



*Aswath Damodaran*


# VALUATION: ART, SCIENCE, CRAFT OR MAGIC?

Aswath Damodaran  
[www.damodaran.com](http://www.damodaran.com)

# Some Initial Thoughts

" One hundred thousand lemmings cannot be wrong"

Graffiti



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# Misconceptions about Valuation

- Myth 1: A valuation is an objective search for “true” value
  - ▣ Truth 1.1: All valuations are biased. The only questions are how much and in which direction.
  - ▣ Truth 1.2: The direction and magnitude of the bias in your valuation is directly proportional to who pays you and how much you are paid.
- Myth 2.: A good valuation provides a precise estimate of value
  - ▣ Truth 2.1: There are no precise valuations
  - ▣ Truth 2.2: The payoff to valuation is greatest when valuation is least precise.
- Myth 3: . The more quantitative a model, the better the valuation
  - ▣ Truth 3.1: One’ s understanding of a valuation model is inversely proportional to the number of inputs required for the model.
  - ▣ Truth 3.2: Simpler valuation models do much better than complex ones.

# Approaches to Valuation

- **Intrinsic valuation**, relates the value of an asset to the present value of expected future cashflows on that asset. In its most common form, this takes the form of a discounted cash flow valuation.
- **Relative valuation**, estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing of 'comparable' assets relative to a common variable like earnings, cash flows, book value or sales.
- **Contingent claim valuation**, uses option pricing models to measure the value of assets that share option characteristics.

# Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

- *What is it:* In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on the asset.
- *Philosophical Basis:* Every asset has an intrinsic value that can be estimated, based upon its characteristics in terms of cash flows, growth and risk.
- *Information Needed:* To use discounted cash flow valuation, you need
  - to estimate the life of the asset
  - to estimate the cash flows during the life of the asset
  - to estimate the discount rate to apply to these cash flows to get present value
- *Market Inefficiency:* Markets are assumed to make mistakes in pricing assets across time, and are assumed to correct themselves over time, as new information comes out about assets.

# Risk Adjusted Value: Three Basic Propositions


- The value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on that asset, over its expected life:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(\text{CF}_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(\text{CF}_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

- Proposition 1: If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.
- Proposition 2: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
- Proposition 3: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


# DCF Choices: Equity Valuation versus Firm Valuation

**Firm Valuation:** Value the entire business




**Equity valuation:** Value just the equity claim in the business

# The Drivers of Value...





# DISCOUNTED CASHFLOW VALUATION



# Amgen: Status Quo

Cap Ex = Acc net Cap Ex(255) + Acquisitions (3975) + R&D (2216)

## Current Cashflow to Firm

EBIT(1-t) = :7336(1-.28) = 6058  
 - Nt CpX = 6443  
 - Chg WC 37  
 = FCFF - 423  
 Reinvestment Rate = 6480/6058 = 106.98%  
 Return on capital = 16.71%

Reinvestment Rate 60%

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)  
 $.60 * .16 = .096$   
 9.6%

Return on Capital 16%

## Stable Growth

g = 4%; Beta = 1.10;  
 Debt Ratio = 20%; Tax rate = 35%  
 Cost of capital = 8.08%  
 ROC = 10.00%;  
 Reinvestment Rate = 4/10 = 40%

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> = 7300 / (.0808 - .04) = 179,099

First 5 years

Growth decreases gradually to 4%

Op. Assets 94214  
 + Cash: 1283  
 - Debt 8272  
 = Equity 87226  
 - Options 479  
 Value/Share \$ 74.33

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EBIT	\$9,221	\$10,106	\$11,076	\$12,140	\$13,305	\$14,433	\$15,496	\$16,463	\$17,306	\$17,998
EBIT (1-t)	\$6,639	\$7,276	\$7,975	\$8,741	\$9,580	\$10,392	\$11,157	\$11,853	\$12,460	\$12,958
- Reinvestment	\$3,983	\$4,366	\$4,785	\$5,244	\$5,748	\$5,820	\$5,802	\$5,690	\$5,482	\$5,183
= FCFF	\$2,656	\$2,911	\$3,190	\$3,496	\$3,832	\$4,573	\$5,355	\$6,164	\$6,978	\$7,775

Term Yr  
 18718  
 12167  
 4867  
 7300

Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.7% (0.90) + 3.66% (0.10) = 10.90%

Debt ratio increases to 20%  
 Beta decreases to 1.10

On May 1, 2007, Amgen was trading at \$ 55/share

Cost of Equity 11.70%

Cost of Debt  
 $(4.78\% + .85\%)(1-.35)$   
 = 3.66%

Weights  
 E = 90% D = 10%

Riskfree Rate:  
 Riskfree rate = 4.78%

+

Beta 1.73

x

Risk Premium 4%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.59

D/E = 11.06%

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# Tata Motors: April 2010

## Current Cashflow to Firm

EBIT(1-t) : Rs 20,116  
 - Nt CpX Rs 31,590  
 - Chg WC Rs 2,732  
 = FCFF - Rs 14,205  
 Reinv Rate =  $(31590+2732)/20116 = 170.61\%$ ; Tax rate = 21.00%  
 Return on capital = 17.16%

Average reinvestment rate  
 from 2005-09: 179.59%;  
 without acquisitions: 70%

Reinvestment Rate  
 70%

Expected Growth  
 from new inv.  
 $70 \cdot 17.16 = 0.1201$

Return on Capital  
 17.16%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 5\%$ ; Beta = 1.00  
 Country Premium = 3%  
 Cost of capital = 10.39%  
 Tax rate = 33.99%  
 ROC = 10.39%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROC = 5/10.39 = 48.11\%$

## Rs Cashflows

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EBIT (1-t)	22533	25240	28272	31668	35472	39236	42848	46192	49150	51607
- Reinvestment	15773	17668	19790	22168	24830	25242	25138	24482	23264	21503
FCFF	6760	7572	8482	9500	10642	13994	17711	21710	25886	30104

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $23493 / (.1039 - .05) = \text{Rs } 435,686$

45278  
 21785  
 23493

Op. Assets Rs 210,813  
 + Cash: 11418  
 + Other NO 140576  
 - Debt 109198  
 = Equity 253,628

Value/Share Rs 614

Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) =  $14.00\% (.747) + 8.09\% (0.253) = 12.50\%$

Growth declines to 5%  
 and cost of capital  
 moves to stable period  
 level.

Cost of Equity  
 14.00%

Cost of Debt  
 $(5\% + 4.25\% + 3\%)(1 - .3399)$   
 = 8.09%

Weights  
 E = 74.7% D = 25.3%

On April 1, 2010  
 Tata Motors price = Rs 781

Riskfree Rate:  
 Rs Riskfree Rate = 5%

+

Beta  
 1.20

X

Mature market  
 premium  
 4.5%

+

Lambda  
 0.80

X

Country Equity Risk  
 Premium  
 4.50%

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Unlevered Beta for  
 Sectors: 1.04

Firm's D/E  
 Ratio: 33%

Country Default  
 Spread  
 3%

X

Rel Equity  
 Mkt Vol  
 1.50

# Severstal: Valuation (June 2015)

	Company	Industry (US)	Industry (Global)
Revenue growth =	-5.63%	6.18%	5.82%
Pre-tax operating margin=	20.97%	4.61%	4.83%
Sales to capital ratio =	2.01	2.03	1.25
Return on invested capital=	13.44%	8.04%	5.22%
Cost of capital =		6.78%	7.51%

Revenue growth of **-2%** a year for 5 years, moving back up to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin decreases to **15%** over time.

Sales to capital ratio of **2.0**

**Stable Growth**  
 g = 2.5%  
 Cost of capital = 8.0%  
 ROC= 8.0%;  
 Reinvestment Rate=2.5%/8% = 37.5%

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> = 616 / (.08 - .025) = \$11,206

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenue growth rate		-2.00%	-2.00%	-2.00%	-2.00%	-2.00%	-1.10%	-0.20%	0.70%	1.60%	2.50%
Revenues	\$ 8,903	\$8,725	\$8,550	\$8,379	\$8,212	\$8,047	\$7,959	\$7,943	\$7,999	\$8,127	\$8,330
EBIT (Operating) margin	20.97%	20.37%	19.77%	19.18%	18.58%	17.98%	17.39%	16.79%	16.19%	15.60%	15.00%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 1,867	\$1,777	\$1,691	\$1,607	\$1,526	\$1,447	\$1,384	\$1,334	\$1,295	\$1,267	\$1,249
Tax rate	22.94%	22.94%	22.94%	22.94%	22.94%	22.94%	24.35%	25.76%	27.18%	28.59%	30.00%
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 1,438	\$1,370	\$1,303	\$1,238	\$1,176	\$1,115	\$1,047	\$ 990	\$ 943	\$ 905	\$ 875
- Reinvestment		\$ (89)	\$ (87)	\$ (86)	\$ (84)	\$ (82)	\$ (44)	\$ (8)	\$ 28	\$ 64	\$ 102
FCFF		\$1,459	\$1,390	\$1,324	\$1,260	\$1,197	\$1,091	\$ 998	\$ 915	\$ 841	\$ 773

**Year 11**  
 EBIT (1-t) 896  
 - Reinv 280  
 FCFF 616

Operating assets \$12,258  
 + Cash & CH 1,623  
 - Debt 2,987  
 - Minority Interests 18  
 Value of equity 10,877  
 / No of shares 837.72  
 Value/share \$12.98

Cost of capital = 11.14% (.761) + 3.57% (.239) = 9.35%

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10

**Cost of Equity**  
11.14%

**Cost of Debt**  
 Bond rating: BB+  
 (2.5%+2.75%)(1-.30) = 3.68%

**Weights**  
 E = 76.1% D = 23.9%

In June 2015, the stock was trading at \$12.35/share.

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 Riskfree rate = 2.5%

**Beta**  
1.07

**ERP**  
8.08%

D/E=31.41%

Business	Proportion	Unlevered Beta
Steel	69.82%	0.79
Metals & Mining	30.18%	1.07
Company		0.88

Region	Weight	ERP
Eastern Europe & Russia	45.82%	9.08%
Western Europe	33.96%	6.88%
Asia	11.96%	7.26%
Middle East	4.32%	6.85%
Central and South America	2.11%	9.95%
Africa	1.82%	11.73%
Total	100.00%	8.08%

Asw


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**DCF INPUTS**

“Garbage in, garbage out”

# I. Measure earnings right..



# Operating Leases at Amgen in 2007

- Amgen has lease commitments and its cost of debt (based on its A rating) is 5.63%.

Year	Commitment	Present Value
1	\$96.00	\$90.88
2	\$95.00	\$85.14
3	\$102.00	\$86.54
4	\$98.00	\$78.72
5	\$87.00	\$66.16
6-12	\$107.43	\$462.10 (\$752 million prorated)

- Debt Value of leases = \$869.55
- Debt outstanding at Amgen = \$7,402 + \$ 870 = \$8,272 million
- Adjusted Operating Income = Stated OI + Lease expense this year – Depreciation  
= 5,071 m + 69 m - 870/12 = \$5,068 million (12 year life for assets)
- Approximate Operating income= stated OI + PV of Lease commitment \* Pre-tax cost of debt  
= \$5,071 m + 870 m (.0563) = \$ 5,120 million

# Capitalizing R&D Expenses: Amgen

- R & D was assumed to have a 10-year life.

Year	R&D Expense	Unamortized portion	Amortization this year	
Current	3366.00	1.00	3366.00	
-1	2314.00	0.90	2082.60	\$231.40
-2	2028.00	0.80	1622.40	\$202.80
-3	1655.00	0.70	1158.50	\$165.50
-4	1117.00	0.60	670.20	\$111.70
-5	865.00	0.50	432.50	\$86.50
-6	845.00	0.40	338.00	\$84.50
-7	823.00	0.30	246.90	\$82.30
-8	663.00	0.20	132.60	\$66.30
-9	631.00	0.10	63.10	\$63.10
-10	558.00	0.00	0.00	\$55.80
Value of Research Asset =			\$10,112.80	\$1,149.90

- Adjusted Operating Income = \$5,120 + 3,366 - 1,150 = \$7,336 million



## II. Get the big picture (not the accounting one) when it comes to cap ex and working capital

- Capital expenditures should include
  - ▣ Research and development expenses, once they have been re-categorized as capital expenses.
  - ▣ Acquisitions of other firms, whether paid for with cash or stock.
- Working capital should be defined not as the difference between current assets and current liabilities but as the difference between non-cash current assets and non-debt current liabilities.
- On both items, start with what the company did in the most recent year but do look at the company's history and at industry averages.

# Amgen's Net Capital Expenditures

- The accounting net cap ex at Amgen is small:
  - ▣ Accounting Capital Expenditures = \$1,218 million
  - ▣ - Accounting Depreciation = \$ 963 million
  - ▣ Accounting Net Cap Ex = \$ 255 million
- We define capital expenditures broadly to include R&D and acquisitions:
  - ▣ Accounting Net Cap Ex = \$ 255 million
  - ▣ Net R&D Cap Ex = (3366-1150) = \$2,216 million
  - ▣ Acquisitions in 2006 = \$3,975 million
  - ▣ Total Net Capital Expenditures = \$ 6,443 million
- Acquisitions have been a volatile item. Amgen was quiet on the acquisition front in 2004 and 2005 and had a significant acquisition in 2003.

### III. The government bond rate is not always the risk free rate


- When valuing Amgen in US dollars, the US\$ ten-year bond rate of 4.78% was used as the risk free rate. We assumed that the US treasury was default free.
- When valuing Tata Motors in Indian rupees in 2010, the Indian government bond rate of 8% was not default free. Using the Indian government's local currency rating of Ba2 yielded a default spread of 3% for India and a riskfree rate of 5% in Indian rupees.

$$\text{Risk free rate in Indian Rupees} = 8\% - 3\% = 5\%$$

- To estimate a risk free rate in Russian Rubles in January 2015, you would have to start with the Russian government bond rate in rubles and back out the default spread for Russia.
  - ▣ Government bond rate in rubles = 14.09%
  - ▣ Default spread in rubles = 1.90%
  - ▣ Risk free rate in rubles = 12.19%

# Risk free rates will vary across currencies!


Riskfree Rates: January 2015



# But valuations should not!


	In Indian Rupees	In US \$
Risk free Rate	5.00%	2.00%
Expected inflation rate	4.00%	1.00%
Cost of capital		
- High Growth	12.50%	9.25%
- Stable Growth	10.39%	7.21%
Expected growth rate		
- High Growth	12.01%	8.78%
- Stable Growth	5.00%	2.00%
Return on Capital		
- High Growth	17.16%	13.78%
- Stable Growth	10.39%	7.21%
Value per share	Rs 614	\$12.79/share (roughly Rs 614 at current exchange rate)

# IV. Betas do not come from regressions... and are noisy...




# Look better for some companies, but not if run against narrow indices

<HELP> for explanation, <MENU> for similar functions.




# Determinants of Betas





# Bottom-up Betas



# Three examples...

- Amgen

- The unlevered beta for pharmaceutical firms is 1.59. Using Amgen's debt to equity ratio of 11%, the bottom up beta for Amgen is
- Bottom-up Beta =  $1.59 (1 + (1 - .35)(.11)) = 1.73$

- Tata Motors


- The unlevered beta for automobile firms is 0.98. Using Tata Motor's debt to equity ratio of 33.87%, the bottom up beta for Tata Motors is
- Bottom-up Beta =  $0.98 (1 + (1 - .3399)(.3387)) = 1.20$

- Severstal

<i>Business</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Unlevered Beta</i>
Steel	69.82%	0.79
Metals & Mining	30.18%	1.07
Company		0.88


# V. And the past is not always a good indicator of the future

	Arithmetic Average		Geometric Average	
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2014	8.00%	6.25%	6.11%	4.60%
	2.17%	2.32%		
1965-2014	6.19%	4.12%	4.84%	3.14%
	2.42%	2.74%		
2005-2014	7.94%	4.06%	6.18%	2.73%
	6.05%	8.65%		




# Implied Premiums in the US: 1960-2014

*Implied Premium for US Equity Market: 1960-2014*



# The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from September 12, 2008 to January 1, 2009



# Implied Premium for India using the Sensex: April 2010

- Level of the Index = 17559
- FCFE on the Index = 3.5% (Estimated FCFE for companies in index as % of market value of equity)
- Other parameters
  - Riskfree Rate = 5% (Rupee)
  - Expected Growth (in Rupee)
    - Next 5 years = 20% (Used expected growth rate in Earnings)
    - After year 5 = 5%
- Solving for the expected return:
  - Expected return on Equity = 11.72%
  - Implied Equity premium for India =  $11.72\% - 5\% = 6.72\%$

# Emerging versus Developed Markets: Implied Equity Risk Premiums

$$PBV = \frac{(Return\ on\ equity - Expected\ growth\ rate)}{(Cost\ of\ equity - Expected\ growth\ rate)}$$

$$Cost\ of\ Equity = \frac{(ROE - Expected\ growth\ rate)}{PBV} + Expected\ growth\ rate$$

	<i>PBV- Developed</i>	<i>PBV - Emerging</i>	<i>ROE - Developed</i>	<i>ROE- Emerging</i>	<i>T.Bond rate</i>	<i>Cost of equity (Developed)</i>	<i>Cost of equity (Emerging)</i>	<i>Differential</i>
2004	2.00	1.19	10.81%	11.65%	4.22%	7.52%	10.46%	2.95%
2005	2.09	1.27	11.12%	11.93%	4.39%	7.61%	10.33%	2.72%
2006	2.03	1.44	11.32%	12.18%	4.70%	7.96%	9.89%	1.93%
2007	1.67	1.67	10.87%	12.88%	4.02%	8.12%	9.33%	1.20%
2008	0.87	0.83	9.42%	11.12%	2.21%	10.50%	12.94%	2.45%
2009	1.20	1.34	8.48%	11.02%	3.84%	7.71%	9.20%	1.49%
2010	1.39	1.43	9.14%	11.22%	3.29%	7.50%	8.84%	1.34%
2011	1.12	1.08	9.21%	10.04%	1.88%	8.42%	9.44%	1.01%
2012	1.17	1.18	9.10%	9.33%	1.76%	8.03%	8.18%	0.14%
Jun-13	1.17	1.17	8.79%	9.37%	2.55%	7.88%	8.38%	0.50%

## VI. There is a downside to globalization...

- Emerging markets offer growth opportunities but they are also riskier. If we want to count the growth, we have to also consider the risk.
- Two ways of estimating the country risk premium:
  - Sovereign Default Spread: In this approach, the country equity risk premium is set equal to the default spread of the bond issued by the country.
    - Equity Risk Premium for mature market = 4.50%
    - Default Spread for India = 3.00% (based on rating)
    - Equity Risk Premium for India = 4.50% + 3.00%
  - Adjusted for equity risk: The country equity risk premium is based upon the volatility of the equity market relative to the government bond rate.
    - Country risk premium =  $\text{Default Spread} \times \frac{\text{Std Deviation}_{\text{Country Equity}}}{\text{Std Deviation}_{\text{Country Bond}}}$
    - Standard Deviation in Sensex = 21%
    - Standard Deviation in Indian government bond = 14%
    - Default spread on Indian Bond = 2%
    - Additional country risk premium for India =  $2\% \times (21/14) = 3\%$
    - Total equity risk premium = US equity risk premium + CRP for India = 6% + 3% = 9%



# Russia's Country Risk Premium

- Default Spread for Indonesia in June 2015
  - ▣ CDS Spread for Russia in June 2015 = 2.17%
  - ▣ Spread based upon Russia's Ba1 rating = 2.50%
- Relative Volatility
  - ▣ Standard deviation in Russian equities = 18.00%
  - ▣ Standard deviation in Russian Government Bond = 11.00%
  - ▣ Relative standard deviation =  $18\%/11\% = 1.64$  (approximately)
  - ▣ Country risk premium for Russia =  $2.5\% (1.64) = 4.10\%$
  - ▣ If you use the average relative volatility measure across all emerging markets (about 1.50), country risk premium =  $2.50\% (1.50) = 3.75\%$
- Estimating equity risk premium for Russia
  - ▣ Mature market premium on June 1, 2015 = 5.75% (US S&P 500)
  - ▣ Country risk premium for Russia = 3.75%
  - ▣ Total Equity risk premium for Russia =  $5.75\% + 3.75\% = 9.50\%$

# ERP : Jan 2015

Andorra	8.15%	2.40%	Italy	8.60%	2.85%
Austria	5.75%	0.00%	Jersey	6.35%	0.60%
Belgium	6.65%	0.90%	Liechtenstein	5.75%	0.00%
Cyprus	15.50%	9.75%	Luxembourg	5.75%	0.00%
Denmark	5.75%	0.00%	Malta	7.55%	1.80%
Finland	5.75%	0.00%	Netherlands	5.75%	0.00%
France	6.35%	0.60%	Norway	5.75%	0.00%
Germany	5.75%	0.00%	Portugal	9.50%	3.75%
Greece	17.00%	11.25%	Spain	8.60%	2.85%
Guernsey	6.35%	0.60%	Sweden	5.75%	0.00%
Iceland	9.05%	3.30%	Switzerland	5.75%	0.00%
Ireland	8.15%	2.40%	Turkey	9.05%	3.30%
Isle of Man	6.35%	0.60%	UK	6.35%	0.60%
			<b>W. Europe</b>	<b>6.88%</b>	<b>1.13%</b>

Albania	12.50%	6.75%	Montenegro	11.15%	5.40%
Armenia	10.25%	4.50%	Poland	7.03%	1.28%
Azerbaijan	9.05%	3.30%	Romania	9.05%	3.30%
Belarus	15.50%	9.75%	Russia	8.60%	2.85%
Bosnia	15.50%	.75%	Serbia	12.50%	6.75%
Bulgaria	8.60%	2.85%	Slovakia	7.03%	1.28%
Croatia	9.50%	3.75%	Slovenia	9.50%	3.75%
Czech Repub	6.80%	1.05%	Ukraine	20.75%	15.00%
Estonia	6.80%	1.05%	<b>E. Europe</b>	<b>9.08%</b>	<b>3.33%</b>

Canada	5.75%	0.00%
US	5.75%	0.00%
<b>North America</b>	<b>5.75%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>

Angola	10.25%	4.50%
Botswana	7.03%	1.28%
Burkina Faso	15.50%	9.75%
Cameroon	14.00%	8.25%
Cape Verde	14.00%	8.25%
Congo (DR)	15.50%	9.75%
Congo (Republic)	11.15%	5.40%
Côte d'Ivoire	12.50%	6.75%
Egypt	17.00%	11.25%
Ethiopia	12.50%	6.75%
Gabon	11.15%	5.40%
Ghana	14.00%	8.25%
Kenya	12.50%	6.75%
Morocco	9.50%	3.75%
Mozambique	12.50%	6.75%
Namibia	9.05%	3.30%
Nigeria	11.15%	5.40%
Rwanda	14.00%	8.25%
Senegal	12.50%	6.75%
South Africa	8.60%	2.85%
Tunisia	11.15%	5.40%
Uganda	12.50%	6.75%
Zambia	12.50%	6.75%
<b>Africa</b>	<b>11.73%</b>	<b>5.98%</b>

Georgia	11.15%	5.40%
Hungary	9.50%	3.75%
Kazakhstan	8.60%	2.85%
Latvia	8.15%	2.40%
Lithuania	8.15%	2.40%
Macedonia	11.15%	5.40%
Moldova	15.50%	9.75%

Abu Dhabi	6.50%	0.75%
Bahrain	8.60%	2.85%
Israel	6.80%	1.05%
Jordan	12.50%	6.75%
Kuwait	6.50%	0.75%
Lebanon	14.00%	8.25%
Oman	6.80%	1.05%
Qatar	6.50%	0.75%
Ras Al Khaimah	7.03%	1.28%
Saudi Arabia	6.65%	0.90%
Sharjah	7.55%	1.80%
UAE	6.50%	0.75%
<b>Middle East</b>	<b>6.85%</b>	<b>1.10%</b>


Bangladesh	11.15%	5.40%
Cambodia	14.00%	8.25%
China	6.65%	0.90%
Fiji	12.50%	6.75%
Hong Kong	6.35%	0.60%
India	9.05%	3.30%
Indonesia	9.05%	3.30%
Japan	6.80%	1.05%
Korea	6.65%	0.90%
Macao	6.50%	0.75%
Malaysia	7.55%	1.80%
Mauritius	8.15%	2.40%
Mongolia	14.00%	8.25%
Pakistan	17.00%	11.25%
Papua New Guinea	12.50%	6.75%
Philippines	8.60%	2.85%
Singapore	5.75%	0.00%
Sri Lanka	12.50%	6.75%
Taiwan	6.65%	0.90%
Thailand	8.15%	2.40%
Vietnam	12.50%	6.75%
<b>Asia</b>	<b>7.26%</b>	<b>1.51%</b>

Argentina	17.00%	11.25%
Belize	19.25%	13.50%
Bolivia	11.15%	5.40%
Brazil	8.60%	2.85%
Chile	6.65%	0.90%
Colombia	8.60%	2.85%
Costa Rica	9.50%	3.75%
Ecuador	15.50%	9.75%
El Salvador	11.15%	5.40%
Guatemala	9.50%	3.75%
Honduras	15.50%	9.75%
Mexico	7.55%	1.80%
Nicaragua	15.50%	9.75%
Panama	8.60%	2.85%
Paraguay	10.25%	4.50%
Peru	7.55%	1.80%
Suriname	11.15%	5.40%
Uruguay	8.60%	2.85%
Venezuela	17.00%	11.25%
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>9.95%</b>	<b>4.20%</b>

Black #: Total ERP  
 Red #: Country risk premium  
 AVG: GDP weighted average

Australia	5.75%	0.00%
Cook Islands	12.50%	6.75%
New Zealand	5.75%	0.00%
<b>Australia &amp; NZ</b>	<b>5.75%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>

# Russia country risk over time



## VII. And it is not just emerging market companies that are exposed to this risk..

- The “default” approach in valuation has been to assign country risk based upon your country of incorporation. Thus, if you are incorporated in a developed market, the assumption has been that you are not exposed to emerging market risks. If you are incorporated in an emerging market, you are saddled with the entire country risk.
- As companies globalize and look for revenues in foreign markets, this practice will under estimate the costs of equity of developed market companies with significant emerging market risk exposure and over estimate the costs of equity of emerging market companies with significant developed market risk exposure.

# One way of dealing with this: Operation-based ERP for Severstal

<i>Region</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>Weight</i>	<i>ERP</i>
Eastern Europe & Russia	\$3,744.00	45.82%	9.08%
Western Europe	\$2,775.00	33.96%	6.88%
Asia	\$977.00	11.96%	7.26%
Middle East	\$353.00	4.32%	6.85%
Central and South America	\$172.69	2.11%	9.95%
Africa	\$148.57	1.82%	11.73%
North America	\$0.00	0.00%	5.75%
Total	\$8,170.26	100.00%	8.08%

# An alternate way: Estimating a company's exposure to country risk (Lambda)


- **Just as beta measures exposure to macro economic risk, lambda measures exposure just to country risk. Like beta, it is scaled around one.**
- The easiest and most accessible data is on revenues. Most companies break their revenues down by region. One simplistic solution would be to do the following:

$$\text{Lambda} = \frac{\% \text{ of revenues domestically}_{\text{firm}}}{\% \text{ of revenues domestically}_{\text{average firm}}}$$

- In 2008-09, Tata Motors got about 91.37% of its revenues in India and TCS got 7.62%. The average Indian firm gets about 80% of its revenues in India:
  - ▣  $\text{Lambda}_{\text{Tata Motors}} = 91\%/80\% = 1.14$
  - ▣ The danger of focusing just on revenues is that it misses other exposures to risk (production and operations).

	<i>Tata Motors</i>	<i>TCS</i>
% of production/operations in India	High	High
% of revenues in India	91.37% (in 2009) Estimated 70% (in 2010)	7.62%
Lambda	0.80	0.20
Flexibility in moving operations	Low. Significant physical assets.	High. Human capital is mobile.

# VIII. Growth has to be earned (not endowed or estimated)



Adjust EBIT for

- a. Extraordinary or one-time expenses or income
- b. Operating leases and R&D
- c. Cyclical in earnings (Normalize)
- d. Acquisition Debris (Goodwill amortization etc.)

Use a marginal tax rate to be safe. A high ROC created by paying low effective taxes is not sustainable

$$ROC = \frac{EBIT (1 - \text{tax rate})}{\text{Book Value of Equity} + \text{Book value of debt} - \text{Cash}}$$

Adjust book equity for

1. Capitalized R&D
2. Acquisition Debris (Goodwill)


Adjust book value of debt for

- a. Capitalized operating leases

Use end of prior year numbers or average over the year but be consistent in your application


# Sounds simple, right? But companies seem to have trouble in practice

Excess Return (ROC minus Cost of Capital) for firms with market capitalization > \$50 million: Global in 2014





# IX. All good things come to an end..And the terminal value is not an ATM...



# Terminal Value and Growth

<i>Stable Growth Rate</i>	<i>Amgen</i>	<i>Tata Motors</i>	<i>Severstal</i>
0%	\$150,652	435,686₹	\$11,206
1%	\$154,479	435,686₹	\$11,206
2%	\$160,194	435,686₹	\$11,206
3%	\$167,784	435,686₹	
4%	\$179,099	435,686₹	
5%		435,686₹	
Risk free rate	4.78%	5.00%	2.50%
ROIC	10%	10.39%	8.00%
Cost of capital	8.08%	10.39%	8.00%




*Aswath Damodaran*

# THE LOOSE ENDS IN VALUATION...

Aswath Damodaran

# Getting from DCF to value per share: The Loose Ends



# 1. The Value of Cash


## An Exercise in Cash Valuation

	<i>Company A</i>	<i>Company B</i>	<i>Company C</i>
Enterprise Value	\$ 1 billion	\$ 1 billion	\$ 1 billion
Cash	\$ 100 mil	\$ 100 mil	\$ 100 mil
Return on Capital	10%	5%	22%
Cost of Capital	10%	10%	12%
Trades in	US	US	Argentina

- In which of these companies is cash most likely to trade at face value, at a discount and at a premium?

# Cash: Discount or Premium?

*Market Value of \$ 1 in cash:  
Estimates obtained by regressing Enterprise Value against Cash Balances*



## 2. Dealing with Holdings in Other firms

- Holdings in other firms can be categorized into
  - ▣ Minority passive holdings, in which case only the dividend from the holdings is shown in the balance sheet
  - ▣ Minority active holdings, in which case the share of equity income is shown in the income statements
  - ▣ Majority active holdings, in which case the financial statements are consolidated.
- We tend to be sloppy in practice in dealing with cross holdings. After valuing the operating assets of a firm, using consolidated statements, it is common to add on the balance sheet value of minority holdings (which are in book value terms) and subtract out the minority interests (again in book value terms), representing the portion of the consolidated company that does not belong to the parent company.

## How to value holdings in other firms.. In a perfect world..


- In a perfect world, we would strip the parent company from its subsidiaries and value each one separately. The value of the combined firm will be
  - ▣ Value of parent company + Proportion of value of each subsidiary
- To do this right, you will need to be provided detailed information on each subsidiary to estimate cash flows and discount rates.



# Two compromise solutions...

- The market value solution: When the subsidiaries are publicly traded, you could use their traded market capitalizations to estimate the values of the cross holdings. You do risk carrying into your valuation any mistakes that the market may be making in valuation.
- The relative value solution: When there are too many cross holdings to value separately or when there is insufficient information provided on cross holdings, you can convert the book values of holdings that you have on the balance sheet (for both minority holdings and minority interests in majority holdings) by using the average price to book value ratio of the sector in which the subsidiaries operate.

# Tata Motor's Cross Holdings



# Severstal: From operating assets to equity value

PV of cash flows during high growth =	\$7,501	61.19%		
PV of terminal value	\$4,757	38.81%		
Value of operating assets	\$12,258	<b>\$12,258</b>		
+ Cash		\$1,542		
+ Minority holdings		\$81		
Value of firm		\$13,881	<b>\$13,881</b>	
- Debt			\$2,987	
Value of equity in consolidated companies			\$10,895	<b>\$10,895</b>
- Value of minority interests				\$18
Value of equity in company				<b>\$10,877</b>

### 3. Other Assets that have not been counted yet..

- Unutilized assets: If you have assets or property that are not being utilized (vacant land, for example), you have not valued it yet. You can assess a market value for these assets and add them on to the value of the firm.
- Overfunded pension plans: If you have a defined benefit plan and your assets exceed your expected liabilities, you could consider the over funding with two caveats:
  - Collective bargaining agreements may prevent you from laying claim to these excess assets.
  - There are tax consequences. Often, withdrawals from pension plans get taxed at much higher rates.
- **Do not double count an asset.** If you count the income from an asset in your cash flows, you cannot count the market value of the asset in your value.

# The “real estate” play

- Assume that Severstal owns valuable real estate worth \$500 million, underlying its plants, mines and office buildings. Can you add this value on to your DCF value?
  - a. Yes.
  - b. No.
  - c. Depends
- What would you do if the value of the land under the plant exceeds the present value that you have estimated for them as manufacturing facilities?
  - a. Nothing
  - b. Use the higher of the two values
  - c. Use the lower of the two values
  - d. Use a weighted average of the two values

## 4. A Discount for Complexity: An Experiment

	Company A	Company B
Operating Income	\$ 1 billion	\$ 1 billion
Tax rate	40%	40%
ROIC	10%	10%
Expected Growth	5%	5%
Cost of capital	8%	8%
Business Mix	Single	Multiple Businesses
Holdings	Simple	Complex
Accounting	Transparent	Opaque

□ Which firm would you value more highly?

# Measuring Complexity: Volume of Data in Financial Statements

<i>Company</i>	<i>Number of pages in last 10Q</i>	<i>Number of pages in last 10K</i>
General Electric	65	410
Microsoft	63	218
Wal-mart	38	244
Exxon Mobil	86	332
Pfizer	171	460
Citigroup	252	1026
Intel	69	215
AIG	164	720
Johnson & Johnson	63	218
IBM	85	353

# Measuring Complexity: A Complexity Score

Item	Factors	Follow-up Question	Answer	Weighting factor	Gerdau Score	GE Score
Operating Income	1. Multiple Businesses	Number of businesses (with more than 10% of revenues) =	1	2.00	2	30
	2. One-time income and expenses	Percent of operating income =	10%	10.00	1	0.8
	3. Income from unspecified sources	Percent of operating income =	0%	10.00	0	1.2
	4. Items in income statement that are volatile	Percent of operating income =	15%	5.00	0.75	1
Tax Rate	1. Income from multiple locales	Percent of revenues from non-domestic locales =	70%	3.00	2.1	1.8
	2. Different tax and reporting books	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Headquarters in tax havens	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
	4. Volatile effective tax rate	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	0
Capital Expenditures	1. Volatile capital expenditures	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
	2. Frequent and large acquisitions	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=4	4	4
	3. Stock payment for acquisitions and investments	Yes or No	No	Yes=4	0	4
Working capital	1. Unspecified current assets and current liabilities	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
	2. Volatile working capital items	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
Expected Growth rate	1. Off-balance sheet assets and liabilities (operating leases and R&D)	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	2. Substantial stock buybacks	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Changing return on capital over time	Is your return on capital volatile?	Yes	Yes=5	5	5
	4. Unsustainably high return	Is your firm's ROC much higher than industry average?	No	Yes=5	0	0
Cost of capital	1. Multiple businesses	Number of businesses (more than 10% of revenues) =	1	1.00	1	20
	2. Operations in emerging markets	Percent of revenues=	50%	5.00	2.5	2.5
	3. Is the debt market traded?	Yes or No	No	No=2	2	0
	4. Does the company have a rating?	Yes or No	Yes	No=2	0	0
	5. Does the company have off-balance sheet debt?	Yes or No	No	Yes=5	0	5
No-operating assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	0%	20.00	0	0.8
Firm to Equity value	Consolidation of subsidiaries	Minority interest as percent of book value of equity	63%	20.00	12.6	1.2
Per share value	Shares with different voting rights	Does the firm have shares with different voting rights?	Yes	Yes = 10	10	0
	Equity options outstanding	Options outstanding as percent of shares	0%	10.00	0	0.56
Complexity Score =					48.95	90.55



# Dealing with Complexity

## □ In Discounted Cashflow Valuation


- The Aggressive Analyst: Trust the firm to tell the truth and value the firm based upon the firm's statements about their value.
- The Conservative Analyst: Don't value what you cannot see.
- The Compromise: Adjust the value for complexity
  - Adjust cash flows for complexity
  - Adjust the discount rate for complexity
  - Adjust the expected growth rate/ length of growth period
  - Value the firm and then discount value for complexity

## □ In relative valuation

- In a relative valuation, you may be able to assess the price that the market is charging for complexity:
- With the hundred largest market cap firms, for instance:

$$\text{PBV} = 0.65 + 15.31 \text{ ROE} - 0.55 \text{ Beta} + 3.04 \text{ Expected growth rate} - 0.003 \# \text{ Pages in 10K}$$

# 5. The Value of Synergy



# Valuing Synergy

- (1) the firms involved in the merger are valued independently, by discounting expected cash flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm.
- (2) the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, is obtained by adding the values obtained for each firm in the first step.
- (3) The effects of synergy are built into expected growth rates and cashflows, and the combined firm is re-valued with synergy.

$$\text{Value of Synergy} = \text{Value of the combined firm, with synergy} - \text{Value of the combined firm, without synergy}$$

# Valuing Synergy: P&G + Gillette

*Assume that \$250 million in operating expenses will be cut immediately. Translates into an after-tax increase in operating income of approximately \$158 million.*

	P&G	Gillette	Piglet: No Synergy	Piglet: Synergy
Free Cashflow to Equity	\$5,864.74	\$1,547.50	\$7,412.24	\$7,569.73
Growth rate for first 5 years	12%	10%	11.58%	12.50%
Growth rate after five years	4%	4%	4.00%	4.00%
Beta	0.90	0.80	0.88	0.88
Cost of Equity	7.90%	7.50%	7.81%	7.81%
Value of Equity	\$221,292	\$59,878	\$281,170	\$298,355

*Assume that the combined company will grow at a faster rate (for the next decade) starting immediately.*

## 6. Brand name, great management, superb product ...Are we short changing intangibles?

- There is often a temptation to add on premiums for intangibles. Here are a few examples.
  - ▣ Brand name
  - ▣ Great management
  - ▣ Loyal workforce
  - ▣ Technological prowess
- There are two potential dangers:
  - ▣ For some assets, the value may already be in your value and adding a premium will be double counting.
  - ▣ For other assets, the value may be ignored but incorporating it will not be easy.

# Valuing Brand Name

	<b>Coca Cola</b>	<b>With Cott Margins</b>
Current Revenues =	\$21,962.00	\$21,962.00
Length of high-growth period	10	10
Reinvestment Rate =	50%	50%
Operating Margin (after-tax)	15.57%	5.28%
Sales/Capital (Turnover ratio)	1.34	1.34
Return on capital (after-tax)	20.84%	7.06%
Growth rate during period (g) =	10.42%	3.53%
Cost of Capital during period =	7.65%	7.65%
Stable Growth Period		
Growth rate in steady state =	4.00%	4.00%
Return on capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Reinvestment Rate =	52.28%	52.28%
Cost of Capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Value of Firm =	\$79,611.25	\$15,371.24

## 7. Be circumspect about defining debt for cost of capital purposes...

- General Rule: Debt generally has the following characteristics:
  - ▣ Commitment to make fixed payments in the future
  - ▣ The fixed payments are tax deductible
  - ▣ Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the firm to the party to whom payments are due.
- Defined as such, debt should include
  - ▣ All interest bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term
  - ▣ All leases, operating as well as capital
- Debt should not include
  - ▣ Accounts payable or supplier credit

## But should consider other potential liabilities when getting to equity value...


- If you have under funded pension fund or health care plans, you should consider the under funding at this stage in getting to the value of equity.
  - ▣ If you do so, you should not double count by also including a cash flow line item reflecting cash you would need to set aside to meet the unfunded obligation.
  - ▣ You should not be counting these items as debt in your cost of capital calculations....
- If you have contingent liabilities - for example, a potential liability from a lawsuit that has not been decided - you should consider the expected value of these contingent liabilities
  - ▣ Value of contingent liability = Probability that the liability will occur \* Expected value of liability




## 8. The Value of Control

- The value of the control premium that will be paid to acquire a block of equity will depend upon two factors -
  - Probability that control of firm will change: This refers to the probability that incumbent management will be replaced. this can be either through acquisition or through existing stockholders exercising their muscle.
  - Value of Gaining Control of the Company: The value of gaining control of a company arises from two sources - the increase in value that can be wrought by changes in the way the company is managed and run, and the side benefits and perquisites of being in control
  - Value of Gaining Control = Present Value (Value of Company with change in control - Value of company without change in control) + Side Benefits of Control

*Increase Cash Flows*




*Reduce the cost of capital*




**Firm Value**

*Increase Expected Growth*



*Increase length of growth period*



# Adris Grupa (Status Quo): 4/2010

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 436 HRK  
 - Nt CpX 3 HRK  
 - Chg WC -118 HRK  
 = FCFF 551 HRK  
 Reinv Rate = (3-118)/436 = -26.35%;  
 Tax rate = 17.35%  
 Return on capital = 8.72%

Average from 2004-09  
70.83%

Reinvestment Rate  
70.83%

**Expected Growth from new inv.**  
 $.7083 \cdot .0969 = 0.0686$   
 or 6.86%

Average from 2004-09  
9.69%

Return on Capital  
9.69%

**Stable Growth**  
 g = 4%; Beta = 0.80  
 Country Premium = 2%  
 Cost of capital = 9.92%  
 Tax rate = 20.00%  
 ROC = 9.92%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROC = 4/9.92 = 40.32\%$

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $365 / (.0992 - .04) = 6170$  HRK

Op. Assets 4312  
 + Cash: 1787  
 - Debt 141  
 - Minority int 465  
 = Equity 5,484  
 / (Common + Preferred shares)  
 Value non-voting share 335 HRK/share

Year	1	2	3	4	5	
EBIT (1-t)	HRK 466	HRK 498	HRK 532	HRK 569	HRK 608	
- Reinvestment	HRK 330	HRK 353	HRK 377	HRK 403	HRK 431	
FCFF	HRK 136	HRK 145	HRK 155	HRK 166	HRK 177	
						612 246 365


Discount at \$ Cost of Capital (WACC) = 10.7% (.974) + 5.40% (0.026) = 10.55%

**Cost of Equity 10.70%**

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.25\% + 0.5\% + 2\%)(1 - .20) = 5.40\%$

**Weights**  
 E = 97.4% D = 2.6%

On May 1, 2010  
 AG Pfd price = 279 HRK  
 AG Common = 345 HRK



# Adris Grupa: 4/2010 (Restructured)

**Increased ROIC to cost of capital**

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 436 HRK  
 - Nt CpX 3 HRK  
 - Chg WC -118 HRK  
 = FCFF 551 HRK  
 Reinv Rate = (3-118)/436 = -26.35%;  
 Tax rate = 17.35%  
 Return on capital = 8.72%

Average from 2004-09  
70.83%

Reinvestment Rate  
70.83%

**Expected Growth from new inv.**  
 $.7083 \times .01054 = 0.00745$   
 or 6.86%

Return on Capital  
10.54%

Stable Growth  
 $g = 4\%$ ; Beta = 0.80  
 Country Premium = 2%  
 Cost of capital = 9.65%  
 Tax rate = 20.00%  
 ROC = 9.94%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROC = 4/9.65 = 41.47\%$

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $367 / (.0965 - .04) = 6508$  HRK

HKR Cashflows

Op. Assets 4545  
 + Cash: 1787  
 - Debt 141  
 - Minority int 465  
 = Equity 5,735  
 Value/non-voting 334  
 Value/voting 362

Year	1	2	3	4	5	
EBIT (1-t)	HRK 469	HRK 503	HRK 541	HRK 581	HRK 623	628
- Reinvestment	HRK 332	HRK 356	HRK 383	HRK 411	HRK 442	246
FCFF	HRK 137	HRK 147	HRK 158	HRK 169	HRK 182	367

Discount at \$ Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.12% (.90) + 8.20% (0.10) = 10.55%

**Changed mix of debt and equity to optimal**

On May 1, 2010  
 AG Pfd price = 279 HRK  
 AG Common = 345 HRK

**Cost of Equity 11.12%**

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.25\% + 4\% + 2\%) (1 - .20) = 8.20\%$

**Weights**  
 E = 90 % D = 10 %

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 HRK Riskfree Rate = 4.25%

+

**Beta**  
0.75

x

**Mature market premium**  
4.5%

+

**Lambda**  
0.68

x

CRP for Croatia (3%)

**Lambda**  
0.42

x

CRP for Central Europe (3%)

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 0.68

Firm's D/E Ratio: 11.1%

Country Default Spread 2%

x

Rel Equity Mkt Vol 1.50

# Value of Control and the Value of Voting Rights

- Adris Grupa has two classes of shares outstanding: 9.616 million voting shares and 6.748 million non-voting shares.
- To value a non-voting share, we assume that all non-voting shares essentially have to settle for status quo value. All shareholders, common and preferred, get an equal share of the status quo value.

Status Quo Value of Equity = 5,484 million HKR

Value for a non-voting share =  $5484 / (9.616 + 6.748) = 334$  HKR/share

- To value a voting share, we first value control in Adris Grup as the difference between the optimal and the status quo value:

Value of control at Adris Grupa =  $5,735 - 5484 = 249$  million HKR

Value per voting share =  $334 \text{ HKR} + 249 / 9.616 = 362$  HKR


*Aswath Damodaran*



# THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING DIFFICULT-TO-VALUE COMPANIES



# The fundamental determinants of value...



# The Dark Side of Valuation...

- Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.
- The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value “difficult” companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:
  - Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses
  - Companies that don’t fit the accounting mold
  - Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or nationalization risk)




# Difficult to value companies...

- Across the life cycle:
  - Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.
  - Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change, history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.
  - Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.
- Across sectors
  - Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what's going on.
  - Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.
  - Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.
- Across the ownership cycle
  - Privately owned businesses: Exposure to firm specific risk and illiquidity bedevil valuations.
  - Venture Capital (VC) and private equity: Different equity investors, with different perceptions of risk.
  - Closely held public firms: Part private and part public, sharing the troubles of both.

# I. The challenge with young companies...

Figure 5.2: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

*Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/ service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.*




# Upping the ante.. Young companies in young businesses...

- When valuing a business, we generally draw on three sources of information
  - ▣ The firm's current financial statement
    - How much did the firm sell?
    - How much did it earn?
  - ▣ The firm's financial history, usually summarized in its financial statements.
    - How fast have the firm's revenues and earnings grown over time?
    - What can we learn about cost structure and profitability from these trends?
    - Susceptibility to macro-economic factors (recessions and cyclical firms)
  - ▣ The industry and comparable firm data
    - What happens to firms as they mature? (Margins.. Revenue growth... Reinvestment needs... Risk)
- It is when valuing these companies that you find yourself tempted by the dark side, where
  - ▣ "Paradigm shifts" happen...
  - ▣ New metrics are invented ...
  - ▣ The story dominates and the numbers lag...

# Amazon in January 2000

Sales to capital ratio and expected margin are retail industry average numbers

Stable Growth




Value of Op Assets \$ 15,170  
 + Cash \$ 26  
 = Value of Firm \$15,196  
 - Value of Debt \$ 349  
 = Value of Equity \$14,847  
 - Equity Options \$ 2,892  
 Value per share \$ 35.08

	150.00%	100.00%	75.00%	50.00%	30.00%	25.20%	20.40%	15.60%	10.80%	6.00%	Term. Year
Revenues	\$ 2,793	\$ 5,585	\$ 9,774	\$ 14,661	\$ 19,059	\$ 23,862	\$ 28,729	\$ 33,211	\$ 36,798	\$ 39,006	\$ 41,346
Operating Margin	-13.35%	-1.68%	4.16%	7.08%	8.54%	9.27%	9.64%	9.82%	9.91%	9.95%	10.00%
EBIT	-\$373	-\$94	\$407	\$1,038	\$1,628	\$2,212	\$2,768	\$3,261	\$3,646	\$3,883	\$4,135
EBIT(1-t)	-\$373	-\$94	\$407	\$871	\$1,058	\$1,438	\$1,799	\$2,119	\$2,370	\$2,524	\$2,688
- Reinvestment	\$600	\$967	\$1,420	\$1,663	\$1,543	\$1,688	\$1,721	\$1,619	\$1,363	\$961	\$155
FCFF	-\$931	-\$1,024	-\$989	-\$758	-\$408	-\$163	\$177	\$625	\$1,174	\$1,788	\$1,881


All existing options valued as options, using current stock price of \$84.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Forever
Cost of Equity	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.42%	11.94%	11.46%	10.98%	10.50%	
Cost of Debt	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	7.80%	7.75%	7.67%	7.50%	7.00%	
After-tax cost of debt	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	6.71%	5.20%	5.07%	5.04%	4.98%	4.88%	4.55%	
Cost of Capital	12.84%	12.84%	12.84%	12.83%	12.81%	12.13%	11.62%	11.08%	10.49%	9.61%	




Amazon was trading at \$84 in January 2000.

Pushed debt ratio to retail industry average of 15%.



# Lesson 1: Don't trust regression betas....




## Lesson 2: Work backwards and keep it simple...

Year	Revenue Growth	Sales	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)
Tr 12 mths		\$1,117	-36.71%	-\$410	-\$410
1	150.00%	\$2,793	-13.35%	-\$373	-\$373
2	100.00%	\$5,585	-1.68%	-\$94	-\$94
3	75.00%	\$9,774	4.16%	\$407	\$407
4	50.00%	\$14,661	7.08%	\$1,038	\$871
5	30.00%	\$19,059	8.54%	\$1,628	\$1,058
6	25.20%	\$23,862	9.27%	\$2,212	\$1,438
7	20.40%	\$28,729	9.64%	\$2,768	\$1,799
8	15.60%	\$33,211	9.82%	\$3,261	\$2,119
9	10.80%	\$36,798	9.91%	\$3,646	\$2,370
10	6.00%	\$39,006	9.95%	\$3,883	\$2,524
TY	6.00%	\$41,346	10.00%	\$4,135	\$2,688

# Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do...

Typically, the revenue growth rate of a newly public company outpaces its industry average for only about five years.



Source: Andrew Metrick

The New York Times

# Lesson 4: Don't forget to pay for growth...

Year	Revenues	Δ Revenue	Sales/Cap	Δ Investment	Invested Capital	EBIT (1-t)	Imputed ROC
Tr 12 mths	\$1,117				\$ 487	-\$410	
1	\$2,793	\$1,676	3.00	\$559	\$ 1,045	-\$373	-76.62%
2	\$5,585	\$2,793	3.00	\$931	\$ 1,976	-\$94	-8.96%
3	\$9,774	\$4,189	3.00	\$1,396	\$ 3,372	\$407	20.59%
4	\$14,661	\$4,887	3.00	\$1,629	\$ 5,001	\$871	25.82%
5	\$19,059	\$4,398	3.00	\$1,466	\$ 6,467	\$1,058	21.16%
6	\$23,862	\$4,803	3.00	\$1,601	\$ 8,068	\$1,438	22.23%
7	\$28,729	\$4,868	3.00	\$1,623	\$ 9,691	\$1,799	22.30%
8	\$33,211	\$4,482	3.00	\$1,494	\$ 11,185	\$2,119	21.87%
9	\$36,798	\$3,587	3.00	\$1,196	\$ 12,380	\$2,370	21.19%
10	\$39,006	\$2,208	3.00	\$736	\$ 13,116	\$2,524	20.39%
TY	\$41,346	\$2,340	NA		Assumed to be =		20.00%



# Lesson 5: There are always scenarios where the market price can be justified...

		Target pre-tax Operating Margin				
		6%	8%	10%	12%	14%
Compounded annual Revenue Growth rate	30%	\$ (1.94)	\$ 2.95	\$ 7.84	\$ 12.71	\$ 17.57
	35%	\$ 1.41	\$ 8.37	\$ 15.33	\$ 22.27	\$ 29.21
	40%	\$ 6.10	\$ 15.93	\$ 25.74	\$ 35.54	\$ 45.34
	45%	\$ 12.59	\$ 26.34	\$ 40.05	\$ 53.77	\$ 67.48
	50%	\$ 21.47	\$ 40.50	\$ 59.52	\$ 78.53	\$ 97.54
	55%	\$ 33.47	\$ 59.60	\$ 85.72	\$ 111.84	\$ 137.95
	60%	\$ 49.53	\$ 85.10	\$ 120.66	\$ 156.22	\$ 191.77

## Lesson 6: Don't forget to mop up...


- Watch out for “other” equity claims: If you buy equity in a young, growth company, watch out for other (often hidden) claims on the equity that don't take the form of common shares. In particular, watch for options granted to managers, employees, venture capitalists and others (you will be surprised...).
  - ▣ Value these options as options (not at exercise value)
  - ▣ Take into consideration expectations of future option grants when computing expected future earnings/cash flows.
- Not all shares are equal: If there are differences in cash flow claims (dividends or liquidation) or voting rights across shares, value these differences.
  - ▣ Voting rights matter even at well run companies

## Lesson 7: You will be wrong 100% of the time... and it really is not (always) your fault...

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- A test: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least over time).

# And the market is often “more wrong” ....

**Amazon: Value and Price**



# Valuing an IPO

## □ Valuation issues:

- Use of the proceeds from the offering: The proceeds from the offering can be held as cash by the firm to cover future investment needs, paid to existing equity investors who want to cash out or used to pay down debt.
- Warrants/ Special deals with prior equity investors: If venture capitalists and other equity investors from earlier iterations of fund raising have rights to buy or sell their equity at pre-specified prices, it can affect the value per share offered to the public.

## □ Pricing issues:

- Institutional set-up: Most IPOs are backed by investment banking guarantees on the price, which can affect how they are priced.
- Follow-up offerings: The proportion of equity being offered at initial offering and subsequent offering plans can affect pricing.

# Alibaba: Pre-IPO valuation - September 2, 2014 (in US \$)

	T12M	2012-13
Revenues	\$9,268	\$4,821
Operating Income	\$4,702	\$1,777
Effective tax rate	11.92%	
Operating Margin	50.73%	

Revenue growth of 25% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.63% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin decreases to 40% over time & tax rate rises to 25%

Sales to capital ratio maintained at 2.00

**Stable Growth**  
 $g = 2.41\%$   
 Cost of capital = 8%  
 ROC = 8%;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $2.41\%/8\% = 30.125\%$

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> =  $10,353 / (.08 - 0.0241) = \$185,198$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenue growth rate	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	20.48%	15.96%	11.45%	6.93%	2.41%
Revenues	\$ 11,585	\$ 14,481	\$ 18,101	\$ 22,626	\$ 28,283	\$ 34,075	\$ 39,515	\$ 44,038	\$ 47,089	\$ 48,224
EBIT (Operating margin)	49.66%	48.59%	47.51%	46.44%	45.37%	44.29%	43.22%	42.15%	41.07%	40.00%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 5,753	\$ 7,035	\$ 8,600	\$ 10,507	\$ 12,831	\$ 15,093	\$ 17,078	\$ 18,560	\$ 19,341	\$ 19,290
Tax rate	11.92%	11.92%	11.92%	11.92%	11.92%	14.54%	17.15%	19.77%	22.38%	25.00%
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 5,067	\$ 6,197	\$ 7,575	\$ 9,255	\$ 11,301	\$ 12,899	\$ 14,149	\$ 14,891	\$ 15,012	\$ 14,467
- Reinvestment	\$ 1,158	\$ 1,448	\$ 1,810	\$ 2,263	\$ 2,828	\$ 2,896	\$ 2,720	\$ 2,261	\$ 1,525	\$ 567
FCFF	\$ 3,908	\$ 4,749	\$ 5,765	\$ 6,992	\$ 8,473	\$ 10,002	\$ 11,429	\$ 12,630	\$ 13,486	\$ 13,900

Term yr  
 EBIT (1-t) \$14,816  
 - Reinv 4,463  
 FCFF 10,353

Operating assets \$137,386  
 + Cash 9330  
 - Debt 10068  
 + Equity investments 2,087  
 + Alipay provision 3,000  
 + IPO Proceeds (est) 20,000  
 - Options 696  
 Value of equity 161,039  
 Value per share \$65.98


Cost of capital =  $8.90\% (.943) + 3.00\% (.057) = 8.56\%$

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10

Cost of Equity 8.90%

Cost of Debt 4% (1-.25) = 3.00%

Weights  
 E = 94.3% D = 5.7%




Two days after this valuation, the company (and its bankers) valued itself at about \$155 billion and the shares at \$63 apiece. The offering price was raised to \$69 and the opening price was \$93/share.

## II. Mature Companies in transition..

- Mature companies are generally the easiest group to value. They have long, established histories that can be mined for inputs. They have investment policies that are set and capital structures that are stable, thus making valuation more grounded in past data.
- However, this stability in the numbers can mask real problems at the company. The company may be set in a process, where it invests more or less than it should and does not have the right financing mix. In effect, the policies are consistent, stable and bad.
- If you expect these companies to change or as is more often the case to have change thrust upon them,

# The perils of valuing mature companies...

Figure 7.1: Estimation Issues - Mature Companies





### Hormel Foods: The Value of Control Changing

Hormel Foods sells packaged meat and other food products and has been in existence as a publicly traded company for almost 80 years. In 2008, the firm reported after-tax operating income of \$315 million, reflecting a compounded growth of 5% over the previous 5 years.

#### The Status Quo

Run by existing management, with conservative reinvestment policies (reinvestment rate = 14.34% and debt ratio = 10.4%.

Anemic growth rate and short growth period, due to reinvestment policy

Low debt ratio affects cost of capital

Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	\$315							
1	\$324	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$62	\$262	6.79%	\$245
2	\$333	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$64	\$269	6.79%	\$236
3	\$342	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	\$65	\$276	6.79%	\$227
Beyond	\$350	2.35%	7.23%	32.52%	\$114	\$4,840	7.23%	\$3,974
Value of operating assets								\$4,682
(Add) Cash								\$155
(Subtract) Debt								\$491
(Subtract) Management Options								\$53
Value of equity in common stock								\$4,293
Value per share								\$31.91

#### New and better management

More aggressive reinvestment which increases the reinvestment rate (to 40%) and length of growth (to 5 years), and higher debt ratio (20%).

#### Operating Restructuring ①

Expected growth rate =  $ROC \times \text{Reinvestment Rate}$   
 Expected growth rate (status quo) =  $14.34\% \times 19.14\% = 2.75\%$   
 Expected growth rate (optimal) =  $14.00\% \times 40\% = 5.60\%$   
 ROC drops, reinvestment rises and growth goes up.

#### Financial restructuring ②

Cost of capital = Cost of equity (1-Debt ratio) + Cost of debt (Debt ratio)  
 Status quo =  $7.33\% (1-.104) + 3.60\% (1-.40) (.104) = 6.79\%$   
 Optimal =  $7.75\% (1-.20) + 3.60\% (1-.40) (.20) = 6.63\%$   
 Cost of equity rises but cost of capital drops.

Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	\$315							
1	\$333	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$133	\$200	6.63%	\$187
2	\$351	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$141	\$211	6.63%	\$185
3	\$371	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$148	\$223	6.63%	\$184
4	\$392	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$260	\$235	6.63%	\$182
5	\$414	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	\$223	\$248	6.63%	\$180
Beyond	\$423	2.35%	6.74%	34.87%	\$148	\$6,282	6.74%	\$4,557
Value of operating assets								\$5,475
(Add) Cash								\$155
(Subtract) Debt								\$491
(Subtract) Management Options								\$53
Value of equity in common stock								\$5,085
Value per share								\$37.80

Aswath Damodaran

Probability of management change = 10%  
 Expected value =  $\$31.91 (.90) + \$37.80 (.10) = \$32.50$


③

④

# Lesson 1: Cost cutting and increased efficiency are easier accomplished on paper than in practice...

## Cost-synergy estimation is better, but there are patterns emerging in the errors

Mergers achieving stated percentage of expected cost savings, percent  $N = 92$




Typical sources of estimation error

- Underestimating one-time costs
- Using benchmarks from noncomparable situations
- Not sanity-checking management estimates against precedent transactions
- Failing to ground estimates in bottom-up analysis (e.g., location-by-location review of overlaps)

Source: McKinsey (2002) Postmerger Management Practice client survey; client case studies


# Lesson 2: Increasing growth is not always an option (or at least not a good option)

**Modes of organic growth vary in value creation intensity—  
consumer goods industry**



# Lesson 3: Financial leverage is a double-edged sword..

Exhibit 7.1: Optimal Financing Mix: Hormel Foods in January 2009



# III. Dealing with decline and distress...

*Historical data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.*

*Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.*

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

*Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity*

What is the value of equity in the firm?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

*Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestiture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can change.*

When will the firm become a mature firm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.*

# Dealing with the “downside” of Distress

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will understate the value of the firm.
- Value of Equity= DCF value of equity (1 - Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
  - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
  - Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
  - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).

Current Revenue  
\$ 4,390

Current Margin:  
4.76%

EBIT  
\$ 209m

Reinvestment:  
Capital expenditures include cost of new casinos and working capital

Extended reinvestment break, due to investment in past

Industry average

Expected Margin:  
-> 17%

Stable Growth  
Stable Revenue Growth: 3%  
Stable Operating Margin: 17%  
Stable ROC=10%  
Reinvest 30% of EBIT(1-t)

Terminal Value =  $758 \cdot (.0743 \cdot .03)$   
= \$ 17,129

Value of Op Assets \$ 9,793  
+ Cash & Non-op \$ 3,040  
= Value of Firm \$ 12,833  
- Value of Debt \$ 7,565  
= Value of Equity \$ 5,268  
  
Value per share \$ 8.12

Revenues	\$4,434	\$4,523	\$5,427	\$6,513	\$7,815	\$8,206	\$8,616	\$9,047	\$9,499	\$9,974	
Oper margin	5.81%	6.86%	7.90%	8.95%	10%	11.40%	12.80%	14.20%	15.60%	17%	
EBIT	\$258	\$310	\$429	\$583	\$782	\$935	\$1,103	\$1,285	\$1,482	\$1,696	
Tax rate	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%	28.4%	30.8%	33.2%	35.6%	38.00%	
EBIT * (1 - t)	\$191	\$229	\$317	\$431	\$578	\$670	\$763	\$858	\$954	\$1,051	
- Reinvestment	-\$19	-\$11	\$0	\$22	\$58	\$67	\$153	\$215	\$286	\$350	
FCFF	\$210	\$241	\$317	\$410	\$520	\$603	\$611	\$644	\$668	\$701	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Beta	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	2.75	2.36	1.97	1.59	1.20	
Cost of equity	21.82%	21.82%	21.82%	21.82%	21.82%	19.50%	17.17%	14.85%	12.52%	10.20%	
Cost of debt	9%	9%	9%	9%	9%	8.70%	8.40%	8.10%	7.80%	7.50%	
Debt/ratio	73.50%	73.50%	73.50%	73.50%	73.50%	68.80%	64.10%	59.40%	54.70%	50.00%	
Cost of capital	9.88%	9.88%	9.88%	9.88%	9.88%	9.79%	9.50%	9.01%	8.32%	7.43%	

Term. Year  
\$10,273  
17%  
\$ 1,746  
38%  
\$1,083  
\$ 325  
\$758

Forever

Cost of Equity  
21.82%

Cost of Debt  
3%+6%= 9%  
9% (1-.38)=5.58%

Weights  
Debt= 73.5% ->50%

Riskfree Rate:  
T. Bond rate = 3%

+

Beta  
3.14-> 1.20

X

Risk Premium  
6%

Aswath Damodaran

Casino  
1.15

Current  
D/E: 277%

Base Equity  
Premium

Country Risk  
Premium

Las Vegas Sands  
February 2009  
Trading @ \$4.25

# Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..


- In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at \$529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:

$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1 - \pi_{\text{Distress}})^t}{(1.03)^t} + \frac{1000(1 - \pi_{\text{Distress}})^7}{(1.03)^7}$$

- Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:
- $\pi_{\text{Distress}}$  = Annual probability of default = 13.54%
  - ▣ Cumulative probability of surviving 10 years =  $(1 - .1354)^{10} = 23.34\%$
  - ▣ Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years =  $1 - .2334 = .7666$  or 76.66%
- If LVS is becomes distressed:
  - ▣ Expected distress sale proceeds = \$2,769 million < Face value of debt
  - ▣ Expected equity value/share = \$0.00
- Expected value per share =  $\$8.12 (1 - .7666) + \$0.00 (.7666) = \$1.92$



# The “sunny” side of distress: Equity as a call option to liquidate the firm



# Application to valuation: A simple example

- Assume that you have a firm whose assets are currently valued at \$100 million and that the standard deviation in this asset value is 40%.
- Further, assume that the face value of debt is \$80 million (It is zero coupon debt with 10 years left to maturity).
- If the ten-year treasury bond rate is 10%,
  - ▣ how much is the equity worth?
  - ▣ What should the interest rate on debt be?




# Firm value drops..

- Assume now that a catastrophe wipes out half the value of this firm (the value drops to \$ 50 million), while the face value of the debt remains at \$ 80 million.
- The inputs
  - Value of the underlying asset =  $S$  = Value of the firm = \$ 50 million
  - All the other inputs remain unchanged
- The output
  - Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
    - $d1 = 1.0515$                        $N(d1) = 0.8534$
    - $d2 = -0.2135$                        $N(d2) = 0.4155$
  - Value of the call =  $50 (0.8534) - 80 \exp^{(-0.10)(10)} (0.4155) = \$30.44$  million
  - Value of the bond =  $\$50 - \$30.44 = \$19.56$  million

# Equity value persists .. As firm value declines..

Value of Equity as Firm Value Changes



# IV. Valuing Financial Service Companies

*Existing assets are usually financial assets or loans, often marked to market. Earnings do not provide much information on underlying risk.*

*Defining capital expenditures and working capital is a challenge. Growth can be strongly influenced by regulatory limits and constraints. Both the amount of new investments and the returns on these investments can change with regulatory changes.*

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

What is the value added by growth assets?

When will the firm become a mature firm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

*Preferred stock is a significant source of capital.*

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

What is the value of equity in the firm?

*For financial service firms, debt is raw material rather than a source of capital. It is not only tough to define but if defined broadly can result in high financial leverage, magnifying the impact of small operating risk changes on equity risk.*

*In addition to all the normal constraints, financial service firms also have to worry about maintaining capital ratios that are acceptable to regulators. If they do not, they can be taken over and shut down.*


## 2b. Goldman Sachs: August 2008

### Rationale for model

Why dividends? Because FCFE cannot be estimated

Why 3-stage? Because the firm is behaving (reinvesting, growing) like a firm with potential.

Left return on equity at 2008 levels. well below 16% in 2007 and 20% in 2004-2006.



# Lesson 1: Financial service companies are opaque...

- With financial service firms, we enter into a Faustian bargain. They tell us very little about the quality of their assets (loans, for a bank, for instance are not broken down by default risk status) but we accept that in return for assets being marked to market (by accountants who presumably have access to the information that we don't have).
- In addition, estimating cash flows for a financial service firm is difficult to do. So, we trust financial service firms to pay out their cash flows as dividends. Hence, the use of the dividend discount model.



## Lesson 2: For financial service companies, book value matters...

- The book value of assets and equity is mostly irrelevant when valuing non-financial service companies. After all, the book value of equity is a historical figure and can be nonsensical. (The book value of equity can be negative and is so for more than a 1000 publicly traded US companies)
- With financial service firms, book value of equity is relevant for two reasons:
  - Since financial service firms mark to market, the book value is more likely to reflect what the firms own right now (rather than a historical value)
  - The regulatory capital ratios are based on book equity. Thus, a bank with negative or even low book equity will be shut down by the regulators.
- From a valuation perspective, it therefore makes sense to pay heed to book value. In fact, you can argue that reinvestment for a bank is the amount that it needs to add to book equity to sustain its growth ambitions and safety requirements:
  - $FCFE = \text{Net Income} - \text{Reinvestment in regulatory capital (book equity)}$

## 2d. Deutsche Bank: March 2009

### Last 2 years

	2007	2008
Net Income	3,954 m	-3,855m
Dividends	2,146 m	285 m
Risk adjusted assets =		312,882m
Book Equity =		31,914 m
Regulatory Capital =		

Normalized  
Net Income  
for base year  
3,000 m  
Normalized  
ROE = 9.4%

Expected  
growth in  
asset base  
4%

Target capital  
ratio 10%  
  
Target ROE  
10.2%

Stable Growth  
g = 3%; Beta = 1.00  
Cost of equity = 10.20%  
Return on equity = 10.20%;  
Reinvestment Rate =  $g/ROE$   
=  $3/10.20\% = 29.41\%$

### Cashflows

	1	2	3	4	5
Asset Base	325,398 €	338,414 €	351,950 €	366,028 €	380,669 €
Capital ratio	10.16%	10.12%	10.08%	10.04%	10.00%
Regulatory Capital	33,060 €	34,247 €	35,477 €	36,749 €	38,067 €
Change in capital	1,146 €	1,187 €	1,229 €	1,273 €	1,318 €
ROE	9.56%	9.72%	9.88%	10.04%	10.20%
Net Income	3,161 €	3,329 €	3,505 €	3,690 €	3,883 €
-Reinvestment	1,146 €	1,187 €	1,229 €	1,273 €	1,318 €
FCFE	2,014 €	2,142 €	2,276 €	2,417 €	2,565 €

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $2,823 / (.102 - .03) = 39,209$  m

3,999  
1,176  
2,823

PV of CF = 31,383 m  
/ # shares 581.85  
Value/Share 53.94 €

Discount at Cost of equity =  $3.60\% + 1.162 * 6\% + -0.60\% = 11.172\%$

In March 2009  
Deutsche Bank price = 48  
Euros/share (down from 89  
Euros in early 2008)

Riskfree Rate:  
Euro Riskfree Rate =  
3.6%

+

Beta  
1.162

X

Mature market  
premium  
6%

+


Region	Lambda	CRP
Western Europe	0.68	0.00%
United States	0.42	0.00%
Latin America	0.01	4.50%
Africa & Middle East	0.01	7.00%
Asia	0.11	3.50%
Eastern Europe	0.04	3.00%
Deutsche Bank		0.60%

Beta for commercial &  
Investment banking

Aswath Damodaran

# V. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies

*Company growth often comes from movements in the economic cycle, for cyclical firms, or commodity prices, for commodity companies.*



## Valuing a Cyclical Company - Toyota in Early 2009

Year	Revenues	Operating Incol	EBITDA	Operating Marg
FY1 1992	¥10,163,380	¥218,511	¥218,511	2.15%
FY1 1993	¥10,210,750	¥181,897	¥181,897	1.78%
FY1 1994	¥9,362,732	¥136,226	¥136,226	1.45%
FY1 1995	¥8,120,975	¥255,719	¥255,719	3.15%
FY1 1996	¥10,718,740	¥348,069	¥348,069	3.25%
FY1 1997	¥12,243,830	¥665,110	¥665,110	5.43%
FY1 1998	¥11,678,400	¥779,800	¥1,382,950	6.68%
FY1 1999	¥12,749,010	¥774,947	¥1,415,997	6.08%
FY1 2000	¥12,879,560	¥775,982	¥1,430,982	6.02%
FY1 2001	¥13,424,420	¥870,131	¥1,542,631	6.48%
FY1 2002	¥15,106,300	¥1,123,475	¥1,822,975	7.44%
FY1 2003	¥16,054,290	¥1,363,680	¥2,101,780	8.49%
FY1 2004	¥17,294,760	¥1,666,894	¥2,454,994	9.64%
FY1 2005	¥18,551,530	¥1,672,187	¥2,447,987	9.01%
FY1 2006	¥21,036,910	¥1,878,342	¥2,769,742	8.93%
FY1 2007	¥23,948,090	¥2,238,683	¥3,185,683	9.35%
FY1 2008	¥26,289,240	¥2,270,375	¥3,312,775	8.64%
FY 2009 (Estin	¥22,661,325	¥267,904	¥1,310,304	1.18%
		¥1,306,867		7.33%

In early 2009, Toyota Motors had the highest market share in the sector. However, the global economic recession in 2008-09 had pulled earnings down.

### Normalized Return on capital and Reinvestment <sup>②</sup>

Once earnings bounce back to normal, we assume that Toyota will be able to earn a return on capital equal to its cost of capital (5.09%). This is a sector, where earning excess returns has proved to be difficult even for the best of firms. To sustain a 1.5% growth rate, the reinvestment rate has to be:  
 Reinvestment rate =  $1.5\% / 5.09\%$   
 = 29.46%

### Normalized Earnings <sup>①</sup>

As a cyclical company, Toyota's earnings have been volatile and 2009 earnings reflect the troubled global economy. We will assume that when economic growth returns, the operating margin for Toyota will revert back to the historical average.

$$\text{Normalized Operating Income} = \text{Revenues in 2009} * \text{Average Operating Margin (98--09)}$$

$$= 22661 * .0733 = 1660.7 \text{ billion yen}$$

Operating Assets	19,640
+ Cash	2,288
+ Non-operating assets	6,845
- Debt	11,862
- Minority Interests	583
Value of Equity	
/ No of shares	/3,448
Value per share	¥4735

$$\text{Value of operating assets} = \frac{1660.7 (1.015) (1 - .407) (1 - .2946)}{(.0509 - .015)} = 19,640 \text{ billion}$$

### Normalized Cost of capital <sup>③</sup>

The cost of capital is computed using the average beta of automobile companies (1.10), and Toyota's cost of debt (3.25%) and debt ratio (52.9% debt ratio). We use the Japanese marginal tax rate of 40.7% for computing both the after-tax cost of debt and the after-tax operating income

$$\text{Cost of capital} = (1.10 * 0.529 * 0.593) + 3.25\% (1 - 0.407) = 5.09\%$$

### Stable Growth <sup>④</sup>

Once earnings are normalized, we assume that Toyota, as the largest market-share company, will be able to maintain only stable growth (1.5% in Yen terms)

## Valuing Lukoil in April 2015 (in US dollars)

Let's start with some history & estimate what a normalized year will look like

**Earnings Update**  
Lukoil reported lower earnings in 2014, but seems to be holding up, given oil price drop.

Year	Operating Income (\$)	Effective tax rate	BV of Debt	BV of Equity	Cash	Invested capital	ROIC
2010	\$11,896	20.50%	\$11,323	\$56,379	\$2,349	\$65,353	14.47%
2011	\$14,818	25.10%	\$11,194	\$59,608	\$2,536	\$68,266	16.26%
2012	\$14,040	20.39%	\$9,092	\$67,466	\$2,910	\$73,648	15.18%
2013	\$12,808	27.07%	\$6,621	\$74,188	\$3,200	\$77,609	12.04%
2014	\$8,879	30.39%	\$10,821	\$78,855	\$2,075	\$87,601	7.06%
<b>Average</b>	<b>\$12,488</b>	<b>24.69%</b>					<b>13.00%</b>

**Governance**  
Lukoil seems to be focused on keeping investors informed. No overt power grabs (yet).

Estimate the costs of equity & capital for Lukoil

Business	Unlevered beta	Proportion of value	D/E ratio	Levered beta
Integrated Petroleum	1.17	100.00%	34.33%	1.4913
<b>Lukoil</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>100%</b>	34.33%	1.4913

Region	Exploration & Drilling	% of total	ERP
Russia	77661	86%	8.60%
Rest of the world	12648	14%	7.18%
<b>Lukoil</b>	<b>90309</b>		<b>8.40%</b>

Riskfree Rate	2.00%
Default Spread for Russia	2.50%
Default spread for Lukoil	2.00%
Cost of debt for Lukoil (pre-tax)	6.50%

Oil sector's beta has increased in 2015.

The Ukraine crisis continues to cast a pall, but it seems to have receded for the moment. ERP & Default Spreads are updated.

$$\text{Cost of equity} = 2.00\% + 1.4913 (8.40\%) = 14.24\%$$

$$\text{Cost of capital} = 14.24\% (.7656) + 6.50\% (1-.20) (.2344) = 12.12\%$$

Assume that the company is in stable growth, growing 1.5% a year in perpetuity, with the last 12 months as the base year for operating income and assuming return on capital = cost of capital in perpetuity. (Effective tax rate of 30.39% used for earnings)

$$\text{Reinvestment Rate} = \frac{\text{Expected growth rate}}{\text{Return on Capital}} = \frac{1.50\%}{12.12\%} = 12.38\%$$

$$\text{Value of Operating Assets} = \frac{\$8,879 (1.015) (1-.3039)(1-.1238)}{(.122 - .015)} = \$58,403$$

Value of operating assets	= \$ 51,767
+ Cash & Equity in Affiliates	= \$ 3,004
- Debt & Minority Interests	= \$ 13,529
Value of equity	= \$ 41,242
Value per share	= \$ <b>48.49</b>
Stock price (4/15/15)	= \$ 51.96

Aswath Damodaran

# Lesson 1: With “macro” companies, it is easy to get lost in “macro” assumptions...

- With cyclical and commodity companies, it is undeniable that the value you arrive at will be affected by your views on the economy or the price of the commodity.
- Consequently, you will feel the urge to take a stand on these macro variables and build them into your valuation. Doing so, though, will create valuations that are jointly impacted by your views on macro variables and your views on the company, and it is difficult to separate the two.
- The best (though not easiest) thing to do is to separate your macro views from your micro views. Use current market based numbers for your valuation, but then provide a separate assessment of what you think about those market numbers.

## Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a function of macro variables...


- If there is a key macro variable affecting the value of your company that you are uncertain about (and who is not), why not quantify the uncertainty in a distribution (rather than a single price) and use that distribution in your valuation.
- That is exactly what you do in a Monte Carlo simulation, where you allow one or more variables to be distributions and compute a distribution of values for the company.
- With a simulation, you get not only everything you would get in a standard valuation (an estimated value for your company) but you will get additional output (on the variation in that value and the likelihood that your firm is under or over valued)

# Lukoil Valuation: Oil Price Simulation


Oil Price Distribution



Distribution of Value Per Share: Lukoil



Operating Income =  $-2364.52 + 266.59$  (Average Oil Price for year)




Decile	Value per share
0%	-\$26.00
10%	\$17.03
20%	\$28.19
30%	\$37.61
40%	\$46.33
50%	\$55.39
60%	\$65.46
70%	\$77.23
80%	\$92.40
90%	\$117.26

At its actual stock price of \$51.26, there is a 54% chance that Lukoil is under valued.



# The optionality in commodities: Undeveloped reserves as an option



# Valuing Gulf Oil

- Gulf Oil was the target of a takeover in early 1984 at \$70 per share (It had 165.30 million shares outstanding, and total debt of \$9.9 billion).
  - It had estimated reserves of 3038 million barrels of oil and the average cost of developing these reserves was estimated to be \$10 a barrel in present value dollars (The development lag is approximately two years).
  - The average relinquishment life of the reserves is 12 years.
  - The price of oil was \$22.38 per barrel, and the production cost, taxes and royalties were estimated at \$7 per barrel.
  - The bond rate at the time of the analysis was 9.00%.
  - Gulf was expected to have net production revenues each year of approximately 5% of the value of the developed reserves. The variance in oil prices is 0.03.

# Valuing Undeveloped Reserves


- Inputs for valuing undeveloped reserves
  - Value of underlying asset = Value of estimated reserves discounted back for period of development lag =  $3038 * (\$ 22.38 - \$7) / 1.05^2 = \$42,380.44$
  - Exercise price = Estimated development cost of reserves =  $3038 * \$10 = \$30,380$  million
  - Time to expiration = Average length of relinquishment option = 12 years
  - Variance in value of asset = Variance in oil prices = 0.03
  - Riskless interest rate = 9%
  - Dividend yield = Net production revenue/ Value of developed reserves = 5%
- Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
  - $d1 = 1.6548$     $N(d1) = 0.9510$
  - $d2 = 1.0548$     $N(d2) = 0.8542$
- Call Value =  $42,380.44 \exp^{(-0.05)(12)} (0.9510) - 30,380 (\exp^{(-0.09)(12)} (0.8542)) = \$13,306$  million

# The composite value...

- In addition, Gulf Oil had free cashflows to the firm from its oil and gas production of \$915 million from already developed reserves and these cashflows are likely to continue for ten years (the remaining lifetime of developed reserves).
- The present value of these developed reserves, discounted at the weighted average cost of capital of 12.5%, yields:
  - ▣ Value of already developed reserves =  $915 (1 - 1.125^{-10}) / .125 = \$5065.83$
- Adding the value of the developed and undeveloped reserves
  - ▣ Value of undeveloped reserves = \$ 13,306 million
  - ▣ Value of production in place = \$ 5,066 million
  - ▣ Total value of firm = \$ 18,372 million
  - ▣ Less Outstanding Debt = \$ 9,900 million
  - ▣ Value of Equity = \$ 8,472 million
  - ▣ Value per share = \$ 8,472 / 165.3 = \$51.25

# VII. Valuing Companies across the ownership cycle

*Reported income and balance sheet are heavily affected by tax considerations rather than information disclosure requirements. The line between the personal and business expenses is a fine one.*



*Reversing investment mistakes is difficult to do. The need for and the cost of illiquidity has to be incorporated into current*

*Different buyers can perceive risk differently in the same private business, largely because what they see as risk will be a function of how diversified they are. The fall back positions of using market prices to extract risk measures does not*

*Many private businesses are finite life enterprises, not expected to last into perpetuity*

# Kristin's Kandy: Valuation in March 2006

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t) : 300  
 - Nt CpX 100  
 - Chg WC 40  
 = FCFF 160  
 Reinvestment Rate = 46.67%

**Reinvestment Rate**  
 46.67%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.4667 * .1364 = .0636$   
**6.36%**

**Return on Capital**  
 13.64%

**Stable Growth**  
 $g = 4\%$ ; Beta = 3.00;  
 ROC = 12.54%  
 Reinvestment Rate = 31.90%

**Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> =  $289 / (.1254 - .04) = 3,403$**

**Firm Value:** 2,571  
 + Cash 125  
 - Debt: 900  
 = Equity 1,796  
 - Illiq Discount 12.5%  
 Adj Value 1,571

Year	1	2	3	4	5	Term Yr
EBIT (1-t)	\$319	\$339	\$361	\$384	\$408	425
- Reinvestment	\$149	\$158	\$168	\$179	\$191	136
=FCFF	\$170	\$181	\$193	\$205	\$218	289

**Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) =  $16.26\% (.70) + 3.30\% (.30) = 12.37\%$**

**Cost of Equity**  
 16.26%

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(4.5\% + 1.00)(1 - .40) = 3.30\%$   
 Synthetic rating = A-

**Weights**  
 E = 70% D = 30%

**Riskfree Rate:**  
 Riskfree rate = 4.50%  
 (10-year T.Bond rate)

**Total Beta**  
 2.94

X

**Risk Premium**  
 4.00%

+  
 1/3 of risk is market risk

Adjusted for ownrer non-diversification

Market Beta: 0.98

Mature risk premium 4%

Country Risk Premium 0%

Aswath Damodaran

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 0.78

Firm's D/E Ratio: 30/70

# Lesson 1: In private businesses, risk in the eyes of the “beholder” (buyer)

Private business owner with entire wealth invested in the business

Venture capitalist, with multiple holdings in the sector.

Public company investor with diversified portfolio


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Exposed to all risk in the company. Total beta measures exposure to total risk. Total Beta = Market Beta/ Correlation of firm with market

Partially diversified. Diversify away some firm specific risk but not all. Beta will fall between total and market beta.

Firm-specific risk is diversified away. Market or macro risk exposure captured in a market beta or betas.

## Private Owner versus Publicly Traded Company Perceptions of Risk in an Investment





# Total Risk versus Market Risk

- Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is a relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the proportion of the risk that is market risk.
  - Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
- To estimate the beta for Kristin Kandy, we begin with the bottom-up unlevered beta of food processing companies:
  - Unlevered beta for publicly traded food processing companies = 0.78
  - Average correlation of food processing companies with market = 0.333
  - Unlevered total beta for Kristin Kandy =  $0.78/0.333 = 2.34$
  - Debt to equity ratio for Kristin Kandy = 0.3/0.7 (assumed industry average)
  - Total Beta =  $2.34 ( 1 - (1-.40)(30/70)) = 2.94$
  - Total Cost of Equity =  $4.50\% + 2.94 (4\%) = 16.26\%$

## Lesson 2: With financials, trust but verify..

- Different Accounting Standards: The accounting statements for private firms are often based upon different accounting standards than public firms, which operate under much tighter constraints on what to report and when to report.
- Intermingling of personal and business expenses: In the case of private firms, some personal expenses may be reported as business expenses.
- Separating “Salaries” from “Dividends”: It is difficult to tell where salaries end and dividends begin in a private firm, since they both end up with the owner.
- The Key person issue: In some private businesses, with a personal component, the cashflows may be intertwined with the owner being part of the business.

## Lesson 3: Illiquidity is a clear and present danger..


- In private company valuation, illiquidity is a constant theme. All the talk, though, seems to lead to a rule of thumb. The illiquidity discount for a private firm is between 20-30% and does not vary across private firms.
- But illiquidity should vary across:
  - Companies: Healthier and larger companies, with more liquid assets, should have smaller discounts than money-losing smaller businesses with more illiquid assets.
  - Time: Liquidity is worth more when the economy is doing badly and credit is tough to come by than when markets are booming.
  - Buyers: Liquidity is worth more to buyers who have shorter time horizons and greater cash needs than for longer term investors who don't need the cash and are willing to hold the investment.



NARRATIVE AND NUMBERS:  
VALUATION AS A BRIDGE




# Bridging the Gap



# Step 1: Create a narrative



- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates



# Potential Markets for Uber

<i>Potential Market</i>	<i>Market Size</i>	<i>Industry structure</i>
Taxi & Limo Market	Roughly \$100 billion (based upon city-specific estimates).	Highly splintered (top 50 companies account for 35% market share), localized and private.
Rental Car Market	Approximately \$36 billion just for the US and \$50 billion globally.	Three companies (Enterprise, Hertz and Avis) account for 60% of the overall market.
Moving Services	Approximately \$20 billion in the US (and no data is available for global).	A few large companies but none with dominant market share, with lots of localized, small movers.
Local Delivery business	Approximately \$35 billion (more guesstimate than estimate).	Historically, it has been a localized, splintered business but Amazon and Google have entered the business recently.
Mass Transit	Approximately \$60 billion for the US.	Barring a few privately owned bus companies, mostly government owned and subsidized.
Car Sharing	Approximately \$20 billion, bigger in Europe than in the US, but growing fast.	A mix of young businesses, some tech based, trying to match needs to resources.




# Your narrative and counters

- *My narrative for Uber:* Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its competitive advantages to get a significant but not dominant market share and maintain its profit margins.
- *Bill Gurley's counter narrative*
  - Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
  - Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
  - Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.


# Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense

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


# Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable


Uber (My valuation))



Uber (Bill Gurley)



# Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value




# The narrative to numbers

<i>Step</i>	<i>Narrative</i>	<i>Numbers</i>
1	<p><i>What market(s) is (are) Uber's products targeting?</i></p> <p>a. Is Uber just a car service company?</p> <p>b. If not, what other markets do you see Uber competing in?</p>	<p><i>Potential Market</i></p> <p>This sets the limits of growth for the company, and the more broadly defined the market, the larger the potential growth (and the higher the value).</p>
2	<p><i>How will Uber &amp; like products affect market growth?</i></p> <p>a. Given the potential market defined in step 1, how many new users will Uber &amp; like products/services attract into the market?</p> <p>b. What effect will these new users have on overall market growth?</p>	<p><i>Potential Market Growth</i></p> <p>The more new users that a company attracts into the market, the higher the expected growth rate in that market.</p>
3	<p><i>Will Uber derive any network benefits as it grows?</i></p> <p>a. As Uber grows in an existing market, will that make further growth in that market easier (local network effects)?</p> <p>b. If Uber goes into a new market, how much does success in existing markets help it? (global network effects)</p>	<p><i>Market Share</i></p> <p>If there are no network effects in the market, it will stay splintered with no company claiming a significant market share. If there are only local network effects, multiple companies will get significant market shares, but none will be dominant. With global network effects, a company will be able to get a dominant market share.</p>
4	<p><i>What are Uber's competitive advantages?</i></p> <p>a. What are Uber's competitive advantages over existing competitors?</p> <p>b. Will these competitive advantages hold up as the market growth (and new competitors enter)?</p>	<p><i>Cut of gross receipts &amp; Operating Costs</i></p> <p>The slice of revenue that Uber claims of the gross receipts (on cab rides, local delivery etc.) will depend on how strong and sustainable its competitive advantages are, with stronger/more sustainable advantages going along with larger slices of revenues/higher operating margins.</p>
5	<p><i>What will Uber have to invest to generate growth?</i></p> <p>a. Will Uber continue with its existing model (low capital intensity) as it grows?</p> <p>b. Will the growth be organic or acquired?</p>	<p><i>Reinvestment</i></p> <p>The more Uber will have to invest to generate new growth, the less cash flow will be left over for investors (and the lower the value).</p>
6	<p><i>How risky is Uber as an investment?</i></p> <p>a. How much risk is there in Uber's operating businesses?</p> <p>b. What is the chance that Uber will not survive?</p>	<p><i>Risk Adjustment</i></p> <p>The higher the risk in the operating businesses, the higher will be the rate of return (cost of capital) you demand for investing in the company. If failure risk is high, the value will be adjusted down even further.</p>

# Step 4: Value the company

## Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)



# Step 5: Keep the feedback loop

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	<i>Uber (Gurley)</i>	<i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i>	<i>Uber (Damodaran)</i>
Narrative	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages</u> to get a <u>significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	\$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+)	\$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+)	\$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion)

# Narratives drive value

<i>Total Market</i>	<i>Growth Effect</i>	<i>Network Effect</i>	<i>Competitive Advantages</i>	<i>Value of Uber</i>
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799



# Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options



*Aswath Damodaran*

## RELATIVE VALUATION (PRICING)

Aswath Damodaran

# Relative valuation is pervasive...

- Most asset valuations are relative.
- Most equity valuations on Wall Street are relative valuations.
  - Almost 85% of equity research reports are based upon a multiple and comparables.
  - More than 50% of all acquisition valuations are based upon multiples
  - Rules of thumb based on multiples are not only common but are often the basis for final valuation judgments.
- While there are more discounted cashflow valuations in consulting and corporate finance, they are often relative valuations masquerading as discounted cash flow valuations.
  - The objective in many discounted cashflow valuations is to back into a number that has been obtained by using a multiple.
  - The terminal value in a significant number of discounted cashflow valuations is estimated using a multiple.

# The Reasons for the allure...

- “If you think I’m crazy, you should see the guy who lives across the hall”

Jerry Seinfeld talking about Kramer in a Seinfeld episode

- “A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation”


H.H. Munro

- “If you are going to screw up, make sure that you have lots of company”

Ex-portfolio manager

# Pricing versus Valuation

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# Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

**5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr**  
La Jolla, CA 92037  
Status: Active

**\$995,000**  
Price

**3**  
Beds


**2.5**  
Baths

**1,440** Sq. Ft.  
\$691 / Sq. Ft.

Built: 1955 Lot Size: 3,000 Sq. Ft. On Redfin: 12 days

Favorite X-Out Share... Tour Home

Overview Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights Similar Homes



**Lisa Padilla**  
REDFIN Real Estate Agent


★★★★★  
47 client reviews

\$8,726 commission refund

**Go Tour This Home**

Ask Lisa a Question or Start an Offer

1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area



# Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

143

Europe  
Switzerland  
  
Biotechnology  
Biotechnology

Reuters BION.S      Bloomberg BION SW      Exchange SWX      Ticker BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

## Strong sector and stock-picking continue

### Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

### Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

### Key changes

Target Price 106.50 to 164.50 ↑ 54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

### Price/price relative



Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4

# Test 3: Are you pricing or valuing?


144

	1	2	3	4	5
EBITDA	\$100.00	\$120.00	\$144.00	\$172.80	\$207.36
- Depreciation	\$20.00	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47
EBIT	\$80.00	\$96.00	\$115.20	\$138.24	\$165.89
- Taxes	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47	\$49.77
EBIT (1-t)	\$56.00	\$67.20	\$80.64	\$96.77	\$116.12
+ Depreciation	\$20.00	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47
- Cap Ex	\$50.00	\$60.00	\$72.00	\$86.40	\$103.68
- Chg in WC	\$10.00	\$12.00	\$14.40	\$17.28	\$20.74
FCFF	\$16.00	\$19.20	\$23.04	\$27.65	\$33.18
Terminal Value					\$1,658.88
Cost of capital	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%
Present Value	\$14.78	\$16.38	\$18.16	\$20.14	\$1,138.35
Value of operating assets today	\$1,207.81				
+ Cash	\$125.00				
- Debt	\$200.00				
<b>Value of equity</b>	<b>\$1,132.81</b>				



# The tool for pricing: A multiple

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# The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

- Define the multiple
  - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Describe the multiple
  - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
  - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
  - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

# Definitional Tests

- Is the multiple consistently defined?
  - Proposition 1: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.
- Is the multiple uniformly estimated?
  - The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the “comparable firm” list.
  - If earnings-based multiples are used, the accounting rules to measure earnings should be applied consistently across assets. The same rule applies with book-value based multiples.

# Example 1: Price Earnings Ratio: Definition

$PE = \text{Market Price per Share} / \text{Earnings per Share}$

- There are a number of variants on the basic PE ratio in use. They are based upon how the price and the earnings are defined.

Price: is usually the current price

is sometimes the average price for the year

EPS: EPS in most recent financial year

EPS in trailing 12 months (Trailing PE)

Forecasted EPS next year (Forward PE)

Forecasted EPS in future year

## Example 2: Enterprise Value /EBITDA Multiple

- The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple is obtained by netting cash out against debt to arrive at enterprise value and dividing by EBITDA.

$$\frac{\text{Enterprise Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{\text{Market Value of Equity} + \text{Market Value of Debt} - \text{Cash}}{\text{Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation}}$$


- Why do we net out cash from firm value?
- What happens if a firm has cross holdings which are categorized as:
  - ▣ Minority interests?
  - ▣ Majority active interests?

# Descriptive Tests

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- What is the median for this multiple?
  - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
  - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

# 1. Multiples have skewed distributions...

*PE Ratios for US stocks: January 2015*




## 2. Making statistics “dicey”

	<i>Current PE</i>	<i>Trailing PE</i>	<i>Forward PE</i>
Number of firms	7887	7887	7887
Number with PE	3403	3398	2820
Average	72.13	60.49	35.25
Median	20.88	19.74	18.32
Minimum	0.25	0.4	1.15
Maximum	23,100.	23,100.	5,230.91
Standard deviation	509.6	510.41	139.75
Standard error	8.74	8.76	2.63
Skewness	31.	32.77	25.04
25th percentile	13.578	13.2	14.32
75th percentile	33.86	31.16	25.66




### 3. Markets have a lot in common : Comparing Global PEs

**PE Ratio Distribution: Global Comparison in January 2015**




# 4. Simplistic rules almost always break down...6 times EBITDA may not be cheap...



# But it may be in 2015, unless you are in Japan, Australia or Canada

### EV/EBITDA: A Global Comparison - January 2015



# Analytical Tests

- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
  - Proposition 2: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
  - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
  - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
  - Proposition 3: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.

# PE Ratio: Understanding the Fundamentals

- To understand the fundamentals, start with a basic equity discounted cash flow model.
- With the dividend discount model,

$$P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$$

- Dividing both sides by the current earnings per share,


$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

- If this had been a FCFE Model,

$$P_0 = \frac{FCFE_1}{r - g_n}$$


$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{(\text{FCFE/Earnings}) * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

# The Determinants of Multiples...



## Equity Multiples

## Firm Multiples



# Application Tests

- Given the firm that we are valuing, what is a “comparable” firm?
  - While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
  - Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
  - Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.

# An Example: Comparing PE Ratios across a Sector: PE

<i>Company Name</i>	<i>PE</i>	<i>Growth</i>
<i>PT Indosat ADR</i>	7.8	0.06
<i>Telebras ADR</i>	8.9	0.075
<i>Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ADR</i>	11.2	0.11
<i>Telecom Argentina Stet - France Telecom SA ADR B</i>	12.5	0.08
<i>Hellenic Telecommunication Organization SA ADR</i>	12.8	0.12
<i>Telecomunicaciones de Chile ADR</i>	16.6	0.08
<i>Swisscom AG ADR</i>	18.3	0.11
<i>Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings ADR</i>	19.6	0.16
<i>Portugal Telecom SA ADR</i>	20.8	0.13
<i>Telefonos de Mexico ADR L</i>	21.1	0.14
<i>Matav RT ADR</i>	21.5	0.22
<i>Telstra ADR</i>	21.7	0.12
<i>Gilat Communications</i>	22.7	0.31
<i>Deutsche Telekom AG ADR</i>	24.6	0.11
<i>British Telecommunications PLC ADR</i>	25.7	0.07
<i>Tele Danmark AS ADR</i>	27	0.09
<i>Telekomunikasi Indonesia ADR</i>	28.4	0.32
<i>Cable &amp; Wireless PLC ADR</i>	29.8	0.14
<i>APT Satellite Holdings ADR</i>	31	0.33
<i>Telefonica SA ADR</i>	32.5	0.18
<i>Royal KPN NV ADR</i>	35.7	0.13
<i>Telecom Italia SPA ADR</i>	42.2	0.14
<i>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone ADR</i>	44.3	0.2
<i>France Telecom SA ADR</i>	45.2	0.19
<i>Korea Telecom ADR</i>	71.3	0.44



# PE, Growth and Risk

- Dependent variable is: PE
- R squared = 66.2%    R squared (adjusted) = 63.1%

<i>Variable</i>		<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t-ratio</i>	<i>Probability</i>
Constant	13.1151	3.471	3.78	0.0010	
Growth rate		121.223	19.27	6.29	≤ 0.0001
Emerging Market	-13.853	1	3.606	-3.84	0.0009
Emerging Market is a dummy:				1 if emerging market 0 if not	

- Is Indosat cheap?

$$PE = 13.13 + 121.22 (.06) - 13.85 (1) = 6.55$$

At 7.8 times earnings, Indosat is over valued.

# Lukoil: A Relative Valuation



# Comparing Multiples

	<i>Lukoil</i>	<i>Russian Oil</i>	<i>Emerging Oil</i>	<i>Global Oil</i>
Sample Size		4	21	40
PE	7.89	5.30	11.09	15.75
Price to Book	0.46	0.47	1.23	1.23
EV to Sales	0.33	0.57	0.95	1.01
EV/EBITDA	2.71	2.53	4.56	4.89
EV/EBIT	5.44	3.88	9.21	9.46
EV/Invested Capital	0.52	0.47	1.15	1.19
EV/Barrel of Proven Reserves	3.53	5.20	16.77	25.09

# Controlling for differences

	<i>Lukoil</i>	<i>Russian Oil</i>	<i>Emerging Oil</i>	<i>Global Oil</i>
ROE	5.85%	9.14%	8.56%	6.75%
Pre-tax ROIC	9.59%	12.57%	11.35%	11.61%
Debt/Capital (Market)	26.55%	28.16%	28.13%	29.59%
Debt/EBITDA	0.26	0.57	0.85	0.86
Interest coverage ratio	13.76	26.40	6.83	10.11

# Looking for Price Drivers

	<i>EV/Invested Capital</i>	<i>Pre-tax ROIC</i>	<i>Debt/Capital (Market)</i>	<i>Debt/EBITDA</i>	<i>Interest coverage ratio</i>	<i>Emerging Dummy</i>
<i>EV/Invested Capital</i>	1.0000	0.0510	-0.3780	0.5760	0.1260	0.0980
<i>Pre-tax ROIC</i>		1.0000	-0.2750	-0.1330	0.1260	0.1630
<i>Debt/Capital (Market)</i>			1.0000	-0.2150	-0.2160	0.0330
<i>Debt/EBITDA</i>				1.0000	0.0920	0.0870
<i>Interest coverage ratio</i>					1.0000	-0.2060
<i>Emerging Dummy</i>						1.0000

# Lukoil: The Bottom line

- If you regress EV/Invested Capital against Debt to Capital ratios, you get:

$$\text{EV/IC} = 1.833 - 2.092 \text{ Debt/Capital} \quad R^2=50.8\%$$

- Plugging in Lukoil's debt to capital ratio of 26.55% into the regression:

$$\text{EV/IC} = 1.833 - 2.092 (.2655) = 1.2776$$

- At its actual EV/Invested Capital ratio of 0.52, Lukoil looks like a bargain.

## Comparisons to the entire market: Why not?

- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

# PE Ratio: Standard Regression for US stocks - January 2015

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**Model Summary<sup>a</sup>**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.597 <sup>b</sup>	.356	.355	1002.538

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Predictors: (Constant), Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years, Beta, Payout ratio

*The regression is run with growth and payout entered as decimals, i.e., 25% is entered as 0.25)*

**Coefficients<sup>a,b,c</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6.479	1.204		5.380	.000
	Beta	-3.248	.840	-.108	-3.866	.000
	Payout ratio	16.772	1.290	.365	12.998	.000
	Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years	98.579	4.428	.588	22.260	.000

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE

c. Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)



# PE ratio regressions across markets

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Region	Regression – January 2015	R <sup>2</sup>
US	PE = 6.48 + 98.58 $g_{EPS}$ + 16.77 Payout - 3.25 Beta	35.5%
Europe	PE = 19.32 + 43.89 $g_{EPS}$ + 5.14 Payout - 4.45 Beta	17.4%
Japan	PE = 7.85 + 32.48 $g_{EPS}$ + 31.32 Payout - 1.165 Beta	25.2%
Emerging Markets	PE = 10.90 + 57.47 $g_{EPS}$ + 7.62 Payout - 2.36 Beta	27.0%
Global	PE = 12.49 + 56.89 $g_{EPS}$ + 10.40 Payout - 3.10 Beta	23.3%

$g_{EPS}$  = *Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS or Net Income: Next 5 years*

*Beta: Regression or Bottom up Beta*

*Payout ratio: Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0*

# Choosing Between the Multiples

- As presented in this section, there are dozens of multiples that can be potentially used to value an individual firm.
- In addition, relative valuation can be relative to a sector (or comparable firms) or to the entire market (using the regressions, for instance)
- Since there can be only one final estimate of value, there are three choices at this stage:
  - Use a simple average of the valuations obtained using a number of different multiples
  - Use a weighted average of the valuations obtained using a number of different multiples
  - Choose one of the multiples and base your valuation on that multiple

# Picking one Multiple

- This is usually the best way to approach this issue. While a range of values can be obtained from a number of multiples, the “best estimate” value is obtained using one multiple.
- The multiple that is used can be chosen in one of two ways:
  - Use the multiple that best fits your objective. Thus, if you want the company to be undervalued, you pick the multiple that yields the highest value.
  - Use the multiple that has the highest R-squared in the sector when regressed against fundamentals. Thus, if you have tried PE, PBV, PS, etc. and run regressions of these multiples against fundamentals, use the multiple that works best at explaining differences across firms in that sector.
  - Use the multiple that seems to make the most sense for that sector, given how value is measured and created.

# Conventional usage...

Sector	Multiple Used	Rationale
Cyclical Manufacturing	PE, Relative PE	Often with normalized earnings
Growth firms	PEG ratio	Big differences in growth rates
Young growth firms w/ losses	Revenue Multiples	What choice do you have?
Infrastructure	EV/EBITDA	Early losses, big DA
REIT	P/CFE (where CFE = Net income + Depreciation)	Big depreciation charges on real estate
Financial Services	Price/ Book equity	Marked to market?
Retailing	Revenue multiples	Margins equalize sooner or later



## RISK MANAGEMENT & VALUE

You cannot live life in a defensive crouch!

# Risk: The definition

- Risk, in traditional terms, is viewed as a ‘negative’. Webster’s dictionary, for instance, defines risk as “exposing to danger or hazard”. The Chinese symbols for crisis, reproduced below, give a much better description of risk.

危險

- The first symbol is the symbol for “danger”, while the second is the symbol for “opportunity”, making risk a mix of danger and opportunity.

# We are all risk averse, but to different degrees

- Individuals are risk averse, though the studies differ on what they find about relative risk aversion as wealth increases.
- Surveys find that women are more risk averse than men, even after controlling for differences in age, income and education.
- The lifecycle risk aversion hypothesis posits that risk aversion should increase with age, but surveys cannot directly test this proposition, since it would require testing the same person at different ages. In weak support of this hypothesis, surveys find that older people are, in fact, more risk averse than younger people because they tend to invest less of their wealth in riskier assets.

# But we are not always rational

1. Framing: Would you rather save 200 out of 600 people or accept a one-third probability that everyone will be saved? While the two statements may be mathematically equivalent, most people choose the first.
2. Loss Aversion: Would you rather take \$ 750 or a 75% chance of winning \$1000? Would you rather lose \$750 guaranteed or a 75% chance of losing \$ 1000?
3. Myopic loss aversion: Getting more frequent feedback on where they stand makes individuals more risk averse.
4. House Money Effect: Individuals are more willing to takes risk with found money (i.e. money obtained easily) than with earned money.
5. The Breakeven Effect: Subjects in experiments who have lost money seem willing to gamble on lotteries (that standing alone would be viewed as unattractive) that offer them a chance to break even.



# Task 1: How risk averse are you?

- How risk averse are you?
  - a. More risk averse than my colleagues
  - b. About as risk averse as my colleagues
  - c. Less risk averse than my colleagues
  - d. If you are more or less risk averse than your colleagues, how does this difference affect your decisions and discussions?

# Ways of dealing with risk in analysis

## □ Risk Adjusted Value

- ▣ Estimate expected cash flows and adjust the discount rate for risk
- ▣ Use certainty equivalent cash flows and use the riskfree rate as the discount rate
- ▣ Hybrid approaches

## □ Probabilistic Approaches

- ▣ Sensitivity Analysis
- ▣ Decision Trees
- ▣ Simulations

## □ Value at Risk (VAR) and variants

# Task 2: Risk Assessment at your organization

- What risk assessment approaches do you use in your organization? (You can pick more than one)
  - a. Risk adjusted Value
  - b. Sensitivity Analysis
  - c. Decision Trees
  - d. Simulation
  - e. All of the above
  - f. None of the above
- If you picked none of the above, what do you do about risk in decision making?

# How risk can affect value..

- For an action to affect value, it has to affect one or more of the following inputs into value:
  - ▣ Cash flows from existing assets
  - ▣ Growth rate during excess return phase
  - ▣ Length of period of excess returns
  - ▣ Discount rate
- Proposition 1: Risk hedging/management can increase value only if they affect cash flows, growth rates, discount rates and/or length of the growth period.
- Proposition 2: When risk hedging/management has no effect on cash flows, growth rates, discount rates and/or length of the growth period, it can have no effect on value.

# Risk Hedging/ Management and Value

<i>Valuation Component</i>	<i>Effect of Risk Hedging</i>	<i>Effect of Risk Management</i>
Costs of equity and capital	Reduce cost of equity for private and closely held firms. Reduce cost of debt for heavily levered firms with significant distress risk	May increase costs of equity and capital, if a firm increases its exposure to risks where it feels it has a differential advantage.
Cash flow to the Firm	Cost of risk hedging will reduce earnings. Smoothing out earnings may reduce taxes paid over time.	More effective risk management may increase operating margins and increase cash flows.
Expected Growth rate during high growth period	Reducing risk exposure may make managers more comfortable taking risky (and good) investments. <u>Increase in reinvestment rate will increase growth.</u>	Exploiting opportunities created by risk will allow the firm to earn a <u>higher return on capital</u> on its new investments.
Length of high growth period	No effect	Strategic risk management can be a long-term competitive advantage and increase length of growth period.

*Steps in Developing a Risk Strategy: Potential Problems and Possible Opportunities*

	<i>What is it?</i>	<i>Who does it now?</i>	<i>Limitations/ Problems</i>	<i>Possible Improvements</i>
Step 1	Make an inventory of all of the risks that the firm is faced with – firm specific, sector and market.	Internal. Managers of firms do this now, but often haphazardly and in reaction to events.	Managers may be good at identifying firm-specific problems but may not be very good at assessing sector or market risks. They may miss some risks and inflate others.	A team with sector expertise and experience can do a much more comprehensive job.
Step 2	Decide what risks should be hedged and should not.	Managers of the firm with significant input (and sales pitches) from investment bankers and insurance companies.	Conflict of interest. Not surprisingly, the investment banker or insurance company will want managers to over hedge risk and argue that their products are the best ones.	Look for unbiased advice on both components; in effect, you want an outsider with no ax to grind to assess risk hedging products to find cheapest and best alternatives.
Step 3	For the risks to be hedged, pick the risk hedging products which can be derivatives or insurance products			
Step 4	Determine the risk dimensions where you have an advantage over your competitors either because you understand the risk better or you control a resource.	If it occurs, it is usually part of strategic management and consultants and is packaged with other strategic objectives.	Risk gets short shrift since the focus is on rewards. In other words, strategies that offer higher growth will win out over ones which emphasize risk advantages.	Develop a team that focuses only on strategic risk taking. Draw on services that offer advice purely on this dimension
Step 5	Take strategic steps to ensure that you can use this risk advantage to gain over your competition.			

# Step 1: Developing a risk profile

- List the risks you are exposed to as a business, from the risk of a supplier failing to deliver supplies to environmental/social risk.
- Categorize the risk into groups: Not all risks are made equal and it makes sense to break risks down into:
  - Economic versus non-Economic risks
  - Market versus Firm-specific risks
  - Operating versus Financial risk
  - Continuous versus Discrete risk
  - Catastrophic versus smaller risks
- Measure exposure to each risk (if possible): Use historical data and subjective judgments to make your best estimates.

# Task 1: Risk in your organization

- List the five biggest risks that you see your firm (organization) facing, and then categorize them.

Risk	Micro or Macro	Discrete or Continuous	Catastrophic or Small
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			



## Step 2: Decide on what risks to take, which to avoid and which to pass through

- Every business (individual) is faced with a laundry list of risks. The key to success is to not avoid every risk, or take every one but to classify these risks into
  - ▣ Risks to pass through to the investors in the business.
  - ▣ Risks to avoid or hedge.
  - ▣ Risks to seek out
- In practice, firms often hedge risk that they should be passing through, seek out some risks that they should not be seeking out and avoid risks that they should be taking.

# a. Risk Hedging: Potential Benefits

- Tax Benefits: Hedging may reduce taxes paid by either smoothing out earnings or from the tax treatment of hedging expenses.
- Better investment decisions: Hedging against macroeconomic risk factors may create better investment decisions because
  - Managers are risk averse and protecting against some “uncontrollable” risks may allow them to focus better on business decisions.
  - Capital markets are imperfect
- Distress costs: Hedging may reduce the chance that a firm will face distress (and cease to exist) and thus reduce indirect bankruptcy costs.
- Capital Structure: Hedging risk may allow a firm to borrow more money and take advantage of the tax code’s bias to debt.
- Informational benefits: Hedging against macroeconomic risks makes earnings more informative, by eliminating the noise create by shifts in macroeconomic variables.

## And costs...


- Explicit costs: When companies hedge risk against risk by either buying insurance or put options, the cost of hedging is the cost of buying the protection against risk. It increases costs and reduces income.
- Implicit costs: When you buy/sell futures or forward contracts, you have no upfront explicit cost but you have an implicit cost. You give up upside to get downside protection.
  - A related and subjective implicit cost is that buying protection may give managers too much insulation against that risk and provide them with a false sense of security.

# Evidence on hedging..

- Hedging is common: In 1999, Mian studied the annual reports of 3,022 companies in 1992 and found that 771 of these firms did some risk hedging during the course of the year.
- Large firms hedge more: Looking across companies, he concluded that larger firms were more likely to hedge than smaller firms, indicating that economies of scale allow larger firms to hedge at lower costs.
- Some risks are hedged more frequently: Exchange rate risk is the most commonly hedged risk because it is easy and relatively cheap to hedge and also because it affects accounting earnings (through translation exposure). Commodity risk is the next most hedged risk by both suppliers of the commodity and users.

# At commodity companies.. Hedging at gold mining companies.


Figure 10.1: Production Hedging at Gold Mining Companies: 1990-93



# Does hedging affect value?

- Studies that examine whether hedging increase value range from finding marginal gains to mild losses.
  - Smithson presents evidence that he argues is consistent with the notion that risk management increases value, but the increase in value at firms that hedge is small and not statistically significant.
  - Mian finds only weak or mixed evidence of the potential hedging benefits—lower taxes and distress costs or better investment decisions. In fact, the evidence is inconsistent with a distress cost model, since the companies with the greatest distress costs hedge the least.
  - Tufano's study of gold mining companies finds little support for the proposition that hedging is driven by the value enhancement
- In summary, the benefits of hedging are hazy at best and non-existent at worst, when we look at publicly traded firms. A reasonable case can be made that most hedging can be attributed to managerial interests being served rather than increasing stockholder value.

# A framework for risk hedging..



# Hedging Alternatives..


- Investment Choices: By investing in many projects, across geographical regions or businesses, a firm may be able to get at least partial hedging against some types of risk.
- Financing Choices: Matching the cash flows on financing to the cash flows on assets can also mitigate exposure to risk. Thus, using peso debt to fund peso assets can reduce peso risk exposure.
- Insurance: Buying insurance can provide protection against some types of risk. In effect, the firm shifts the risk to the insurance company in return for a payment.
- Derivatives: In the last few decades, options, futures, forward contracts and swaps have all been used to good effect to reduce risk exposure.



# The right tool for hedging...

- If you want complete, customized risk exposure, forward contracts can be designed to a firm's specific needs, but only if the firm knows these needs. The costs are likely to be higher and you can be exposed to credit risk (in the other party to the contract).
- Futures contracts provide a cheaper alternative to forward contracts, since they are traded on the exchanges and not customized and there is no credit risk. However, they may not provide complete protection against risk.
- Option contracts provide protection against only downside risk while preserving upside potential. This benefit has to be weighed against the cost of buying the options, which will vary with the amount of protection desired.
- In combating event risk, a firm can either self-insure or use a third party insurance product. Self insurance makes sense if the firm can achieve the benefits of risk pooling on its own, does not need the services or support offered by insurance companies and can provide the insurance more economically than the third party.

## b. Risk Taking & Effect on Value



# Evidence on risk taking and value..


- The most successful companies in any economy got there by seeking out and exploiting risks and uncertainties and not by avoiding these risks.
- Across time, on average, risk taking has paid off for investors and companies.
- At the same time, there is evidence that some firms and investors have been destroyed by either taking intemperate risks or worse, from the downside of taking prudent risks.
- In conclusion, then, there is a positive payoff to risk taking but not if it is reckless. Firms that are selective about the risks they take can exploit those risks to advantage, but firms that take risks without sufficiently preparing for their consequences can be hurt badly.

# How do you exploit risk?

- To exploit risk better than your competitors, you need to bring something to the table. In particular, there are five possible advantages that successful risk taking firms exploit:
  1. Information Advantage: In a crisis, getting better information (and getting it early) can allow be a huge benefit.
  2. Speed Advantage: Being able to act quickly (and appropriately) can allow a firm to exploit opportunities that open up in the midst of risk.
  3. Experience/Knowledge Advantage: Firms (and managers) who have been through similar crises in the past can use what they have learned.
  4. Resource Advantage: Having superior resources can allow a firm to withstand a crisis that devastates its competition.
  5. Flexibility: Building in the capacity to change course quickly can be an advantage when faced with risk.

# a. The Information Advantage

- Invest in information networks. Businesses can use their own employees and the entities that they deal with – suppliers, creditors and joint venture partners – as sources of information.
- Test the reliability of the intelligence network well before the crisis hits with the intent of removing weak links and augmenting strengths.
- Protect the network from the prying eyes of competitors who may be tempted to raid it rather than design their own.



## b. The Speed Advantage

- Improve the quality of the information that you receive about the nature of the threat and its consequences. Knowing what is happening is often a key part of reacting quickly.
- Recognize both the potential short term and long-term consequences of the threat. All too often, entities under threat respond to the near term effects by going into a defensive posture and either downplaying the costs or denying the risks when they would be better served by being open about the dangers and what they are doing to protect against them.
- Understand the audience and constituencies that you are providing the response for. A response tailored to the wrong audience will fail.

## c. The Experience/Knowledge Advantage

- Expose the firm to new risks and learn from mistakes. The process can be painful and take decades but experience gained internally is often not only cost effective but more engrained in the organization.
- Acquire firms in unfamiliar markets and use their personnel and expertise, albeit at a premium.. The perils of this strategy, though, are numerous, beginning with the fact that you have to pay a premium in acquisitions and continuing with the post-merger struggle of trying to integrate firms with two very different cultures. Studies of cross border acquisitions find that the record of failure is high.
- Try to hire away managers of firms or share (joint ventures) in the experience of firms that have lived through specific risks.
- Find a way to build on and share the existing knowledge/ experience within the firm.


## d. The Resource Advantage

- Capital Access: Being able to access capital markets allows firms to raise funds in the midst of a crisis. Thus, firms that operate in more accessible capital markets should have an advantage over firms that operate in less accessible capital markets.
- Debt capacity: One advantage of preserving debt capacity is that you can use it to meet a crisis. Firms that operate in risky businesses should therefore hold less debt than they can afford. In some cases, this debt capacity can be made explicit by arranging lines of credit in advance of a crisis.



## e. The Flexibility Advantage

- Being able to modify production, operating and marketing processes quickly in the face of uncertainty and changing markets is key to being able to take advantage of risk. Consequently, this may require having more adaptable operating models (with less fixed costs), even if that requires you to settle for lower revenues.
- In the 1990s, corporate strategists argued that as firms become more successful, it becomes more difficult for them to adapt and change.



# Task 2: Risk actions

- Take the five risks that you listed in task 1 and consider for each one, whether you will pass the risk through to your investors, hedge the risk or seek out and exploit the risk.

Risk	Action (Hedge, Pass through or exploit)	Why?

## Step 3: Build a successful risk taking organization..

- While firms sometimes get lucky, consistently successful risk taking cannot happen by accident.
- In particular, firms have to start preparing when times are good (and stable) for bad and risky times.

# 3.1: Align interests...




## 3.2: Pick the right people

- Good risk takers
  - Are realists who still manage to be upbeat.
  - Allow for the possibility of losses but are not overwhelmed or scared by its prospects.
  - Keep their perspective and see the big picture.
  - Make decisions with limited and often incomplete information
- To hire and retain good risk takers
  - Have a hiring process that looks past technical skills at crisis skills
  - Accept that good risk takers will not be model employees in stable environments.
  - Keep them challenged, interested and involved. Boredom will drive them away.
  - Surround them with kindred spirits.

# 3.3: Make sure that the incentives for risk taking are set correctly...

- You should reward good risk taking behavior, not good outcomes and punish bad risk taking behavior, even if it makes money.



## 3.4: Make sure the organizational size and culture are in tune..

- Organizations can encourage or discourage risk based upon how big they are and how they are structured. Large, layered organizations tend to be better at avoiding risk whereas smaller, flatter organizations tend to be better at risk taking. Each has to be kept from its own excesses.
- The culture of a firm can also act as an engine for or as a brake on sensible risk taking. Some firms are clearly much more open to risk taking and its consequences, positive as well as negative. One key factor in risk taking is how the firm deals with failure rather than success; after all, risk takers are seldom punished for succeeding.

## 3.5. Preserve your options..

- Even if you are a sensible risk taker and measure risks well, you will be wrong a substantial portion of the time. Sometimes, you will be wrong on the upside (you under estimate the potential for profit) and sometimes, you will be wrong on the downside.
- Successful firms preserve their options to take advantage of both scenarios:
  - The option to expand an investment, if faced with the potential for more upside than expected.
  - The option to abandon an investment, if faced with more downside than expected.



# Task 3: Assess the “risk taking” capacity of your organization

Dimension	Your organization’s standing
1. Are the interests of managers aligned with the interests of capital providers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Aligned with stockholders <input type="checkbox"/> Aligned with bondholders <input type="checkbox"/> Aligned with their own interests
2. Do you have the right people in place to deal with risk?	<input type="checkbox"/> Too many risk takers <input type="checkbox"/> Too many risk avoiders <input type="checkbox"/> Right balance
3. Is the incentive process designed to encourage good risk taking?	<input type="checkbox"/> Discourages all risk taking <input type="checkbox"/> Encourages too much risk taking <input type="checkbox"/> Right balance
4. What is the risk culture in your organization?	<input type="checkbox"/> Risk seeking <input type="checkbox"/> Risk avoiding <input type="checkbox"/> No risk culture
5. How much flexibility is there in terms of exploiting upside risk and protecting against downside risk?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good on exploiting upside risk <input type="checkbox"/> Good in protecting against downside <input type="checkbox"/> Good on both

# And here is the most important ingredient in risk management: Be lucky...

- There is so much noise in this process that the dominant variable explaining success in any given period is luck and not skill.
  - Proposition 1: Today's hero will be tomorrow's goat (and vice versa) There are no experts. Let your common sense guide you.
  - Proposition 2: Don't mistake luck for skill: Do not over react either to success or to failure. Chill.
  - Proposition 3: Life is not fair: You can do everything right and go bankrupt. You can do everything wrong and make millions.

# Propositions about risk

1. Risk is everywhere
2. Risk is threat and opportunity
3. We (as human beings) are ambivalent about risk and not always rational in the way we deal with it.
4. Not all risk is created equal: Small versus Large, symmetric versus asymmetric, continuous vs discrete, macro vs micro.
5. Risk can be measured
6. Risk measurement/assessment should lead to better decisions
7. The key to risk management is deciding what risks to hedge, what risks to pass through and what risks to take.

# A closing thought...

