
## MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!


February 2019 Aswath Damodaran

### I. Don't mistake accounting for finance



True intangible assets like brand name, patents and customer did not show up. The only intangible asset of any magnitude (goodwill) is a plug variable that is of consequence only if you do an acquisition. Equity reflects original capital invested and historical retained earnings.

#### The financial balance sheet



Value will depend upon magnitude of growth investments and excess returns on these investments

Intrinsic value of equity, reflecting intrinsic value of assets, net of true value of debt outstanding.

#### II. Don't assume that D+CF = DCF

- □ The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate: Value of asset =  $\frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$
- 1. The IT Proposition: If "it" does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), "it" cannot affect value.
- 2. The DUH Proposition: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
- 3. The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


#### The drivers of value..

	What is the <b>value added</b> by growth assets? Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflows Firm: Growth in operating earnings/	
What are the cashflows from existing assets? - Equity: Cashflows	cashflows	When will the firm become a <b>mature firm</b> , and what are
after debt payments - Firm: Cashflows before debt payments	How <b>risky are the cash flows</b> from both existing assets and growth assets? Equity: Risk in equity in the company Firm: Risk in the firm's operations	the potential roadblocks?

#### DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

#### Value of growth

The future cash flows will reflect expectations of how quickly earnings will grow in the future (as a positive) and how much the company will have to reinvest to generate that growth (as a negative). The net effect will determine the value of growth. Expected Cash Flow in year t = E(CF) = Expected Earnings in year t - Reinvestment needed for growth



#### **Risk in the Cash flows**

The risk in the investment is captured in the discount rate as a beta in the cost of equity and the default spread in the cost of debt.

### 1. Match your cash flows to your discount

#### rates..

7

25.00%	Ten-year Government Bond Rates, net of Default spread (based on sovereign rating)										
25.00%											
20.00%											
15.00%											
10.00%											
5.00%											
0.00%											
0.00%	Croatian Kuna Bulgarian Lev garian Forint Swiss Franc Tai wanese 5 Euro namese Dong Danish Krona British Pound HK \$ Wedish Krona Israeli Shekel kistani Rupee HK \$ NZ \$ Polish Zloty HK \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ Vasian Ringgit Qatari Dinar Chinese Yuan Peruvian Sol hilipine Peso Canadian \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ NZ \$ NZ										
-5.00%	Croatian Kuna Japanese Yeni Bulgarian Levi Hungarian Forint Swiss Franc Tai wanese \$ Euro Vietnamese Dong Danish Krona Euro Vietnamese Dong Danish Krona Singapore \$ Canadian \$ HK \$ Norwegian Krone Korean Won Singapore \$ Canadian \$ NZ \$ Norwegian Krona Israeli Shekel PK \$ Norwegian Krona Israeli Shekel PK \$ Norwegian Krona Singapore \$ Canadian \$ NZ \$ Nalyasian Ringgit Oatari Dinar Canadian \$ NZ \$ Nalyasian Ringe NZ \$ Nalyasian Ringe Nalyasian Rupiah Colombian Peso Indonesian Rupiah Colombian Peso Russian Ruble Indian Rupee South African Rand Mexican Peso Brazilian Raira Nigerian Naira Kenyan Shilling Turkish Lira Venezuelan Bolivar										
	Risk free Rate Default Spread based on rating										

Aswath Damodaran

### Valuing Infosys in Rupees and Dollars

	In Rupees	In Dollars
Risk free Rate	5.38%	2.85%
Expected growth rate	10.00% for next 5 years, scaling down to 5.38% in year 10 (and forever)	7.37% for next 5 years, scaling down to 2.85% in year 10 (and forever)
Return on Capital	Marginal ROIC of 39.70%, scaling down to 15% forever	Marginal ROIC of 37.68%, scaling down to 12.36% forever.
Cost of capital	11.02% for next 5 years, scaling down to 9.88% in year 10 (and beyond)	8.36% for next 5 years, scaling down to 7.23% in year 10 (and beyond)
Value per share	Rs 1072.22 per share about 7% below stock price of Rs 1,150/share	\$16.86 per share about 7% below stock price of \$18.02/share

Aswath Damodaran

### 2. Risk is not in the past..


	Arithmet	tic Average	Geometric Average				
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds			
1928-2017	8.09%	6.38%	6.26%	4.77%			
Std Error	2.10%	2.24%					
1968-2017	6.58%	4.24%	5.28%	3.29%			
Std Error	2.39%	2.70%					
2008-2017	9.85% 5.98%		8.01%	4.56%			
Std Error	6.12%	8.70%					

□If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it

- Long term (because of the standard error)
- Consistent with your risk free rate
- A "compounded" average

■No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.

#### But in the future..



### 3. Globalization is not a buzz word

- As companies get globalized, the valuations that we do have to reflect that globalization. In particular, we need to be wary of
  - Currency mismatches: Multinationals derive their revenues in many currencies but you have to be currency-consistent.
  - Beta gaming: When a company is listed in many markets, you can get very different betas, depending on how you set up and run a beta regression
  - Equity Risk Premiums: The standard practice of estimating equity risk premiums based on your country of incorporation will lead to skewed valuations.

Central	and South America	10.61%	4.65%					Red #: Country Regional #: GD			
Venezu					12.63%	6.67	0	Black #: Total I			
Urugua	r	8.60%		Africa	16.37%						
Surinan	ne	13.60%		~	13.60%		_	Middle East		7.96%	2.00%
Peru				_	13.60%		_	United Arab Emirates		6.65%	
Paragua	y	9.43%		_	12,21%			Sharjah		7.63%	
Panama		8.60%			13.60%			Saudi Arabia	1400 017	6.94%	
Nicarag		13.60%		South Africa	9.02%	3.06	6	Ras Al Khaimah (Emi	rate of	7.14%	
Mexico			1.67%	Sellegal	10.96%	5.00	6	Qatar			0.84%
Hondur		12.21%	6.25%	Rwanda	13.60%		_	Oman		9.02%	3.06%
Juatem		9.43%	3.47%	Nigeria	13.60%		_	Lebanon		14.99%	9.03%
El Salva		16.37%	10.41%	Namihia	9.43%		_	Kuwait		6.65%	0.69%
Ecuador				Mozambique	19.83%		_	Jordan		12.21%	
		14.99%	9.03%	Morocco	9.43%		_	Israel		6.94%	0.98%
Costa R		12.21%	6.25%	Kenya	13.60%	_	_	Iraq		16.37%	
Colomb	ia	8.60%	2.64%	Ghana	14.99%		_	Bahrain		13.60%	7.64%
Chile		6.94%	0.98%	Gabon	16.37%		_	Abu Dhabi		6.65%	0.69%
Brazil		10.13%	4.17%	Egypt Ethiopia	12.21%			Eastern Europe & Russia	9.24%	3.28%	
Bolivia		10.96%	5.00%	Cole u Ivolle	10.96%		_	Ukraine	18.46%		
Belize		14.99%	9.03%	- Congo (Rep)	10.96%			Tajikistan	9.43%		
Argenti	na	13.60%	7.64%	Congo (DR) Congo (Rep)	14.99%	_	_	Slovenia	8.18%		
				Cape Verde Congo (DR)	15.60%			Slovakia	7.14%		
Caribbe	an	13.61%	7.65%	Cameroon Came Varda	13.60% 13.60%		_	Serbia	10.96%		
					13.60%		_	Russia	9.43%		
North A	merica	5.96%	0.00%	Botswana Burkina Faso	7.14%		_	Romania	9.02%		
United			0.00%	Benin	12.21%		_	Poland	7.14%		
Canada		5.96%	0.00%	Angola	14.99%		_	Montenegro	12.21%	6.25%	
				4	14.000	0.02		Moldova	14.99%		
┝┷┷┥				Western Europe	7.1	1% 1.:	3%	Macedonia	10.96%		
ER	Isle of Man	6.65%	0.69%	United Kingdom	_	5% 0.0	_	Lithuania	7.63%		
$\sim$	Ireland	7.14%		Turkey	_	6% <mark>5.</mark>		Latvia	7.63%		
Ч	Iceland	7.63%		Switzerland	_	6% 0.0	_	Kyrgyzstan	9.02%		
••	Guernsey (States of)			Sweden		6% 0.0		Hungary Kazakhstan	9.02%	3.06% 3.06%	Madagascar
	Greece	14.99%	-	Spain	8.1			Georgia	10.13% 9.02%		Libya
α'	Germany	5.96%		Portugal	_	2% 3.		Estonia	6.94%		Liberia
an	France	6.65%		Norway	5.9	_	_	Czech Republic	6.94%		Iran Korea, D.P.R
	Finland	6.51%		Netherlands	_	6% <mark>0.</mark>		Croatia	10.13%		Haiti
$\widetilde{\sim}$	Denmark	5.96%		Malta	7.6		_	Bulgaria	8.60%		Guyana
201	Cyprus	10.13%		Luxembourg	5.9	_		Bosnia and Herzegovina	14.99%		Guinea Guinea-Bissa
	Belgium	6.80%		Liechtenstein	_	6% 0.0	-	Belarus	14.99%	-	Gambia
6	Austria	6.51%	-	Jersey (States o	<u> </u>	0% 0.1		Azerbaijan	10.13%		Brunei
	Andorra	6 5404	-	Italy	0 00	2% 3.0	_	Armenia	12.21%		Algeria

PRS	ERP	CRP	Country		PRS	ERP	CRP
65	13.60%	7.64%	Malawi			16.37%	
	6.94%					16.37%	
63.3	14.99%	9.03%	Myanm	ar		16.37%	
	22.61% 16.37%					22.61% 22.61%	
	12.21%					22.61%	
	18.46%			3		28.10%	
	10.13%				51.8	22.61%	16.65%
. 53	22.61%	16.65%	Togo		61	16.37%	
53.5	22.61%	16.65%	Yemen,	Republic		28.10%	
	12.21%			we	59.3	18.46%	12.50%
64	14.99%	9.03%					
Bang	glades	h		10.96	%	5.00%	6
Cam	bodia	1		13.60	%	7.64%	6
Chir	a			6.94	%	0.98%	6
Fiji					_	5.00%	_
	g Koi	ng		6.65	%	0. <b>69</b> %	6
India				8.60	%	2.64%	6
Indo	nesia			8.60	%	2.64%	6
Japa	n			6.94	%	0.98%	6
Kore	ea				_	0.69%	_
Mac				6.80	_	0.84%	_
	aysia			7.63	_	1.67%	_
	dives			13.60	_	7.64%	_
	ritius			8.18	_	2.22%	_
	igolia					9.03%	
Paki					_	9.03%	_
-	ia Ne		inea		_	7.64%	_
	ppine			8.60	_	2.64%	_
	apore			5.96	_	0.00%	
	mon		ls	14.99	_	9.03%	_
	anka			12.21	_	6.25%	_
Taiw				8.18	-	2.22%	_
Thai				8.18	_	2.22%	_
Viet				10.96	_	5.00%	_
Asia				7.43	%	1.47%	6

Australia & New Zealand	5.96%	0.00%
New Zealand	5.96%	0.00%
Cook Islands	12.21%	6.25%
Australia	5.96%	0.00%

### And your country risk exposure comes from where you operate, not where you incorporate!

Region	Revenues	ERP	Weight	Weighted ERP
North America	₹ 42,408	5.08%	62.01%	3.1499%
Europe	₹ 15,302	6.01%	22.37%	1.3437%
Rest of the World	₹ 8,504	6.21%	12.43%	0.7721%
India	₹ 2,180	7.27%	3.19%	0.2317%
Total	₹ 68,394		100.00%	5.4974%

1. By focusing on revenues, are we misestimating country risk exposure?


2. As the company looks to grow in Latin America and Asia, how do you see this premium evolving?

### Shell: Equity Risk Premium- March 2016

Country	Oil & Gas Production	% of Total	ERP
Denmark	17396	3.83%	6.20%
Italy	11179	2.46%	9.14%
Norway	14337	3.16%	6.20%
UK	20762	4.57%	6.81%
Rest of Europe	874	0.19%	7.40%
Brunei	823	0.18%	9.04%
Iraq	20009	4.40%	11.37%
Malaysia	22980	5.06%	8.05%
Oman	78404	17.26%	7.29%
Russia	22016	4.85%	10.06%
Rest of Asia & ME	24480	5.39%	7.74%
Oceania	7858	1.73%	6.20%
Gabon	12472	2.75%	11.76%
Nigeria	67832	14.93%	11.76%
Rest of Africa	6159	1.36%	12.17%
USA	104263	22.95%	6.20%
Canada	8599	1.89%	6.20%
Brazil	13307	2.93%	9.60%
Rest of Latin America	576	0.13%	10.78%
Royal Dutch Shell	454326	100.00%	8.26%

## 4. Everyone may do it, but that does not make it right.. The small cap premium


Figure 4: Small Firm Premium over time- 1927 -2015



Year

Aswath Damodaran

# 5. Don't let your inputs be at war with each other..



#### The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

#### Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)


,	/		,	<b>`</b>						/						
	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 20
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,7
6 Growth		52%	75%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	1
automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,
6 Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,9
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	_
Total Sales	2,478	3,361	5,655	7,095	10,072	12,768	16,736	21,648	26,403	31,416	36,959	42,087	48,017	54,355	61,296	68,0
6 Growth		36%	68%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	
EBITDA	148	417	920	1,042	1,586	2,150	3,138	4,066	4,857	5,723	6,328	7,182	8,144	9,688	10,874	12,0
6 Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17,1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17
8A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,
6 of Capex	41%	79%	55%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	75%	76%	76%	76%	76%	
BIT	45	259	748	839	1,285	1,796	2,749	3,529	4,252	5,027	5,517	6,244	7,056	8,429	9,423	10,4
6 Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14,1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	16.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	1
let Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	1
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
retax Income	46	258	758	872	1,332	1,886	2,857	3,684	4,451	5,305	5,875	6,688	7,598	9,080	10,207	11,2
ncome Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2;
6 Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	
let Income	44	256	744	839	1,246	1,624	2,395	3,043	3,644	4,303	4,741	5,372	6,128	7,319	8,179	9,0
Plus																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(9
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,6
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
055																
hange in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	6
6 of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	
apital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,
of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	_
Ither	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
inlevered Free Cash Flow	78	229	750	863	1,186	1,702	2,343	2,884	3,314	4,113	4,472	4,959	5,456	6,597	7,315	8,
					1,100		2,010	2,004	0,014	4,110	4,478			0,000	1,010	
													EBITDA			12,
													Sales			68,
													Net Debt (Cas			(
													Tesla Diluted	Shares		
xit EBITDA High							12.0 >	(	Exit PPG Hid	h	5.0%		Exit P/Sales H	lich	180%	
Exit EBITDA Low							8.0 3		Exit PPG Low		3.0%		Exit P/Sales L		130%	
													and a second		10010	

Discount R Discount R		FY Month of Valuation Month of FY End	1.0 (Beginning of this Month) 12.0 (End of this Month)	
Discontro	reage cow a.u.w	Monar of FT Eng	rate (cha or ans monar)	

\_\_\_\_\_

#### And consider the trade offs..


18



Aswath Damodaran

#### 6. Don't sweat the small stuff





Aswath Damodaran

### 7. Don't let your terminal value run away with your valuation

 In the terminal value equation, the growth seems to be the magic input, the key driver of value.

$$Terminal \ Value_n = \frac{Free \ Cash \ Flow_{n+1}}{(r-g)}$$

- Since that growth rate has to be maintained in perpetuity, it cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which you operate:
  - If your valuation is in nominal terms, it is the nominal growth rate of the economy. If it is real terms, it is the real growth rate.
  - If your company is purely domestic, it is the growth rate of the domestic economy. If it is global, it is the global economy.

#### My Simple Proxy: The Risk free Rate

 I use a simpler and more easily observable number as a cap on stable growth: the risk free rate that I have used in the valuation. This take into account the currency automatically (since higher inflation currencies have higher risk free rates) and it is not unreasonable to argue that it is a good proxy for the nominal growth rate in the economy.

#### □ There are three reasons I do it:

- The best predictor nominal growth in the US economy at the start of every decade has been the US treasury bond rate at the time.
- It preserves consistency. If you believe, as many have, that the risk free rate is too low in US \$ or Euros, it compensates for the resulting too-low cost of capital by also capping the growth rate at the same number (at least in terminal value).
- It puts a control on my biases.

#### A Consistent Version of Terminal Value

• The terminal value equation can be restated:

Terminal Value in year n = -

$$\frac{\text{EBIT}_{n+1} (1-t)(1-\frac{g}{\text{ROC}})}{(\text{Cost of Capital} - g)}$$


Terminal Value for a firm with \$100 million in after-tax operating income & cost of capital = 10% (for different g and ROIC)

		Return on capital in perpetuity										
			Return on cupitar in perpetaity									
		6%	8%	12%	14%							
r	0.00%	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000						
ever	0.50%	\$965	\$987	\$1,000	\$1,009	\$1,015						
fore	1.00%	\$926	\$972	\$1,000	\$1,019	\$1,032						
rate	1.50%	\$882	\$956	\$1,000	\$1,029	\$1,050						
	2.00%	\$833	\$938	\$1,000	\$1,042	\$1,071						
Growth	2.50%	\$778	\$917	\$1,000	\$1,056	\$1,095						
9	3.00%	\$714	\$893	\$1,000	\$1,071	\$1,122						

# 8. Don't let your macro views drown out your micro views..

- When you are asked to value a company, you should keep your focus on what drives that value. If you bring in your specific macro views into the valuation, the value that you obtain for a company will be a joint result of what you think about the company and your macro views.
- Bottom line: If you have macro views, provide them separately. You should be as macro-neutral as you can be, in your company valuations.
- Follow up: If you find macro risk dominating your thoughts, deal with it frontally.

# The biggest driver for Shell (and no surprise) is..




### Valuing Shell at April 2016 oil price (\$40)

Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of \$40/barrel in March 2016 Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40\*\$40 = \$201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

	Base Yea	r T	1		2		3		4		5	Те	rminal Year	
Revenues	\$ 201,5	69 Ş	209,450	\$	217,639	\$	226,149	\$	234,991	\$	244,180	\$	249,063	Operating
Operating Margin	3.01%		6.18%		7.76%		8.56%		8.95%		9.35%		9.35%	Operating
Operating Income	\$ 6,065	00 ;	5 12,942.85	\$	16,899.10	\$	19,352.39	\$	21,040.39	\$	22,830.80	\$	23,287.41	margin converges on
Effective tax rate	30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%		30.00%	Shell's historical
AT Operating Income	\$ 4,245	50 \$	9,060.00	\$	11,829.37	\$	13,546.68	\$	14,728.27	\$	15,981.56	\$	16,301.19	average margin
+ Depreciation	\$ 26,714	00 3	27,759	\$	28,844	\$	29,972	\$	31,144	\$	32,361			of 9.35% from
- Cap Ex	\$ 31,854	00 \$	33,099	\$	34,394	\$	35,738	\$	37,136	\$	38,588			200-2015
- Chg in WC			472.88	\$	491.37	\$	510.58	\$	530.55	\$	551.29			200 2010
FCFF		Ş	3,246.14	\$	5,788.19	\$	7,269.29	\$	8,205.44	\$	9,203.68	\$	13,011.34	
Terminal Value										\$	216,855.71			
Return on capital													12.37%	
Cost of Capital			9.91%		9.91%		9.91%		9.91%		9.91%		8.00%	Return on
Cumulated Discount Factor			1.0991		1.2080		1.3277		1.4593		1.6039			capital reverts
Present Value		Ş	2,953.45	\$	4,791.47	\$	5,474.95	\$	5,622.81	\$	140,940.73			and stays at
Value of Operating Assets	\$ 159,783	41												Shell's historic
+ Cash	\$ 31,752	00											average of	
+ Cross Holdings	\$ 33,566	00		Added long term investments in joint ventures and								12.37% from		
- Debt	\$ 58,379	00	subt	subtracted out minority interest in consolidated							200-2015			
- Minority Interets	\$ 1,245	00		holdings.										
Value of Equity	\$ 165,477	41												
Number of shares	4209.7													
Value per share	\$ 39	31												





The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules

In a Dreamstate DCF, you build

spreadsheets, making outlandish

assumptions about growth and

operating margins over time.

amazing companies on



Sec

D+CF ≠ DCF


In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).

A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.




In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.



A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of

#### III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation




#### From story to numbers and beyond..

┍●	Step 1: Develop a narrative for the business that you are valuing In the narrative, you tell your story about how you see the business evolving over time. Keep it <u>simple</u> & <u>focused</u> .							
	Step 2: Test the narrative to see if it is possible, plausible and probable There are lots of possible narratives, not all of them are plausible and only a few of them are probable. No <u>fairy tales</u> or <u>runaway stories</u> .							
	Step 3: Convert the narrative into drivers of value Take the narrative apart and look at how you will bring it into valuaton inputs starting with potential market size down to cash flows and risk. By the time you are done, each part of the narrative should have a place in your numbers and each number should be backed up a portion of your story.							
	Step 4: Connect the drivers of value to a valuation Create an intrinsic valuation model that connects the inputs to an end-value the business.							
	Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open Listen to people who know the business better than you do and use their suggestions to fine tune your narrative and perhaps even alter it. Work out the effects on value of alternative narratives for the company.							

Aswath Damodaran

#### Step Zero: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
  - Your company (its products, its management and its history.
  - The market or markets that you see it growing in.
  - The competition it faces and will face.
  - The macro environment in which it operates.



#### Step 1: Create a narrative for the future


- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
  - Rule 1: Keep it simple.
  - Rule 2: Keep it focused.

#### The Uber Narrative


In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

- 1. <u>An urban car service business</u>: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
- 2. Which <u>would expand the business moderately (about 40%</u> over ten years) by bringing in new users.
- 3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
- 4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong <u>competitive advantages</u> (from being a first mover).
- 5. And <u>its existing low-capital business model</u>, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.


## Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense




# The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable




#### Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



#### The Impossible: The Runaway Story




# Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



The Uber narrative (June 2014)

#### Step 4: Value the company (Uber)



39

### Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
  - **□** Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
  - Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
  - Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
  - Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

## The Gurley Pushback

- 41
- <u>Not just car service company.</u>: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
- <u>Not just urban</u>: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
- 3. <u>Global networking benefits</u>: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

## Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	Uber (Gurley)	Uber (Gurley Mod)	Uber (Damodaran)
Narrative	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service	Uber will expand the car service
	market substantially, bringing in	market substantially, bringing in	market moderately, primarily in
	mass transit users & non-users	mass transit users & non-users from	urban environments, and use its
	from the suburbs into the market,	the suburbs into the market, and use	competitive advantages to get a
	and use its <u>networking</u> advantage	its networking advantage to gain a	significant but not dominant
	to gain a dominant market share,	dominant market share, while	market share and maintain its
	while maintaining its revenue slice	cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	revenue slice at 20%.
	at 20%.		
Total	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market			
Market	40%	40%	10%
Share			
Uber's	20%	10%	20%
revenue			
slice			
Value for	\$53.4 billion + Option value of	\$28.7 billion + Option value of	\$5.9 billion + Option value of
Uber	entering car ownership market	entering car ownership market (\$6	entering car ownership market (\$2-
	(\$10 billion+)	billion+)	3 billion)

## Different narratives, Different Numbers

Total Market	Growth Effect	Network Effect	Competitive Advantages	Value of Uber
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

# The Real World Intrudes: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)			
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.			
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.			
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options			

#### Uber: Personal Mobility Player?


Uber is primarily a ride sharing company, with ambtions of being a global logistics player. Its revenue growth has been astonishing, though it is starting to slow, but it remains a big money loser, as it searches for a business model that delivers more stickiness. In this story, Uber uses a combination of economies of scale and a more capital intensive business model to create a pathway to profitability. Along the way, it will become a less risky company, though its losses leave it exposed to a 5% chance of failure.

			The Assumption	5				
	Base year	Years 1-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	S	tory link		
Total Market	\$400,000	Gro	w 10.39% a year	Grows 2.75% a year	Global logistics			
Gross Market Share	12.45%		6.71%>30%	30%	Global Netwo			
						ance keeps billing		
Revenue Share	20.13%		Unchanged	20.13%	share high.			
Operating Margin	-24.39%	-	24.39% ->20%	15.00%		& more regulations		
Reinvestment	NA		capital ratio of 4.00	Reinvestment rate = 7.5%		vestment model		
Cost of capital	NA	9.97%	9,97%->8.24%	8.24%		ntile of US firms		
Risk of failure	5% cł	nance of failure,	if pricing meltdown leads	to capital being cut off	Cash on hand	+ Capital access		
			The Cash Flows					
	Total Market	Market Share	Revenues	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF		
1	\$ 441,560	14.20%	\$ 12,627	\$ (2,369)	\$ 650	\$ (3,019)		
2	\$ 487,438	15.96%	\$ 15,661	\$ (2,057)		\$ (2,816)		
3	\$ 538,083	17.71%	\$ 19,189	\$ (1,441)		\$ (2,323)		
4	\$ 593,990	19.47%	\$ 23,281	\$ (438)	\$ 1,023	\$ (1,461)		
5	\$ 655,705	21.22%	\$ 28,017	\$ 1,050	\$ 1,184	\$ (134)		
6	\$ 723,833	22.98%	\$ 33,485	\$ 3,139	\$ 1,367	\$ 1,771		
7	\$ 799,039	24.73%	\$ 39,787	\$ 5,292	\$ 1,576	\$ 3,716		
8	\$ 882,059	26.49%	\$ 47,037	\$ 5,292	\$ 1,813	\$ 3,479		
9	\$ 973,705	28.24%	\$ 55,365	\$ 6,229	\$ 2,082	\$ 4,147		
10	\$1,074,873	30.00%	\$ 64,915	\$ 7,303	\$ 2,387	\$ 4,915		
Terminal year	\$1,101,745	30.00%	\$ 66,537	\$ 7,485	\$ 936	\$ 6,550		
			The Value					
Terminal value			\$ 114,108					
PV(Terminal value)			\$ 46,258					
PV (CF over next 10 y	ears)		\$ 501					
Value of operating asse	ets =		\$ 46,759					
Probability of failure			5%					
Value in case of failure			s -					
Adjusted Value for ope	rating assets		\$ 44,421					
+ Cash on hand			\$ 6,406					
+ Cross holdings			\$ 8,700					
+ IPO Proceeds			\$ 9,000					
- Debt			\$ 6,869					
Value of equity			\$ 52,958					
Value per share			\$ 45.00					

# IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy.. And accuracy for payoff..

Better accurate than precise

**46** 



It's all relative

# Valuing a start up or a young company is hard to do..

#### Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.

Cash flows from existing assets non-existent or ( negative.	What is the value a assets?	added by growth	$\bigcirc$	
What are the cashflows from existing assets? Different claims on cash flows can affect value of equity at each stage.	existing assets and Limited historical	l data on earnings, rices for securities		When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks? Will the firm make it through the gauntlet of market demand and competition? Even if it
What is the value of equity in the firm?				does, assessing when it will become mature is difficult because there is so little to go on.

## And the dark side will beckon..

- **48**
- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is "too difficult" or even "impossible" to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the "dark side", where
  - You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
  - You will hear "macro" stories, justifying value
  - You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.

#### Twitter: Priming the Pump for Valuation

#### 1. Make small revenues into big revenues

#### 2. Make losses into profits

	20	11	20	12	2013		
	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	
Google	32.09%	\$27.74	31.46%	\$32.73	33.24%	\$38.83	
Facebook	3.65%	\$3.15	4.11%	\$4.28	5.04%	\$5.89	
Yahoo!	3.95%	\$3.41	3.37%	\$3.51	3.10%	\$3.62	
Microsoft	1.27%	\$1.10	1.63%	\$1.70	1.78%	\$2.08	
IAC	1.15%	\$0.99	1.39%	\$1.45	1.47%	\$1.72	
AOL	1.17%	\$1.01	1.02%	\$1.06	0.95%	\$1.11	
Amazon	0.48%	\$0.41	0.59%	\$0.61	0.71%	\$0.83	
Pandora	0.28%	\$0.24	0.36%	\$0.37	0.50%	\$0.58	
Twitter	0.16%	\$0.14	0.28%	\$0.29	0.50%	\$0.58	
Linkedin	0.18%	\$0.16	0.25%	\$0.26	0.32%	\$0.37	
Millennial Media	0.05%	\$0.04	0.07%	\$0.07	0.10%	\$0.12	
Other	55.59%	\$48.05	55.47%	\$57.71	52.29%	\$61.09	
Total Market	100%	\$86.43	100.00%	\$104.04	100.00%	\$116.82	

Company	Operating Margin
Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG)	22.82%
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	29.99%
Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO)	13.79%
Netlfix	3.16%
Groupon	2.53%
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	5.18%
Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P)	-9.13%
Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP)	-6.19%
OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN)	24.90%
RetailMeNot	45.40%
Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO)	15.66%
Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z)	-66.60%
Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA)	-6.79%
Aggregate	20.40%


		Annu	al growth rate	e in Global Aa	lvertising Spei	nding
		2.00%	2.50%	3.00%	3.50%	4.00%
Online	20%	\$124.78	\$131.03	\$137.56	\$144.39	\$151.52
advertising	25%	\$155.97	\$163.79	\$171.95	\$180.49	\$189.40
share of	30%	\$187.16	\$196.54	\$206.34	\$216.58	\$227.28
market	35%	\$218.36	\$229.30	\$240.74	\$252.68	\$265.16
market	40%	\$249.55	\$262.06	\$275.13	\$288.78	\$303.04

My estimate for 2023: Overall online advertising market will be close to \$200 billion and Twitter will have about 5.7% (\$11.5 billion) My estimate for Twitter: Operating margin of 25% in year 10


#### 3. Reinvest for growth

	Sales/ Invested Capita			
Twitter (2013)	1.10			
Advertising Companies	1.40			
Social Media Companies	1.05			


My estimate for Twitter: Sales/Capital will be 1.50 for next 10 years



#### Twitter Pre-IPO Valuation: October 27, 2013



#### **Amazon Simulation**




# A sobering reminder: You will be "wrong" and it is okay

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- Remember that it is not just your value that is changing, but so is the price, and the price will change a great deal more than the value.

52

## And your value is not a fact, but an

#### estimate ..



## Forecasting in the face of uncertainty. A

#### test:

#### In which of these two cities would you find it easier to forecast the weather?

#### Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	1.7°	1.2°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	67%	81%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	1.5°	2.0°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	7%	13%

#### Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota


Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%

# V. Valuation is a craft, and you should never stop learning

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. Valuation is not a science.
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. Valuation is not an art.
- A craft is a skill that you learn <u>by doing</u>. The more you do it, the better you get at it. Valuation is a craft.

Existing Users			New Users			Corporate Expenses				
Inputs			Inputs			Inputs				
Net Revenue/User =	\$ 110.16		Cost of acquiring user =	\$ 113.71		Corporate Expenses	\$ 2,812.72			
Operating Expense/User=	\$ 65.12		Value of new user =	\$ 373.54		CAGR - Next 10 years	7.00%			
Operating Profit/User =	\$ 45.05		Growth rate in net users (1-5)	12.00%		Discount Rate =	8.24%			
CAGR in Revenue/User	12.00%		Growth rate in net users (6-10)	6.00%						
Annual Renewal Rate =	95.00%		Discount Rate	9.97%						
User Life =	15									
Discount Rate =	8.24%									
Output			Output			Output				
Value/User =	\$ 487.25		# Users in year 10 =	214.62						
# Existing Users =	91.00		# Net New Users (10 years)	123.62						
Value of Existing Users =	\$44,339.77	+	Value of New Users =	\$60,253.08	-	PV of Corporate Expenses	\$ (63,216.48)	=	Value of Operating	\$41,376.37
									+ Cash	\$15,407.00
Existing users will stick with	h Uber and		Uber will continue to add new us	ers, but at a		Uber's corporate expenses will continue to			+ Cross Holdings	\$ 8,700.00
increase how much they sp	end on its		decreasing pace, with a cost of a	cquiring a		grow, notwithstanding econom	nies of scale, as		- Debt	\$ 6,869.00
services, the longer they st	ay.		new user staying stable (with the	current cost		the company increases spending moderately			Value of equity	\$58,614.37
Operating expneses are mo	Operating expneses are mostly fixed,		incrteasing at the inflation rate). The new user			on autonomous cars.			# Shares	1158.30
but there will be mild econmies of scale.			spending profile will mirror existi	ng users.					Value/Share	\$ 50.60

### VI. Don't mistake price for value!



57

## Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr \$995,000 2.5 1,440 Sq. Ft 3 La Jolla, CA 92037 \$691 / Sq. Ft. Baths Price Beds Status: Active Built: 1955 Lot Size: 3,000 Sq. Ft. On Redfin: 12 days Favorite X-Out Overview **Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records** Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights X 🚰 Lisa Padilla **REDFIN** Real Estate Agent  $\star$   $\star$   $\star$   $\star$ **47 client reviews** \$8,726 commission refund  $(\mathbf{A})$ 🛛 Play Video 🕞 1 of 25 B

h Go Tour This Home Ask Lisa a Question or Start an Offer 1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area  $\bigcirc$ Map Satellite

5

Share...

Tour Home

Similar Homes

58

## Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

#### Europe Switzerland

Biotechnology

Reuters BION S

Bloomberg BION SW

Exchange Ticker SWX BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

#### Biotechnology

#### Strong sector and stock-picking continue

#### Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

#### Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares

164.50			
128.40 - 84.90			

Key changes	
-------------	--

Target Price	106.50 to 164.50	1	54.5%
Source: Deutsche Ba	nk		

#### Price/price relative



## **Classifying Investments**

- <u>Cash flow generating assets</u>: Generate cash flows now or are expected to do so in the future. Can be a fixed cash flow claim, a residual claim or a contingent claim.
- <u>Commodities</u>: Used as raw material to meet another need (energy, food etc.).
- 3. <u>Currencies</u>: Measure of cash flows, medium of exchange or store of value.
- 4. <u>Collectibles</u>: May have aesthetic or emotional value but derives its pricing from its scarcity (supply) and the perception of others that it is wanted.

### Value versus Price

	To value	To price
Assets	Can be valued based upon expected cashflows, with higher cashflows & lower risk = higher value.	Can be priced against similar assets, after controlling for cash flows and risk.
Commodity	Can be valued, based upon utilitarian demand and supply, but with long lags in both.	Can be priced against its own history (normalized price over time)
Currency	Cannot be valued	Can be priced against other currencies, with greater acceptance & more stable purchasing power = higher price.
Collectible	Cannot be valued	Can be priced based upon scarcity and desirability.

### The determinants of price

Mood and Momentum Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by

greed).

behavioral factors (panic, fear,

Liquidity & Trading Ease

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.


The Market Price

Incremental information Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think

To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

## **Multiples and Comparable Transactions**



#### Pricing Twitter: Start with the "comparables"

						Number of				
		Enterprise				users				
Company	Market Cap	value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	(millions)	EV/User	EV/Revenue	EV/EBITDA	PE
Facebook	\$173,540.00	\$160,090.00	\$7,870.00	\$3,930.00	\$1,490.00	1230.00	\$130.15	20.34	40.74	116.47
Linkedin	\$23,530.00	\$19,980.00	\$1,530.00	\$182.00	\$27.00	277.00	\$72.13	13.06	109.78	871.48
Pandora	\$7,320.00	\$7,150.00	\$655.00	-\$18.00	-\$29.00	73.40	\$97.41	10.92	NA	NA
Groupon	\$6,690.00	\$5,880.00	\$2,440.00	\$125.00	-\$95.00	43.00	\$136.74	2.41	47.04	NA
Netflix	\$25,900.00	\$25,380.00	\$4,370.00	\$277.00	\$112.00	44.00	\$576.82	5.81	91.62	231.25
Yelp	\$6,200.00	\$5,790.00	\$233.00	\$2.40	-\$10.00	120.00	\$48.25	24.85	2412.50	NA
Open Table	\$1,720.00	\$1,500.00	\$190.00	\$63.00	\$33.00	14.00	\$107.14	7.89	23.81	52.12
Zynga	\$4,200.00	\$2,930.00	\$873.00	\$74.00	-\$37.00	27.00	\$108.52	3.36	39.59	NA
Zillow	\$3,070.00	\$2,860.00	\$197.00	-\$13.00	-\$12.45	34.50	\$82.90	14.52	NA	NA
Trulia	\$1,140.00	\$1,120.00	\$144.00	-\$6.00	-\$18.00	54.40	\$20.59	7.78	NA	NA
Tripadvisor	\$13,510.00	\$12,860.00	\$945.00	\$311.00	\$205.00	260.00	\$49.46	13.61	41.35	65.90
	Ανε					Average	\$130.01	11.32	350.80	267.44
						Median	\$97.41	10.92	44.20	116.47

# Read the tea leaves: See what the market cares about

	Market Cap	Enterprise value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	Number of users (millions)
Market Cap	1.					
Enterprise value	0.9998	1.				
Revenues	0.8933	0.8966	1.			
EBITDA	0.9709	0.9701	0.8869	1.		
Net Income	0.8978	0.8971	0.8466	0.9716	1.	
Number of users (millions)	0.9812	0.9789	0.8053	0.9354	0.8453	1.

Twitter had 240 million users at the time of its IPO. What price would you attach to the company?

#### Use the "market metric" and "market price"

- The most important variable, in late 2013, in determining market value and price in this sector (social media, ill defined as that is) is the number of users that a company has.
- Looking at comparable firms, it looks like the market is paying about \$100/user in valuing social media companies, with a premium for "predictable" revenues (subscriptions) and user intensity.
- Twitter has about 240 million users and can be valued based on the \$100/user:
- Enterprise value = 240 \* 100 = \$24 billion

### VII. Investing is an act of faith..


- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
- That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
- Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as "speculators", viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.
- □ If you have faith in investing, you will be tested.

**67** 

## Active Investing is a loser's game

#### **Tough to Beat**

Percentage of U.S. large-company mutual funds outperforming the Vanguard 500 Index Fund



68


## And it stays that way across styles..

	% of US Mutual Funds that beat their respective indices							
	Value	Growth	Core	All				
Large	82.17%	86.54%	88.26%	84.15%				
Mid-cap	70.27%	81.48%	76.51%	76.69%				
Small	92.31%	91.89%	91.44%	90.13%				
All Equity				88.43%				
Real Estate				82.64%				

S&P computes these percentages for the last year, the last 3 years & the last 10 years. There is not a single period or a single fund grouping where the number is <50%.

# And the "smart" money does not stay smart for very long


#### **Funds' Flop**



#### Investment Heaven is a promise, not a

#### guarantee..

71



Apple, Price and Value - 2010 to 2017

## Follow the yellow brick road..

