



MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!

January 2017

Aswath Damodaran

I. Don't mistake accounting for finance

Valued based upon motive for investment – some marked to market, some recorded at cost and some at quasi-cost

Assets are recorded at original cost, adjusted for depreciation.

The Balance Sheet

Assets		Liabilities	
Long Lived Real Assets	Fixed Assets	Current Liabilities	Short-term liabilities of the firm
Short-lived Assets	Current Assets	Debt	Debt obligations of firm
Investments in securities & assets of other firms	Financial Investments	Other Liabilities	Other long-term obligations
Assets which are not physical, like patents & trademarks	Intangible Assets	Equity	Equity investment in firm

True intangible assets like brand name, patents and customer did not show up. The only intangible asset of any magnitude (goodwill) is a plug variable that is of consequence only if you do an acquisition.

Equity reflects original capital invested and historical retained earnings.

The financial balance sheet

Recorded at intrinsic value (based upon cash flows and risk), not at original cost



Value will depend upon magnitude of growth investments and excess returns on these investments

Intrinsic value of equity, reflecting intrinsic value of assets, net of true value of debt outstanding.

II. Don't assume that D+CF = DCF

4


- The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(\text{CF}_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(\text{CF}_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

1. *The IT Proposition:* If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.
2. *The DUH Proposition:* For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. *The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition:* Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


The drivers of value..

5




DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

6




1. Match your cash flows to your discount rates..

7



2. Don't let your "beta" dislike get in the way of assessing risk

8




3. Risk is not in the past..

	<i>Arithmetic Average</i>		<i>Geometric Average</i>	
	<i>Stocks - T. Bills</i>	<i>Stocks - T. Bonds</i>	<i>Stocks - T. Bills</i>	<i>Stocks - T. Bonds</i>
1928-2016	7.96%	6.24%	6.11%	4.62%
Std Error	2.13%	2.28%		
1967-2016	6.57%	4.37%	5.26%	3.42%
Std Error	2.42%	2.74%		
2007-2016	7.91%	3.62%	6.15%	2.30%
Std Error	6.06%	8.66%		

- If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it
 - ▣ Long term (because of the standard error)
 - ▣ Consistent with your risk free rate
 - ▣ A “compounded” average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.

But in the future..

10



4. Globalization is not a buzz word

11

- As companies get globalized, the valuations that we do have to reflect that globalization. In particular, we need to be wary of
 - ▣ Currency mismatches: Multinationals derive their revenues in many currencies but you have to be currency-consistent.
 - ▣ Beta gaming: When a company is listed in many markets, you can get very different betas, depending on how you set up and run a beta regression
 - ▣ Equity Risk Premiums: The standard practice of estimating equity risk premiums based on your country of incorporation will lead to skewed valuations.

ERP : Jan 2017

Andorra	8.81%	3.12%	Jersey	6.26%	0.57%
Austria	6.26%	0.57%	Liechtenstein	5.69%	0.00%
Belgium	6.55%	0.86%	Luxembourg	5.69%	0.00%
Cyprus	12.09%	6.40%	Malta	7.40%	1.71%
Denmark	5.69%	0.00%	Netherlands	5.69%	0.00%
Finland	6.26%	0.57%	Norway	5.69%	0.00%
France	6.39%	0.70%	Portugal	9.24%	3.55%
Germany	5.69%	0.00%	Spain	8.40%	2.71%
Greece	19.89%	14.20%	Sweden	5.69%	0.00%
Guernsey	6.26%	0.57%	Switzerland	5.69%	0.00%
Iceland	7.40%	1.71%	Turkey	9.24%	3.55%
Ireland	7.40%	1.71%	UK	6.26%	0.57%
Isle of Man	6.26%	0.57%	W.Europe	6.81%	1.12%
Italy	8.40%	2.71%			

Canada	5.69%	0.00%
USA	5.69%	0.00%
North America	5.69%	0.00%

Caribbean	13.81%	8.12%
------------------	---------------	--------------

Argentina	14.93%	9.24%
Belize	18.48%	12.79%
Bolivia	10.81%	5.12%
Brazil	9.96%	4.27%
Chile	6.55%	0.86%
Colombia	8.40%	2.71%
Costa Rica	9.24%	3.55%
Ecuador	14.93%	9.24%
El Salvador	14.93%	9.24%
Guatemala	9.24%	3.55%
Honduras	13.51%	7.82%
Mexico	7.40%	1.71%
Nicaragua	13.51%	7.82%
Panama	8.40%	2.71%
Paraguay	9.24%	3.55%
Peru	7.40%	1.71%
Suriname	12.09%	6.40%
Uruguay	8.40%	2.71%
Venezuela	19.89%	14.20%
Latin America	10.11%	4.42%

Angola	12.09%	6.40%
Botswana	6.90%	1.21%
Burkina Faso	14.93%	9.24%
Cameroon	13.51%	7.82%
Cape Verde	13.51%	7.82%
Congo (DR)	14.93%	9.24%
Congo (Rep)	14.93%	9.24%
Côte d'Ivoire	10.81%	5.12%
Egypt	14.93%	9.24%
Ethiopia	12.09%	6.40%
Gabon	12.09%	6.40%
Ghana	14.93%	9.24%
Kenya	12.09%	6.40%
Morocco	9.24%	3.55%
Mozambique	19.89%	14.20%
Namibia	8.81%	3.12%
Nigeria	12.09%	6.40%
Rwanda	13.51%	7.82%
Senegal	12.09%	6.40%
South Africa	8.40%	2.71%
Tunisia	10.81%	5.12%
Uganda	13.51%	7.82%
Zambia	14.93%	9.24%
Africa	11.98%	6.29%

Albania	12.09%	6.40%
Armenia	12.09%	6.40%
Azerbaijan	9.24%	3.55%
Belarus	16.34%	10.65%
Bosnia and Her	14.93%	9.24%
Bulgaria	8.40%	2.71%
Croatia	9.96%	4.27%
Czech Republic	6.69%	1.00%
Estonia	6.69%	1.00%
Georgia	10.81%	5.12%
Hungary	8.81%	3.12%
Kazakhstan	8.81%	3.12%
Kyrgyzstan	13.51%	7.82%
Latvia	7.40%	1.71%
Lithuania	7.40%	1.71%
Macedonia	10.81%	5.12%
Moldova	14.93%	9.24%
Montenegro	12.09%	6.40%
Poland	6.90%	1.21%
Romania	8.81%	3.12%
Russia	9.24%	3.55%
Serbia	12.09%	6.40%
Slovakia	6.90%	1.21%
Slovenia	8.81%	3.12%
Ukraine	19.89%	14.20%
E.Europe	9.09%	3.40%

Bahrain	9.96%	4.27%
Iraq	14.94%	9.25%
Israel	6.69%	1.00%
Jordan	12.09%	6.40%
Kuwait	6.40%	0.71%
Lebanon	13.51%	7.82%
Oman	7.96%	2.27%
Qatar	6.40%	0.71%
Ras Al Khaimah	6.90%	1.21%
Saudi Arabia	6.69%	1.00%
Sharjah	7.40%	1.71%
United Arab Emirates	6.40%	0.71%
Middle East	7.50%	1.81%

Country	ERP	CRP	Country	ERP	CRP
Algeria	13.72%	7.47%	Malawi	17.24%	10.99%
Brunei	9.75%	3.50%	Mali	13.90%	7.65%
Gambia	13.72%	7.47%	Myanmar	13.72%	7.47%
Guinea	20.00%	13.75%	Niger	17.24%	10.99%
Guinea-Bissau	12.48%	6.23%	Sierra Leone	16.61%	10.36%
Guyana	12.48%	6.23%	Somalia	20.00%	13.75%
Haiti	16.61%	10.36%	Sudan	20.00%	13.75%
Iran, D.P.R.	11.22%	4.97%	Syria	20.00%	13.75%
Korea, D.P.R.	17.24%	10.99%	Tanzania	13.90%	7.65%
Liberia	17.24%	10.99%	Togo	13.72%	7.47%
Libya	20.00%	13.75%	Yemen, Republic	17.24%	10.99%
Madagascar	12.48%	6.23%	Zimbabwe	17.24%	10.99%

Bangladesh	10.81%	5.12%
Cambodia	13.51%	7.82%
China	6.55%	0.86%
Fiji	12.09%	6.40%
Hong Kong	6.26%	0.57%
India	8.81%	3.12%
Indonesia	8.81%	3.12%
Japan	6.69%	1.00%
Korea	6.39%	0.70%
Macao	6.55%	0.86%
Malaysia	7.40%	1.71%
Mauritius	7.95%	2.26%
Mongolia	16.34%	10.65%
Pakistan	14.93%	9.24%
Papua New Guinea	13.51%	7.82%
Philippines	8.40%	2.71%
Singapore	5.69%	0.00%
Sri Lanka	12.09%	6.40%
Taiwan	6.55%	0.86%
Thailand	7.95%	2.26%
Vietnam	12.09%	6.40%
Asia	7.12%	1.43%


Australia	5.69%	0.00%
Cook Islands	12.09%	6.40%
New Zealand	5.69%	0.00%
Australia & NZ	5.70%	0.01%

Black #: Total ERP
 Red #: Country risk premium
 AVG: GDP weighted average

5. Everyone may do it, but that does not make it right.. The small cap premium


13

Figure 4: Small Firm Premium over time- 1927 -2015




6. Don't let your inputs be at war with each other.

14




And consider the trade offs..

Excess Returns - Global in January 2017



7. Don't sweat the small stuff

Cost of Capital in US \$: US and Global in January 2017



8. Don't let your macro views drown out your micro views..

18


- When you are asked to value a company, you should keep your focus on what drives that value. If you bring in your specific macro views into the valuation, the value that you obtain for a company will be a joint result of what you think about the company and your macro views.
- **Bottom line:** If you have macro views, provide them separately. You should be as macro-neutral as you can be, in your company valuations.
- **Follow up:** If you find macro risk dominating your thoughts, deal with it frontally.

San Miguel: November 2015 (in ARS)

Cash flows from existing assets

	2015	Last 5 years
Revenues (millions)	\$2,316.41	CAGR of 23.2%
Operating income (millions)	\$845.79	Operating margin = 36.51%
Effective tax rate	33.70%	Average = 36%
Book value of equity (millions)	\$1,057	
Invested Capital (millions)	\$1,442	
Return on invested capital =	38.90%	

The Payoff from growth



Maturity and Closure

Stable Growth $g = 15\%$;
 Cost of capital = 20%
 ROC=20%;
 Reinvestment Rate= $g/ROC = 15/20 = 75\%$

Terminal Value = $1,046 / (.20 - .15) = 20,916$

ARS Cashflows

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term Year
Revenue growth rate	23.34%	23.34%	23.34%	23.34%	23.34%	21.67%	20.00%	18.34%	16.67%	15.00%	15.00%
Revenues	\$ 2,857	\$ 3,524	\$ 4,346	\$ 5,361	\$ 6,612	\$ 8,044	\$ 9,653	\$ 11,423	\$ 13,327	\$ 15,327	\$ 17,625
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 1,043	\$ 1,287	\$ 1,587	\$ 1,957	\$ 2,414	\$ 2,937	\$ 3,525	\$ 4,171	\$ 4,866	\$ 5,596	\$ 6,436
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 692	\$ 853	\$ 1,052	\$ 1,298	\$ 1,601	\$ 1,940	\$ 2,319	\$ 2,733	\$ 3,176	\$ 3,638	\$ 4,183
- Reinvestment	\$ 336	\$ 415	\$ 512	\$ 631	\$ 779	\$ 892	\$ 1,001	\$ 1,102	\$ 1,185	\$ 1,244	\$ 3,137
FCFF	\$ 355	\$ 438	\$ 540	\$ 666	\$ 822	\$ 1,048	\$ 1,317	\$ 1,631	\$ 1,991	\$ 2,393	\$ 1,046

PV(Terminal value)	\$ 3,212
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 3,314
Value of operating assets =	\$ 6,526
- Debt	\$ 1,540
+ Cash	\$ 466
Value of equity	\$ 5,452
Number of shares	644.20
Estimated value /share	\$ 8.46

Discount at \$ Cost of Capital (WACC) = $22.62\% (.837) + 12.07\% (0.163) = 20.87\%$

The Risk in the Cash flows

Cost of Equity
22.62%

Cost of Debt
 $(15.57\% + .3\%)(1 - .25) = 12.07\%$

Weights
E = 83.7% D = 16.3%

On August 18, 2016, San Miguel was trading at \$10.30 per shares

Riskfree Rate:
ARS Risk free rate = 15.57%

+ Beta 0.83 X

Firm's D/E
Ratio: 20.6%

ERP = 8.53%

Country	Revenues	Weight	ERP
Argentina	255	11.08%	17.17%
Rest of the World	2047	88.92%	7.45%
San Miguel	2302	100.00%	8.53%

Business	Revenues	EV/Sales	Estimated Value	Unlevered Beta
Farming/Agriculture	\$ 476	1.3100	\$ 624	0.7600
Food Processing	\$ 1,163	1.6400	\$ 1,907	0.7200
Company	\$ 1,639		\$ 2,531	0.7299



The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules



In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).



In a **Dreamstate DCF**, you build amazing companies on spreadsheets, making outlandish assumptions about growth and operating margins over time.



A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

$$D+CF \neq DCF$$



In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.




In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.




A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of


III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation



From story to numbers and beyond..

22





Low Growth


The Auto Business

Low Margins

Year	Revenues (\$)	% Growth Rate
2005	1,274,716.60	
2006	1,421,804.20	11.54%
2007	1,854,576.40	30.44%
2008	1,818,533.00	-1.94%
2009	1,572,890.10	-13.51%
2010	1,816,269.40	15.47%
2011	1,962,630.40	8.06%
2012	2,110,572.20	7.54%
2013	2,158,603.00	2.28%
2014	2,086,124.80	-3.36%
ounded Average =		5.63%


+

The Automobile Business: Pre-tax Operating Margins in 2015



High & Increasing Reinvestment

Bad Business



=

	ROIC	Cost of capital	ROIC - Cost of capital
2004	6.82%	7.93%	-1.11%
2005	10.47%	7.02%	3.45%
2006	4.60%	7.97%	-3.37%
2007	7.62%	8.50%	-0.88%
2008	3.48%	8.03%	-4.55%
2009	-4.97%	8.58%	-13.55%
2010	5.16%	8.03%	-2.87%
2011	7.55%	8.15%	-0.60%
2012	7.80%	8.55%	-0.75%
2013	7.83%	8.47%	-0.64%
2014	6.47%	7.53%	-1.06%


Only once in the last 10 years have auto companies collectively earned more than their cost of capital

What makes Ferrari different?

Ferrari sold only 7,255 cars in all of 2014

Ferrari had a profit margin of 18.2%, in the 95th percentile, partly because of its high prices and partly because it spends little on advertising.

Ferrari: Geographical Sales (2014)



Ferrari sales (in units) have grown very little in the last decade & have been stable

Ferrari has not invested in new plants.

Step 1: The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be


1. An urban car service business: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong competitive advantages (from being a first mover).
5. And its existing low-capital business model, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

The Ferrari Narrative

- Ferrari will stay an exclusive auto club, deriving its allure from its scarcity and the fact that only a few own Ferraris.
- By staying exclusive, the company gets three benefits:
 - It can continue to charge nose bleed prices for its cars and sell them with little or no advertising.
 - It does not need to invest in new assembly plants, since it does not plan to ramp up production.
 - It sells only to the super rich, who are unaffected by overall economic conditions or market crises.

Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense

28



The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable

29

The Impossible

Bigger than the economy
Assuming Growth rate for company in perpetuity > Growth rate for economy

Bigger than the total market
Allowing a company's revenues to grow so much that it has more than a 100% market share of whatever business it is in.

Profit margin > 100%
Assuming earnings growth will exceed revenue growth for a long enough period, and pushing margins above 100%

Depreciation without cap ex
Assuming that depreciation will exceed cap ex in perpetuity.


The Implausible

Growth without reinvestment
Assuming growth forever without reinvestment.

Profits without competition
Assuming that your company will grow and earn higher profits, with no competition.


Returns without risk
Assuming that you can generate high returns in a business with no risk.

The Improbable



Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable

Uber (My narrative))



The Impossible: The Runaway Story

The Story




The Checks (?)


Board Member	Designation	Age
Henry Kissinger	Former Secretary of State	92
Bill Perry	Former Secretary of Defense	88
George Schultz	Former Secretary of State	94
Bill Frist	Former Senate Majority Leader	63
Sam Nunn	Former Senator	77
Gary Roughead	Former Navy Admiral	64
James Mattis	Former Marine Corps General	65
Dick Kovocovich	Former CEO of Wells Fargo	72
Riley Bechtel	Former CEO of Bechtel	63
William Foege	Epidemiologist	79
Elizabeth Holmes	Founder & CEO, Theranos	31
Sunny Balwani	President & COO, Theranos	NA

+ Money

Companies valued at \$1 billion or more by venture-capital firms



Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)

Stable Growth (after year 10)
 Expected growth rate = 2.50%
 Cost of capital = 8%
 Return on capital = 25%
 Reinvestment Rate = 2.5%/25% = 10%

Terminal Value₁₀ = 793 / (.08 - 0.025) = \$14,418

Term yr
 EBIT (1-t) \$881
 - Reinv 88
 FCFF \$793

Based on the investment of \$1.2 billion made by investors, the imputed value for Uber's operating assets, in June 2014, was \$17 billion.

Global taxi market is \$100 billion currently, expected to grow 6% a year for next ten years.

Uber will keep 20% of the gross cab receipts as its revenues

Uber's market share of this market will increase to 10% over the next 10 years.

Uber's operating expenses will amount to 60% of its revenues. (Operating margin=40%)

Uber will pay a tax rate of 30% on its income, increasing to 40% over the next 10 years

Uber will generate \$5 in incremental revenues for every dollar of incremental capital.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Overall market	\$106,000	\$112,360	\$119,102	\$126,248	\$133,823	\$141,852	\$150,363	\$159,385	\$168,948	\$179,085
Share of market (gross)	3.63%	5.22%	6.41%	7.31%	7.98%	8.49%	8.87%	9.15%	9.36%	10.00%
Revenues as percent of gross	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%
Annual Revenue	\$769	\$1,173	\$1,528	\$1,846	\$2,137	\$2,408	\$2,666	\$2,916	\$3,163	\$3,582
Operating margin	7.00%	10.67%	14.33%	18.00%	21.67%	25.33%	29.00%	32.67%	36.33%	40.00%
Operating Income	\$54	\$125	\$219	\$332	\$463	\$610	\$773	\$953	\$1,149	\$1,433
Effective tax rate	31%	32%	33%	34%	35%	36%	37%	38%	39%	40%
- Taxes	\$17	\$40	\$72	\$113	\$162	\$220	\$286	\$362	\$448	\$573
After-tax operating income	\$37	\$85	\$147	\$219	\$301	\$390	\$487	\$591	\$701	\$860
Sales/Capital Ratio	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
- Reinvestment	\$94	\$81	\$71	\$64	\$58	\$54	\$52	\$50	\$49	\$84
Free Cash Flow to the Firm	-\$57	\$4	\$76	\$156	\$243	\$336	\$435	\$541	\$652	\$776

Value of operating assets = \$6,595

Adjust for probability of failure (10%)
 Expected value = \$6,595 (.9) = \$5,895

Discount back the cash flows (including terminal value) at the cumulated cost of capital.

Cost of capital for first 5 years =
 Top decile of US companies =
 12%

Cost of capital declines from 12% to
 8% from years 6 to 10.

Ferrari: The “Exclusive Club” Value

Stay Super Exclusive: Revenue growth is low

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.34%	2.68%	2.02%	1.36%	0.70%	0.70%
Revenues	€ 2,763	€ 2,874	€ 2,988	€ 3,108	€ 3,232	€ 3,362	€ 3,474	€ 3,567	€ 3,639	€ 3,689	€ 3,714	€ 3,740
EBIT (Operating) margin	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 503	€ 523	€ 544	€ 566	€ 588	€ 612	€ 632	€ 649	€ 662	€ 671	€ 676	€ 681
Tax rate	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%
EBIT(1-t)	€ 334	€ 348	€ 361	€ 376	€ 391	€ 407	€ 420	€ 431	€ 440	€ 446	€ 449	€ 452
- Reinvestment		€ 78	€ 81	€ 84	€ 87	€ 91	€ 79	€ 66	€ 51	€ 35	€ 18	€ 22
FCFF		€ 270	€ 281	€ 292	€ 303	€ 316	€ 341	€ 366	€ 389	€ 411	€ 431	€ 431
Cost of capital		6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.97%	6.98%	6.99%	7.00%	7.00%
PV(FCFF)		€ 252	€ 245	€ 238	€ 232	€ 225	€ 228	€ 228	€ 227	€ 224	€ 220	
Terminal value	€ 6,835											
PV(Terminal value)	€ 3,485											
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 2,321											
Value of operating assets =	€ 5,806											
- Debt	€ 623											
- Minority interests	€ 13											
+ Cash	€ 1,141											
Value of equity	€ 6,311											

High Prices
+ No selling
cost =
Preserve
current
operating
margin

Minimal
Reinvestment
due to low
growth

The super
rich are not
sensitive to
economic
downturns

Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
 - ▣ Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
 - ▣ Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
 - ▣ Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
 - ▣ Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

The Gurley Pushback

36

1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	<i>Uber (Gurley)</i>	<i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i>	<i>Uber (Damodaran)</i>
Narrative	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages</u> to get a <u>significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	\$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+)	\$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+)	\$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion)

Different narratives, Different Numbers

<i>Total Market</i>	<i>Growth Effect</i>	<i>Network Effect</i>	<i>Competitive Advantages</i>	<i>Value of Uber</i>
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

The Real World Intrudes: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold


39

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options

IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy.. And accuracy for payoff..

40

Better accurate
than precise




High Accuracy
High Precision

Low Accuracy
High Precision

High Accuracy
Low Precision

Low Accuracy
Low Precision


It's all relative



Valuing a start up is hard to do..

Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.



And the dark side will beckon..

42

- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is “too difficult” or even “impossible” to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the “dark side”, where
 - ▣ You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
 - ▣ You will hear “macro” stories, justifying value
 - ▣ You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.

Twitter: Setting the table in October 2013

	Last 10K	Trailing 12 month
Revenues	\$316.93	\$534.46
Operating Income	(\$77.06)	(\$134.91)
Adjusted Operating Income		\$7.66
Invested Capital		\$955.00
Adjusted Operating Margin		1.44%
Sales/ Invested Capital		\$0.56

Twitter: Priming the Pump for Valuation

1. Make small revenues into big revenues

	2011		2012		2013	
	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$
Google	32.09%	\$27.74	31.46%	\$32.73	33.24%	\$38.83
Facebook	3.65%	\$3.15	4.11%	\$4.28	5.04%	\$5.89
Yahoo!	3.95%	\$3.41	3.37%	\$3.51	3.10%	\$3.62
Microsoft	1.27%	\$1.10	1.63%	\$1.70	1.78%	\$2.08
IAC	1.15%	\$0.99	1.39%	\$1.45	1.47%	\$1.72
AOL	1.17%	\$1.01	1.02%	\$1.06	0.95%	\$1.11
Amazon	0.48%	\$0.41	0.59%	\$0.61	0.71%	\$0.83
Pandora	0.28%	\$0.24	0.36%	\$0.37	0.50%	\$0.58
Twitter	0.16%	\$0.14	0.28%	\$0.29	0.50%	\$0.58
Linkedin	0.18%	\$0.16	0.25%	\$0.26	0.32%	\$0.37
Millennial Media	0.05%	\$0.04	0.07%	\$0.07	0.10%	\$0.12
Other	55.59%	\$48.05	55.47%	\$57.71	52.29%	\$61.09
Total Market	100%	\$86.43	100.00%	\$104.04	100.00%	\$116.82

2. Make losses into profits

Company	Operating Margin
Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG)	22.82%
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	29.99%
Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO)	13.79%
Netflix	3.16%
Groupon	2.53%
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	5.18%
Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P)	-9.13%
Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP)	-6.19%
OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN)	24.90%
RetailMeNot	45.40%
Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO)	15.66%
Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z)	-66.60%
Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA)	-6.79%
Aggregate	20.40%

		Annual growth rate in Global Advertising Spending				
		2.00%	2.50%	3.00%	3.50%	4.00%
Online advertising share of market	20%	\$124.78	\$131.03	\$137.56	\$144.39	\$151.52
	25%	\$155.97	\$163.79	\$171.95	\$180.49	\$189.40
	30%	\$187.16	\$196.54	\$206.34	\$216.58	\$227.28
	35%	\$218.36	\$229.30	\$240.74	\$252.68	\$265.16
	40%	\$249.55	\$262.06	\$275.13	\$288.78	\$303.04

My estimate for 2023: Overall online advertising market will be close to \$200 billion and Twitter will have about 5.7% (\$11.5 billion)

My estimate for Twitter: Operating margin of 25% in year 10

3. Reinvest for growth


	Sales/ Invested Capital
Twitter (2013)	1.10
Advertising Companies	1.40
Social Media Companies	1.05

My estimate for Twitter: Sales/Capital will be 1.50 for next 10 years



The Cost of Capital for Twitter

Risk in the discount rate

My estimate for Twitter



Cost of Capital: US - Nov '13



Certain to make it as going concern

Certain to fail

My assumption for Twitter

Starting numbers

	Last 10K	Trailing 12 month
Revenues	\$316.93	\$534.46
Operating income	-\$77.06	-\$134.91
Adjusted Operating Income		\$7.67
Invested Capital		\$955.00
Adjusted Operatng Margin		1.44%
Sales/ Invested Capital		0.56
Interest expenses	\$2.49	\$5.30

Twitter Pre-IPO Valuation: October 27, 2013

Revenue growth of 51.5% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 25% over the next 10 years

Sales to capital ratio of 1.50 for incremental sales

Stable Growth
 g = 2.5%; Beta = 1.00;
 Cost of capital = 8%
 ROC = 12%;
 Reinvestment Rate = 2.5%/12% = 20.83%

Terminal Value₁₀ = 1466 / (.08 - .025) = \$26,657

Operating assets	\$9,705
+ Cash	321
+ IPO Proceeds	1295
- Debt	214
Value of equity	11,106
- Options	713
Value in stock	10,394
/ # of shares	582.46
Value/share	\$17.84


	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenues	\$ 810	\$1,227	\$1,858	\$2,816	\$4,266	\$6,044	\$7,973	\$9,734	\$10,932	\$11,205
Operating Income	\$ 31	\$ 75	\$ 158	\$ 306	\$ 564	\$ 941	\$1,430	\$1,975	\$ 2,475	\$ 2,801
Operating Income after tax	\$ 31	\$ 75	\$ 158	\$ 294	\$ 395	\$ 649	\$ 969	\$1,317	\$ 1,624	\$ 1,807
- Reinvestment	\$ 183	\$ 278	\$ 421	\$ 638	\$ 967	\$1,186	\$1,285	\$1,175	\$ 798	\$ 182
FCFF	\$(153)	\$(203)	\$(263)	\$(344)	\$(572)	\$(537)	\$(316)	\$ 143	\$ 826	\$ 1,625

Terminal year (11)

EBIT (1-t)	\$ 1,852
- Reinvestment	\$ 386
FCFF	\$ 1,466

Cost of capital = 11.12% (.981) + 5.16% (.019) = 11.01%

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10




A sobering reminder: You will be “wrong” and it is okay

47

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- Remember that it is not just your value that is changing, but so is the price, and the price will change a great deal more than the value.

And your value is not a fact, but an estimate..

<p>Revenue Growth Rate Distribution: Uniform Expected Value = 55% Minimum Value: 40% Maximum Value: 70%</p>	<p>Compounded annual revenue growth rate over next 5 years =</p> <p>Not for Commercial Use</p>
<p>Target Operating Margin Distribution: Normal Expected Value = 25% Standard Deviation = 5%</p>	<p>Target pre-tax operating margin (2.00% on % of sales in year 5) =</p> <p>Not for Commercial Use</p>
<p>Sales to Capital Ratio Distribution: Lognormal Expected value: 1.50 Standard deviation: 0.15</p>	<p>Sales to capital ratio (for computing reinvestment) =</p> <p>Not for Commercial Use</p>
<p>Cost of Capital Distribution: Triangular Expected value: 11.22% Minimum value: 10.02% Maximum value: 12.22%</p>	<p>Initial cost of capital =</p> <p>Not for Commercial Use</p>



Forecasting in the face of uncertainty. A test:

49

- In which of these two cities would you find it easier to forecast the weather?

Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	1.7°	1.2°
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	1.5°	2.0°

Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Chance of dry day after a precip day	67%	81%
Chance of precip day after a dry day	7%	13%

Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°

Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%

But the payoff is greatest where there is the most uncertainty...

Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	1.7°	1.2°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	67%	81%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	1.5°	2.0°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	7%	13%

[Further changeability analysis »](#)

Weather forecast accuracy for Honolulu, Hawaii

Last Month		Last Year	
MeteoGroup	88.44%	MeteoGroup	88.50%
Persistence	81.80%	CustomWeather	85.87%
CustomWeather	78.23%	AccuWeather	81.82%
The Weather Channel	73.12%	The Weather Channel	81.56%
AccuWeather	69.89%	Persistence	80.44%
Weather Underground	62.10%	Weather Underground	67.07%
National Weather Service	48.39%	National Weather Service	59.90%
Foreca	44.35%	Foreca	57.52%
WeatherBug	32.26%	WeatherBug	37.09%


Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%

[Further changeability analysis »](#)


Weather forecast accuracy for Epping, North Dakota

Last Month		Last Year	
MeteoGroup	62.50%	MeteoGroup	66.97%
Foreca	61.61%	The Weather Channel	66.73%
The Weather Channel	61.31%	AccuWeather	64.86%
AccuWeather	60.42%	WeatherBug	64.80%
Weather Underground	56.85%	Foreca	62.75%
WeatherBug	56.17%	CustomWeather	62.70%
National Weather Service	54.76%	National Weather Service	62.64%
CustomWeather	54.46%	Weather Underground	61.38%
Persistence	38.01%	Persistence	44.09%




V. Don't mistake price for value!

51



Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

52

 **5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr**
La Jolla, CA 92037
Status: Active





\$995,000
Price

3
Beds

2.5
Baths


1,440 Sq. Ft.
\$691 / Sq. Ft.


Built: 1955 Lot Size: 3,000 Sq. Ft. On Redfin: 12 days

Favorite X-Out Share... Tour Home

Overview Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights Similar Homes




1 of 25  [Play Video](#)

Lisa Padilla
REDFIN Real Estate Agent


★★★★★
47 client reviews

\$8,726 commission refund

 [Go Tour This Home](#)

[Ask Lisa a Question](#) or [Start an Offer](#)

1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area



Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

53

Europe
Switzerland

Biotechnology
Biotechnology

Reuters
BION.S

Bloomberg
BION SW

Exchange
SWX
Ticker
BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

Key changes

Target Price 106.50 to 164.50 ↑ 54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4

Test 3: Are you pricing or valuing?

54

	1	2	3	4	5
EBITDA	\$100.00	\$120.00	\$144.00	\$172.80	\$207.36
- Depreciation	\$20.00	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47
EBIT	\$80.00	\$96.00	\$115.20	\$138.24	\$165.89
- Taxes	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47	\$49.77
EBIT (1-t)	\$56.00	\$67.20	\$80.64	\$96.77	\$116.12
+ Depreciation	\$20.00	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47
- Cap Ex	\$50.00	\$60.00	\$72.00	\$86.40	\$103.68
- Chg in WC	\$10.00	\$12.00	\$14.40	\$17.28	\$20.74
FCFF	\$16.00	\$19.20	\$23.04	\$27.65	\$33.18
Terminal Value					\$1,658.88
Cost of capital	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%
Present Value	\$14.78	\$16.38	\$18.16	\$20.14	\$1,138.35
Value of operating assets today	\$1,207.81				
+ Cash	\$125.00				
- Debt	\$200.00				
Value of equity	\$1,132.81				

The determinants of price

55

Mood and Momentum

Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed).

Liquidity & Trading Ease

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price


Incremental information

Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think

To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

Multiples and Comparable Transactions



To be a better pricer, here are four suggestions

- Check your multiple or consistency/uniformity
 - ▣ In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Look at all the data, not just the key statistics
 - ▣ Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Don't forget the fundamentals ultimately matter
 - ▣ It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Don't define comparables based only on sector
 - ▣ Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

Pricing Twitter: Start with the “comparables”

58

Company	Market Cap	Enterprise value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	Number of users (millions)	EV/User	EV/Revenue	EV/EBITDA	PE
Facebook	\$173,540.00	\$160,090.00	\$7,870.00	\$3,930.00	\$1,490.00	1230.00	\$130.15	20.34	40.74	116.47
Linkedin	\$23,530.00	\$19,980.00	\$1,530.00	\$182.00	\$27.00	277.00	\$72.13	13.06	109.78	871.48
Pandora	\$7,320.00	\$7,150.00	\$655.00	-\$18.00	-\$29.00	73.40	\$97.41	10.92	NA	NA
Groupon	\$6,690.00	\$5,880.00	\$2,440.00	\$125.00	-\$95.00	43.00	\$136.74	2.41	47.04	NA
Netflix	\$25,900.00	\$25,380.00	\$4,370.00	\$277.00	\$112.00	44.00	\$576.82	5.81	91.62	231.25
Yelp	\$6,200.00	\$5,790.00	\$233.00	\$2.40	-\$10.00	120.00	\$48.25	24.85	2412.50	NA
Open Table	\$1,720.00	\$1,500.00	\$190.00	\$63.00	\$33.00	14.00	\$107.14	7.89	23.81	52.12
Zynga	\$4,200.00	\$2,930.00	\$873.00	\$74.00	-\$37.00	27.00	\$108.52	3.36	39.59	NA
Zillow	\$3,070.00	\$2,860.00	\$197.00	-\$13.00	-\$12.45	34.50	\$82.90	14.52	NA	NA
Trulia	\$1,140.00	\$1,120.00	\$144.00	-\$6.00	-\$18.00	54.40	\$20.59	7.78	NA	NA
Tripadvisor	\$13,510.00	\$12,860.00	\$945.00	\$311.00	\$205.00	260.00	\$49.46	13.61	41.35	65.90
						Average	\$130.01	11.32	350.80	267.44
						Median	\$97.41	10.92	44.20	116.47

Read the tea leaves: See what the market cares about

59

	<i>Market Cap</i>	<i>Enterprise value</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>Net Income</i>	<i>Number of users (millions)</i>
<i>Market Cap</i>	1.					
<i>Enterprise value</i>	0.9998	1.				
<i>Revenues</i>	0.8933	0.8966	1.			
<i>EBITDA</i>	0.9709	0.9701	0.8869	1.		
<i>Net Income</i>	0.8978	0.8971	0.8466	0.9716	1.	
<i>Number of users (millions)</i>	0.9812	0.9789	0.8053	0.9354	0.8453	1.

Twitter had 240 million users at the time of its IPO. What price would you attach to the company?

Use the “market metric” and “market price”

60

- The most important variable, in late 2013, in determining market value and price in this sector (social media, ill defined as that is) is the number of users that a company has.
- Looking at comparable firms, it looks like the market is paying about \$100/user in valuing social media companies, with a premium for “predictable” revenues (subscriptions) and user intensity.
- Twitter has about 240 million users and can be valued based on the \$100/user:
- Enterprise value = $240 * 100 = \$24$ billion

VI. Investing is an act of faith..


61

- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
- That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
- Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as “speculators”, viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.
- If you have faith in investing, you will be tested.

Active Investing is a loser's game

Tough to Beat

Percentage of U.S. large-company mutual funds outperforming the Vanguard 500 Index Fund



And it stays that way across styles..

	<i>% of US Mutual Funds that beat their respective indices</i>			
	Value	Growth	Core	All
Large	82.17%	86.54%	88.26%	84.15%
Mid-cap	70.27%	81.48%	76.51%	76.69%
Small	92.31%	91.89%	91.44%	90.13%
All Equity				88.43%
Real Estate				82.64%

S&P computes these percentages for the last year, the last 3 years & the last 10 years. There is not a single period or a single fund grouping where the number is <50%.

And the "smart" money does not stay smart for very long

Funds' Flop

Three-year rolling relative performance of stock hedge funds




*Compared to a 50/50 MSCI World Net Return Local Currency/LIBOR 3 Month USD index

Source: Partners Capital Investment Group analysis of data from HFR, MSCI and WSJ Market Data Group

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Investment Heaven is a promise, not a guarantee..

Apple, Price and Value - 2010 to 2017



Follow the yellow brick road..



Aswath Damodaran