
MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!

January 2021 Aswath Damodaran

I. Your biggest challenges in valuation



Uncertainty & the Unknown

Valuation Bias

- Preconceptions and priors: When you start on the valuation of a company, you almost never start with a blank slate. Instead, your valuation is shaped by your prior views of the company in question.
 - Corollary 1: The more you know about a company, the more likely it is that you will be biased, when valuing the company.
 - Corollary 2: The "closer" you get to the management/owners of a company, the more biased your valuation of the company will become.
- Value first, valuation to follow: In principle, you should do your valuation first before you decide how much to pay for an asset. In practice, people often decide what to pay and do the valuation afterwards.


Sources of bias

- <u>The power of the subconscious</u>: We are human, after all, and as a consequence are susceptible to
 - Herd behavior: For instance, there is the "market price" magnet in valuation, where estimates of intrinsic value move towards the market price with each iteration.
 - <u>Hindsight bias</u>: If you know the outcome of a sequence of events, it will affect your valuation. (That is why teaching valuation with cases is an exercise in futility)
- <u>The power of suggestion:</u> Hearing what others think a company is worth will color your thinking, and if you view those others as more informed/smarter than you are, you will be influenced even more.
- <u>The power of money</u>: If you have an economic stake in the outcome of a valuation, bias will almost always follow.
 - Corollary 1: Your bias in a valuation will be directly proportional to who pays you to do the valuation and how much you get paid.
 - Corollary 2: You will be more biased when valuing a company where you already have a position (long or short) in the company.

II. Don't assume that D+CF = DCF

- □ The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate: Value of asset = $\frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$
- The IT Proposition: If "it" does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), "it" cannot affect value.
- 2. The DUH Proposition: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
- 3. The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


The drivers of value..



DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

Value of growth

The future cash flows will reflect expectations of how quickly earnings will grow in the future (as a positive) and how much the company will have to reinvest to generate that growth (as a negative). The net effect will determine the value of growth. Expected Cash Flow in year t = E(CF) = Expected Earnings in year t - Reinvestment needed for growth



Risk in the Cash flows

The risk in the investment is captured in the discount rate as a beta in the cost of equity and the default spread in the cost of debt.



The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules

In a Dreamstate DCF, you build

spreadsheets, making outlandish

assumptions about growth and

operating margins over time.

amazing companies on



D+CF ≠ DCF

In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).

A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.




In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.



A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of

III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation



From story to numbers and beyond..

Step 1: Develop a narrative for the business that you are valuing In the narrative, you tell your story about how you see the business evolving over time. Keep it <u>simple</u> & <u>focused</u> .
Step 2: Test the narrative to see if it is possible, plausible and probable There are lots of possible narratives, not all of them are plausible and only a few of them are probable. No <u>fairy tales</u> or <u>runaway stories</u> .
Step 3: Convert the narrative into drivers of value Take the narrative apart and look at how you will bring it into valuaton inputs starting with potential market size down to cash flows and risk. By the time you are done, each part of the narrative should have a place in your numbers and each number should be backed up a portion of your story.
Step 4: Connect the drivers of value to a valuation Create an intrinsic valuation model that connects the inputs to an end-value the business.
Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open Listen to people who know the business better than you do and use their suggestions to fine tune your narrative and perhaps even alter it. Work out the effects on value of alternative narratives for the company.

Aswath Damodaran

Airbnb

The Story

Airbnb has brought the sharing economy to housing, connecting home owners (hosts) who own units or houses that they want to rent with renters (guests) online, collecting a percentage of the transaction revenues from both sides of the transaction. Its low capital intensity model and extended reach has allowed it to expand not only to expand to almost every part of the world (220 countries) but also provide an unmatched range of offerings. The growth in gross bookings has started to slow down, as the company gets bigger, and the COVID shut downs made 2020 a regressive year. That said, as its competitors in the hotel business have been damaged far more by the crisis, Airbnb will be able to recover quickly from the crisis, and continue on its growth path. Economies of scale will allow for only mild improvements in revenues as a % of gross billings, but the brokerage-based business will generate high margins, in steady state, and require relatively little reinvestment.


			The Ass	umptions		
	Base year	In 2021	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
Gross Bookings & Growth Rate	\$ 26,491,803.00	40.00%	25.00%		2.00%	Growth continues, as hotels scale back growth plans after COVID shock.
Revenues as % of Gross Bookings	13.69%	12.65%			14.00%	Mild economies of scale allow slight increase in percent over time
Operating margin (b)	-13.69%	-10.0%			25.00%	Higher margins than the hotel business, but lower than ad driven businesses.
Tax rate	25.00%	0.00% —			25.00%	Global/US marginal tax rate, after NOLs are used up.
Reinvestment (c)		Sales to Capital =		2.00	20.00%	Low capital intensity business
Return on capital	-25.61%	Marginal ROIC =		65.81%	10.00%	Networking benefits allow for high value growth
Cost of capital (d)			6.50%	7.23%	7.23%	Cost of capital moves up over time.
				sh Flows		
	Gross Bookings	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$ 37,088,524.20	\$ 4,691,698	-10.00%	\$ (469,170)	\$ 532,984	\$ (1,002,153
2	\$ 46,360,655.25	\$ 5,989,797	-3.00%	\$ (179,694)		\$ (828,743
3	\$ 57,950,819.06	\$ 7,565,479	0.50%	\$ 37,827	\$ 787,841	\$ (750,014
4	\$ 72,438,523.83	\$ 9,554,641	4.00%	\$ 382,186	\$ 994,581	\$ (612,395
5	\$ 90,548,154.79	\$ 12,065,542	7.50%	\$ 777,799	\$ 1,255,450	\$ (477,651
6	\$ 109,019,978.36	\$ 14,674,089	9.52%	\$ 1,047,952	\$ 1,304,274	\$ (256,322
7	\$ 126,245,134.94	\$ 17,163,026	13.39%	\$ 1,723,792	\$ 1,244,469	\$ 479,323
8	\$ 140,384,590.06	\$ 19,274,804	17.26%	\$ 2,495,269	\$ 1,055,889	\$ 1,439,380
9	\$ 149,649,973.00	\$ 20,748,969	21.13%	\$ 3,288,271	\$ 737,082	\$ 2,551,189
10	\$ 152,642,972.46	\$ 21,370,016	25.00%	\$ 4,006,878	\$ 310,524	\$ 3,696,354
Terminal year	\$ 155,695,831.91	\$ 21,797,416	25.00%	\$ 4,087,016	\$ 817,403	\$ 3,269,612
			The	Value		
Terminal value			\$ 62,516,491	1		
PV(Terminal value)			\$ 32,633,194			
PV (CF over next 10 year	ars)		\$ 1,234,582			
Value of operating asse	ets =		\$ 33,867,776			
Adjustment for distress			\$ 1,693,389		Probability of failure =	10.00%
- Debt & Minority Interests			\$ 2,192,381			
+ IPO Proceeds			\$ 3,000,000	Based up	on early news stories. May ch	ange as final offering details are set.
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets			\$ 4,495,211	1	a the second	
Value of equity			\$ 37,477,217			
- Value of equity option	าร		\$ 1,351,835			
Number of shares			935,298.09	Fill	er for the moment. Will updat	e when final prospectus is filed
Value per share			\$ 38.62		Stock was trading at =	

Nov-20

IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy.. And accuracy for payoff..

Better accurate than precise

12



It's all relative

Aswath Damodaran

The sources of uncertainty

Estimation versus Economic uncertainty

- <u>Estimation uncertainty</u> reflects the possibility that you could have the "wrong model" or estimated inputs incorrectly within this model.
- <u>Economic uncertainty</u> comes the fact that markets and economies can change over time and that even the best medals will fail to capture these unexpected changes.


□ Micro uncertainty versus Macro uncertainty

- <u>Micro uncertainty</u> refers to uncertainty about the potential market for a firm's products, the competition it will face and the quality of its management team.
- <u>Macro uncertainty</u> reflects the reality that your firm's fortunes can be affected by changes in the macro economic environment.

Discrete versus continuous uncertainty

- <u>Discrete risk</u>: Risks that lie dormant for periods but show up at points in time. (Examples: A drug working its way through the FDA pipeline may fail at some stage of the approval process or a company in Venezuela may be nationalized)
- <u>Continuous risk</u>: Risks changes in interest rates or economic growth occur continuously and affect value as they happen.

A Life Cycle View




And the dark side will beckon..

- 15
- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is "too difficult" or even "impossible" to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the "dark side", where
 - You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
 - You will hear "macro" stories, justifying value
 - You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.


A sobering reminder: You will be "wrong" and it is okay

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- Remember that it is not just your value that is changing, but so is the price, and the price will change a great deal more than the value.


Growth rate in Gross Bookings: 2022-2025 Expected = 25%, Max = 35%, Min = 15%




Target Operating Margin in year 10 Expected = 25%, Std Dev = 4%



Cost of Capital (initial) Expected = 6.50%, Std Dev = 0.45%




Airbnb IPO: Simulation of Equity Value in November 2020



Percentile	Forecast values			
0%	\$17,591,165			
10%	\$26,150,864			
20%	\$28,790,133			
30%	\$30,952,251			
40%	\$32,981,840			
50%	\$35,114,898			
60%	\$37,463,932			
70%	\$40,181,915			
80%	\$43,595,272			
90% \$49,120,328				
100%	\$100,382,037			

V. Don't mistake price for value!



Aswath Damodaran

In the market? What's your game?

	Value	Price		
What drives it	Cash flows, Growth and Risk	Demand and supply, which brings in mood and momentum and other behavioral factors on top of fundamentals		
How to estimate it	Forecast cash flows and adjust for risk, either by risk adjusting the cash flows or the discount rate.	r Assess what other people are paying similar assets/investments, by scaling the price they are paying to a commo metric (multiple)		
What causes change	Change in the fundamentals at the company level (earnings, cash flows, growth and risk) or at the macro level (interest rates, risk premiums)	Changes in fundamentals matter, but are often drowned out by swings in mood and momentum caused by "incremental news stories".		
Investment Philosophy	Invest in assets that trade at prices less than value, and make money as price moves to value.	Buy assets at low prices and sell them at higher prices, i.e., trade the assets.		
Key ingredients	Valuation skills, Patience, Faith	Gauge mood and momentum well and get timing right.		
A Picture	Cash Flows Growth Risk	The Gap Price Peer Group Story		

Aswath Damodaran

Classifying Assets: Value versus Price

	To value	To price
Assets	Can be valued based upon expected cashflows, with higher cashflows & lower risk = higher value.	Can be priced against similar assets, after controlling for cash flows and risk.
Commodity	Can be valued, based upon utilitarian demand and supply, but with long lags in both.	Can be priced against its own history (normalized price over time)
Currency	Cannot be valued	Can be priced against other currencies, with greater acceptance & more stable purchasing power = higher price.
Collectible	Cannot be valued	Can be priced based upon scarcity and desirability.

The determinants of price

Mood and Momentum Price is determined in large part

by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed). Liquidity & Trading Ease

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price

Incremental information Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

Aswath Damodaran


VI. Investing is an act of faith..

- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
 - That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
 - Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as "speculators", viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.
- If you have faith in investing, you will be tested. And you will sometimes fail.. And that's okay...

Active Investing is a loser's game

Tough to Beat

Percentage of U.S. large-company mutual funds outperforming the Vanguard 500 Index Fund



And the "smart" money does not stay smart for very long

Funds' Flop



Follow the yellow brick road..



Aswath Damodaran


GETTING REAL




Market Worries

- Disconnect from economic news: For some, the skepticism comes from the disconnect with macroeconomic numbers that are abysmal, as unemployment claims climb into the tens of millions and consumer confidence hovers around historic lows. I will spend the first part of this section arguing that this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what markets try to do, and a misreading of history.
- In denial? For others, the question is whether markets are adequately reflecting the potential for long term damage to earnings and cash flows, as well as the cost of defaults, from this crisis. Since that answer to that question lies in the eyes of the beholder, I will provide a framework for converting your fears and hopes into numbers and a value for the market.

Explaining the disconnect...



Value Drivers for the Index



1. Earnings


1	Estimated S&P 500 Ear	nings (Ed Yardeni)	Bottom-up	Estimates (Analyst Co	onsensus on 10/5/2	
Year Earnings on Index		Earnings on Index	Year	Earnings on Index		
2019		163	2019	17.25.5	162.97	
2020	-23.31%	125	2020	-20.10%	130.21	
2021	24.00%	155	2021	27.65%	166.21	
2022	16.13%	180	2022	14.76%	190,75	

Firm	Strategist	2020 S&P Target	
Bank of America Merrill Lynch	Savita Subramanian	\$125.00	
Barclays	Maneesh Deshpande	\$137.00	
BMO	Brian Belski	\$130.00	
BTIG	Julian Emanuel	\$127.00	
Canaccord Genuity	Tony Dwyer	\$125.00	
CFRA	Sam Stovall	\$129.84	
Citigroup	Tobias Levkovich	\$131.50	
Credit Suisse	Jonathan Golub	\$125.00	
Deutsche Bank	Binky Chadha	\$133.00	
Goldman Sachs	David Kostin	\$130.00	
JPMorgan Chase	Dubravko Lakos-Bujas	\$136.00	
	Mike Wilson	\$130.00	
Oppenheimer	John Stoltzfus	Suspended	
RBC	Lori Calvasina	Suspended	
UBS	Keith Parker	\$126.00	
Wells Fargo Investment Institute	Darrell Cronk	\$130.00	
	High Value	\$137.00	
	Low Value	\$125.00	
	Median	\$130.00	


2. Cash Flows

Year		S8	P 500			
	Market value	Earnings	Dividends	Buybacks	Cash Returned as % of Earnings	Cash Returned a % of Market Cap
2001	1148.09	38.85	15.74	14.34	77.43%	2.62%
2002	879.82	46.04	15.96	13.87	64.78%	3.39%
2003	1111.91	54.69	17.88	13.70	57.74%	2.84%
2004	1211.92	67.68	19.01	21.59	59.99%	3.35%
2005	1248.29	76.45	22.34	38.82	80.01%	4.90%
2006	1418.30	87.72	25.04	48.12	83.40%	5.16%
2007	1468.36	82.54	28.14	67.22	115.53%	6.49%
2008	903.25	49.51	28.45	39.07	136.37%	7.47%
2009	1115.00	56.86	21.97	15.46	65.82%	3.36%
2010	1257.64	83.77	22.65	32.88	66.28%	4.42%
2011	1257.60	96.44	26.53	44.75	73.91%	5.67%
2012	1426.19	96.82	31.25	44.65	78.39%	5.32%
2013	1848.36	104.92	34.90	53.23	84.00%	4.77%
2014	2058.90	116.16	39.55	62.44	87.79%	4.95%
2015	2043.94	100.48	43.41	64.94	107.83%	5.30%
2016	2238.82	106.26	45.70	62.32	101.66%	4.82%
2017	2673.61	124.51	48.93	60.85	88.17%	4.11%
2018	2506.85	152.78	54.39	96.11	98.51%	6.00%
2019	3230.78	163.00	58.50	87.81	89.76%	4.53%
				Median	83.40%	4.82%
				High	136.37%	7.47%
				Low	57.74%	2.84%

3. Equity Risk Pricing



My Story for the Market



My Valuation of the Index

	Earnings drop to 130 in 2020, rise to 166 in 2021 and 191 in 2022 & recover 80% of the loss by 2024				buybac		% in 202	20% & 20, and ca 1gh 2024	ish
		Ea	mings and Cash Ret	urn: Pre- ve	rsus Post-C	Corona Estin	mates		
		Pre-Corona		1	Post-Coron	a	-	Corol	na Effect
	Year	Earnings	Cash Return	Earnings	Ca	ash Return	Ea	rnings	Cash Return
	2020	169.29	151.24	130.21	-	97.66		3.09%	-35.43%
	2021	175.83	156.34	166.21		129.92		.47%	-16.90%
0	2022	182.61	161.60	173.14	-	140.81		.19%	-12.87%
Growth rate in	2023	189.66	167.04	180.36	-	152.39		.90%	-8.77%
perpetuity capped at riskfree rate (2.00%)	2024	196.98 200.92	172.66 176.12	187.89 191.65	-	164.69 167.99		.62%	-4.62%
▲	2025	200.52	170,12	131.05		107.55		.0270	-4.02.70
After year 5, risk free	i		Last 12 months	1	2	3	4	5	Terminal Year
rate rises to 2% & ERP	Expected Earnings		\$163.00	130.21	166.21	173.14	180.36	187.89	191.65
drops back to 4.82%,									
the long term average.		ut (dividends + buybaci		75.00%	78.16%	81.33%	84.49%	87.65%	87.65%
	Expected Dividends	+ Buybacks =	\$146.30	\$97.66	\$129.92	\$140.81	\$152.39		167.99
Riskfree rate for next	Expected Terminal	Value =			1		12.21	\$3,481.65	
5 years is T.Bond rate	Present Value =			\$ 91.73	\$ 114.63	\$ 116.70	\$ 118.64	\$2,666.40	1.
of 0.88%	Intrinsic Value of Ir	ndex =		3108.09					
0.88%+5.58% = 6.46%		lue of S&P 500 = tart of trading							

Facing up to uncertainty

