PE = 17.88 + 0.44 Beta + 3.00 Payout + 113.80 g_{EPS}$	21.9%
Australia, NZ, Canad	$PE = 12.07 + 1.72 Beta + 12.00 Payout + 114.10 g_{EPS}$ a	16.1%
Global	PE = 20.04 – 2.57 Beta + 8.70 Payout + 139.20 g _{EPS}	23.2%

<u>g_{EPS}=Expected Growth</u>: Expected growth in EPS or Net Income: Next 5 years (decimals) <u>Beta</u>: Regression or Bottom up Beta

<u>Payout ratio:</u> Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0Aswath Damodaran 222

Choosing Between the Multiples

- As presented in this section, there are dozens of multiples that can be potentially used to value an individual firm.
- In addition, relative valuation can be relative to a sector (or comparable firms) or to the entire market (using the regressions, for instance)
- Since there can be only one final estimate of value, there are three choices at this stage:
 - Use a simple average of the valuations obtained using a number of different multiples
 - Use a weighted average of the valuations obtained using a nmber of different multiples
 - Choose one of the multiples and base your valuation on that multiple

Picking one Multiple

- This is usually the best way to approach this issue. While a range of values can be obtained from a number of multiples, the "best estimate" value is obtained using one multiple.
- □ The multiple that is used can be chosen in one of two ways:
 - Use the multiple that best fits your objective. Thus, if you want the company to be undervalued, you pick the multiple that yields the highest value.
 - Use the multiple that has the highest R-squared in the sector when regressed against fundamentals. Thus, if you have tried PE, PBV, PS, etc. and run regressions of these multiples against fundamentals, use the multiple that works best at explaining differences across firms in that sector.
 - Use the multiple that seems to make the most sense for that sector, given how value is measured and created.

Conventional usage...

Sector	Multiple Used	Rationale
Cyclical Manufacturing	PE, Relative PE	Often with normalized earnings
Growth firms	PEG ratio	Big differences in growth rates
Young growth firms w/ losses	Revenue Multiples	What choice do you have?
Infrastructure	EV/EBITDA	Early losses, big DA
REIT	P/CFE (where CFE = Net income + Depreciation)	Big depreciation charges on real estate
Financial Services	Price/ Book equity	Marked to market?
Retailing	Revenue multiples	Margins equalize sooner or later

A closing thought...

