



MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!

May 2020

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I. Don't mistake accounting for finance

Valued based upon motive for investment – some marked to market, some recorded at cost and some at quasi-cost

Assets are recorded at original cost, adjusted for depreciation.

The Balance Sheet

| Assets | | Liabilities | |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| Long Lived Real Assets | Fixed Assets | Current Liabilities | Short-term liabilities of the firm |
| Short-lived Assets | Current Assets | Debt | Debt obligations of firm |
| Investments in securities & assets of other firms | Financial Investments | Other Liabilities | Other long-term obligations |
| Assets which are not physical, like patents & trademarks | Intangible Assets | Equity | Equity investment in firm |

True intangible assets like brand name, patents and customer did not show up. The only intangible asset of any magnitude (goodwill) is a plug variable that is of consequence only if you do an acquisition.

Equity reflects original capital invested and historical retained earnings.

The financial balance sheet

Recorded at intrinsic value (based upon cash flows and risk), not at original cost



Value will depend upon magnitude of growth investments and excess returns on these investments

Intrinsic value of equity, reflecting intrinsic value of assets, net of true value of debt outstanding.

II. Don't assume that $D+CF = DCF$

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
- The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

1. *The IT Proposition:* If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.
2. *The DUH Proposition:* For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. *The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition:* Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


The drivers of value..

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
DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

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
The Drivers of Value

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1. Match your cash flows to your discount rates..

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Valuing Infosys in Rupees and Dollars

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| | In Rupees | In Dollars |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Risk free Rate | 5.38% | 2.85% |
| Expected growth rate | 10.00% for next 5 years, scaling down to 5.38% in year 10 (and forever) | 7.37% for next 5 years, scaling down to 2.85% in year 10 (and forever) |
| Return on Capital | Marginal ROIC of 39.70%, scaling down to 15% forever | Marginal ROIC of 37.68%, scaling down to 12.36% forever. |
| Cost of capital | 11.02% for next 5 years, scaling down to 9.88% in year 10 (and beyond) | 8.36% for next 5 years, scaling down to 7.23% in year 10 (and beyond) |
| Value per share | Rs 1072.22 per share about 7% below stock price of Rs 1,150/share | \$16.86 per share about 7% below stock price of \$18.02/share |


2. Risk is not in the past..

| | Arithmetic Average | | Geometric Average | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Stocks - T. Bills | Stocks - T. Bonds | Stocks - T. Bills | Stocks - T. Bonds |
| 1928-2017 | 8.09% | 6.38% | 6.26% | 4.77% |
| Std Error | 2.10% | 2.24% | | |
| 1968-2017 | 6.58% | 4.24% | 5.28% | 3.29% |
| Std Error | 2.39% | 2.70% | | |
| 2008-2017 | 9.85% | 5.98% | 8.01% | 4.56% |
| Std Error | 6.12% | 8.70% | | |


- If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it
 - ▣ Long term (because of the standard error)
 - ▣ Consistent with your risk free rate
 - ▣ A “compounded” average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.

But in the future..

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The Price of Risk: The COVID crisis



3. Globalization is not a buzz word

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- As companies get globalized, the valuations that we do have to reflect that globalization. In particular, we need to be wary of
 - ▣ Currency mismatches: Multinationals derive their revenues in many currencies but you have to be currency-consistent.
 - ▣ Beta gaming: When a company is listed in many markets, you can get very different betas, depending on how you set up and run a beta regression
 - ▣ Equity Risk Premiums: The standard practice of estimating equity risk premiums based on your country of incorporation will lead to skewed valuations.

ERP : April 1, 2020

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|--------|-------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Andorra | 9.49% | 7.08% | Italy | 10.04% | 7.37% |
| Austria | 6.74% | 5.59% | Jersey (States of) | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Belgium | 7.12% | 5.80% | Liechtenstein | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Cyprus | 11.51% | 8.16% | Luxembourg | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Denmark | 6.01% | 5.20% | Malta | 7.56% | 6.04% |
| Finland | 6.74% | 5.59% | Netherlands | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| France | 6.92% | 5.69% | Norway | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Germany | 6.01% | 5.20% | Portugal | 10.04% | 7.37% |
| Greece | 14.25% | 9.64% | Spain | 8.93% | 6.77% |
| Guernsey (States of) | 8.93% | 6.77% | Sweden | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Iceland | 7.56% | 6.04% | Switzerland | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Ireland | 7.56% | 6.04% | Turkey | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Isle of Man | 6.92% | 5.69% | United Kingdom | 6.92% | 5.69% |
| | | | Western Europe | 7.51% | 6.01% |

| | | |
|----------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Canada | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| United States | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| North America | 6.01% | 5.20% |

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Argentina | 22.49% | 14.08% |
| Belize | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Bolivia | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Brazil | 11.51% | 8.16% |
| Chile | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Colombia | 9.49% | 7.08% |
| Costa Rica | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Ecuador | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| El Salvador | 17.91% | 14.08% |
| Guatemala | 10.58% | 7.66% |
| Honduras | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Mexico | 8.21% | 6.38% |
| Nicaragua | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Panama | 8.93% | 6.77% |
| Paraguay | 10.58% | 7.66% |
| Peru | 8.21% | 6.38% |
| Suriname | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Uruguay | 9.49% | 7.08% |
| Venezuela | 24.52% | 22.89% |
| Central and South America | 11.79% | 8.48% |

| | | |
|---------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Angola | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Benin | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Botswana | 7.56% | 6.04% |
| Burkina Faso | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Cameroon | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Cape Verde | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Congo (DR) | 19.73% | 12.59% |
| Congo (Republic of) | 22.49% | 14.08% |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Egypt | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Ethiopia | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Gabon | 19.73% | 12.59% |
| Ghana | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Kenya | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Mali | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Morocco | 10.58% | 7.66% |
| Mozambique | 22.49% | 14.08% |
| Namibia | 11.51% | 8.16% |
| Niger | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Nigeria | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Rwanda | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Senegal | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| South Africa | 10.58% | 7.37% |
| Swaziland | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Tanzania | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Togo | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Tunisia | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Uganda | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Zambia | 24.52% | 14.08% |
| Africa | 14.71% | 9.89% |

| | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Albania | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Armenia | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Azerbaijan | 11.51% | 8.16% |
| Belarus | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Bulgaria | 9.49% | 7.08% |
| Croatia | 11.51% | 8.16% |
| Czech Republic | 7.12% | 5.80% |
| Estonia | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Georgia | 11.51% | 8.16% |
| Hungary | 10.04% | 7.37% |
| Kazakhstan | 10.04% | 7.37% |
| Kyrgyzstan | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Latvia | 8.21% | 6.38% |
| Lithuania | 8.21% | 6.38% |
| Macedonia | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Moldova | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Montenegro | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Poland | 7.56% | 6.04% |
| Romania | 10.04% | 7.37% |
| Russia | 10.04% | 7.37% |
| Serbia | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Slovakia | 7.56% | 6.04% |
| Slovenia | 8.93% | 6.77% |
| Tajikistan | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Ukraine | 19.73% | 12.59% |
| Uzbekistan | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Eastern Europe & Russia | 9.98% | 7.34% |

| | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Abu Dhabi | 6.92% | 5.69% |
| Bahrain | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Iraq | 19.73% | 12.59% |
| Israel | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Jordan | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| Kuwait | 6.92% | 5.69% |
| Lebanon | 24.52% | 14.08% |
| Oman | 11.51% | 7.66% |
| Qatar | 7.12% | 5.80% |
| Ras Al Khaimah (Emirate) | 19.73% | 12.59% |
| Saudi Arabia | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Sharjah | 9.49% | 6.38% |
| United Arab Emirates | 6.92% | 5.69% |
| Middle East | 8.93% | 6.77% |

| Country | PRS Risk Score | ERP (4/1/20) | ERP (1/1/20) |
|-----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| Algeria | 63 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Brunei | 82.75 | 6.74% | 5.59% |
| Gambia | 63.75 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Guinea | 57 | 24.30% | 15.06% |
| Guinea-Bissau | 63.25 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Guyana | 63.75 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Haiti | 57.5 | 22.49% | 14.08% |
| Iran | 62.5 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Korea, D.P.R. | 50.5 | 27.03% | 17.03% |
| Liberia | 49.5 | 31.93% | 21.71% |
| Libya | 69.5 | 11.51% | 8.16% |
| Madagascar | 65.5 | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Malawi | 63.5 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Myanmar | 64 | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Sierra Leone | 57 | 24.30% | 15.06% |
| Somalia | 53 | 27.03% | 17.03% |
| Sudan | 39.75 | 31.93% | 21.71% |
| Syria | 53 | 27.03% | 17.03% |
| Yemen, Republic | 54.5 | 27.03% | 17.03% |
| Zimbabwe | 50.5 | 27.03% | 17.03% |

| | | |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Bangladesh | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Cambodia | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| China | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Fiji | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Hong Kong | 7.12% | 5.69% |
| India | 9.49% | 7.08% |
| Indonesia | 9.49% | 7.08% |
| Japan | 7.30% | 5.89% |
| Korea | 6.92% | 5.69% |
| Laos | 8.21% | NA |
| Macao | 7.12% | 5.80% |
| Malaysia | 8.21% | 6.38% |
| Maldives | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Mauritius | 8.93% | 6.77% |
| Mongolia | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Pakistan | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Papua New Guinea | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Philippines | 9.49% | 7.08% |
| Singapore | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Solomon Islands | 17.91% | 11.62% |
| Sri Lanka | 16.08% | 10.63% |
| Taiwan | 7.12% | 5.80% |
| Thailand | 8.93% | 6.77% |
| Vietnam | 12.60% | 8.75% |
| Asia | 7.89% | 6.21% |

| | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Australia | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Cook Islands | 14.25% | 9.64% |
| New Zealand | 6.01% | 5.20% |
| Australia & NZ | 6.02% | 5.20% |

And your country risk exposure comes from where you operate, not where you incorporate!

| <i>Region</i> | <i>Revenues</i> | <i>ERP</i> | <i>Weight</i> | <i>Weighted ERP</i> |
|-------------------|-----------------|------------|---------------|---------------------|
| North America | ₹ 42,408 | 5.08% | 62.01% | 3.1499% |
| Europe | ₹ 15,302 | 6.01% | 22.37% | 1.3437% |
| Rest of the World | ₹ 8,504 | 6.21% | 12.43% | 0.7721% |
| India | ₹ 2,180 | 7.27% | 3.19% | 0.2317% |
| Total | ₹ 68,394 | | 100.00% | 5.4974% |

1. By focusing on revenues, are we misestimating country risk exposure?
2. As the company looks to grow in Latin America and Asia, how do you see this premium evolving?


Shell: Equity Risk Premium- March 2016

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Oil & Gas Production</i> | <i>% of Total</i> | <i>ERP</i> |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Denmark | 17396 | 3.83% | 6.20% |
| Italy | 11179 | 2.46% | 9.14% |
| Norway | 14337 | 3.16% | 6.20% |
| UK | 20762 | 4.57% | 6.81% |
| <i>Rest of Europe</i> | <i>874</i> | <i>0.19%</i> | <i>7.40%</i> |
| Brunei | 823 | 0.18% | 9.04% |
| Iraq | 20009 | 4.40% | 11.37% |
| Malaysia | 22980 | 5.06% | 8.05% |
| Oman | 78404 | 17.26% | 7.29% |
| Russia | 22016 | 4.85% | 10.06% |
| <i>Rest of Asia & ME</i> | <i>24480</i> | <i>5.39%</i> | <i>7.74%</i> |
| <i>Oceania</i> | <i>7858</i> | <i>1.73%</i> | <i>6.20%</i> |
| Gabon | 12472 | 2.75% | 11.76% |
| Nigeria | 67832 | 14.93% | 11.76% |
| Rest of Africa | 6159 | 1.36% | 12.17% |
| USA | 104263 | 22.95% | 6.20% |
| Canada | 8599 | 1.89% | 6.20% |
| Brazil | 13307 | 2.93% | 9.60% |
| <i>Rest of Latin America</i> | <i>576</i> | <i>0.13%</i> | <i>10.78%</i> |
| Royal Dutch Shell | 454326 | 100.00% | 8.26% |

4. Everyone may do it, but that does not make it right.. The small cap premium


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Figure 4: Small Firm Premium over time- 1927 -2015




5. Don't let your inputs be at war with each other.

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


And consider the trade offs..



6. Don't sweat the small stuff

Cost of Capital Distribution- January 2019



7. Don't let your terminal value run away with your valuation

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- In the terminal value equation, the growth seems to be the magic input, the key driver of value.

$$\text{Terminal Value}_n = \frac{\text{Free Cash Flow}_{n+1}}{(r - g)}$$

- Since that growth rate has to be maintained in perpetuity, it cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which you operate:
 - ▣ If your valuation is in nominal terms, it is the nominal growth rate of the economy. If it is in real terms, it is the real growth rate.
 - ▣ If your company is purely domestic, it is the growth rate of the domestic economy. If it is global, it is the global economy.

My Simple Proxy: The Risk free Rate

- I use a simpler and more easily observable number as a cap on stable growth: the risk free rate that I have used in the valuation. This take into account the currency automatically (since higher inflation currencies have higher risk free rates) and it is not unreasonable to argue that it is a good proxy for the nominal growth rate in the economy.
- There are three reasons I do it:
 - The best predictor nominal growth in the US economy at the start of every decade has been the US treasury bond rate at the time.
 - It preserves consistency. If you believe, as many have, that the risk free rate is too low in US \$ or Euros, it compensates for the resulting too-low cost of capital by also capping the growth rate at the same number (at least in terminal value).
 - It puts a control on my biases.

A Consistent Version of Terminal Value

- The terminal value equation can be restated:

$$\text{Terminal Value in year } n = \frac{\text{EBIT}_{n+1} (1 - t) \left(1 - \frac{g}{\text{ROC}}\right)}{(\text{Cost of Capital} - g)}$$

Terminal Value for a firm with \$100 million in after-tax operating income & cost of capital = 10% (for different g and ROIC)


| | | <i>Return on capital in perpetuity</i> | | | | |
|---------------------|-------|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | | 6% | 8% | 10% | 12% | 14% |
| Growth rate forever | 0.00% | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | \$1,000 | \$1,000 |
| | 0.50% | \$965 | \$987 | \$1,000 | \$1,009 | \$1,015 |
| | 1.00% | \$926 | \$972 | \$1,000 | \$1,019 | \$1,032 |
| | 1.50% | \$882 | \$956 | \$1,000 | \$1,029 | \$1,050 |
| | 2.00% | \$833 | \$938 | \$1,000 | \$1,042 | \$1,071 |
| | 2.50% | \$778 | \$917 | \$1,000 | \$1,056 | \$1,095 |
| | 3.00% | \$714 | \$893 | \$1,000 | \$1,071 | \$1,122 |

8. Don't let your macro views drown out your micro views..

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- When you are asked to value a company, you should keep your focus on what drives that value. If you bring in your specific macro views into the valuation, the value that you obtain for a company will be a joint result of what you think about the company and your macro views.
- **Bottom line:** If you have macro views, provide them separately. You should be as macro-neutral as you can be, in your company valuations.
- **Follow up:** If you find macro risk dominating your thoughts, deal with it frontally.

The biggest driver for Shell (and no surprise) is..



Valuing Shell at April 2016 oil price (\$40)

Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of \$40/barrel in March 2016
 Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*\$40
 = \$201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

| | <i>Base Year</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>Terminal Year</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|----------------------|
| Revenues | \$ 201,569 | \$ 209,450 | \$ 217,639 | \$ 226,149 | \$ 234,991 | \$ 244,180 | \$ 249,063 |
| Operating Margin | 3.01% | 6.18% | 7.76% | 8.56% | 8.95% | 9.35% | 9.35% |
| Operating Income | \$ 6,065.00 | \$ 12,942.85 | \$ 16,899.10 | \$ 19,352.39 | \$ 21,040.39 | \$ 22,830.80 | \$ 23,287.41 |
| Effective tax rate | 30.00% | 30.00% | 30.00% | 30.00% | 30.00% | 30.00% | 30.00% |
| AT Operating Income | \$ 4,245.50 | \$ 9,060.00 | \$ 11,829.37 | \$ 13,546.68 | \$ 14,728.27 | \$ 15,981.56 | \$ 16,301.19 |
| + Depreciation | \$ 26,714.00 | \$ 27,759 | \$ 28,844 | \$ 29,972 | \$ 31,144 | \$ 32,361 | |
| - Cap Ex | \$ 31,854.00 | \$ 33,099 | \$ 34,394 | \$ 35,738 | \$ 37,136 | \$ 38,588 | |
| - Chg in WC | | \$ 472.88 | \$ 491.37 | \$ 510.58 | \$ 530.55 | \$ 551.29 | |
| FCFF | | \$ 3,246.14 | \$ 5,788.19 | \$ 7,269.29 | \$ 8,205.44 | \$ 9,203.68 | \$ 13,011.34 |
| Terminal Value | | | | | | \$ 216,855.71 | |
| Return on capital | | | | | | | 12.37% |
| Cost of Capital | | 9.91% | 9.91% | 9.91% | 9.91% | 9.91% | 8.00% |
| Cumulated Discount Factor | | 1.0991 | 1.2080 | 1.3277 | 1.4593 | 1.6039 | |
| Present Value | | \$ 2,953.45 | \$ 4,791.47 | \$ 5,474.95 | \$ 5,622.81 | \$ 140,940.73 | |
| Value of Operating Assets | \$ 159,783.41 | | | | | | |
| + Cash | \$ 31,752.00 | | | | | | |
| + Cross Holdings | \$ 33,566.00 | | | | | | |
| - Debt | \$ 58,379.00 | | | | | | |
| - Minority Interests | \$ 1,245.00 | | | | | | |
| Value of Equity | \$ 165,477.41 | | | | | | |
| Number of shares | 4209.7 | | | | | | |
| Value per share | \$ 39.31 | | | | | | |

Operating margin converges on Shell's historical average margin of 9.35% from 200-2015

Return on capital reverts and stays at Shell's historic average of 12.37% from 200-2015

Added long term investments in joint ventures and subtracted out minority interest in consolidated holdings.

Infosys: March 2018 (in Rupees)

Cash flows from existing assets

| | LTM | 2011-2017 | Industry (US data) |
|------------------------------|--------|-----------|--------------------|
| Revenue growth = | 3.28% | 14.22% | 15.31% |
| Pre-tax operating margin = | 24.29% | 26.16% | 8.35% |
| Sales to capital ratio = | 1.81 | 2.50 | 3.69 |
| Return on invested capital = | 31.57% | 47.80% | 27.96% |

The Payoff from growth

Revenues will grow 10% a year for next 5 years, tapering down to 5.38% growth in year 10

Operating margin (per-tax) will continue to decline from 24.29% to 23%

Sales/Invested Capital will stay at ten-year average of 1.81

Maturity and Closure

Stable Growth $g = 5.38\%$;
 Cost of capital = 9.88%
 ROC = 15%;
 Reinvestment Rate = $g/ROC = 5.83\%/15.00\% = 35.87\%$

Rupee Cashflows

Terminal Value = $169,632 / (.0988 - .0538) = 3,769,597$

| | Base year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | Terminal year |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| PV(Terminal value) | ₹ 1,366,411 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PV (CF over next 10 years) | ₹ 790,711 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of operating assets = | ₹ 2,157,122 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Debt | ₹ - | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Minority interests | ₹ - | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + Cash | ₹ 230,727 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + Non-operating assets | ₹ 61,081 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of equity | ₹ 2,448,930 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Value of options | ₹ 945 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of equity in common stock | ₹ 2,447,985 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of shares | ₹ 2,283 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estimated value /share | ₹ 1,072.22 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenue growth rate | | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 10.00% | 9.08% | 8.15% | 7.23% | 6.30% | 5.38% | 5.38% |
| Revenues | ₹ 683,119 | ₹ 751,431 | ₹ 826,574 | ₹ 909,231 | ₹ 1,000,155 | ₹ 1,100,170 | ₹ 1,200,021 | ₹ 1,297,847 | ₹ 1,391,656 | ₹ 1,479,386 | ₹ 1,558,976 | ₹ 1,642,849 |
| EBIT (Operating) margin | 24.29% | 24.16% | 24.03% | 23.90% | 23.78% | 23.65% | 23.52% | 23.39% | 23.26% | 23.13% | 23.00% | 23.00% |
| EBIT (Operating income) | ₹ 165,945 | ₹ 181,568 | ₹ 198,657 | ₹ 217,348 | ₹ 237,790 | ₹ 260,148 | ₹ 282,208 | ₹ 303,536 | ₹ 323,678 | ₹ 342,170 | ₹ 358,565 | ₹ 377,855 |
| Tax rate | 28.00% | 28.00% | 28.00% | 28.00% | 28.00% | 28.00% | 28.40% | 28.80% | 29.20% | 29.60% | 30.00% | 30.00% |
| EBIT(1-t) | ₹ 119,480 | ₹ 130,729 | ₹ 143,033 | ₹ 156,491 | ₹ 171,209 | ₹ 187,306 | ₹ 202,061 | ₹ 216,118 | ₹ 229,164 | ₹ 240,888 | ₹ 250,995 | ₹ 264,499 |
| - Reinvestment | ₹ 37,842 | ₹ 41,626 | ₹ 45,789 | ₹ 50,368 | ₹ 55,404 | ₹ 55,313 | ₹ 54,191 | ₹ 51,966 | ₹ 48,599 | ₹ 44,090 | ₹ 44,090 | ₹ 94,867 |
| FCFF | | ₹ 92,887 | ₹ 101,407 | ₹ 110,702 | ₹ 120,841 | ₹ 131,902 | ₹ 146,747 | ₹ 161,927 | ₹ 177,198 | ₹ 192,289 | ₹ 206,905 | ₹ 169,632 |
| Cost of capital | | 11.02% | 11.02% | 11.02% | 11.02% | 11.02% | 10.80% | 10.57% | 10.34% | 10.11% | 9.88% | |
| Cumulated discount factor | | 0.9007 | 0.8113 | 0.7307 | 0.6581 | 0.5928 | 0.5350 | 0.4839 | 0.4386 | 0.3983 | 0.3625 | |
| PV(FCFF) | | ₹ 83,664 | ₹ 82,268 | ₹ 80,890 | ₹ 79,531 | ₹ 78,190 | ₹ 78,514 | ₹ 78,356 | ₹ 77,712 | ₹ 76,588 | ₹ 74,999 | |

Discount at Rs Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.02% (.100) = 11.02%

The Risk in the Cash flows

On March 27, 2018, Infosys was trading at Rs 1150/ share

Cost of Equity 11.02%

Cost of Debt NO DEBT

Weights E = 100% D = 0%

Riskfree Rate:
 Rupee Risk free Rate = 7.33% - 1.95% = 5.38%

Beta = 1.03

Firm's D/E Ratio: 0%

| Business | Revenues | EV/Sales | Estimated Value | Value Weight | Unlevered Beta |
|-------------------|----------|----------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|
| Computer Software | ₹ 2,101 | 6.3640 | ₹ 13,371 | 13.51% | 1.1114 |
| Computer Services | ₹ 66,383 | 1.2899 | ₹ 85,630 | 86.49% | 1.0136 |
| Company | ₹ 68,484 | | ₹ 99,001 | | 1.0268 |

ERP = 5.50%

| Region | Revenues | ERP | Weight | Weighted ERP |
|-------------------|----------|-------|---------|--------------|
| North America | ₹ 42,408 | 5.08% | 62.01% | 3.1499% |
| Europe | ₹ 15,302 | 6.01% | 22.37% | 1.3437% |
| Rest of the World | ₹ 8,504 | 6.21% | 12.43% | 0.7721% |
| India | ₹ 2,180 | 7.27% | 3.19% | 0.2317% |
| Total | ₹ 68,394 | | 100.00% | 5.4974% |



The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules



In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).



In a **Dreamstate DCF**, you build amazing companies on spreadsheets, making outlandish assumptions about growth and operating margins over time.



A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

$$D+CF \neq DCF$$



In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.




In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.




A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of

III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation




From story to numbers and beyond..

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Step Zero: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
 - ▣ Your company (its products, its management and its history).
 - ▣ The market or markets that you see it growing in.
 - ▣ The competition it faces and will face.
 - ▣ The macro environment in which it operates.



Step 1: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
 - ▣ Rule 1: Keep it simple.
 - ▣ Rule 2: Keep it focused.


The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

1. An urban car service business: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong competitive advantages (from being a first mover).
5. And its existing low-capital business model, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense

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The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable

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The Impossible

Bigger than the economy
Assuming Growth rate for company in perpetuity > Growth rate for economy

Bigger than the total market
Allowing a company's revenues to grow so much that it has more than a 100% market share of whatever business it is in.

Profit margin > 100%
Assuming earnings growth will exceed revenue growth for a long enough period, and pushing margins above 100%

Depreciation without cap ex
Assuming that depreciation will exceed cap ex in perpetuity.


The Implausible

Growth without reinvestment
Assuming growth forever without reinvestment.

Profits without competition
Assuming that your company will grow and earn higher profits, with no competition.


Returns without risk
Assuming that you can generate high returns in a business with no risk.

The Improbable



Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable

Uber (My narrative))



The Impossible: The Runaway Story

The Story



The Checks (?)


| Board Member | Designation | Age |
|------------------|-------------------------------|-----|
| Henry Kissinger | Former Secretary of State | 92 |
| Bill Perry | Former Secretary of Defense | 88 |
| George Schultz | Former Secretary of State | 94 |
| Bill Frist | Former Senate Majority Leader | 63 |
| Sam Nunn | Former Senator | 77 |
| Gary Roughead | Former Navy Admiral | 64 |
| James Mattis | Former Marine Corps General | 65 |
| Dick Kovocovich | Former CEO of Wells Fargo | 72 |
| Riley Bechtel | Former CEO of Bechtel | 63 |
| William Foege | Epidemiologist | 79 |
| Elizabeth Holmes | Founder & CEO, Theranos | 31 |
| Sunny Balwani | President & COO, Theranos | NA |

+


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Money

Companies valued at \$1 billion or more by venture-capital firms



Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

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Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)

Stable Growth (after year 10)
 Expected growth rate = 2.50%
 Cost of capital = 8%
 Return on capital = 25%
 Reinvestment Rate = 2.5%/25% = 10%

Terminal Value₁₀ = 793 / (.08 - 0.25) = \$14,418

Term yr
 EBIT (1-t) \$881
 - Reinv 88
 FCFF \$793

Based on the investment of \$1.2 billion made by investors, the imputed value for Uber's operating assets, in June 2014, was \$17 billion.

Global taxi market is \$100 billion currently, expected to grow 6% a year for next ten years.

Uber will keep 20% of the gross cab receipts as its revenues

Uber's market share of this market will increase to 10% over the next 10 years.

Uber's operating expenses will amount to 60% of its revenues. (Operating margin=40%)

Uber will pay a tax rate of 30% on its income, increasing to 40% over the next 10 years

Uber will generate \$5 in incremental revenues for every dollar of incremental capital.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Overall market | \$106,000 | \$112,360 | \$119,102 | \$126,248 | \$133,823 | \$141,852 | \$150,363 | \$159,385 | \$168,948 | \$179,085 |
| Share of market (gross) | 3.63% | 5.22% | 6.41% | 7.31% | 7.98% | 8.49% | 8.87% | 9.15% | 9.36% | 10.00% |
| Revenues as percent of gross | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% | 20.00% |
| Annual Revenue | \$769 | \$1,173 | \$1,528 | \$1,846 | \$2,137 | \$2,408 | \$2,666 | \$2,916 | \$3,163 | \$3,582 |
| Operating margin | 7.00% | 10.67% | 14.33% | 18.00% | 21.67% | 25.33% | 29.00% | 32.67% | 36.33% | 40.00% |
| Operating Income | \$54 | \$125 | \$219 | \$332 | \$463 | \$610 | \$773 | \$953 | \$1,149 | \$1,433 |
| Effective tax rate | 31% | 32% | 33% | 34% | 35% | 36% | 37% | 38% | 39% | 40% |
| - Taxes | \$17 | \$40 | \$72 | \$113 | \$162 | \$220 | \$286 | \$362 | \$448 | \$573 |
| After-tax operating income | \$37 | \$85 | \$147 | \$219 | \$301 | \$390 | \$487 | \$591 | \$701 | \$860 |
| Sales/Capital Ratio | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| - Reinvestment | \$94 | \$81 | \$71 | \$64 | \$58 | \$54 | \$52 | \$50 | \$49 | \$84 |
| Free Cash Flow to the Firm | -\$57 | \$4 | \$76 | \$156 | \$243 | \$336 | \$435 | \$541 | \$652 | \$776 |

Value of operating assets = \$6,595

Adjust for probability of failure (10%)
 Expected value = \$6,595 (.9) = \$5,895

Discount back the cash flows (including terminal value) at the cumulated cost of capital.

Cost of capital for first 5 years = Top decile of US companies = 12%

Cost of capital declines from 12% to 8% from years 6 to 10.

Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
 - ▣ Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
 - ▣ Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
 - ▣ Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
 - ▣ Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

The Gurley Pushback

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1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

| | <i>Uber (Gurley)</i> | <i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i> | <i>Uber (Damodaran)</i> |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| Narrative | Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%. | Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%). | Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages</u> to get a <u>significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%. |
| Total Market | \$300 billion, growing at 3% a year | \$300 billion, growing at 3% a year | \$100 billion, growing at 6% a year |
| Market Share | 40% | 40% | 10% |
| Uber's revenue slice | 20% | 10% | 20% |
| Value for Uber | \$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+) | \$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+) | \$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion) |

Different narratives, Different Numbers

| <i>Total Market</i> | <i>Growth Effect</i> | <i>Network Effect</i> | <i>Competitive Advantages</i> | <i>Value of Uber</i> |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| A4. Mobility Services | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$90,457 |
| A3. Logistics | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$65,158 |
| A4. Mobility Services | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$52,346 |
| A2. All car service | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$47,764 |
| A1. Urban car service | B4. Double market size | C5. Strong global network effects | D4. Strong & Sustainable | \$31,952 |
| A3. Logistics | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$14,321 |
| A1. Urban car service | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$7,127 |
| A2. All car service | B3. Increase market by 50% | C3. Strong local network effects | D3. Semi-strong | \$4,764 |
| A4. Mobility Services | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$1,888 |
| A3. Logistics | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$1,417 |
| A2. All car service | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$1,094 |
| A1. Urban car service | B1. None | C1. No network effects | D1. None | \$799 |

The Real World Intrudes: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

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| Narrative Break/End | Narrative Shift | Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction) |
|---|--|--|
| Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end. | Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability. | Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market. |
| Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative | Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company. | Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics. |
| Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences | Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis | Real Options |

Uber: Personal Mobility Player?

Uber is primarily a ride sharing company, with ambitions of being a global logistics player. Its revenue growth has been astonishing, though it is starting to slow, but it remains a big money loser, as it searches for a business model that delivers more stickiness. In this story, Uber uses a combination of economies of scale and a more capital intensive business model to create a pathway to profitability. Along the way, it will become a less risky company, though its losses leave it exposed to a 5% chance of failure.

The Assumptions

| | Base year | Years 1-5 | Years 6-10 | After year 10 | Story link |
|--------------------|---|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|--|
| Total Market | \$400,000 | Grow 10.39% a year | | Grows 2.75% a year | Global logistics |
| Gross Market Share | 12.45% | 6.71%>30% | | 30% | Global Network benefits |
| Revenue Share | 20.13% | Unchanged | | 20.13% | Market dominance keeps billing share high. |
| Operating Margin | -24.39% | -24.39% ->20% | | 15.00% | Full employee & more regulations |
| Reinvestment | NA | Sales to capital ratio of 4.00 | | Reinvestment rate = 7.5% | Low capital investment model |
| Cost of capital | NA | 9.97% | 9,97%->8.24% | 8.24% | At 75th percentile of US firms |
| Risk of failure | 5% chance of failure, if pricing meltdown leads to capital being cut off | | | | Cash on hand + Capital access |

The Cash Flows

| | Total Market | Market Share | Revenues | EBIT (1-t) | Reinvestment | FCFF |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|------------|--------------|------------|
| 1 | \$ 441,560 | 14.20% | \$ 12,627 | \$ (2,369) | \$ 650 | \$ (3,019) |
| 2 | \$ 487,438 | 15.96% | \$ 15,661 | \$ (2,057) | \$ 759 | \$ (2,816) |
| 3 | \$ 538,083 | 17.71% | \$ 19,189 | \$ (1,441) | \$ 882 | \$ (2,323) |
| 4 | \$ 593,990 | 19.47% | \$ 23,281 | \$ (438) | \$ 1,023 | \$ (1,461) |
| 5 | \$ 655,705 | 21.22% | \$ 28,017 | \$ 1,050 | \$ 1,184 | \$ (134) |
| 6 | \$ 723,833 | 22.98% | \$ 33,485 | \$ 3,139 | \$ 1,367 | \$ 1,771 |
| 7 | \$ 799,039 | 24.73% | \$ 39,787 | \$ 5,292 | \$ 1,576 | \$ 3,716 |
| 8 | \$ 882,059 | 26.49% | \$ 47,037 | \$ 5,292 | \$ 1,813 | \$ 3,479 |
| 9 | \$ 973,705 | 28.24% | \$ 55,365 | \$ 6,229 | \$ 2,082 | \$ 4,147 |
| 10 | \$1,074,873 | 30.00% | \$ 64,915 | \$ 7,303 | \$ 2,387 | \$ 4,915 |
| Terminal year | \$1,101,745 | 30.00% | \$ 66,537 | \$ 7,485 | \$ 936 | \$ 6,550 |

The Value

| | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------|--|--|
| Terminal value | \$ 114,108 | | |
| PV(Terminal value) | \$ 46,258 | | |
| PV (CF over next 10 years) | \$ 501 | | |
| Value of operating assets = | \$ 46,759 | | |
| Probability of failure | 5% | | |
| Value in case of failure | \$ - | | |
| Adjusted Value for operating assets | \$ 44,421 | | |
| + Cash on hand | \$ 6,406 | | |
| + Cross holdings | \$ 8,700 | | |
| + IPO Proceeds | \$ 9,000 | | |
| - Debt | \$ 6,869 | | |
| Value of equity | \$ 52,958 | | |
| Value per share | \$ 45.00 | | |

IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy. And accuracy for payoff..

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Better accurate
than precise



High Accuracy
High Precision



Low Accuracy
High Precision




High Accuracy
Low Precision



Low Accuracy
Low Precision


It's all relative



Valuing a start up or a young company is hard to do..

Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.



And the dark side will beckon..

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- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is “too difficult” or even “impossible” to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the “dark side”, where
 - ▣ You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
 - ▣ You will hear “macro” stories, justifying value
 - ▣ You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.

Twitter: Priming the Pump for Valuation

1. Make small revenues into big revenues

| | 2011 | | 2012 | | 2013 | |
|------------------|--------|---------|---------|----------|---------|----------|
| | % | \$ | % | \$ | % | \$ |
| Google | 32.09% | \$27.74 | 31.46% | \$32.73 | 33.24% | \$38.83 |
| Facebook | 3.65% | \$3.15 | 4.11% | \$4.28 | 5.04% | \$5.89 |
| Yahoo! | 3.95% | \$3.41 | 3.37% | \$3.51 | 3.10% | \$3.62 |
| Microsoft | 1.27% | \$1.10 | 1.63% | \$1.70 | 1.78% | \$2.08 |
| IAC | 1.15% | \$0.99 | 1.39% | \$1.45 | 1.47% | \$1.72 |
| AOL | 1.17% | \$1.01 | 1.02% | \$1.06 | 0.95% | \$1.11 |
| Amazon | 0.48% | \$0.41 | 0.59% | \$0.61 | 0.71% | \$0.83 |
| Pandora | 0.28% | \$0.24 | 0.36% | \$0.37 | 0.50% | \$0.58 |
| Twitter | 0.16% | \$0.14 | 0.28% | \$0.29 | 0.50% | \$0.58 |
| Linkedin | 0.18% | \$0.16 | 0.25% | \$0.26 | 0.32% | \$0.37 |
| Millennial Media | 0.05% | \$0.04 | 0.07% | \$0.07 | 0.10% | \$0.12 |
| Other | 55.59% | \$48.05 | 55.47% | \$57.71 | 52.29% | \$61.09 |
| Total Market | 100% | \$86.43 | 100.00% | \$104.04 | 100.00% | \$116.82 |

2. Make losses into profits

| Company | Operating Margin |
|----------------------------------|------------------|
| Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG) | 22.82% |
| Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB) | 29.99% |
| Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO) | 13.79% |
| Netflix | 3.16% |
| Groupon | 2.53% |
| LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD) | 5.18% |
| Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P) | -9.13% |
| Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP) | -6.19% |
| OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN) | 24.90% |
| RetailMeNot | 45.40% |
| Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO) | 15.66% |
| Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z) | -66.60% |
| Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA) | -6.79% |
| Aggregate | 20.40% |

| | | Annual growth rate in Global Advertising Spending | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-----|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | | 2.00% | 2.50% | 3.00% | 3.50% | 4.00% |
| Online advertising share of market | 20% | \$124.78 | \$131.03 | \$137.56 | \$144.39 | \$151.52 |
| | 25% | \$155.97 | \$163.79 | \$171.95 | \$180.49 | \$189.40 |
| | 30% | \$187.16 | \$196.54 | \$206.34 | \$216.58 | \$227.28 |
| | 35% | \$218.36 | \$229.30 | \$240.74 | \$252.68 | \$265.16 |
| | 40% | \$249.55 | \$262.06 | \$275.13 | \$288.78 | \$303.04 |

My estimate for 2023: Overall online advertising market will be close to \$200 billion and Twitter will have about 5.7% (\$11.5 billion)

Aswath Damodaran

My estimate for Twitter: Operating margin of 25% in year 10

3. Reinvest for growth

| | Sales/ Invested Capital |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Twitter (2013) | 1.10 |
| Advertising Companies | 1.40 |
| Social Media Companies | 1.05 |

My estimate for Twitter: Sales/Capital will be 1.50 for next 10 years

Starting numbers

| | Last 10K | Trailing 12 month |
|---------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| Revenues | \$316.93 | \$534.46 |
| Operating income | -\$77.06 | -\$134.91 |
| Adjusted Operating Income | | \$7.67 |
| Invested Capital | | \$955.00 |
| Adjusted Operatng Margin | | 1.44% |
| Sales/ Invested Capital | | 0.56 |
| Interest expenses | \$2.49 | \$5.30 |

Twitter Pre-IPO Valuation: October 27, 2013

Revenue growth of 51.5% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 25% over the next 10 years

Sales to capital ratio of 1.50 for incremental sales

Stable Growth
 g = 2.5%; Beta = 1.00;
 Cost of capital = 8%
 ROC= 12%;
 Reinvestment Rate=2.5%/12% = 20.83%


Terminal Value₁₀ = 1466 / (.08 - .025) = \$26,657

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| Operating assets | \$9,705 | | | | | | | | | | |
| + Cash | 321 | | | | | | | | | | |
| + IPO Proceeds | 1295 | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Debt | 214 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of equity | 11,106 | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Options | 713 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value in stock | 10,394 | | | | | | | | | | |
| / # of shares | 582.46 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value/share | \$17.84 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenues | | \$ 810 | \$1,227 | \$1,858 | \$2,816 | \$4,266 | \$6,044 | \$7,973 | \$9,734 | \$10,932 | \$11,205 |
| Operating Income | | \$ 31 | \$ 75 | \$ 158 | \$ 306 | \$ 564 | \$ 941 | \$1,430 | \$1,975 | \$ 2,475 | \$ 2,801 |
| Operating Income after tax | | \$ 31 | \$ 75 | \$ 158 | \$ 294 | \$ 395 | \$ 649 | \$ 969 | \$1,317 | \$ 1,624 | \$ 1,807 |
| - Reinvestment | | \$ 183 | \$ 278 | \$ 421 | \$ 638 | \$ 967 | \$1,186 | \$1,285 | \$1,175 | \$ 798 | \$ 182 |
| FCFF | | \$(153) | \$(203) | \$(263) | \$(344) | \$(572) | \$(537) | \$(316) | \$ 143 | \$ 826 | \$ 1,625 |

Terminal year (11)
 EBIT (1-t) \$ 1,852
 - Reinvestment \$ 386
 FCFF \$ 1,466

Cost of capital = 11.12% (.981) + 5.16% (.019) = 11.01%

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10




Amazon Simulation

| Revenue Growth Rate | |
|---------------------|--------|
| Minimum | 5.00% |
| Maximum | 25.00% |




| Operating Margin | |
|------------------|--------|
| Mean | 12.50% |
| Std Dev | 2.00% |



| Sales/Invested Capital | |
|------------------------|------|
| Minimum | 3.95 |
| Likeliest | 5.95 |
| Maximum | 7.95 |



| Cost of Capital | |
|-----------------|-------|
| Location | 5.00% |
| Mean | 7.97% |
| Std. Dev. | 0.80% |




Correlation = 0.40

| | |
|-----------|------------|
| Base Case | \$1,255.09 |
| Mean | \$1,343.67 |
| Median | \$1,241.98 |

Amazon: Simulated Values in September 2018

| Percentiles | Value/Share |
|-------------|-------------|
| 0% | \$234.29 |
| 10% | \$705.19 |
| 20% | \$832.65 |
| 30% | \$957.69 |
| 40% | \$1,092.41 |
| 50% | \$1,241.97 |
| 60% | \$1,411.82 |
| 70% | \$1,605.37 |
| 80% | \$1,837.98 |
| 90% | \$2,152.15 |
| 100% | \$3,887.62 |








A sobering reminder: You will be “wrong” and it is okay

54


- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- Remember that it is not just your value that is changing, but so is the price, and the price will change a great deal more than the value.

And your value is not a fact, but an estimate..

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>Revenue Growth Rate Distribution: Uniform Expected Value = 55% Minimum Value: 40% Maximum Value: 70%</p> |  <p>Computed annual revenue growth rate over next 5 years - <i>Not for Commercial Use</i></p> |
| <p>Target Operating Margin Distribution: Normal Expected Value = 25% Standard Deviation = 5%</p> |  <p>Target pre-tax operating margin (EBIT as % of sales in year 5) - <i>Not for Commercial Use</i></p> |
| <p>Sales to Capital Ratio Distribution: Lognormal Expected value: 1.50 Standard deviation: 0.15</p> |  <p>Sales to capital ratio (for computing/reward) - <i>Not for Commercial Use</i></p> |
| <p>Cost of Capital Distribution: Triangular Expected value: 11.22% Minimum value: 10.02% Maximum value: 12.22%</p> |  <p>Initial cost of capital - <i>Not for Commercial Use</i></p> |




Valuing the Market: COVID effect




What now? Valuing the Index


Expected drop in 2020 Earnings




% of drop recouped by 2025



Equity Risk Premium




Cash Returned as % of Earnings




Valuing the S&P 500 Index: March 13, 2020

| Percentile | S&P 500 Index |
|------------|---------------|
| 0% | \$1,903.33 |
| 10% | \$2,450.16 |
| 20% | \$2,547.91 |
| 30% | \$2,621.98 |
| 40% | \$2,688.01 |
| 50% | \$2,750.84 |
| 60% | \$2,817.83 |
| 70% | \$2,893.02 |
| 80% | \$2,986.04 |
| 90% | \$3,123.78 |
| 100% | \$4,452.38 |



Valuing Individual Stocks: A Post-Corona Version



Boeing

The Story

Boeing is in deep trouble. Already exposed to significant pain because of its mishandling of the Boeing 737 Max, which caused revenues to plummet in 2019, the company is facing a mountain of pain with the Corona Virus decimating the airline business (Boeing's customers). I assume more pain the year to come, with revenues dropping even with the 737 Max returning to the fold and increased losses. After that, I assume that there will be higher growth, as airlines start playing catch up and buy more aircraft from a duopoly. I assume that margins will revert back to pre-2018 levels over the next 5 years and that during the next year, Boeing is exposed to a risk of failure, not so much because it will go out of business (it is too big to fail) but from needing a bailout from the government that is large enough to wipe out equity (as was the case with GM in 2009).

The Assumptions

| | Base year | In 2020 | Years 1-5 | Years 6-10 | After year 10 | Link to story |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|------------------------|------------|---------------|--|
| Revenues (a) | \$ 76,559 | -10.0% | 15.00% | 2.00% | 2.00% | Duopoly, growing market |
| Operating margin (b) | -3.10% | -5.0% | -3.10% | 9.60% | 9.60% | Industry margins, also close to historical |
| Tax rate | 25.00% | | 25.00% | 25.00% | 25.00% | |
| Reinvestment (c) | | | Sales to capital ratio | 3.80 | 20.00% | |
| Return on capital | -11.78% | | Marginal ROIC = | 76.00% | 10.00% | |
| Cost of capital (d) | | | 8.51% | 7.50% | 7.50% | |

The Cash Flows

| | Revenues | Operating Margin | EBIT | EBIT (1-t) | Reinvestment | FCFF |
|---------------|------------|------------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| 1 | \$ 68,903 | -5.00% | \$ (3,445) | \$ (3,445) | \$ (2,014) | \$ (1,431) |
| 2 | \$ 79,239 | 4.73% | \$ 3,751 | \$ 3,675 | \$ 2,719 | \$ 955 |
| 3 | \$ 91,124 | 9.60% | \$ 8,749 | \$ 6,562 | \$ 3,127 | \$ 3,435 |
| 4 | \$ 104,793 | 9.60% | \$ 10,061 | \$ 7,546 | \$ 3,596 | \$ 3,950 |
| 5 | \$ 120,512 | 9.60% | \$ 11,571 | \$ 8,678 | \$ 4,136 | \$ 4,542 |
| 6 | \$ 135,455 | 9.60% | \$ 13,005 | \$ 9,754 | \$ 3,932 | \$ 5,822 |
| 7 | \$ 148,730 | 9.60% | \$ 14,280 | \$ 10,710 | \$ 3,493 | \$ 7,217 |
| 8 | \$ 159,439 | 9.60% | \$ 15,308 | \$ 11,481 | \$ 2,817 | \$ 8,664 |
| 9 | \$ 166,773 | 9.60% | \$ 16,012 | \$ 12,009 | \$ 1,930 | \$ 10,080 |
| 10 | \$ 170,108 | 9.60% | \$ 16,333 | \$ 12,249 | \$ 878 | \$ 11,372 |
| Terminal year | \$ 173,510 | 9.60% | \$ 16,659 | \$ 12,494 | \$ 2,499 | \$ 9,996 |

The Value

| | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|----------|
| Terminal value | \$ 181,737 | | |
| PV(Terminal value) | \$ 82,610 | | |
| PV (CF over next 10 years) | \$ 30,378 | | |
| Value of operating assets = | \$ 112,988 | | |
| Adjustment for distress | \$ 11,299 | Probability of failure = | 20.00% |
| - Debt & Mnority Interests | \$ 28,532 | | |
| + Cash & Other Non-operating assets | \$ 10,030 | | |
| Value of equity | \$ 83,187 | | |
| - Value of equity options | \$ - | | |
| Number of shares | 566.00 | | |
| Value per share | \$ 146.97 | Stock was trading at = | \$127.68 |

Forecasting in the face of uncertainty. A test:

60

- In which of these two cities would you find it easier to forecast the weather?

Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

| Temperature | Last Month | Last Year |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| Average change in high temperature day-to-day | 1.7° | 1.2° |
| Average change in low temperature day-to-day | 1.5° | 2.0° |

| Precipitation | Last Month | Last Year |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Chance of dry day after a precip day | 67% | 81% |
| Chance of precip day after a dry day | 7% | 13% |

Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota

| Temperature | Last Month | Last Year |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| Average change in high temperature day-to-day | 8.5° | 7.7° |
| Average change in low temperature day-to-day | 7.1° | 8.6° |

| Precipitation | Last Month | Last Year |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Chance of dry day after a precip day | 50% | 65% |
| Chance of precip day after a dry day | 38% | 20% |

V. Valuation is a craft, and you should never stop learning

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. **Valuation is not a science.**
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. **Valuation is not an art.**
- A craft is a skill that you learn by doing. The more you do it, the better you get at it. **Valuation is a craft.**

Uber's Existing User Value

Growth rate in Operating Expenses
Assumed that 90% of operating expenses are variable, growing at revenue growth rate. Overall expenses grow 10.95%/year

Growth rate in Revenues
Assumed 12% growth in annual revenues/user over next 15 years

User Lifetime
Assumed to be 15 years, with an annual renewal probability of 95%.

| | Base Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Membership Survival | 1.0000 | 0.9500 | 0.9025 | 0.8574 | 0.8145 | 0.7738 | 0.7351 | 0.6983 | 0.6634 | 0.6302 | 0.5987 | 0.5688 | 0.5404 | 0.5133 | 0.4877 | 0.4633 |
| Gross Billings | \$ 547.24 | \$ 612.91 | \$ 686.46 | \$ 768.84 | \$ 861.10 | \$ 964.43 | \$ 1,080.16 | \$ 1,209.78 | \$ 1,354.95 | \$ 1,517.54 | \$ 1,699.65 | \$ 1,903.61 | \$ 2,132.04 | \$ 2,387.89 | \$ 2,674.43 | \$ 2,995.36 |
| Net Revenues | \$ 110.16 | \$ 123.38 | \$ 138.19 | \$ 154.77 | \$ 173.35 | \$ 194.15 | \$ 217.45 | \$ 243.54 | \$ 272.76 | \$ 305.50 | \$ 342.16 | \$ 383.21 | \$ 429.20 | \$ 480.70 | \$ 538.39 | \$ 602.99 |
| Operating Expenses | \$ 65.12 | \$ 72.25 | \$ 80.16 | \$ 88.94 | \$ 98.67 | \$ 109.48 | \$ 121.47 | \$ 134.77 | \$ 149.52 | \$ 165.90 | \$ 184.06 | \$ 204.22 | \$ 226.58 | \$ 251.39 | \$ 278.92 | \$ 309.46 |
| Operating Profit/user | \$ 45.05 | \$ 51.14 | \$ 58.03 | \$ 65.84 | \$ 74.67 | \$ 84.67 | \$ 95.98 | \$ 108.77 | \$ 123.24 | \$ 139.60 | \$ 158.09 | \$ 179.00 | \$ 202.62 | \$ 229.31 | \$ 259.47 | \$ 293.54 |
| Survival adjusted Operating Profit | | \$ 48.58 | \$ 52.37 | \$ 56.45 | \$ 60.82 | \$ 65.52 | \$ 70.55 | \$ 75.96 | \$ 81.76 | \$ 87.98 | \$ 94.66 | \$ 101.81 | \$ 109.49 | \$ 117.72 | \$ 126.54 | \$ 135.99 |
| After-tax Operating Profit/user | \$ 33.79 | \$ 36.44 | \$ 39.28 | \$ 42.34 | \$ 45.62 | \$ 49.14 | \$ 52.92 | \$ 56.97 | \$ 61.32 | \$ 65.99 | \$ 70.99 | \$ 76.36 | \$ 82.12 | \$ 88.29 | \$ 94.90 | \$ 101.99 |
| Present Value | | \$ 33.66 | \$ 33.53 | \$ 33.38 | \$ 33.23 | \$ 33.07 | \$ 32.90 | \$ 32.73 | \$ 32.55 | \$ 32.36 | \$ 32.16 | \$ 31.96 | \$ 31.75 | \$ 31.54 | \$ 31.32 | \$ 31.10 |
| Annual Growth Rate (Revenues) | 12.00% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Annual Growth Rate (Op Exp) | 10.95% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Risk-adjusted discount rate | 8.24% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Life of user = | 15.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value per existing user = | \$ 487.25 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of existing users = | 91.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Value of Existing Users | \$ 44,339.77 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Survival-adjusted PV
PV of after-tax operating income, adjusted for drop out rate over time.

Risk Adjusted Discount Rate
Used a 8.24% cost of capital, set at the median cost of capital for US companies, adjusted for inflation difference.

Uber's New User Value

Value Added by New Users at Uber

Base year Value/ New User
 Value of User = \$487.25
 Cost of adding New User = \$113.71
 Value added by new user = \$373.54

User Growth rates
 Years 1-5: 12%
 Years 6-10: 6%

Cost of capital
 Used 9.97%, the 75th percentile of US companies


| | Base Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Total Users | 91.00 | 101.92 | 114.15 | 127.85 | 143.19 | 160.37 | 170.00 | 180.20 | 191.01 | 202.47 | 214.62 |
| New Users | 0.00 | 15.47 | 17.33 | 19.41 | 21.73 | 24.34 | 17.64 | 18.70 | 19.82 | 21.01 | 22.27 |
| Value per new user | \$373.54 | \$379.14 | \$384.83 | \$390.60 | \$396.46 | \$402.40 | \$408.44 | \$414.57 | \$420.78 | \$427.10 | \$433.50 |
| Value added by new users | | \$5,865.27 | \$6,667.64 | \$7,579.77 | \$8,616.68 | \$9,795.45 | \$7,205.30 | \$7,752.18 | \$8,340.57 | \$8,973.62 | \$9,654.72 |
| Terminal Value (new users) | | | | | | | | | | | \$31,603.73 |
| Present Value | | \$ 5,333.52 | \$ 5,513.45 | \$ 5,699.46 | \$ 5,891.74 | \$ 6,090.50 | \$ 4,073.87 | \$ 3,985.70 | \$ 3,899.44 | \$ 3,815.05 | \$ 15,950.37 |
| Value Added by New Users | \$ 60,253.08 | | | | | | | | | | |

Beyond year 10
 User growth continues at 2.5% a year

| Existing Users | | New Users | | Corporate Expenses | | | |
|--|--------------------|--|---------------------|--|-----------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Inputs | | Inputs | | Inputs | | | |
| Net Revenue/User = | \$ 110.16 | Cost of acquiring user = | \$ 113.71 | Corporate Expenses | \$ 2,812.72 | | |
| Operating Expense/User= | \$ 65.12 | Value of new user = | \$ 373.54 | CAGR - Next 10 years | 7.00% | | |
| Operating Profit/User = | \$ 45.05 | Growth rate in net users (1-5) | 12.00% | Discount Rate = | 8.24% | | |
| CAGR in Revenue/User | 12.00% | Growth rate in net users (6-10) | 6.00% | | | | |
| Annual Renewal Rate = | 95.00% | Discount Rate | 9.97% | | | | |
| User Life = | 15 | | | | | | |
| Discount Rate = | 8.24% | | | | | | |
| Output | | Output | | Output | | | |
| Value/User = | \$ 487.25 | # Users in year 10 = | 214.62 | | | | |
| # Existing Users = | 91.00 | # Net New Users (10 years) | 123.62 | | | | |
| Value of Existing Users = | \$44,339.77 | Value of New Users = | \$ 60,253.08 | PV of Corporate Expenses | \$ (63,216.48) | = | Value of Operating / \$41,376.37 |
| <i>Existing users will stick with Uber and increase how much they spend on its services, the longer they stay. Operating expenses are mostly fixed, but there will be mild economies of scale.</i> | | <i>Uber will continue to add new users, but at a decreasing pace, with a cost of acquiring a new user staying stable (with the current cost increasing at the inflation rate). The new user spending profile will mirror existing users.</i> | | <i>Uber's corporate expenses will continue to grow, notwithstanding economies of scale, as the company increases spending moderately on autonomous cars.</i> | | | + Cash \$15,407.00 |
| | | | | | | | + Cross Holdings \$ 8,700.00 |
| | | | | | | | - Debt \$ 6,869.00 |
| | | | | | | | Value of equity \$58,614.37 |
| | | | | | | | # Shares 1158.30 |
| | | | | | | | Value/Share \$ 50.60 |


VI. Don't mistake price for value!

65



Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

66

 **5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr**
La Jolla, CA 92037
Status: Active





\$995,000
Price

3
Beds

2.5
Baths


1,440 Sq. Ft.
\$691 / Sq. Ft.


Built: 1955 Lot Size: 3,000 Sq. Ft. On Redfin: 12 days

Favorite X-Out Share... Tour Home

Overview Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights Similar Homes




1 of 25  [Play Video](#)

Lisa Padilla
REDFIN Real Estate Agent


★★★★★
47 client reviews

\$8,726 commission refund

 [Go Tour This Home](#)

[Ask Lisa a Question](#) or [Start an Offer](#)

1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area



Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

67

Europe
Switzerland

Biotechnology
Biotechnology

Reuters
BION.S

Bloomberg
BION SW

Exchange
SWX
Ticker
BION

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF) | 124.00 |
| Price Target (CHF) | 164.50 |
| 52-week range (CHF) | 128.40 - 84.90 |

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

Key changes

Target Price 106.50 to 164.50 ↑ 54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



| Performance (%) | 1m | 3m | 12m |
|-----------------|------|-----|------|
| Absolute | -1.4 | 5.4 | 37.4 |

Classifying Investments


1. Cash flow generating assets: Generate cash flows now or are expected to do so in the future. Can be a fixed cash flow claim, a residual claim or a contingent claim.
2. Commodities: Used as raw material to meet another need (energy, food etc.).
3. Currencies: Measure of cash flows, medium of exchange or store of value.
4. Collectibles: May have aesthetic or emotional value but derives its pricing from its scarcity (supply) and the perception of others that it is wanted.

Value versus Price


| | To value | To price |
|-------------|---|--|
| Assets | Can be valued based upon expected cashflows, with higher cashflows & lower risk = higher value. | Can be priced against similar assets, after controlling for cash flows and risk. |
| Commodity | Can be valued, based upon utilitarian demand and supply, but with long lags in both. | Can be priced against its own history (normalized price over time) |
| Currency | Cannot be valued | Can be priced against other currencies, with greater acceptance & more stable purchasing power = higher price. |
| Collectible | Cannot be valued | Can be priced based upon scarcity and desirability. |

The determinants of price

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Multiples and Comparable Transactions



Pricing Twitter: Start with the “comparables”

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| Company | Market Cap | Enterprise value | Revenues | EBITDA | Net Income | Number of users (millions) | EV/User | EV/Revenue | EV/EBITDA | PE |
|-------------|--------------|------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------------|----------|------------|-----------|--------|
| Facebook | \$173,540.00 | \$160,090.00 | \$7,870.00 | \$3,930.00 | \$1,490.00 | 1230.00 | \$130.15 | 20.34 | 40.74 | 116.47 |
| Linkedin | \$23,530.00 | \$19,980.00 | \$1,530.00 | \$182.00 | \$27.00 | 277.00 | \$72.13 | 13.06 | 109.78 | 871.48 |
| Pandora | \$7,320.00 | \$7,150.00 | \$655.00 | -\$18.00 | -\$29.00 | 73.40 | \$97.41 | 10.92 | NA | NA |
| Groupon | \$6,690.00 | \$5,880.00 | \$2,440.00 | \$125.00 | -\$95.00 | 43.00 | \$136.74 | 2.41 | 47.04 | NA |
| Netflix | \$25,900.00 | \$25,380.00 | \$4,370.00 | \$277.00 | \$112.00 | 44.00 | \$576.82 | 5.81 | 91.62 | 231.25 |
| Yelp | \$6,200.00 | \$5,790.00 | \$233.00 | \$2.40 | -\$10.00 | 120.00 | \$48.25 | 24.85 | 2412.50 | NA |
| Open Table | \$1,720.00 | \$1,500.00 | \$190.00 | \$63.00 | \$33.00 | 14.00 | \$107.14 | 7.89 | 23.81 | 52.12 |
| Zynga | \$4,200.00 | \$2,930.00 | \$873.00 | \$74.00 | -\$37.00 | 27.00 | \$108.52 | 3.36 | 39.59 | NA |
| Zillow | \$3,070.00 | \$2,860.00 | \$197.00 | -\$13.00 | -\$12.45 | 34.50 | \$82.90 | 14.52 | NA | NA |
| Trulia | \$1,140.00 | \$1,120.00 | \$144.00 | -\$6.00 | -\$18.00 | 54.40 | \$20.59 | 7.78 | NA | NA |
| Tripadvisor | \$13,510.00 | \$12,860.00 | \$945.00 | \$311.00 | \$205.00 | 260.00 | \$49.46 | 13.61 | 41.35 | 65.90 |
| | | | | | | Average | \$130.01 | 11.32 | 350.80 | 267.44 |
| | | | | | | Median | \$97.41 | 10.92 | 44.20 | 116.47 |

Read the tea leaves: See what the market cares about

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| | <i>Market Cap</i> | <i>Enterprise value</i> | <i>Revenues</i> | <i>EBITDA</i> | <i>Net Income</i> | <i>Number of users (millions)</i> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Market Cap</i> | <i>1.</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Enterprise value</i> | <i>0.9998</i> | <i>1.</i> | | | | |
| <i>Revenues</i> | <i>0.8933</i> | <i>0.8966</i> | <i>1.</i> | | | |
| <i>EBITDA</i> | <i>0.9709</i> | <i>0.9701</i> | <i>0.8869</i> | <i>1.</i> | | |
| <i>Net Income</i> | <i>0.8978</i> | <i>0.8971</i> | <i>0.8466</i> | <i>0.9716</i> | <i>1.</i> | |
| <i>Number of users (millions)</i> | <i>0.9812</i> | <i>0.9789</i> | <i>0.8053</i> | <i>0.9354</i> | <i>0.8453</i> | <i>1.</i> |

Twitter had 240 million users at the time of its IPO. What price would you attach to the company?

Use the “market metric” and “market price”

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- The most important variable, in late 2013, in determining market value and price in this sector (social media, ill defined as that is) is the number of users that a company has.
- Looking at comparable firms, it looks like the market is paying about \$100/user in valuing social media companies, with a premium for “predictable” revenues (subscriptions) and user intensity.
- Twitter has about 240 million users and can be valued based on the \$100/user:
- Enterprise value = $240 * 100 = \$24$ billion

VII. Investing is an act of faith..


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- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
- That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
- Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as “speculators”, viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.
- If you have faith in investing, you will be tested.

Active Investing is a loser's game

Tough to Beat

Percentage of U.S. large-company mutual funds outperforming the Vanguard 500 Index Fund



And it stays that way across styles..

| | <i>% of US Mutual Funds that beat their respective indices</i> | | | |
|-------------|--|--------|--------|--------|
| | Value | Growth | Core | All |
| Large | 82.17% | 86.54% | 88.26% | 84.15% |
| Mid-cap | 70.27% | 81.48% | 76.51% | 76.69% |
| Small | 92.31% | 91.89% | 91.44% | 90.13% |
| All Equity | | | | 88.43% |
| Real Estate | | | | 82.64% |

S&P computes these percentages for the last year, the last 3 years & the last 10 years. There is not a single period or a single fund grouping where the number is <50%.

And the "smart" money does not stay smart for very long

Funds' Flop

Three-year rolling relative performance of stock hedge funds



*Compared to a 50/50 MSCI World Net Return Local Currency/LIBOR 3 Month USD index


Source: Partners Capital Investment Group analysis of data from HFR, MSCI and WSJ Market Data Group

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Investment Heaven is a promise, not a guarantee..

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Apple, Price and Value - 2010 to 2017



Follow the yellow brick road..

