Aswath Damodaran

VALUATION: FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE!

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Some Initial Thoughts

" One hundred thousand lemmings cannot be wrong"

Graffiti



Theme 1: Characterizing Valuation as a discipline

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. Valuation is not a science.
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. Valuation is not an art.
- A craft is a skill that you learn <u>by doing</u>. The more you do it, the better you get at it. Valuation is a craft.

Theme 2: Valuing an asset is not the same as pricing that asset



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Theme 3: Good valuation = Story + Numbers



Theme 4: If you value something, you should be willing to act on it..

- <u>What theory?</u> There is very little theory in valuation and I am not sure what an academic valuation would like like and am not sure that I want to find out.
- <u>Pragmatism, not purity</u>: The end game is to estimate a value for an asset. I plan to get there, even if it means taking short cuts and making assumptions that would make purists blanch.
- <u>Faith</u>: To act on your valuations, you have to have faith in
 In your own valuation judgments.
 - In markets: that prices will move towards your value estimates.
 That faith will have to be earned and will be tested.

Misconceptions about Valuation

Myth 1: A valuation is an objective search for "true" value

- Truth 1.1: All valuations are biased. The only questions are how much and in which direction.
- Truth 1.2: The direction and magnitude of the bias in your valuation is directly proportional to who pays you and how much you are paid.
- Myth 2.: A good valuation provides a precise estimate of value
 - **Truth 2.1: There are no precise valuations.**
 - Truth 2.2: The payoff to valuation is greatest when valuation is least precise.
- □ Myth 3: . The more quantitative a model, the better the valuation
 - Truth 3.1: One's understanding of a valuation model is inversely proportional to the number of inputs required for the model.
 - Truth 3.2: Simpler valuation models do much better than complex ones.

Approaches to Valuation

- Intrinsic valuation, relates the value of an asset to the present value of expected future cashflows on that asset. In its most common form, this takes the form of a discounted cash flow valuation.
- Relative valuation, estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing of 'comparable' assets relative to a common variable like earnings, cash flows, book value or sales.
- Contingent claim valuation, uses option pricing models to measure the value of assets that share option characteristics.

Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

- What is it: In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on the asset.
- Philosophical Basis: Every asset has an intrinsic value that can be estimated, based upon its characteristics in terms of cash flows, growth and risk.
- Information Needed: To use discounted cash flow valuation, you need
 - to estimate the life of the asset
 - to estimate the cash flows during the life of the asset
 - to estimate the discount rate to apply to these cash flows to get present value
- Market Inefficiency: Markets are assumed to make mistakes in pricing assets across time, and are assumed to correct themselves over time, as new information comes out about assets.

Risk Adjusted Value: Three Basic Propositions

The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

Value of asset = $\frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$

- 1. The IT Proposition: If "it" does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), "it" cannot affect value.
- 2. The DUH Proposition: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
- 3. The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.

DCF Choices: Equity Valuation versus Firm Valuation



The Drivers of Value...









Genting's revenue growth has been sluggish and their operating margins have been sliding since 2009

Genting Berhad: My valuation (July 2016)



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DCF INPUTS

"Garbage in, garbage out"

I. Measure earnings right..



Operating Leases at Amgen in 2007

Amgen has lease commitments and its cost of debt (based on it's A rating) is 5.63%.

| Year | Commitment | Present Value |
|------|------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | \$96.00 | \$90.88 |
| 2 | \$95.00 | \$85.14 |
| 3 | \$102.00 | \$86.54 |
| 4 | \$98.00 | \$78.72 |
| 5 | \$87.00 | \$66.16 |
| 6-12 | \$107.43 | \$462.10 (\$752 million prorated) |
| | | |

Debt Value of leases =

\$869.55

- Debt outstanding at Amgen = \$7,402 + \$870 = \$8,272 million
- Adjusted Operating Income = Stated OI + Lease expense this year Depreciation

= 5,071 m + 69 m - 870/12 = \$5,068 million (12 year life for assets)

- □ Approximate Operating income= stated OI + PV of Lease commitment * Pre-tax cost of debt
- = \$5,071 m + 870 m (.0563) = \$5,120 million

Capitalizing R&D Expenses: Amgen

R & D was assumed to have a 10-year life.

| Year | R&D Expense | Unamortized portion | | Amortizati | on this year |
|------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| Current | 3366.00 | 1.00 | 3366.00 | | |
| -1 | 2314.00 | 0.90 | 2082.60 | | \$231.40 |
| -2 | 2028.00 | 0.80 | 1622.40 | | \$202.80 |
| -3 | 1655.00 | 0.70 | 1158.50 | | \$165.50 |
| -4 | 1117.00 | 0.60 | 670.20 | | \$111.70 |
| -5 | 865.00 | 0.50 | 432.50 | | \$86.50 |
| -6 | 845.00 | 0.40 | 338.00 | | \$84.50 |
| -7 | 823.00 | 0.30 | 246.90 | | \$82.30 |
| -8 | 663.00 | 0.20 | 132.60 | | \$66.30 |
| -9 | 631.00 | 0.10 | 63.10 | | \$63.10 |
| -10 | 558.00 | | 0.00 | | \$55.80 |
| Value of Research Asse | t = | | \$10,112.80 | | \$1,149.90 |
| | | | | | |

□ Adjusted Operating Income = \$5,120 + 3,366 - 1,150 = \$7,336 million

Genting's Operating Earnings History



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II. Get the big picture (not the accounting one) when it comes to cap ex and working capital

Capital expenditures should include

- Research and development expenses, once they have been recategorized as capital expenses.
- Acquisitions of other firms, whether paid for with cash or stock.
- Working capital should be defined not as the difference between current assets and current liabilities but as the difference between non-cash current assets and nondebt current liabilities.
- On both items, start with what the company did in the most recent year but do look at the company's history and at industry averages.

Amgen's Net Capital Expenditures

□ The accounting net cap ex at Amgen is small:

- Accounting Capital Expenditures =
- Accounting Depreciation =
- Accounting Net Cap Ex =
- We define capital expenditures broadly to include R&D and acquisitions:
 - Accounting Net Cap Ex =
 - Net R&D Cap Ex = (3366-1150) =
 - Acquisitions in 2006 =
 - Total Net Capital Expenditures =

\$ 255 million
\$2,216 million
\$3,975 million
\$ 6,443 million

\$1,218 million

\$ 963 million

\$ 255 million

 Acquisitions have been a volatile item. Amgen was quiet on the acquisition front in 2004 and 2005 and had a significant acquisition in 2003.

III. The government bond rate is not always the risk free rate

- When valuing Amgen in US dollars, the US\$ ten-year bond rate of 4.78% was used as the risk free rate. We assumed that the US treasury was default free.
- When valuing Tata Motors in Indian rupees in 2010, the Indian government bond rate of 8% was not default free. Using the Indian government's local currency rating of Ba2 yielded a default spread of 3% for India and a riskfree rate of 5% in Indian rupees.

Risk free rate in Indian Rupees = 8% - 3% = 5%

To value Universal Robina in Philippine Pesos, you need a risk free rate in Pesos. The Philippine Peso government bond was yielding 6.24% on April 20, 2018. The bond rating for Philippines is Baa2, with a default spread of 1.95%, yielding a riskfree rate of 4.29%.

Riskfree rate in Philippine Pesos = 6.24% - 1.95% = 4.29%

Risk free rates will vary across currencies!



Risk free Rate: A Sanity Check

- The risk free rate in a currency is a sum of the expected inflation in the currency and a real interest rate. If you assume that the global real interest rate is a constant, the only differential between risk free rates should be the inflation differential.
- If you have the US treasury bond rate (or a German Euro bond rate), you can add the differential inflation rate between the currency and the US dollar (or Euro) to the US T.Bond rate (or Euro risk free rate) to get to a currency risk free rate.
 - LC Risk free rate = Risk free rate in \$ + (Inflation rate in LC Inflation rate in US \$)
- The expected inflation rate in the US dollar is about 2%. What is the expected inflation rate in the Philippines?

But valuations should not! Valuing Tata Motors

| | In Indian Rupees | In US \$ |
|-------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Risk free Rate | 5.00% | 2.00% |
| Expected inflation rate | 4.00% | 1.00% |
| Cost of capital | | |
| - High Growth | 12.50% | 9.25% |
| - Stable Growth | 10.39% | 7.21% |
| Expected growth rate | | |
| - High Growth | 12.01% | 8.78% |
| - Stable Growth | 5.00% | 2.00% |
| Return on Capital | | |
| - High Growth | 17.16% | 13.78% |
| - Stable Growth | 10.39% | 7.21% |
| Value per share | Rs 614 | \$12.79/share (roughly Rs |
| | | 614 at current exchange |
| | | rate) |

IV. Betas do not come from regressions... and are noisy...



And are meaningless when run against narrow indices..

| GENT MK MYR ↓ 7.8831 K7.88/7.90K | 156k x94900 | |
|--|--|------------------|
| At 4:59 d Vol 8,388,100 0 8.19K H 8.19K L 7.86K | Val 66.618M | |
| GENT MK Equit Relative Index FBMKLCI Index 96 Actions - 9 | 7) Edit • H | listorical Beta |
| Data Last Price Data Last Price Wkly Linear Beta | +/- Non-Param | Reg On Percent |
| ■ 06/25/2014 = - 06/24/2016 = ■ 06/25/2013 = - 06/25/2015 = Lag | 0 Winsorize 2 St | d Dev Local |
| 6M YTD 1Y 2Y 5Y Max Weekly V | Z Statistics A Tra | nsformations O |
| Burry + link z brank Q her , who I hav | Y = GENTING BHD | |
| 9 ² • 1.1561-689 • • | X = FTSE Bursa Malaysia | KLCI |
| | Linear Beta | Range 1 |
| | Raw BETA | 1.349 |
| | Adjusted BETA | 1.233 |
| 1 | ALPHA (Intercept) | -0.010 |
| | R ² (Correlation ²) | 0.420 |
| · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | R (Correlation) | 0.648 |
| ······································ | Std Dev of Error | 2.434 |
| | Std Error of ALPHA | 0.239 |
| | Std Error of BETA | 0.157 |
| | t-Test | 8.598 |
| | Significance | 0.000 |
| and the second s | Last T-Value | -1.243 |
| | Last P-Value | 0.108 |
| FEMILICI Index-Percent | Number of Points | 104 |
| A AND THE A | Last Spread | 1626.17 |
| in the man | Last Ratio | 0.005 |
| | | |
| | | |
| 1984 1984 2004 2004 2004 2004 CONTRACT | 1 | |
| Australia 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 2395 9000 Europe 44 20 2330 2500 German | 49 69 9204 1210 Here Ke | A 052 2022 (000 |
| Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 | Copyright 2016 Bloomb | era Finance L.P. |

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Even if they look really good...



Determinants of Betas



Bottom-up Betas Step 1: Find the business or businesses that your firm operates in. Possible Refinements Step 2: Find publicly traded firms in each of these businesses and obtain their regression betas. Compute the simple average across these regression betas to arrive at an average beta for these publicly If you can, adjust this beta for differences traded firms. Unlever this average beta using the average debt to between your firm and the comparable equity ratio across the publicly traded firms in the sample. firms on operating leverage and product Unlevered beta for business = Average beta across publicly traded characteristics. firms/ (1 + (1-t) (Average D/E ratio across firms)) While revenues or operating income Step 3: Estimate how much value your firm derives from each of are often used as weights, it is better the different businesses it is in. to try to estimate the value of each business. Step 4: Compute a weighted average of the unlevered betas of the If you expect the business mix of your different businesses (from step 2) using the weights from step 3. firm to change over time, you can Bottom-up Unlevered beta for your firm = Weighted average of the change the weights on a year-to-year unlevered betas of the individual business basis.

Step 5: Compute a levered beta (equity beta) for your firm, using the market debt to equity ratio for your firm. Levered bottom-up beta = Unlevered beta (1+ (1-t) (Debt/Equity)) If you expect your debt to equity ratio to change over time, the levered beta will change over time.

Three examples...

Amgen

The unlevered beta for pharmaceutical firms is 1.59. Using Amgen's debt to equity ratio of 11%, the bottom up beta for Amgen is

Bottom-up Beta = 1.59 (1+ (1-.35)(.11)) = 1.73

- Tata Motors
 - The unlevered beta for automobile firms is 0.98. Using Tata Motor's debt to equity ratio of 33.87%, the bottom up beta for Tata Motors is

Bottom-up Beta = 0.98 (1+ (1-.3399)(.3387)) = 1.20

Genting Berhad

| Business | Revenues | EV/Sales | Estimated Value | Unlevered Beta |
|---------------------|----------|----------|-----------------|----------------|
| Hotel/Gaming | RM15,023 | 2.5600 | RM38,459 | 0.7300 |
| Farming/Agriculture | RM1,107 | 1.3100 | RM1,450 | 0.7600 |
| Company | RM16,130 | | RM39,909 | 0.7311 |

Levered Beta = 0.7311 (1 + (1 - .25)(.5674)) = 1.04

V. And the past is not always a good indicator of the future.

| | Arithmetic Average | | Geometric Average | | |
|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|
| | Stocks - T. Bills | Stocks - T. Bonds | Stocks - T. Bills | Stocks - T. Bonds | |
| 1928-2017 | 8.09% | 6.38% | 6.26% | 4.77% | |
| Std Error | 2.10% | 2.24% | | | |
| 1968-2017 | 6.58% | 4.24% | 5.28% | 3.29% | |
| Std Error | 2.39% | 2.70% | | | |
| 2008-2017 | 9.85% | 5.98% | 8.01% | 4.56% | |
| Std Error | 6.12% | 8.70% | | | |

□ If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it

- Long term (because of the standard error)
- Consistent with your risk free rate
- A "compounded" average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.

But in the future..

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Implied Premiums in the US: 1960-2017



Implied Premium for US Equity Market: 1960-2017
The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from September 12, 2008 to January 1, 2009



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Implied Premium for India using the Sensex: April 2010

- \Box Level of the Index = 17559
- FCFE on the Index = 3.5% (Estimated FCFE for companies in index as % of market value of equity)
- Other parameters
 - Riskfree Rate = 5% (Rupee)
 - Expected Growth (in Rupee)
 - Next 5 years = 20% (Used expected growth rate in Earnings)
 - After year 5 = 5%
- Solving for the expected return:
 - Expected return on Equity = 11.72%
 - Implied Equity premium for India =11.72% 5% = 6.72%

VI. The Downside of Globalization: Dealing with Country Risk

<u>The Default Spread</u>: Most practitioners estimate the equity risk premium for riskier markets by starting with a base premium for a mature market and adding the default spread for the government in the risky market.

ERP for country = ERP for Mature Market + Default spread for country ERP for Malaysia = ERP for US + Default Spread for Malaysia

= 5.08% + 1.23% = 7.03%

<u>The Melded Default Spread</u>: Equities are riskier than bonds and scaling up the default spread for the higher risk in equities should yield a better estimate of the additional risk for a country:

ERP for country = ERP for Mature Market + Default spread for country *(Std Deviation of Equity_{Country}/ Std Deviation of Govt Bond_{Country}) ERP for Malaysia = 5.08% + 1.23% (14.35%/12.15%) = 6.53%

A Template for Estimating the ERP



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| | | | _ | | _ | | | | - | | - | | | - | |
|---|----------------|--------------|----|------|-----|-------|-----|-------|---|----------------|---|-----|------|----|-------|
| | 3 | Andorra | | Baa | 2 | 7.27 | % | 2.19 | % | Jersey | Α | la3 | 5.78 | % | 0.70% |
| | | Austria | | Aa | 1 | 5.549 | % | 0.46 | % | Liechtenstein | Α | laa | 5.08 | % | 0.00% |
| | Ô | Belgium | | Aa | 3 | 5.78 | % | 0.70 | % | Luxembourg | A | laa | 5.08 | % | 0.00% |
| | $\widetilde{}$ | Cyprus | | Ba | 3 | 9.23 | % | 4.15 | % | Malta | 1 | A3 | 6.46 | % | 1.38% |
| | - 1 | Denmark | | Aaa | а | 5.08 | % | 0.00 | % | Netherlands | A | laa | 5.08 | % | 0.00% |
| | 2 | Finland | | Aa | 1 | 5.54 | % | 0.46 | % | Norway | Α | laa | 5.08 | % | 0.00% |
| | B | France | | Aa | 2 | 5.65 | % | 0.57 | % | Portugal | B | 3a1 | 7.96 | % | 2.88% |
| | 5 | Germany | r | Aa | а | 5.08 | % | 0.00 | % | Spain | B | aa2 | 7.27 | % | 2.19% |
| | | Greece | | Caa | 2 1 | 15.46 | % | 10.38 | % | Sweden | Α | laa | 5.08 | % | 0.00% |
| | \mathbf{n} | Guernsey | / | Aa | 3 | 5.78 | % | 0.70 | % | Switzerland | Α | laa | 5.08 | % | 0.00% |
| | Ц | Iceland | | A3 | | 6.46 | % | 1.38 | % | Turkey | B | 3a1 | 7.96 | % | 2.88% |
| | r | Ireland | | A2 | 2 | 6.06 | % | 0.98 | % | United Kingdom | Α | la2 | 5.65 | % | 0.57% |
| | Гī | Isle of M | an | Aa | 2 | 5.65 | % | 0.57 | % | Western Europe | | | 6.01 | % | 0.93% |
| | | Italy | | Baa | 2 | 7.27 | % | 2.19 | % | A I | | 4.4 | 420/ | | 2.40/ |
| | | | | | | | | | | Angola | - | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| | Cana | da | Aa | a 5. | 08% | 0.00 | % | | | Botswana | | 6.0 | 06% | 0 | .98% |
| | Unite | d States | Aa | a 5. | 08% | 0.00 | % | | | Burkina Faso | | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| | North | n America | | 5. | 08% | 0.00 | % | | | Cameroon | | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| _ | | | _ | _ | _ | | | | | Cape Verde | | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| С | aribb | ean | | 1 | 1.3 | 9% | 6.3 | 31% | | Congo (DR) | | 12. | 58% | 7 | .50% |
| | Arge | ntina | T | 82 | 11 | 42% | | 6 34% | | Congo (Rep of) | | 15. | 46% | 10 | 0.38% |
| | Beliz | incina io | + | 83 | 12 | 58% | | 7.50% | - | Côte d'Ivoire | | 9.2 | 23% | 4 | .15% |
| | Boliv | /ia | B | la3 | 9 | .23% | | 4.15% | | Egypt | | 12. | 58% | 7 | .50% |
| | Braz | il | В | a2 | 8 | .54% | 1 | 3.46% | | Ethiopia | | 10. | 27% | 5 | .19% |
| | Chile | 2 | A | a3 | 5 | .78% | | 0.70% | - | Gabon | | 12. | 58% | 7 | .50% |
| | Colo | mbia | Ba | aa2 | 7 | .27% | | 2.19% | | Ghana | | 12. | 58% | 7 | .50% |
| | Cost | a Rica | В | la2 | 8 | .54% | 1 | 3.46% | | Kenya | | 10. | 27% | 5 | .19% |
| | Ecua | dor | 1 | B3 | 12 | .58% | 1 | 7.50% | - | Morocco | | 7.9 | 96% | 2 | .88% |
| | El Sa | lvador | C | aa1 | 13 | .72% | 1 | 8.64% | | Mozambique | | 16. | 60% | 1 | 1.52% |
| | Guat | temala | B | a1 | 7 | .96% | | 2.88% | | Namibia | | 7.9 | 96% | 2 | .88% |
| | Hon | duras | | 81 | 10 | .27% | | 5.19% | | Nigeria | | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| | Mex | ICO | ť | A3 | 6 | .46% | | 1.38% | | Rwanda | | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| | Papa | ragua | | 322 | 7 | .42% | | 0.34% | | Senegal | | 9.2 | 23% | 4 | .15% |
| | Para | anna | 6 | adz | 7 | 06% | - | 2.15% | | South Africa | | 7.6 | 62% | 2 | .54% |
| | Peru | Buay | | Δ3 | 6 | 46% | - | 1.38% | | Swaziland | | 5.0 | 08% | 1 | 1.42% |
| | Suri | name | ť | B1 | 10 | .27% | | 5.19% | | Tunisia | | 10. | 27% | 5 | .19% |
| | Urug | guay | B | aa2 | 7 | .27% | | 2.19% | | Uganda | | 11. | 42% | 6 | .34% |
| | Vene | ezuela | С | aa3 | 16 | .60% | 1 | 1.52% | | Zambia | | 12. | 58% | 7 | .50% |
| | Latir | n America | | | 8 | .63% | 1 | 3.55% | | Africa | | 10. | 63% | 5 | .58% |
| | | | _ | | | | _ | | | | _ | | | | |

| | Albania | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% | |
|---|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Armenia | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% | Count |
| | Azerbaijan | Ba2 | 8.54% | 3.46% | Brune |
| | Belarus | Caa1 | 13.72% | 8.64% | Gamb |
| ſ | Bosnia | B3 | 12.58% | 7.50% | Guine |
| | Bulgaria | Baa2 | 7.27% | 2.19% | Guine |
| | Croatia | Ba2 | 8.54% | 3.46% | Guya |
| [| Czech Republic | A1 | 5.89% | 0.81% | Haiti |
| [| Estonia | A1 | 5.89% | 0.81% | Korea |
| I | Georgia | Ba2 | 8.54% | 3.46% | Liberi |
| I | Hungary | Baa3 | 7.62% | 2.54% | Libya |
| I | Kazakhstan | Baa3 | 7.62% | 2.54% | Mada |
| I | Kyrgyzstan | B2 | 11.42% | 6.34% | |
| I | Latvia | A3 | 6.46% | 1.38% | |
| [| Lithuania | A3 | 6.46% | 1.38% | |
| Γ | Macedonia | Ba3 | 9.23% | 4.15% | |
| [| Moldova | B3 | 12.58% | 7.50% | |
| [| Montenegro | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% | |
| Γ | Poland | A2 | 6.06% | 0.98% | |
| Γ | Romania | Baa3 | 7.62% | 2.54% | |
| Γ | Russia | Ba1 | 7.96% | 2.88% | |
| | Serbia | Ba3 | 9.23% | 4.15% | |
| | Slovakia | A2 | 6.06% | 0.98% | |
| | Slovenia | Baa1 | 6.92% | 1.84% | |
| | Tajikistan | B3 | 7.96% | 2.88% | |
| [| Ukraine | Caa2 | 15.46% | 10.38% | |
| | E. Europe | | 7.75% | 2.69% | |
| 1 | | | | | |
| | Abu Dhabi | | Aa2 | 5.65% | 0.57% |
| | Bahrain | | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% |
| | Iraq | | Caa1 | 13.72% | 8.64% |
| | Israel | | A1 | 5.89% | 0.81% |
| | Jordan | | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% |
| | Kuwait | | Aa2 | 5.65% | 0.57% |
| | Lebanon | | B3 | 12.58% | 7.50% |
| | Oman | | Baa2 | 7.27% | 2.19% |
| | Qatar | | Aa3 | 5.78% | 0.70% |
| | Ras Al Khaimal | h | A2 | 6.06% | 0.98% |
| | Saudi Arabia | | A1 | 5.89% | 0.81% |
| | Sharjah | | A3 | 6.46% | 1.38% |
| | United Arab Er | nirate | s Aa2 | 5.65% | 0.57% |
| | Middle East | | | 6.69% | 1.61% |
| | | | | | |

| PRS | ERP | CRP | Country | PRS | ERP | CRP |
|------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 62.3 | 12.58% | 7.50% | Malawi | 61.3 | 13.73% | 8.65% |
| 76.3 | 6.06% | 0.98% | Mali | 60.8 | 13.73% | 8.65% |
| 59.3 | 15.46% | 10.38% | Myanmar | 63.8 | 12.58% | 7.50% |
| 58.3 | 15.46% | 10.38% | Niger | 53.7 | 18.91% | 13.83% |
| 63.8 | 12.58% | 7.50% | Sierra Leone | 54.3 | 18.91% | 13.83% |
| 68.5 | 9.23% | 4.15% | Somalia | 52 | 18.91% | 13.83% |
| 61.8 | 13.73% | 8.65% | Sudan | 48 | 25.32% | 20.24% |
| 73.3 | 7.27% | 2.19% | Syria | 47 | 25.32% | 20.24% |
| 56 | 16.60% | 11.52% | Tanzania | 63.3 | 12.58% | 7.50% |
| 53 | 18.91% | 13.83% | Togo | 61 | 13.73% | 8.65% |
| 62 | 13.73% | 8.65% | Yemen, Republic | 49.3 | 25.32% | 20.24% |
| 64.5 | 11.42% | 6.34% | Zimbabwe | 58.5 | 15.46% | 10.38% |
| | PRS 62.3 76.3 59.3 58.3 63.8 63.8 63.8 63.8 61.8 73.3 56 53 53 62 64.5 | PRS ERP 62.3 12.58% 76.3 6.06% 59.3 15.46% 58.3 15.46% 63.8 12.58% 63.8 12.58% 64.5 9.23% 61.8 13.73% 73.3 7.27% 56 16.60% 53 18.91% 62 13.73% 64.5 11.42% | PRS ERP CRP 62.3 12.58% 7.50% 76.3 6.06% 0.98% 59.3 15.46% 10.38% 58.3 15.46% 10.38% 63.8 12.58% 7.50% 63.8 12.58% 7.50% 64.5 9.23% 4.15% 61.8 13.73% 8.65% 73.3 7.27% 2.19% 56 16.60% 11.52% 53 18.91% 13.83% 62 13.73% 8.65% 64.5 11.42% 6.34% | PRS ERP CRP Country 62.3 12.58% 7.50% Malawi 76.3 6.06% 0.98% Mali 59.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 58.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 58.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 63.8 12.58% 7.50% Sierra Leone 63.8 12.58% 7.50% Somalia 61.8 13.73% 8.65% Sudan 73.3 7.27% 2.19% Syria 56 16.60% 11.52% Tanzania 53 18.91% 13.83% Togo 62 13.73% 8.65% Yemen, Republic 64.5 11.42% 6.34% Zimbabwe | PRS ERP CRP Country PRS 62.3 12.58% 7.50% Malawi 61.3 76.3 6.06% 0.98% Mali 60.8 59.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 63.8 58.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 53.7 63.8 12.58% 7.50% Sierra Leone 54.3 68.5 9.23% 4.15% Somalia 52 61.8 13.73% 8.65% Sudan 48 73.3 7.27% 2.19% Syria 47 56 16.60% 11.52% Tanzania 63.3 53 18.91% 13.83% Togo 61 62 13.73% 8.65% Yemen, Republic 49.3 64.5 11.42% 6.34% Zimbabwe 58.5 | PRS ERP CRP Country PRS ERP 62.3 12.58% 7.50% Malawi 61.3 13.73% 76.3 6.06% 0.98% Mali 60.8 13.73% 76.3 6.06% 0.98% Mali 60.8 13.73% 59.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 63.8 12.58% 58.3 15.46% 10.38% Myanmar 63.8 12.58% 58.3 15.46% 10.38% Niger 53.7 18.91% 63.8 12.58% 7.50% Sierra Leone 54.3 18.91% 64.5 9.23% 4.15% Somalia 52 18.91% 64.8 13.73% 8.65% Sudan 48 25.32% 73.3 7.27% 2.19% Syria 47 25.32% 56 16.60% 11.52% Tanzania 63.3 12.58% 53 18.91% 13.83% Togo 61 13.73% |

| Bangladesh | Ba3 | 9.23% | 4.15% |
|------------------|------|--------|-------|
| Cambodia | B2 | 11.42% | 6.34% |
| China | Al | 5.89% | 0.81% |
| Fiji | Ba3 | 9.23% | 4.15% |
| Hong Kong | Aa2 | 5.65% | 0.57% |
| India | Baa2 | 7.27% | 2.19% |
| Indonesia | Baa3 | 7.62% | 2.54% |
| Japan | Al | 5.89% | 0.81% |
| Korea | Aa2 | 5.65% | 0.57% |
| Macao | Aa3 | 5.78% | 0.70% |
| Malaysia | A3 | 6.46% | 1.38% |
| Mauritius | Baa1 | 6.92% | 1.84% |
| Mongolia | Caa1 | 13.72% | 8.64% |
| Pakistan | B3 | 12.58% | 7.50% |
| Papua New Guinea | B2 | 11.42% | 6.34% |
| Philippines | Baa2 | 7.27% | 2.19% |
| Singapore | Aaa | 5.08% | 0.00% |
| Sri Lanka | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% |
| Taiwan | Aa3 | 5.78% | 0.70% |
| Thailand | Baa1 | 6.92% | 1.84% |
| Vietnam | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% |
| Asia | | 6.27% | 1.19% |

| Australia | Aaa | 5.08% | 0.00% |
|-------------------------|-----|--------|-------|
| Cook Islands | B1 | 10.27% | 5.19% |
| New Zealand | Aaa | 5.08% | 0.00% |
| Australia & New Zealand | | 5.08% | 0.00% |

Red #: Country risk premium Regional #: GDP weighted average

VII. And it is not just emerging market companies that are exposed to this risk..

- The "default" approach in valuation has been to assign country risk based upon your country of incorporation. Thus, if you are incorporated in a developed market, the assumption has been that you are not exposed to emerging market risks. If you are incorporated in an emerging market, you are saddled with the entire country risk.
- As companies globalize and look for revenues in foreign markets, this practice will under estimate the costs of equity of developed market companies with significant emerging market risk exposure and over estimate the costs of equity of emerging market companies with significant developed market risk exposure.

One way of dealing with this: Operation-based ERP for Genting in 2016

| Country | Revenues | ERP | Weight | Weighted ERP |
|-------------------|----------|-------|---------|--------------|
| Singapore | 6808 | 6.00% | 41.05% | 2.46% |
| Malaysia | 6455 | 7.79% | 38.93% | 3.03% |
| United Kingdom | 1350 | 6.59% | 8.14% | 0.54% |
| Rest of the World | 1970 | 7.45% | 11.88% | 0.89% |
| Genting | 16583 | | 100.00% | 6.92% |

- 1. By focusing on revenues, are we misestimating country risk exposure?
- 2. Are you satisfied with the information disclosure about geographical risk from Universal Robina?

Natural Resource Twists? Royal Dutch

| | | - | - |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------|--------|
| Country | Oil & Gas Production | % of Total | ERP |
| Denmark | 17396 | 3.83% | 6.20% |
| Italy | 11179 | 2.46% | 9.14% |
| Norway | 14337 | 3.16% | 6.20% |
| UK | 20762 | 4.57% | 6.81% |
| Rest of Europe | 874 | 0.19% | 7.40% |
| Brunei | 823 | 0.18% | 9.04% |
| Iraq | 20009 | 4.40% | 11.37% |
| Malaysia | 22980 | 5.06% | 8.05% |
| Oman | 78404 | 17.26% | 7.29% |
| Russia | 22016 | 4.85% | 10.06% |
| Rest of Asia & ME | 24480 | 5.39% | 7.74% |
| Oceania | 7858 | 1.73% | 6.20% |
| Gabon | 12472 | 2.75% | 11.76% |
| Nigeria | 67832 | 14.93% | 11.76% |
| Rest of Africa | 6159 | 1.36% | 12.17% |
| USA | 104263 | 22.95% | 6.20% |
| Canada | 8599 | 1.89% | 6.20% |
| Brazil | 13307 | 2.93% | 9.60% |
| Rest of Latin America | 576 | 0.13% | 10.78% |
| Royal Dutch Shell | 454326 | 100.00% | 8.26% |
| | | | |

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An alternate way: Estimating a company's exposure to country risk (Lambda)

- Just as beta measures exposure to macro economic risk, lambda measures exposure just to country risk. Like beta, it is scaled around one.
- The easiest and most accessible data is on revenues. Most companies break their revenues down by region. One simplistic solution would be to do the following:

Lambda = % of revenues domestically _{firm}/ % of revenues domestically _{average firm}

- In 2008-09, Tata Motors got about 91.37% of its revenues in India and TCS got 7.62%. The average Indian firm gets about 80% of its revenues in India:
 - Lambda _{Tata Motors} = 91%/80% = 1.14
 - The danger of focusing just on revenues is that it misses other exposures to risk (production and operations).

| | Tata Motors | TCS |
|-------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| % of production/operations in India | High | High |
| % of revenues in India | 91.37% (in 2009) Estimated 70% (in 2010) | 7.62% |
| Lambda | 0.80 | 0.20 |
| Flexibility in moving operations | Low. Significant physical assets. | High. Human capital is mobile. |

VIII. Growth has to be earned (not endowed or estimated): Sustainable Growth



- 1. <u>No free growth</u>: In the long term, to grow, you have to reinvest.
- 2. <u>Growth Quality</u>: For a given reinvestment, the higher the return you generate on your reinvestment, the faster you can grow.
- 3. <u>Scaling up is hard to do.</u>

Measuring Returns: The Quandary



Operating income, Reinvestment & Return on Capital – Genting in 2016



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Earn at least your cost of capital! But companies seem to have trouble in practice



A Regional Breakdown

| | Number of | Cost of | | ROIC - Cost of | % of firms with |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|--------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Sub Group | firms | Capital | ROIC | Capital | ROIC>WACC |
| Africa and Middle East | 1,742 | 9.38% | 7.08% | -2.29% | 36.02% |
| Australia & NZ | 1,527 | 7.67% | 4.98% | -2.69% | 28.35% |
| Canada | 2,601 | 7.89% | 3.14% | -4.76% | 15.88% |
| China | 4,793 | 8.05% | 5.74% | -2.31% | 38.84% |
| EU & Environs | 4,812 | 8.07% | 8.88% | 0.81% | 42.92% |
| Eastern Europe & Russia | 491 | 9.90% | 7.70% | -2.19% | 33.98% |
| India | 2,966 | 9.55% | 13.56% | 4.01% | 39.84% |
| Japan | 3,487 | 7.83% | 7.37% | -0.46% | 51.73% |
| Latin America | 748 | 9.28% | 7.90% | -1.38% | 42.92% |
| Small Asia | 7,500 | 9.06% | 7.55% | -1.50% | 35.18% |
| UK | 1,193 | 8.04% | 8.06% | 0.02% | 44.42% |
| United States | 6,125 | 7.54% | 10.23% | 2.69% | 42.40% |

A More General Way to Estimate Growth: Top Down Growth

- All of the fundamental growth equations assume that the firm has a return on equity or return on capital it can sustain in the long term.
- When operating income is negative or margins are expected to change over time, we use a three step process to estimate growth:
 - Estimate growth rates in revenues over time
 - Determine the total market (given your business model) and estimate the market share that you think your company will earn.
 - Decrease the growth rate as the firm becomes larger
 - Keep track of absolute revenues to make sure that the growth is feasible
 - Estimate expected operating margins each year
 - Set a target margin that the firm will move towards
 - Adjust the current margin towards the target margin
 - Estimate the capital that needs to be invested to generate revenue growth and expected margins
 - Estimate a sales to capital ratio that you will use to generate reinvestment needs each year.

7. Don't let your terminal value run away with your valuation

 In the terminal value equation, the growth seems to be the magic input, the key driver of value.

$$Terminal \ Value_n = \frac{Free \ Cash \ Flow_{n+1}}{(r-g)}$$

- Since that growth rate has to be maintained in perpetuity, it cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which you operate:
 - If your valuation is in nominal terms, it is the nominal growth rate of the economy. If it is real terms, it is the real growth rate.
 - If your company is purely domestic, it is the growth rate of the domestic economy. If it is global, it is the global economy.

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My Simple Proxy: The Risk free Rate

 I use a simpler and more easily observable number as a cap on stable growth: the risk free rate that I have used in the valuation. This take into account the currency automatically (since higher inflation currencies have higher risk free rates) and it is not unreasonable to argue that it is a good proxy for the nominal growth rate in the economy.

□ There are three reasons I do it:

- The best predictor nominal growth in the US economy at the start of every decade has been the US treasury bond rate at the time.
- It preserves consistency. If you believe, as many have, that the risk free rate is too low in US \$ or Euros, it compensates for the resulting too-low cost of capital by also capping the growth rate at the same number (at least in terminal value).
- It puts a control on my biases.

A Consistent Version of Terminal Value

• The terminal value equation can be restated:

Terminal Value in year n =

$$\frac{\text{EBIT}_{n+1} \ (1-t)(1-\frac{g}{\text{ROC}})}{(\text{Cost of Capital} - g)}$$

Terminal Value for a firm with \$100 million in after-tax operating income & cost of capital = 10% (for different g and ROIC)

| | | | Return on capital in perpetuity | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | 6% | 8% | 10% | 12% | 14% | | | | | | |
| r | 0.00% | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | | | | | | |
| eve. | 0.50% | \$965 | \$987 | \$1,000 | \$1,009 | \$1,015 | | | | | | |
| for | 1.00% | \$926 | \$972 | \$1,000 | \$1,019 | \$1,032 | | | | | | |
| rate | 1.50% | \$882 | \$956 | \$1,000 | \$1,029 | \$1,050 | | | | | | |
| ¢, | 2.00% | \$833 | \$938 | \$1,000 | \$1,042 | \$1,071 | | | | | | |
| row | 2.50% | \$778 | \$917 | \$1,000 | \$1,056 | \$1,095 | | | | | | |
| 9 | 3.00% | \$714 | \$893 | \$1,000 | \$1,071 | \$1,122 | | | | | | |

Dangerous Practice 1: Just grow the FCFF another year!

Valuation of a firm with expected growth in earnings of 10% for next 5 yeras and 3% thereafter; Cost of capital is 10% abd Return on capital is 15%

| | | | Terminal Value = FCFF in y | | | | | ear 6/ (.10 | 03) | |
|-------------|---|--|--|---|---|--|---|---|---|--|
| | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| | | | | Just Gro | w F | CFF | / | Recomp | ute F | CFF |
| Year | El | BIT(1-t) | | FCFF | Ter | rm Value | | FCFF | Ter | n Value |
| 1 | \$ | 108.00 | \$ | 36.00 | | | \$ | 36.00 | | |
| 2 | \$ | 116.64 | \$ | 38.88 | | / | \$ | 38.88 | | |
| 3 | \$ | 125.97 | \$ | 41.99 | | | \$ | 41.99 | | |
| 4 | \$ | 136.05 | \$ | 45.35 | | * | \$ | 45.35 | | + |
| 5 | \$ | 146.93 | \$ | 48.98 | \$ | 720.67 | \$ | 48.98 | \$1 | ,729.61 |
| 6 | \$ | 151.34 | \$ | 50.45 | | | \$ | 121.07 | ĸ | |
| Value today | \$ | 605.27 | | / | | | \$ | 1,073.95 | $\overline{\ }$ | |
| | Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Value today | Year El 1 \$ 2 \$ 3 \$ 4 \$ 5 \$ 6 \$ Value today \$ | Year EBIT(1-t) 1 \$ 108.00 2 \$ 116.64 3 \$ 125.97 4 \$ 136.05 5 \$ 146.93 6 \$ 151.34 Value today \$ 605.27 | Year EBIT(1-t) 1 \$ 108.00 \$ 2 \$ 116.64 \$ 3 \$ 125.97 \$ 4 \$ 136.05 \$ 5 \$ 146.93 \$ 6 \$ 151.34 \$ Value today \$ 605.27 \$ | Terminal Year EBIT(1-t) FCFF 1 \$ 108.00 \$ 36.00 2 \$ 116.64 \$ 38.88 3 \$ 125.97 \$ 41.99 4 \$ 136.05 \$ 45.35 5 \$ 146.93 \$ 48.98 6 \$ 151.34 \$ 50.45 Value today \$ 605.27 \$ 41.99 | Terminal Valu Year EBIT(1-t) FCFF Terminal 1 \$ 108.00 \$ 36.00 \$ 2 \$ 116.64 \$ 38.88 \$ 3 \$ 125.97 \$ 41.99 \$ 4 \$ 136.05 \$ 45.35 \$ 5 \$ 146.93 \$ 48.98 \$ 6 \$ 151.34 \$ 50.45 \$ Value today \$ 605.27 \$ \$ | Terminal Value = FCFF iYearEBIT(1-t)FCFFTerm Value1\$ 108.00\$ 36.002\$ 116.64\$ 38.883\$ 125.97\$ 41.994\$ 136.05\$ 45.35V5\$ 146.93\$ 48.98\$ 720.676\$ 151.34\$ 50.45Value today\$ 605.27V | Terminal Value = FCFF in yearYearEBIT(1-t)FCFFTerm Value1\$ 108.00\$ 36.00\$2\$ 116.64\$ 38.88\$3\$ 125.97\$ 41.99\$4\$ 136.05\$ 45.35\$5\$ 146.93\$ 48.98\$ 720.676\$ 151.34\$ 50.45\$Value today\$ 605.27\$\$ | Terminal Value = FCFF in year 6/ (.10Just Grow FCFFRecompositionYearEBIT(1-t)FCFFTerm ValueFCFF1\$ 108.00\$ 36.00\$ 36.002\$ 116.64\$ 38.88\$ 38.883\$ 125.97\$ 41.99\$ 41.994\$ 136.05\$ 45.35\$ \$ 45.355\$ 146.93\$ 48.98\$ 720.67\$ 48.986\$ 151.34\$ 50.45\$ 121.07Value today\$ 605.27\$ 1,073.95 | Terminal Value = FCFF in year 6/ (.1003)YearEBIT(1-t)FCFFTerm ValueFCFFTerm1\$ 108.00\$ 36.00\$ 36.00\$ 36.00\$ 36.002\$ 116.64\$ 38.88\$ 38.88\$ 38.883\$ 125.97\$ 41.99\$ 41.994\$ 136.05\$ 45.35\$ 45.355\$ 146.93\$ 48.98\$ 720.67\$ 48.986\$ 151.34\$ 50.45\$ 121.07Value today\$ 605.27\$ 1,073.95 |

FCFF in year 6 = \$29.39 (1.03)

Reinvestment Rate in year 6 = g/ ROC = 3%/15% = 20% FCFF in year 6 = 149.87 (1-.20) = \$119.90

Terminal Value and Growth

| Stable Growth Rate | Amgen | Tata Motors | Genting |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| 0% | \$150,652 | ₹ 435,686 | MR 62,924 |
| 1% | \$154,479 | ₹ 435,686 | MR 62,924 |
| 2% | \$160,194 | ₹ 435,686 | MR 62,924 |
| 3% | \$167,784 | ₹ 435,686 | |
| 4% | \$179,099 | ₹ 435,686 | |
| 5% | | ₹ 435,686 | |
| | | | |
| Risk free Rate | 4.78% | 5.00% | 2.39% |
| Cost of capital | 8.08% | 10.39% | 6.89% |
| Return on capital | 10.00% | 10.39% | 6.89% |

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THE LOOSE ENDS IN VALUATION...

Aswath Damodaran

Getting from DCF to value per share: The Loose Ends



1. The Value of Cash An Exercise in Cash Valuation

| | Company A | Company B | Company C |
|-------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Enterprise Value | \$1 billion | \$ 1 billion | \$ 1 billion |
| Cash | \$ 100 mil | \$ 100 mil | \$ 100 mil |
| Return on Capital | 10% | 5% | 22% |
| Cost of Capital | 10% | 10% | 12% |
| Trades in | US | US | Argentina |

In which of these companies is cash most likely to trade at face value, at a discount and at a premium?

Cash: Discount or Premium?

Market Value of \$ 1 in cash: Estimates obtained by regressing Enterprise Value against Cash Balances



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Genting's Cash Balance

| 1. Would you | 4187 | Cross holdings account for 5.6% of value. |
|---|---------|---|
| discount Genting's cash balance? If yes, why? If no, why | 24355 | Cash accounts for 32.9% of value. |
| not? 2. Would your answer be different if you | | |
| were told that Genting has RM 18 billion in debt? | 45525 | Operating assets account for 61.5% of value. |
| | | |
| | GENTING | |

2. Dealing with Holdings in Other firms

Holdings in other firms can be categorized into

- Minority passive holdings, in which case only the dividend from the holdings is shown in the balance sheet
- Minority active holdings, in which case the share of equity income is shown in the income statements
- Majority active holdings, in which case the financial statements are consolidated.
- We tend to be sloppy in practice in dealing with cross holdings. After valuing the operating assets of a firm, using consolidated statements, it is common to add on the balance sheet value of minority holdings (which are in book value terms) and subtract out the minority interests (again in book value terms), representing the portion of the consolidated company that does not belong to the parent company.

How to value holdings in other firms.. In a perfect world..

- In a perfect world, we would strip the parent company from its subsidiaries and value each one separately. The value of the combined firm will be
 - Value of parent company + Proportion of value of each subsidiary
- To do this right, you will need to be provided detailed information on each subsidiary to estimate cash flows and discount rates.

Two compromise solutions...

- The market value solution: When the subsidiaries are publicly traded, you could use their traded market capitalizations to estimate the values of the cross holdings. You do risk carrying into your valuation any mistakes that the market may be making in valuation.
- The relative value solution: When there are too many cross holdings to value separately or when there is insufficient information provided on cross holdings, you can convert the book values of holdings that you have on the balance sheet (for both minority holdings and minority interests in majority holdings) by using the average price to book value ratio of the sector in which the subsidiaries operate.

Tata Motor's Cross Holdings



Aswath Damodaran

3. Other Assets that have not been counted

yet..

- Unutilized assets: If you have assets or property that are not being utilized (vacant land, for example), you have not valued it yet. You can assess a market value for these assets and add them on to the value of the firm.
- <u>Overfunded pension plans</u>: If you have a defined benefit plan and your assets exceed your expected liabilities, you could consider the over funding with two caveats:
 - Collective bargaining agreements may prevent you from laying claim to these excess assets.
 - There are tax consequences. Often, withdrawals from pension plans get taxed at much higher rates.
- Do not double count an asset. If you count the income from an asset in your cash flows, you cannot count the market value of the asset in your value.

An Uncounted Asset?



The longtime home of Playboy magazine founder Hugh Hefner is to be sold to Daren Metropoulos, a principal at private-equity firm Metropoulos & Co. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

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Genting's Agricultural Holdings

- Underlying Genting's operating assets is real estate (in both their hospitality and plantation businesses). Assume that this real estate has a value of RM 20 billion. Would you add this value to the RM 45 billion that you estimated for the operating assets?
- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) Maybe

What if the value of the real estate is RM 60 billion?

4. A Discount for Complexity: An Experiment

| | Company A | Company B |
|------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Operating Income | \$1 billion | \$1 billion |
| Tax rate | 40% | 40% |
| ROIC | 10% | 10% |
| Expected Growth | 5% | 5% |
| Cost of capital | 8% | 8% |
| Business Mix | Single | Multiple Businesses |
| Holdings | Simple | Complex |
| Accounting | Transparent | Opaque |
| Which firm would | d you value mo | ore highly? |

Measuring Complexity: Volume of Data in Financial Statements

| Company | Number of pages in last 10Q | Number of pages in last 10K |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| General Electric | 65 | 410 |
| Microsoft | 63 | 218 |
| Wal-mart | 38 | 244 |
| Exxon Mobil | 86 | 332 |
| Pfizer | 171 | 460 |
| Citigroup | 252 | 1026 |
| Intel | 69 | 215 |
| AIG | 164 | 720 |
| Johnson & Johnson | 63 | 218 |
| IBM | 85 | 353 |

Measuring Complexity: A Complexity Score

| Item | Factors | Follow-up Question | Answer | Weighting factor | Gerdau Score | GE Score |
|----------------------|--|---|---------|------------------|--------------|---------------|
| Operating Income | 1. Multiple Businesses | Number of businesses (with more than 10% of | 1 mower | Weighting factor | Gerada Score | GL Seore |
| | - | revenues) = | 1 | 2.00 | 2 | 30 |
| | 2. One-time income and expenses | Percent of operating income = | 10% | 10.00 | 1 | 0.8 |
| 3. In | . Income from unspecified sources | Percent of operating income = | 0% | 10.00 | 0 | 1.2 |
| | 4. Items in income statement that are volatile | Percent of operating income = | 15% | 5.00 | 0.75 | 1 |
| Tax Rate | 1. Income from multiple locales | Percent of revenues from non-domestic locales = | 70% | 3.00 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| | 2. Different tax and reporting books | Yes or No | No | Yes=3 | 0 | 3 |
| | 3. Headquarters in tax havens | Yes or No | No | Yes=3 | 0 | 0 |
| | 4. Volatile effective tax rate | Yes or No | Yes | Yes=2 | 2 | 0 |
| Capital Expenditures | 1. Volatile capital expenditures | Yes or No | Yes | Yes=2 | 2 | 2 |
| | 2. Frequent and large acquisitions | Yes or No | Yes | Yes=4 | 4 | 4 |
| | 3. Stock payment for acquisitions and | | | | | |
| | investments | Yes or No | No | Yes=4 | 0 | 4 |
| Working capital | I. Unspecified current assets and current | X7 X1 | N | V 2 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2. Volatile working capital items | Yes or No | NO | Yes=3 | 0 | 0 |
| Expected Growth rate | 1. Off-balance sheet assets and liabilities | Yes or No | Yes | Yes=2 | 2 | 2 |
| | (operating leases and R&D) | 57 NT | NT | N/ O | 0 | 2 |
| | 2 Substantial stock buybacks | Yes or No | No | Yes=3 | 0 | 3 |
| | 3 Changing return on capital over time | Yes or No | No | Yes=3 | 0 | 3 |
| | 4. Unsustainably high return | Is your return on capital volatile? | Yes | Yes=5 | 5 | 5 |
| | 4. Onsustainably high feturit | Is your firm's ROC much higher than industry average? | ? No | Yes=5 | 0 | 0 |
| Cost of capital | 1. Multiple businesses | Number of businesses (more than 10% of revenues) = | 1 | 1.00 | 1 | 20 |
| | 2. Operations in emerging markets | Percent of revenues= | 50% | 5.00 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| | 3. Is the debt market traded? | Yes or No | No | No=2 | 2 | 0 |
| | 4. Does the company have a rating? | Yes or No | Yes | No=2 | 0 | 0 |
| | 5. Does the company have off-balance sheet | | | | | |
| | debt? | Yes or No | No | Yes=5 | 0 | 5 |
| No-operating assets | Minority holdings as percent of book assets | Minority holdings as percent of book assets | 0% | 20.00 | 0 | 0.8 |
| Firm to Equity value | Consolidation of subsidiaries | Minority interest as percent of book value of equity | 63% | 20.00 | 12.6 | 1.2 |
| Per share value | Shares with different voting rights | Does the firm have shares with different voting rights? | Yes | Yes = 10 | 10 | 0 |
| | Equity options outstanding | Options outstanding as percent of shares | 0% | 10.00 | 0 | 0.2 71 |
| Complexity Score = | | 48.95 | 90.55 | | | |

Dealing with Complexity

In Discounted Cashflow Valuation

- The Aggressive Analyst: Trust the firm to tell the truth and value the firm based upon the firm's statements about their value.
- The Conservative Analyst: Don't value what you cannot see.
- **The Compromise: Adjust the value for complexity**
 - Adjust cash flows for complexity
 - Adjust the discount rate for complexity
 - Adjust the expected growth rate/ length of growth period
 - Value the firm and then discount value for complexity
- In relative valuation
 - In a relative valuation, you may be able to assess the price that the market is charging for complexity:
 - With the hundred largest market cap firms, for instance:

PBV = 0.65 + 15.31 ROE – 0.55 Beta + 3.04 Expected growth rate – 0.003 # Pages in 10K
5. The Value of Synergy



Valuing Synergy

(1) the firms involved in the merger are valued independently, by discounting expected cash flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm.

(2) the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, is obtained by adding the values obtained for each firm in the first step.

(3) The effects of synergy are built into expected growth rates and cashflows, and the combined firm is re-valued with synergy.

Value of Synergy = Value of the combined firm, with synergy - Value of the combined firm, without synergy

Inbev + SAB Miller: Where's the synergy?

| | | | Combined | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | firm (status | Combined firm |
| | Inbev | SABMiller | quo) | (synergy) |
| Levered Beta | 0.85 | 0.8289 | 0.84641 | 0.84641 |
| Pre-tax cost of debt | 3.0000% | 3.2000% | 3.00% | 3.00% |
| Effective tax rate | 18.00% | 26.36% | 19.92% | 19.92% |
| Debt to Equity Ratio | 30.51% | 23.18% | 29.71% | 29.71% |
| Revenues | \$45,762.00 | \$22,130.00 | \$67,892.00 | \$67,892.00 |
| Operating Margin | 32.28% | 19.97% | 28.27% | 30.00% |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | \$14,771.97 | \$4,419.36 | \$19,191.33 | \$20.368 |
| | | | | |
| After-tax return on capital | 12.10% | 12.64% | 11.68% | 12.00% |
| Reinvestment Rate = | 50.99% | 33.29% | 43.58% | 50.00% |
| Expected Growth Rate | 6.17% | 4.21% | 5.09% | 6.00% |

The value of synergy

| | | | Combined | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | firm (status | Combined firm |
| | Inbev | SABMiller | quo) | (synergy) |
| Cost of Equity = | 8.93% | 9.37% | 9.12% | 9.12% |
| After-tax cost of debt = | 2.10% | 2.24% | 2.10% | 2.10% |
| Cost of capital = | 7.33% | 8.03% | 7.51% | 7.51% |
| After-tax return on capital = | 12.10% | 12.64% | 11.68% | 12.00% |
| Reinvestment Rate = | 50.99% | 33.29% | 43.58% | 50.00% |
| Expected growth rate= | 6.17% | 4.21% | 5.09% | 6.00% |
| | Value of | firm | | |
| PV of ECEE in high growth - | ¢22 222 | | ¢38 530 | \$20,151 |
| | γ20,733 | | \$30,333 | \$33,131 |
| ierminai value = | \$260,982 | \$58,/36 | \$319,/1/ | \$340,175 |
| Value of operating assets = | \$211,953 | \$50,065 | \$262,018 | \$276,610 |

Value of synergy = 276,610 – 262,018 = 14,592 million 76

6. Brand name, great management, superb product ... Are we short changing intangibles?

- There is often a temptation to add on premiums for intangibles. Here are a few examples.
 - Brand name
 - Great management
 - Loyal workforce
 - Technological prowess
- There are two potential dangers:
 - For some assets, the value may already be in your value and adding a premium will be double counting.
 - For other assets, the value may be ignored but incorporating it will not be easy.

Valuing Brand Name

| | Coca Cola | With Cott Margins |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Current Revenues = | \$21,962.00 | \$21,962.00 |
| Length of high-growth period | 10 | 10 |
| Reinvestment Rate = | 50% | 50% |
| Operating Margin (after-tax) | 15.57% | 5.28% |
| Sales/Capital (Turnover ratio) | 1.34 | 1.34 |
| Return on capital (after-tax) | 20.84% | 7.06% |
| Growth rate during period (g) = | 10.42% | 3.53% |
| Cost of Capital during period = | 7.65% | 7.65% |
| Stable Growth Period | | |
| Growth rate in steady state = | 4.00% | 4.00% |
| Return on capital = | 7.65% | 7.65% |
| Reinvestment Rate = | 52.28% | 52.28% |
| Cost of Capital = | 7.65% | 7.65% |
| Value of Firm = | \$79,611.25 | \$15,371.24 |

Valuing a Franchise: Star Wars

| | | Add-on \$ per Box Office \$ | Sta | r Wars Fra | an | chise Valı | Jat | ion: Dec | eml | oer 20 | 15 | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|--------------|------------|----------------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|--|
| Streamin | g/Video | \$1.20 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Toys & M | lerchandise | \$2.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Books/eB | Books | \$0.20 | | | | Inin Mavian | | | Γ | S | nin () | ff Movi | <u></u> | | |
| Gaming | | \$0.50 | | World B | 1V. O Y | office of \$1 | 5 h | illion | | World Box office is 50% of | | | | of | |
| Other | - | \$0.50 | | adjus | ste | d for 2% infl | atio | on. | | r | nain | novies | S. | | |
| | Add on \$ | | | Mai | n S | tar Wars Mo | ar Wars Movies | | | Star Wars Spin | | | | offs | |
| | per box | | S | tar Wars VII | Ste | ar Wars VIII | Sto | r Wars IX | Roge | ue One | Hans | Solo? | Bob | a Fett? | |
| | Onice a | Years from now | | 0.0 | | 2.0 | | 4.0 | | 1.0 | | 3.0 | | 5.0 | |
| | | Movies - Revenues | - 21 | \$2,000 | | \$2,081 | | \$2,165 | \$ | 1,020 | \$1 | ,061 | \$ | 1,104 | |
| | | Streaming/Video - Revenues | i de la | \$2,400 | 3 | \$2,497 | | \$2,598 | \$ | 1,224 | \$1 | ,273 | \$ | 1,325 | |
| | | Toys & Merchandise - Revenues | 6. | \$4,000 | 1 | \$4,162 | | \$4,330 \$2,04 | | 2,040 | \$2,122 \$212 | | \$ | 2,208 | |
| | | Books/eBooks - Revenues | | \$400 | 6 | \$416 | | \$433 | \$204 | | | | \$221 | | |
| | | Gaming - Revenues | | \$1,000 | 2 | \$1,040 | | \$1,082 | | 510 | \$ | 531 | | 552 | |
| | | Other - Revenues | | \$1,000 | | \$1,040 | | \$1,082 | | 510 | \$ | 531 | | 552 | |
| Operatin | ng Margin | Total - Revenues | 0 | \$10,800 | | \$11,236 | 2 | \$11,690 | \$ | 5,508 | \$5 | ,731 | \$ | 5,962 | |
| 20.14% f 5% for n | or movies on-movies | After-tax Operating Income (movies) | | 282 | Ś | 293 | Ś | 305 | Ś | 144 | \$ | 150 | Ś | 156 | |
| 30% t | ax rate | After-tax Operating Income (non-mo | vies) | 924 | \$ | 961 | \$ | 1,000 | \$ | 471 | \$ | 490 | \$ | 510 | |
| | | Present Value | | 5 1,206 | \$ | 1,083 | \$ | 973 | \$ | 572 | \$ | 514 | \$ | 461 | |
| | | Value of new Star Wars movies = | | \$4,809 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Discounted back | | Value of continuing income = | | \$5,163 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 07.6 | pital of | Value of Star Wars = | | \$9,972 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| enter com | tainment npanies | | | | | Assume continue a | es t afte | hat revenu r 2020, gro | ues fi owinę | rom ado g at 2% | d ons a yea | ar, | | | |

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7. Be circumspect about defining debt for cost of capital purposes...

- General Rule: Debt generally has the following characteristics:
 - Commitment to make fixed payments in the future
 - The fixed payments are tax deductible
 - Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the firm to the party to whom payments are due.
- Defined as such, debt should include
 - All interest bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term
 - All leases, operating as well as capital
- Debt should not include
 - Accounts payable or supplier credit

But should consider other potential liabilities when getting to equity value...

- If you have under funded pension fund or health care plans, you should consider the under funding at this stage in getting to the value of equity.
 - If you do so, you should not double count by also including a cash flow line item reflecting cash you would need to set aside to meet the unfunded obligation.
 - You should not be counting these items as debt in your cost of capital calculations....
- If you have contingent liabilities for example, a potential liability from a lawsuit that has not been decided - you should consider the expected value of these contingent liabilities
 - Value of contingent liability = Probability that the liability will occur * Expected value of liability

8. The Value of Control

- The value of the control premium that will be paid to acquire a block of equity will depend upon two factors -
 - Probability that control of firm will change: This refers to the probability that incumbent management will be replaced. this can be either through acquisition or through existing stockholders exercising their muscle.
 - Value of Gaining Control of the Company: The value of gaining control of a company arises from two sources - the increase in value that can be wrought by changes in the way the company is managed and run, and the side benefits and perquisites of being in control
 - Value of Gaining Control = Present Value (Value of Company with change in control - Value of company without change in control) + Side Benefits of Control







Value of Control and the Value of Voting Rights

- Adris Grupa has two classes of shares outstanding: 9.616 million voting shares and 6.748 million non-voting shares.
- To value a non-voting share, we assume that all non-voting shares essentially have to settle for status quo value. All shareholders, common and preferred, get an equal share of the status quo value.

Status Quo Value of Equity = 5,484 million HKR

Value for a non-voting share = 5484/(9.616+6.748) = 334 HKR/share

To value a voting share, we first value control in Adris Grup as the difference between the optimal and the status quo value:

Value of control at Adris Grupa = 5,735 – 5484 = 249 million HKR

 If you assume a 100% probability of change occurring, the value per voting share can be written as:

Value per voting share =334 HKR + 249/9.616 = 362 HKR

- If the probability of control changing is only 40%, the expected value of control and value per voting share can be written as follows:
 - Expected value of control = 249 (.4) = 99.6 million HKR
 - Value per voting share = 334 HKR + 99.6/9.616 = 344 HKR

Genting's revenue growth has been sluggish and their operating margins have been sliding since 2009

Genting Berhad Restructured My valuation (July 2016)



Aswath Damodaran

THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING DIFFICULT-TO-VALUE COMPANIES

The fundamental determinants of value...



The Dark Side of Valuation...

- Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.
- The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value "difficult" companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:
 - Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses
 - Companies that don't fit the accounting mold
 - Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or nationalization risk)

Difficult to value companies...

□ Across the life cycle:

- Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.
- Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change, history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.
- Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.

Across sectors

- Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what's going on.
- Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.
- **•** Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.
- Across the ownership cycle
 - Privately owned businesses: Exposure to firm specific risk and illiquidity bedevil valuations.
 - Venture Capital (VC) and private equity: Different equity investors, with different perceptions of risk.
 - Closely held public firms: Part private and part public, sharing the troubles of both.

I. The challenge with young companies...

Figure 5.2: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult becaue you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/ service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.

| Cash flows from existing assets non-existent or negative. | What is the value added b assets? | y growth | |
|--|--|--|--|
| What are the cashflows from existing assets? Different claims on cash flows can affect value of equity at each stage. What is the value of equity in the firm? | How risky are the cash flor existing assets and growth Limited historical data of and no market prices for makes it difficult to asses | ws from both n assets? n earnings, r securities ss risk. | When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?Will the firm make it through the gauntlet of market demand and competition? Even if it does, assessing when it will become mature is difficult because there is so little to go on. |

Upping the ante.. Young companies in young businesses...

- □ When valuing a business, we generally draw on three sources of information
 - **D** The firm's current financial statement
 - How much did the firm sell?
 - How much did it earn?
 - **The firm's financial history**, usually summarized in its financial statements.
 - How fast have the firm's revenues and earnings grown over time?
 - What can we learn about cost structure and profitability from these trends?
 - Susceptibility to macro-economic factors (recessions and cyclical firms)
 - The industry and comparable firm data
 - What happens to firms as they mature? (Margins.. Revenue growth... Reinvestment needs... Risk)
- It is when valuing these companies that you find yourself tempted by the dark side, where
 - "Paradigm shifts" happen...
 - New metrics are invented ...
 - The story dominates and the numbers lag...



Lesson 1: Don't trust regression betas....



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Lesson 2: Work backwards and keep it simple...

| Year | Revenue Growth | Sales | Operating Margin | EBIT | EBIT (1-t) |
|------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------------|---------|------------|
| Tr 12 mths | | \$1,117 | -36.71% | -\$410 | -\$410 |
| 1 | 150.00% | \$2,793 | -13.35% | -\$373 | -\$373 |
| 2 | 100.00% | \$5,585 | -1.68% | -\$94 | -\$94 |
| 3 | 75.00% | \$9,774 | 4.16% | \$407 | \$407 |
| 4 | 50.00% | \$14,661 | 7.08% | \$1,038 | \$871 |
| 5 | 30.00% | \$19,059 | 8.54% | \$1,628 | \$1,058 |
| 6 | 25.20% | \$23,862 | 9.27% | \$2,212 | \$1,438 |
| 7 | 20.40% | \$28,729 | 9.64% | \$2,768 | \$1,799 |
| 8 | 15.60% | \$33,211 | 9.82% | \$3,261 | \$2,119 |
| 9 | 10.80% | \$36,798 | 9.91% | \$3,646 | \$2,370 |
| 10 | 6.00% | \$39,006 | 9.95% | \$3,883 | \$2,524 |
| TY | 6.00% | \$41,346 | 10.00% | \$4,135 | \$2,688 |

Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do...



Lesson 4: Don't forget to pay for growth...

| Year | Revenues | Δ Revenue | Sales/Cap | Δ Investment | Invested Capital | | Invested Capital EBIT (1-t) Ir | |
|------------|----------|------------------|-----------|---------------------|------------------|------------|--------------------------------|---------|
| Tr 12 mths | \$1,117 | | | | \$ | 487 | -\$410 | |
| 1 | \$2,793 | \$1,676 | 3.00 | \$559 | \$ | 1,045 | -\$373 | -76.62% |
| 2 | \$5,585 | \$2,793 | 3.00 | \$931 | \$ | 1,976 | -\$94 | -8.96% |
| 3 | \$9,774 | \$4,189 | 3.00 | \$1,396 | \$ | 3,372 | \$407 | 20.59% |
| 4 | \$14,661 | \$4,887 | 3.00 | \$1,629 | \$ | 5,001 | \$871 | 25.82% |
| 5 | \$19,059 | \$4,398 | 3.00 | \$1,466 | \$ | 6,467 | \$1,058 | 21.16% |
| 6 | \$23,862 | \$4,803 | 3.00 | \$1,601 | \$ | 8,068 | \$1,438 | 22.23% |
| 7 | \$28,729 | \$4,868 | 3.00 | \$1,623 | \$ | 9,691 | \$1,799 | 22.30% |
| 8 | \$33,211 | \$4,482 | 3.00 | \$1,494 | \$ | 11,185 | \$2,119 | 21.87% |
| 9 | \$36,798 | \$3,587 | 3.00 | \$1,196 | \$ | 12,380 | \$2,370 | 21.19% |
| 10 | \$39,006 | \$2,208 | 3.00 | \$736 | \$ | 13,116 | \$2,524 | 20.39% |
| TY | \$41,346 | \$2,340 | NA | | | Assumed to | be = | 20.00% |

Lesson 5: There are always scenarios where the market price can be justified...

| | | Target pre-tax Operating Margin | | | | | | | | |
|----------|-----|---------------------------------|--------|-------|-----|--------|----|--------|----|--------|
| Φ | | 6% | 8% 10% | | 10% | 0% 12% | | 14% | | |
| lual | 30% | \$ (1.94) | \$ | 2.95 | \$ | 7.84 | \$ | 12.71 | \$ | 17.57 |
| th | 35% | \$ 1.41 | \$ | 8.37 | \$ | 15.33 | \$ | 22.27 | \$ | 29.21 |
| pe wo | 40% | \$ 6.10 | \$ | 15.93 | \$ | 25.74 | \$ | 35.54 | \$ | 45.34 |
| D de | 45% | \$ 12.59 | \$ | 26.34 | \$ | 40.05 | \$ | 53.77 | \$ | 67.48 |
| noc | 50% | \$ 21.47 | \$ | 40.50 | \$ | 59.52 | \$ | 78.53 | \$ | 97.54 |
| mp | 55% | \$ 33.47 | \$ | 59.60 | \$ | 85.72 | \$ | 111.84 | \$ | 137.95 |
| Cc Re | 60% | \$ 49.53 | \$ | 85.10 | \$ | 120.66 | \$ | 156.22 | \$ | 191.77 |

Lesson 6: Don't forget to mop up...

- Watch out for "other" equity claims: If you buy equity in a young, growth company, watch out for other (often hidden) claims on the equity that don't take the form of common shares. In particular, watch for options granted to managers, employees, venture capitalists and others (you will be surprised...).
 - Value these options as options (not at exercise value)
 - Take into consideration expectations of future option grants when computing expected future earnings/cash flows.
- Not all shares are equal: If there are differences in cash flow claims (dividends or liquidation) or voting rights across shares, value these differences.
 - Voting rights matter even at well run companies

Lesson 7: You will be wrong 100% of the time... and it really is not (always) your fault...

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- A test: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least over time).

And the market is often "more wrong"....

\$90.00 \$80.00 \$70.00 \$60.00-\$50.00-■ Value per share Price per share \$40.00 \$30.00 \$20.00 \$10.00 \$0.00-2000 2002 2001 2003 **Time of analysis**

Amazon: Value and Price

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Valuing an IPO

Valuation issues:

- Use of the proceeds from the offering: The proceeds from the offering can be held as cash by the firm to cover future investment needs, paid to existing equity investors who want to cash out or used to pay down debt.
- Warrants/ Special deals with prior equity investors: If venture capitalists and other equity investors from earlier iterations of fund raising have rights to buy or sell their equity at pre-specified prices, it can affect the value per share offered to the public.

Pricing issues:

- Institutional set-up: Most IPOs are backed by investment banking guarantees on the price, which can affect how they are priced.
- Follow-up offerings: The proportion of equity being offered at initial offering and subsequent offering plans can affect pricing.

Alibaba: Pre-IPO valuation - September 2, 2014 (in US \$)



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II. Mature Companies in transition..

- Mature companies are generally the easiest group to value. They have long, established histories that can be mined for inputs. They have investment policies that are set and capital structures that are stable, thus making valuation more grounded in past data.
- However, this stability in the numbers can mask real problems at the company. The company may be set in a process, where it invests more or less than it should and does not have the right financing mix. In effect, the policies are consistent, stable and bad.
- If you expect these companies to change or as is more often the case to have change thrust upon them,

The perils of valuing mature companies...

Figure 7.1: Estimation Issues - Mature Companies



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Hormel Foods: The Value of Control Changing

Hormel Foods sells packaged meat and other food products and has been in existence as a publicly traded company for almost 80 years. In 2008, the firm reported after-tax operating income of \$315 million, reflecting a compounded growth of 5% over the previous 5 years. *The Status Quo*

Run by existing management, with conservative reinvestment policies (reinvestment rate = 14.34% and debt ratio = 10.4%.

| Low dest rate and short growth period, due to reinvestment policy | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------------|---------|-----------------|---------------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Year | Operating income after taxes | Expected growth rate | ROC | Reinvestment Rate | Reinvestment | FCFF | Cost of capital | Present Value | |
| Trailing 12 months | \$315 | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | \$324 | 2.75% | 14.34% | 19.14% | \$62 | \$262 | 6.79% | \$245 | |
| 2 | \$333 | 2.75% | 14.34% | 19.14% | \$64 | \$269 | 6.79% | \$236 | |
| 3 | \$342 | 2.75% | 14.34% | 19.14% | \$65 | \$276 | 6.79% | \$227 | |
| Beyond | \$350 | 2.35% | 7.23% | 32.52% | \$114 | \$4,840 | 7.23% | \$3,974 | |
| Value of operating a | assets | | | | | | | \$4,682 | |
| (Add) Cash | | | | | | | | \$155 | |
| (Subtract) Debt | | | | | | | | \$491 | |
| (Subtract) Manager | nent Options | | | | | | | \$53 | |
| Value of equity in c | ommon stock | | | | | | | \$4,293 | |
| Value per share | | | | | | | | \$31.91 | |

New and better management

More aggressive reinvestment which increases the reinvestment rate (to 40%) and tlength of growth (to 5 years), and higher debt ratio (20%).

Operating Restructuring (1) Expected growth rate = ROC * Reinvestment Rate Expected growth rae (status quo) = 14.34% * 19.14% = 2.75% Expected growth rate (optimal) = 14.00% * 40% = 5.60% ROC drops, reinvestment rises and growth goes up.

Anomic growth rate and short growth period, due to reinvestment policy

Financial restructuring 🔗

Cost of capital = Cost of equity (1-Debt ratio) + Cost of debt (Debt ratio) Status quo = 7.33% (1-.104) + 3.60% (1-.40) (.104) = 6.79%Optimal = 7.75% (1-.20) + 3.60% (1-.40) (.20) = 6.63%Cost of equity rises but cost of capital drops.

 \mathbf{X}

(Low debt ratio affects cost of capital)

| | | | | | | | ▲ | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------------|---------|-----------------|---------------|
| Year | Operating income after taxes | Expected growth rate | ROC | Reinvestment Rate | Reinvestment | FCFF | Cost of capital | Present Value |
| Trailing 12 months | \$315 | | | | | | | |
| 1 | \$333 | 5.60% | 14.00% | 40.00% | \$133 | \$200 | 6.63% | \$187 |
| 2 | \$351 | 5.60% | 14.00% | 40.00% | \$141 | \$211 | 6.63% | \$185 |
| 3 | \$371 | 5.60% | 14.00% | 40.00% | \$148 | \$223 | 6.63% | \$184 |
| 4 | \$392 | 5.60% | 14.00% | 40.00% | \$260 | \$235 | 6.63% | \$182 |
| 5 | \$414 | 5.60% | 14.00% | 40.00% | \$223 | \$248 | 6.63% | \$180 |
| Beyond | \$423 | 2.35% | 6.74% | 34.87% | \$148 | \$6,282 | 6.74% | \$4,557 |
| Value of operating a | assets | | | | | | | \$5,475 |
| (Add) Cash | | | | | | | | \$155 |
| (Subtract) Debt | | | | | | | | \$491 |
| (Subtract) Manager | nent Options | | | | | | | \$53 |
| Value of equity in c | ommon stock | | | | | | | \$5,085 |
| Value perAlswat | h Damodaran | | | | | | | \$37.80 |

Lesson 1: Cost cutting and increased efficiency are easier accomplished on paper than in practice...


Lesson 2: Increasing growth is not always an option (or at least not a good option)



Lesson 3: Financial leverage is a double-edged sword..



Exhibit 7.1: Optimal Financing Mix: Hormel Foods in January 2009

III. Dealing with decline and distress...

Historial data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.

Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity

What is the value of equity in the firm?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestuture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can change. There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.

Dealing with the "downside" of Distress

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will understate the value of the firm.
- Value of Equity= DCF value of equity (1 Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- □ There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
 - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
 - Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
 - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).



Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..

In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at \$529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:

$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^{t}}{(1.03)^{t}} + \frac{1000(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^{7}}{(1.03)^{7}}$$

- □ Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:
- \Box π_{Distress} = Annual probability of default = 13.54%
 - Cumulative probability of surviving 10 years = (1 .1354)10 = 23.34%
 - Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years = 1 .2334 = .7666 or 76.66%
- If LVS is becomes distressed:
 - Expected distress sale proceeds = \$2,769 million < Face value of debt</p>
 - Expected equity value/share = \$0.00
- □ Expected value per share = \$8.12 (1 .7666) + \$0.00 (.7666) = \$1.92

The "sunny" side of distress: Equity as a call option to liquidate the firm



Application to valuation: A simple example

- Assume that you have a firm whose assets are currently valued at \$100 million and that the standard deviation in this asset value is 40%.
- Further, assume that the face value of debt is \$80 million (It is zero coupon debt with 10 years left to maturity).
- □ If the ten-year treasury bond rate is 10%,
 - how much is the equity worth?
 - What should the interest rate on debt be?

Model Parameters & Valuation

The inputs

- Value of the underlying asset = S = Value of the firm = \$ 100 million
- Exercise price = K = Face Value of outstanding debt = \$80 million
- Life of the option = t = Life of zero-coupon debt = 10 years
- Variance in the value of the underlying asset = σ² = Variance in firm value = 0.16
- Riskless rate = r = Treasury bond rate corresponding to option life = 10%

□ The output

- The Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
 - d1 = 1.5994 N(d1) = 0.9451
 d2 = 0.3345 N(d2) = 0.6310
- Value of the call = 100 (0.9451) 80 $exp^{(-0.10)(10)}$ (0.6310) = \$75.94 million
- Value of the outstanding debt = \$100 \$75.94 = \$24.06 million
- Interest rate on debt = $(\$ 80 / \$24.06)^{1/10} 1 = 12.77\%$

Firm value drops..

- Assume now that a catastrophe wipes out half the value of this firm (the value drops to \$ 50 million), while the face value of the debt remains at \$ 80 million.
- The inputs
 - Value of the underlying asset = S = Value of the firm = \$50 million
 - All the other inputs remain unchanged
- □ The output
 - Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
 - d1 = 1.0515 N(d1) = 0.8534
 - d2 = -0.2135 N(d2) = 0.4155
 - □ Value of the call = 50 (0.8534) 80 $exp^{(-0.10)(10)}$ (0.4155) = \$30.44 million
 - Value of the bond= \$50 \$30.44 = \$19.56 million

Equity value persists .. As firm value declines..

Value of Equity as Firm Value Changes



IV. Valuing Financial Service Companies

| Existing assets are usually financial assets or loans, often marked to market. Earnings do not provide much information on underlying risk. | Defining capital expenditures and working challenge.Growth can be strongly influence regulatory limits and constraints. Both the a new investments and the returns on these can change with regulatory changes. What is the value added by growth assets? | capital is a ed by amount of investments |
|--|---|---|
| What are the cashflows from existing assets? Preferred stock is a significant source of capital. | How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets? For financial service firms, debt is raw material rather than a source of capital. It is not only tough to define but if defined broadly can result in | When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks? In addition to all the normal constraints, financial service firms also have to worry about |
| equity in the firm? | high financial leverage, magnifying the impact of small operating risk changes on equity risk. | are acceptable ot regulators. If they do not, they can be taken over and shut down. |



Lesson 1: Financial service companies are

opaque...

- With financial service firms, we enter into a Faustian bargain. They tell us very little about the quality of their assets (loans, for a bank, for instance are not broken down by default risk status) but we accept that in return for assets being marked to market (by accountants who presumably have access to the information that we don't have).
- In addition, estimating cash flows for a financial service firm is difficult to do. So, we trust financial service firms to pay out their cash flows as dividends. Hence, the use of the dividend discount model.

Lesson 2: For financial service companies, book value matters...

- The book value of assets and equity is mostly irrelevant when valuing non-financial service companies. After all, the book value of equity is a historical figure and can be nonsensical. (The book value of equity can be negative and is so for more than a 1000 publicly traded US companies)
- With financial service firms, book value of equity is relevant for two reasons:
 - Since financial service firms mark to market, the book value is more likely to reflect what the firms own right now (rather than a historical value)
 - The regulatory capital ratios are based on book equity. Thus, a bank with negative or even low book equity will be shut down by the regulators.
- From a valuation perspective, it therefore makes sense to pay heed to book value. In fact, you can argue that reinvestment for a bank is the amount that it needs to add to book equity to sustain its growth ambitions and safety requirements:
 - FCFE = Net Income Reinvestment in regulatory capital (book equity)

| Risk adjuste inflation rate of | ed of | assets grows at 1% a year forever. | | | | | | | | | | | | ſ | Т | ïer 1 | Ca | apital | ra | tio ind rcenti | cre | ases for a | s te | o 15.6 banks | 7%, th | e 7! | 5th |
|-----------------------------------|------------|--|-----|----------|------|----------|------|---------|-------|---------|------|---------|-----|------------|------|---------|----|---------|-----|-------------------|-----------|---------------|------|-----------------|--------|------|-----|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| \backslash | _ [| | C | urrent | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | | | |
| | • | Risk Adjusted Assets | \$ | 445,570 | \$ 4 | 150,026 | \$ 4 | 54,526 | \$ 4 | 59,071 | \$ 4 | 463,662 | \$ | 468,299 | \$ 4 | 172,982 | \$ | 477,711 | \$ | 482,488 | \$ 4 | 487,313 | \$ | 492,186 | | | |
| Expected DOJ | | Tier 1 Capital Ratio | 1 | 2.41% | 1 | 3.74% | 13 | 8.95% | 14 | .17% | 1 | 4.38% | 1 | 4.60% | 14 | 4.81% | 1 | 15.03% | 1 | 15.24% | 1 | 5.46% | | 15.67% | • | | |
| fine of \$10 | | Tier 1 Capital (Risk Adjusted Assets * 1 | \$ | 55,282 | \$6 | 51,834 | \$6 | 3,427 | \$6 | 5,045 | \$ | 66,690 | \$ | 68,361 | \$7 | 70,059 | \$ | 71,784 | \$ | 73,537 | \$7 | 75,317 | | \$77,126 | | | |
| billions lower | | Change in regulatory capital (Tier 1) | | | \$ | 6,552 | \$ | 1,593 | \$1 | 1,619 | \$ | 1,645 | - | 1,671 | \$ | 1,698 | - | \$1,725 | | \$1,753 | \$ | 1,780 | | \$1,809 | | | |
| Tier 1 capital | | Book Equity | \$ | 64,609 | \$7 | 71,161 | \$7 | 2,754 | \$7 | 4,372 | \$ | 76,017 | \$ | 77,688 | \$7 | 79,386 | \$ | 81,111 | \$ | 82,864 | \$8 | 84,644 | 1 | \$86,453 | | | |
| today | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| / | | Expected ROE | -1 | 3.70% | | 7.18% | -2 | .84% | 0. | .06% | 1 | .99% | 5 | 5.85% | 6. | 568% | 7 | .286% | 8 | .004% | 8 | .722% | | 9.440% | • | | |
| | | Net Income (Book Equity * ROE) | \$ | (8,851) | \$ | (5,111) | \$ | (2,065) | \$ | 43 | \$ | 1,512 | \$ | 4,545 | \$ | 5,214 | \$ | 5,910 | \$ | 6,632 | \$ | 7,383 | \$ | 8,161 | | | |
| Common | | - Investment in Regulatory Capital | | | \$ | 6,552 | \$ | 1,593 | \$ | 1,619 | \$ | 1,645 | \$ | 1,671 | \$ | 1,698 | \$ | 1,725 | \$ | 1,753 | \$ | 1,780 | \$ | 1,809 | | | |
| Equity | | FCFE | | | \$ | (11,663) | \$ | (3,658) | \$ | (1,576) | \$ | (133) | \$ | 2,874 | \$ | 3,516 | \$ | 4,185 | \$ | 4,880 | \$ | 5,602 | \$ | 6,352 | | | |
| increases in | | Terminal value of equity | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ | | | | | \$87,317 | | | |
| tandem with | | Present value | | | \$ | (10,583) | \$ | (3,012) | \$ | (1,178) | \$ | (90) | \$ | 1,768 | \$ | 1,966 | \$ | 2,129 | \$ | 2,262 | \$ | 2,370 | \$ | 36,207 | | | |
| Tier 1 capital | | Cost of equity | | 10.20% | | 10.20% | | 10.20% | 1 | 10.20% | | 10.20% | | 10.20% | 1 | 10.048% | | 9.896% | | 9.744% | | 9.592% | | 9.440% | | | |
| / | | Cumulative Cost of equity | | | | 1.1020 | | 1.2144 | | 1.3383 | | 1.4748 | | 1.6252 | | 1.7885 | | 1.9655 | | 2.1570 | | 2.3639 | | 2.5871 | | | |
| / | | Value of equity today = | \$3 | 1,838.74 | | _ | | | | | | | | | _ | | | | | | | | Ļ | | | | |
| Cost of equity | | Number of shares outstanding = | | 1386.00 | | | Va | lue n | er | shar | e ; | adiust | ter | for | | | | | | | | | F | | | | |
| starts at 10.2% | | DCF Value per share = | \$ | 22.97 | | | n | robal | bilit | ty of | ca | tastro | n | hic | | | _ | | _ | | _ | | | | | | |
| (75th percentile | | Probability of equity wipeout | | 10.00% | | | fa | ilure | (ha | ailout | t) r | result | ind | nin | | | 0 | | ~ ~ | oqui | | noro | | | | (05 | th |
| of banks) & | | Adjusted value per share = | \$ | 20.67 | - | | | comr | let | e los | S | ofea | uit | v. | | | | aroon | | equi | ly I | ke) i | as | ioar E | ond 0 | (20 | |
| decreases after | | Stock price on October 3, 2016= | \$ | 13.33 | | | | | | | | 0. 04 | ~ | <i>.</i> , | | | P | ercen | in | | an t o | KS) I | 1) | in voo | anu 9 | ,447 | /0 |
| vear 5 to 9 44% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | | (1 | 0510 | e | quity | | in yea | 10 | | |
| (median across | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| hanks) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| burno). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

V. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies

Company growth often comes from movements in the economic cycle, for cyclical firms, or commodity prices, for commodity companies.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Historial revenue and earnings data are volatile, as the economic cycle and commodity prices change. How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Primary risk is from the economy for cyclical firms and from commodity price movements for commodity companies. These risks can stay dormant for long periods of apparent prosperity. When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

For commodity companies, the fact that there are only finite amounts of the commodity may put a limit on growth forever. For cyclical firms, there is the peril that the next recession may put an end to the firm. Valuing a Cyclical Company - Toyota in Early 2009



Lesson 1: With "macro" companies, it is easy to get lost in "macro" assumptions...

- With cyclical and commodity companies, it is undeniable that the value you arrive at will be affected by your views on the economy or the price of the commodity.
- Consequently, you will feel the urge to take a stand on these macro variables and build them into your valuation. Doing so, though, will create valuations that are jointly impacted by your views on macro variables and your views on the company, and it is difficult to separate the two.
- The best (though not easiest) thing to do is to separate your macro views from your micro views. Use current market based numbers for your valuation, but then provide a separate assessment of what you think about those market numbers.

Shell's Revenues & Oil Prices



Shell: A "Oil Price" Neutral Valuation: March 2016

Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of \$40/barrel in March 2016 Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*\$40 = \$201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

| | Base Y | ar | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | Tei | rminal Year | | |
|---------------------------|-----------|------|-----------------|-----|------------|-----|-------------|------|-------------|------|------------|-----|-------------|---|--------------------|
| Revenues | \$ 201 | ,569 | \$ 209,450 | \$ | 217,639 | \$ | 226,149 | \$ | 234,991 | \$ | 244,180 | \$ | 249,063 | Г | Operating |
| Operating Margin | 3.019 | 6 | 6.18% | | 7.76% | | 8.56% | | 8.95% | | 9.35% | | 9.35% | | margin |
| Operating Income | \$ 6,06 | 5.00 | \$ 12,942.85 | \$ | 16,899.10 | \$ | 19,352.39 | \$ | 21,040.39 | \$ | 22,830.80 | \$ | 23,287.41 | | converges on |
| Effective tax rate | 30.00 | % | 30.00% | | 30.00% | _ | 30.00% | _ | 30.00% | | 30.00% | | 30.00% | - | Shell's historical |
| AT Operating Income | \$ 4,24 | 5.50 | \$ 9,060.00 | \$ | 11,829.37 | \$ | 13,546.68 | \$ | 14,728.27 | \$ | 15,981.56 | \$ | 16,301.19 | | average margin |
| + Depreciation | \$ 26,71 | 4.00 | \$ 27,759 | \$ | 28,844 | \$ | 29,972 | \$ | 31,144 | \$ | 32,361 | | | | of 9 35% from |
| - Cap Ex | \$ 31,85 | 4.00 | \$ 33,099 | \$ | 34,394 | \$ | 35,738 | \$ | 37,136 | \$ | 38,588 | | | | 200-2015 |
| - Chg in WC | | | \$ 472.88 | \$ | 491.37 | \$ | 510.58 | \$ | 530.55 | \$ | 551.29 | | | | 200-2010 |
| FCFF | | | \$ 3,246.14 | \$ | 5,788.19 | \$ | 7,269.29 | \$ | 8,205.44 | \$ | 9,203.68 | \$ | 13,011.34 | | |
| Terminal Value | | | | | | | | | | \$ 3 | 216,855.71 | | | | |
| Return on capital | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12.37% | | - |
| Cost of Capital | | | 9.91% | | 9.91% | | 9.91% | | 9.91% | | 9.91% | | 8.00% | | Return on |
| Cumulated Discount Factor | | | 1.0991 | | 1.2080 | | 1.3277 | | 1.4593 | | 1.6039 | | | | capital reverts |
| Present Value | | | \$ 2,953.45 | \$ | 4,791.47 | \$ | 5,474.95 | \$ | 5,622.81 | \$ | 140,940.73 | | | | and stays at |
| Value of Operating Assets | \$ 159,78 | 3.41 | | | | | | | | | | | | | Shell's historic |
| + Cash | \$ 31,75 | 2.00 | | | | | | | | | 1900 | | | | average of |
| + Cross Holdings | \$ 33,56 | 6.00 | Added | loi | ng term in | ves | tments in | joir | nt ventures | s ar | nd | | | | 12.37% from |
| - Debt | \$ 58,37 | 9.00 | subt | ac | ted out mi | nor | ity interes | t in | consolida | ted | | | | | 200-2015 |
| - Minority Interets | \$ 1,24 | 5.00 | | | | h | oldings. | | | | | | | | |
| Value of Equity | \$ 165,47 | 7.41 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of shares | 4209 | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value per share | \$ 3 | 9.31 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a function of macro variables...

- If there is a key macro variable affecting the value of your company that you are uncertain about (and who is not), why not quantify the uncertainty in a distribution (rather than a single price) and use that distribution in your valuation.
- That is exactly what you do in a Monte Carlo simulation, where you allow one or more variables to be distributions and compute a distribution of values for the company.
- With a simulation, you get not only everything you would get in a standard valuation (an estimated value for your company) but you will get additional output (on the variation in that value and the likelihood that your firm is under or over valued)



| Percentiles: | Forecast values |
|--------------|-----------------|
| 0% | \$6.55 |
| 10% | \$23.90 |
| 20% | \$27.73 |
| 30% | \$30.89 |
| 40% | \$33.88 |
| 50% | \$36.99 |
| 60% | \$40.28 |
| 70% | \$44.22 |
| 80% | \$49.24 |
| 90% | \$57.49 |
| 100% | \$197.11 |

6.00%

131

7.00%

0.00%

9.00%

10.00%

11.00%

1200%

13.00%



The optionality in commodities: Undeveloped reserves as an option



Valuing Gulf Oil

- Gulf Oil was the target of a takeover in early 1984 at \$70 per share (It had 165.30 million shares outstanding, and total debt of \$9.9 billion).
 - It had estimated reserves of 3038 million barrels of oil and the average cost of developing these reserves was estimated to be \$10 a barrel in present value dollars (The development lag is approximately two years).
 - The average relinquishment life of the reserves is 12 years.
 - The price of oil was \$22.38 per barrel, and the production cost, taxes and royalties were estimated at \$7 per barrel.
 - The bond rate at the time of the analysis was 9.00%.
 - Gulf was expected to have net production revenues each year of approximately 5% of the value of the developed reserves. The variance in oil prices is 0.03.

Valuing Undeveloped Reserves

- Inputs for valuing undeveloped reserves
 - Value of underlying asset = Value of estimated reserves discounted back for period of development lag= 3038 * (\$ 22.38 - \$7) / 1.05² = \$42,380.44
 - Exercise price = Estimated development cost of reserves = 3038 * \$10 = \$30,380 million
 - Time to expiration = Average length of relinquishment option = 12 years
 - Variance in value of asset = Variance in oil prices = 0.03
 - Riskless interest rate = 9%
 - Dividend yield = Net production revenue/ Value of developed reserves = 5%
- Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
 - □ d1 = 1.6548 N(d1) = 0.9510
 - **d** $d_2 = 1.0548$ N(d2) = 0.8542
- Call Value= $42,380.44 \exp^{(-0.05)(12)} (0.9510) 30,380 (\exp^{(-0.09)(12)} (0.8542) = $13,306 million$

The composite value...

- In addition, Gulf Oil had free cashflows to the firm from its oil and gas production of \$915 million from already developed reserves and these cashflows are likely to continue for ten years (the remaining lifetime of developed reserves).
- The present value of these developed reserves, discounted at the weighted average cost of capital of 12.5%, yields:
 - Value of already developed reserves = 915 (1 1.125⁻¹⁰)/.125 = \$5065.83
- Adding the value of the developed and undeveloped reserves
 - Value of undeveloped reserves
 - Value of production in place
 - Total value of firm
 - Less Outstanding Debt
 - Value of Equity
 - Value per share

= \$ 13,306 million

- = \$ 5,066 million
- = \$ 18,372 million
- = \$ 9,900 million
- = \$ 8,472 million
- = \$ 8,472/165.3 = \$51.25

VII. Valuing Companies across the ownership

cycle

Reported income and balance sheet are heavily affected by tax considerations rather than information disclosure requirements. The line between the personal and business expenses is a fine one.

What are the cashflows from existing assets? - Equity: Cashflows after debt payments - Firm: Cashflows before debt payments

> Reversing investment mistakes is difficult to do. The need for and the cost of illiquidity has to be incorporated into current value.

What is the **value added** by growth assets? Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflows Firm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows

How **risky are the cash flows** from both existing assets and growth assets? Equity: Risk in equity in the company Firm: Risk in the firm's operations

Different buyers can perceive risk differently in the same private business, largely because what they see as risk will be a function of how diversified they are. The fall back positions of using market prices to extract risk measures does not work. When will the firm become a **mature fiirm**, and what are the potential roadblocks?

Many private businesses are finite life enterprises, not expected to last into perpetuity



Lesson 1: In private businesses, risk in the eyes of the "beholder" (buyer)

Private business owner with entire wealth invested in the business

Venture capitalist, with multiple holdings in the sector.

Public company investor with diversified portfolio

Exposed to all risk in the company. Total beta measures exposure to total risk. Total Beta = Market Beta/ Correlation of firm with market Partially diversified. Diversify away some firm specific risk but not all. Beta will fall berbetween total and market beta. Firm-specific risk is diversified away. Market or macro risk exposure captured in a market beta or betas.



Total Risk versus Market Risk

- Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is a relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the proportion of the risk that is market risk.
 - Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
- To estimate the beta for Kristin Kandy, we begin with the bottom-up unlevered beta of food processing companies:
 - Unlevered beta for publicly traded food processing companies = 0.78
 - Average correlation of food processing companies with market = 0.333
 - Unlevered total beta for Kristin Kandy = 0.78/0.333 = 2.34
 - Debt to equity ratio for Kristin Kandy = 0.3/0.7 (assumed industry average)
 - Total Beta = 2.34 (1-(1-.40)(30/70)) = 2.94
 - **Total Cost of Equity = 4.50% + 2.94 (4%) = 16.26%**

Lesson 2: With financials, trust but verify..

- Different Accounting Standards: The accounting statements for private firms are often based upon different accounting standards than public firms, which operate under much tighter constraints on what to report and when to report.
- Intermingling of personal and business expenses: In the case of private firms, some personal expenses may be reported as business expenses.
- Separating "Salaries" from "Dividends": It is difficult to tell where salaries end and dividends begin in a private firm, since they both end up with the owner.
- The Key Person issue: In some private businesses, with a personal component, the cashflows may be intertwined with the owner being part of the business.

Lesson 3: Illiquidity is a clear and present danger..

In private company valuation, illiquidity is a constant theme. All the talk, though, seems to lead to a rule of thumb. The illiquidity discount for a private firm is between 20-30% and does not vary across private firms.

□ But illiquidity should vary across:

- Companies: Healthier and larger companies, with more liquid assets, should have smaller discounts than money-losing smaller businesses with more illiquid assets.
- Time: Liquidity is worth more when the economy is doing badly and credit is tough to come by than when markets are booming.
- Buyers: Liquidity is worth more to buyers who have shorter time horizons and greater cash needs than for longer term investors who don't need the cash and are willing to hold the investment.

And it is not just in private businesses..

- Universal Robina is a publicly traded company, but in a market with light and sporadic liquidity. Will the lack of liquidity affect your valuation of Filipino companies?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
- If yes, where, in your valuation, would you reflect it? If not, why not?

NARRATIVE AND NUMBERS: VALUATION AS A BRIDGE
Valuation as a bridge

Number Crunchers

Story Tellers



Step 1: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
 - Your company (its products, its management and its history.
 - The market or markets that you see it growing in.
 - The competition it faces and will face.
 - The macro environment in which it operates.



Low Growth

The Auto Business

Low Margins

| 2005 1,274,716.60 2006 1,421,804.20 11.54% 2007 1,854,576.40 30.44% 2008 1,818,533.00 -1.94% 2009 1,572,890.10 -13.51% | ate 🔻 |
|--|-------|
| 2006 1,421,804.20 11.54% 2007 1,854,576.40 30.44% 2008 1,818,533.00 -1.94% 2009 1,572,890.10 -13.51% | |
| 2007 1,854,576.40 30.44% 2008 1,818,533.00 -1.94% 2009 1,572,890.10 -13.51% | |
| 2008 1,818,533.00 -1.94% 2009 1,572,890.10 -13.51% | |
| 2009 1,572,890.10 -13.51% | |
| | |
| 2010 1,816,269.40 15.47% | |
| 2011 1,962,630.40 8.06% | |
| 2012 2,110,572.20 7.54% | |
| 2013 2,158,603.00 2.28% | |
| 2014 2,086,124.80 -3.36% | |
| ounded Average = 5.63% | |



Bad Business

High & Increasing Reinvestment



| | ROIC | Cost of capital | ROiC - Cost of capital |
|------|--------|-----------------|------------------------|
| 2004 | 6.82% | 7.93% | -1.11% |
| 2005 | 10.47% | 7.02% | 3.45% |
| 2006 | 4.60% | 7.97% | -3.37% |
| 2007 | 7.62% | 8.50% | -0.88% |
| 2008 | 3.48% | 8.03% | -4.55% |
| 2009 | -4.97% | 8.58% | -13.55% |
| 2010 | 5.16% | 8.03% | -2.87% |
| 2011 | 7.55% | 8.15% | -0.60% |
| 2012 | 7.80% | 8.55% | -0.75% |
| 2013 | 7.83% | 8.47% | -0.64% |
| 2014 | 6.47% | 7.53% | -1.06% |
| | | | |

Only once in the last 10 years have auto companies collectively earned more than their cost of capital

What makes Ferrari different?

Ferrari had a profit margin of 18.2%, in the 95th percentile, partly because of its high prices and partly because it spends little on advertising.

Ferrari sold only 7,255

cars in all of 2014



Ferrari: Geographical Sales (2014)

Ferrari sales (in units) have grown very little in the last decade & have been stable

Ferrari has not invested in new plants.

Step 2: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
 - Rule 1: Keep it simple.
 - Rule 2: Keep it focused.

The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

- 1. <u>An urban car service business</u>: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
- 2. Which <u>would expand the business moderately (about 40%</u> over ten years) by bringing in new users.
- 3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
- 4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong <u>competitive advantages</u> (from being a first mover).
- 5. And <u>its existing low-capital business model</u>, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

The Ferrari Narrative

- Ferrari will stay an exclusive auto club, deriving its allure from its scarcity and the fact that only a few own Ferraris.
- By staying exclusive, the company gets three benefits:
 - It can continue to charge nose bleed prices for its cars and sell them with little or no advertising.
 - It does not need to invest in new assembly plants, since it does not plan to ramp up production.
 - It sells only to the super rich, who are unaffected by overall economic conditions or market crises.

Step 3: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense



The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable



Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



The Uber narrative (June 2014)

Ferrari: From story to numbers

| Valuation Input | The Story | Valuation Inputs | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Revenues | Keep it scarce | Revenue growth of 4% (in Euro terms) a | | | | | |
| <i>Operating Margin & Taxes</i> | | 0.7% in year 10. Translates into an increase in production of about 25% in next 10 years | | | | | |
| Operating Income | And pricey | Ferrari's pre-tax operating margin stays at 18.2%, in the 95th percentile of auto business. | | | | | |
| Reinvestment | Little need for capacity expansion | Sales/Invested Capital stays at 1.42, i.e. every euro invested generates 1.42 euros in sales | | | | | |
| Cash Flow | | | | | | | |
| Discount Rate (Risk) | <i>Super-rich clients are recession-proof</i> | Cost of capital of 6.96% in Euros and no chance of default. | | | | | |

Step 5: Value the company (Uber)

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Ferrari: The "Exclusive Club" Value

| | | | | | | | | | Sta | y Su | per | Excl | usiv | ve: R | eve | enue | gro | wth is | s lo | w | | | | | High Prices + No selling |
|-----------------------------|-----|---------|----|-------|----|-------|----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|------|-------|-----|-------|-----|--------|------|-------|----|-------|-------|------------|-----------------------------|
| | Bas | se year | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | Terr | minal year | cost = |
| Revenue growth rate | | | 4 | .00% | 4 | .00% | 4. | 00% | 4 | .00% | 4 | .00% | 3. | .34% | 2 | .68% | 2 | .02% | 1. | 36% | 0. | 70% | | 0.70% | Preserve |
| Revenues | € | 2,763 | € | 2,874 | € | 2,988 | € | 3,108 | € | 3,232 | € | 3,362 | € | 3,474 | € | 3,567 | € | 3,639 | € | 3,689 | € | 3,714 | € | 3,740 | current |
| EBIT (Operating) margin | | 18.20% | 18 | 8.20% | 18 | .20% | 18 | .20% | 18 | 8.20% | 18 | .20% | 18 | .20% | 18 | 8.20% | 18 | 8.20% | 18 | .20% | 18 | .20% | 1 | 18.20% | margin |
| EBIT (Operating income) | € | 503 | € | 523 | € | 544 | € | 566 | € | 588 | € | 612 | € | 632 | € | 649 | € | 662 | € | 671 | € | 676 | € | 681 | |
| Tax rate | | 33.54% | 33 | 3.54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | 8.54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | 3.54% | 33 | 8.54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 6 | 33.54% | Minimal |
| EBIT(1-t) | € | 334 | € | 348 | € | 361 | € | 376 | € | 391 | € | 407 | € | 420 | € | 431 | € | 440 | € | 446 | € | 449 | € | 452 | Reinvestment |
| - Reinvestment | | | € | 78 | € | 81 | € | 84 | € | 87 | € | 91 | € | 79 | € | 66 | € | 51 | € | 35 | € | 18 | € | 22 | due to low |
| FCFF | | | € | 270 | € | 281 | € | 292 | € | 303 | € | 316 | € | 341 | € | 366 | € | 389 | € | 411 | € | 431 | € | 431 | growth |
| Cost of capital | | | 6 | .96% | 6 | .96% | 6. | 96% | 6 | .96% | 6 | .96% | 6. | .96% | 6 | .97% | 6 | .98% | 6. | 99% | 7. | 00% | 1 - B | 7.00% | |
| PV(FCFF) | | | € | 252 | € | 245 | € | 238 | € | 232 | € | 225 | € | 228 | € | 228 | € | 227 | € | 224 | € | 220 | | | The super |
| | | | | | [| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ĺ. | | | | [| | rich are not |
| Terminal value | € | 6,835 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sensitive to |
| PV(Terminal value) | € | 3,485 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | economic |
| PV (CF over next 10 years) | € | 2,321 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | downtums |
| Value of operating assets = | € | 5,806 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Debt | € | 623 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Minority interests | € | 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + Cash | € | 1,141 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of equity | € | 6,311 | | | Ĩ. | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | |

Step 5: Keep the feedback loop

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- <u>Not just car service company.</u>: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
- <u>Not just urban</u>: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
- 3. <u>Global networking benefits</u>: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

| | Uber (Gurley) | Uber (Gurley Mod) | Uber (Damodaran) |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Narrative | Uber will expand the car service | Uber will expand the car service | Uber will expand the car service |
| | market substantially, bringing in | market substantially, bringing in | market moderately, primarily in |
| | mass transit users & non-users | mass transit users & non-users from | urban environments, and use its |
| | from the suburbs into the market, | the suburbs into the market, and use | competitive advantages to get a |
| | and use its networking advantage | its networking advantage to gain a | significant but not dominant |
| | to gain a dominant market share, | dominant market share, while | market share and maintain its |
| | while maintaining its revenue slice | cutting prices and margins (to 10%). | revenue slice at 20%. |
| | at 20%. | | |
| Total | \$300 billion, growing at 3% a year | \$300 billion, growing at 3% a year | \$100 billion, growing at 6% a year |
| Market | | | |
| Market | 40% | 40% | 10% |
| Share | | | |
| Uber's | 20% | 10% | 20% |
| revenue | | | |
| slice | | | |
| Value for | \$53.4 billion + Option value of | \$28.7 billion + Option value of | \$5.9 billion + Option value of |
| Uber | entering car ownership market | entering car ownership market (\$6 | entering car ownership market (\$2- |
| | (\$10 billion+) | billion+) | 3 billion) |

Different narratives, Different Numbers

| Total Market | Growth Effect | Network Effect | Competitive Advantages | Value of Uber |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| A4. Mobility Services | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$90,457 |
| A3. Logistics | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$65,158 |
| A4. Mobility Services | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$52,346 |
| A2. All car service | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$47,764 |
| A1. Urban car service | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$31,952 |
| A3. Logistics | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$14,321 |
| A1. Urban car service | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$7,127 |
| A2. All car service | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$4,764 |
| A4. Mobility Services | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$1,888 |
| A3. Logistics | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$1,417 |
| A2. All car service | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$1,094 |
| A1. Urban car service | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$799 |

The Ferrari Counter Narrative

| | Ferrari: The | Rev-it-up Option |
|---|--|--|
| Valuation Input | The Story | Valuation Inputs |
| Revenues Operating Margin & Taxes | Sales Push | Revenue growth of 12% (in Euro terms) a year for next 5 years, scaling down to 0.7% in year 10. Translates into an increase in production of about 100% in next 10 years |
| Operating Income | With lower priced models & selling costs | Ferrari's pre-tax operating margin drops to 14.32%, in the 90th percentile of auto business. |
| Reinvestment | With investments in additional capacity | Sales/Invested Capital stays at 1.42, but higher sales create more reinvestment |
| Cash Flow | | |
| Discount Rate (Risk) | Very rich are more sensitive to economic | Cost of capital of 8% in Euros and no chance of default |
| Value | conditions | |

Ferrari: The "Rev-it-up" Alternative

| | | | | | | Ge | t le | ss ex | clu | sive: | Do | ouble | nu | mber | of | cars | SO | ld ove | e <mark>r r</mark> | next o | lec | ade | | | | Lower |
|-----------------------------|----|---------|----|-------|----|-------|------|-------|-----|-------|----|-------|----|-------|----|-------|----|--------|--------------------|--------|-----|-------|-----|-------------|---|--------------|
| | Ba | se year | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | Ter | rminal year | | Prices + |
| Revenue growth rate | | | 12 | .00% | 12 | .00% | 12 | .00% | 12 | .00% | 12 | .00% | 9. | 74% | 7. | 48% | 5 | .22% | 2. | 96% | 0. | 70% | | 0.70% | | cost = Lower |
| Revenues | € | 2,763 | € | 3,095 | € | 3,466 | € | 3,882 | € | 4,348 | € | 4,869 | € | 5,344 | € | 5,743 | € | 6,043 | € | 6,222 | € | 6,266 | € | 6,309 | | operating |
| EBIT (Operating) margin | | 18.20% | 17 | .81% | 17 | .42% | 17 | .04% | 16 | .65% | 16 | 6.26% | 15 | .87% | 15 | .48% | 15 | 5.10% | 14 | .71% | 14 | .32% | | 14.32% | | margin |
| EBIT (Operating income) | € | 503 | € | 551 | € | 604 | € | 661 | € | 724 | € | 792 | € | 848 | € | 889 | € | 912 | € | 915 | € | 897 | € | 904 | L | |
| Tax rate | | 33.54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | 8.54% | 33 | .54% | 33 | .54% | | 33.54% | | |
| EBIT(1-t) | € | 334 | € | 366 | € | 401 | € | 439 | € | 481 | € | 526 | € | 564 | € | 591 | € | 606 | € | 608 | € | 596 | € | 600 | | Reinvestment |
| - Reinvestment | | | € | 233 | € | 261 | € | 293 | € | 328 | € | 367 | € | 334 | € | 281 | € | 211 | € | 126 | € | 31 | € | 35 | | reflects |
| FCFF | | | € | 133 | € | 140 | € | 147 | € | 153 | € | 159 | € | 230 | € | 310 | € | 395 | € | 482 | € | 566 | € | 565 | | nigher sales |
| Cost of capital | | | 8 | .00% | 8. | 00% | 8. | 00% | 8 | .00% | 8 | .00% | 7. | 90% | 7. | 80% | 7 | .70% | 7. | 60% | 7. | 50% | | 7.50% | | |
| PV(FCFF) | | | € | 123 | € | 120 | € | 117 | € | 113 | € | 108 | € | 145 | € | 181 | € | 215 | € | 244 | € | 266 | | | | The very |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ | | | | | | | rich are |
| Terminal value | € | 8,315 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | more |
| PV(Terminal value) | € | 3,906 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | economic |
| PV (CF over next 10 years) | € | 1,631 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | conditions |
| Value of operating assets = | € | 5,537 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Debt | € | 623 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Minority interests | € | 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + Cash | € | 1,141 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of equity | € | 6,042 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

And the world is full of feedback.. My Ferrari afterthought!



Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

| Narrative Break/End | Narrative Shift | Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction) |
|--|--|---|
| Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end. | Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability. | Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market. |
| Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative | Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company. | Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics. |
| Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences | Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis | Real Options |

Uber: The September 2015 Update

| of failure | 10/0 | 0,0 | threats to survival. |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|
| Cost of capital | 12% (Ninth decile of US companies) | 10% (75 th percentile of US companies) | Business model in place and substantial revenues. |
| Operating margin | 40% (Low cost model) | 25% (Partial employee model) | Drivers will become partial employees, higher insurance and regulatory costs. |
| Slice of gross receipts | 20% (Left at status quo) | 15% | Increased competition will reduce car service company slice. |
| Market Share | 10% (Local Networking) | 25% (Weak Global Networking) | Higher cost of entry will reduce competitors, but remaining competitors have access to capital & in Asia, the hometown advantage. |
| Growth in market | Increase market size by 34%; CAGR of 6%. | Double market size; CAGR of 10.39%. | New customers being drawn to car sharing, with more diverse offerings. |
| Total Market | \$100 billion; Urban car service | \$230 billion; Logistics | Market is broader, bigger & more global than I thought it would be. Uber's entry into delivery & moving businesses is now plausible, perhaps even probable. |
| Input | June 2014 | September 2015 | Rationale |

| | | Growth Effoct | CACP (next 10 years) | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| Potential Market | Market size (in millions) | GIOWIII EIIECL | CAGR (liext 10 years) | Network Effects | Market Share |
| A1. Urban car service | \$100,000 | B1. None | 3.00% | C1 No network effects | 5% |
| A2. All car service | \$175.000 | B2. Increase market by 25% | 5.32% | | J70 |
| A3 Logistics | \$230,000 | B3. Increase market size by 50% | 7.26% | C2. Weak local network effects | 10% |
| A4. Mobility Services | \$310,000 | B4: Double market size | 10.39% | C3. Strong local network effects | 15% |
| Inc | creases overall market to \$ | 618 billion in vear 10 | | C4. Weak global network effects | 25% |
| | | | | | |

C5. Strong global network effects 40%

| | Base | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Assumptions |
|---------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| Overall market | \$230,000 | \$253,897 | \$280,277 | \$309,398 | \$341,544 | \$377,031 | \$416,204 | \$459 <i>,</i> 448 | \$507,184 | \$559,881 | \$618,052 | A3 & B4 |
| Share of market (gross) | 4.71% | 6.74% | 8.77% | 10.80% | 12.83% | 14.86% | 16.89% | 18.91% | 20.94% | 22.97% | 25.00% | C4 |
| Gross Billings | \$10,840 | \$17,117 | \$24,582 | \$33,412 | \$43,813 | \$56,014 | \$70,277 | \$86,900 | \$106,218 | \$128,612 | \$154,513 | |
| Revenues as percent of gross | 20.00% | 19.50% | 19.00% | 18.50% | 18.00% | 17.50% | 17.00% | 16.50% | 16.00% | 15.50% | 15.00% | D3 |
| Annual Revenue | \$2,168 | \$3,338 | \$4,670 | \$6,181 | \$7,886 | \$9 <i>,</i> 802 | \$11,947 | \$14,338 | \$16,995 | \$19,935 | \$23,177 | |
| Operating margin | -23.06% | -18.26% | -13.45% | -8.64% | -3.84% | 0.97% | 5.77% | 10.58% | 15.39% | 20.19% | 25.00% | E2 |
| Operating Income | -\$500 | -\$609 | -\$628 | -\$534 | -\$303 | \$95 | \$690 | \$1,517 | \$2,615 | \$4,026 | \$5,794 | |
| Effective tax rate | 30.00% | 31.00% | 32.00% | 33.00% | 34.00% | 35.00% | 36.00% | 37.00% | 38.00% | 39.00% | 40.00% | |
| - Taxes | -\$150 | -\$189 | -\$201 | -\$176 | -\$103 | \$33 | \$248 | \$561 | \$994 | \$1,570 | \$2,318 | |
| After-tax operating income | -\$350 | -\$420 | -\$427 | -\$358 | -\$200 | \$62 | \$442 | \$956 | \$1,621 | \$2,456 | \$3,477 | |
| Sales/Capital Ratio | | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | F |
| - Reinvestment | | \$234 | \$267 | \$302 | \$341 | \$383 | \$429 | \$478 | \$531 | \$588 | \$648 | |
| Free Cash Flow to the Firm | | -\$654 | -\$694 | -\$660 | -\$541 | -\$322 | \$13 | \$478 | \$1,090 | \$1,868 | \$2,828 | |
| Terminal value | | | | | | | | | | | \$56,258 | |
| Present value of FCFF | | -\$595 | -\$573 | -\$496 | -\$369 | -\$200 | \$7 | \$248 | \$520 | \$822 | \$1,152 | |
| Present value of terminal value | | | | | | | | | | | \$22,914 | |
| Cost of capital | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 9.60% | 9.20% | 8.80% | 8.40% | 8.00% | G1 |

| PV of cash flows during next 10 years = | \$515 | |
|---|----------|----|
| PV of terminal value = | \$22,914 | |
| Value of operating assets | \$23,429 | |
| Probability of failure | 0.00% | G2 |
| Adjusted value of operating assets | \$23,429 | |
| Less Debt | \$0 | |
| Value of Equity | \$23,429 | |

| Expense Profile | Operating Margin |
|----------------------------|------------------|
| E1: Independent contractor | 40% |
| E2: Partial employee | 25% |
| E3: Full employee | 15% |

Capital Intensity

F: Status Quo: Sales/Capital = 5

| Competitive Advantages | Slice of Gross Receipts |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| D1. None | 5% |
| D2. Weak | 10% |
| D3. Semi-strong | 15% |
| D4. Strong & Sustainable | 20% |

Risk Estimates G1. Cost of capital at 75th percentile of US companies = 10%

G2. Probability of failure in next 10 years= 0%

Uber Valuation: September 2015

| | | | | Univ | /ersal | Robina | | | | |
|--|-------------------|------------------------|---------|-----------------|--------|--------------------------|-------|---------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| | | | | 1 | The St | ory | | | | |
| Universal Robina is a s | tatus quo story. | With its existing man | nagem | ent in place, t | theco | ompany wil | I see | revenues growing at its a | verage grow | th rate for the last five years |
| and margins increasing | slowly to get to | o the average erned o | ver the | five year per | iod. T | he firm will | l con | ntinue to be funded prima | arily with eq | uity and to.pay a low |
| effective tax rate. After | year 10, the fire | m will become a matu | ure one | e, with the co | st of | capital to m | natch | h. | | |
| - | | | | The | Assun | nptions | | | | |
| | Base year | Years 1-5 | Ye | ars 6-10 | | | | After year 10 | | Link to story |
| Revenues (a) | \$ 116,971 | 10.80% | + | 4.29% | | | | 4.29% | | |
| Operating margin (b) | 13.69% | 13.69% | - | 13.84% | | | | 13.84% | | |
| Tax rate | 18.72% | 18.72% | | 18.72% | | | | 18.72% | | |
| Reinvestment (c) | | Sales to capital ratio | 1.59 | | | RIR = | | 48.81% | | |
| Return on capital | 12.18% | Marginal ROIC = | 22.18 | 1% | | | | 8.79% | | |
| Cost of capital (d) | | 9.23% | - | 8.79% | | | | 8.79% | | |
| | | | | The | Cash | Flows | | | | |
| | Revenues | Operating Margin | EBIT | | EBIT | (1-t) | Rei | nvestment | FCFF | |
| 1 | \$ 129,604 | 13.72% | \$ | 17,786 | \$ | 14,456 | \$ | 7,945 | \$ | 6,511 |
| 2 | \$ 143,601 | 13.75% | \$ | 19,748 | \$ | 16,051 | \$ | 8,803 | \$ | 7,248 |
| 3 | \$ 159,110 | 13.78% | \$ | 21,928 | \$ | 17,823 | \$ | 9,754 | \$ | 8,069 |
| 4 | \$ 176,294 | 13.81% | \$ | 24,347 | \$ | 19,790 | \$ | 10,807 | \$ | 8,982 |
| 5 | \$ 195,334 | 13.84% | \$ | 27,034 | \$ | 21,973 | \$ | 11,975 | \$ | 9,999 |
| 6 | \$ 213,886 | 13.84% | \$ | 29,602 | \$ | 24,060 | \$ | 11,668 | \$ | 12,392 |
| 7 | \$ 231,417 | 13.84% | \$ | 32,028 | \$ | 26,032 | \$ | 11,025 | \$ | 15,007 |
| 8 | \$ 247,370 | 13.84% | \$ | 34,236 | \$ | 27,827 | \$ | 10,034 | \$ | 17,793 |
| 9 | \$ 261,203 | 13.84% | \$ | 36,151 | \$ | 29,383 | \$ | 8,700 | \$ | 20,683 |
| 10 | \$ 272,409 | 13.84% | \$ | 37,701 | \$ | 30,644 | \$ | 7,048 | \$ | 23,596 |
| Terminal year | \$ 284,095 | 13.84% | \$ | 39,319 | \$ | 31,958 | \$ | 15,597 | \$ | 16,361 |
| | | | | 1 | the Ve | alue | | | | |
| Terminal value | | | \$ | 363,576 | | | | | | |
| PV(Terminal value) | | | \$ | 152,243 | | | | | | |
| PV (CF over next 10 year | ars) | | \$ | 74,512 | | | | | | |
| Value of operating asse | ets = | | \$ | 226,756 | | | | | | |
| Adjustment for distress \$ | | | | | | Probability of failure = | 0.00% | | | |
| - Debt & Mnority Interests \$ | | \$ | 41,609 | | | | | | | |
| + Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$ | | | \$ | 12,305 | | | | | | |
| Value of equity | | | \$ | 197,451 | | | | | | |
| - Value of equity optio | ns | | \$ | | | | | | | |
| Number of shares | | | | 2,181.60 | | | | | | |
| Value per share | | | \$ | 90.51 | | | | Stock was trading at = | \$140.00 | |

Aswath Damodaran

RELATIVE VALUATION (PRICING)

Relative valuation is pervasive...

- Most asset valuations are relative.
- Most equity valuations on Wall Street are relative valuations.
 - Almost 85% of equity research reports are based upon a multiple and comparables.
 - More than 50% of all acquisition valuations are based upon multiples
 - Rules of thumb based on multiples are not only common but are often the basis for final valuation judgments.
- While there are more discounted cashflow valuations in consulting and corporate finance, they are often relative valuations masquerading as discounted cash flow valuations.
 - The objective in many discounted cashflow valuations is to back into a number that has been obtained by using a multiple.
 - The terminal value in a significant number of discounted cashflow valuations is estimated using a multiple.

The Reasons for the allure...

"If you think I'm crazy, you should see the guy who lives across the hall"

Jerry Seinfeld talking about Kramer in a Seinfeld episode

A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation

H.H. Munro

If you are going to screw up, make sure that you have lots of company"

Ex-portfolio manager

Pricing versus Valuation



Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

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| La Jolla, CA 92037 | a Dr | 5 | \$995,000 Price | 3 Beds | 2.5 Baths | 1,440 Sq. Ft. \$691 / Sq. Ft. | • | × | | 16m |
|--------------------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|---|------------|--|---|---------------------------------|
| Status: Active | | | Built: 1955 | Lot Size: 3,0 | 000 Sq. Ft. | On Redfin: 12 days | Favorite | X-Out | Share | Tour Home |
| erview Property Details Tour I | r Insights F | Property History | Public | Records | Activity | Schools | Neighborho | od & Offe | r Insights | Similar Home |
| | | | | | | | Ask Lie | a Estate Ag ews iission re Go Sa a Que: 4 Redfin | fund Tour This I stion or Sta Agents in th | Home rt an Offer nis area |

Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

Europe Switzerland

Biotechnology Biotechnology BION.S

Bloomberg BION SW Exchange Ticker SWX BION

| Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF) | 124.00 |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| Price Target (CHF) | 164.50 |
| 52-week range (CHF) | 128.40 - 84.90 |

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive

With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares

 Key changes

 Target Price
 106.50 to 164.50 ↑
 54.5%

 Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



Test 3: Are you pricing or valuing?

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| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---------------------------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|------------|
| EBITDA | \$100.00 | \$120.00 | \$144.00 | \$172.80 | \$207.36 |
| - Depreciation | \$20.00 | \$24.00 | \$28.80 | \$34.56 | \$41.47 |
| EBIT | \$80.00 | \$96.00 | \$115.20 | \$138.24 | \$165.89 |
| - Taxes | \$24.00 | \$28.80 | \$34.56 | \$41.47 | \$49.77 |
| EBIT (1-t) | \$56.00 | \$67.20 | \$80.64 | \$96.77 | \$116.12 |
| + Depreciation | \$20.00 | \$24.00 | \$28.80 | \$34.56 | \$41.47 |
| - Cap Ex | \$50.00 | \$60.00 | \$72.00 | \$86.40 | \$103.68 |
| - Chg in WC | \$10.00 | \$12.00 | \$14.40 | \$17.28 | \$20.74 |
| FCFF | \$16.00 | \$19.20 | \$23.04 | \$27.65 | \$33.18 |
| Terminal Value | | | | | \$1,658.88 |
| Cost of capital | 8.25% | 8.25% | 8.25% | 8.25% | 8.25% |
| Present Value | \$14.78 | \$16.38 | \$18.16 | \$20.14 | \$1,138.35 |
| Value of operating assets today | \$1,207.81 | | | | |
| + Cash | \$125.00 | | | | |
| - Debt | \$200.00 | | | | |
| Value of equity | \$1,132.81 | | | | |

The tool for pricing: A multiple

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The Pricing Game: Choices

| Measure | Choices | Considerations/ Questions |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Value | Enterprise, Equity or Firm Value? | Is this a financial service business? Are there big differences in leverage? |
| Scalar | Revenues, Earnings, Cash Flows or Book Value? | How are you measuring value? Is the scaling number positive? How (and how much) do accounting choices affect the scaling measure? |
| Timing & Normalizing | Current, Trailing, Forward or Really Forward? | Where are you in the life cycle? How much cyclicality is there in the number? Can you get forecasted values? |
| Comparable | What is your peer group? (Global or local? Similar size or all firms?) | How much do companies share in common globally? Does company size affect business economics? How big a sample of firms do you need? How do you plan to control for differences? |
| | | 1/8 |

The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

Define the multiple

In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated

Describe the multiple

- Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
 - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
 - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

Definitional Tests

Is the multiple consistently defined?

Proposition 1: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.

Is the multiple uniformly estimated?

- The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the "comparable firm" list.
- If earnings-based multiples are used, the accounting rules to measure earnings should be applied consistently across assets. The same rule applies with book-value based multiples.
Example 1: Price Earnings Ratio: Definition

PE = Market Price per Share / Earnings per Share

- There are a number of variants on the basic PE ratio in use. They are based upon how the price and the earnings are defined.
- Price: is usually the current price

is sometimes the average price for the year

EPS: EPS in most recent financial year
EPS in trailing 12 months (Trailing PE)
Forecasted EPSnnext year (Forward PE)
Forecasted EPS in future year

Example 2: Enterprise Value / EBITDA Multiple

- The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple is obtained by netting cash out against debt to arrive at enterprise value and dividing by EBITDA.
 - $\frac{\text{Enterprise Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{\text{Market Value of Equity} + \text{Market Value of Debt} \text{Cash}}{\text{Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation}}$
- Why do we net out cash from firm value?
- What happens if a firm has cross holdings which are categorized as:
 - Minority interests?
 - Majority active interests?

Descriptive Tests

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- □ What is the median for this multiple?
 - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
 - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

1. Multiples have skewed distributions...



2. Making statistics "dicey"

| | Current PE | Trailing PE | Forward PE |
|--------------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| Number of firms | 7,247 | 7,247 | 7,247 |
| Number with PE | 2,955 | 2,958 | 2,448 |
| Average | 71.28 | 65.33 | 41.75 |
| Median | 23.13 | 21.79 | 19.76 |
| Minimum | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.3 |
| Maximum | 21,560 | 10,333 | 9,087 |
| Standard deviation | 491.39 | 401.07 | 251.2 |
| Standard error | 9.03 | 7.33 | 5.08 |
| Skewness | 80.51 | 73.51 | 80.08 |
| 25th percentile | 15.86 | 15.41 | 14.86 |
| 75th percentile | 37.22 | 34.38 | 28.19 |

US firms in January 2018

3. Markets have a lot in common : Comparing Global PEs

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And South East Asia is not unique..



PE Ratios for SE Asia: July 2016

Current PE Trailing PE

4. Simplistic rules almost always break down...6 times EBITDA may not be cheap...



But it may be in 2018, unless you are in Russia!

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Analytical Tests

- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
 - Proposition 2: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
 - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
 - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
 - Proposition 3: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.

A Simple Analytical device

| | Start with a basic intrinsic value model | Divide both sides of the equation by the denominator of the multiple that you are trying to deconstruct,. | You should end up with an intrinsic version of your multiple, which should relate it to fundamentals. |
|-----------------------|--|---|---|
| If Equity Multiple | Start with a dividend or FCFE model, preferably simple. | Divide your dividend or FCFE model by denominator of equity multiple. | Intrinsic version of equity multiple, with drivers of value |
| | Price= EPS * Payout / (r -g) | Prtce/Book = ROE * Payout / (r -g) | Price/Book = f(ROE, r, g, Payout) |
| | | | |
| If EV | Start with a operating asset value model, preferably simple. | Divide your operating asset model by denominator of EV multiple. | Intrinsic version of EV multiple, with drivers of value |
| мищре | EV= EBIT (1-t) (1- RIR)/ (WACC -g) | EV/Sales = After-tax Operating Margin (1- RIR)/ (WACC -g) | EV/Sales = f(After-tax Operating Margin, RIR, WACC, g) |

PE Ratio: Understanding the Fundamentals

- To understand the fundamentals, start with a basic equity discounted cash flow model.
- With the dividend discount model,

$$P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$$

EPS_o

Dividing both sides by the current earnings per share,

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{Payout Ratio * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

If this had been a FCFE Model,

$$P_{0} = \frac{FCFE_{1}}{r - g_{n}}$$

$$\frac{P_{0}}{r - g_{n}} = PE = \frac{(FCFE/Earnings)*(1 + g_{n})}{(1 + g_{n})}$$

r-g_n

The Determinants of Multiples...



Application Tests

Given the firm that you are valuing, what is a "comparable" firm?

- While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
- Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, how do you adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
 - Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.

An Example: Comparing PE Ratios across a Sector: PE

| Company Name | PE | Growth |
|--|------|--------|
| PT Indosat ADR | 7.8 | 0.06 |
| Telebras ADR | 8.9 | 0.075 |
| Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ADR | 11.2 | 0.11 |
| Telecom Argentina Stet - France Telecom SA ADR B | 12.5 | 0.08 |
| Hellenic Telecommunication Organization SA ADR | 12.8 | 0.12 |
| Telecomunicaciones de Chile ADR | 16.6 | 0.08 |
| Swisscom AG ADR | 18.3 | 0.11 |
| Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings ADR | 19.6 | 0.16 |
| Portugal Telecom SA ADR | 20.8 | 0.13 |
| Telefonos de Mexico ADR L | 21.1 | 0.14 |
| Matav RT ADR | 21.5 | 0.22 |
| Telstra ADR | 21.7 | 0.12 |
| Gilat Communications | 22.7 | 0.31 |
| Deutsche Telekom AG ADR | 24.6 | 0.11 |
| British Telecommunications PLC ADR | 25.7 | 0.07 |
| Tele Danmark AS ADR | 27 | 0.09 |
| Telekomunikasi Indonesia ADR | 28.4 | 0.32 |
| Cable & Wireless PLC ADR | 29.8 | 0.14 |
| APT Satellite Holdings ADR | 31 | 0.33 |
| Telefonica SA ADR | 32.5 | 0.18 |
| Royal KPN NV ADR | 35.7 | 0.13 |
| Telecom Italia SPA ADR | 42.2 | 0.14 |
| Nippon Telegraph & Telephone ADR | 44.3 | 0.2 |
| France Telecom SA ADR | 45.2 | 0.19 |
| Korea Telecom ADR | 71.3 | 0.44 |

PE, Growth and Risk

Dependent variable is: PE

□ R squared = 66.2% R squared (adjusted) = 63.1%

| Variable | Coefficien | t | SE | t-ratio | Probability |
|--------------------------|------------|----------|-----------|---------|-------------|
| Constant | 13.1151 | | 3.471 | 3.78 | 0.0010 |
| Growth rate | 121.223 | | 19.27 | 6.29 | ≤ 0.0001 |
| Emerging Market | -13.853 | | 3.606 | -3.84 | 0.0009 |
| Emerging Market is a dum | my: 1 | 1 if eme | rging mar | ket | |
| | | | 0 if not | | |

Is Indosat cheap?
 PE = 13.13 + 121.22 (.06) -13.85 (1) = 6.55
 At 7.8 times earnings, Indosat is over valued.

Genting: A Relative Valuation

| | | | | | | | | | FV/Invested | |
|-----------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| Company Name | Current PE | Trailing PE | Forward PE | PEG | PBV | PS | EV/EBIT | EV/EBITDA | Capital | EV/Sales |
| Olympia Industries Berhad | 5.97 | 5.01 | NA | NA | 0.24 | 0.65 | 35.23 | 20.83 | 0.50 | 2.03 |
| RGB International Bhd. | 11.11 | 9.34 | 8.20 | NA | 1.12 | 1.00 | 5.19 | 2.60 | 1.17 | 0.77 |
| Berjaya Sports Toto Berhad | 12.84 | 12.84 | 12.43 | NA | 4.69 | 0.71 | 9.71 | 9.11 | 3.01 | 0.83 |
| Magnum Berhad | 15.36 | 15.36 | 13.90 | NA | 1.27 | 1.26 | 11.15 | 10.92 | 1.22 | 1.51 |
| Shangri-La Hotels Malaysia Bhd | 18.78 | 17.89 | NA | NA | 1.90 | 4.87 | 16.57 | 11.29 | 1.87 | 4.94 |
| Genting Malaysia Berhad | 21.12 | 22.70 | 19.12 | 2.18 | 1.34 | 3.16 | 23.70 | 13.23 | 1.32 | 3.27 |
| Genting Berhad | 18.30 | 22.83 | 16.81 | 6.78 | 0.49 | 1.77 | 6.89 | 4.45 | 0.46 | 1.53 |
| TA Global Berhad | 28.36 | 28.36 | NA | NA | 0.43 | 2.07 | 26.54 | 16.28 | 0.66 | 5.25 |
| Berjaya Assets Berhad | 11.15 | 48.58 | NA | NA | 0.37 | 1.97 | 19.98 | 16.20 | 0.55 | 4.10 |
| TA Enterprise Berhad | 365.86 | 365.86 | NA | NA | 0.26 | 1.16 | 2184.44 | 1490.38 | 0.53 | 3.70 |
| Median | 16.83 | 20.30 | 13.90 | 4.48 | 0.81 | 1.51 | 18.28 | 12.26 | 0.91 | 2.65 |
| Genting vs Median | 8.71% | 12.46% | 20.89% | 51.26% | -39.09% | 16.79% | -62.32% | -63.72% | -50.24% | -42.33% |

Genting: Controlling for differences

| | | | | | | | | Historical | |
|--------------------------------|------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------|--------|-----------|------------|--------------|
| | | | | | | | | growth in | Historical |
| | | | Market | | Return | Net | | Net Income | growth in |
| | Cash/ Firm | Liquidity | Debt to | Return on | on | Profit | Operating | - Last 5 | Revenues - |
| Company Name | Value | Ratio | capital ratio | Equity | Capital | Margin | Margin | years | Last 3 years |
| Olympia Industries Berhad | 19.92% | 0.21 | 74.19% | 5.64% | 0.99% | 12.24% | 5.40% | NA | NA |
| RGB International Bhd. | 28.52% | 2.29 | 7.79% | 18.23% | 18.32% | 8.96% | 12.51% | NA | 9.49% |
| Berjaya Sports Toto Berhad | 2.75% | 0.16 | 17.48% | 40.74% | 54.88% | 5.50% | 8.57% | -2.63% | 15.30% |
| Magnum Berhad | 9.18% | 0.07 | 24.01% | 7.94% | 7.38% | 7.52% | 12.38% | -8.53% | -4.13% |
| Shangri-La Hotels Malaysia Bhd | 5.09% | 0.10 | 6.37% | 11.97% | 11.02% | 23.91% | 26.17% | 11.30% | 1.81% |
| Genting Malaysia Berhad | 15.19% | 0.18 | 17.96% | 5.84% | 4.67% | 12.42% | 12.30% | -5.75% | 2.75% |
| Genting Berhad | 47.71% | 0.23 | 39.48% | 4.27% | 9.86% | 6.87% | 19.68% | -14.60% | 4.56% |
| TA Global Berhad | 7.16% | 0.03 | 63.42% | 1.45% | 1.34% | 7.30% | 19.79% | NA | NA |
| Berjaya Assets Berhad | 1.27% | 0.01 | 52.54% | 0.77% | 1.54% | 4.39% | 22.20% | NA | 5.04% |
| TA Enterprise Berhad | 21.90% | 0.09 | 75.56% | 0.11% | 0.01% | 0.32% | 0.17% | NA | NA |
| Median | 12.18% | 12.95% | 31.74% | 5.74% | 6.03% | 7.41% | 12.45% | -5.75% | 4.56% |
| Genting vs Median | 291.62% | 78.91% | 24.38% | -25.55% | 63.60% | -7.21% | 58.16% | 153.91% | 0.00% |

Comparisons to the entire market: Why not?

- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

PE Ratio: Standard Regression for US stocks -January 2018

Std. Error of

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| Mode | I R | R Square | Square | the Estimate | | T 1 | | • . 1 |
|------------------------|---|--|---|-------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | .611 ^b | .373 | .372 | 2322.83634 | | The regi | ression is r | run with |
| a. b. c. 1 d. | Broad Group Predictors: (C Next 5 years, Dependent Va Weighted Lea Market Cap (i | = United State constant), Expe Payout ratio, I ariable: Trailing st Squares Reg in US \$) | s cted growth rat Beta g PE gression – Weig | te in EPS- hted by | | growth a decimal as 0.25) | and payou s, i.e., 25% | t entered as 6 is entered |
| | | | Coeffic | cients ^{a,b,c} | | | | |
| | | | Unstandardize | ed Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | | | |
| Model | | | В | Std. Error | Beta | t | Sig. | |
| 1 | (Constant) | | 5.905 | 1.567 | | 3.767 | .000 | |
| | Beta | | 1.637 | 1.546 | .023 | 1.059 | .290 | |
| | Payout ratio | | 17.434 | .826 | .448 | 21.115 | .000 | |
| | Expected gr EPS- Next 5 | owth rate in years | 113.715 | 5.324 | .439 | 21.359 | .000 | |

- a. Broad Group = United States
- b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE
- c. Weighted Least Squares Regression Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

Model Summary^{a,c,d}

Adjusted R

Aswath Damodaran

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PE ratio regressions across markets – January 2018

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| | Region | Regression – January 2017 | R ² | |
|----|--------------------------|---|-----------------------|----|
| | US | $PE = 5.91 + 1.64 Beta + 17.43 Payout + 113.72 g_{EPS}$ | 37,2% | |
| | Europe | $PE = 17.68 - 2.08 Beta + 12.55 Payout + 21.98 g_{EPS}$ | 23.6% | |
| | Japan | $PE = 14.62 - 1.83 Beta + 23.37 Payout + 14.06 g_{EPS}$ | 16.8% | |
| | Emerging Markets | $PE = 16.36 - 1.44 Beta + 5.33 Payout + 50.15 g_{EPS}$ | 24.5% | |
| | Australia, NZ, Canada | $PE = 17.05 - 3.89 Beta + 14.05 Payout + 22.70 g_{EPS}$ | 13.6% | |
| | Global | $PE = 17.46 - 2.74 Beta + 13.32 Payout + 44.37 g_{EPS}$ | 23.2% | |
| | <u>g_{EPS}=</u> | Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS or Net Income: Next 5 years | | |
| | <u>Beta</u> : | Regression or Bottom up Beta | | |
| | Payo | <u>ut ratio: D</u> ividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net in | come < 0 21 | 01 |
| As | wath Damodara | n | - | |

Choosing Between the Multiples

- As presented in this section, there are dozens of multiples that can be potentially used to value an individual firm.
- In addition, relative valuation can be relative to a sector (or comparable firms) or to the entire market (using the regressions, for instance)
- Since there can be only one final estimate of value, there are three choices at this stage:
 - Use a simple average of the valuations obtained using a number of different multiples
 - Use a weighted average of the valuations obtained using a nmber of different multiples
 - Choose one of the multiples and base your valuation on that multiple

Picking one Multiple

- This is usually the best way to approach this issue. While a range of values can be obtained from a number of multiples, the "best estimate" value is obtained using one multiple.
- □ The multiple that is used can be chosen in one of two ways:
 - Use the multiple that best fits your objective. Thus, if you want the company to be undervalued, you pick the multiple that yields the highest value.
 - Use the multiple that has the highest R-squared in the sector when regressed against fundamentals. Thus, if you have tried PE, PBV, PS, etc. and run regressions of these multiples against fundamentals, use the multiple that works best at explaining differences across firms in that sector.
 - Use the multiple that seems to make the most sense for that sector, given how value is measured and created.

Conventional usage...

| Sector | Multiple Used | Rationale |
|---------------------------------|--|---|
| Cyclical Manufacturing | PE, Relative PE | Often with normalized earnings |
| Growth firms | PEG ratio | Big differences in growth rates |
| Young growth firms w/ losses | Revenue Multiples | What choice do you have? |
| Infrastructure | EV/EBITDA | Early losses, big DA |
| REIT | P/CFE (where CFE = Net income + Depreciation) | Big depreciation charges on real estate |
| Financial Services | Price/ Book equity | Marked to market? |
| Retailing | Revenue multiples | Margins equalize sooner or later |

A closing thought...

