



MY VALUATION JOURNEY: HAVE FAITH, YOU MUST!

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I. Don't mistake accounting for finance

Valued based upon motive for investment – some marked to market, some recorded at cost and some at quasi-cost

Assets are recorded at original cost, adjusted for depreciation.

The Balance Sheet

Assets		Liabilities	
Long Lived Real Assets	Fixed Assets	Current Liabilities	Short-term liabilities of the firm
Short-lived Assets	Current Assets	Debt	Debt obligations of firm
Investments in securities & assets of other firms	Financial Investments	Other Liabilities	Other long-term obligations
Assets which are not physical, like patents & trademarks	Intangible Assets	Equity	Equity investment in firm

True intangible assets like brand name, patents and customer did not show up. The only intangible asset of any magnitude (goodwill) is a plug variable that is of consequence only if you do an acquisition.

Equity reflects original capital invested and historical retained earnings.

The financial balance sheet

Recorded at intrinsic value (based upon cash flows and risk), not at original cost



Value will depend upon magnitude of growth investments and excess returns on these investments

Intrinsic value of equity, reflecting intrinsic value of assets, net of true value of debt outstanding.

II. Don't assume that $D+CF = DCF$

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
- The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

1. *The IT Proposition:* If “it” does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), “it” cannot affect value.
2. *The DUH Proposition:* For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. *The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition:* Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.


The Key Questions in valuation...

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And Business Drivers that determine value...

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DCF as a tool for intrinsic valuation

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Value of growth
The future cash flows will reflect expectations of how quickly earnings will grow in the future (as a positive) and how much the company will have to reinvest to generate that growth (as a negative). The net effect will determine the value of growth.
Expected Cash Flow in year $t = E(CF) = \text{Expected Earnings in year } t - \text{Reinvestment needed for growth}$

Cash flows from existing assets
The base earnings will reflect the earnings power of the existing assets of the firm, net of taxes and any reinvestment needed to sustain the base earnings.


$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} + \dots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

Steady state
The value of growth comes from the capacity to generate excess returns. The length of your growth period comes from the strength & sustainability of your competitive advantages.

Risk in the Cash flows
The risk in the investment is captured in the discount rate as a beta in the cost of equity and the default spread in the cost of debt.


1. Match your cash flows to your discount rates..

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And the Fed is not the answer to every interest rate question..

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Year end	Ten-year T. Bond rate	Inflation rate	Real GDP growth	Intrinsic riskfree rate	The Fed Effect
1954-2020	5.65%	3.50%	2.92%	6.42%	-0.78%
1954-1980	5.83%	4.49%	3.50%	7.98%	-2.15%
1981-2008	6.88%	3.26%	3.04%	6.30%	0.58%
2010-2020	2.25%	1.76%	1.74%	3.50%	-1.03%

2. Risk is not in the past..

	<i>Arithmetic Average</i>		<i>Geometric Average</i>	
	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds	Stocks - T. Bills	Stocks - T. Bonds
1928-2020	8.28%	6.43%	6.47%	4.84%
Std Error	2.06%	2.18%		
1971-2020	7.67%	4.90%	6.35%	3.91%
Std Error	2.38%	2.70%		
2011-2020	13.83%	9.70%	13.24%	9.35%
Std Error	3.88%	4.87%		

- If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it
 - ▣ Long term (because of the standard error)
 - ▣ Consistent with your risk free rate
 - ▣ A “compounded” average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias.

But in the future..

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In 2020, COVID caused major drops in both earnings & cash return from 2019 levels

Base year cash flow (last 12 mths)
 Dividends (TTM): 58.89
 + Buybacks (TTM): 68.89
 = Cash to investors (TTM): **127.78**

Expected earnings/cashflow growth in next 5 years
 Earnings for next year based upon analyst estimates for 2021 and 10.15% growth in earnings from 2021-25, mostly a recovery from COVID drop in 2020.

Actual numbers Forecasted numbers

	2019	Last 12 months	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Terminal Year
Expected Earnings	\$ 163.00	\$123.35	138.55	152.62	168.11	185.18	203.98	205.88
Expected cash payout as % of earnings	89.76%	103.59%	89.09%	90.21%	91.33%	92.46%	93.58%	93.58%
Expected Dividends + Buybacks =	\$ 146.31	\$127.78	\$123.43	\$137.67	\$153.54	\$171.21	\$190.88	192.66

Earnings and Cash flows grow @0.93% (set equal to risk free rate) a year forever.

S&P 500 on 1/1/21=
3756.07

$$3756.07 = \frac{123.43}{(1+r)} + \frac{137.67}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{153.54}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{171.21}{(1+r)^4} + \frac{190.88}{(1+r)^5} + \frac{190.88(1.0093)}{(r-.0093)(1+r)^5}$$

The last term in this equation is the expected index level at the end of year 5 (capturing price appreciation)

Solve for r

r = Implied Expected Return on Stocks = 5.65%

Minus

Risk free rate = T.Bond rate on 1/1/20= 0.93%

Equals

Implied Equity Risk Premium (1/1/21) = 5.65% - 0.93% = 4.72%

3. Globalization is not a buzz word

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- As companies get globalized, the valuations that we do have to reflect that globalization. In particular, we need to be wary of
 - ▣ Currency mismatches: Multinationals derive their revenues in many currencies but you have to be currency-consistent.
 - ▣ Beta gaming: When a company is listed in many markets, you can get very different betas, depending on how you set up and run a beta regression
 - ▣ Equity Risk Premiums: The standard practice of estimating equity risk premiums based on your country of incorporation will lead to skewed valuations.

ERP : Jan 2021

Andorra	Caal	7.26%	11.98%	Italy	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Austria	Aa1	0.38%	5.10%	Jersey	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Belgium	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%	Liechtenstein	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Cyprus	Ba2	2.91%	7.63%	Luxembourg	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Denmark	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%	Malta	A2	0.82%	5.54%
Finland	Aa1	0.38%	5.10%	Netherlands	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
France	Aa2	0.48%	5.20%	Norway	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Germany	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%	Portugal	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Greece	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%	Spain	Baa1	1.55%	6.27%
Guernsey	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%	Sweden	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Iceland	A2	0.82%	5.54%	Switzerland	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Ireland	A2	0.82%	5.54%	Turkey	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Isle of Man	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%	UK	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%
				Western Europe		0.84%	5.56%

Canada	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
United States	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
North America		0.00%	4.72%

Caribbean		5.31%	10.03%
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Argentina	Ca	11.62%	16.34%
Belize	Caa3	9.68%	14.40%
Bolivia	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Brazil	Ba2	2.91%	7.63%
Chile	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Colombia	Baa2	1.84%	6.56%
Costa Rica	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Ecuador	Caa3	9.68%	14.40%
El Salvador	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Guatemala	Ba1	2.42%	7.14%
Honduras	B1	4.36%	9.08%
Mexico	Baa1	1.55%	6.27%
Nicaragua	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Panama	Baa1	1.55%	6.27%
Paraguay	Ba1	2.42%	7.14%
Peru	A3	1.16%	5.88%
Suriname	Caa3	9.68%	14.40%
Uruguay	B1	4.36%	9.08%
Venezuela	C	19.18%	23.90%
Latin America		3.99%	8.71%

Country	Rating	CRP	ERP
Angola	Caa1	7.26%	11.98%
Benin	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Botswana	A2	0.82%	5.54%
Burkina Faso	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Cameroon	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Cape Verde	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Congo (DR)	Caa1	7.26%	11.98%
Congo (Rep of)	Caa2	8.72%	13.44%
Côte d'Ivoire	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Egypt	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Ethiopia	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Gabon	Caa1	7.26%	11.98%
Ghana	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Kenya	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Mali	Caa1	7.26%	11.98%
Morocco	Ba1	2.42%	7.14%
Mozambique	Caa2	8.72%	13.44%
Namibia	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Niger	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Nigeria	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Rwanda	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Senegal	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
South Africa	Ba2	2.91%	7.63%
Swaziland	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Tanzania	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Togo	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Tunisia	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Uganda	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Zambia	Ca	11.62%	16.34%
Africa		4.94%	9.66%

Albania	B1	4.36%	9.08%
Armenia	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Azerbaijan	Ba2	2.91%	7.63%
Belarus	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Bosnia & Herzegovina	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Bulgaria	Baa1	1.55%	6.27%
Croatia	Ba1	2.42%	7.14%
Czech Republic	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%
Estonia	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Georgia	Ba2	2.91%	7.63%
Hungary	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Kazakhstan	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Kyrgyzstan	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Latvia	A3	1.16%	5.88%
Lithuania	A3	1.16%	5.88%
Macedonia	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Moldova	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Montenegro	B1	4.36%	9.08%
Poland	A2	0.82%	5.54%
Romania	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Russia	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Serbia	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Slovakia	A2	0.82%	5.54%
Slovenia	A3	1.16%	5.88%
Tajikistan	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Ukraine	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Uzbekistan	Baa2	1.84%	6.56%
E. Europe & Russia		2.08%	6.80%

Abu Dhabi	Aa2	0.48%	5.20%
Bahrain	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Iraq	Caa1	7.26%	11.98%
Israel	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Jordan	B1	4.36%	9.08%
Kuwait	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Lebanon	C	19.18%	23.90%
Oman	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Qatar	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%
Ras Al Khaima	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Saudi Arabia	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Sharjah	Baa2	1.84%	6.56%
United Arab Emirates	Aa2	0.48%	5.20%
Middle East		1.53%	6.25%

Country	PRS	CRP	ERP
Algeria	57.25	8.72%	13.44%
Brunei	80	0.82%	5.54%
Gambia	63.75	6.30%	11.02%
Guinea	53.5	11.62%	16.34%
Guinea-Bissau	62	7.26%	11.98%
Guyana	65.75	5.33%	10.05%
Haiti	52.75	11.62%	16.34%
Iran	59.25	8.72%	13.44%
Korea, D.P.R.	50.75	11.62%	16.34%
Liberia	53.5	11.62%	16.34%
Libya	58.25	8.72%	13.44%
Madagascar	63.25	6.30%	11.02%
Malawi	58.75	8.72%	13.44%
Myanmar	63.75	6.30%	11.02%
Sierra Leone	58.75	8.72%	13.44%
Somalia	50.5	11.62%	16.34%
Sudan	38.25	19.18%	23.90%
Syria	47	19.18%	23.90%
Yemen, Republic	50	19.18%	23.90%
Zimbabwe	52.25	11.62%	16.34%

Bangladesh	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Cambodia	B2	5.33%	10.05%
China	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Fiji	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%
Hong Kong	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%
India	Baa3	2.13%	6.85%
Indonesia	Baa2	1.84%	6.56%
Japan	A1	0.68%	5.40%
Korea	Aa2	0.48%	5.20%
Laos	Caa2	8.72%	13.44%
Macao	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%
Malaysia	A3	1.16%	5.88%
Maldives	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Mauritius	Baa1	1.55%	6.27%
Mongolia	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Pakistan	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Papua New Guinea	B2	5.33%	10.05%
Philippines	Baa2	1.84%	6.56%
Singapore	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Solomon Islands	B3	6.30%	11.02%
Sri Lanka	Caa1	7.26%	11.98%
Taiwan	Aa3	0.59%	5.31%
Thailand	Baa1	1.55%	6.27%
Vietnam	Ba3	3.49%	8.21%

Australia	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Cook Islands	B1	4.36%	9.08%
New Zealand	Aaa	0.00%	4.72%
Australia & NZ		0.00%	4.72%

Blue: Moody's Rating
 Red: Added Country Risk
 Green #: Total ERP


Risk comes from where you operate: Severstal in 2017

Region	Revenues	Weight	ERP
Russia	\$3,805	64.52%	9.24%
Western Europe	\$1,174	19.91%	6.81%
Middle East	\$336	5.70%	7.03%
Africa	\$299	5.07%	12.00%
Asia	\$139	2.36%	7.12%
Central and South America	\$88	1.49%	10.21%
North America	\$56	0.95%	5.69%
Severstal	\$5,897	100.00%	8.70%

1. By focusing on revenues, are we misestimating country risk exposure?
2. As the company looks to grow in Latin America and Asia, how do you see this premium evolving?

4. Don't let your inputs be at war with each other.

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The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 2028
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,780
% Growth		52%	79%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10%
Automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,554
% Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	79
Total Sales	2,478	3,361	5,655	7,095	10,072	12,768	16,736	21,648	26,403	31,416	36,959	42,087	48,017	54,355	61,296	68,059
% Growth		36%	60%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	11%
EBITDA	148	417	920	1,042	1,586	2,150	3,138	4,066	4,857	5,723	6,328	7,182	8,144	9,688	10,874	12,099
% Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17.8%
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	41%	79%	59%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	79%	76%	76%	76%	76%	77%
EBIT	45	259	748	839	1,285	1,796	2,749	3,529	4,252	5,027	5,517	6,244	7,056	8,429	9,423	10,439
% Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14.1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	15.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15.3%
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pretax Income	46	258	758	872	1,332	1,886	2,857	3,684	4,451	5,305	5,875	6,688	7,598	9,080	10,207	11,373
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,323
% Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	20%
Net Income	44	256	744	839	1,246	1,624	2,395	3,043	3,644	4,303	4,741	5,372	6,128	7,319	8,179	9,050
Plus																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932)
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Less																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376)
% of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-6%
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,149
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlevered Free Cash Flow	78	229	750	863	1,186	1,702	2,343	2,884	3,314	4,113	4,472	4,959	5,456	6,597	7,315	8,005


EBITDA	12,099
Sales	68,059
Net Debt (Cash)	(260)
Tesla Diluted Shares	142

Exit EBITDA High	12.0 x	Exit PPG High	5.0%	Exit P/Sales High	180%
Exit EBITDA Low	8.0 x	Exit PPG Low	3.0%	Exit P/Sales Low	130%

Discount Rate High	13.0%	FY Month of Valuation	1.0 (Beginning of this Month)
Discount Rate Low	9.0%	Month of FY End	12.0 (End of this Month)

5. Don't sweat the small stuff

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Severstal: Valuation (April 2017)

	1997-2003	2004-2011	2012-2016	2016	Global Steel
Revenue Growth	4.26%	22.12%	-17.85%	-7.50%	-5.04%
Operating Margin	17.51%	19.13%	17.68%	25.81%	3.19%
ROIC	17.07%	19.31%	17.87%	32.58%	2.79%
Sales/Inv Capital	1.22	1.20	1.22	1.52	0.99

Revenue growth of **3% a year** for 5 years, moving back up to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin decreases to **19.13%** over time.

Sales to capital ratio of **1.20**

Stable Growth
 $g = 2.5\%$
 Cost of capital = 8.5%
 $ROC = 8.5\%$;
 Reinvestment Rate = $2.5\%/8.5\% = 29.41\%$

Terminal Value₁₀ = $868 / (.085 - .025) = \$14.460$

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenue growth rate		3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	2.90%	2.80%	2.70%	2.60%	2.50%
Revenues	\$ 5,916	\$ 6,093	\$ 6,276	\$ 6,465	\$ 6,659	\$ 6,858	\$ 7,057	\$ 7,255	\$ 7,451	\$ 7,644	\$ 7,835
EBIT (Operating) margin	25.81%	25.14%	24.48%	23.81%	23.14%	22.47%	21.80%	21.13%	20.47%	19.80%	19.13%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 1,527	\$ 1,532	\$ 1,536	\$ 1,539	\$ 1,541	\$ 1,541	\$ 1,539	\$ 1,533	\$ 1,525	\$ 1,513	\$ 1,499
Tax rate	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.76%	18.32%	18.88%	19.44%	20.00%
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 1,264	\$ 1,269	\$ 1,272	\$ 1,274	\$ 1,276	\$ 1,276	\$ 1,265	\$ 1,252	\$ 1,237	\$ 1,219	\$ 1,199
- Reinvestment		\$ 148	\$ 152	\$ 157	\$ 162	\$ 166	\$ 166	\$ 165	\$ 163	\$ 161	\$ 159
FCFF		\$ 1,121	\$ 1,120	\$ 1,117	\$ 1,114	\$ 1,110	\$ 1,100	\$ 1,088	\$ 1,074	\$ 1,058	\$ 1,040

	Terminal year
Revenues	\$ 8,031.35
EBIT (Operating) margin	19.13%
EBIT (Operating income)	\$ 1,536.40
Tax rate	20.00%
EBIT(1-t)	\$ 1,229.12
- Reinvestment	\$ 361.51
FCFF	\$ 867.61

PV(Terminal value)	\$ 6,066.96
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 6,987.62
Value of operating assets =	\$ 13,054.58
- Debt	\$ 2,013.00
- Minority interests	\$ 15.00
+ Cash	\$ 1,173.00
+ Non-operating assets	\$ 266.00
Value of equity	\$ 12,465.58
Number of shares	837.72
Estimated value /share	\$ 14.88
Price	\$ 13.84
Price as % of value	93.01%

Cost of capital = $10.34\% (.852) + 4.00\% (.148) = 9.32\%$

Cost of capital decreases to 8.5% from years 6-10

Cost of Equity
10.24%

Cost of Debt
Bond rating: BB+
 $(2.5\% + 2.5\%)(1 - .20) = 4.00\%$

Weights
E = 85.2% D = 14.8%

In April 2017, the stock was trading at \$13.84/share.

Riskfree Rate:
Riskfree rate = 2.5%

Beta
0.89

D/E = 17.36%

ERP
8.70%

Business	Weights	Unlevered Beta
Steel	74.83%	0.7355
Metals & Mining	25.17%	0.9178
Severstal	100%	0.7814

Region	Weight	ERP
Russia	64.52%	9.24%
Western Europe	19.91%	6.81%
Middle East	5.70%	7.03%
Africa	5.07%	12.00%
Asia	2.36%	7.12%
Latin America	1.49%	10.21%
North America	0.95%	5.69%
Severstal	100.00%	8.70%



The **Chimera DCF** mixes dollar cash flows with peso discount rates, nominal cash flows with real costs of capital and cash flows before debt payments with costs of equity, violating basic consistency rules



In a **Trojan Horse DCF**, Just as the Greeks used a wooden horse to smuggle soldiers into Troy, analysts use the Trojan Horse of cash flows to smuggle in a pricing (in the form of a terminal value, estimated by using a multiple).



In a **Dreamstate DCF**, you build amazing companies on spreadsheets, making outlandish assumptions about growth and operating margins over time.



A **Kabuki DCF** is a work of art, where analyst and rule maker (or court) go through the motions of valuation, with the intent of developing models that are legally or accounting-rule defensible rather than yielding reasonable values.

$$D+CF \neq DCF$$



In a **Robo DCF**, the analyst builds a valuation almost entirely from the most recent financial statements and automated forecasts.




In a **Dissonant DCF**, assumptions about growth, risk and cash flows are not consistent with each other, with little or no explanation given for the mismatch.




A **Mutant DCF** is a collection of numbers where items have familiar names (free cash flow, cost of capital) but the analyst putting it together has neither a narrative nor a sense of the basic principles of

III. Don't mistake modeling for valuation




From story to numbers and beyond..

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Step 1: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
 - ▣ Your company (its products, its management and its history).
 - ▣ The market or markets that you see it growing in.
 - ▣ The competition it faces and will face.
 - ▣ The macro environment in which it operates.



Step 2: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
 - ▣ Rule 1: Keep it simple.
 - ▣ Rule 2: Keep it focused.


The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

1. An urban car service business: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong competitive advantages (from being a first mover).
5. And its existing low-capital business model, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.


Step 3: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense

26




Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable

Uber (My narrative))




Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)



Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open

- When you tell a story about a company (either explicitly or implicitly), it is natural to feel attached to that story and to defend it against all attacks. Nothing can destroy an investor more than hubris.
- Being open to other views about a company is not easy, but here are some suggestions that may help:
 - ▣ Face up to the uncertainty in your own estimates of value.
 - ▣ Present the valuation to people who don't think like you do.
 - ▣ Create a process where people who disagree with you the most have a say.
 - ▣ Provide a structure where the criticisms can be specific and pointed, rather than general.

The Uber Feedback Loop: Bill Gurley

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1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	<i>Uber (Gurley)</i>	<i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i>	<i>Uber (Damodaran)</i>
Narrative	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage to gain a dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage to gain a dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages to get a significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	\$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+)	\$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+)	\$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion)

IV. Don't mistake precision for accuracy.. And accuracy for payoff..

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Better accurate
than precise



High Accuracy
High Precision



Low Accuracy
High Precision




High Accuracy
Low Precision



Low Accuracy
Low Precision


It's all relative



Valuing a start up or a young company is hard to do..

Figure 3: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies

Making judgments on revenues/ profits difficult because you cannot draw on history. If you have no product/service, it is difficult to gauge market potential or profitability. The company's entire value lies in future growth but you have little to base your estimate on.





And the dark side will beckon..

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- With young start up companies, you will be told that it is “too difficult” or even “impossible” to value these companies, because there is so little history and so much uncertainty in the future.
- Instead, you will be asked to come over to the “dark side”, where
 - ▣ You will see value metrics that you have never seen before
 - ▣ You will hear “macro” stories, justifying value
 - ▣ You will be asked to play the momentum game
- While all of this behavior is understandable, none of it makes the uncertainty go away. You have a choice. You can either hide from uncertainty or face up to it.

Airbnb's IPO: The Business Model




In 2019, there were 4 million hosts on the platform.


In 2019, there were 5.6 million units listed across 10,000 cities in 220 countries.

In 2019, there were 54 million travellers on the site, who booked 327 million nights.


The Financial Payoffs..



The COVID Effect.. In nights booked



And in financials..



Prospectus Revelations: On Costs

Airbnb: Cost and Profit Patterns

	2017	2018	2019	LTM
Gross Bookings	\$20,000,000	\$29,400,000	\$38,000,000	\$26,491,803
Revenues	\$ 2,561,721	\$ 3,651,985	\$ 4,805,239	\$ 3,625,731
COGS	\$ 1,043,429	\$ 1,473,234	\$ 2,011,387	\$ 1,722,568
Gross Profit	\$ 1,518,292	\$ 2,178,751	\$ 2,793,852	\$ 1,903,163
Product Development	\$ 400,749	\$ 579,193	\$ 976,695	\$ 973,576
Sales & Marketing	\$ 871,749	\$ 1,101,327	\$ 1,621,519	\$ 982,523
G&A	\$ 327,156	\$ 479,487	\$ 697,181	\$ 628,001
Restructuring Charges				\$ 136,969
Operating Profit	\$ (81,362)	\$ 18,744	\$ (501,543)	\$ (817,906)
Revenues/ Gross Bookings	12.81%	12.42%	12.65%	13.69%
Gross Margin	59.27%	59.66%	58.14%	52.49%
Operating Margin	-3.18%	0.51%	-10.44%	-22.56%
COGS/Revenues	40.73%	40.34%	41.86%	47.51%
Product Development/ Revenues	15.64%	15.86%	20.33%	26.85%
Sales & Marketing/Revenues	34.03%	30.16%	33.74%	27.10%
G&A/ Revenues	12.77%	13.13%	14.51%	17.32%

Revenues as a % of gross billings has been relatively stable between 2017-19. In 2020, it did increase, perhaps because of the new host model.

Barring 2020, the direct operating expenses have been fairly stable at 40-42% of revenues. There is little evidence that scaling up is lowering this number.


Non-direct operating expenses (G&A, Selling and Product development) are all increasing as revenues grow, suggesting that growth demands are drowning out economies of scale, at least for the moment.

Prospectus Revelations: On Proceeds & Control


- Use of Proceeds: While the details are still being worked out, it is rumored that Airbnb is looking to raise about \$3 billion in proceeds on the offering date, and that while some of the proceeds will be used to retire existing debt, most of it will be held by the company to cover future investment needs.
- Share classes: In keeping with the practices of tech companies that have gone public in recent years, Airbnb has shares with different voting rights: class A shares with one voting right per share, class B shares with 20 voting rights per share, and class C & class H shares with no voting rights per share. Not surprisingly, the class B shares will be held by founders and other insiders, allowing them control of the company, even if they own well below 50% of all shares outstanding.

The Hospitality Business


The market is big, but growth has slowed



It is concentrated, and getting more so...



The US is the biggest market, but China is growing.



Airbnb's TAM in 2020

- In its prospectus, Airbnb has expanded its estimate of market potential to \$3.4 trillion, as evidenced in this excerpt from the prospectus:
 - *We have a substantial market opportunity in the growing travel market and experience economy. We estimate our serviceable addressable market (“SAM”) today to be \$1.5 trillion, including \$1.2 trillion for short-term stays and \$239 billion for experiences. We estimate our total addressable market (“TAM”) to be \$3.4 trillion, including \$1.8 trillion for short-term stays, \$210 billion for long-term stays, and \$1.4 trillion for experiences.*
- In my view, Airbnb's targetable market falls somewhere in the middle, clearly higher than just the hotel business of \$600 billion, but below Airbnb's upper end estimate of \$2 trillion for this business.
- Given how much trouble Airbnb has had in the experiences business, I think Airbnb's estimate of \$1.4 trillion for that business is more fictional than even aspirational.

The Players: Booking Companies

	Expedia			Booking.com		
	2019	LTM	% Change (Annualized)	2019	LTM	% Change (Annualized)
Gross Bookings	\$107,870.00	\$52,470.00	-61.75%	\$96,400.00	\$48,752.00	-59.71%
Revenues	\$ 12,067.00	\$ 7,026.00	-51.38%	\$15,066.00	\$ 8,897.00	-50.46%
Operating Income	\$ 961.00	\$ (892.00)	NA	\$ 5,345.00	\$ 1,831.00	-76.05%
Revenues/Gross Bookings	11.19%	13.39%		15.63%	18.25%	
Operating Margin	7.96%	-12.70%		35.48%	20.58%	

Business Mix

Airbnb derives almost of its revenues from acting as a booking intermediary. Expedia & Booking.com derive some of their revenues from bookings (agency services), but also have a merchant business (where they buy hotel rooms at discounted rates & sell them at higher prices) and an advertising revenue stream.

Expedia: Merchant (40%), Agency (47%), Ads (13%)

Booking.com: Merchant (25%), Agency (68%), Ads (8%)

Status Quo vs Disruption
Expedia & Booking.com derive most of their revenues from traditional hotel companies, whereas Airbnb plays a more disruptive role, allowing home owners to list their housing units for rent.

The COVID effect
With the COVID shutdown, both Expedia & Booking.com saw a sharp drop in revenues in 2020, with the second quarter of 2020 being the worst hit.

The Airbnb Story

- Continued Growth: Airbnb will continue to grow, while finding a pathway to profitability. Airbnb's growth in gross bookings will come not only from disrupting and taking market share from the hotel business, bad news for conventional hotel companies and travel providers who serves them, but also from continued expansion of non-conventional hospitality providers (home and apartment owners).
- Revenue share stable + Improving margins: As it grows, Airbnb's share of those gross bookings is likely to plateau at close to current levels, but its operating margins will continue to improve towards travel booking industry levels, as product development, marketing and G&A costs decrease, not in dollar terms, but as a percent of revenues.
- Experiences business is tangential: While Airbnb is enthusiastic about the experiences business, it is likely to remain a tangential business, contributing only marginally to revenues and profitability.
- Low Risk, for a young company: Since Airbnb has a light debt load and is closer to profitability than most of the sharing-economy companies that have gone public in recent years

The Story

Airbnb has brought the sharing economy to housing, connecting home owners (hosts) who own units or houses that they want to rent with renters (guests) online, collecting a percentage of the transaction revenues from both sides of the transaction. Its low capital intensity model and extended reach has allowed it to expand not only to almost every part of the world (220 countries) but also provide an unmatched range of offerings. The growth in gross bookings has started to slow down, as the company gets bigger, and the COVID shut downs made 2020 a regressive year. That said, as its competitors in the hotel business have been damaged far more by the crisis, Airbnb will be able to recover quickly from the crisis, and continue on its growth path. Economies of scale will allow for only mild improvements in revenues as a % of gross billings, but the brokerage-based business will generate high margins, in steady state, and require relatively little reinvestment.

The Assumptions

	Base year	In 2021	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
Gross Bookings & Growth Rate	\$ 26,491,803.00	40.00%	25.00%		2.00%	Growth continues, as hotels scale back growth plans after COVID shock.
Revenues as % of Gross Bookings	13.69%	12.65%			14.00%	Mild economies of scale allow slight increase in percent over time
Operating margin (b)	-13.69%	-10.00%			25.00%	Higher margins than the hotel business, but lower than ad driven businesses.
Tax rate	25.00%	0.00%			25.00%	Global/US marginal tax rate, after NOLs are used up.
Reinvestment (c)		Sales to Capital =		2.00	20.00%	Low capital intensity business
Return on capital	-25.61%	Marginal ROIC =		65.81%	10.00%	Networking benefits allow for high value growth
Cost of capital (d)			6.50%	7.12%	7.12%	Cost of capital moves up over time.

The Cash Flows


	Gross Bookings	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$ 37,088,524.20	\$ 4,691,698	-10.00%	\$ (469,170)	\$ 532,984	\$ (1,002,153)
2	\$ 46,360,655.25	\$ 5,989,797	-3.00%	\$ (179,694)	\$ 649,049	\$ (828,743)
3	\$ 57,950,819.06	\$ 7,565,479	0.50%	\$ 37,827	\$ 787,841	\$ (750,014)
4	\$ 72,438,523.83	\$ 9,554,641	4.00%	\$ 382,186	\$ 994,581	\$ (612,395)
5	\$ 90,548,154.79	\$ 12,065,542	7.50%	\$ 777,799	\$ 1,255,450	\$ (477,651)
6	\$ 109,019,978.36	\$ 14,674,089	9.52%	\$ 1,047,952	\$ 1,304,274	\$ (256,322)
7	\$ 126,245,134.94	\$ 17,163,026	13.39%	\$ 1,723,792	\$ 1,244,469	\$ 479,323
8	\$ 140,384,590.06	\$ 19,274,804	17.26%	\$ 2,495,269	\$ 1,055,889	\$ 1,439,380
9	\$ 149,649,973.00	\$ 20,748,969	21.13%	\$ 3,288,271	\$ 737,082	\$ 2,551,189
10	\$ 152,642,972.46	\$ 21,370,016	25.00%	\$ 4,006,878	\$ 310,524	\$ 3,696,354
Terminal year	\$ 155,695,831.91	\$ 21,797,416	25.00%	\$ 4,087,016	\$ 817,403	\$ 3,269,612

The Value


Terminal value	\$ 63,859,619		
PV(Terminal value)	\$ 33,434,589		
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$ 1,244,447		
Value of operating assets =	\$ 34,679,036		
Adjustment for distress	\$ 1,733,952	Probability of failure =	10.00%
- Debt & Minority Interests	\$ 2,192,381		
+ IPO Proceeds	\$ 3,000,000	Based upon early news stories. May change as final offering details are set.	
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets	\$ 4,495,211		
Value of equity	\$ 38,247,914		
- Value of equity options	\$ 1,736,757		
Number of shares	671,064.00	Filler for the moment. Will update when final prospectus is filed	
Value per share	\$ 54.41	Stock was trading at = <i>Not yet listed</i>	

Airbnb IPO: Simulation of Equity Value in November 2020



Growth rate in Gross Bookings: 2022-2025
 Expected = 25%, Max = 35%, Min = 15%



Target Operating Margin in year 10
 Expected = 25%, Std Dev = 4%



Cost of Capital (initial)
 Expected = 6.50%, Std Dev = 0.45%



Percentile	Forecast values
0%	\$17,591,165
10%	\$26,150,864
20%	\$28,790,133
30%	\$30,952,251
40%	\$32,981,840
50%	\$35,114,898
60%	\$37,463,932
70%	\$40,181,915
80%	\$43,595,272
90%	\$49,120,328
100%	\$100,382,037

V. Valuation is a craft, and you should never stop learning

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. **Valuation is not a science.**
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. **Valuation is not an art.**
- A craft is a skill that you learn by doing. The more you do it, the better you get at it. **Valuation is a craft.**

Uber's Existing User Value

Growth rate in Operating Expenses
Assumed that 90% of operating expenses are variable, growing at revenue growth rate. Overall expenses grow 10.95%/year

Growth rate in Revenues
Assumed 12% growth in annual revenues/user over next 15 years

User Lifetime
Assumed to be 15 years, with an annual renewal probability of 95%.

	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Membership Survival	1.0000	0.9500	0.9025	0.8574	0.8145	0.7738	0.7351	0.6983	0.6634	0.6302	0.5987	0.5688	0.5404	0.5133	0.4877	0.4633
Gross Billings	\$ 547.24	\$ 612.91	\$ 686.46	\$ 768.84	\$ 861.10	\$ 964.43	\$ 1,080.16	\$ 1,209.78	\$ 1,354.95	\$ 1,517.54	\$ 1,699.65	\$ 1,903.61	\$ 2,132.04	\$ 2,387.89	\$ 2,674.43	\$ 2,995.36
Net Revenues	\$ 110.16	\$ 123.38	\$ 138.19	\$ 154.77	\$ 173.35	\$ 194.15	\$ 217.45	\$ 243.54	\$ 272.76	\$ 305.50	\$ 342.16	\$ 383.21	\$ 429.20	\$ 480.70	\$ 538.39	\$ 602.99
Operating Expenses	\$ 65.12	\$ 72.25	\$ 80.16	\$ 88.94	\$ 98.67	\$ 109.48	\$ 121.47	\$ 134.77	\$ 149.52	\$ 165.90	\$ 184.06	\$ 204.22	\$ 226.58	\$ 251.39	\$ 278.92	\$ 309.46
Operating Profit/user	\$ 45.05	\$ 51.14	\$ 58.03	\$ 65.84	\$ 74.67	\$ 84.67	\$ 95.98	\$ 108.77	\$ 123.24	\$ 139.60	\$ 158.09	\$ 179.00	\$ 202.62	\$ 229.31	\$ 259.47	\$ 293.54
Survival adjusted Operating Profit		\$ 48.58	\$ 52.37	\$ 56.45	\$ 60.82	\$ 65.52	\$ 70.55	\$ 75.96	\$ 81.76	\$ 87.98	\$ 94.66	\$ 101.81	\$ 109.49	\$ 117.72	\$ 126.54	\$ 135.99
After-tax Operating Profit/user	\$ 33.79	\$ 36.44	\$ 39.28	\$ 42.34	\$ 45.62	\$ 49.14	\$ 52.92	\$ 56.97	\$ 61.32	\$ 65.99	\$ 70.99	\$ 76.36	\$ 82.12	\$ 88.29	\$ 94.90	\$ 101.99
Present Value		\$ 33.66	\$ 33.53	\$ 33.38	\$ 33.23	\$ 33.07	\$ 32.90	\$ 32.73	\$ 32.55	\$ 32.36	\$ 32.16	\$ 31.96	\$ 31.75	\$ 31.54	\$ 31.32	\$ 31.10
Annual Growth Rate (Revenues)	12.00%															
Annual Growth Rate (Op Exp)	10.95%															
Risk-adjusted discount rate	8.24%															
Life of user =	15.00															
Value per existing user =	\$ 487.25															
Number of existing users =	91.00															
Value of Existing Users	\$ 44,339.77															

Survival-adjusted PV
PV of after-tax operating income, adjusted for drop out rate over time.

Risk Adjusted Discount Rate
Used a 8.24% cost of capital, set at the median cost of capital for US companies, adjusted for inflation difference.

Uber's New User Value

Value Added by New Users at Uber

Base year Value/ New User
 Value of User = \$487.25
 Cost of adding New User = \$113.71
 Value added by new user = \$373.54

User Growth rates
 Years 1-5: 12%
 Years 6-10: 6%

Cost of capital
 Used 9.97%, the 75th percentile of US companies


	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Total Users	91.00	101.92	114.15	127.85	143.19	160.37	170.00	180.20	191.01	202.47	214.62
New Users	0.00	15.47	17.33	19.41	21.73	24.34	17.64	18.70	19.82	21.01	22.27
Value per new user	\$373.54	\$379.14	\$384.83	\$390.60	\$396.46	\$402.40	\$408.44	\$414.57	\$420.78	\$427.10	\$433.50
Value added by new users		\$5,865.27	\$6,667.64	\$7,579.77	\$8,616.68	\$9,795.45	\$7,205.30	\$7,752.18	\$8,340.57	\$8,973.62	\$9,654.72
Terminal Value (new users)											\$31,603.73
Present Value		\$ 5,333.52	\$ 5,513.45	\$ 5,699.46	\$ 5,891.74	\$ 6,090.50	\$ 4,073.87	\$ 3,985.70	\$ 3,899.44	\$ 3,815.05	\$ 15,950.37
Value Added by New Users	\$ 60,253.08										

Beyond year 10
 User growth continues at 2.5% a year

Existing Users		New Users		Corporate Expenses			
Inputs		Inputs		Inputs			
Net Revenue/User =	\$ 110.16	Cost of acquiring user =	\$ 113.71	Corporate Expenses	\$ 2,812.72		
Operating Expense/User=	\$ 65.12	Value of new user =	\$ 373.54	CAGR - Next 10 years	7.00%		
Operating Profit/User =	\$ 45.05	Growth rate in net users (1-5)	12.00%	Discount Rate =	8.24%		
CAGR in Revenue/User	12.00%	Growth rate in net users (6-10)	6.00%				
Annual Renewal Rate =	95.00%	Discount Rate	9.97%				
User Life =	15						
Discount Rate =	8.24%						
Output		Output		Output			
Value/User =	\$ 487.25	# Users in year 10 =	214.62				
# Existing Users =	91.00	# Net New Users (10 years)	123.62				
Value of Existing Users =	\$44,339.77	Value of New Users =	\$60,253.08	PV of Corporate Expenses	\$(63,216.48)	=	Value of Operating Assets
							\$ 41,376.37
							+ Cash
							\$ 15,407.00
							+ Cross Holdings
							\$ 8,700.00
							- Debt
							\$ 6,869.00
							Value of equity
							\$58,614.37
							# Shares
							1158.30
							Value/Share
							\$ 50.60
<p>Existing users will stick with Uber and increase how much they spend on its services, the longer they stay. Operating expenses are mostly fixed, but there will be mild economies of scale.</p>		<p>Uber will continue to add new users, but at a decreasing pace, with a cost of acquiring a new user staying stable (with the current cost increasing at the inflation rate). The new user spending profile will mirror existing users.</p>		<p>Uber's corporate expenses will continue to grow, notwithstanding economies of scale, as the company increases spending moderately on autonomous cars.</p>			


VI. Don't mistake price for value!

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Are you pricing or valuing?

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5369 La Jolla Mesa Dr
La Jolla, CA 92037
Status: Active

\$995,000
Price

3
Beds


2.5
Baths

1,440 Sq. Ft.
\$691 / Sq. Ft.

Built: 1955 **Lot Size:** 3,000 Sq. Ft. **On Redfin:** 12 days

Favorite X-Out Share... Tour Home

Overview Property Details Tour Insights Property History Public Records Activity Schools Neighborhood & Offer Insights Similar Homes



1 of 25 Play Video

Lisa Padilla
REDFIN Real Estate Agent


★★★★★
47 client reviews

\$8,726 commission refund

Go Tour This Home

[Ask Lisa a Question](#) or [Start an Offer](#)

1 of 4 Redfin Agents in this area



Value versus Price

	To value	To price
Assets	Can be valued based upon expected cashflows, with higher cashflows & lower risk = higher value.	Can be priced against similar assets, after controlling for cash flows and risk.
Commodity	Can be valued, based upon utilitarian demand and supply, but with long lags in both.	Can be priced against its own history (normalized price over time)
Currency	Cannot be valued	Can be priced against other currencies, with greater acceptance & more stable purchasing power = higher price.
Collectible	Cannot be valued	Can be priced based upon scarcity and desirability.

The determinants of price

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Mood and Momentum

Price is determined in large part by mood and momentum, which, in turn, are driven by behavioral factors (panic, fear, greed).

Liquidity & Trading Ease

While the value of an asset may not change much from period to period, liquidity and ease of trading can, and as it does, so will the price.

The Market Price

Incremental information

Since you make money on price changes, not price levels, the focus is on incremental information (news stories, rumors, gossip) and how it measures up, relative to expectations

Group Think

To the extent that pricing is about gauging what other investors will do, the price can be determined by the "herd".

The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

- Define the multiple
 - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Describe the multiple
 - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
 - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
 - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

VII. Investing is an act of faith..


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- When investing, we are often told that if you are virtuous (careful in your research, good at valuation, have a long time horizon), you will be rewarded (with high returns).
- That pitch is amplified by anecdotal evidence of righteous ones, i.e., those who have followed the path to success.
- Those who chose not to be virtuous are labeled as “speculators”, viewed as shallow and deserving of the fate that awaits them.
- If you have faith in investing, you will be tested.

Active Investing is a loser's game

Tough to Beat

Percentage of U.S. large-company mutual funds outperforming the Vanguard 500 Index Fund




And it stays that way across styles..

	<i>% of US Mutual Funds that beat their respective indices</i>			
	Value	Growth	Core	All
Large	82.17%	86.54%	88.26%	84.15%
Mid-cap	70.27%	81.48%	76.51%	76.69%
Small	92.31%	91.89%	91.44%	90.13%
All Equity				88.43%
Real Estate				82.64%


S&P computes these percentages for the last year, the last 3 years & the last 10 years. There is not a single period or a single fund grouping where the number is <50%.

The secret is now out in the open...

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
The "smart" money does not stay smart for very long..



Investment Heaven is a promise, not a guarantee..

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Apple, Price and Value - 2010 to 2017



Follow the yellow brick road..

