



MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!

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I. Don't mistake accounting for finance

Valued based upon motive for investment – some marked to market, some recorded at cost and some at quasi-cost

Assets are recorded at original cost, adjusted for depreciation.

The Balance Sheet

Assets		Liabilities	
Long Lived Real Assets	Fixed Assets	Current Liabilities	Short-term liabilities of the firm
Short-lived Assets	Current Assets	Debt	Debt obligations of firm
Investments in securities & assets of other firms	Financial Investments	Other Liabilities	Other long-term obligations
Assets which are not physical, like patents & trademarks	Intangible Assets	Equity	Equity investment in firm

True intangible assets like brand name, patents and customer did not show up. The only intangible asset of any magnitude (goodwill) is a plug variable that is of consequence only if you do an acquisition.

Equity reflects original capital invested and historical retained earnings.

The financial balance sheet

Recorded at intrinsic value (based upon cash flows and risk), not at original cost



Value will depend upon magnitude of growth investments and excess returns on these investments

Intrinsic value of equity, reflecting intrinsic value of assets, net of true value of debt outstanding.

And fair value accounting will not bridge the gap..

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- In the last two decades, accounting has decided (for better or worse) that it can bridge the gap between the two balance sheets by
 - ▣ Marking up assets to fair value, though the accounting definition of value suggests that the rule writers are mixing up fair pricing with fair value.
 - ▣ Bringing “intangibles” on to the books, by trying to capitalize everything from brand name to customer lists.
- In my view, fair value accounting is an oxymoron, a hopeless attempt to bridge the difference that will do neither accounting nor valuation justice.

II. Don't assume that $D+CF = DCF$

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
- The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

1. *The IT Proposition:* If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.
2. *The DUH Proposition:* For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. *The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition:* Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


The Key Questions in valuation...

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And Business Drivers that determine value...

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DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

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Value of growth
The future cash flows will reflect expectations of how quickly earnings will grow in the future (as a positive) and how much the company will have to reinvest to generate that growth (as a negative). The net effect will determine the value of growth.
Expected Cash Flow in year $t = E(CF) = \text{Expected Earnings in year } t - \text{Reinvestment needed for growth}$

Cash flows from existing assets
The base earnings will reflect the earnings power of the existing assets of the firm, net of taxes and any reinvestment needed to sustain the base earnings.


$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} + \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

Steady state
The value of growth comes from the capacity to generate excess returns. The length of your growth period comes from the strength & sustainability of your competitive advantages.

Risk in the Cash flows
The risk in the investment is captured in the discount rate as a beta in the cost of equity and the default spread in the cost of debt.


1. Match your cash flows to your discount rates..

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And the Fed is not the answer to every interest rate question..

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	<i>Ten-year T.Bond rate</i>	<i>Inflation rate</i>	<i>Real GDP growth</i>	<i>Intrinsic riskfree rate</i>
1954-2021	5.59%	3.55%	2.94%	6.50%
1954-1980	5.83%	4.49%	3.50%	7.98%
1981-2008	6.88%	3.26%	3.04%	6.30%
2011-2021	2.25%	1.76%	1.70%	3.46%

Currencies don't drive value...

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	In Rupees	In Dollars
Risk free Rate	5.38%	2.85%
Expected growth rate	10.00% for next 5 years, scaling down to 5.38% in year 10 (and forever)	7.37% for next 5 years, scaling down to 2.85% in year 10 (and forever)
Return on Capital	Marginal ROIC of 39.70%, scaling down to 15% forever	Marginal ROIC of 37.68%, scaling down to 12.36% forever.
Cost of capital	11.02% for next 5 years, scaling down to 9.88% in year 10 (and beyond)	8.36% for next 5 years, scaling down to 7.23% in year 10 (and beyond)
Value per share	Rs 1072.22 per share about 7% below stock price of Rs 1,150/share	\$16.86 per share about 7% below stock price of \$18.02/share

Heineken: September 2019 (in Euros)

Cash flows from existing assets

	LTM	2013-2018
Revenues	€ 23,119	Growth rate = 3.22%
Operating Margin	14.86%	14.44%
Sales/Invested Capital	0.71	0.79
ROIC	7.46%	8.32%
Effective Tax Rate	29.70%	27.00%

The Payoff from growth

Revenues will grow 3.22% a year for next 5 years, tapering down to -0.5% growth in year 10

Operating margin (per-tax) will drop to 14.00%

Sales/Invested Capital will stay at five-year average of 0.79.

Maturity and Closure

Stable Growth
 $g = -0.5\%$;
 Cost of capital = 5%
 $ROC = 5\%$;
 Reinvestment Rate = $-0.5\%/5\% = -10\%$

Euro Cashflows

Terminal Value = $2972 / (0.05 - (-0.005)) = 54,034$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate	3.22%	3.22%	3.22%	3.22%	3.22%	2.48%	1.73%	0.99%	0.24%	-0.50%	-0.50%
Revenues	€ 23,863	€ 24,632	€ 25,425	€ 26,244	€ 27,089	€ 27,759	€ 28,240	€ 28,519	€ 28,589	€ 28,446	€ 28,304
EBIT (Operating) margin	14.38%	14.34%	14.30%	14.26%	14.21%	14.17%	14.13%	14.09%	14.04%	14.00%	14.00%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 3,432	€ 3,532	€ 3,635	€ 3,741	€ 3,850	€ 3,934	€ 3,990	€ 4,017	€ 4,015	€ 3,982	\$ 3,963
Tax rate	29.70%	29.70%	29.70%	29.70%	29.70%	28.76%	27.82%	26.88%	25.94%	25.00%	0
EBIT(1-t)	€ 2,413	€ 2,483	€ 2,556	€ 2,630	€ 2,707	€ 2,802	€ 2,880	€ 2,937	€ 2,973	€ 2,987	\$ 2,972
- Reinvestment	€ 942	€ 973	€ 1,004	€ 1,036	€ 1,070	€ 849	€ 609	€ 353	€ 88	€ (181)	\$ (297)
FCFF	€ 1,471	€ 1,511	€ 1,552	€ 1,594	€ 1,637	€ 1,953	€ 2,271	€ 2,584	€ 2,885	€ 3,168	\$ 3,269

PV(Terminal value)	€ 36,390.85
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 15,300.34
Value of operating assets =	€ 51,691.19
- Debt	€ 19,709.52
- Minority interests	€ 1,069.00
+ Cash	€ 1,751.60
+ Non-operating assets	€ 1,401.00
Value of equity	€ 34,065.26
Number of shares	571.10
Estimated value /share	€ 59.65
Price	€ 93.25
Price as % of value	56.33%

Discount at Euro Cost of Capital (WACC) = $7.66\% (.599) + 1.13\% (0.401) = 5.04\%$

The Risk in the Cash flows

On September 1, 2019, Heineken was trading at 93.25 Euros/share

Cost of Equity 7.66%

Cost of Debt $(-0.5\% + 2\%)(1 - 0.25) = 1.13\%$

Weights
 $E = 59.9\%$ $D = 40.1\%$

Riskfree Rate:
 Euro Risk free rate = -0.50%

+ Beta = 1.20 x

Unlevered beta of alcoholic beverage business = 0.80

Firm's D/E Ratio: 66.98%

ERP = 6.83%

Region	Revenues	Weight	ERP
Europe	10348	50.24%	6.90%
North America	5920	28.74%	5.75%
Asia	2919	14.17%	7.22%
Latin America & Caribbean	781	3.79%	10.53%
Africa & Mid East	631	3.06%	9.30%
Total	20599	100.00%	6.83%

Arcelik's revenue growth has been solid and its margins have been high, but return on capital has been less than the cost of capital

Arcelik: My valuation (October 2019)

	LTM	2014-2019	Industry Average
Revenue Growth	37.03%	20.14%	7.83%
Pre-tax Operating Margin	7.82%	7.70%	7.93%
ROIC	11.70%	12.74%	18.68%
Sales/Capital	1.70	1.77	2.73

Between 2014 and 2019, Arcelik reported a growth rate of 20.14% in revenues, an average operating margin of 7.70% and an average sales to capital ratio of 1.77.

Stable Growth
 $g = 10\%$
 Cost of capital = 15%
 ROC = 15%;
 Reinvestment Rate = $10\%/15\% = 66.67\%$

Revenue growth of 20% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 10% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 8.00% over time.

Sales to capital ratio of 2.73, matching global average



Terminal Value = $3,332 / (.15 - .10) = TL 66,633$

PV(Terminal value)	\$ 11,766.68
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 3,603.22
Value of operating assets =	\$ 15,369.90
- Debt	\$ 14,305.92
- Minority interests	\$ 114.60
+ Cash	\$ 6,026.00
+ Non-operating assets	\$ 481.10
Value of equity	\$ 7,456.48
Number of shares	675.70
Estimated value /share	\$ 11.04

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	18.00%	16.00%	14.00%	12.00%	10.00%	10.00%
Revenues	30,440 ₺	36,528 ₺	43,834 ₺	52,600 ₺	63,120 ₺	75,744 ₺	89,378 ₺	103,679 ₺	118,194 ₺	132,377 ₺	145,615 ₺	160,177 ₺
EBIT (Operating) margin	7.82%	7.84%	7.86%	7.88%	7.89%	7.91%	7.93%	7.95%	7.96%	7.98%	8.00%	8.00%
EBIT (Operating income)	2,381 ₺	2,864 ₺	3,444 ₺	4,143 ₺	4,982 ₺	5,992 ₺	7,087 ₺	8,239 ₺	9,413 ₺	10,567 ₺	11,649 ₺	12,814 ₺
Tax rate	14.80%	14.80%	14.80%	14.80%	14.80%	14.80%	16.24%	17.68%	19.12%	20.56%	22.00%	22.00%
EBIT(1-t)	2,029 ₺	2,440 ₺	2,935 ₺	3,529 ₺	4,245 ₺	5,105 ₺	5,936 ₺	6,782 ₺	7,614 ₺	8,394 ₺	9,086 ₺	9,995 ₺
- Reinvestment		2,226 ₺	2,672 ₺	3,206 ₺	3,847 ₺	4,616 ₺	4,986 ₺	5,230 ₺	5,308 ₺	5,187 ₺	4,841 ₺	6,663 ₺
FCFF		214 ₺	263 ₺	324 ₺	398 ₺	489 ₺	950 ₺	1,553 ₺	2,306 ₺	3,208 ₺	4,246 ₺	3,332 ₺

Cost of capital = $24.73\% (.522) + 16.01\% (.478) = 20.64\%$
 Cost of capital decreases to 15% from years 6-10

On October 14, 2019, the shares were trading at 18 TL/share.



2. Risk is not in the past..

	Arithmetic Average		Geometric Average	
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2021	8.49%	6.71%	6.69%	5.13%
Std Error	2.05%	2.17%		
1972-2021	8.04%	5.47%	6.70%	4.47%
Std Error	2.44%	2.76%		
2012-2021	16.47%	14.39%	15.89%	14.00%
Std Error	3.88%	4.59%		

- If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it
 - ▣ Long term (because of the standard error)
 - ▣ Consistent with your risk free rate
 - ▣ A “compounded” average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.

But in the future..

In 2021, earnings recovered almost entirely from the 2020 collapse and dividends & buybacks surged as well.

Base year cash flow (last 12 mths)
 Dividends (TTM): 59.20
 + Buybacks (TTM): 88.05
 = Cash to investors (TTM): **147.24**

Expected earnings/cashflow growth in next 5 years
 Analysts were on target in 2021, with estimated earnings of 206.38 for the year. They were projecting compounded annual growth rate of 6.47% a year for next five years.

Modified Payout
 This computation assumes that the payout ratio stays constant over time. If you assume that it changes to a sustainable level (given stable growth & ROE), the implied ERP = 4.90%

Actual numbers Forecasted numbers

	2019	2020	LTM	2021E	1	2	3	4	5
Expected Earnings	157.18	139.76	190.34	206.38	219.74	233.96	249.11	265.23	282.40
Cash payout as % of earnings	146.31	118.66	77.36%	77.36%	77.36%	77.36%	77.36%	77.36%	77.36%
Dividends + Buybacks =	93.08%	84.90%	147.24	159.65	\$169.99	\$180.99	\$192.71	\$205.18	\$218.46

Earnings and Cash flows grow @1.51% (set equal to risk free rate) a year forever.

S&P 500 on 1/1/22=
4766.18

$$4766.18 = \frac{169.99}{(1+r)} + \frac{180.99}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{192.71}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{205.18}{(1+r)^4} + \frac{218.46}{(1+r)^5} + \frac{218.46(1.0151)}{(r-.0151)(1+r)^5}$$

The last term in this equation is the expected index level at the end of year 5 (capturing price appreciation)

Solve for r

You can solve for this r either iteratively or using the solver function in Excel

r = Implied Expected Return on Stocks = 5.75%


Minus

Risk free rate = T.Bond rate on 1/1/22= 1.51%

Equals


Implied Equity Risk Premium (1/1/22) = 5.75% - 1.51% = 4.24%

The Price of Risk: The COVID crisis




Comparison to History

Implied Premium for US Equity Market: 1960-2021



But there is a catch...



3. Globalization is not a buzz word

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- As companies get globalized, the valuations that we do have to reflect that globalization. In particular, we need to be wary of
 - ▣ Currency mismatches: Multinationals derive their revenues in many currencies but you have to be currency-consistent.
 - ▣ Beta gaming: When a company is listed in many markets, you can get very different betas, depending on how you set up and run a beta regression
 - ▣ Equity Risk Premiums: The standard practice of estimating equity risk premiums based on your country of incorporation will lead to skewed valuations.

ERP : Jan 2022

Andorra	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%	Italy	Baa3	2.18%	6.42%
Austria	Aa1	0.39%	4.63%	Jersey	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Belgium	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%	Liechtenstein	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Cyprus	Ba1	2.47%	6.71%	Luxembourg	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Denmark	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%	Malta	A2	0.84%	5.08%
Finland	Aa1	0.39%	4.63%	Netherlands	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
France	Aa2	0.49%	4.73%	Norway	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Germany	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%	Portugal	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Greece	Ba3	3.56%	7.80%	Spain	Baa1	1.58%	5.82%
Guernsey	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%	Sweden	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Iceland	A2	0.84%	5.08%	Switzerland	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Ireland	A2	0.84%	5.08%	Turkey	B2	5.44%	9.68%
Isle of Man	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%	UK	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%
				W. Europe		0.83%	5.07%

Canada	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
United States	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
North America		0.00%	4.24%

Caribbean	NA	6.83%	11.07%
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Argentina	Ca	11.87%	16.11%
Belize	Caa3	9.89%	14.13%
Bolivia	B2	5.44%	9.68%
Brazil	Ba2	2.97%	7.21%
Chile	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Colombia	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Costa Rica	B2	5.44%	9.68%
Ecuador	Caa3	9.89%	14.13%
El Salvador	Caal	7.41%	11.65%
Guatemala	Ba1	2.47%	6.71%
Honduras	B1	4.45%	8.69%
Mexico	Baa1	1.58%	5.82%
Nicaragua	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Panama	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Paraguay	Ba1	2.47%	6.71%
Peru	Baa1	1.58%	5.82%
Suriname	Caa3	9.89%	14.13%
Uruguay	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Venezuela	C	20.34%	24.58%
Latin America		3.79%	8.03%

Country	Rating	CRP	ERP
Angola	B3	5.53%	10.67%
Benin	B1	3.83%	8.69%
Botswana	A3	1.02%	5.43%
Burkina Faso	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Cameroon	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Cape Verde	B3	5.53%	10.67%
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	Caa1	6.38%	11.65%
Congo (Republic of)	Caa2	7.66%	13.14%
Côte d'Ivoire	Ba3	3.06%	7.80%
Egypt	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Ethiopia	Caa2	7.66%	13.14%
Gabon	Caa1	6.38%	11.65%
Ghana	B3	5.53%	10.67%
Kenya	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Mali	Caa1	6.38%	11.65%
Mauritius	Baa2	1.62%	6.12%
Morocco	Ba1	2.13%	6.71%
Mozambique	Caa2	7.66%	13.14%
Namibia	Ba3	3.06%	7.80%
Niger	B3	5.53%	10.67%
Nigeria	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Rwanda	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Senegal	Ba3	3.06%	7.80%
South Africa	Ba2	2.56%	7.21%
Swaziland	B3	5.53%	10.67%
Tanzania	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Togo	B3	5.53%	10.67%
Tunisia	Caa1	6.38%	11.65%
Uganda	B2	4.68%	9.68%
Zambia	Ca	10.21%	16.11%
Africa		5.25%	9.49%

Albania	B1	4.45%	8.69%
Armenia	Ba3	3.56%	7.80%
Azerbaijan	Ba2	2.97%	7.21%
Belarus	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Bulgaria	Baa1	1.58%	5.82%
Croatia	Ba1	2.47%	6.71%
Czech Republic	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%
Estonia	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Georgia	Ba2	2.97%	7.21%
Hungary	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Kazakhstan	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Kyrgyzstan	B2	5.44%	9.68%
Latvia	A3	1.19%	5.43%
Lithuania	A2	0.84%	5.08%
Macedonia	Ba3	3.56%	7.80%
Moldova	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Montenegro	B1	4.45%	8.69%
Poland	A2	0.84%	5.08%
Romania	Baa3	2.18%	6.42%
Russia	Baa3	2.18%	6.42%
Serbia	Ba2	2.97%	7.21%
Slovakia	A2	0.84%	5.08%
Slovenia	A3	1.19%	5.43%
Tajikistan	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Ukraine	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Uzbekistan	B1	4.45%	8.69%
E. Europe & Russia		2.11%	6.35%

Abu Dhabi	Aa2	0.49%	4.73%
Bahrain	B2	5.44%	9.68%
Iraq	Caa1	7.41%	11.65%
Israel	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Jordan	B1	4.45%	8.69%
Kuwait	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Lebanon	C	20.34%	24.58%
Oman	Ba3	3.56%	7.80%
Qatar	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%
Ras Al Khaimah	A3	1.19%	5.43%
Saudi Arabia	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Sharjah	Baa3	2.18%	6.42%
United Arab Emirates	Aa2	0.49%	4.73%
Middle East		1.60%	5.84%

Country	PRS	CRP	ERP
Algeria	62.25	6.43%	10.67%
Brunei	79	0.84%	5.08%
Gambia	65.75	5.44%	9.68%
Guinea	57.5	8.90%	13.14%
Guinea-Bissau	62.75	6.43%	10.67%
Guyana	66.25	4.45%	8.69%
Haiti	56.25	9.89%	14.13%
Iran	63.75	6.43%	10.67%
Korea, D.P.R.	51.5	11.87%	16.11%
Liberia	59	8.90%	13.14%
Libya	66.25	4.45%	8.69%
Madagascar	63.5	6.43%	10.67%
Malawi	59.75	8.90%	13.14%
Myanmar	53	11.87%	16.11%
Sierra Leone	57	9.89%	14.13%
Somalia	51.5	11.87%	16.11%
Sudan	36.25	20.34%	24.58%
Syria	45.5	20.34%	24.58%
Yemen	52.75	11.87%	16.11%
Zimbabwe	61	7.41%	11.65%

Bangladesh	Ba3	3.56%	7.80%
Cambodia	B2	5.44%	9.68%
China	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Fiji	B1	4.45%	8.69%
Hong Kong	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%
India	Baa3	2.18%	6.42%
Indonesia	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Japan	A1	0.70%	4.94%
Korea	Aa2	0.49%	4.73%
Laos	Caa2	8.90%	13.14%
Macao	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%
Malaysia	A3	1.19%	5.43%
Maldives	Caa1	7.41%	11.65%
Mongolia	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Pakistan	B3	6.43%	10.67%
Papua New Guinea	B2	5.44%	9.68%
Philippines	Baa2	1.88%	6.12%
Singapore	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Solomon Islands	Caa1	7.41%	11.65%
Sri Lanka	Caa2	8.90%	13.14%
Taiwan	Aa3	0.60%	4.84%
Thailand	Baa1	1.58%	5.82%
Vietnam	Ba3	3.56%	7.80%
Asia		1.04%	5.28%

Australia	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Cook Islands	B1	4.45%	8.69%
New Zealand	Aaa	0.00%	4.24%
Australia & NZ		0.00%	4.24%

Blue: Moody's Rating
 Red: Added Country Risk
 Green #: Total ERP

And your country risk exposure comes from where you operate, not where you incorporate!

<i>Region</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>ERP</i>	<i>Weight</i>	<i>Weighted ERP</i>
North America	₹ 42,408	5.08%	62.01%	3.1499%
Europe	₹ 15,302	6.01%	22.37%	1.3437%
Rest of the World	₹ 8,504	6.21%	12.43%	0.7721%
India	₹ 2,180	7.27%	3.19%	0.2317%
Total	₹ 68,394		100.00%	5.4974%

1. By focusing on revenues, are we misestimating country risk exposure?
2. As the company looks to grow in Latin America and Asia, how do you see this premium evolving?


Shell: Equity Risk Premium- March 2016

<i>Country</i>	<i>Oil & Gas Production</i>	<i>% of Total</i>	<i>ERP</i>
Denmark	17396	3.83%	6.20%
Italy	11179	2.46%	9.14%
Norway	14337	3.16%	6.20%
UK	20762	4.57%	6.81%
<i>Rest of Europe</i>	<i>874</i>	<i>0.19%</i>	<i>7.40%</i>
Brunei	823	0.18%	9.04%
Iraq	20009	4.40%	11.37%
Malaysia	22980	5.06%	8.05%
Oman	78404	17.26%	7.29%
Russia	22016	4.85%	10.06%
<i>Rest of Asia & ME</i>	<i>24480</i>	<i>5.39%</i>	<i>7.74%</i>
<i>Oceania</i>	<i>7858</i>	<i>1.73%</i>	<i>6.20%</i>
Gabon	12472	2.75%	11.76%
Nigeria	67832	14.93%	11.76%
Rest of Africa	6159	1.36%	12.17%
USA	104263	22.95%	6.20%
Canada	8599	1.89%	6.20%
Brazil	13307	2.93%	9.60%
<i>Rest of Latin America</i>	<i>576</i>	<i>0.13%</i>	<i>10.78%</i>
Royal Dutch Shell	454326	100.00%	8.26%

4. Everyone may do it, but that does not make it right.. The small cap premium


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Figure 4: The Small Cap Premium from 1927 to 2019: Smallest versus Largest Deciles



5. Don't let your inputs be at war with each other.

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The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 2028
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,780
% Growth		52%	79%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10%
Automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,554
% Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	79
Total Sales	2,478	3,361	5,655	7,095	10,072	12,768	16,736	21,648	26,403	31,416	36,959	42,087	48,017	54,355	61,296	68,059
% Growth		36%	60%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	11%
EBITDA	148	417	920	1,042	1,586	2,150	3,138	4,066	4,857	5,723	6,328	7,182	8,144	9,688	10,874	12,099
% Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17.8%
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	41%	79%	59%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	79%	76%	76%	76%	76%	77%
EBIT	45	259	748	839	1,285	1,796	2,749	3,529	4,252	5,027	5,517	6,244	7,056	8,429	9,423	10,439
% Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14.1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	15.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15.3%
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pretax Income	46	258	758	872	1,332	1,886	2,857	3,684	4,451	5,305	5,875	6,688	7,598	9,080	10,207	11,373
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,323
% Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	20%
Net Income	44	256	744	839	1,246	1,624	2,395	3,043	3,644	4,303	4,741	5,372	6,128	7,319	8,179	9,050
Plus																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932)
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Less																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376)
% of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-6%
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,149
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlevered Free Cash Flow	78	229	750	863	1,186	1,702	2,343	2,884	3,314	4,113	4,472	4,959	5,456	6,597	7,315	8,005


EBITDA	12,099
Sales	68,059
Net Debt (Cash)	(260)
Tesla Diluted Shares	142

Exit EBITDA High	12.0 x	Exit PPG High	5.0%	Exit P/Sales High	180%
Exit EBITDA Low	8.0 x	Exit PPG Low	3.0%	Exit P/Sales Low	130%

Discount Rate High	13.0%	FY Month of Valuation	1.0 (Beginning of this Month)
Discount Rate Low	9.0%	Month of FY End	12.0 (End of this Month)


And consider the trade offs in 2021..

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Sub Group	Number of firms	Return on Capital - Cost of Capital					Positive	Negative
		<-5%	-5% to -2%	-2% to +2%	2% to 5%	>5%		
Africa and Middle East	1,913	37.95%	14.69%	14.22%	7.16%	25.98%	39.52%	60.48%
Australia & NZ	1,510	60.66%	5.23%	7.48%	4.37%	22.25%	30.66%	69.34%
Canada	2,071	72.33%	4.01%	6.13%	2.95%	14.58%	21.05%	78.95%
China	6,377	27.16%	14.08%	13.88%	8.95%	35.93%	51.73%	48.27%
Eastern Europe & Russia	415	30.60%	12.77%	16.14%	9.88%	30.60%	47.95%	52.05%
EU & Environs	4,698	34.36%	11.56%	12.71%	6.85%	34.53%	47.40%	52.60%
India	3,526	33.35%	17.81%	12.62%	7.71%	28.50%	41.97%	58.03%
Japan	3,665	17.49%	16.13%	22.05%	10.89%	33.45%	53.70%	46.30%
Latin America & Caribbean	847	31.17%	11.57%	13.70%	8.50%	35.06%	49.23%	50.77%
Small Asia	8,346	35.85%	15.96%	15.37%	8.24%	24.57%	39.91%	60.09%
UK	1,037	37.51%	9.35%	10.22%	5.01%	37.90%	48.60%	51.40%
United States	4,593	39.95%	16.20%	6.88%	5.60%	31.37%	40.15%	59.85%
Global	38,998	35.67%	13.92%	13.17%	7.53%	29.71%	43.40%	56.60%

6. Don't sweat the small stuff



7. Don't let your terminal value run away with your valuation

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- In the terminal value equation, the growth seems to be the magic input, the key driver of value.

$$\text{Terminal Value}_n = \frac{\text{Free Cash Flow}_{n+1}}{(r - g)}$$

- Since that growth rate has to be maintained in perpetuity, it cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which you operate:
 - ▣ If your valuation is in nominal terms, it is the nominal growth rate of the economy. If it is in real terms, it is the real growth rate.
 - ▣ If your company is purely domestic, it is the growth rate of the domestic economy. If it is global, it is the global economy.

Four simple truths about terminal value..

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1. It is not the most influential number in your valuation (even though it is usually the biggest).
 - ▣ The lead in assumptions that get you to your terminal year are more critical than what you assume in your terminal year.
 - ▣ In your terminal year, you are constrained in what you can assume will happen forever.
2. You have more flexibility to bring in company differences into your terminal value than you realize:
 - You don't have to assume a perpetuity (it can be an annuity)
 - Your growth rate in perpetuity can be negative.
3. There are no rules (none) on what percent of a good DCF comes from your terminal value. It can be 50%, 75%, 100% or even 150%.
 - ▣ The percent of your current value that comes from your terminal value will reflect where your company is in the life cycle.
 - ▣ It is a reflection of how you expect to make money on that company, as an equity investor.
4. Your company in your terminal year may have the same name as your company today, but it will be a very different company in terms of its fundamentals (risk, cash flows, accounting returns) than it is today.

My Simple Proxy: The Risk free Rate

- I use a simpler and more easily observable number as a cap on stable growth: the risk free rate that I have used in the valuation. This takes into account the currency automatically (since higher inflation currencies have higher risk free rates) and it is not unreasonable to argue that it is a good proxy for the nominal growth rate in the economy.
- There are three reasons I do it:
 - The best predictor nominal growth in the US economy at the start of every decade has been the US treasury bond rate at the time.
 - It preserves consistency. If you believe, as many have, that the risk free rate is too low in US \$ or Euros, it compensates for the resulting too-low cost of capital by also capping the growth rate at the same number (at least in terminal value).
 - It puts a control on my biases.

A Consistent Version of Terminal Value

- The terminal value equation can be restated:

$$\text{Terminal Value in year } n = \frac{\text{EBIT}_{n+1} (1 - t)(1 - \frac{g}{\text{ROC}})}{(\text{Cost of Capital} - g)}$$

Terminal Value for a firm with \$100 million in after-tax operating income & cost of capital = 10% (for different g and ROIC)

		<i>Return on capital in perpetuity</i>				
		6%	8%	10%	12%	14%
<i>Growth rate forever</i>	0.00%	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000
	0.50%	\$965	\$987	\$1,000	\$1,009	\$1,015
	1.00%	\$926	\$972	\$1,000	\$1,019	\$1,032
	1.50%	\$882	\$956	\$1,000	\$1,029	\$1,050
	2.00%	\$833	\$938	\$1,000	\$1,042	\$1,071
	2.50%	\$778	\$917	\$1,000	\$1,056	\$1,095
	3.00%	\$714	\$893	\$1,000	\$1,071	\$1,122


8. Don't let your macro views drown out your micro views..

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- When you are asked to value a company, you should keep your focus on what drives that value. If you bring in your specific macro views into the valuation, the value that you obtain for a company will be a joint result of what you think about the company and your macro views.
- **Bottom line:** If you have macro views, provide them separately. You should be as macro-neutral as you can be, in your company valuations.
- **Follow up:** If you find macro risk dominating your thoughts, deal with it frontally.

The biggest driver for Shell (and no surprise) is..

Shell: Revenues vs Oil Price



Valuing Shell at April 2016 oil price (\$40)

Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of \$40/barrel in March 2016
 Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*\$40
 = \$201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	Terminal Year
Revenues	\$ 201,569	\$ 209,450	\$ 217,639	\$ 226,149	\$ 234,991	\$ 244,180	\$ 249,063
Operating Margin	3.01%	6.18%	7.76%	8.56%	8.95%	9.35%	9.35%
Operating Income	\$ 6,065.00	\$ 12,942.85	\$ 16,899.10	\$ 19,352.39	\$ 21,040.39	\$ 22,830.80	\$ 23,287.41
Effective tax rate	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%
AT Operating Income	\$ 4,245.50	\$ 9,060.00	\$ 11,829.37	\$ 13,546.68	\$ 14,728.27	\$ 15,981.56	\$ 16,301.19
+ Depreciation	\$ 26,714.00	\$ 27,759	\$ 28,844	\$ 29,972	\$ 31,144	\$ 32,361	
- Cap Ex	\$ 31,854.00	\$ 33,099	\$ 34,394	\$ 35,738	\$ 37,136	\$ 38,588	
- Chg in WC		\$ 472.88	\$ 491.37	\$ 510.58	\$ 530.55	\$ 551.29	
FCFF		\$ 3,246.14	\$ 5,788.19	\$ 7,269.29	\$ 8,205.44	\$ 9,203.68	\$ 13,011.34
Terminal Value						\$ 216,855.71	
Return on capital							12.37%
Cost of Capital		9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	8.00%
Cumulated Discount Factor		1.0991	1.2080	1.3277	1.4593	1.6039	
Present Value		\$ 2,953.45	\$ 4,791.47	\$ 5,474.95	\$ 5,622.81	\$ 140,940.73	
Value of Operating Assets	\$ 159,783.41						
+ Cash	\$ 31,752.00						
+ Cross Holdings	\$ 33,566.00						
- Debt	\$ 58,379.00						
- Minority Interests	\$ 1,245.00						
Value of Equity	\$ 165,477.41						
Number of shares	4209.7						
Value per share	\$ 39.31						

Added long term investments in joint ventures and subtracted out minority interest in consolidated holdings.

Operating margin converges on Shell's historical average margin of 9.35% from 200-2015

Return on capital reverts and stays at Shell's historic average of 12.37% from 200-2015

Infosys: March 2018 (in Rupees)

Cash flows from existing assets

	LTM	2011-2017	Industry (US data)
Revenue growth =	3.28%	14.22%	15.31%
Pre-tax operating margin =	24.29%	26.16%	8.35%
Sales to capital ratio =	1.81	2.50	3.69
Return on invested capital =	31.57%	47.80%	27.96%

The Payoff from growth

Revenues will grow 10% a year for next 5 years, tapering down to 5.38% growth in year 10

Operating margin (per-tax) will continue to decline from 24.29% to 23%

Sales/Invested Capital will stay at ten-year average of 1.81

Maturity and Closure

Stable Growth $g = 5.38\%$;
 Cost of capital = 9.88%
 ROC = 15%;
 Reinvestment Rate = $g/ROC = 5.83\%/15.00\% = 35.87\%$

Rupee Cashflows

Terminal Value = $169,632 / (.0988 - .0538) = 3,769,597$

PV(Terminal value)	₹ 1,366,411
PV (CF over next 10 years)	₹ 790,711
Value of operating assets =	₹ 2,157,122
- Debt	₹ -
- Minority interests	₹ -
+ Cash	₹ 230,727
+ Non-operating assets	₹ 61,081
Value of equity	₹ 2,448,930
- Value of options	₹ 945
Value of equity in common stock	₹ 2,447,985
Number of shares	₹ 2,283
Estimated value /share	₹ 1,072.22

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	9.08%	8.15%	7.23%	6.30%	5.38%	5.38%
Revenues	₹ 683,119	₹ 751,431	₹ 826,574	₹ 909,231	₹ 1,000,155	₹ 1,100,170	₹ 1,200,021	₹ 1,297,847	₹ 1,391,656	₹ 1,479,386	₹ 1,558,976	₹ 1,642,849
EBIT (Operating) margin	24.29%	24.16%	24.03%	23.90%	23.78%	23.65%	23.52%	23.39%	23.26%	23.13%	23.00%	23.00%
EBIT (Operating income)	₹ 165,945	₹ 181,568	₹ 198,657	₹ 217,348	₹ 237,790	₹ 260,148	₹ 282,208	₹ 303,536	₹ 323,678	₹ 342,170	₹ 358,565	₹ 377,855
Tax rate	28.00%	28.00%	28.00%	28.00%	28.00%	28.00%	28.40%	28.80%	29.20%	29.60%	30.00%	30.00%
EBIT(1-t)	₹ 119,480	₹ 130,729	₹ 143,033	₹ 156,491	₹ 171,209	₹ 187,306	₹ 202,061	₹ 216,118	₹ 229,164	₹ 240,888	₹ 250,995	₹ 264,499
- Reinvestment	₹ 37,842	₹ 41,626	₹ 45,789	₹ 50,368	₹ 55,404	₹ 55,313	₹ 54,191	₹ 51,966	₹ 48,599	₹ 44,090	₹ 44,090	₹ 94,867
FCFF	₹ 92,887	₹ 101,407	₹ 110,702	₹ 120,841	₹ 131,902	₹ 146,747	₹ 161,927	₹ 177,198	₹ 192,289	₹ 206,905	₹ 206,905	₹ 169,632
Cost of capital		11.02%	11.02%	11.02%	11.02%	11.02%	10.80%	10.57%	10.34%	10.11%	9.88%	
Cumulated discount factor		0.9007	0.8113	0.7307	0.6581	0.5928	0.5350	0.4839	0.4386	0.3983	0.3625	
PV(FCFF)		₹ 83,664	₹ 82,268	₹ 80,890	₹ 79,531	₹ 78,190	₹ 78,514	₹ 78,356	₹ 77,712	₹ 76,588	₹ 74,999	

Discount at Rs Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.02% (.100) = 11.02%

The Risk in the Cash flows

On March 27, 2018, Infosys was trading at Rs 1150/ share

Cost of Equity 11.02%

Cost of Debt NO DEBT

Weights E = 100% D = 0%

Riskfree Rate:
Rupee Risk free Rate = 7.33% - 1.95% = 5.38%

Beta = 1.03

Firm's D/E Ratio: 0%

Business	Revenues	EV/Sales	Estimated Value	Value Weight	Unlevered Beta
Computer Software	₹ 2,101	6.3640	₹ 13,371	13.51%	1.1114
Computer Services	₹ 66,383	1.2899	₹ 85,630	86.49%	1.0136
Company	₹ 68,484		₹ 99,001		1.0268

ERP = 5.50%

Region	Revenues	ERP	Weight	Weighted ERP
North America	₹ 42,408	5.08%	62.01%	3.1499%
Europe	₹ 15,302	6.01%	22.37%	1.3437%
Rest of the World	₹ 8,504	6.21%	12.43%	0.7721%
India	₹ 2,180	7.27%	3.19%	0.2317%
Total	₹ 68,394		100.00%	5.4974%



The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules



In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).



In a **Dreamstate DCF**, you build amazing companies on spreadsheets, making outlandish assumptions about growth and operating margins over time.



A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

$$D+CF \neq DCF$$



In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.




In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.




A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of

III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation




From story to numbers and beyond..

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Step Zero: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
 - ▣ Your company (its products, its management and its history).
 - ▣ The market or markets that you see it growing in.
 - ▣ The competition it faces and will face.
 - ▣ The macro environment in which it operates.



Step 1: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
 - ▣ Rule 1: Keep it simple.
 - ▣ Rule 2: Keep it focused.


The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

1. An urban car service business: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong competitive advantages (from being a first mover).
5. And its existing low-capital business model, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense

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The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable

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The Impossible

Bigger than the economy

Assuming Growth rate for company in perpetuity > Growth rate for economy

Bigger than the total market

Allowing a company's revenues to grow so much that it has more than a 100% market share of whatever business it is in.

Profit margin > 100%

Assuming earnings growth will exceed revenue growth for a long enough period, and pushing margins above 100%

Depreciation without cap ex

Assuming that depreciation will exceed cap ex in perpetuity.

The Implausible

Growth without reinvestment

Assuming growth forever without reinvestment.


Profits without competition

Assuming that your company will grow and earn higher profits, with no competition.

Returns without risk


Assuming that you can generate high returns in a business with no risk.

The Improbable




Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable

Uber (My narrative))



The Impossible: The Runaway Story

The Story



+


The Checks (?)

Board Member	Designation	Age
Henry Kissinger	Former Secretary of State	92
Bill Perry	Former Secretary of Defense	88
George Schultz	Former Secretary of State	94
Bill Frist	Former Senate Majority Leader	63
Sam Nunn	Former Senator	77
Gary Roughead	Former Navy Admiral	64
James Mattis	Former Marine Corps General	65
Dick Kovocovich	Former CEO of Wells Fargo	72
Riley Bechtel	Former CEO of Bechtel	63
William Foege	Epidemiologist	79
Elizabeth Holmes	Founder & CEO, Theranos	31
Sunny Balwani	President & COO, Theranos	NA


+

Money

Companies valued at \$1 billion or more by venture-capital firms




Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)



Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
 - ▣ Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
 - ▣ Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
 - ▣ Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
 - ▣ Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

The Gurley Pushback

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1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	<i>Uber (Gurley)</i>	<i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i>	<i>Uber (Damodaran)</i>
Narrative	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages</u> to get a <u>significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	\$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+)	\$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+)	\$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion)

Different narratives, Different Numbers

<i>Total Market</i>	<i>Growth Effect</i>	<i>Network Effect</i>	<i>Competitive Advantages</i>	<i>Value of Uber</i>
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

The Real World Intrudes: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

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Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options

Uber: Personal Mobility Player?

Uber is primarily a ride sharing company, with ambitions of being a global logistics player. Its revenue growth has been astonishing, though it is starting to slow, but it remains a big money loser, as it searches for a business model that delivers more stickiness. In this story, Uber uses a combination of economies of scale and a more capital intensive business model to create a pathway to profitability. Along the way, it will become a less risky company, though its losses leave it exposed to a 5% chance of failure.

The Assumptions

	<i>Base year</i>	<i>Years 1-5</i>	<i>Years 6-10</i>	<i>After year 10</i>	<i>Story link</i>
Total Market	\$400,000	Grow 10.39% a year		Grows 2.75% a year	Global logistics
Gross Market Share	12.45%	6.71%>30%		30%	Global Network benefits
Revenue Share	20.13%	Unchanged		20.13%	Market dominance keeps billing share high.
Operating Margin	-24.39%	-24.39% ->20%		15.00%	Full employee & more regulations
Reinvestment	NA	Sales to capital ratio of 4.00		Reinvestment rate = 7.5%	Low capital investment model
Cost of capital	NA	9.97%	9,97%->8.24%	8.24%	At 75th percentile of US firms
Risk of failure	5% chance of failure, if pricing meltdown leads to capital being cut off				Cash on hand + Capital access

The Cash Flows

	<i>Total Market</i>	<i>Market Share</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>EBIT (1-t)</i>	<i>Reinvestment</i>	<i>FCFF</i>
1	\$ 441,560	14.20%	\$ 12,627	\$ (2,369)	\$ 650	\$ (3,019)
2	\$ 487,438	15.96%	\$ 15,661	\$ (2,057)	\$ 759	\$ (2,816)
3	\$ 538,083	17.71%	\$ 19,189	\$ (1,441)	\$ 882	\$ (2,323)
4	\$ 593,990	19.47%	\$ 23,281	\$ (438)	\$ 1,023	\$ (1,461)
5	\$ 655,705	21.22%	\$ 28,017	\$ 1,050	\$ 1,184	\$ (134)
6	\$ 723,833	22.98%	\$ 33,485	\$ 3,139	\$ 1,367	\$ 1,771
7	\$ 799,039	24.73%	\$ 39,787	\$ 5,292	\$ 1,576	\$ 3,716
8	\$ 882,059	26.49%	\$ 47,037	\$ 5,292	\$ 1,813	\$ 3,479
9	\$ 973,705	28.24%	\$ 55,365	\$ 6,229	\$ 2,082	\$ 4,147
10	\$1,074,873	30.00%	\$ 64,915	\$ 7,303	\$ 2,387	\$ 4,915
Terminal year	\$1,101,745	30.00%	\$ 66,537	\$ 7,485	\$ 936	\$ 6,550

The Value

Terminal value	\$ 114,108		
PV(Terminal value)	\$ 46,258		
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 501		
Value of operating assets =	\$ 46,759		
Probability of failure	5%		
Value in case of failure	\$ -		
Adjusted Value for operating assets	\$ 44,421		
+ Cash on hand	\$ 6,406		
+ Cross holdings	\$ 8,700		
+ IPO Proceeds	\$ 9,000		
- Debt	\$ 6,869		
Value of equity	\$ 52,958		
Value per share	\$ 45.00		

IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy.. And accuracy for payoff..

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Better accurate
than precise



High Accuracy
High Precision



Low Accuracy
High Precision




High Accuracy
Low Precision



Low Accuracy
Low Precision


It's all relative



Valuing a start up or a young company is hard to do..

Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.



And the dark side will beckon..

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- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is “too difficult” or even “impossible” to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the “dark side”, where
 - ▣ You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
 - ▣ You will hear “macro” stories, justifying value
 - ▣ You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.

A much-watched IPO

- ❑ Zomato, an Indian online food-delivery company, started trading on the Sensex on July 14, 2021, and its market debut is being watched for clues by a number of other online ventures in India, waiting in the wings to go public.
 - ❑ The primary attraction, to investors, of the company comes not from its current standing (modest revenues and big losses), but from its capacity to take advantage of the potential growth in the Indian food delivery market.
 - ❑ In this post, I will value Zomato, and rather than just make a value judgment (which I will), I will also tie the value per share to macro expectations about the overall market.
- ❑ I will argue that a bet on Zomato is as much a bet on the company's business model, as it is a bet on Indian consumers not only acquiring more buying power and digital access, but also changing their eating behavior.

Setting the Stage: Zomato's history

- Zomato was founded in 2008 by Deepinder Goel and Pankaj Chaddah, as Foodiebay, in response to the difficulties that they noticed the difficulties that their office mates were having in downloading menus for restaurants, that they wanted to order food from.
- Their initial response was a simple one, where they uploaded soft copies of menus of local restaurants, in Delhi, on to their website, initially for people in their office, and then to everyone in the city.
- As the popularity grew, they expanded to other large Indian cities, and in 2010, they renamed the company "Zomato", with the tagline of "never have a bad meal".

And Business Model

- Transaction Fees: The bulk of Zomato's revenues come from the transactions on its platform, from food ordering and delivery, as the company keeps a percentage of the total order value for itself. While Zomato's revenue slice varies across restaurants, decreasing with restaurant profile and reach, it remains about 20-25% of gross order value.
- Advertising: Restaurants that list on Zomato have to pay a fixed fee to get listed, but they can also spend more on advertising, based upon customer visits and resetting revenues, to get additional visibility.
- Subscriptions to Zomato Gold (Pro): Zomato also offers a subscription service, and subscribers to Zomato Gold ([now Zomato Pro](#)) get discounts on food and faster deliveries. The service was initiated in 2017 and it had 1.5 million plus members in 2021, delivering subscription revenues of 600 million rupees (a little less than \$ 10 million, and less than 5% of overall revenues) in 2021.
- Restaurant Raw Material: In 2018, Zomato introduced HyperPure, a service directed at restaurants, offering groceries and meats that are source-checked for quality.

Cash Burn? VC Investors


Date	Stage	Investment (in millions of)		Investor
		In INR	In US \$	
Sep-11	Series A	₹ 160	\$3.5	Info Edge
Sep-12	Series B	₹ 125	\$2.3	Info Edge
Feb-13	Series C	₹ 543	\$10.0	Info Edge
Nov-13	Series D	₹ 2,311	\$37.0	Info Edge, Sequoia Capital
Nov-14	Series E	₹ 3,703	\$60.0	Info Edge, Vy Capital
Apr-15	Series F	₹ 3,127	\$50.0	Info Edge, Vy Capital
Sep-15	Series G	₹ 3,970	\$60.0	Temasek Holdings, Vy Capital
Apr-17	Series H	₹ 1,293	\$20.0	Sequoia Capital India
Feb-18	Series I	₹ 12,826	\$200.0	Ant Financial
Oct-18	Series J	₹ 15,422	\$210.0	Ant Financial
Feb-19	Series J	₹ 2,501	\$35.0	Glade Brook Capital Partners
Mar-19	Corporate Round	₹ 3,850	\$55.0	Delivery Hero
Jan-20	Corporate Round	₹ 10,644	\$150.0	Ant Financial
Apr-20	Series J	₹ 381	\$5.0	Baillie Gifford
Sep-20	Series J	₹ 12,198	\$166.0	Tiger Global
Oct-20	Series J	₹ 3,839	\$52.0	Kora
Dec-20	Series J	₹ 48,708	\$660.0	Kora, Tiger Global Management
Feb-21	Venture Round	₹ 18,148	\$250.0	Kora, Tiger Global, Fidelity
Total funds raised		₹ 143,748	\$2,026	

Acquisition-driven Growth

<i>Company Acquired</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Price (in millions INR)</i>	<i>In US \$ millions</i>
MenuMania	Jul-14	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Obedovat	Aug-14	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Lunchtime	Aug-14	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
gastronauci.pl	Sep-14	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Cibando	Dec-14	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Urbanspoon	Jan-15	₹ 3,500	\$52
Mekanist	Jan-15	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
MapleGraph Solutions	Apr-15	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Nextable	Apr-15	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Sparse Labs	Sep-16	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Runnr	Sep-17	₹ 1,300	\$20
Tonguestun Food Network	Sep-18	₹ 1,230	\$18
TechEagle	Dec-18	Undisclosed	Undisclosed
Uber Eats India	Jan-20	₹ 15,250	\$206
FITSO	Jan-21	₹ 1,000	₹ 13

Zomato's Shareholder Base (Pre-IPO)

Zomato: Equity Ownership prior to IPO



The Food Delivery Market

	<i>India</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>EU</i>
<i>General</i>				
GDP in 2020 (in trillions of US \$)	\$ 2.71	\$ 14.70	\$ 20.93	\$ 15.17
Population (millions)	1360	1430	330	445
Per Capital GDP	\$ 1,993	\$ 10,280	\$ 63,424	\$ 34,090
Number of restaurants (in 000s)	1000	9000	660	890
<i>Food Delivery</i>				
Online Access (percent)	43%	63%	88%	90%
Online Food Delivery Users (millions)	50.00	450.00	105.00	150.00
Online Food Delivery Market (\$ million) in 2019	\$ 4,200	\$ 90,000	\$ 21,000	\$ 15,000
Online Food Delivery Market (\$ million) in 2020	\$ 2,900	\$ 110,000	\$ 49,000	\$ 13,800

Difference Drivers

- Lower per-capita income: Eating out and prosperity don't always go hand in hand, but you are more likely to eat out, as your discretionary income rises. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the number of restaurants increases with per capita GDP, and that one reason for the paucity of restaurants (and food delivery) in India is its low GDP, less than a fifth of per capita GDP in China and a fraction of per capita GDP in the US & EU.
- Less digital reach: To use online restaurant services, you first need to be online, and digital reach in India, in spite of advances in recent years, lags digital reach in China, and is about half the reach in the US and the EU.
- Eating habits: Looking across the regions, it seems clear that there is a third factor at play, a pre-disposition to eat out in the populace. Looking at the number of restaurants in China and the size of its food delivery market, it is quite clear that Chinese consumers are far more willing to eat out (either in person at or with delivery from restaurants) than people living in the US and EU, especially if you control for per capita income differences.

Indian Market Size, adjusted for income and digital reach...

	<i>Indian Per Capita GDP as % of China Per Capita GDP</i>			
	25%	50%	75%	100%
Current Internet access	\$5,417	\$10,834	\$16,250	\$21,667
China-level Internet access	\$7,936	\$15,872	\$23,809	\$31,745
US-level Internet access	\$11,085	\$22,171	\$33,256	\$44,342

Zomato: The Prospectus

- Definitions and abbreviations: The prospectus starts, and I wonder whether this is by design, with 17 pages of abbreviations of terms, some of which are obvious and need no definition (board of directors, shareholders), some of which are meaningless even when expanded (19 classes of preferred shares, all of which will be replaced with common shares after the IP) and some of which are just corporate names.
- Risk Profile: If you did not believe my assertions about the pointlessness of risk sections in IPOs, please do read all 30 pages of Zomato's risk profile (pages 39-68 of the prospectus). The company lists 69 different risks investors may face from investing in the company, and after you have read them all, I dare you to list three on that list that you would remember.
- Subsidiary/Holdings Mess: I find it mind boggling that a company that is only thirteen years old has managed to accumulate as many subsidiaries, both in India and overseas, as Zomato has done. Since Zomato owns 100% of most of these subsidiaries, there may be legal or tax reasons for this structure, but there is no denying that it adds complexity (and pages) to the prospectus, with no real information benefits.



Growth & Profitability Trends

<i>Fiscal Year ended</i>	<i>3/31/18</i>	<i>3/31/19</i>	<i>3/31/20</i>	<i>3/31/21</i>
Gross Order Value	₹ 19,154.25	₹ 53,870.10	₹ 112,209.00	₹ 94,828.70
Total Revenue	₹ 4,660.23	₹ 13,125.86	₹ 26,047.37	₹ 19,937.89
Cost Of Goods Sold	₹ 2,963.53	₹ 6,269.94	₹ 9,229.39	₹ 9,455.04
Gross Profit	₹ 1,696.70	₹ 6,855.92	₹ 16,817.98	₹ 10,482.85
Selling General & Admin Exp.	₹ 944.06	₹ 12,629.44	₹ 13,771.49	₹ 5,823.91
Provision for Bad Debts	₹ 18.31	₹ 29.47	₹ 124.95	₹ 88.42
R & D Exp.	-	-	-	-
Depreciation & Amort.	₹ 291.47	₹ 431.15	₹ 842.36	₹ 431.99
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	₹ 1,641.21	₹ 16,630.87	₹ 25,966.51	₹ 8,941.29
Operating Income	-₹ 1,198.40	-₹ 22,865.00	-₹ 23,887.30	-₹ 4,802.76
Interest Expense	-₹ 52.80	-₹ 70.60	-₹ 110.20	-₹ 63.95
Interest and Invest. Income	₹ 73.10	₹ 133.46	₹ 264.90	₹ 223.75
Net Interest Exp.	₹ 20.32	₹ 62.84	₹ 154.66	-₹ 287.70
Currency Exchange Gains (Loss)	-₹ 16.90	-₹ 0.30	-₹ 0.90	₹ 24.83
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	₹ 8.72	-₹ 10.70	₹ 266.44	₹ 289.94
EBT Excl. Unusual Items	-₹ 1,186.30	-₹ 22,813.20	-₹ 23,467.10	-₹ 4,328.19
Impairment of Goodwill	-	-	-₹ 962.70	₹ 0.00
Gain (Loss) On Sale Of Invest.	₹ 94.85	₹ 600.82	₹ 513.91	₹ 612.30
Gain (Loss) On Sale Of Assets	₹ 2.96	₹ 0.31	₹ 0.86	₹ 0.00
Asset Writedown	-₹ 0.10	-₹ 0.10	-₹ 155.20	₹ 0.00
Other Unusual Items	₹ 19.39	₹ 12,109.81	₹ 214.27	₹ 0.00
EBT Incl. Unusual Items	-₹ 1,069.20	-₹ 10,102.30	-₹ 23,856.00	-₹ 8,164.28
Income Tax Expense	-	-	-	-
Earnings from Cont. Ops.	-₹ 1,069.20	-₹ 10,102.30	-₹ 23,856.00	-₹ 8,164.28
Minority Int. in Earnings	₹ 32.39	₹ 452.86	₹ 184.43	₹ 36.12
Net Income	-₹ 1,036.80	-₹ 9,649.50	-₹ 23,671.60	-₹ 8,128.16

Quarterly Come back?

	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>% Change</i>
Q1	₹ 25,333.00	₹ 10,936.00	-56.83%
Q2	₹ 32,174.00	₹ 20,952.00	-34.88%
Q3	₹ 27,853.00	₹ 29,810.00	7.03%
Q4	₹ 26,849.00	₹ 33,130.00	23.39%

Unit Economics



Zomato: Story Pieces

- Total Market: I find it hard to see the *total market exceeding \$40 billion, with US \$20-\$30 billion, in ten years*, being a more likely outcome. (In rupee terms, this will translate into a market that is roughly 1800-2000 billion INR.)
- Market Share: Expecting any company to have a *market share that exceeds 40%* of this market is a reach, and I will assume that Zomato will be one of the winners/survivors
- Revenue Share: That number was 23.13% in FY 2020, but dropped to 21.03% in FY 2021, as shut downs put a crimp on business. I will assume a *partial bounce back to 22% of GOV*, starting in 2022, but the presence of Amazon Food will prevent a return to higher values in the future.
- Profitability: I will assume that *pre-tax operating margins will trend towards 30%*, largely because I believe that the market will be dominated by a few big players, but with the very real possibility that one rogue player that is unwilling to play the game can upend profitability.
- Reinvestment: One of the advantages of being an intermediary business is that you can grow with relatively little capital investment, defined in conventional form (as plant, equipment or manufacturing facilities). That said, reinvestment takes a different form for online intermediaries, like Zomato, with investments in technology and in acquisitions, driving future growth.
- Risk: In terms of operating risk, the company, in spite of its global ambitions, is still primarily an Indian company, dependent on Indian macroeconomic growth to succeed, and my rupee cost of capital will incorporate the country risk. Zomato is a money losing company, but it is no start-up, facing imminent failure. On the plus side, its size and access to capital, as well as its post-IPO augmented cash balance, push down the risk of failure. Overall, I will attach a likelihood of failure of 10%, reflecting this balance.

The Story

Zomato will benefit as the Indian food delivery market grows, driven by overall economic growth and more digital access, and it will be one of a few (two or three) players who will dominate the market; there will be a near term COVID bounceback effect. While Amazon Food remains the wild card, economies of scales will allow the company to generate high operating margins, and the company will continue to reinvest (acquisitions and technology) as it grows. The risk of failure is low, given the company's post-IPO cash balance and access to capital and its operating risk reflects its exposure to Indian country risk.

The Assumptions

	Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
Indian Food Delivery	₹ 225,000	₹ 337,500	30.00%	15.27%	₹ 1,961,979	Indian food market rebounds in 2021 and grows to about \$25 billion in year 10
Market Share	42.15%	41.72%	→	40.00%	40.00%	Zomato is one of two or three lead players in Indian food delivery market
Revenues as % of GOV	21.03%	22.00%			22.00%	
Revenues (a)	₹ 19,937.89	₹ 30,975	Total Market * Market Share * Revenue as % of GOV		₹ 172,654	COVID rebound in 2021 + Growth in food delivery market in India long term
Operating margin (b)	-24.10%	-10.0%	-10.00%	→ 35.00%	35.00%	Margins improve as growth wanes
Tax rate	30.00%		30.00%	→ 30.00%	30.00%	Indian corporate tax rate over time
Reinvestment (c)		5.00	2.50	3.00	35.42%	Acquisitions & technology investments needed to sustain growth
Return on capital	-7.15%	Marginal ROIC =	127.01%		12.00%	New working benefits allow for high ROIC, near and long term.
Cost of capital (d)			10.25%	→ 8.97%	8.97%	Cost of capital reflects Indian country risk


The Cash Flows

	Total Market	Market Share	Revenues	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	₹ 337,500	41.72%	₹ 30,974.78	-₹ 3,097.48	₹ 2,207.38	-₹ 5,304.86
2	₹ 438,750	41.29%	₹ 39,852.91	₹ 498.16	₹ 3,551.25	-₹ 3,053.09
3	₹ 570,375	40.86%	₹ 51,270.19	₹ 3,247.17	₹ 4,566.91	-₹ 1,319.74
4	₹ 741,488	40.43%	₹ 65,951.07	₹ 5,770.72	₹ 5,872.35	-₹ 101.64
5	₹ 963,934	40.00%	₹ 84,826.17	₹ 10,762.32	₹ 6,291.70	₹ 4,470.62
6	₹ 1,203,471	40.00%	₹ 105,905.47	₹ 14,994.01	₹ 7,026.43	₹ 7,967.57
7	₹ 1,440,555	40.00%	₹ 126,768.85	₹ 24,503.10	₹ 6,954.46	₹ 17,548.64
8	₹ 1,650,156	40.00%	₹ 145,213.72	₹ 35,577.36	₹ 6,148.29	₹ 29,429.07
9	₹ 1,805,271	40.00%	₹ 158,863.81	₹ 38,921.63	₹ 4,550.03	₹ 34,371.60
10	₹ 1,881,995	40.00%	₹ 165,615.52	₹ 40,575.80	₹ 2,250.57	₹ 38,325.23
Terminal year	₹ 1,961,979	40.00%	₹ 172,654.18	₹ 42,300.27	₹ 14,981.35	₹ 27,318.93


The Value

Terminal value	₹ 578,790.83		
PV(Terminal value)	₹ 225,869.40		
PV (CF over next 10 years)	₹ 50,979.90		
Value of operating assets =	₹ 276,849.30		
Adjustment for distress	₹ 13,842.46	Probability of failure =	10.00%
- Debt & Minority Interests	₹ 1,591.72		
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets	₹ 135,959.70	Includes cash proceeds from IPO of	₹ 90,000
Value of equity	₹ 397,374.81		
- Value of equity options	₹ 73,244.53		
Number of shares	7,946.68		
Value per share	₹ 40.79	Stock was offered at =	₹ 70.00


Growth in Indian Food Delivery Market



Zomato's Market Share




Zomato's Operating Margin (Pre-tax)



Correlation = 0.50

Zomato: Monte Carlo Simulation of Value/Share



Percentile	Value per share
0%	-₹ 0.22
10%	₹ 24.49
20%	₹ 27.96
30%	₹ 30.74
40%	₹ 33.35
50%	₹ 36.02
60%	₹ 28.86
70%	₹ 42.11
80%	₹ 46.07
90%	₹ 51.92
100%	₹ 91.69

Add-ons and Distractions: Platform Optionality

- As a company with millions of users on its platform, if Zomato can deliver other products and services to the users of the platform, it can augment its earnings and value.
 - ▣ First, not all platforms are created equal, in terms of being adding value, with platforms with more intense users and proprietary data having more value than platforms where users are transitory and there is little exclusive data being collected.
 - ▣ Second, even if you believe that there is optionality, attach a numerical value to that option is one of the most difficult tasks in investment. While there are option pricing models that can be adapted to do the valuation, getting the inputs for these models, especially before the optionality takes form, is difficult to do.

A Big Market Premium?

- Indian and Chinese companies, especially in young and nascent businesses, have an advantage that they often play to, which is immense local markets. It is not surprising that companies play up this advantage, when marketing themselves to investors, with some analysts attaching premiums to value, just because of market size.
 - ▣ Double counting: I believe that this is a distraction, because that market size should already be incorporated into the intrinsic value, through growth and margin expectations. In my base case valuation of Zomato, I assume that revenues will increase more than twenty-fold over the next 10 years, because the Indian market is expected to grow so strongly.
 - ▣ The Big Market Delusion: In fact, the danger to investors, when faced with Indian and Chinese companies, is not that they will under value these companies, but that they will over value them, precisely because the markets are so big.

V. Valuation is a craft, and you should never stop learning

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. **Valuation is not a science.**
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. **Valuation is not an art.**
- A craft is a skill that you learn by doing. The more you do it, the better you get at it. **Valuation is a craft.**

Uber's Existing User Value

Growth rate in Operating Expenses
Assumed that 90% of operating expenses are variable, growing at revenue growth rate. Overall expenses grow 10.95%/year

Growth rate in Revenues
Assumed 12% growth in annual revenues/user over next 15 years

User Lifetime
Assumed to be 15 years, with an annual renewal probability of 95%.

	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Membership Survival	1.0000	0.9500	0.9025	0.8574	0.8145	0.7738	0.7351	0.6983	0.6634	0.6302	0.5987	0.5688	0.5404	0.5133	0.4877	0.4633
Gross Billings	\$ 547.24	\$ 612.91	\$ 686.46	\$ 768.84	\$ 861.10	\$ 964.43	\$ 1,080.16	\$ 1,209.78	\$ 1,354.95	\$ 1,517.54	\$ 1,699.65	\$ 1,903.61	\$ 2,132.04	\$ 2,387.89	\$ 2,674.43	\$ 2,995.36
Net Revenues	\$ 110.16	\$ 123.38	\$ 138.19	\$ 154.77	\$ 173.35	\$ 194.15	\$ 217.45	\$ 243.54	\$ 272.76	\$ 305.50	\$ 342.16	\$ 383.21	\$ 429.20	\$ 480.70	\$ 538.39	\$ 602.99
Operating Expenses	\$ 65.12	\$ 72.25	\$ 80.16	\$ 88.94	\$ 98.67	\$ 109.48	\$ 121.47	\$ 134.77	\$ 149.52	\$ 165.90	\$ 184.06	\$ 204.22	\$ 226.58	\$ 251.39	\$ 278.92	\$ 309.46
Operating Profit/user	\$ 45.05	\$ 51.14	\$ 58.03	\$ 65.84	\$ 74.67	\$ 84.67	\$ 95.98	\$ 108.77	\$ 123.24	\$ 139.60	\$ 158.09	\$ 179.00	\$ 202.62	\$ 229.31	\$ 259.47	\$ 293.54
Survival adjusted Operating Profit		\$ 48.58	\$ 52.37	\$ 56.45	\$ 60.82	\$ 65.52	\$ 70.55	\$ 75.96	\$ 81.76	\$ 87.98	\$ 94.66	\$ 101.81	\$ 109.49	\$ 117.72	\$ 126.54	\$ 135.99
After-tax Operating Profit/user	\$ 33.79	\$ 36.44	\$ 39.28	\$ 42.34	\$ 45.62	\$ 49.14	\$ 52.92	\$ 56.97	\$ 61.32	\$ 65.99	\$ 70.99	\$ 76.36	\$ 82.12	\$ 88.29	\$ 94.90	\$ 101.99
Present Value		\$ 33.66	\$ 33.53	\$ 33.38	\$ 33.23	\$ 33.07	\$ 32.90	\$ 32.73	\$ 32.55	\$ 32.36	\$ 32.16	\$ 31.96	\$ 31.75	\$ 31.54	\$ 31.32	\$ 31.10
Annual Growth Rate (Revenues)	12.00%															
Annual Growth Rate (Op Exp)	10.95%															
Risk-adjusted discount rate	8.24%															
Life of user =	15.00															
Value per existing user =	\$ 487.25															
Number of existing users =	91.00															
Value of Existing Users	\$ 44,339.77															

Survival-adjusted PV
PV of after-tax operating income, adjusted for drop out rate over time.

Risk Adjusted Discount Rate
Used a 8.24% cost of capital, set at the median cost of capital for US companies, adjusted for inflation difference.

Uber's New User Value

Value Added by New Users at Uber

Base year Value/ New User
 Value of User = \$487.25
 Cost of adding New User = \$113.71
 Value added by new user = \$373.54

User Growth rates
 Years 1-5: 12%
 Years 6-10: 6%

Cost of capital
 Used 9.97%, the 75th percentile of US companies

	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Total Users	91.00	101.92	114.15	127.85	143.19	160.37	170.00	180.20	191.01	202.47	214.62
New Users	0.00	15.47	17.33	19.41	21.73	24.34	17.64	18.70	19.82	21.01	22.27
Value per new user	\$373.54	\$379.14	\$384.83	\$390.60	\$396.46	\$402.40	\$408.44	\$414.57	\$420.78	\$427.10	\$433.50
Value added by new users		\$5,865.27	\$6,667.64	\$7,579.77	\$8,616.68	\$9,795.45	\$7,205.30	\$7,752.18	\$8,340.57	\$8,973.62	\$9,654.72
Terminal Value (new users)											\$31,603.73
Present Value		\$ 5,333.52	\$ 5,513.45	\$ 5,699.46	\$ 5,891.74	\$ 6,090.50	\$ 4,073.87	\$ 3,985.70	\$ 3,899.44	\$ 3,815.05	\$ 15,950.37
Value Added by New Users	\$ 60,253.08										

Beyond year 10
 User growth continues at 2.5% a year

Existing Users		New Users		Corporate Expenses			
Inputs		Inputs		Inputs			
Net Revenue/User =	\$ 110.16	Cost of acquiring user =	\$ 113.71	Corporate Expenses	\$ 2,812.72		
Operating Expense/User=	\$ 65.12	Value of new user =	\$ 373.54	CAGR - Next 10 years	7.00%		
Operating Profit/User =	\$ 45.05	Growth rate in net users (1-5)	12.00%	Discount Rate =	8.24%		
CAGR in Revenue/User	12.00%	Growth rate in net users (6-10)	6.00%				
Annual Renewal Rate =	95.00%	Discount Rate	9.97%				
User Life =	15						
Discount Rate =	8.24%						
Output		Output		Output			
Value/User =	\$ 487.25	# Users in year 10 =	214.62				
# Existing Users =	91.00	# Net New Users (10 years)	123.62				
Value of Existing Users =	\$44,339.77	Value of New Users =	\$60,253.08	PV of Corporate Expenses	\$(63,216.48)	=	Value of Operating Assets
							\$41,376.37
							+ Cash
							\$15,407.00
							+ Cross Holdings
							\$ 8,700.00
							- Debt
							\$ 6,869.00
							Value of equity
							\$58,614.37
							# Shares
							1158.30
							Value/Share
							\$ 50.60
<p>Existing users will stick with Uber and increase how much they spend on its services, the longer they stay. Operating expenses are mostly fixed, but there will be mild economies of scale.</p>		<p>Uber will continue to add new users, but at a decreasing pace, with a cost of acquiring a new user staying stable (with the current cost increasing at the inflation rate). The new user spending profile will mirror existing users.</p>		<p>Uber's corporate expenses will continue to grow, notwithstanding economies of scale, as the company increases spending moderately on autonomous cars.</p>			

VI. Don't mistake price for value!


- Drivers of intrinsic value
- Cashflows from existing assets
 - Growth in cash flows
 - Quality of Growth

- Drivers of price
- Market moods & momentum
 - Surface stories about fundamentals

Accounting Estimates

Valuation Estimates


INTRINSIC VALUE



THE GAP
Is there one?
If so, will it close?
If it will close, what will cause it to close?



PRICE



Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

81

5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr
La Jolla, CA 92037
Status: Active

\$995,000
Price

3
Beds

2.5
Baths

1,440 Sq. Ft.
\$691 / Sq. Ft.

Built: 1955 Lot Size: 3,000 Sq. Ft. On Redfin: 12 days

Favorite X-Out Share... Tour Home

Overview Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights Similar Homes

Lisa Padilla
REDFIN Real Estate Agent
★★★★★
47 client reviews
\$8,726 commission refund
Go Tour This Home
Ask Lisa a Question or Start an Offer

1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area

Map Satellite

5400 La Jolla

1 of 25 Play Video

Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

82

Europe
Switzerland

Biotechnology
Biotechnology

Reuters
BION.S

Bloomberg
BION SW

Exchange
SWX
Ticker
BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

Key changes

Target Price 106.50 to 164.50 ↑ 54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4

Classifying Investments

1. Cash flow generating assets: Generate cash flows now or are expected to do so in the future. Can be a fixed cash flow claim, a residual claim or a contingent claim.
2. Commodities: Used as raw material to meet another need (energy, food etc.).
3. Currencies: Measure of cash flows, medium of exchange or store of value.
4. Collectibles: May have aesthetic or emotional value but derives its pricing from its scarcity (supply) and the perception of others that it is wanted.

Value versus Price

	To value	To price
Assets	Can be valued based upon expected cashflows, with higher cashflows & lower risk = higher value.	Can be priced against similar assets, after controlling for cash flows and risk.
Commodity	Can be valued, based upon utilitarian demand and supply, but with long lags in both.	Can be priced against its own history (normalized price over time)
Currency	Cannot be valued	Can be priced against other currencies, with greater acceptance & more stable purchasing power = higher price.
Collectible	Cannot be valued	Can be priced based upon scarcity and desirability.

The determinants of price

85

Mood and Momentum

Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed).

Liquidity & Trading Ease

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price


Incremental information

Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think

To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

Multiples and Comparable Transactions



The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

- Define the multiple
 - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Describe the multiple
 - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
 - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
 - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

Henkel: October 2016 (in Euros)

Cash flows from existing assets

	LTM	Last 10 years
Revenues	\$ 18,074	Growth rate = 4.20%
Operating margin	15.25%	Average = 12.80%
Sales/Invested Capital	1.33	Average = 1.52
Return on Invested Capital	15.26%	Average = 14.48%
Effective Tax Rate	24.20%	Average = 25.00%

The Payoff from growth

Revenues will grow 4.2% a year for next 5 years, tapering down to 0.1% growth in year 10

Operating margin (per-tax) will revert to ten-year average of 12.80%

Sales/Invested Capital will stay at ten-year average of 1.52

Maturity and Closure

Stable Growth $g = 0.03\%$;
 Cost of capital = 7%
 ROC = 7%;
 Reinvestment Rate = $g/ROC = .03\%/7\% = 0.42\%$

Terminal Value = $2,292 / (.07 - .0003) = 33,214$


PV(Terminal value)	€ 16,316
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 12,741
Value of operating assets =	€ 29,057
- Debt	€ 2,048
- Minority interests	€ 138
+ Cash	€ 2,305
Value of equity	€ 29,176
Number of shares	399.83
Estimated value /share	€ 72.97
Price	€ 118.22
Price as % of value	162.01%

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal Yr
Revenue growth rate		4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	3.38%	2.56%	1.74%	0.92%	0.10%	0.10%
Revenues	€ 18,074	€ 18,833	€ 19,624	€ 20,448	€ 21,307	€ 22,202	€ 22,952	€ 23,540	€ 23,950	€ 24,170	€ 24,194	€ 24,218
EBIT (Operating) margin	15.25%	15.00%	14.76%	14.51%	14.27%	14.02%	13.78%	13.53%	13.29%	13.04%	12.80%	12.80%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 2,756	€ 2,826	€ 2,896	€ 2,968	€ 3,040	€ 3,114	€ 3,163	€ 3,186	€ 3,183	€ 3,153	€ 3,097	€ 3,100
Tax rate	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%
EBIT(1-t)	€ 2,067	€ 2,119	€ 2,172	€ 2,226	€ 2,280	€ 2,335	€ 2,372	€ 2,390	€ 2,387	€ 2,365	€ 2,323	€ 2,325
- Reinvestment		€ 499	€ 520	€ 542	€ 565	€ 589	€ 494	€ 387	€ 269	€ 145	€ 16	€ 33
FCFF		€ 1,620	€ 1,652	€ 1,684	€ 1,715	€ 1,746	€ 1,878	€ 2,003	€ 2,118	€ 2,220	€ 2,307	€ 2,292

Discount at Euro Cost of Capital (WACC) = 7.78% (.958) + 0.72% (0.042) = 7.48%

The Risk in the Cash flows

On October 25, 2016, Henkel was trading at 118 Euros per share



Riskfree Rate: Euro Risk free rate = 0.03%

Beta = 1.01

Firm's D/E Ratio: 4.4%

ERP = 7.71%

Region	Revenues	Weight	ERP
Africa	€ 600	3.34%	11.76%
Asia	€ 3,134	17.45%	7.49%
Central and South America	€ 1,110	6.18%	10.42%
Eastern Europe & Russia	€ 2,695	15.00%	9.65%
Middle East	€ 729	4.06%	7.11%
North America	€ 3,648	20.31%	6.00%
Western Europe	€ 6,045	33.66%	7.16%
Henkel	€ 17,961	100.00%	7.71%

Business	Estimated Value	Weight	Unlevered Beta
Chemical (Specialty)	€ 16,276	35.61%	1.03
Household Products	€ 14,486	31.69%	0.96
Cosmetics/Toiletries	€ 14,949	32.70%	0.93
Henkel	€ 45,711		0.98

Henkel: A Pricing

Company Name	Exchange: Ticker	PE	PBV	EV/Sales	EV/EBITDA	EV/ Invested Capital
The Procter & Gamble Company	NYSE:PG	21.14	3.81	3.73	13.96	3.20
Colgate-Palmolive Co.	NYSE:CL	45.20	NA	4.45	15.89	NA
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc	LSE:RB.	29.87	6.47	5.31	18.21	5.38
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA	DB:HEN3	22.88	3.38	2.54	13.66	3.46
Kimberly-Clark Corporation	NYSE:KMB	20.46	136.45	2.63	11.53	6.72
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA	OM:SCA B	31.56	2.52	1.79	10.88	2.04
The Clorox Company	NYSE:CLX	23.73	51.77	3.00	14.42	7.80
Church & Dwight Co. Inc.	NYSE:CHD	26.85	6.06	3.77	15.96	4.53
Spectrum Brands Holdings, Inc.	NYSE:SPB	27.37	4.58	2.33	13.54	2.15
HRG Group, Inc.	NYSE:HRG	NA	5.48	1.87	9.01	1.60
Energizer Holdings, Inc.	NYSE:ENR	23.42	NA	2.16	11.83	NA
PZ Cussons Plc	LSE:PZC	18.03	2.42	1.68	10.88	2.13
WD-40 Company	NasdaqGS:WDF	28.86	10.81	4.02	19.68	9.95
Central Garden & Pet Company	NasdaqGS:CEN	26.86	2.21	0.88	9.63	1.74
McBride plc	LSE:MCB	18.93	4.70	0.60	7.70	2.55
Orchids Paper Products Company	AMEX:TIS	16.66	2.01	2.10	10.52	1.59
Oil-Dri Corp. of America	NYSE:ODC	17.80	2.09	0.87	8.29	2.24
Suominen Oyj	HLSE:SUY1V	11.69	1.43	0.52	4.78	1.32
Accrol Group Holdings Plc	AIM:ACRL	17.74	NA	1.28	9.29	NA
Median		23.15	4.20	2.16	11.53	2.39
Henkel versus Median (Under or Over)		-1.16%	-19.54%	17.57%	18.45%	44.70%

Henkel: Controlling for differences

Company Name	Operating Margin	Net Margin	ROIC	ROE	Net Debt/Market Cap	Expected Growth in EPS	Revenue CAGR (Last 5 years)
The Procter & Gamble Company	22.00%	16.27%	14.23%	18.02%	7.60%	6.30%	-4.57%
Colgate-Palmolive Co.	25.17%	9.04%	53.52%	NA	8.40%	6.93%	-0.75%
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc	27.45%	17.17%	21.34%	21.67%	3.79%	11.00%	0.17%
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA	16.11%	11.15%	16.66%	14.75%	-0.91%	8.96%	3.17%
Kimberly-Clark Corporation	18.92%	10.96%	33.53%	666.89%	16.74%	7.20%	-2.59%
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA	11.20%	4.62%	7.49%	8.00%	20.54%	8.04%	10.80%
The Clorox Company	18.23%	11.25%	31.23%	218.18%	12.48%	7.05%	1.95%
Church & Dwight Co. Inc.	20.64%	13.12%	16.21%	22.57%	7.15%	9.41%	5.64%
Spectrum Brands Holdings, Inc.	13.58%	5.78%	9.72%	16.74%	46.63%	12.20%	10.10%
HRG Group, Inc.	16.19%	-6.49%	9.37%	-60.24%	179.41%	0.00%	13.00%
Energizer Holdings, Inc.	15.97%	8.07%	45.82%	NA	14.16%	5.77%	NA
PZ Cussons Plc	12.82%	8.24%	13.49%	13.44%	12.05%	0.00%	0.01%
WD-40 Company	18.73%	13.82%	33.50%	37.46%	0.89%	10.00%	2.50%
Central Garden & Pet Company	6.80%	2.54%	8.73%	8.24%	28.87%	11.00%	2.42%
McBride plc	5.03%	2.50%	14.15%	24.81%	28.23%	0.00%	-3.47%
Orchids Paper Products Company	12.85%	9.32%	6.48%	12.09%	35.53%	14.30%	13.60%
Oil-Dri Corp. of America	5.87%	5.18%	14.29%	11.76%	-5.53%	0.00%	2.96%
Suominen Oyj	6.71%	3.69%	11.07%	12.19%	21.64%	-0.20%	19.80%
Accrol Group Holdings Plc	10.52%	4.83%	NA	NA	NA	0.00%	NA
Median	15.97%	8.24%	14.26%	15.75%	13.32%	7.05%	2.50%
Henkel versus Median (Under or Over)	0.84%	35.37%	16.81%	-6.32%	-106.83%	27.09%	26.80%

VII. Investing is an act of faith..


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- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
- That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
- Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as “speculators”, viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.
- If you have faith in investing, you will be tested.

Active Investing is a loser's game

Tough to Beat

Percentage of U.S. large-company mutual funds outperforming the Vanguard 500 Index Fund




And it stays that way across styles..


	<i>% of US Mutual Funds that beat their respective indices</i>			
	Value	Growth	Core	All
Large	82.17%	86.54%	88.26%	84.15%
Mid-cap	70.27%	81.48%	76.51%	76.69%
Small	92.31%	91.89%	91.44%	90.13%
All Equity				88.43%
Real Estate				82.64%

S&P computes these percentages for the last year, the last 3 years & the last 10 years. There is not a single period or a single fund grouping where the number is <50%.

The secret is now out in the open...




The "smart" money does not stay smart for very long..



Investment Heaven is a promise, not a guarantee..

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Apple, Price and Value - 2010 to 2017



Follow the yellow brick road..

