



# MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!

May 2016

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# I. Don't mistake accounting for finance

*Valued based upon motive for investment – some marked to market, some recorded at cost and some at quasi-cost*

*Assets are recorded at original cost, adjusted for depreciation.*

## The Balance Sheet

Assets		Liabilities	
Long Lived Real Assets	Fixed Assets	Current Liabilities	Short-term liabilities of the firm
Short-lived Assets	Current Assets	Debt	Debt obligations of firm
Investments in securities & assets of other firms	Financial Investments	Other Liabilities	Other long-term obligations
Assets which are not physical, like patents & trademarks	Intangible Assets	Equity	Equity investment in firm

*True intangible assets like brand name, patents and customer did not show up. The only intangible asset of any magnitude (goodwill) is a plug variable that is of consequence only if you do an acquisition.*

*Equity reflects original capital invested and historical retained earnings.*

# The financial balance sheet

*Recorded at intrinsic value (based upon cash flows and risk), not at original cost*



*Value will depend upon magnitude of growth investments and excess returns on these investments*

*Intrinsic value of equity, reflecting intrinsic value of assets, net of true value of debt outstanding.*

## II. Don't assume that D+CF = DCF

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
- The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(\text{CF}_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(\text{CF}_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(\text{CF}_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

1. *The IT Proposition:* If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.
2. *The DUH Proposition:* For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. *The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition:* Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


# The drivers of value..

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# DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

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# 1. Cash Flows

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To get to cash flow	Here is why
Operating Earnings	This is the earnings before interest & taxes you generate from your existing assets. Operating Earnings = Revenues * Operating Margin Measures the operating efficiency of your assets & can be grown either by growing revenues and/or improving margins.
(minus) Taxes	These are the taxes you would pay on your operating income and are a function of the tax code under which you operate & your fidelity to that code.
(minus) Reinvestment	Reinvestment is designed to generate future growth and can be in long term and short term assets. Higher growth usually requires more reinvestment, and the efficiency of growth is a function of how much growth you can get for your reinvestment.
Free Cash Flow to the Firm	This is a pre-debt cash flow that will be shared by lenders (as interest & principal payments) and by equity investors (as dividends & buybacks).

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## 2. Discount rates

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Expected Return on a Risky Investment = Cost of Equity

### **Risk free Rate**

Rate of return on a long term, default free bond.

*Will vary across currencies and across time.*

+

### **Beta**

Relative measure of risk added to a diversified portfolio.

*Determined by the business or businesses that you operate in, with more exposure to macro economic risk translating into a higher beta.*

=

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
### **Equity Risk Premium**

Premium investors demand over and above the risk free rate for investing in equities as a class.

*Function of the countries that you do business in and how much value you derive from each country.*




# 3. Expected Growth




- Quality growth is rare and requires that a firm be able to reinvest a lot and reinvest well (earnings more than your cost of capital) at the same time.
- The larger you get, the more difficult it becomes to maintain quality growth.
- You can grow while destroying value at the same time.

# 4. The Terminal Value



# Caveat 1. Match your cash flows to your discount rates..

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
# Where is the Argentine Peso?

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
- Note that the Argentine Peso is not one of the currencies shown in the table. That is because there was no base 10-year Argentine Government bond rate, denominated in pesos, that you could build from.
- Your alternatives are
  - To do your valuation in a different currency
  - To estimate a synthetic risk free rate in pesos, starting with the US dollar risk free rate and incorporating inflation differentials. Using a 15% expected inflation rate in Argentina and a 1% inflation rate in the US, with a US T.Bond rate of 1.5% as the US \$ risk free rate:
    - Argentine Peso Risk free rate =  $(1.015) (1.15/1.01) - 1 = 15.57\%$

# Caveat 2. Don't let your inputs be at war with each other.

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# And consider the trade offs..



## Caveat 3. Globalization is not a buzz word

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- As companies get globalized, the valuations that we do have to reflect that globalization. In particular, we need to be wary of
  - Currency mismatches: Multinationals derive their revenues in many currencies but you have to be currency-consistent.
  - Beta gaming: When a company is listed in many markets, you can get very different betas, depending on how you set up and run a beta regression
  - Equity Risk Premiums: The standard practice of estimating equity risk premiums based on your country of incorporation will lead to skewed valuations.

# ERP : July 2016

Andorra (Principality of)	9.71%	3.46%	Jersey (States of)	6.88%	0.63%
Austria	6.88%	0.63%	Liechtenstein	6.25%	0.00%
Belgium	7.20%	0.95%	Luxembourg	6.25%	0.00%
Cyprus	13.32%	7.07%	Malta	8.14%	1.89%
Denmark	6.25%	0.00%	Netherlands	6.25%	0.00%
Finland	6.88%	0.63%	Norway	6.25%	0.00%
France	7.03%	0.78%	Portugal	10.17%	3.92%
Germany	6.25%	0.00%	Spain	9.23%	2.98%
Greece	21.94%	15.69%	Sweden	6.25%	0.00%
Guernsey (States of)	6.88%	0.63%	Switzerland	6.25%	0.00%
Iceland	9.23%	2.98%	Turkey	9.71%	3.46%
Ireland	8.14%	1.89%	United Kingdom	6.88%	0.63%
Isle of Man	6.88%	0.63%	<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>7.49%</b>	<b>1.24%</b>
Italy	9.23%	2.98%			

Canada	6.25%	0.00%
US	6.25%	0.00%
<b>North America</b>	<b>6.25%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>Caribbean</b>	<b>15.31%</b>	<b>9.06%</b>

Argentina	16.46%	10.21%
Belize	20.39%	14.14%
Bolivia	11.91%	5.66%
Brazil	10.97%	4.72%
Chile	7.20%	0.95%
Colombia	9.23%	2.98%
Costa Rica	10.17%	3.92%
Ecuador	16.46%	10.21%
El Salvador	11.91%	5.66%
Guatemala	10.17%	3.92%
Honduras	14.89%	8.64%
Mexico	8.14%	1.89%
Nicaragua	14.89%	8.64%
Panama	9.23%	2.98%
Paraguay	10.17%	3.92%
Peru	8.14%	1.89%
Suriname	13.32%	7.07%
Uruguay	9.23%	2.98%
Venezuela	21.94%	15.69%
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>11.27%</b>	<b>5.02%</b>

Country	ERP	CRP
Angola	13.32%	7.07%
Botswana	7.58%	1.33%
Burkina Faso	16.46%	10.21%
Cameroon	14.89%	8.64%
Cape Verde	14.89%	8.64%
Congo (DR)	16.46%	10.21%
Congo (Rep)	14.89%	8.64%
Côte d'Ivoire	11.91%	5.66%
Egypt	16.46%	10.21%
Ethiopia	13.32%	7.07%
Gabon	13.32%	7.07%
Ghana	16.46%	10.21%
Kenya	13.32%	7.07%
Morocco	10.17%	3.92%
Mozambique	18.02%	11.77%
Namibia	9.71%	3.46%
Nigeria	13.32%	7.07%
Rwanda	13.32%	7.07%
Senegal	13.32%	7.07%
South Africa	9.23%	2.98%
Tunisia	11.91%	5.66%
Uganda	13.32%	7.07%
Zambia	16.46%	10.21%
<b>Africa</b>	<b>12.99%</b>	<b>6.74%</b>

Albania	13.32%	7.07%
Armenia	13.32%	7.07%
Azerbaijan	10.17%	3.92%
Belarus	18.02%	11.77%
Bosnia	16.46%	10.21%
Bulgaria	9.23%	2.98%
Croatia	10.97%	4.72%
Czech Republic	7.36%	1.11%
Estonia	7.36%	1.11%
Georgia	11.91%	5.66%
Hungary	10.17%	3.92%
Kazakhstan	9.71%	3.46%
Kyrgyzstan	14.89%	8.64%
Latvia	8.14%	1.89%
Lithuania	8.14%	1.89%
Macedonia	11.91%	5.66%
Moldova	16.46%	10.21%
Montenegro	11.91%	5.66%
Poland	7.58%	1.33%
Romania	9.71%	3.46%
Russia	10.17%	3.92%
Serbia	13.32%	7.07%
Slovakia	7.58%	1.33%
Slovenia	9.71%	3.46%
Ukraine	21.94%	15.69%
<b>E. Europe</b>	<b>10.17%</b>	<b>3.92%</b>

Abu Dhabi	7.03%	0.78%
Bahrain	10.97%	4.72%
Iraq	9.71%	3.46%
Israel	7.36%	1.11%
Jordan	13.32%	7.07%
Kuwait	7.03%	0.78%
Lebanon	14.89%	8.64%
Oman	8.76%	2.51%
Qatar	7.03%	0.78%
Ras Al Khaimah	7.58%	1.33%
Saudi Arabia	7.36%	1.11%
Sharjah	8.14%	1.89%
United Arab Emirates	7.03%	0.78%
<b>Middle East</b>	<b>7.56%</b>	<b>1.31%</b>

Country	PRS	ERP	CRP	Country	PRS	ERP	CRP
Algeria	60.3	13.72%	7.47%	Malawi	54.8	17.24%	10.99%
Brunei	72.8	9.75%	3.50%	Mali	63.5	13.90%	7.65%
Gambia	61.5	13.72%	7.47%	Myanmar	61.8	13.72%	7.47%
Guinea	48.5	20.00%	13.75%	Niger	53.8	17.24%	10.99%
Guinea-Bissau	64.5	12.48%	6.23%	Sierra Leone	57.3	16.61%	10.36%
Guyana	64.5	12.48%	6.23%	Somalia	41.0	20.00%	13.75%
Haiti	58.0	16.61%	10.36%	Sudan	48.3	20.00%	13.75%
Iran	72.0	11.22%	4.97%	Syria	45.8	20.00%	13.75%
Korea, D.P.R.	56.0	17.24%	10.99%	Tanzania	64.0	13.90%	7.65%
Liberia	52.8	17.24%	10.99%	Togo	61.0	13.72%	7.47%
Libya	50.0	20.00%	13.75%	Yemen, Republic	50.5	17.24%	10.99%
Madagascar	64.5	12.48%	6.23%	Zimbabwe	56.0	17.24%	10.99%

Bangladesh	11.91%	5.66%
Cambodia	14.89%	8.64%
China	7.20%	0.95%
Fiji	13.32%	7.07%
Hong Kong	6.88%	0.63%
India	9.71%	3.46%
Indonesia	9.71%	3.46%
Japan	7.36%	1.11%
Korea	7.03%	0.78%
Macao	7.20%	0.95%
Malaysia	8.14%	1.89%
Mauritius	8.76%	2.51%
Mongolia	14.89%	8.64%
Pakistan	16.46%	10.21%
Papua NG	14.89%	8.64%
Philippines	9.23%	2.98%
Singapore	6.25%	0.00%
Sri Lanka	13.32%	7.07%
Taiwan	7.20%	0.95%
Thailand	8.76%	2.51%
Vietnam	13.32%	7.07%
<b>Asia</b>	<b>7.82%</b>	<b>1.57%</b>


Australia	6.25%	0.00%
Cook Islands	13.32%	7.07%
New Zealand	6.25%	0.00%
<b>Australia &amp; NZ</b>	<b>6.26%</b>	<b>0.01%</b>

Black #: Total ERP  
 Red #: Country risk premium  
 AVG: GDP weighted average



# Caveat 4. Everyone may do it, but that does not make it right.. Small cap premium

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
## Caveat 5. Value is not about the past..

	<i>Arithmetic Average</i>		<i>Geometric Average</i>	
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2015	7.92%	6.18%	6.05%	4.54%
Std Error	<i>2.15%</i>	<i>2.29%</i>		
1966-2015	6.05%	3.89%	4.69%	2.90%
Std Error	<i>2.42%</i>	<i>2.74%</i>		
2006-2015	7.87%	3.88%	6.11%	2.53%
Std Error	<i>6.06%</i>	<i>8.66%</i>		

- If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it
  - ▣ Long term (because of the standard error)
  - ▣ Consistent with your risk free rate
  - ▣ A “compounded” average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.


# But in the future..

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# Caveat 6. Don't sweat the small stuff

*Cost of equity for Publicly traded US firms*



## Caveat 7. Don't let your macro views drown out your micro views..

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
- When you are asked to value a company, you should keep your focus on what drives that value. If you bring in your specific macro views into the valuation, the value that you obtain for a company will be a joint result of what you think about the company and your macro views.
- **Bottom line:** If you have macro views, provide them separately. You should be as macro-neutral as you can be, in your company valuations.
- **Follow up:** If you find macro risk dominating your thoughts, deal with it frontally.

## San Miguel: November 2015 (in ARS)


### Cash flows from existing assets

	2015	Last 5 years
Revenues (millions)	\$2,316.41	CAGR of 23.2%
Operating income (millions)	\$845.79	Operating margin = 36.51%
Effective tax rate	33.70%	Average = 36%
Book value of equity (millions)	\$1,057	
Invested Capital (millions)	\$1,442	
Return on invested capital =	38.90%	

### The Payoff from growth



### Maturity and Closure



ARS Cashflows

Terminal Value =  $1,046 / (.20 - .15) = 20,916$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term Year
Revenue growth rate	23.34%	23.34%	23.34%	23.34%	23.34%	21.67%	20.00%	18.34%	16.67%	15.00%	15.00%
Revenues	\$ 2,857	\$ 3,524	\$ 4,346	\$ 5,361	\$ 6,612	\$ 8,044	\$ 9,653	\$ 11,423	\$ 13,327	\$ 15,327	\$ 17,625
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 1,043	\$ 1,287	\$ 1,587	\$ 1,957	\$ 2,414	\$ 2,937	\$ 3,525	\$ 4,171	\$ 4,866	\$ 5,596	\$ 6,436
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 692	\$ 853	\$ 1,052	\$ 1,298	\$ 1,601	\$ 1,940	\$ 2,319	\$ 2,733	\$ 3,176	\$ 3,638	\$ 4,183
- Reinvestment	\$ 336	\$ 415	\$ 512	\$ 631	\$ 779	\$ 892	\$ 1,001	\$ 1,102	\$ 1,185	\$ 1,244	\$ 3,137
FCFF	\$ 355	\$ 438	\$ 540	\$ 666	\$ 822	\$ 1,048	\$ 1,317	\$ 1,631	\$ 1,991	\$ 2,393	\$ 1,046

PV(Terminal value)	\$ 3,212
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 3,314
Value of operating assets =	\$ 6,526
- Debt	\$ 1,540
+ Cash	\$ 466
Value of equity	\$ 5,452
Number of shares	644.20
Estimated value /share	\$ 8.46

Discount at  $\$$  Cost of Capital (WACC) =  $22.62\% (.837) + 12.07\% (0.163) = 20.87\%$

The Risk in the Cash flows

Cost of Equity  
22.62%

Cost of Debt  
 $(15.57\% + .3\%)(1 - .25) = 12.07\%$

Weights  
E = 83.7% D = 16.3%

On August 18, 2016, San Miguel was trading at \$10.30 per shares

Riskfree Rate:  
ARS Risk free rate = 15.57%

Beta  
0.83

X

Firm's D/E  
Ratio: 20.6%

ERP = 8.53%

Country	Revenues	Weight	ERP
Argentina	255	11.08%	17.17%
Rest of the World	2047	88.92%	7.45%
San Miguel	2302	100.00%	8.53%

Business	Revenues	EV/Sales	Estimated Value	Unlevered Beta
Farming/Agriculture	\$ 476	1.3100	\$ 624	0.7600
Food Processing	\$ 1,163	1.6400	\$ 1,907	0.7200
Company	\$ 1,639		\$ 2,531	0.7299

# Latam: Valuation (September 2013)

## Cash flows from existing assets

	2012	2008-2012	US Industry average	Global industry average
Revenues	\$9,722	\$5,213		
Operating income	\$276	\$468		
Operating margin	2.84%	8.98%	8.38%	0.05
ROIC	6.07%	15.97%	17.97%	6.94%
Sales/Capital	2.14	1.78	2.74	1.67

Revenue growth of 15% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 8.98% over time.

Sales to capital ratio of 10.0 for first 5 years, 2.74 thereafter

## Maturity & Closure

**Stable Growth**  
 $g = 2.9\%$ ;  $\text{Beta} = 1.00$ ;  
 Cost of capital = 8.5%  
 $\text{ROC} = 8.5\%$ ;  
 Reinvestment Rate =  $2.9\%/8.5\% = 34.1\%$

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> =  $1379 / (.085 - .025) = \$24,621$

PV(Terminal value)	\$ 9,304.39
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 3,547.29
Value of operating assets =	\$ 12,851.68
- Debt	\$ 9,559.56
- Minority interests	\$ 26.73
+ Cash	\$ 1,286.80
+ Non-operating assets	\$ 3.76
Value of equity	\$ 4,555.95
Number of shares	475.12
Estimated value /share	\$ 9.59
In Chilean Pesos	CLP 4,860

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate	15.00%	15.00%	15.00%	15.00%	15.00%	15.00%	12.58%	10.16%	7.74%	5.32%	2.90%	2.90%
Revenues	\$9,722	\$11,181	\$12,858	\$14,786	\$17,004	\$19,555	\$22,015	\$24,251	\$26,129	\$27,519	\$28,317	\$29,138
EBIT (Operating) margin	2.84%	3.45%	4.07%	4.68%	5.30%	5.91%	6.52%	7.14%	7.75%	8.36%	8.98%	8.98%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$276	\$386	\$523	\$692	\$900	\$1,155	\$1,436	\$1,731	\$2,025	\$2,302	\$2,542	\$2,616
Tax rate	16.00%	16.00%	16.00%	16.00%	16.00%	16.00%	16.80%	17.60%	18.40%	19.20%	20.00%	20.00%
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 232	\$ 324	\$ 439	\$ 581	\$ 756	\$ 971	\$ 1,195	\$ 1,426	\$ 1,652	\$ 1,860	\$ 2,034	\$ 2,093
- Reinvestment		\$ 146	\$ 168	\$ 193	\$ 222	\$ 255	\$ 297	\$ 346	\$ 402	\$ 465	\$ 536	\$ 614
FCFF		\$ 179	\$ 272	\$ 389	\$ 535	\$ 716	\$ 898	\$ 1,080	\$ 1,250	\$ 1,395	\$ 1,508	\$ 1,479

Good

Payoff from growth

Bad

Cost of capital =  $16.92\% (.466) + 5.76\% (.534) = 10.96\%$

Cost of capital decreases to 8.5% from years 6-10

In September 2013, the stock was trading at 8,910 CLP/share.

Cost of Equity  
16.92%

Cost of Debt  
Bond rating: BB+  
 $(2.9\% + 4.3\%)(1 - .20) = 5.76\%$

Weights  
E = 46.6% D = 53.4%

Riskfree Rate:  
Riskfree rate = 2.90%

Beta  
1.57

Financial Risk

ERP  
8.92%

Unlevered Beta for Airline Business:  
0.82

D/E = 144.5%

The Operating Risk

Brazil	34.3	34.30%	8.75%
Chile	15.7	15.70%	6.95%
United States of America	13	13.00%	5.75%
Peru	6.4	6.40%	8.75%
Colombia	3.8	3.80%	9.13%
Ecuador	2.7	2.70%	17.75%
Argentina	9.2	9.20%	15.88%
Western Europe	7.6	7.60%	6.97%
Central and South America	7.3	7.30%	9.69%
Total	100	100.00%	8.92%



The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules



In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).



A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

**D+CF ≠ DCF**



In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.



In a **Dreamstate DCF**, you build amazing companies on spreadsheets, making outlandish assumptions about growth and operating margins over time.




In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.



A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of




# III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation




# From story to numbers and beyond..

26



# Understanding Uber




# Step 1: Survey the landscape



- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
  - ▣ Your company (its products, its management and its history).
  - ▣ The market or markets that you see it growing in.
  - ▣ The competition it faces and will face.
  - ▣ The macro environment in which it operates.






## Low Growth

Year	Revenues (\$)	% Growth Rate
2005	1,274,716.60	
2006	1,421,804.20	11.54%
2007	1,854,576.40	30.44%
2008	1,818,533.00	-1.94%
2009	1,572,890.10	-13.51%
2010	1,816,269.40	15.47%
2011	1,962,630.40	8.06%
2012	2,110,572.20	7.54%
2013	2,158,603.00	2.28%
2014	2,086,124.80	-3.36%
<b>ounded Average =</b>		<b>5.63%</b>

## The Auto Business

## Low Margins

The Automobile Business: Pre-tax Operating Margins in 2015




Auto Business- 2015	
Average	-2.11%
Median	4.46%
10th percentile	-13.26%
25th percentile	-1.63%
75th percentile	7.99%
90th percentile	14.32%

+

## High & Increasing Reinvestment

The Reinvestment Burden: Investment as % of Sales for Auto Business



## Bad Business

	ROIC	Cost of capital	ROiC - Cost of capital
2004	6.82%	7.93%	-1.11%
2005	10.47%	7.02%	3.45%
2006	4.60%	7.97%	-3.37%
2007	7.62%	8.50%	-0.88%
2008	3.48%	8.03%	-4.55%
2009	-4.97%	8.58%	-13.55%
2010	5.16%	8.03%	-2.87%
2011	7.55%	8.15%	-0.60%
2012	7.80%	8.55%	-0.75%
2013	7.83%	8.47%	-0.64%
2014	6.47%	7.53%	-1.06%

=


Only once in the last 10 years have auto companies collectively earned more than their cost of capital

# What makes Ferrari different?

Ferrari sold only 7,255 cars in all of 2014

Ferrari had a profit margin of 18.2%, in the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile, partly because of its high prices and partly because it spends little on advertising.

*Ferrari: Geographical Sales (2014)*



Ferrari sales (in units) have grown very little in the last decade & have been stable

Ferrari has not invested in new plants.

## Step 2: Create a narrative for the future



- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
  - Rule 1: Keep it simple.
  - Rule 2: Keep it focused.



# The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be


1. An urban car service business: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong competitive advantages (from being a first mover).
5. And its existing low-capital business model, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

# The Ferrari Narrative

- Ferrari will stay an exclusive auto club, deriving its allure from its scarcity and the fact that only a few own Ferraris.
- By staying exclusive, the company gets three benefits:
  - It can continue to charge nose bleed prices for its cars and sell them with little or no advertising.
  - It does not need to invest in new assembly plants, since it does not plan to ramp up production.
  - It sells only to the super rich, who are unaffected by overall economic conditions or market crises.

# Step 3: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense

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# The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable

## The Impossible

**Bigger than the economy**  
Assuming Growth rate for company in perpetuity > Growth rate for economy

**Bigger than the total market**  
Allowing a company's revenues to grow so much that it has more than a 100% market share of whatever business it is in.

**Profit margin > 100%**  
Assuming earnings growth will exceed revenue growth for a long enough period, and pushing margins above 100%

**Depreciation without cap ex**  
Assuming that depreciation will exceed cap ex in perpetuity.


## The Implausible

**Growth without reinvestment**  
Assuming growth forever without reinvestment.

**Profits without competition**  
Assuming that your company will grow and earn higher profits, with no competition.


**Returns without risk**  
Assuming that you can generate high returns in a business with no risk.

## The Improbable



# Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable

## Uber (My narrative))



# The Impossible: The Runaway Story

The Story




The Checks (?)

Board Member	Designation	Age
Henry Kissinger	Former Secretary of State	92
Bill Perry	Former Secretary of Defense	88
George Schultz	Former Secretary of State	94
Bill Frist	Former Senate Majority Leader	63
Sam Nunn	Former Senator	77
Gary Roughead	Former Navy Admiral	64
James Mattis	Former Marine Corps General	65
Dick Kovocovich	Former CEO of Wells Fargo	72
Riley Bechtel	Former CEO of Bechtel	63
William Foege	Epidemiologist	79
Elizabeth Holmes	Founder & CEO, Theranos	31
Sunny Balwani	President & COO, Theranos	NA

+ Money



Companies valued at \$1 billion or more by venture-capital firms



Select companies from the chart or table for more detail.



# The Implausible: The Big Market Delusion



Company	Market Cap	Enterprise Value	Current Revenues	Breakeven Revenues (2025)	% from Online Advertising	Imputed Online Ad Revenue (2025)
Google	\$441,572.00	\$386,954.00	\$69,611.00	\$224,923.20	89.50%	\$201,306.26
Facebook	\$245,662.00	\$234,696.00	\$14,640.00	\$129,375.54	92.20%	\$119,284.25
Yahoo!	\$30,614.00	\$23,836.10	\$4,871.00	\$25,413.13	100.00%	\$25,413.13
LinkedIn	\$23,265.00	\$20,904.00	\$2,561.00	\$22,371.44	80.30%	\$17,964.26
Twitter	\$16,927.90	\$14,912.90	\$1,779.00	\$23,128.68	89.50%	\$20,700.17
Pandora	\$3,643.00	\$3,271.00	\$1,024.00	\$2,915.67	79.50%	\$2,317.96
Yelp	\$1,765.00	\$0.00	\$465.00	\$1,144.26	93.60%	\$1,071.02
Zillow	\$4,496.00	\$4,101.00	\$480.00	\$4,156.21	18.00%	\$748.12
Zynga	\$2,241.00	\$1,142.00	\$752.00	\$757.86	22.10%	\$167.49
<b>Total US</b>	<b>\$770,185.90</b>	<b>\$689,817.00</b>	<b>\$96,183.00</b>	<b>\$434,185.98</b>		<b>\$388,972.66</b>
Alibaba	\$184,362.00	\$173,871.00	\$12,598.00	\$111,414.06	60.00%	\$66,848.43
Tencent	\$154,366.00	\$151,554.00	\$13,969.00	\$63,730.36	10.50%	\$6,691.69
Baidu	\$49,991.00	\$44,864.00	\$9,172.00	\$30,999.49	98.90%	\$30,658.50
Sohu.com	\$18,240.00	\$17,411.00	\$1,857.00	\$16,973.01	53.70%	\$9,114.51
Naver	\$13,699.00	\$12,686.00	\$2,755.00	\$12,139.34	76.60%	\$9,298.74
Yandex	\$3,454.00	\$3,449.00	\$972.00	\$2,082.52	98.80%	\$2,057.52
Yahoo! Japan	\$23,188.00	\$18,988.00	\$3,591.00	\$5,707.61	69.40%	\$3,961.08
Sina	\$2,113.00	\$746.00	\$808.00	\$505.09	48.90%	\$246.99
Netease	\$14,566.00	\$11,257.00	\$2,388.00	\$840.00	11.90%	\$3,013.71
Mail.ru	\$3,492.00	\$3,768.00	\$636.00	\$1,676.47	35.00%	\$586.76
Mixi	\$3,095.00	\$2,661.00	\$1,229.00	\$777.02	96.00%	\$745.94
Kakaku	\$3,565.00	\$3,358.00	\$404.00	\$1,650.49	11.60%	\$191.46
<b>Total non-US</b>	<b>\$474,131.00</b>	<b>\$444,613.00</b>	<b>\$50,379.00</b>	<b>\$248,495.46</b>		<b>\$133,415.32</b>
<b>Global Total</b>	<b>\$1,244,316.90</b>	<b>\$1,134,430.00</b>	<b>\$146,562.00</b>	<b>\$682,681.44</b>		<b>\$522,387.98</b>

# The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

## Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 2028
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	486,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,780
% Growth		52%	75%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10%
Automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,554
% Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	79
<b>Total Sales</b>	<b>2,478</b>	<b>3,361</b>	<b>5,655</b>	<b>7,095</b>	<b>10,072</b>	<b>12,768</b>	<b>16,736</b>	<b>21,648</b>	<b>26,403</b>	<b>31,416</b>	<b>36,959</b>	<b>42,087</b>	<b>48,017</b>	<b>54,355</b>	<b>61,296</b>	<b>68,059</b>
% Growth		36%	68%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	11%
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>920</b>	<b>1,042</b>	<b>1,586</b>	<b>2,150</b>	<b>3,138</b>	<b>4,066</b>	<b>4,857</b>	<b>5,723</b>	<b>6,328</b>	<b>7,182</b>	<b>8,144</b>	<b>9,688</b>	<b>10,874</b>	<b>12,099</b>
% Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17.8%
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	41%	79%	55%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	75%	76%	76%	76%	76%	77%
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>1,285</b>	<b>1,796</b>	<b>2,749</b>	<b>3,529</b>	<b>4,252</b>	<b>5,027</b>	<b>5,517</b>	<b>6,244</b>	<b>7,056</b>	<b>8,429</b>	<b>9,423</b>	<b>10,439</b>
% Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14.1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	16.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15.3%
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Pretax Income</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>758</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>1,332</b>	<b>1,886</b>	<b>2,857</b>	<b>3,684</b>	<b>4,451</b>	<b>5,305</b>	<b>5,875</b>	<b>6,688</b>	<b>7,598</b>	<b>9,080</b>	<b>10,207</b>	<b>11,373</b>
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,323
% Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	20%
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>744</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>1,246</b>	<b>1,624</b>	<b>2,395</b>	<b>3,043</b>	<b>3,644</b>	<b>4,303</b>	<b>4,741</b>	<b>5,372</b>	<b>6,128</b>	<b>7,319</b>	<b>8,179</b>	<b>9,050</b>
<b>Plus</b>																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932)
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Less</b>																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376)
% of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-6%
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,149
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Unlevered Free Cash Flow</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>863</b>	<b>1,186</b>	<b>1,702</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,884</b>	<b>3,314</b>	<b>4,113</b>	<b>4,472</b>	<b>4,959</b>	<b>5,456</b>	<b>6,597</b>	<b>7,315</b>	<b>8,005</b>


EBITDA 12,099  
 Sales 68,059  
 Net Debt (Cash) (260)  
 Tesla Diluted Shares 142

Exit EBITDA High	12.0 x	Exit PPG High	5.0%	Exit P/Sales High	180%
Exit EBITDA Low	8.0 x	Exit PPG Low	3.0%	Exit P/Sales Low	130%


Discount Rate High 13.0%      FY Month of Valuation 1.0 (Beginning of this Month)  
 Discount Rate Low 9.0%      Month of FY End 12.0 (End of this Month)



# Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value




# Ferrari: From story to numbers



# Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

## Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)



# Ferrari: The “Exclusive Club” Value

Stay Super Exclusive: Revenue growth is low

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.34%	2.68%	2.02%	1.36%	0.70%	0.70%
Revenues	€ 2,763	€ 2,874	€ 2,988	€ 3,108	€ 3,232	€ 3,362	€ 3,474	€ 3,567	€ 3,639	€ 3,689	€ 3,714	€ 3,740
EBIT (Operating) margin	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 503	€ 523	€ 544	€ 566	€ 588	€ 612	€ 632	€ 649	€ 662	€ 671	€ 676	€ 681
Tax rate	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%
EBIT(1-t)	€ 334	€ 348	€ 361	€ 376	€ 391	€ 407	€ 420	€ 431	€ 440	€ 446	€ 449	€ 452
- Reinvestment		€ 78	€ 81	€ 84	€ 87	€ 91	€ 79	€ 66	€ 51	€ 35	€ 18	€ 22
FCFF		€ 270	€ 281	€ 292	€ 303	€ 316	€ 341	€ 366	€ 389	€ 411	€ 431	€ 431
Cost of capital		6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.97%	6.98%	6.99%	7.00%	7.00%
PV(FCFF)		€ 252	€ 245	€ 238	€ 232	€ 225	€ 228	€ 228	€ 227	€ 224	€ 220	
Terminal value	€ 6,835											
PV(Terminal value)	€ 3,485											
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 2,321											
Value of operating assets =	€ 5,806											
- Debt	€ 623											
- Minority interests	€ 13											
+ Cash	€ 1,141											
Value of equity	€ 6,311											

High Prices  
+ No selling  
cost =  
Preserve  
current  
operating  
margin

Minimal  
Reinvestment  
due to low  
growth

The super  
rich are not  
sensitive to  
economic  
downturns

## Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
  - ▣ Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
  - ▣ Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
  - ▣ Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
  - ▣ Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

# The Uber Feedback Loop: Bill Gurley

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1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

# Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	<i>Uber (Gurley)</i>	<i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i>	<i>Uber (Damodaran)</i>
Narrative	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages</u> to get a <u>significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	\$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+)	\$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+)	\$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion)




# Different narratives, Different Numbers

<i>Total Market</i>	<i>Growth Effect</i>	<i>Network Effect</i>	<i>Competitive Advantages</i>	<i>Value of Uber</i>
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799



# The Ferrari Counter Narrative



# Ferrari: The “Rev-it-up” Alternative

Get less exclusive: Double number of cars sold over next decade

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		12.00%	12.00%	12.00%	12.00%	12.00%	9.74%	7.48%	5.22%	2.96%	0.70%	0.70%
Revenues	€ 2,763	€ 3,095	€ 3,466	€ 3,882	€ 4,348	€ 4,869	€ 5,344	€ 5,743	€ 6,043	€ 6,222	€ 6,266	€ 6,309
EBIT (Operating) margin	18.20%	17.81%	17.42%	17.04%	16.65%	16.26%	15.87%	15.48%	15.10%	14.71%	14.32%	14.32%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 503	€ 551	€ 604	€ 661	€ 724	€ 792	€ 848	€ 889	€ 912	€ 915	€ 897	€ 904
Tax rate	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%
EBIT(1-t)	€ 334	€ 366	€ 401	€ 439	€ 481	€ 526	€ 564	€ 591	€ 606	€ 608	€ 596	€ 600
- Reinvestment		€ 233	€ 261	€ 293	€ 328	€ 367	€ 334	€ 281	€ 211	€ 126	€ 31	€ 35
FCFF		€ 133	€ 140	€ 147	€ 153	€ 159	€ 230	€ 310	€ 395	€ 482	€ 566	€ 565
Cost of capital		8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	7.90%	7.80%	7.70%	7.60%	7.50%	7.50%
PV(FCFF)		€ 123	€ 120	€ 117	€ 113	€ 108	€ 145	€ 181	€ 215	€ 244	€ 266	
Terminal value	€ 8,315											
PV(Terminal value)	€ 3,906											
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 1,631											
Value of operating assets =	€ 5,537											
- Debt	€ 623											
- Minority interests	€ 13											
+ Cash	€ 1,141											
Value of equity	€ 6,042											

Lower Prices +  
Some selling cost = Lower operating margin

Reinvestment reflects higher sales

The very rich are more sensitive to economic conditions

# And the world is full of feedback.. My Ferrari afterthought!



# Step 6: If the world changes, your narrative has to change with it..

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options



# Uber: The September 2015 Update

<i>Input</i>	<i>June 2014</i>	<i>September 2015</i>	<i>Rationale</i>
Total Market	\$100 billion; Urban car service	\$230 billion; Logistics	Market is broader, bigger & more global than I thought it would be. <u>Uber's</u> entry into delivery & moving businesses is now plausible, perhaps even probable.
Growth in market	Increase market size by 34%; CAGR of 6%.	Double market size; CAGR of 10.39%.	New customers being drawn to car sharing, with more diverse offerings.
Market Share	10% (Local Networking)	25% (Weak Global Networking)	Higher cost of entry will reduce competitors, but remaining competitors have access to capital & in Asia, the hometown advantage.
Slice of gross receipts	20% (Left at status quo)	15%	Increased competition will reduce car service company slice.
Operating margin	40% (Low cost model)	25% (Partial employee model)	Drivers will become partial employees, higher insurance and regulatory costs.
Cost of capital	12% (Ninth <u>decile</u> of US companies)	10% (75 <sup>th</sup> percentile of US companies)	Business model in place and substantial revenues.
Probability of failure	10%	0%	Enough cash on hand to find off threats to survival.
<b>Value of equity</b>	<b>\$5.9 billion</b>	<b>\$23.4 billion</b>	<b>Value increased more than four fold.</b>

Potential Market	Market size (in millions)
A1. Urban car service	\$100,000
A2. All car service	\$175,000
A3. Logistics	\$230,000
A4. Mobility Services	\$310,000

Growth Effect	CAGR (next 10 years)
B1. None	3.00%
B2. Increase market by 25%	5.32%
B3. Increase market size by 50%	7.26%
B4: Double market size	10.39%

Network Effects	Market Share
C1. No network effects	5%
C2. Weak local network effects	10%
C3. Strong local network effects	15%
C4. Weak global network effects	25%
C5. Strong global network effects	40%

Increases overall market to \$618 billion in year 10

	Base	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Assumptions
Overall market	\$230,000	\$253,897	\$280,277	\$309,398	\$341,544	\$377,031	\$416,204	\$459,448	\$507,184	\$559,881	\$618,052	A3 & B4
Share of market (gross)	4.71%	6.74%	8.77%	10.80%	12.83%	14.86%	16.89%	18.91%	20.94%	22.97%	25.00%	C4
Gross Billings	\$10,840	\$17,117	\$24,582	\$33,412	\$43,813	\$56,014	\$70,277	\$86,900	\$106,218	\$128,612	\$154,513	
Revenues as percent of gross	20.00%	19.50%	19.00%	18.50%	18.00%	17.50%	17.00%	16.50%	16.00%	15.50%	15.00%	D3
Annual Revenue	\$2,168	\$3,338	\$4,670	\$6,181	\$7,886	\$9,802	\$11,947	\$14,338	\$16,995	\$19,935	\$23,177	
Operating margin	-23.06%	-18.26%	-13.45%	-8.64%	-3.84%	0.97%	5.77%	10.58%	15.39%	20.19%	25.00%	E2
Operating Income	-\$500	-\$609	-\$628	-\$534	-\$303	\$95	\$690	\$1,517	\$2,615	\$4,026	\$5,794	
Effective tax rate	30.00%	31.00%	32.00%	33.00%	34.00%	35.00%	36.00%	37.00%	38.00%	39.00%	40.00%	
- Taxes	-\$150	-\$189	-\$201	-\$176	-\$103	\$33	\$248	\$561	\$994	\$1,570	\$2,318	
After-tax operating income	-\$350	-\$420	-\$427	-\$358	-\$200	\$62	\$442	\$956	\$1,621	\$2,456	\$3,477	
Sales/Capital Ratio		5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	F
- Reinvestment		\$234	\$267	\$302	\$341	\$383	\$429	\$478	\$531	\$588	\$648	
Free Cash Flow to the Firm		-\$654	-\$694	-\$660	-\$541	-\$322	\$13	\$478	\$1,090	\$1,868	\$2,828	
Terminal value											\$56,258	
Present value of FCFF		-\$595	-\$573	-\$496	-\$369	-\$200	\$7	\$248	\$520	\$822	\$1,152	
Present value of terminal value											\$22,914	
Cost of capital	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	9.60%	9.20%	8.80%	8.40%	8.00%	G1

PV of cash flows during next 10 years =	\$515	
PV of terminal value =	\$22,914	
Value of operating assets	\$23,429	
Probability of failure	0.00%	<b>G2</b>
Adjusted value of operating assets	\$23,429	
Less Debt	\$0	
Value of Equity	\$23,429	

**Capital Intensity**  
F: Status Quo: Sales/Capital = 5

Expense Profile	Operating Margin
E1: Independent contractor	40%
E2: Partial employee	25%
E3: Full employee	15%

Competitive Advantages	Slice of Gross Receipts
D1. None	5%
D2. Weak	10%
D3. Semi-strong	15%
D4. Strong & Sustainable	20%

#### Risk Estimates

- G1. Cost of capital at 75th percentile of US companies = 10%  
G2. Probability of failure in next 10 years= 0%

Uber Valuation: September 2015

# IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy. And accuracy for payoff.

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Better accurate  
than precise



High Accuracy  
High Precision



Low Accuracy  
High Precision




High Accuracy  
Low Precision




Low Accuracy  
Low Precision

It's all relative



# Introducing the corporate life cycle






# The Investor Challenge

<i>Growth stage</i>	<i>Stage 1 Start-up</i>	<i>Stage 2 Young Growth</i>	<i>Stage 3: High Growth</i>	<i>Stage 4 &amp; 5 Mature Stable</i>	<i>Stage 6 Decline</i>
<i>Key Questions</i>	Is there a market for the product or service? How big is that market? Will you survive?	Do people use your product or service? How much do they like it?	Will people pay for the product or service? Can you scale up, i.e., grow as you get bigger?	Can you make money of the product and service and sustain profitability in the face of competition?	What will you get if you sell your assets? How do you plan to return cash flows to your investors?
<i>Pricing Metrics &amp; Measures</i>	Market size, Cash on hand, Access to capital	Number of users, User intensity (EV/User)	User engagement with model, Revenues (EV/Sales)	Earnings levels and growth (PE, EV/EBIT)	Cash flows, Payout & Debt servicing (PBV, EV/EBITDA)
<i>Narrative vs Numbers</i>	Mostly or all narrative	More narrative than numbers	Mix of narrative & numbers	More numbers than narrative	Mostly or all numbers
<i>Value Drivers</i>	Total market size, Market Share & Target Margin	Revenue Growth (and its drivers)	Revenue Growth & Reinvestment	Operating margins and Return on capital	Dividends/Cash Returns & Debt ratios
<i>Dangers</i>	<i>Macro delusions</i> , where companies are collectively overpriced, given market size.	<i>Value distractions</i> , with focus on wrong revenue drivers.	<i>Growth illusions</i> , with failure to factor in the cost of growth.	<i>Disruption Denial</i> , with failure to see threats to sustainable profits.	<i>Liquidation leakage</i> , with unrealistic assumptions about what others will pay for liquidated assets.
<i>Transitions</i>	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <span>Potential to Product</span> <span>Product to Revenues</span> <span>Revenues to Profits</span> <span>Profits to Cash flows</span> </div>				

# Valuing a start up is hard to do..

Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

*Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.*



# And the dark side will beckon..

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- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is “too difficult” or even “impossible” to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the “dark side”, where
  - You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
  - You will hear “macro” stories, justifying value
  - You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.

# Twitter: Setting the table in October 2013

	Last 10K	Trailing 12 month
Revenues	\$316.93	\$534.46
Operating Income	(\$77.06)	(\$134.91)
Adjusted Operating Income		\$7.66
Invested Capital		\$955.00
Adjusted Operating Margin		1.44%
Sales/ Invested Capital		\$0.56

# Twitter: Priming the Pump for Valuation

## 1. Make small revenues into big revenues

	2011		2012		2013	
	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$
Google	32.09%	\$27.74	31.46%	\$32.73	33.24%	\$38.83
Facebook	3.65%	\$3.15	4.11%	\$4.28	5.04%	\$5.89
Yahoo!	3.95%	\$3.41	3.37%	\$3.51	3.10%	\$3.62
Microsoft	1.27%	\$1.10	1.63%	\$1.70	1.78%	\$2.08
IAC	1.15%	\$0.99	1.39%	\$1.45	1.47%	\$1.72
AOL	1.17%	\$1.01	1.02%	\$1.06	0.95%	\$1.11
Amazon	0.48%	\$0.41	0.59%	\$0.61	0.71%	\$0.83
Pandora	0.28%	\$0.24	0.36%	\$0.37	0.50%	\$0.58
Twitter	0.16%	\$0.14	0.28%	\$0.29	0.50%	\$0.58
Linkedin	0.18%	\$0.16	0.25%	\$0.26	0.32%	\$0.37
Millennial Media	0.05%	\$0.04	0.07%	\$0.07	0.10%	\$0.12
Other	55.59%	\$48.05	55.47%	\$57.71	52.29%	\$61.09
Total Market	100%	\$86.43	100.00%	\$104.04	100.00%	\$116.82

## 2. Make losses into profits

Company	Operating Margin
Google Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOG)	22.82%
Facebook, Inc. (NasdaqGS:FB)	29.99%
Yahoo! Inc. (NasdaqGS:YHOO)	13.79%
Netflix	3.16%
Groupon	2.53%
LinkedIn Corporation (NYSE:LNKD)	5.18%
Pandora Media, Inc. (NYSE:P)	-9.13%
Yelp, Inc. (NYSE:YELP)	-6.19%
OpenTable, Inc. (NasdaqGS:OPEN)	24.90%
RetailMeNot	45.40%
Travelzoo Inc. (NasdaqGS:TZOO)	15.66%
Zillow, Inc. (NasdaqGS:Z)	-66.60%
Trulia, Inc. (NYSE:TRLA)	-6.79%
Aggregate	20.40%

		Annual growth rate in Global Advertising Spending				
		2.00%	2.50%	3.00%	3.50%	4.00%
Online advertising share of market	20%	\$124.78	\$131.03	\$137.56	\$144.39	\$151.52
	25%	\$155.97	\$163.79	\$171.95	\$180.49	\$189.40
	30%	\$187.16	\$196.54	\$206.34	\$216.58	\$227.28
	35%	\$218.36	\$229.30	\$240.74	\$252.68	\$265.16
	40%	\$249.55	\$262.06	\$275.13	\$288.78	\$303.04

My estimate for 2023: Overall online advertising market will be close to \$200 billion and Twitter will have about 5.7% (\$11.5 billion)

Aswath Damodaran

My estimate for Twitter: Operating margin of 25% in year 10

## 3. Reinvest for growth


	Sales/ Invested Capital
Twitter (2013)	1.10
Advertising Companies	1.40
Social Media Companies	1.05

My estimate for Twitter: Sales/Capital will be 1.50 for next 10 years


# The Cost of Capital for Twitter

## Risk in the discount rate

### My estimate for Twitter



### Cost of Capital: US - Nov '13



Probability that the firm will not make it as a going concern

Certain to make it as going concern

Certain to fail

My assumption for Twitter

Starting numbers

	Last 10K	Trailing 12 month
Revenues	\$316.93	\$534.46
Operating income	-\$77.06	-\$134.91
Adjusted Operating Income		\$7.67
Invested Capital		\$955.00
Adjusted Operatng Margin		1.44%
Sales/ Invested Capital		0.56
Interest expenses	\$2.49	\$5.30

Twitter Pre-IPO Valuation: October 27, 2013

Revenue growth of 51.5% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 25% over the next 10 years

Sales to capital ratio of 1.50 for incremental sales

**Stable Growth**  
 g = 2.5%; Beta = 1.00;  
 Cost of capital = 8%  
 ROC = 12%;  
 Reinvestment Rate = 2.5%/12% = 20.83%

Terminal Value<sub>10</sub> = 1466 / (.08 - .025) = \$26,657

Operating assets	\$9,705
+ Cash	321
+ IPO Proceeds	1295
- Debt	214
Value of equity	11,106
- Options	713
Value in stock	10,394
/ # of shares	582.46
Value/share	\$17.84

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenues	\$ 810	\$1,227	\$1,858	\$2,816	\$4,266	\$6,044	\$7,973	\$9,734	\$10,932	\$11,205
Operating Income	\$ 31	\$ 75	\$ 158	\$ 306	\$ 564	\$ 941	\$1,430	\$1,975	\$ 2,475	\$ 2,801
Operating Income after tax	\$ 31	\$ 75	\$ 158	\$ 294	\$ 395	\$ 649	\$ 969	\$1,317	\$ 1,624	\$ 1,807
- Reinvestment	\$ 183	\$ 278	\$ 421	\$ 638	\$ 967	\$1,186	\$1,285	\$1,175	\$ 798	\$ 182
FCFF	\$(153)	\$(203)	\$(263)	\$(344)	\$(572)	\$(537)	\$(316)	\$ 143	\$ 826	\$ 1,625

Terminal year (11)	
EBIT (1-t)	\$ 1,852
- Reinvestment	\$ 386
FCFF	\$ 1,466


Cost of capital = 11.12% (.981) + 5.16% (.019) = 11.01%

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10

Cost of Equity  
11.12%

Cost of Debt  
(2.5% + 5.5%)(1 - .40)  
= 5.16%

Weights  
E = 98.1% D = 1.9%









# A sobering reminder: You will be “wrong” and it is okay


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- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- Remember that it is not just your value that is changing, but so is the price, and the price will change a great deal more than the value.



# And your value is not a fact, but an estimate..

<p><b>Revenue Growth Rate</b>                  Distribution: Uniform                  Expected Value = 55%                  Minimum Value: 40%                  Maximum Value: 70%</p>	
<p><b>Target Operating Margin</b>                  Distribution: Normal                  Expected Value = 25%                  Standard Deviation = 5%</p>	
<p><b>Sales to Capital Ratio</b>                  Distribution: Lognormal                  Expected value: 1.50                  Standard deviation: 0.15</p>	
<p><b>Cost of Capital</b>                  Distribution: Triangular                  Expected value: 11.22%                  Minimum value: 10.02%                  Maximum value: 12.22%</p>	



# Forecasting in the face of uncertainty. A test:

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- In which of these two cities would you find it easier to forecast the weather?

## Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	1.7°	1.2°
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	1.5°	2.0°

Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Chance of dry day after a precip day	67%	81%
Chance of precip day after a dry day	7%	13%

## Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°

Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%

# But the payoff is greatest where there is the most uncertainty...

Weather changeability for Honolulu, Hawaii

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	1.7°	1.2°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	67%	81%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	1.5°	2.0°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	7%	13%

[Further changeability analysis >](#)

Weather forecast accuracy for Honolulu, Hawaii

Last Month		Last Year	
MeteoGroup	88.44%	MeteoGroup	88.50%
Persistence	81.80%	CustomWeather	85.87%
CustomWeather	78.23%	AccuWeather	81.82%
The Weather Channel	73.12%	The Weather Channel	81.56%
AccuWeather	69.89%	Persistence	80.44%
Weather Underground	62.10%	Weather Underground	67.07%
National Weather Service	48.39%	National Weather Service	59.90%
Foreca	44.35%	Foreca	57.52%
WeatherBug	32.26%	WeatherBug	37.09%


Weather changeability for Epping, North Dakota

Temperature	Last Month	Last Year	Precipitation	Last Month	Last Year
Average change in high temperature day-to-day	8.5°	7.7°	Chance of dry day after a precip day	50%	65%
Average change in low temperature day-to-day	7.1°	8.6°	Chance of precip day after a dry day	38%	20%

[Further changeability analysis >](#)


Weather forecast accuracy for Epping, North Dakota

Last Month		Last Year	
MeteoGroup	62.50%	MeteoGroup	66.97%
Foreca	61.61%	The Weather Channel	66.73%
The Weather Channel	61.31%	AccuWeather	64.86%
AccuWeather	60.42%	WeatherBug	64.80%
Weather Underground	56.85%	Foreca	62.75%
WeatherBug	56.17%	CustomWeather	62.70%
National Weather Service	54.76%	National Weather Service	62.64%
CustomWeather	54.46%	Weather Underground	61.38%
Persistence	38.01%	Persistence	44.09%



# V. Don't mistake price for value!


68





# Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?

69

 **5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr**  
La Jolla, CA 92037  
Status: Active





**\$995,000**  
Price

**3**  
Beds

**2.5**  
Baths


**1,440** Sq. Ft.  
\$691 / Sq. Ft.


**Built:** 1955 **Lot Size:** 3,000 Sq. Ft. **On Redfin:** 12 days

Favorite X-Out Share... Tour Home


Overview Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights Similar Homes



1 of 25 

**Lisa Padilla**  
REDFIN Real Estate Agent  
★★★★★  
47 client reviews  
\$8,726 commission refund  
[Go Tour This Home](#)  
[Ask Lisa a Question or Start an Offer](#)

1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area



# Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

70

Europe  
Switzerland  
  
Biotechnology  
Biotechnology

Reuters BION.S    Bloomberg BION SW    Exchange SWX    Ticker BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

## Strong sector and stock-picking continue

### Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

### Biotech industry remains attractive


With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares.

### Key changes

Target Price 106.50 to 164.50 ↑ 54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

### Price/price relative



Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4

# Test 3: Are you pricing or valuing?

71

	1	2	3	4	5
EBITDA	\$100.00	\$120.00	\$144.00	\$172.80	\$207.36
- Depreciation	\$20.00	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47
EBIT	\$80.00	\$96.00	\$115.20	\$138.24	\$165.89
- Taxes	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47	\$49.77
EBIT (1-t)	\$56.00	\$67.20	\$80.64	\$96.77	\$116.12
+ Depreciation	\$20.00	\$24.00	\$28.80	\$34.56	\$41.47
- Cap Ex	\$50.00	\$60.00	\$72.00	\$86.40	\$103.68
- Chg in WC	\$10.00	\$12.00	\$14.40	\$17.28	\$20.74
FCFF	\$16.00	\$19.20	\$23.04	\$27.65	\$33.18
Terminal Value					\$1,658.88
Cost of capital	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%
Present Value	\$14.78	\$16.38	\$18.16	\$20.14	\$1,138.35
Value of operating assets today	\$1,207.81				
+ Cash	\$125.00				
- Debt	\$200.00				
<b>Value of equity</b>	<b>\$1,132.81</b>				



# The determinants of price

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## **Mood and Momentum**

Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed).

## **Liquidity & Trading Ease**

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price


## **Incremental information**

Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

## **Group Think**

To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

# Multiples and Comparable Transactions



# To be a better pricer, here are four suggestions

- Check your multiple or consistency/uniformity
  - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Look at all the data, not just the key statistics
  - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Don't forget the fundamentals ultimately matter
  - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Don't define comparables based only on sector
  - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

# 1. Check the Multiple

- Is the multiple consistently defined?
  - The consistency principle: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.
  - The cost of mismatching: Assets that are not cheap(expensive) will look cheap (expensive), because your mismatch will skew the numbers.
- Is the multiple uniformly estimated?
  - The uniformity rule: The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the “comparable firm” list.
  - The cost of ignoring this rule: You will be comparing non-comparable numbers and drawing all the wrong conclusions.


## 2. Play Moneyball: Let the numbers talk (not the analysts)

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- What is the median for this multiple?
  - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
  - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

### 3. Understand your “implicit” assumptions


- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
  - Proposition 1: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
  - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
  - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
  - Proposition 2: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.

# The Determinants of Multiples...



## Equity Multiples

## Firm Multiples





## 4. Define “comparable” broadly & control for differences

- Given the firm that we are valuing, what is a “comparable” firm?
  - ▣ While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
  - ▣ Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
  - ▣ Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.

# Pricing Twitter: Start with the “comparables”

80

Company	Market Cap	Enterprise value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	Number of users (millions)	EV/User	EV/Revenue	EV/EBITDA	PE
Facebook	\$173,540.00	\$160,090.00	\$7,870.00	\$3,930.00	\$1,490.00	1230.00	\$130.15	20.34	40.74	116.47
Linkedin	\$23,530.00	\$19,980.00	\$1,530.00	\$182.00	\$27.00	277.00	\$72.13	13.06	109.78	871.48
Pandora	\$7,320.00	\$7,150.00	\$655.00	-\$18.00	-\$29.00	73.40	\$97.41	10.92	NA	NA
Groupon	\$6,690.00	\$5,880.00	\$2,440.00	\$125.00	-\$95.00	43.00	\$136.74	2.41	47.04	NA
Netflix	\$25,900.00	\$25,380.00	\$4,370.00	\$277.00	\$112.00	44.00	\$576.82	5.81	91.62	231.25
Yelp	\$6,200.00	\$5,790.00	\$233.00	\$2.40	-\$10.00	120.00	\$48.25	24.85	2412.50	NA
Open Table	\$1,720.00	\$1,500.00	\$190.00	\$63.00	\$33.00	14.00	\$107.14	7.89	23.81	52.12
Zynga	\$4,200.00	\$2,930.00	\$873.00	\$74.00	-\$37.00	27.00	\$108.52	3.36	39.59	NA
Zillow	\$3,070.00	\$2,860.00	\$197.00	-\$13.00	-\$12.45	34.50	\$82.90	14.52	NA	NA
Trulia	\$1,140.00	\$1,120.00	\$144.00	-\$6.00	-\$18.00	54.40	\$20.59	7.78	NA	NA
Tripadvisor	\$13,510.00	\$12,860.00	\$945.00	\$311.00	\$205.00	260.00	\$49.46	13.61	41.35	65.90
						<b>Average</b>	\$130.01	11.32	350.80	267.44
						<b>Median</b>	\$97.41	10.92	44.20	116.47

# Read the tea leaves: See what the market cares about

81

	<i>Market Cap</i>	<i>Enterprise value</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>Net Income</i>	<i>Number of users (millions)</i>
<i>Market Cap</i>	1.					
<i>Enterprise value</i>	0.9998	1.				
<i>Revenues</i>	0.8933	0.8966	1.			
<i>EBITDA</i>	0.9709	0.9701	0.8869	1.		
<i>Net Income</i>	0.8978	0.8971	0.8466	0.9716	1.	
<i>Number of users (millions)</i>	0.9812	0.9789	0.8053	0.9354	0.8453	1.

Twitter had 240 million users at the time of its IPO. What price would you attach to the company?

## Use the “market metric” and “market price”

82


- The most important variable, in late 2013, in determining market value and price in this sector (social media, ill defined as that is) is the number of users that a company has.
- Looking at comparable firms, it looks like the market is paying about \$100/user in valuing social media companies, with a premium for “predictable” revenues (subscriptions) and user intensity.
- Twitter has about 240 million users and can be valued based on the \$100/user:
- Enterprise value =  $240 * 100 = \$24$  billion

## VI. Investing is an act of faith..

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- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
- That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
- Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as “speculators”, viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.


# 1. Investment Heaven is a promise, not a guarantee..





## 2. There is no “smart” money

85



### 3. There is nothing more tiresome than a value investing scold

86

- Rigid: The strategies that have come to characterize a great deal of value investing reveal an astonishing faith in accounting numbers and an equally stunning lack of faith in markets getting anything right.
- Righteous: Value investors have convinced themselves that they are better people than other investors. Index fund investors are viewed as “academic stooges”, growth investors are considered to be “dilettantes” and momentum investors are “lemmings”. Value investors consider themselves to be the grown ups in the investing game.
- Ritualistic: Modern day value investing has a whole menu of rituals that investors have to perform to be “value investors”. The rituals range from the benign (reading Security Analysis by Graham) to the not-so-benign..

Follow the yellow brick road..



*Aswath Damodaran*