

VALUATION: PACKET 2

RELATIVE VALUATION, ASSET-BASED VALUATION AND PRIVATE COMPANY VALUATION

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THE ESSENCE OF RELATIVE VALUATION (PRICING)

- In relative valuation, the price of an asset is compared to the prices assessed by the market for similar or comparable assets.
- To do relative valuation then,
 - we need to **identify comparable assets** and obtain market pricing for these assets
 - convert these market prices **into standardized prices**, since the absolute prices cannot be compared This process of standardizing creates price multiples.
 - compare the **standardized price or multiple for the asset being analyzed to the standardized prices for comparable assets**, controlling for any differences between the firms that might affect the multiple, to judge whether the asset is under or over priced.

RELATIVE VALUATION IS PERVASIVE...

- Most asset valuations are relative.
- Most equity valuations on Wall Street are relative valuations.
 - Almost **85% of equity research reports** are based upon a multiple and comparable firms.
 - More than 50% of all **acquisition valuations** are **based upon multiples**.
 - **Rules of thumb** based on multiples are not only common but are often the basis for final valuation judgments.
- While there are more discounted cashflow valuations in consulting and corporate finance, they are often relative valuations masquerading as discounted cash flow valuations.
 - The objective in many discounted cashflow valuations is to **back into a number that has been obtained by using a multiple**.
 - The **terminal value in a significant number of discounted cashflow valuations is estimated using a multiple**.

WHY RELATIVE VALUATION?

- “If you think I’m crazy, you should see the guy who lives across the hall”

Jerry Seinfeld talking about Kramer in a Seinfeld episode



“ A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation”

H.H. Munro


“ If you are going to screw up, make sure that you have lots of company”

Ex-portfolio manager

THE MARKET IMPERATIVE....

- Relative valuation is **much more likely to reflect market perceptions and moods** than discounted cash flow valuation. This can be an advantage when it is important that the price reflect these perceptions as is the case when
 - the objective is to sell a security at that price today (as in the case of an IPO)
 - investing on “momentum” based strategies
- With relative valuation, there will **always be a significant proportion of securities that are under valued and over valued.**
- Since portfolio managers are **judged based upon how they perform on a relative basis** (to the market and other money managers), relative valuation is more tailored to their needs

MULTIPLES ARE JUST STANDARDIZED ESTIMATES OF PRICE...



THE FOUR STEPS TO DECONSTRUCTING MULTIPLES

- Define the multiple
 - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we **understand how the multiples have been estimated**
- Describe the multiple
 - If you do not know what the **crossectional distribution of a multiple** is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
 - It is critical that we **understand the fundamentals** that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
 - Defining the **comparable universe and controlling for differences** is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

DEFINITIONAL TESTS

- Is the multiple **consistently defined**?
 - **Proposition 1: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm.**
 - In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.
- Is the multiple **uniformly estimated**?
 - The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the “comparable firm” list.
 - If earnings-based multiples are used, the accounting rules to measure earnings should be applied consistently across assets. The same rule applies with book-value based multiples.

EXAMPLE 1: PRICE EARNINGS RATIO: DEFINITION

- $PE = \text{Market Price per Share} / \text{Earnings per Share}$
- There are many variants on the basic PE ratio in use. They are based upon how the price and the earnings are defined.

Price: is usually the current price

is sometimes the average price for the year

EPS: EPS in most recent financial year

EPS in trailing 12 months

Forecasted earnings per share next year

Forecasted earnings per share in future year

EXAMPLE 2: STAYING ON PE RATIOS

- Assuming that you are comparing the PE ratios across technology companies, many of which have options outstanding. What measure of PE ratio would yield the most consistent comparisons?
 - a. Price/ Primary EPS (actual shares, no options)
 - b. Price/ Fully Diluted EPS (actual shares + all options)
 - c. Price/ Partially Diluted EPS (counting only in-the-money options)
 - d. Other

EXAMPLE 3: ENTERPRISE VALUE / EBITDA MULTIPLE

- The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple is obtained by netting cash out against debt to arrive at enterprise value and dividing by EBITDA.

$$\frac{\text{Enterprise Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{\text{Market Value of Equity} + \text{Market Value of Debt} - \text{Cash}}{\text{Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation}}$$

- a. Why do we net out cash from firm value?
- b. What happens if a firm has cross holdings which are categorized as:
 - Minority interests?
 - Majority active interests?

EXAMPLE 4: A HOUSING PRICE MULTIPLE


- The bubbles and busts in housing prices has led investors to search for a multiple that they can use to determine when housing prices are getting out of line.
- One measure that has acquired adherents is the ratio of housing price to annual net rental income (for renting out the same house).
- Assume that you decide to compute this ratio and compare it to the multiple at which stocks are trading. Which valuation ratio would be the one that corresponds to the house price/rent ratio?
 - a. Price Earnings Ratio
 - b. EV to Sales
 - c. EV to EBITDA
 - d. EV to EBIT

DESCRIPTIVE TESTS

- What is the **average and standard deviation** for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- What is the **median (and quartiles or deciles)** for this multiple?
 - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How **large are the outliers** to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
 - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are **there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated**? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this **multiple changed over time**?

1. MULTIPLES HAVE SKEWED DISTRIBUTIONS... US COMPANY PE RATIOS

PE Ratios at the start of 2026: United States




2. MAKING STATISTICS “DICEY”

	Current PE	Trailing PE	Forward PE
Sample Size	5994	5994	5994
# firms	2537	2568	2330
Average	72.19	57.86	27.66
Minimum	0.16	0,25	0.09
First Quartile	11.66	11.23	10.86
Median	18.65	18.90	16.80
Third Quartile	34.44	33.00	26.67
Maximum	18533	8190	1074
Skewness	40.1	18.1	10.08

US firms in January 2026


3. MARKETS HAVE A LOT IN COMMON : COMPARING GLOBAL PES

PE Ratios in January 2025: US and Global Stocks




3A. AND THE DIFFERENCES ARE SOMETIMES REVEALING... PRICE TO BOOK RATIOS ACROSS GLOBE – JANUARY 2026

Price to Book Ratios in January 2026




4. SIMPLISTIC RULES ALMOST ALWAYS BREAK DOWN...6 TIMES EBITDA WAS NOT CHEAP IN 2010...



BUT IT MAY BE IN 2026 UNLESS YOU IN JAPAN OR RUSSIA...

EV to EBITDA in January 2025



ANALYTICAL TESTS

- What are the **fundamentals** that determine and drive these multiples?
 - Proposition 2: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
- How do **changes in these fundamentals** change the multiple?
 - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is **almost never linear**.
 - Proposition 3: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know how fundamentals and the multiple move.

A SIMPLE ANALYTICAL DEVICE

Start with a basic intrinsic value model

Divide both sides of the equation by the denominator of the multiple that you are trying to deconstruct.

You should end up with an intrinsic version of your multiple, which should relate it to fundamentals.

If Equity Multiple

Start with a dividend or FCFE model, preferably simple.

$$\text{Price} = \text{EPS} * \text{Payout} / (r - g)$$

Divide your dividend or FCFE model by denominator of equity multiple.

$$\text{Price/Book} = \text{ROE} * \text{Payout} / (r - g)$$

Intrinsic version of equity multiple, with drivers of value

$$\text{Price/Book} = f(\text{ROE}, r, g, \text{Payout})$$

If EV Multiple

Start with a operating asset value model, preferably simple.

$$\text{EV} = \text{EBIT} (1-t) (1- \text{RIR}) / (\text{WACC} - g)$$

Divide your operating asset model by denominator of EV multiple.

$$\text{EV/Sales} = \text{After-tax Operating Margin} (1- \text{RIR}) / (\text{WACC} - g)$$

Intrinsic version of EV multiple, with drivers of value

$$\text{EV/Sales} = f(\text{After-tax Operating Margin}, \text{RIR}, \text{WACC}, g)$$

I . PE RATIOS

- To understand the fundamentals, start with a basic equity discounted cash flow model.

- With the dividend discount model, $P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$

- Dividing both sides by the current earnings per share,

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

- If you believe **that companies don't pay out what they can:**

$$P_0 = \frac{FCFE_1}{r - g_n}$$

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{(FCFE/\text{Earnings}) * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

USING THE FUNDAMENTAL MODEL TO ESTIMATE PE FOR A HIGH GROWTH FIRM

- The price-earnings ratio for a high growth firm can also be related to fundamentals. In the **special case of the two-stage dividend discount model**, this relationship can be made explicit fairly simply:

$$P_0 = \frac{EPS_0 * \text{Payout Ratio} * (1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+r)^n}\right)}{r-g} + \frac{EPS_0 * \text{Payout Ratio}_n * (1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{(r-g_n)(1+r)^n}$$

- For a firm that **does not pay what it can afford to in dividends**, substitute FCFE/Earnings for the payout ratio.
- Dividing both sides by the earnings per share:

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+r)^n}\right)}{r-g} + \frac{\text{Payout Ratio}_n * (1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{(r-g_n)(1+r)^n}$$

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE

- Assume that you have been asked to estimate the PE ratio for a firm which has the following characteristics:

<i>Variable</i>	<i>High Growth</i>	<i>Stable Growth</i>
Expected Growth Rate	15%	1.5%
Payout Ratio	25%	92.5% (based on ROE = 20%)
Beta	1.00	1.00
Number of years	5 years	Forever after year 5

- Riskfree rate = Treasury Bond Rate = 1.5%, ERP = 5%
- Required rate of return = 1.5% + 1(5%) = 6.5%

$$PE = \frac{.25 * 1.15 * \left(1 - \frac{1.15^5}{1.065^5}\right)}{(.065 - .15)} + \frac{.925 * 1.15^5 * (1.015)}{(.065 - .015)(1.065)^5} = 29.15$$

A. PE, GROWTH AND INTEREST RATES

As interest rates rise, holding all else constant, PE ratios drop, but they drop by more for high growth stocks than low growth stocks.

		Riskfree Rate					% Change as rate goes from 0% to 6%
		0.00%	1.50%	3.00%	4.50%	6.00%	
Expected Growth Rate - Next 5 years	0.00%	20.00	17.86	15.91	14.13	12.50	37.50%
	3.00%	22.18	19.74	17.51	15.48	13.62	38.59%
	6.00%	24.57	21.79	19.26	16.95	14.84	39.60%
	9.00%	27.19	24.04	21.16	18.54	16.16	40.57%
	12.00%	30.05	26.49	23.24	20.27	17.38	42.16%
	15.00%	33.17	29.15	25.48	22.15	19.11	42.39%
	18.00%	36.57	32.04	27.92	24.17	20.75	43.26%
	21.00%	40.25	35.18	30.55	26.35	22.52	44.05%
	24.00%	44.25	38.56	33.39	28.69	24.41	44.84%
	27.00%	48.56	42.22	36.45	31.20	26.43	45.57%
	30.00%	53.22	46.16	39.74	33.90	28.58	46.30%
% Change as growth goes from 0% to 30%		166.10%	158.45%	149.78%	139.92%	128.64%	

Earnings growth surprises have a much bigger impact on PE ratios, when interest rates are low, than high.

B. PE AND RISK: A FOLLOW UP EXAMPLE



Growth Augmentation

If a firm can increase growth, it should see a payoff in higher PE

Superstars

Combination of low risk and high growth

		Expected Growth Rate next 5 years				
		5.00%	10.00%	15.00%	20.00%	25.00%
Beta	0.50	43.26	52.68	63.79	76.81	91.96
	1.00	21.09	24.83	29.15	34.10	39.75
	1.50	13.74	15.67	17.84	20.25	22.91
	2.00	10.10	11.17	12.33	13.56	14.84
	2.50	7.93	8.53	9.13	9.71	10.24

Risk Reduction

If a firm can reduce its risk, it should see a payoff in higher PE

Investment Dogs

Combination of high risk and low growth

C. PE AND GROWTH QUALITY: VALUE ADDITION AND DESTRUCTION

For any given growth rate, the higher the ROE, the higher the PE ratio of the stock.

		Expected Growth Rate for next 5 years				
		5%	10%	15%	20%	25%
ROE on Investments	5%	13.24	11.19	8.2	4.04	Worthless
	10%	18.47	20.28	22.16	24.08	25.99
	15%	20.21	23.31	26.82	30.76	35.17
	20%	21.09	24.83	29.15	34.1	39.75
	25%	21.61	25.74	30.55	36.11	42.5

When ROE < Cost of equity, increasing growth lowers PE ratio

Cost of equity = 6.5%

EXAMPLE 1: THE CHEAPEST MARKETS AT THE START OF 2024

Country	# firms	median(EV/EBITDA)	median(Trailing PE)
Zambia	15	3.75	4.31
Kenya	50	3.70	4.43
Ghana	23	2.74	5.34
Cyprus	64	8.14	6.08
Pakistan	424	5.14	6.24
Serbia	17	5.64	6.69
Kazakhstan	21	5.78	6.82
Isle of Man	16	5.34	7.32
Sri Lanka	262	7.09	7.49
Mauritius	75	8.72	7.51
Tanzania	15	6.27	7.52
Nigeria	126	5.40	7.90
Macau	16	4.87	8.30
Ivory Coast	34	4.39	8.41
Tunisia	76	7.73	8.68
Bermuda	62	7.46	8.69
Malawi	14	5.02	8.71
Colombia	28	5.36	8.71
Chile	122	6.80	8.84
Lithuania	29	7.47	8.87

EXAMPLE 2: CONTROLLING FOR DIFFERENCES - AN OLD EXAMPLE WITH EMERGING MARKETS: JUNE 2000

<i>Country</i>	<i>PE Ratio</i>	<i>Interest Rates</i>	<i>GDP Real Growth</i>	<i>Country Risk</i>
Argentina	14	18.00%	2.50%	45
Brazil	21	14.00%	4.80%	35
Chile	25	9.50%	5.50%	15
Hong Kong	20	8.00%	6.00%	15
India	17	11.48%	4.20%	25
Indonesia	15	21.00%	4.00%	50
Malaysia	14	5.67%	3.00%	40
Mexico	19	11.50%	5.50%	30
Pakistan	14	19.00%	3.00%	45
Peru	15	18.00%	4.90%	50
Phillipines	15	17.00%	3.80%	45
Singapore	24	6.50%	5.20%	5
South Korea	21	10.00%	4.80%	25
Thailand	21	12.75%	5.50%	25
Turkey	12	25.00%	2.00%	35
Venezuela	20	15.00%	3.50%	45

REGRESSION RESULTS


- The regression of PE ratios on these variables provides the following –
PE = 16.16
 - **7.94** Interest Rates
 - + **154.40** Growth in GDP
 - **0.1116** Country Risk
- R Squared = 73%
- What do the coefficients tell you about how each of these variables play into PE ratio differences across countries?

PREDICTED PE RATIOS


<i>Country</i>	<i>PE Ratio</i>	<i>Interest Rates</i>	<i>GDP Real Growth</i>	<i>Country Risk</i>	<i>Predicted PE</i>
Argentina	14	18.00%	2.50%	45	13.57
Brazil	21	14.00%	4.80%	35	18.55
Chile	25	9.50%	5.50%	15	22.22
Hong Kong	20	8.00%	6.00%	15	23.11
India	17	11.48%	4.20%	25	18.94
Indonesia	15	21.00%	4.00%	50	15.09
Malaysia	14	5.67%	3.00%	40	15.87
Mexico	19	11.50%	5.50%	30	20.39
Pakistan	14	19.00%	3.00%	45	14.26
Peru	15	18.00%	4.90%	50	16.71
Phillipines	15	17.00%	3.80%	45	15.65
Singapore	24	6.50%	5.20%	5	23.11
South Korea	21	10.00%	4.80%	25	19.98
Thailand	21	12.75%	5.50%	25	20.85
Turkey	12	25.00%	2.00%	35	13.35
Venezuela	20	15.00%	3.50%	45	15.35

EXAMPLE 3: US STOCKS ARE EXPENSIVE, JUST LOOK AT THE PE RATIO


PE Ratios for S&P 500: 1960 to 2025



A COUNTER: WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE?



THE TIE BREAKER: E/P RATIOS , T.BOND RATES AND TERM STRUCTURE



REGRESSION RESULTS

	Earnings Yield	T. Bond Rate	T.Bond minus T.Bill
Earnings Yield	1.0000		
T. Bond Rate	0.6873	1.0000	
T.Bond minus T.Bill	-0.0544	-0.0175	1.0000

Correlation between E/P and interest rate

- In the following regression, using 1960-2025 data, we regress E/P ratios against the level of T.Bond rates and a term structure variable (T.Bond - T.Bill rate)
 - $$\text{EP Ratio} = 0.0341 + 0.5618 \text{ T.Bond Rate} - 0.1161 (\text{T.Bond Rate} - \text{T.Bill Rate})$$

(6.47) **(7.45)** (-0.08)
 - R squared = 47.4%
- In 2008, this is what the regression looked like:
 - $$\text{E/P} = 2.56\% + 0.7044 \text{ T.Bond Rate} - 0.3289 (\text{T.Bond Rate} - \text{T.Bill Rate})$$

(4.71) (7.10) (1.46)
 - R squared = 50.71%
 - **The R-squared has dropped and the differential with the T.Bill rate has lost significance. How would you read this result?**

II. PEG RATIO

- **PEG Ratio = PE ratio/ Expected Growth Rate in EPS**
 - For consistency, you should make sure that your earnings growth reflects the EPS that you use in your PE ratio computation.
 - The growth rates should preferably be over the same time period.
- To understand the fundamentals that determine PEG ratios, let us return again to a 2-stage equity discounted cash flow model:

$$P_0 = \frac{EPS_0 * \text{Payout Ratio} * (1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+r)^n}\right)}{r-g} + \frac{EPS_0 * \text{Payout Ratio}_n * (1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{(r-g_n)(1+r)^n}$$

- Dividing both sides of the equation by the earnings gives us the equation for the PE ratio. Dividing it again by the expected growth:

$$PEG = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+r)^n}\right)}{g(r-g)} + \frac{\text{Payout Ratio}_n * (1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{g(r-g_n)(1+r)^n}$$

PEG RATIOS AND FUNDAMENTALS

- Risk and payout, which affect PE ratios, continue to affect PEG ratios as well.
 - Implication: When comparing PEG ratios across companies, we are making implicit or explicit assumptions about these variables.
- Dividing PE by expected growth does not neutralize the effects of expected growth, since the relationship between growth and value is not linear and fairly complex (even in a 2-stage model).
- In short, using a PEG ratio and assuming that you can ignore growth differences is pricing malpractice.

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE

- Assume that you have been asked to estimate the PEG ratio for a firm which has the following characteristics:


<i>Variable</i>	<i>High Growth Phase</i>	<i>Stable Growth Phase</i>
Expected Growth Rate	15%	1.5%
Payout Ratio	25%	92.5%
Beta	1.00	1.00

- Riskfree rate = Treasury Bond Rate = 1.5%, ERP = 5%
- Required rate of return = 1.5% + 1(5%) = 6.5%
- The PEG ratio for this firm can be estimated as follows

$$PEG = \frac{.25 * 1.15 * \left(1 - \frac{1.15^5}{1.065^5}\right)}{.15 * (.065 - .15)} + \frac{.925 * 1.15^5 * (1.015)}{.15(.065 - .015)(1.065)^5} = 1.94$$

A. PEG RATIOS ARE RISK-SENSITIVE

PEG Ratios, Risk and Growth



B. PEG RATIOS ARE AFFECTED BY THE QUALITY OF GROWTH

PEG ratios tend to increase with ROE, for every given growth rate.

		<i>Expected Growth Rate for next 5 years</i>				
		5%	10%	15%	20%	25%
<i>ROE on Investments</i>	5%	2.65	1.12	0.55	0.20	NA
	10%	3.69	2.03	1.48	1.20	1.04
	15%	4.04	2.33	1.79	1.54	1.41
	20%	4.22	2.48	1.94	1.71	1.59
	25%	4.32	2.57	2.04	1.81	1.70

High growth firms with very low ROE can trade at very low PEG ratios.

C. PEG RATIOS ARE NOT GROWTH NEUTRAL...

As risk free rates rise, PEG ratios decrease, for every growth rate.

		Riskfree Rate			
		1.50%	3.00%	4.50%	6.00%
Expected Growth first 5 years	3.00%	4.34	3.89	3.48	3.10
	15.00%	1.94	1.70	1.48	1.27
	30.00%	1.54	1.32	1.13	0.95
	45.00%	1.57	1.33	1.12	0.92
	60.00%	1.73	1.45	1.20	0.97
	75.00%	1.97	1.63	1.33	1.06

As growth increases, PEG ratios initially decline, but at a high-enough growth rate, PEG ratios rise again.

PEG RATIOS AND FUNDAMENTALS: PROPOSITIONS

- **Proposition 1: High risk companies will trade at much lower PEG ratios** than low risk companies with the same expected growth rate.
 - Corollary 1: The company that looks most under valued on a PEG ratio basis in a sector may be the riskiest firm in the sector
- **Proposition 2: Companies that can attain growth more efficiently by investing less in better return projects will have higher PEG ratios** than companies that grow at the same rate less efficiently.
 - Corollary 2: Companies that look cheap on a PEG ratio basis may be companies with high reinvestment rates and poor project returns.
- **Proposition 3: Companies with very low or very high growth rates** will tend to have higher PEG ratios than firms with average growth rates. This bias is worse for low growth stocks.
 - Corollary 3: PEG ratios do not neutralize the growth effect.

III. BOOK VALUE MULTIPLES

- With book value multiples, you scale the market value (which is what the market values your company at) to its book value (which is the accounting estimate of value. It can take two forms:
 - $\text{Price to Book} = \text{Market Capitalization} / \text{Book Value of Equity}$
 - $\text{EV to Invested Capital} = \text{Enterprise Value} / (\text{Book Value of Equity} + \text{Book Value of Debt} - \text{Cash})$
- To the extent that you believe that accountants have a better (or a more conservative) estimate of value, or that book value is a proxy for liquidation value, a company that trades at below its book value is cheap.

PRICE TO BOOK RATIO: DETERMINANTS

- Going back to a simple dividend discount model,

$$P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$$

- Defining the return on equity (ROE) = EPS₀ / Book Value of Equity, the value of equity can be written as:

$$P_0 = \frac{BV_0 * ROE * Payout Ratio * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

$$\frac{P_0}{BV_0} = PBV = \frac{ROE * Payout Ratio * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

- If the return on equity is based upon expected earnings in the next time period, this can be simplified to,

- $$\frac{P_0}{BV_0} = PBV = \frac{ROE * Payout Ratio}{r - g_n}$$

PRICE BOOK VALUE RATIO: STABLE GROWTH FIRM ANOTHER PRESENTATION

- This formulation can be simplified even further by relating growth to the return on equity:

$$g = (1 - \text{Payout ratio}) * \text{ROE}$$

- Substituting back into the P/BV equation,

$$\frac{P_0}{BV_0} = \text{PBV} = \frac{\text{ROE} - g_n}{r - g_n}$$

- The price-book value ratio of a stable firm is **determined by the differential between the return on equity and the required rate of return on its projects.**
- Building on this equation, a company that is expected to generate a ROE higher (lower than, equal to) its cost of equity should trade at a price to book ratio higher (less than, equal to) one.

NOW CHANGING TO AN ENTERPRISE VALUE MULTIPLE EV/ BOOK CAPITAL

- To see the determinants of the value/book ratio, consider the simple free cash flow to the firm model:

$$V_0 = \frac{FCFF_1}{WACC - g}$$

- Dividing both sides by the book value, we get:

$$\frac{V_0}{BV} = \frac{FCFF_1/BV}{WACC - g}$$

- If we replace, $FCFF = EBIT(1-t) - (g/ROC) EBIT(1-t)$, we get:

$$\frac{V_0}{BV} = \frac{ROC - g}{WACC - g}$$

IV. EV TO EBITDA MULTIPLES

- With EV to EBITDA multiples, you scale enterprise value to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization:
 - **EV to EBITDA = Enterprise Value/ EBITDA**
 - There are variants where even more gets added back, including stock-based compensation and R&D
- EV to EBITDA multiples have become far more widely used in the last four decades than they used to be for both good and bad reasons:
 - The good reasons include **less sampling bias** (since fewer companies have negative EBITDA) and that it is **based on cash flows**.
 - The bad reason is that it will give you **lower absolute numbers than PE ratios**, and for those without perspective, that may signify cheapness.

EV TO EBITDA - DETERMINANTS

- The value of the operating assets of a firm can be written as:

$$EV_0 = \frac{FCFF_1}{WACC - g}$$

- Now the value of the firm can be rewritten as

$$EV = \frac{EBITDA (1 - t) + Depr (t) - Cex - \Delta \text{ Working Capital}}{WACC - g}$$

- Dividing both sides of the equation by EBITDA,

$$\frac{EV}{EBITDA} = \frac{(1 - t)}{WACC - g} + \frac{Depr (t)/EBITDA}{WACC - g} - \frac{CEx/EBITDA}{WACC - g} - \frac{\Delta \text{ Working Capital}/EBITDA}{WACC - g}$$

- The determinants of EV/EBITDA are:

1. The cost of capital
2. Expected growth rate
3. Tax rate
4. Reinvestment rate (or ROC)


A SIMPLE EXAMPLE

- Consider a firm with the following characteristics:
 - Tax Rate = 36%
 - Capital Expenditures/EBITDA = 30%
 - Depreciation/EBITDA = 20%
 - Cost of Capital = 10%
 - The firm has no working capital requirements
 - The firm is in stable growth and is expected to grow 5% a year forever.
- In this case, the Value/EBITDA multiple for this firm can be estimated as follows:


$$\frac{\text{Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{(1-.36)}{.10-.05} + \frac{(0.2)(.36)}{.10-.05} - \frac{0.3}{.10-.05} - \frac{0}{.10-.05} = 8.24$$

THE DETERMINANTS OF EV/EBITDA


Tax
Rates



Reinvestment
Needs



Excess
Returns



V. REVENUE MULTIPLES

- With revenue multiples, you scale market value to the revenues generated by a firm. There are two variants in use:
 - Price to Sales = Market Capitalization / Sales
 - EV to Sales = Enterprise Value / Sales
- The former, while widely used, **is internally inconsistent** and can be misleading for firms with significant debt loads and/or cash holdings.
- The biggest selling point for revenue multiples is that **you lose far fewer firms** when computing the multiple, since revenues cannot be negative.
- That said, you cannot compute this ratio for firms that either have no reportable revenues (financial service firms) or use wide variants on revenues (payment processing firms).

EV / SALES RATIO: DETERMINANTS

- If pre-tax operating margins are used, the appropriate value estimate is that of the firm. In particular, if one makes the replaces the FCFF with the expanded version:

- Free Cash Flow to the Firm = EBIT (1 - tax rate) (1 - Reinvestment Rate)

$$\frac{\text{Value}}{\text{Sales}_0} = \text{After-tax Oper. Margin} * \left[\frac{(1 - \text{RIR}_{\text{growth}})(1+g) * \left(1 - \frac{(1+g)^n}{(1+WACC)^n} \right)}{WACC - g} + \frac{(1 - \text{RIR}_{\text{stable}})(1+g)^n * (1+g_n)}{(WACC - g_n)(1+WACC)^n} \right]$$

- g = Growth rate in after-tax operating income for the first n years
- g_n = Growth rate in after-tax operating income after n years forever (Stable growth rate)
- RIR Growth, Stable = Reinvestment rate in high growth and stable periods
- WACC = Weighted average cost of capital

THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME



- One of the critiques of traditional valuation is that it fails to consider the value of brand names and other intangibles.
 - The approaches used by analysts to value brand names **are often ad-hoc** and may significantly overstate or understate their value.
 - One of the benefits of having a well-known and respected brand name is that firms can **charge higher prices for the same products**, leading to **higher profit margins** and hence to higher price-sales ratios and firm value. The larger the price premium that a firm can charge, the greater is the value of the brand name.
- In general, the value of a brand name can be written as:
 - Value of brand name = $\{(V/S)_b - (V/S)_g\} * \text{Sales}$
 - $(V/S)_b$ = Value of Firm/Sales ratio with the benefit of the brand name
 - $(V/S)_g$ = Value of Firm/Sales ratio of the firm with the generic product

VALUING BRAND NAME

	Coca Cola	With Cott Margins
Current Revenues =	\$21,962.00	\$21,962.00
Length of high-growth period	10	10
Reinvestment Rate =	50%	50%
Operating Margin (after-tax)	15.57%	5.28%
Sales/Capital (Turnover ratio)	1.34	1.34
Return on capital (after-tax)	20.84%	7.06%
Growth rate during period (g) =	10.42%	3.53%
Cost of Capital during period =	7.65%	7.65%
Stable Growth Period		
Growth rate in steady state =	4.00%	4.00%
Return on capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Reinvestment Rate =	52.28%	52.28%
Cost of Capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Value of Firm =	\$79,611.25	\$15,371.24

Value of brand name = \$79,611 - \$15,371 = \$64,240 million

THE DETERMINANTS OF MULTIPLES...



APPLICATION TESTS

- Given the firm that we are valuing, **what is a “comparable” firm?**
 - While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
 - There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, **how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?**
 - It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.
 - You need to control for differences across firms.

THE SAMPLING CHOICE

- Ideally, you would like to find **lots of publicly traded firms that look just like your firm**, in terms of fundamentals, and compare the pricing of your firm to the pricing of these other publicly traded firms. Since, they are all just like your firm, there will be no need to control for differences.
- In practice, it is **very difficult (and perhaps impossible) to find firms that share the same risk, growth and cash flow** characteristics of your firm. Even if you are able to find such firms, they will be very few in number. The trade off then becomes:

Small sample of firms that are “just like” your firm

Large sample of firms that are similar in some dimensions but different on others

THE "CONTROL FOR DIFFERENCES" CHOICES

1. **Direct comparisons:** If the comparable firms are “just like” your firm, you can compare multiples directly across the firms and conclude that your firm is expensive (cheap) if it trades at a multiple higher (lower) than the other firms.
2. **Story telling:** If there is a key dimension on which the firms vary, you can tell a story based upon your understanding of how value varies on that dimension.

An example: This company trades at 12 times earnings, whereas the rest of the sector trades at 10 times earnings, but I think it is cheap because it has a much higher growth rate than the rest of the sector.
3. **Modified multiple:** You can modify the multiple to incorporate the dimension on which there are differences across firms.
4. **Statistical techniques:** If your firms vary on more than one dimension, you can try using multiple regressions (or variants thereof) to arrive at a “controlled” estimate for your firm.

1. JUST STORY TELLING

TRAILING PE ACROSS BEVERAGE COMPANIES

Company Name	Trailing PE	Expected Growth	Standard Deviation
Coca-Cola Bottling	29.18	9.50%	20.58%
Molson Inc. Ltd. 'A'	43.65	15.50%	21.88%
Anheuser-Busch	24.31	11.00%	22.92%
Corby Distilleries Ltd.	16.24	7.50%	23.66%
Chalone Wine Group	21.76	14.00%	24.08%
Andres Wines Ltd. 'A'	8.96	3.50%	24.70%
Todhunter Int'l	8.94	3.00%	25.74%
Brown-Forman 'B'	10.07	11.50%	29.43%
Coors (Adolph) 'B'	23.02	10.00%	29.52%
PepsiCo, Inc.	33.00	10.50%	31.35%
Coca-Cola	44.33	19.00%	35.51%
Boston Beer 'A'	10.59	17.13%	39.58%
Whitman Corp.	25.19	11.50%	44.26%
Mondavi (Robert) 'A'	16.47	14.00%	45.84%
Coca-Cola Enterprises	37.14	27.00%	51.34%
Hansen Natural Corp	9.70	17.00%	62.45%

A QUESTION

- You are reading an equity research report on this sector, and the analyst claims that Andres Wine and Hansen Natural are under valued because they have low PE ratios. Would you agree?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
- Why or why not?

2: STATISTICAL CONTROLS

COMPARING PE RATIOS ACROSS TELECOM COMPANIES

<i>Company Name</i>	<i>PE</i>	<i>Growth</i>
<i>PT Indosat ADR</i>	<i>7.8</i>	<i>0.06</i>
<i>Telebras ADR</i>	<i>8.9</i>	<i>0.075</i>
<i>Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ADR</i>	<i>11.2</i>	<i>0.11</i>
<i>Telecom Argentina Stet - France Telecom SA ADR B</i>	<i>12.5</i>	<i>0.08</i>
<i>Hellenic Telecommunication Organization SA ADR</i>	<i>12.8</i>	<i>0.12</i>
<i>Telecomunicaciones de Chile ADR</i>	<i>16.6</i>	<i>0.08</i>
<i>Swisscom AG ADR</i>	<i>18.3</i>	<i>0.11</i>
<i>Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings ADR</i>	<i>19.6</i>	<i>0.16</i>
<i>Portugal Telecom SA ADR</i>	<i>20.8</i>	<i>0.13</i>
<i>Telefonos de Mexico ADR L</i>	<i>21.1</i>	<i>0.14</i>
<i>Matav RT ADR</i>	<i>21.5</i>	<i>0.22</i>
<i>Telstra ADR</i>	<i>21.7</i>	<i>0.12</i>
<i>Gilat Communications</i>	<i>22.7</i>	<i>0.31</i>
<i>Deutsche Telekom AG ADR</i>	<i>24.6</i>	<i>0.11</i>
<i>British Telecommunications PLC ADR</i>	<i>25.7</i>	<i>0.07</i>
<i>Tele Danmark AS ADR</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>0.09</i>
<i>Telekomunikasi Indonesia ADR</i>	<i>28.4</i>	<i>0.32</i>
<i>Cable & Wireless PLC ADR</i>	<i>29.8</i>	<i>0.14</i>
<i>APT Satellite Holdings ADR</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>0.33</i>
<i>Telefonica SA ADR</i>	<i>32.5</i>	<i>0.18</i>
<i>Royal KPN NV ADR</i>	<i>35.7</i>	<i>0.13</i>
<i>Telecom Italia SPA ADR</i>	<i>42.2</i>	<i>0.14</i>
<i>Nippon Telegraph & Telephone ADR</i>	<i>44.3</i>	<i>0.2</i>
<i>France Telecom SA ADR</i>	<i>45.2</i>	<i>0.19</i>
<i>Korea Telecom ADR</i>	<i>71.3</i>	<i>0.44</i>

PE, GROWTH AND RISK

- Dependent variable is: PE
- R squared = 66.2% R squared (adjusted) = 63.1%

Variable	Coefficient	SE	t-ratio	Probability
Constant	13.1151	3.471	3.78	0.0010
Growth rate	121.223	19.27	6.29	≤ 0.0001
Emerging Market	-13.8531	3.606	-3.84	0.0009

Emerging Market is a dummy: 1 if emerging market
0 if not

IS TELEBRAS UNDER VALUED?

- Plugging in Telebras's expected growth rate and the fact that it is an emerging market company into the regression:
 - **Predicted PE = $13.12 + 121.22 (.075) - 13.85 (1) = 8.35$**
 - At an actual price to earnings ratio of 8.9, Telebras is slightly overvalued.
- **Bottom line: Just because a company trades at a low PE ratio does not make it cheap.**

3: AN EYEBALLING EXERCISE

PBV RATIOS ACROSS EUROPEAN BANKS IN 2010

<i>Name</i>	<i>PBV Ratio</i>	<i>Return on Equity</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
BAYERISCHE HYPO-UND VEREINSB	0.80	-1.66%	49.06%
COMMERZBANK AG	1.09	-6.72%	36.21%
DEUTSCHE BANK AG -REG	1.23	1.32%	35.79%
BANCA INTESA SPA	1.66	1.56%	34.14%
BNP PARIBAS	1.72	12.46%	31.03%
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISP	1.86	11.06%	28.36%
SANPAOLO IMI SPA	1.96	8.55%	26.64%
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA	1.98	11.17%	18.62%
SOCIETE GENERALE	2.04	9.71%	22.55%
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP	2.09	20.22%	18.35%
HBOS PLC	2.15	22.45%	21.95%
BARCLAYS PLC	2.23	21.16%	20.73%
UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA	2.30	14.86%	13.79%
KREDIETBANK SA LUXEMBOURGEOI	2.46	17.74%	12.38%
ERSTE BANK DER OESTER SPARK	2.53	10.28%	21.91%
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC	2.59	20.18%	19.93%
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC	2.94	18.50%	19.66%
LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC	3.33	32.84%	18.66%
Average	2.05	12.54%	24.99%
Median	2.07	11.82%	21.93%

THE MEDIAN TEST...

- We are looking for stocks that trade at **low price to book ratios, while generating high returns on equity, with low risk**. But what is a low price to book ratio? Or a high return on equity? Or a low risk
- One simple measure of what is par for the sector are the **median values for each of the variables**. A simplistic decision rule on under and over valued stocks would therefore be:
 - **Undervalued stocks**: Trade at price to book ratios below the median for the sector, (2.07), generate returns on equity higher than the sector median (11.82%) and have standard deviations lower than the median (21.93%).
 - **Overvalued stocks**: Trade at price to book ratios above the median for the sector and generate returns on equity lower than the sector median.

THE STATISTICAL ALTERNATIVE

- We are looking for stocks that trade at low price to book ratios, while generating high returns on equity. But what is a low price to book ratio? Or a high return on equity?
- Taking the sample of 18 banks, we ran a regression of PBV against ROE and standard deviation in stock prices (as a proxy for risk).

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \text{PBV} = & 2.27 & + & 3.63 \text{ ROE} - & 2.68 \text{ Std dev} \\ & (5.56) & & (3.32) & (2.33) \end{array}$$


R squared of regression = 79%

- Reading the regression tea leaves:
 - Every **1% increase in the return on equity at a European bank increases its price to book ratio by 0.0363.**
 - Every **1% increase in the standard deviation in equity reduces the price to book ratio by 0.0268.**
 - The regression predictions will **have a range**, the size of which is inversely proportionate to the R squared.


AND THESE PREDICTIONS?

<i>Name</i>	<i>PBV Ratio</i>	<i>Return on Equity</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Predicted PBV</i>	<i>Under/Over (%)</i>
BAYERISCHE HYPO-UND VEREINSB	0.80	-1.66%	49.06%	0.89	-10.60%
COMMERZBANK AG	1.09	-6.72%	36.21%	1.05	3.25%
DEUTSCHE BANK AG -REG	1.23	1.32%	35.79%	1.36	-9.26%
BANCA INTESA SPA	1.66	1.56%	34.14%	1.41	17.83%
BNP PARIBAS	1.72	12.46%	31.03%	1.89	-8.75%
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISP	1.86	11.06%	28.36%	1.91	-2.66%
SANPAOLO IMI SPA	1.96	8.55%	26.64%	1.86	5.23%
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA	1.98	11.17%	18.62%	2.17	-9.12%
SOCIETE GENERALE	2.04	9.71%	22.55%	2.02	1.37%
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP	2.09	20.22%	18.35%	2.51	-16.65%
HBOS PLC	2.15	22.45%	21.95%	2.49	-13.71%
BARCLAYS PLC	2.23	21.16%	20.73%	2.48	-9.96%
UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA	2.30	14.86%	13.79%	2.44	-5.72%
KREDIETBANK SA LUXEMBOURGEOI	2.46	17.74%	12.38%	2.58	-4.79%
ERSTE BANK DER OESTER SPARK	2.53	10.28%	21.91%	2.05	23.11%
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC	2.59	20.18%	19.93%	2.47	5.00%
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC	2.94	18.50%	19.66%	2.41	21.91%
LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC	3.33	32.84%	18.66%	2.96	12.40%


EXAMPLE 4: MORE STATISTICS AND A LARGER SAMPLE PRICE TO BOOK VERSUS ROE: LARGEST FIRMS IN THE US: JANUARY 2010



MISSING GROWTH?



PBV, ROE AND RISK: LARGE CAP US FIRMS



al

BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER... LARGEST US STOCKS IN JANUARY 2010

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.819 ^a	.670	.661	1.19253


a. Predictors: (Constant), ROE, Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years, Regression Beta

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.406	.424		.958	.340
	Regression Beta	-.065	.253	-.015	-.256	.799
	Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years	9.340	2.366	.228	3.947	.000
	ROE	10.546	.771	.777	13.672	.000

a. Dependent Variable: PBV Ratio

UPDATED PBV RATIOS – LARGEST MARKET CAP US COMPANIES -UPDATED TO JANUARY 2026



EXAMPLE 5: OVERLOOKED FUNDAMENTALS? EV/EBITDA MULTIPLE FOR TRUCKING COMPANIES


Company Name	Value	EBITDA	Value/EBITDA
KLLM Trans. Svcs.	\$ 114.32	\$ 48.81	2.34
Ryder System	\$5,158.04	\$1,838.26	2.81
Rollins Truck Leasing	\$1,368.35	\$ 447.67	3.06
Cannon Express Inc.	\$ 83.57	\$ 27.05	3.09
Hunt (J.B.)	\$ 982.67	\$ 310.22	3.17
Yellow Corp.	\$ 931.47	\$ 292.82	3.18
Roadway Express	\$ 554.96	\$ 169.38	3.28
Marten Transport Ltd.	\$ 116.93	\$ 35.62	3.28
Kenan Transport Co.	\$ 67.66	\$ 19.44	3.48
M.S. Carriers	\$ 344.93	\$ 97.85	3.53
Old Dominion Freight	\$ 170.42	\$ 45.13	3.78
Trimac Ltd	\$ 661.18	\$ 174.28	3.79
Matlack Systems	\$ 112.42	\$ 28.94	3.88
XTRA Corp.	\$1,708.57	\$ 427.30	4.00
Covenant Transport Inc	\$ 259.16	\$ 64.35	4.03
Builders Transport	\$ 221.09	\$ 51.44	4.30
Werner Enterprises	\$ 844.39	\$ 196.15	4.30
Landstar Sys.	\$ 422.79	\$ 95.20	4.44
AMERCO	\$1,632.30	\$ 345.78	4.72
USA Truck	\$ 141.77	\$ 29.93	4.74
Frozen Food Express	\$ 164.17	\$ 34.10	4.81
Arnold Inds.	\$ 472.27	\$ 96.88	4.87
Greyhound Lines Inc.	\$ 437.71	\$ 89.61	4.88
USFreightways	\$ 983.86	\$ 198.91	4.95
Golden Eagle Group Inc.	\$ 12.50	\$ 2.33	5.37
Arkansas Best	\$ 578.78	\$ 107.15	5.40
Airlease Ltd.	\$ 73.64	\$ 13.48	5.46
Celadon Group	\$ 182.30	\$ 32.72	5.57
Amer. Freightways	\$ 716.15	\$ 120.94	5.92
Transfinancial Holdings	\$ 56.92	\$ 8.79	6.47
Vitrans Corp. 'A'	\$ 140.68	\$ 21.51	6.54
Interpool Inc.	\$1,002.20	\$ 151.18	6.63
Intrenet Inc.	\$ 70.23	\$ 10.38	6.77
Swift Transportation	\$ 835.58	\$ 121.34	6.89
Landair Services	\$ 212.95	\$ 30.38	7.01
CNF Transportation	\$2,700.69	\$ 366.99	7.36
Budget Group Inc	\$1,247.30	\$ 166.71	7.48
Caliber System	\$2,514.99	\$ 333.13	7.55
Knight Transportation Inc	\$ 269.01	\$ 28.20	9.54
Heartland Express	\$ 727.50	\$ 64.62	11.26
Greyhound CDA Transn Corp	\$ 83.25	\$ 6.99	11.91
Mark VII	\$ 160.45	\$ 12.96	12.38
Coach USA Inc	\$ 678.38	\$ 51.76	13.11
US 1 Inds Inc.	\$ 5.60	\$ (0.17)	NA
Average			5.61

A TEST ON EBITDA

- Ryder System looks very cheap on a Value/EBITDA multiple basis, relative to the rest of the sector. What explanation (other than misvaluation) might there be for this difference?
- What general lessons would you draw from this on the EV/EBITDA multiples for infrastructure companies as their infrastructure ages?


EXAMPLE 6: PRICING ACROSS TIME - PS RATIOS

GROCERY STORES - US IN JANUARY 2007



Whole Foods: In 2007: Net Margin was 3.41% and Price/ Sales ratio was 1.41
 Predicted Price to Sales = $0.07 + 10.49 (0.0341) = 0.43$


THE DIFFERENCE TWO YEARS CAN MAKE: GROCERY STORES - US IN JANUARY 2009



Whole Foods: In 2009, Net Margin had dropped to 2.77% and Price to Sales ratio was down to 0.31.


$$\text{Predicted Price to Sales} = 0.07 + 10.49 (.0277) = 0.36$$

IS THIS STEADY STATE? IN 2010..



Whole Foods: In 2010, Net Margin had dropped to 1.44% and Price to Sales ratio increased to 0.50.
 Predicted Price to Sales = $0.06 + 11.43 (.0144) = 0.22$

THERE IS A NEW KID IN TOWN: JANUARY 2015




There is a new star in town (Sprouts)

$$PS = 0.557 + 0.085 \text{ Net Margin}$$

$$\text{Whole Foods} = 0.557 + 8.50 (0.0408) = 0.90$$

At 1.35 times sales, Whole Foods is overvalued (again)

EXAMPLE 7: NOTHING'S WORKING! INTERNET STOCKS IN EARLY 2000..



PS RATIOS AND MARGINS ARE NOT HIGHLY CORRELATED

- Regressing PS ratios against current margins yields the following
 - $PS = 81.36 - 7.54(\text{Net Margin})$ $R^2 = 0.04$
 - (0.49)
- This is not surprising. These firms are priced based upon expected margins, rather than current margins.

SOLUTION 1: USE PROXIES FOR SURVIVAL AND GROWTH: AMAZON IN EARLY 2000

- Hypothesizing that firms with higher revenue growth and higher cash balances should have a greater chance of surviving and becoming profitable, we ran the following regression: (The level of revenues was used to control for size)

$$\text{PS} = 30.61 - 2.77 \ln(\text{Rev}) + 6.42 (\text{Rev Growth}) + 5.11 (\text{Cash/Rev})$$


(0.66) (2.63) (3.49)

R squared = 31.8%

- Predicted PS = $30.61 - 2.77(7.1039) + 6.42(1.9946) + 5.11(.3069) = 30.42$
- Actual PS = 25.63
- **Stock is undervalued, relative to other internet stocks.**

SOLUTION 2: USE FORWARD MULTIPLES

WATCH OUT FOR BUMPS IN THE ROAD (TESLA IN 2013)



THE MARKET SETS THE RULES...

- While we can compute multiples based upon accounting numbers (revenues, earnings, EBITDA or book value), you can also compute the multiple that market are paying on any quantifiable variable.
 - You can compute market cap or EV per employee, per subscriber, per customer etc.
 - The question of whether you should do so is not a theoretical one. It is set by the market.
- Ultimately, your job in pricing is to figure what the market cares about when pricing companies and replicate it.

AN EXAMPLE: LET THE MARKET TELL YOU WHAT MATTERS.. SOCIAL MEDIA IN OCTOBER 2013

Company	Market Cap	Enterprise value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	Number of users (millions)	EV/User	EV/Revenue	EV/EBITDA	PE
Facebook	\$173,540.00	\$160,090.00	\$7,870.00	\$3,930.00	\$1,490.00	1230.00	\$130.15	20.34	40.74	116.47
Linkedin	\$23,530.00	\$19,980.00	\$1,530.00	\$182.00	\$27.00	277.00	\$72.13	13.06	109.78	871.48
Pandora	\$7,320.00	\$7,150.00	\$655.00	-\$18.00	-\$29.00	73.40	\$97.41	10.92	NA	NA
Groupon	\$6,690.00	\$5,880.00	\$2,440.00	\$125.00	-\$95.00	43.00	\$136.74	2.41	47.04	NA
Netflix	\$25,900.00	\$25,380.00	\$4,370.00	\$277.00	\$112.00	44.00	\$576.82	5.81	91.62	231.25
Yelp	\$6,200.00	\$5,790.00	\$233.00	\$2.40	-\$10.00	120.00	\$48.25	24.85	2412.50	NA
Open Table	\$1,720.00	\$1,500.00	\$190.00	\$63.00	\$33.00	14.00	\$107.14	7.89	23.81	52.12
Zynga	\$4,200.00	\$2,930.00	\$873.00	\$74.00	-\$37.00	27.00	\$108.52	3.36	39.59	NA
Zillow	\$3,070.00	\$2,860.00	\$197.00	-\$13.00	-\$12.45	34.50	\$82.90	14.52	NA	NA
Trulia	\$1,140.00	\$1,120.00	\$144.00	-\$6.00	-\$18.00	54.40	\$20.59	7.78	NA	NA
Tripadvisor	\$13,510.00	\$12,860.00	\$945.00	\$311.00	\$205.00	260.00	\$49.46	13.61	41.35	65.90
Average							\$130.01	11.32	350.80	267.44
Median							\$97.41	10.92	44.20	116.47

READ THE TEA LEAVES: SEE WHAT THE MARKET CARES ABOUT

	<i>Market Cap</i>	<i>Enterprise value</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>Net Income</i>	<i>Number of users (millions)</i>
<i>Market Cap</i>	<i>1.</i>					
<i>Enterprise value</i>	<i>0.9998</i>	<i>1.</i>				
<i>Revenues</i>	<i>0.8933</i>	<i>0.8966</i>	<i>1.</i>			
<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>0.9709</i>	<i>0.9701</i>	<i>0.8869</i>	<i>1.</i>		
<i>Net Income</i>	<i>0.8978</i>	<i>0.8971</i>	<i>0.8466</i>	<i>0.9716</i>	<i>1.</i>	
<i>Number of users (millions)</i>	<i>0.9812</i>	<i>0.9789</i>	<i>0.8053</i>	<i>0.9354</i>	<i>0.8453</i>	<i>1.</i>


Twitter had 240 million users at the time of its IPO. What price would you attach to the company?

PRICING ACROSS THE ENTIRE MARKET: WHY NOT?

- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

PE RATIO VERSUS THE MARKET

PE VERSUS EXPECTED EPS GROWTH: JANUARY 2026



PE RATIO: STANDARD REGRESSION FOR US STOCKS - JANUARY 2025

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.616 ^b	.380	.377	2745.78491

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Predictors: (Constant), Expected growth rate in EPS– Next 5 years, Payout ratio, Beta

The regression is run with growth and payout entered as decimals, i.e., 25% is entered as 0.25)

Coefficients^{a,b,c}

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	13.120	1.075		12.200	<.001
	Beta	10.521	1.045	.416	10.067	<.001
	Payout ratio	8.459	1.229	.215	6.885	<.001
	Expected growth rate in EPS– Next 5 years	36.471	4.736	.305	7.701	<.001

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE

c. Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

PROBLEMS WITH THE REGRESSION METHODOLOGY

- **Non-linearity:** The basic regression assumes a linear relationship between PE ratios and the financial proxies, and that might not be appropriate.
- **Non-stationarity:** The basic relationship between PE ratios and financial variables itself might not be stable, and if it shifts from year to year, the predictions from the model may not be reliable. For instance, the 2022 regression has a markedly lower R-squared than the regressions in prior years, as the COVID effect on earnings plays out.
- **Multi-collinearity:** The independent variables are correlated with each other. For example, high growth firms tend to have high risk. This multi-collinearity makes the coefficients of the regressions unreliable and may explain the large changes in these coefficients from period to period.

STATISTICALLY INSIGNIFICANT?

- If a coefficient in a regression is statistically insignificant, all it is doing is adding noise to the regression prediction.
 - There are simple statistical tests of significance, such as the t statistics (>2 is very good, $1-2$ is marginal, <1 is noise)
 - With small samples, don't overload the regression with independent variables.
- Take the variable out of the regression, even if the fundamentals say it should matter. In pricing, it is the market that determines what matters.

THE NEGATIVE INTERCEPT PROBLEM

- When the intercept in a multiple regression is negative, there is the possibility that forecasted values can be negative as well.
- One way (albeit imperfect) is to re-run the regression without an intercept. When the intercept in a multiple regression is negative, there is the possibility that forecasted values can be negative as well. One way (albeit imperfect) is to re-run the regression without an intercept. In 2024, for instance, the regression yielded a negative coefficient, and the intercept-free regression looked like this:

		Coefficients ^{a,b,c,d}				
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	Beta	19.344	.814	.575	23.776	<.001
	Payout ratio	10.368	1.131	.135	9.170	<.001
	Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years	68.704	5.067	.301	13.558	<.001

a. Broad Group = United States
 b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE
 c. Linear Regression through the Origin
 d. Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

IF A COEFFICIENT HAS THE WRONG SIGN: THE MULTICOLLINEARITY PROBLEM

Correlations

		Trailing PE	Beta	Payout ratio	Expected growth rate in EPS– Next 5 years
Trailing PE	Pearson Correlation	1	.175**	.249**	.315**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		<.001	<.001	<.001
	N	26679	25565	19095	4963
Beta	Pearson Correlation	.175**	1	.006	.117**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001		.422	<.001
	N	25565	44756	19957	5533
Payout ratio	Pearson Correlation	.249**	.006	1	-.005
	Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001	.422		.757
	N	19095	19957	20459	4321
Expected growth rate in EPS– Next 5 years	Pearson Correlation	.315**	.117**	-.005	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	<.001	<.001	.757	
	N	4963	5533	4321	5709


** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

USING THE PE RATIO REGRESSION

- Assume that you were given the following information for Disney. The firm has an expected growth rate of 15%, a beta of 0.90 and a 20% dividend payout ratio. Based upon the regression, the predicted PE ratio for Disney is:
 - Predicted PE = $13.12 + 36.47 (.15) + 8.46 (.20) + 10.52 (0.90) = 29.75$
- Disney is trading at 33 times earnings. What does the predicted PE tell you?
- Assume now that you priced Disney against just its peer group. Will you come to the same pricing judgment as you did when you looked at it relative to the market? Why or why not?


THE VALUE OF GROWTH

Value of Growth and Price of Risk: US equities from 2000 to 2025




II. PEG RATIO VERSUS THE MARKET

PEG VERSUS GROWTH IN JANUARY 2026



PEG VERSUS LN(EXPECTED GROWTH) IN JANUARY 2025



PEG RATIO REGRESSION - US STOCKS

JANUARY 2025

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.640 ^a	.410	.409	217.9111001

a. Predictors: (Constant), InGrowth, Payout ratio, Beta

Coefficients^{a,b}

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.121	.101		-1.197	.231
	Beta	-.128	.034	-.054	-3.727	<.001
	Payout ratio	.480	.037	.167	12.830	<.001
	InGrowth	-1.346	.034	-.566	-39.612	<.001

a. Dependent Variable: PEG

b. Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

I. PE RATIO REGRESSIONS ACROSS MARKETS

⚓ Market-wide Regressions of Multiples: PE Ratios in January 2026
T statistics in brackets below coefficients

Regression	R Squared	Region
$PE = 13.12 + 10.52 \text{ Beta} + 36.47 g_{EPS} + 8.46 \text{ Payout}$ (12.20) (10.0) (7.70) (6.89)	38.7%	US
$PE = 9.72 + 2.99 \text{ Beta} + 49.82 g_{EPS} + 7.98 \text{ Payout}$ (8.29) (4.85) (11.95) (9.22)	20.1%	Europe
$PE = 4.51 + 4.28 \text{ Beta} + 42.26 g_{EPS} + 10.46 \text{ Payout}$ (3.50) (7.32) (9.05) (5.78)	34.5%	Japan
$PE = 19.38 + 6.55 \text{ Payout (no other variables significant)}$ (7.27) (2.22)	3.4%	Aus, NZ & Canada
$PE = 14.47 - 0.51 \text{ Beta} + 52.25 g_{EPS} + 2.22 \text{ Payout}$ (10.35) (1.33) (23.99) (3.24)	27.2%	Emerging Markets
$PE = 21.11 + 2.22 \text{ Beta} + 21.49 g_{EPS} + 0.89 \text{ Payout}$ (40.64) (7.16) (18.23) (1.66)	10.3%	Global

g_{EPS} =Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS or Net Income: Next 5 years (decimals)

Beta: Regression or Bottom up Beta

Payout ratio: Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0

II. PEG RATIO REGRESSIONS ACROSS MARKETS

<i>⚓ Market-wide Regressions of Multiples: PEG Ratios in January 2026</i> <i>T statistics in brackets below coefficients</i>									
Regression								R Squared	Region
$\text{PEG} = -0.60 + 0.56 \text{ Payout} - 1.48 \ln(g_{\text{EPS}}) + 0.23 \text{ Beta}$ (1.94) (7.62) (14.72) (1.86)								41.4%	US
$\text{PEG} = -0.91 + 0.76 \text{ Payout} - 1.57 \ln(g_{\text{EPS}})$ (2.77) (3.15) (11.09)								30.3%	Europe
$\text{PEG} = -0.70 + 0.35 \text{ Payout} - 11.19 \ln(g_{\text{EPS}}) + 0.23 \text{ Beta}$ (2.45) (4.81) (1249) (2.68)								32.4%	Japan
$\text{PEG} = -0.78 + 0.82 \text{ Payout} - 1.43 \ln(g_{\text{EPS}}) - 0.09 \text{ Beta}$ (4.50) (10.65) (30.50) (1.95)								51.9%	Emerging Markets
$\text{PEG} = -1.83 + 0.84 \text{ Payout} - 1.74 \ln(g_{\text{EPS}}) + 0.54 \text{ Beta}$ (3.33) (3.45) (10.76) (2.05)								40.9%	Aus, NZ & Canada
$\text{PEG} = -0.12 + 0.56 \text{ Payout} + 0.48 \ln(g_{\text{EPS}}) - 0.13 \text{ Beta}$ (1.20) (12.83) (12.83) (3.73)								41.4%	Global

g_{EPS} = Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS or Net Income: Next 5 years (decimals)

Beta: Regression or Bottom up Beta

Payout ratio: Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0

III. PRICE TO BOOK RATIO: FUNDAMENTALS HOLD IN EVERY MARKET

<i>↱ Market-wide Regressions of Multiples: PBV Ratios in January 2026</i> <i>T statistics in brackets below coefficients</i>									
Regression								R Squared	Region
PBV=	-0.79	-0.47	g_{EPS}	+1.49	Beta	+20.90	ROE	+0.17	Payout Ratio
	(3.17)	(0.53)		(6.76)		(34.45)	(1.30)		
PBV=	0.73	+3.92	g_{EPS}	+0.13	Beta	+10.75	ROE	-0.25	Payout Ratio
	(3.70)	(5.87)		(1.38)		(24.81)	(2.43)		
PBV=	-0.55	+4.64	g_{EPS}	+0.38	Beta	+14.23	ROE		
	(2.63)	(6.72)		(3.84)		(14.99)			
PBV=	1.32	+2.73	g_{EPS}	+0.43	Beta	+4.53	ROE		
	(14.31)	(11.36)		(8.04)		(19.16)			
PBV=	2.69	+0.83	ROE	(other variables were not statistically significant)					
	(69.9)	(5.52)							
PBV=	0.71	+1.13	g_{EPS}	-0.12	Beta	+16.72	ROE	-0.11	Payout Ratio
	(7.52)	(6.91)		(2.59)		(64.18)	(1.86)		

g_{EPS} =Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS/ Net Income: Next 5 years

Beta: Regression or Bottom up Beta

Payout ratio: Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0

ROE: Net Income/ Book value of equity in most recent year.

IV. EV/EBITDA ACROSS MARKETS

⚓ Market-wide Regressions of Multiples: EV to EBITDA Ratios in January 2026
T statistics in brackets below coefficients

Regression	R Squared	Region
EV/EBITDA = 18.82 + 39.30 g - 0.20 DFR + 1.77 ROIC (43.19) (23.04) (14.08) (3.19)	45.9%	US
EV/EBITDA = 18.15 + 35.25 g - 0.11 DFR - 0.12 Tax Rate + 2.29 ROIC (28.40) (13.96) (10.65) (5.19) (5.06)	26.2%	Europe
EV/EBITDA = 10.94 + 35.22 g - 0.05 DFR + 1.22 ROIC (20.89) (8.71) (4.25) (2.99)	6.7%	Japan
EV/EBITDA = 21.24 + 33.07 g - 0.12 DFR - 0.19 Tax Rate - 4.88 ROIC (35.57) (23.20) (14.38) (9.41) (6.98)	23.7%	Emerging Markets
EV/EBITDA = 19.04 + 16.95 g - 0.12 DFR - 0.14 Tax Rate - 1.43 ROIC (12.01) (5.66) (4.86) (2.71) (2.03)	17.9%	Aus, NZ & Canada
EV/EBITDA = 21.79 + 30.86 g - 0.13 DFR - 0.24 Tax Rate + 2.72 ROIC (61.21) (36.81) (22.87) (18.36) (9.98)	36.2%	Global

g = Expected Revenue Growth: Expected growth in revenues: Near term (2 or 5 years)

DFR = Debt Ratio: Total Debt/ (Total Debt + Market value of equity)

Tax Rate: Effective tax rate in most recent year

ROIC = Return on Capital

V. EV/SALES REGRESSIONS ACROSS MARKETS...

⚓ Market-wide Regressions of Multiples: EV to Sales Ratios in January 2026
T statistics in brackets below coefficients

Regression	R Squared	Region
EV/Sales = 6.77 +9.51 g + 0.36 Oper Margin -0.02 DFR- 0.12 Tax rate (32.41) (11.21) (8.97) (6.32) (10.58)	24.1%	US
EV/Sales = 5.08 + 4.03 g + 2.99 Oper Margin -0.02 DFR- 0.09 Tax rate (21.01) (5.39) (6.95) (7.18) (12.26)	14.2%	Europe
EV/Sales = 2.48 + 11.54 g + 0.44 Oper Margin -0.01 DFR- 0.03 Tax rate (13.12) (16.88) (6.38) (2.90) (5.06)	24.4%	Japan
EV/Sales = 4.10 + 3.17 g + 0.65 Oper Margin - 0.01 DFR- 0.03 Tax rate (33.23) (9.48) (5.95) (3.38) (8.02)	5.4%	Emerging Markets
EV/Sales = 2.71 +6.07 g + 5.51 Oper Margin -0.01 DFR- 0.02 Tax rate (7.93) (7.70) 16.39) (1.01) (2.06)	44.7%	Aus, NZ & Canada
EV/Sales =5.44 + 4.97 g + 0.38 Oper Margin -0.01 DFR- 0.07 Tax rate (59.84) (17.34) (16.53) (4.36) (21.18)	13.3%	Global

g =Expected Revenue Growth: Expected growth in revenues: Next 2 or 5 years

Tax Rate: Effective tax rate in most recent year

Oper Margin: Operating Income/ Sales

DFR: Debt to capital ratio (market value)

VI. EV/INVESTED CAPITAL

⚓ *Market-wide Regressions of Multiples: EV to Invested Capital Ratios in January 2026*
T statistics in brackets below coefficients

	Regression	R Squared	Region
EV/Invested Capital=	$5.75 + 1.12 g - 0.01 \text{ ROIC} - 0.06 \text{ DFR}$ (82.70) (4.16) (0.24) (44.71)	49.7%	US
EV/Invested Capital=	$4.46 + 0.90 g + 1.50 \text{ ROIC} - 0.05 \text{ DFR}$ (67.88) (2.92) (13.63) (42.64)	51.3%	Europe
EV/Invested Capital=	$3.01 + 8.96 g + 0.16 \text{ ROIC} - 0.04 \text{ DFR}$ (42.62) (16.82) (4.57) (27.22)	46.9%	Japan
EV/Invested Capital=	$3.42 + 2.74 g + 0.11 \text{ ROIC} - 0.04 \text{ DFR}$ (98.22) (20.69) (5.51) (61.47)	48.8%	Emerging Markets
EV/Invested Capital=	$3.82 + 0.71 g + 0.11 \text{ ROIC} - 0.04 \text{ DFR}$ (41.62) (3.36) (1.47) (23.35)	43.5%	Aus, NZ & Canada
EV/Invested Capital=	$4.67 + 1.53 g + 0.04 \text{ ROIC} - 0.05 \text{ DFR}$ (159.95) (13.36) (2.96) (93.17)	44.5%	Global

g = Expected Revenue Growth: Expected growth in revenues: Near term (2 or 5 years)

DFR: Debt Ratio

ROIC = Return on Invested Capital

THE PRICING GAME: CHOICES

Measure	Choices	Considerations/ Questions
Value	Enterprise, Equity or Firm Value?	1. Is this a financial service business? 2. Are there big differences in leverage?
Scalar	Revenues, Earnings, Cash Flows or Book Value?	1. How are you measuring value? 2. Is the scaling number positive? 3. How (and how much) do accounting choices affect the scaling measure?
Timing & Normalizing	Current, Trailing, Forward or Really Forward?	1. Where are you in the life cycle? 2. How much cyclicalities is there in the number? 3. Can you get forecasted values?
Comparable	What is your peer group? (Global or local? Similar size or all firms? ...)	1. How much do companies share in common globally? 2. Does company size affect business economics? 3. How big a sample of firms do you need? 4. How do you plan to control for differences?

RELATIVE VALUATION: SOME CLOSING PROPOSITIONS

- **Proposition 1:** In a relative valuation, all that you are concluding is that a stock is under or over valued, **relative to your comparable group**.
 - Your relative valuation judgment can be right and your stock can be hopelessly over valued at the same time.
- **Proposition 2:** In asset valuation, **there are no similar assets**. Every asset is unique.
 - If you do not control for fundamental differences in risk, cash flows and growth across firms when comparing how they are priced, your valuation conclusions will reflect your flawed judgments rather than market misvaluations.
- **Bottom line: Relative valuation is pricing, not valuation.**

REVIEWING: THE FOUR STEPS TO UNDERSTANDING MULTIPLES

- Define the multiple
 - Check for consistency
 - Make sure that they are estimated uniformly
- Describe the multiple
 - Multiples have skewed distributions: The averages are seldom good indicators of typical multiples
 - Check for bias, if the multiple cannot be estimated
- Analyze the multiple
 - Identify the companion variable that drives the multiple
 - Examine the nature of the relationship
- Apply the multiple

A DETOUR: ASSET BASED VALUATION

Value assets, not cash flows?

WHAT IS ASSET-BASED VALUATION?

- In intrinsic valuation, you value a business based upon the cash flows you expect that business to generate over time.
- In relative valuation, you value a business based upon how similar businesses are priced.
- In asset-based valuation, you value a business by valuing its individual assets. These individual assets can be tangible or intangible.

WHY WOULD YOU DO ASSET-BASED VALUATION?

- **Liquidation:** If you are liquidating a business by selling its assets piece meal, rather than as a composite business, you would like to estimate what you will get from each asset or asset class individually.
- **Accounting mission:** As both US and international accounting standards have turned to “fair value” accounting, accountants have been called upon to redo balance sheet to reflect the assets at their fair rather than book value.
- **Sum of the parts:** If a business is made up of individual divisions or assets, you may want to value these parts individually for one of two groups:
 - Potential acquirers may want to do this, as a precursor to restructuring the business.
 - Investors may be interested because a business that is selling for less than the sum of its parts may be “cheap”.

HOW DO YOU DO ASSET-BASED VALUATION?

- **Intrinsic value:** Estimate the expected cash flows on each asset or asset class, discount back at a risk adjusted discount rate and arrive at an intrinsic value for each asset.
- **Relative value:** Look for similar assets that have sold in the recent past and estimate a value for each asset in the business.
- **Accounting value:** You could use the book value of the asset as a proxy for the estimated value of the asset.

WHEN IS ASSET-BASED VALUATION EASIEST TO DO?

1. **Separable assets:** If a company is a collection of separable assets (a set of real estate holdings, a holding company of different independent businesses), asset-based valuation is easier to do. If the assets are interrelated or difficult to separate, asset-based valuation becomes problematic. Thus, while real estate or a long-term licensing/franchising contract may be easily valued, brand name (which cuts across assets) is more difficult to value separately.
2. **Stand alone earnings/ cash flows:** An asset is much simpler to value if you can trace its earnings/cash flows to it. It is much more difficult to value when the business generates earnings, but the role of individual assets in generating these earnings cannot be isolated.
3. **Active market for similar assets:** If you plan to do a relative valuation, it is easier if you can find an active market for “similar” assets which you can draw on for transactions prices.

I. LIQUIDATION VALUATION

- In liquidation valuation, you are trying to assess **how much you would get from selling the assets of the business today**, rather than the business as a going concern.
- Consequently, it makes **more sense to price those assets** (i.e., do relative valuation) than it is to value them (do intrinsic valuation).
 - For assets that are **separable and traded** (example: real estate), pricing is easy to do.
 - For assets that are not, you often see book value used either as a proxy for liquidation value or as a basis for estimating liquidation value.
- To the extent that the **liquidation is urgent**, you may attach a **discount to the estimated value**.

II. ACCOUNTING VALUATION: GLIMMERS FROM FAS 157

- **The ubiquitous “market participant”:** Through FAS 157, accountants are asked to attach values to assets/liabilities that market participants would have been willing to pay/ receive.
- **Tilt towards relative value:** “The definition focuses on the price that would be received to sell the asset or paid to transfer the liability (an exit price), not the price that would be paid to acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (an entry price).” The hierarchy puts “market prices”, if available for an asset, at the top with intrinsic value being accepted only if market prices are not accessible.
- **Split mission:** While accounting fair value is titled towards relative valuation, accountants are also required to back their relative valuations with intrinsic valuations. Often, this leads to reverse engineering, where accountants arrive at values first and develop valuations later.

III. SUM OF THE PARTS VALUATION

- You can **value a company in pieces**, using either relative or intrinsic valuation. Which one you use will depend on who you are and your motives for doing the sum of the parts valuation.
- If you are **long term, passive investor** in the company, your intent may be to find market mistakes that you hope will get corrected over time. If that is the case, you should do an intrinsic valuation of the individual assets.
- If you **are an activist investor** that plans to acquire the company or push for change, you should be more focused on relative valuation, since your intent is to get the company to split up and gain the increase in value.

LET'S TRY THIS:

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: RAW DATA - 2009

<i>Division</i>	<i>Business</i>	<i>Revenues</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>Pre-tax Operating Income</i>	<i>Capital Expenditures</i>	<i>Depreciation</i>	<i>Total Assets</i>
Carrier	Refrigeration systems	\$14,944	\$1,510	\$1,316	\$191	\$194	\$10,810
Pratt & Whitney	Defense	\$12,965	\$2,490	\$2,122	\$412	\$368	\$9,650
Otis	Construction	\$12,949	\$2,680	\$2,477	\$150	\$203	\$7,731
UTC Fire & Security	Security	\$6,462	\$780	\$542	\$95	\$238	\$10,022
Hamilton Sundstrand	Manufacturing	\$6,207	\$1,277	\$1,099	\$141	\$178	\$8,648
Sikorsky	Aircraft	\$5,368	\$540	\$478	\$165	\$62	\$3,985

The company also had corporate expenses, unallocated to the divisions of \$408 million in the most recent year.

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: RELATIVE VALUATION MEDIAN MULTIPLES

<i>Division</i>	<i>Business</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>EV/EBITDA for sector</i>	<i>Value of Business</i>
Carrier	Refrigeration systems	\$1,510	5.25	\$7,928
Pratt & Whitney	Defense	\$2,490	8.00	\$19,920
Otis	Construction	\$2,680	6.00	\$16,080
UTC Fire & Security	Security	\$780	7.50	\$5,850
Hamilton Sundstrand	Industrial Products	\$1,277	5.50	\$7,024
Sikorsky	Aircraft	\$540	9.00	\$4,860
Sum of the parts value for business =				\$61,661

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: RELATIVE VALUATION PLUS SCALING VARIABLE & CHOICE OF MULTIPLES

Division	Business	Revenues	EBITDA	Operating Income	Capital Invested
Carrier	Refrigeration systems	\$14,944	\$1,510	\$1,316	\$6,014
Pratt & Whitney	Defense	\$12,965	\$2,490	\$2,122	\$5,369
Otis	Construction	\$12,949	\$2,680	\$2,477	\$4,301
UTC Fire & Security	Security	\$6,462	\$780	\$542	\$5,575
Hamilton Sundstrand	Industrial Products	\$6,207	\$1,277	\$1,099	\$4,811
Sikorsky	Aircraft	\$5,368	\$540	\$478	\$2,217
Total		\$58,895	\$9,277	\$8,034	\$28,287

Business	Best Multiple	Regression	R ²
Refrigeration systems	EV/EBITDA	$EV/EBITDA = 5.35 - 3.55 \text{ Tax Rate} + 14.17 \text{ ROC}$	42%
Defense	EV/Revenues	$EV/Revenues = 0.85 + 7.32 \text{ Pre-tax Operating Margin}$	47%
Construction	EV/EBITDA	$EV/EBITDA = 3.17 - 2.87 \text{ Tax Rate} + 14.66 \text{ ROC}$	36%
Security	EV/Capital	$EV/ \text{ Capital} = 0.55 + 8.22 \text{ ROC}$	55%
Industrial Products	EV/Revenues	$EV/Revenues = 0.51 + 6.13 \text{ Pre-tax Operating Margin}$	48%
Aircraft	EV/Capital	$EV/ \text{ Capital} = 0.65 + 6.98 \text{ ROC}$	40%

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: RELATIVE VALUATION SUM OF THE PARTS VALUE

Division	Scaling Variable	Current value for scaling variable	ROC	Operating Margin	Tax Rate	Predicted Multiple	Estimated Value
Carrier	EBITDA	\$1,510	13.57%	8.81%	38%	$5.35 - 3.55 (.38) + 14.17 (.1357) = 5.92$	\$8,944.47
Pratt & Whitney	Revenues	\$12,965	24.51%	16.37%	38%	$0.85 + 7.32 (.1637) = 2.05$	\$26,553.29
Otis	EBITDA	\$2,680	35.71%	19.13%	38%	$3.17 - 2.87 (.38) + 14.66 (.3571) = 7.31$	\$19,601.70
UTC Fire & Security	Capital	\$5,575	6.03%	8.39%	38%	$0.55 + 8.22 (.0603) = 1.05$	\$5,828.76
Hamilton Sundstrand	Revenues	\$6,207	14.16%	17.71%	38%	$0.51 + 6.13 (.1771) = 1.59$	\$9,902.44
Sikorsky	Capital	\$2,217	13.37%	8.90%	38%	$0.65 + 6.98 (.1337) = 1.58$	\$3,509.61
Sum of the parts value for operating assets =							\$74,230.37

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: DCF PARTS VALUATION

COST OF CAPITAL, BY BUSINESS

Division	Unlevered Beta	Debt/Equity Ratio	Levered beta	Cost of equity	After-tax cost of debt	Debt to Capital	Cost of capital
Carrier	0.83	30.44%	0.97	9.32%	2.95%	23.33%	7.84%
Pratt & Whitney	0.81	30.44%	0.95	9.17%	2.95%	23.33%	7.72%
Otis	1.19	30.44%	1.39	12.07%	2.95%	23.33%	9.94%
UTC Fire & Security	0.65	30.44%	0.76	7.95%	2.95%	23.33%	6.78%
Hamilton Sundstrand	1.04	30.44%	1.22	10.93%	2.95%	23.33%	9.06%
Sikorsky	1.17	30.44%	1.37	11.92%	2.95%	23.33%	9.82%

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: DCF VALUATION FUNDAMENTALS, BY BUSINESS

<i>Division</i>	<i>Total Assets</i>	<i>Capital Invested</i>	<i>Cap Ex</i>	<i>Allocated Reinvestment</i>	<i>Operating income after taxes</i>	<i>Return on capital</i>	<i>Reinvestment Rate</i>
Carrier	\$10,810	\$6,014	\$191	\$353	\$816	13.57%	43.28%
Pratt & Whitney	\$9,650	\$5,369	\$412	\$762	\$1,316	24.51%	57.90%
Otis	\$7,731	\$4,301	\$150	\$277	\$1,536	35.71%	18.06%
UTC Fire & Security	\$10,022	\$5,575	\$95	\$176	\$336	6.03%	52.27%
Hamilton Sundstrand	\$8,648	\$4,811	\$141	\$261	\$681	14.16%	38.26%
Sikorsky	\$3,985	\$2,217	\$165	\$305	\$296	13.37%	102.95%

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, DCF VALUATION GROWTH CHOICES

<i>Division</i>	<i>Cost of capital</i>	<i>Return on capital</i>	<i>Reinvestment Rate</i>	<i>Expected growth</i>	<i>Length of growth period</i>	<i>Stable growth rate</i>	<i>Stable ROC</i>
Carrier	7.84%	13.57%	43.28%	5.87%	5	3%	7.84%
Pratt & Whitney	7.72%	24.51%	57.90%	14.19%	5	3%	12.00%
Otis	9.94%	35.71%	18.06%	6.45%	5	3%	14.00%
UTC Fire & Security	6.78%	6.03%	52.27%	3.15%	0	3%	6.78%
Hamilton Sundstrand	9.06%	14.16%	38.26%	5.42%	5	3%	9.06%
Sikorsky	9.82%	13.37%	102.95%	13.76%	5	3%	9.82%

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, DCF VALUATION VALUES OF THE PARTS

<i>Business</i>	<i>Cost of capital</i>	<i>PV of FCFF</i>	<i>PV of Terminal Value</i>	<i>Value of Operating Assets</i>
Carrier	7.84%	\$2,190	\$9,498	\$11,688
Pratt & Whitney	7.72%	\$3,310	\$27,989	\$31,299
Otis	9.94%	\$5,717	\$14,798	\$20,515
UTC Fire & Security	6.78%	\$0	\$4,953	\$4,953
Hamilton Sundstrand	9.06%	\$1,902	\$6,343	\$8,245
Sikorsky	9.82%	-\$49	\$3,598	\$3,550
<i>Sum</i>				\$80,250

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, DCF VALUATION

SUM OF THE PARTS

▪ Value of the parts = \$80,250

▪ Value of corporate expenses

$$= \frac{\text{Corporate Expenses}_{\text{Current}} (1 - t)(1 + g)}{(\text{Cost of capital}_{\text{Company}} - g)} = \frac{408(1 - .38)(1.03)}{(.0868 - .03)} = \$ 4,587$$

▪ Value of operating assets (sum of parts DCF) = \$75,663

▪ Value of operating assets (sum of parts RV) = \$74,230

▪ Value of operating assets (company DCF) = \$71,410

▪ Enterprise value (based on market prices) = \$52,261

GE IN 2018: THE PARTS

<i>Business</i>	<i>Revenues- 2017</i>	<i>Revenue Growth in 2017</i>	<i>EBIT before G&A</i>	<i>EBIT after G&A</i>	<i>EBIT Margin</i>	<i>Invested Capital</i>	<i>ROIC in 2017</i>	<i>ROIC: 2013-2017</i>	<i>Cost of capital</i>
Power	\$ 36.00	-1.64%	\$ 2.80	\$ 1.69	4.68%	\$328.34	3.85%	9.28%	4.91%
Renewable Energy	\$ 10.30	14.44%	\$ 0.70	\$ 0.41	4.00%	\$49.91	6.19%	8.00%	6.88%
Oil & Gas	\$ 17.20	33.33%	\$ 0.20	\$ (0.31)	-1.78%	\$275.95	-0.83%	3.71%	8.82%
Aviation	\$ 27.40	4.18%	\$ 6.60	\$ 5.80	21.19%	\$192.73	22.59%	20.27%	8.52%
Healthcare	\$ 19.10	4.37%	\$ 3.40	\$ 2.86	15.00%	\$132.81	16.18%	15.07%	7.97%
Transportation	\$ 4.20	-10.64%	\$ 0.80	\$ 0.70	16.56%	\$20.73	25.17%	26.67%	7.49%
Lighting	\$ 2.00	-58.33%	\$ 0.10	\$ 0.03	1.59%	\$3.34	7.16%	9.66%	8.50%
Capital	\$ 9.10	-16.51%	\$ (6.80)	\$ (7.04)	-77.40%	\$723.38	-7.30%	-2.81%	3.64%
Total	\$ 125.30	1.29%	\$ 7.80	\$ 4.15	3.31%	\$1,727.18	1.80%	4.50%	6.23%

GE: VALUE OF THE PARTS

Business	Revenues in 2017	Average EBIT Margin before G&A, 2013-17	Normalized EBIT before G&A	Normalized EBIT (with corporate expenses allocated)	Normalized EBIT (1-t)	Cost of Capital	ROIC - Next 5 years	Expected growth next 5 years	Value of Business
Power	\$ 35,990.00	14.34%	\$ 5,161.92	\$ 4,061.80	\$ 3,046.35	4.91%	9.28%	6.10%	\$ 73,138.18
Renewable Energy	\$ 10,280.00	8.24%	\$ 847.46	\$ 532.70	\$ 399.53	6.88%	8.00%	16.34%	\$ 6,455.88
Oil & Gas	\$ 17,231.00	10.97%	\$ 1,890.80	\$ 1,365.19	\$ 1,023.89	8.82%	3.71%	-0.13%	\$ 11,924.66
Aviation	\$ 27,375.00	22.09%	\$ 6,046.58	\$ 5,209.28	\$ 3,906.96	8.52%	20.27%	4.55%	\$ 52,849.35
Healthcare	\$ 19,116.00	17.01%	\$ 3,251.87	\$ 2,668.20	\$ 2,001.15	7.97%	15.07%	0.99%	\$ 26,233.80
Transportation	\$ 4,178.00	20.71%	\$ 865.41	\$ 737.06	\$ 552.80	7.49%	26.67%	-6.62%	\$ 6,075.26
Lighting	\$ 1,987.00	5.24%	\$ 104.14	\$ 43.03	\$ 32.27	8.50%	9.66%	-24.94%	\$ 280.49
Total (non-capital)	\$ 116,157.00	15.35%	\$ 17,829.69	\$ 17,551.60	\$ 13,163.70				\$ 176,957.62
GE Capital Business	\$ 9,070.00	3.00%	\$ 272.10	\$ (5.98)	\$ (4.49)	6.23%	0.00%	-4.25%	\$ 27,080.96
Value of businesses									\$ 204,038.59
- GE Debt									\$ 83,568.00
- GE Capital Debt									\$ 51,023.00
- Minority Interests									\$ 17,723.00
+ Cash									\$ 43,299.00
Value of equity									\$ 95,023.59
- Options									\$ 218.94
Value of equity in common stock									\$ 94,804.65
Value per share									\$ 10.92

GE: PRICING THE PARTS

<i>Business</i>	<i>Revenues in 2017</i>	<i>Normalized EBIT, using average margin (2013-17)</i>	<i>DA in 2017</i>	<i>EBITDA</i>	<i>Peer Group EV/EBITDA</i>	<i>Estimated Pricing</i>
Power	\$ 35,990.00	\$ 4,061.80	\$1,358.00	\$5,419.80	10.55	\$ 57,179
Renewable Energy	\$ 10,280.00	\$ 532.70	\$ 259.00	\$ 791.70	15.13	\$ 11,978
Oil & Gas	\$ 17,231.00	\$ 1,365.19	\$1,026.00	\$2,391.19	12.15	\$ 29,053
Aviation	\$ 27,375.00	\$ 5,209.28	\$ 979.00	\$6,188.28	6.56	\$ 40,595
Healthcare	\$ 19,116.00	\$ 2,668.20	\$ 806.00	\$3,474.20	10.97	\$ 38,112
Transportation	\$ 4,178.00	\$ 737.06	\$ 135.00	\$ 872.06	11.22	\$ 9,785
Lighting	\$ 1,987.00	\$ 43.03	\$ 86.00	\$ 129.03	12.8	\$ 1,652
Total (non-capital)	\$ 116,157.00	\$ 17,551.60				\$ 188,353
GE Capital Business	\$ 9,070.00	\$ (5.98)	\$2,343.00	\$2,337.02	10.13	\$ 23,674
Pricing of Business						\$ 212,027.44
- GE Debt						\$ 83,568.00
- GE Capital Debt						\$ 51,023.00
- Minority Interests						\$ 17,723.00
+ Cash						\$ 43,299.00
Pricing of Equity						\$ 103,012.44
- Options						218.94
Pricing of Equity in common stock						\$ 102,793.50
Estimating Pricing per share						\$11.84

PRIVATE COMPANY VALUATION

Aswath Damodaran

PROCESS OF VALUING PRIVATE COMPANIES

- The **process of valuing private companies is not different from the process of valuing public companies**. You estimate cash flows, attach a discount rate based upon the riskiness of the cash flows and compute a present value. As with public companies, you can either value
 - The entire business, by discounting cash flows to the firm at the cost of capital.
 - The equity in the business, by discounting cashflows to equity at the cost of equity.
- When valuing private companies, you face two standard problems:
 - There is **no market value** for either debt or equity
 - The financial statements for private firms are **likely to go back fewer years, have less detail and have more holes in them**.

1. NO MARKET VALUE?

- **Market values as inputs:** Since neither the debt nor equity of a private business is traded, any inputs that require them cannot be estimated.
 - Debt ratios for going from **unlevered to levered betas** and for computing cost of capital.
 - Market prices to compute the **value of options and warrants granted to employees**.
- **Market value as output:** When valuing publicly traded firms, the market value operates as a measure of reasonableness. In private company valuation, the value stands alone.
- **Market price based risk measures**, such as beta and bond ratings, will not be available for private businesses.

2. CASH FLOW ESTIMATION ISSUES

1. **Shorter history:** Private firms often have been around for much shorter time periods than most publicly traded firms. There is therefore less historical information available on them.
2. **Different Accounting Standards:** The accounting statements for private firms are often based upon different accounting standards than public firms, which operate under much tighter constraints on what to report and when to report.
3. **Intermingling of personal and business expenses:** In the case of private firms, some personal expenses may be reported as business expenses.
4. **Separating “Salaries” from “Dividends”:** It is difficult to tell where salaries end and dividends begin in a private firm, since they both end up with the owner.

PRIVATE COMPANY VALUATION: MOTIVE MATTERS..

- You can value a private company for
 - 'Show' valuations
 - Curiosity: How much is my business really worth?
 - Legal purposes: Estate tax and divorce court
 - Transaction valuations
 - Sale or prospective sale to another individual or private entity.
 - Sale of one partner's interest to another
 - Sale to a publicly traded firm
 - As prelude to setting the offering price in an initial public offering
- You can value a division or divisions of a publicly traded firm
 - As prelude to a spin off
 - For sale to another entity
 - To do a sum-of-the-parts valuation to determine whether a firm will be worth more broken up or if it is being efficiently run.

PRIVATE COMPANY VALUATIONS: FOUR BROAD SCENARIOS

1. **Private to private transactions:** You can value a private business for sale by one individual to another.
2. **Private to public transactions:** You can value a private firm for sale to a publicly traded firm.
3. **Private to IPO:** You can value a private firm for an initial public offering.
4. **Private to VC to Public:** You can value a private firm that is expected to raise venture capital along the way on its path to going public.

I. PRIVATE TO PRIVATE TRANSACTION

- In private-to-private transactions, a private business is sold by one individual to another. There are three key issues that we need to confront in such transactions:
 - **Neither the buyer nor the seller is diversified.** Consequently, risk and return models that focus on just the risk that cannot be diversified away will seriously under estimate the discount rates.
 - **The investment is illiquid.** Consequently, the buyer of the business will have to factor in an “illiquidity discount” to estimate the value of the business.
 - **Key person value:** There may be a significant personal component to the value. In other words, the revenues and operating profit of the business reflect not just the potential of the business but the presence of the current owner.

AN EXAMPLE: VALUING A RESTAURANT

- Assume that you have been asked to value an upscale French restaurant for sale by the owner (who also happens to be the chef). Both the restaurant and the chef are well regarded, and business has been good for the last 3 years.
 - The potential buyer is a former investment banker, who tired of the rat race, has decide to **cash out all of his savings and use the entire amount to invest in the restaurant.**
 - You have **access to the financial statements for the last 3 years** for the restaurant. In the most recent year, the restaurant reported \$ 1.2 million in revenues and \$ 400,000 in pre-tax operating profit .
 - While the firm has **no conventional debt outstanding**, it has a lease commitment of \$120,000 each year for the next 12 years.

PAST INCOME STATEMENTS...

	3 years ago	2 years ago	Last year	
Revenues	\$800	\$1,100	\$1,200	Operating at full capacity
- Operating lease expense	\$120	\$120	\$120	(12 years left on the lease)
- Wages	\$180	\$200	\$200	(Owner/chef does not draw salary)
- Material	\$200	\$275	\$300	(25% of revenues)
- Other operating expenses	\$120	\$165	\$180	(15% of revenues)
Operating income	\$180	\$340	\$400	
- Taxes	\$72	\$136	\$160	(40% tax rate)
Net Income	\$108	\$204	\$240	

All numbers are in thousands

STEP 1: ESTIMATING DISCOUNT RATES

- Conventional risk and return models in finance are built on the presumption that the **marginal investors in the company are diversified** and that they therefore care only about the risk that cannot be diversified. That risk is measured with a beta or betas, usually estimated by looking at past prices or returns.
- In this valuation, both assumptions are likely to be violated:
 - As a private business, this restaurant **has no market prices** or returns to use in estimation.
 - **The buyer is not diversified.** In fact, he will have his entire wealth tied up in the restaurant after the purchase.

NO MARKET PRICE, NO PROBLEM... USE BOTTOM-UP BETAS TO GET THE UNLEVERED BETA

- **The average unlevered beta across 75 publicly traded restaurants in the US is 0.86.** Most of the publicly traded restaurants on this list are fast-food chains (McDonald's, Burger King) or mass restaurants (Applebee's, TGIF...). An upscale restaurant does not fit easily into this mix.
- There is an argument to be made that the beta for an upscale restaurant is more likely to be **reflect high-end specialty retailers than it is restaurants.** The unlevered beta for 45 high-end retailers is 1.18.

A Data-driven View on Adjusting for Non-Diversification

Completely Undiversified

As investors become less diversified, they will demand returns to cover some or all of this risk

Diversified investors demand an expected return that covers this portion of risk

Diversifiable or firm-specific risk

Non-diversifiable Risk



A Market-Data Approach to estimating non-diversified discount rates

1. Start with the beta of the sector or business that the private business is in, by looking at public companies in the space.
2. From the same regressions that you get the beta from, you also extract the correlation of the stock with the market.
3. By combining the two, you are in effect getting the total standard deviation of the stock, which scaled to market's standard deviation:

Total Beta = Market Beta/ Correlation with the market.

ESTIMATING A TOTAL BETA

- To get from the market beta to the total beta, we need a measure of how much of the risk in the firm comes from the market and how much is firm-specific.
- Looking at the regressions of publicly traded firms that yield the bottom-up beta should provide an answer.
 - The average R-squared across the high-end retailer regressions is 25%.
 - Since betas are based on standard deviations (rather than variances), we will take the correlation coefficient (the square root of the R-squared) as our measure of the proportion of the risk that is market risk.
- Total Unlevered Beta
$$= \text{Market Beta} / \text{Correlation with the market}$$
$$= 1.18 / 0.5 = 2.36$$

THE FINAL STEP IN THE BETA COMPUTATION: ESTIMATE A DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO AND COST OF EQUITY

- With publicly traded firms, **we re-lever the beta using the market D/E ratio for the firm.** With private firms, this option is not feasible. We have two alternatives:
 - Assume that the debt to equity ratio for the firm is **similar to the average market debt to equity ratio for publicly traded firms** in the sector.
 - Use **your estimates of the value of debt and equity** as the weights in the computation. (There will be a circular reasoning problem: you need the cost of capital to get the values and the values to get the cost of capital.)
- We will assume that this privately owned restaurant will have a debt to equity ratio (14.33%) similar to the average publicly traded restaurant (even though we used retailers to the unlevered beta).
 - Levered beta = $2.36 (1 + (1-.4) (.1433)) = 2.56$
 - Cost of equity = $4.25\% + 2.56 (4\%) = 14.50\%$
 - (T Bond rate was 4.25% at the time; 4% is the equity risk premium)

ESTIMATING A COST OF DEBT AND CAPITAL

- While the firm does not have a rating or any recent bank loans to use as reference, it does have a **reported operating income and lease expenses** (treated as interest expenses)

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Coverage Ratio} &= \text{Operating Income} / \text{Interest (Lease) Expense} \\ &= 400,000 / 120,000 = 3.33\end{aligned}$$

Rating based on coverage ratio = BB+ Default spread = 3.25%

$$\begin{aligned}\text{After-tax Cost of debt} &= (\text{Riskfree rate} + \text{Default spread}) (1 - \text{tax rate}) \\ &= (4.25\% + 3.25\%) (1 - .40) = 4.50\%\end{aligned}$$

- To compute the cost of capital, we will use **the same industry average debt ratio** that we used to lever the betas.

- $\text{Cost of capital} = 14.50\% (100/114.33) + 4.50\% (14.33/114.33) = 13.25\%$

(The debt to equity ratio is 14.33%; the cost of capital is based on the debt to capital ratio)

STEP 2: CLEAN UP THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

	Stated	Adjusted	
Revenues	\$1,200	\$1,200	
- Operating lease expenses	\$120		Leases are financial expenses
- Wages	\$200	\$350	! Hire a chef for \$150,000/year
- Material	\$300	\$300	
- Other operating expenses	\$180	\$180	
Operating income	\$400	\$370	
- Interest expnses	\$0	\$69.62	7.5% of \$928.23 (see below)
Taxable income	\$400	\$300.38	
- Taxes	\$160	\$120.15	
Net Income	\$240	\$180.23	
Debt	0	\$928.23	! PV of \$120 million for 12 years @7.5%

STEP 3: ASSESS THE IMPACT OF THE “KEY” PERSON

- Part of the draw of the restaurant **comes from the current chef**. It is possible (and probable) that if he sells and moves on, there will be a drop off in revenues. If you are buying the restaurant, you should consider this drop off when valuing the restaurant.
- For instance, **if 20% of the patrons are drawn to the restaurant because of the chef’s reputation**, the expected operating income will be lower if the chef leaves.
 - Adjusted operating income (existing chef) = \$ 370,000
 - Operating income (adjusted for chef departure) = \$296,000
- **As the owner/chef of the restaurant, what might you be able to do to mitigate this loss in value?**

THE KEY PERSON VALUE: A MORE GENERAL VERSION

Key Person Value Effect


Key Management Person (CEO or Founder): Sets or alters narrative for the business, and in the process, changes expectations of revenue growth, margins, reinvestment and risk, in good (value-increasing) or bad (value-decreasing) ways.

Key Sales Person: Through client relationships and new customers/clients, driving sales (and sales growth).

Key (outside) Spokesperson: As the face of a company's products, can add or detract from its sales and pricing power (margins)

Key Design/Research Person: Involved in creation of design of product/service, driving both sales and margins.

Key Production Person: Instrumental in design/production of product or service and delivery (supply chains), affecting margins and investment efficiency.



STEP 4: DON'T FORGET VALUATION FUNDAMENTALS

- To complete the valuation, you need to assume an expected growth rate. As with any business, assumptions about growth have to be consistent with reinvestment assumptions. In the long term,
 - $\text{Reinvestment rate} = \text{Expected growth rate} / \text{Return on capital}$
- In this case, we will assume a 2% growth rate in perpetuity and a 20% return on capital.
 - $\text{Reinvestment rate} = g / \text{ROC} = 2\% / 20\% = 10\%$
- Even if the restaurant does not grow in size, this reinvestment is what you need to make to keep the restaurant both looking good (remodeling) and working well (new ovens and appliances).

STEP 5: COMPLETE THE VALUATION

- Inputs to valuation

- Adjusted EBIT most recent year = \$ 296,000
- Tax rate = 40%
- Cost of capital (based on total beta) = 13.25%
- Expected growth rate = 2%
- Reinvestment rate (RIR) = 10%

- Valuation

Value of the restaurant

= Expected FCFF next year / (Cost of capital –g)

= Expected EBIT next year (1- tax rate) (1- RIR)/ (Cost of capital –g)

= 296,000 (1.02) (1-.4) (1-.10)/ (.1325 - .02)

= \$1.449 million

- Value of equity in restaurant = \$1.449 million - \$0.928 million (PV of leases) = \$ 0.521 million**

STEP 6: CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF ILLIQUIDITY

- In private company valuation, illiquidity is a constant theme. All the talk, though, seems to lead to a rule of thumb. The illiquidity discount for a private firm is between 20-30% and does not vary across private firms.
- But illiquidity should vary across:
 - **Companies:** Healthier and larger companies, with more liquid assets, should have smaller discounts than money-losing smaller businesses with more illiquid assets.
 - **Time:** Liquidity is worth more when the economy is doing badly and credit is tough to come by than when markets are booming.
 - **Buyers:** Liquidity is worth more to buyers who have shorter time horizons and greater cash needs than for longer term investors who don't need the cash and are willing to hold the investment.

THE STANDARD APPROACH: ILLIQUIDITY DISCOUNT BASED ON ILLIQUID PUBLICLY TRADED ASSETS


- **Restricted stock:** These are stock issued by publicly traded companies to the market that bypass the SEC registration process but the stock cannot be traded for one year after the issue.
- **Pre-IPO transactions:** These are transactions prior to initial public offerings where equity investors in the private firm buy (sell) each other's stakes.
- In both cases, the discount is estimated to be the difference between the market price of the liquid asset and the observed transaction price of the illiquid asset.
 - $\text{Discount Restricted stock} = \text{Stock price} - \text{Price on restricted stock offering}$
 - $\text{Discount IPO} = \text{IPO offering price} - \text{Price on pre-IPO transaction}$

THE RESTRICTED STOCK DISCOUNT

- **Aggregate discount studies**
 - Maher examined restricted stock purchases made by four mutual funds in the period 1969-73 and concluded that they traded an average discount of 35.43% on publicly traded stock in the same companies.
 - Moroney reported a mean discount of 35% for acquisitions of 146 restricted stock issues by 10 investment companies, using data from 1970.
 - In a study of restricted stock offerings from the 1980s, Silber (1991) finds that the median discount for restricted stock is 33.75%.
- Silber related the size of the discount to characteristics of the offering:
$$\text{LN(RPRS)} = 4.33 + 0.036 \text{ LN(REV)} - 0.142 \text{ LN(RBRT)} + 0.174 \text{ DERN} + 0.332 \text{ DCUST}$$
 - RPRS = Relative price of restricted stock (to publicly traded stock)
 - REV = Revenues of the private firm (in millions of dollars)
 - RBRT = Restricted Block relative to Total Common Stock in %
 - DERN = 1 if earnings are positive; 0 if earnings are negative;
 - DCUST = 1 if there is a customer relationship with the investor; 0 otherwise;


CROSS SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ILLIQUIDITY: EXTENDING THE SILBER REGRESSION

Figure 24.1: Illiquidity Discounts: Base Discount of 25% for profitable firm with \$ 10 million in revenues



THE IPO DISCOUNT: PRICING ON PRE-IPO TRANSACTIONS (IN 5 MONTHS PRIOR TO IPO)

Figure 4: Discount on IPOs



THE “SAMPLING” PROBLEM

- With both restricted stock and the IPO studies, there is a **significant sampling bias problem**.
 - The companies that make restricted stock offerings are likely to be small, troubled firms that have run out of conventional financing options.
 - The types of IPOs where equity investors sell their stake in the five months prior to the IPO at a huge discount are likely to be IPOs that have significant pricing uncertainty associated with them.
- With restricted stock, the magnitude of the sampling bias was estimated by **comparing the discount on all private placements to the discount on restricted stock offerings**. One study concluded that the “illiquidity” alone accounted for a discount of less than 10% (leaving the balance of 20-25% to be explained by sampling problems).

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: USE THE WHOLE SAMPLE

- **All traded assets are illiquid.** The bid ask spread, measuring the difference between the price at which you can buy and sell the asset at the same point in time is the illiquidity measure.
- We can **regress the bid-ask spread (as a percent of the price) against variables that can be measured for a private firm** (such as revenues, cash flow generating capacity, type of assets, variance in operating income) and are also available for publicly traded firms.
- Using data from the end of 2000, for instance, we regressed the bid-ask spread against annual revenues, a dummy variable for positive earnings (DERN: 0 if negative and 1 if positive), cash as a percent of firm value and trading volume.
 - $\text{Spread} = 0.145 - 0.0022 \ln(\text{Annual Revenues}) - 0.015 (\text{DERN}) - 0.016 (\text{Cash/Firm Value}) - 0.11 (\text{\$ Monthly trading volume/ Firm Value})$
 - You could plug in the values for a private firm into this regression (with zero trading volume) and estimate the spread for the firm.

ESTIMATING THE ILLIQUIDITY DISCOUNT FOR THE RESTAURANT

Approach used	Estimated discount	Value of restaurant
Bludgeon (Fixed discount)	25%	$\$0.521 (1 - .25) = \0.391 million
Refined Bludgeon (Fixed discount with adjustment for revenue size/ profitability)	28.75% (Silber adjustment for small revenues and positive profits to a base discount of 25%)	$\$0.521 (1 - .2875) = \0.371 million
Bid-ask spread regression	$= 0.145 - 0.0022 \ln(1.2) - 0.015(1) - 0.016(.05) - 0.11(0) = 12.88\%$	$\$0.521 (1 - .1288) = \0.454 million

II. PRIVATE COMPANY SOLD TO PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANY

- The key difference between this scenario and the previous scenario is that the **seller of the business is not diversified but the buyer is (or at least the investors in the buyer are)**. Consequently, they can look at the same firm and see very different amounts of risk in the business with the seller seeing more risk than the buyer.
- The cash flows may also be affected by the fact that the **tax rates for publicly traded companies can diverge from those of private owners**.
- Finally, there should be **no illiquidity discount to a public buyer**, since investors in the buyer can sell their holdings in a market.

REVISITING THE COST OF EQUITY AND CAPITAL: RESTAURANT VALUATION

	Private	Public
Unlevered beta	2.36	1.18
Debt to equity ratio	14.33%	14.33%
Tax rate	40%	40%
Pre-tax cost of debt	7.50%	7.50%
Levered beta	2.56	1.28
Riskfree rate	4.25%	4.25%
Equity risk premium	4%	4%
Cost of equity	14.5%	9.38%
After-tax cost of debt	4.50%	4.50%
Cost of capital	13.25%	8.76%

REVALUING THE RESTAURANT TO A “PUBLIC” BUYER

	<i>Private</i>	<i>Public</i>
Adjusted EBIT =	370	370
Key person discount =	20%	20%
EBIT =	296	296
Expected growth rate =	2%	2%
Return on capital =	20%	20%
Reinvestment rate =	10.00%	10.00%
FCFF next year =	\$163.04	\$163.04
Cost of capital =	13.25%	8.76%
Value of business =	\$1,449.22	\$2,411.79
- Debt	\$928.23	\$928.23
Value of equity =	\$520.99	\$1,483.56
- Illiquidity discount	12.88%	0.00%
Value of equity	\$453.88	\$1,483.56

SO, WHAT PRICE SHOULD YOU ASK FOR?

- Assume that you represent the chef/owner of the restaurant and that you were asking for a “reasonable” price for the restaurant. What would you ask for?
 - a. \$ 454,000
 - b. \$ 1.484 million
 - c. Some number in the middle
- If it is “some number in the middle”, what will determine what you will ultimately get for your business?
- How would you alter the analysis, if your best potential bidder is a private equity or VC fund rather than a publicly traded firm?

III. PRIVATE COMPANY FOR INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING

- In an initial public offering, the private business is opened up to investors who clearly are diversified (or at least have the option to be diversified).
- There are control implications as well. When a private firm goes public, it opens itself up to monitoring by investors, analysts and market.
- The reporting and information disclosure requirements shift to reflect a publicly traded firm
- In short, valuing a firm for an IPO will look much more like the valuation of a publicly traded company than a private business.

Starting numbers

Twitter Pre-IPO Valuation: October 5, 2013

	2012	Trailing 2013
Revenues	\$316.9	\$448.2
Operating Income	-\$77.1	-\$92.9
Adj Op Inc		\$4.3
Invested Capital		\$549.1
Operating Margin		0.96%
Sales/Capital		0.82

Revenue growth of 55% a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.7% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin increases to 25% over the next 10 years

Sales to capital ratio of **1.50** for incremental sales

Stable Growth
 $g = 2.7\%$; $\text{Beta} = 1.00$;
 Cost of capital = 8%
 $\text{ROC} = 12\%$;
 Reinvestment Rate = $2.7\%/12\% = 22.5\%$

Terminal Value₁₀ = $1433 / (.08 - .027) = \$27.036$

Operating assets	\$9,611
+ Cash	375
+ IPO Proceeds	1000
- Debt	207
Value of equity	10,779
- Options	805
Value in stock	9,974
/ # of shares	574.44
Value/share	\$17.36

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenues	\$ 694.7	\$ 1,076.8	\$ 1,669.1	\$ 2,587.1	\$ 4,010.0	\$ 5,796.0	\$ 7,771.3	\$ 9,606.8	\$10,871.1	\$11,164.6
Operating Income	\$ 23.3	\$ 62.0	\$ 136.3	\$ 273.5	\$ 520.3	\$ 891.5	\$ 1,382.2	\$ 1,939.7	\$ 2,456.3	\$ 2,791.2
Operating Income after taxes	\$ 23.3	\$ 62.0	\$ 136.3	\$ 265.3	\$ 364.2	\$ 614.2	\$ 937.1	\$ 1,293.8	\$ 1,611.4	\$ 1,800.3
Reinvestment	\$ 164.3	\$ 254.7	\$ 394.8	\$ 612.0	\$ 948.6	\$ 1,190.7	\$ 1,316.8	\$ 1,223.7	\$ 842.8	\$ 195.7
FCFF	\$ (141.0)	\$ (192.7)	\$ (258.5)	\$ (346.6)	\$ (584.4)	\$ (576.5)	\$ (379.7)	\$ 70.0	\$ 768.5	\$ 1,604.6

Terminal year (11)
 EBIT (1-t) \$1,849
 - Reinvestment \$ 416
 FCFF \$1,433

Cost of capital = $11.32\% (.983) + 5.16\% (.017) = 11.22\%$

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10

Cost of Equity
11.32%

Cost of Debt
 $(2.7\% + 5.3\%)(1 - .40)$
 = 5.16%

Weights
 $E = 98.31\%$ $D = 1.69\%$

Riskfree Rate:
 Riskfree rate = 2.7%

+

Beta
1.40

x

Risk Premium
6.15%

75% from US (5.75%) + 25% from rest of world (7.23%)

90% advertising (1.44) + 10% info svcs (1.05)

D/E = 1.71%

THE TWISTS IN AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING

- Valuation issues:
 - **Use of the proceeds from the offering:** The proceeds from the offering can be held as cash by the firm to cover future investment needs, paid to existing equity investors who want to cash out or used to pay down debt.
 - **Warrants/ Special deals with prior equity investors:** If venture capitalists and other equity investors from earlier iterations of fund raising have rights to buy or sell their equity at pre-specified prices, it can affect the value per share offered to the public.
- Pricing issues:
 - **Institutional set-up:** Most IPOs are backed by investment banking guarantees on the price, which can affect how they are priced.
 - **Follow-up offerings:** The proportion of equity being offered at initial offering and subsequent offering plans can affect pricing.

A. USE OF THE PROCEEDS

- The proceeds from an initial public offering can be
 - **Taken out of the firm** by the existing owners
 - **Used to pay down debt** and other obligations
 - **Held as cash** by the company to cover future reinvestment needs
- How you deal with the issuance will depend upon how the proceeds are used.
 - If taken out of the firm -> Ignore in valuation
 - If used to pay down debt -> Change the debt ratio, which may change the cost of capital and the value of the firm
 - If held as cash to cover future reinvestment needs -> Add the cash proceeds from the IPO to the DCF valuation of the company.

THE IPO PROCEEDS: TWITTER

- **How much?** News stories suggest that the company is planning on raising about \$1 billion from the offering.
- **Use:** In the Twitter prospectus filing, the company specifies that it plans to keep the proceeds in the company to meet future investment needs.
 - In the valuation, I have added a billion to the estimated value of the operating assets because that cash infusion will augment the cash balance.
- How would the valuation have been different if the owners announced that they planned to withdraw half of the offering proceeds?

B. CLAIMS FROM PRIOR EQUITY INVESTORS

- When a private firm goes public, there are already equity investors in the firm, including the founder(s), venture capitalists and other equity investors. In some cases, these equity investors can have warrants, options or other special claims on the equity of the firm.
- If existing equity investors have special claims on the equity, the value of equity per share will be affected by these claims. Specifically, these options need to be valued at the time of the offering and the value of equity reduced by the option value before determining the value per share.

THE CLAIMS ON TWITTER'S EQUITY

- The overall value that we estimate for Twitter's equity is \$10,779 million. There are multiple claims on this equity.
 - The owners of the company own the common shares in the company
 - Twitter has **seven classes of convertible**, preferred stock on the company (from different VCs).
 - Twitter has **86 million restricted stock units** that it has used in employee compensation.
 - Twitter has **44.16 million units of employee options**, also used in compensation contracts. (Strike price=\$1.82, life = 6.94 years)
 - Twitter has agreed to pay MoPub stockholders with 14.791 million shares.
- The convertible preferred shares will be converted at the time of the offering and the common shares outstanding will be 472.61 million, not counting RSUs and options. In the valuation:
 - Number of commons shares= 574.44 million (all but options)
 - Option value = \$805 million (with maturity set to 3.47 years)

C. THE INVESTMENT BANKING GUARANTEE...

- Almost all IPOs are managed by investment banks and are backed by a pricing guarantee, where the investment banker guarantees the offering price to the issuer.
- If the price at which the issuance is made is lower than the guaranteed price, the investment banker will buy the shares at the guaranteed price and potentially bear the loss.

PRICING VERSUS VALUE


- Earlier I assessed the value of equity at Twitter to be \$9.97 billion (with a value per share of \$17.36/share).
- Assume, however, that the market appetite for social media stocks is high and that you pull up the valuations of other publicly traded stocks in the market:

<i>Company</i>	<i>EV</i>	<i>Market Cap</i>	<i>Sales</i>	<i>Users</i>	<i>EV/Sales</i>	<i>Market Cap/User</i>
Facebook	\$100,017.00	\$107,909.00	\$6,118.00	1110	16.35	\$97.22
LinkedIn	\$28,448.50	\$29,321.90	\$1,244.00	225	22.87	\$130.32
FB+LNKD	\$128,465.50	\$137,230.90	\$7,362.00	1335	17.45	\$102.79
Twitter	?	?	\$483.00	215		

- What would you base your offer price on? How would you sell it?

THE EVIDENCE ON IPO PRICING

The IPO story: The offering day return to investors




AN INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY?

- Assume that investment banks try to under price initial public offerings by approximately 10-15%. As an investor, what strategy would you adopt to take advantage of this behavior?
- Why might it not work?


D. THE OFFERING QUANTITY

- Assume now that you are the owner of Twitter and **were offering 100% of the shares in company in the offering to the public**? If investors are willing to pay \$20 billion for the common stock, how much do you lose because of the under pricing (15%)?
- Assume that you were offering **only 10% of the shares in the initial offering** and plan to sell a large portion of your remaining stake over the following two years? Would your views of the under pricing and its effect on your wealth change as a consequence?

THE IPO COMPANY: PROFILE OVER TIME




THE IPO PROCESS: CHANGE OVER TIME!



ALTERNATIVES TO IPOs

- **The traditional IPO model**, with banks operating as intermediaries and setting offering prices, has come under assault for two reasons:
 - Banking failures on the services (pricing & selling) that they offer in return for the fees.
 - Loss of the credibility effect of a banking guarantee, as bankers have fallen in public standing.
- There have been two alternatives offered:
 - In a **direct listing**, the listing company lists its shares directly on the exchange, and let's demand and supply set the price.
 - In a **SPAC**, a publicly traded entity collects money for a future (but unspecified) IPO, and uses the funds to buy out a private company (which now takes on the standing of the public company).

IV. AN INTERMEDIATE PROBLEM PRIVATE TO VC TO PUBLIC OFFERING...



A CASE STUDY IN TRANSITIONS...

- Assume that you have a private business operating in a sector, where publicly traded companies have an average beta of 1 and where the average correlation of firms with the market is 0.25. Consider the cost of equity at three stages (Riskfree rate = 4%; ERP = 5%):
 - Stage 1: The nascent business, with a private owner, who is fully invested in that business.
 - Perceived Beta = $1 / 0.25 = 4$
 - Cost of Equity = $4\% + 4 (5\%) = 24\%$
 - Stage 2: Angel financing provided by specialized venture capitalist, who holds multiple investments, in high technology companies. (Correlation of portfolio with market is 0.5)
 - Perceived Beta = $1 / 0.5 = 2$
 - Cost of Equity = $4\% + 2 (5\%) = 14\%$
 - Stage 3: Public offering, where investors are retail and institutional investors, with diversified portfolios:
 - Perceived Beta = 1
 - Cost of Equity = $4\% + 1 (5\%) = 9\%$

TO VALUE THIS COMPANY...

Assume that this company will be fully owned by its current owner for two years, will access the technology venture capitalist at the start of year 3 and that is expected to either go public or be sold to a publicly traded firm at the end of year 5.

	1	2	3	4	5	Terminal year
E(Cash flow)	\$100	\$125	\$150	\$165	\$170	\$175
Market beta	1	1	1	1	1	1
Correlation	0.25	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.5	1
Beta used	4	4	2	2	2	1
Cost of equity	24.00%	24.00%	14.00%	14.00%	14.00%	9.00%
Terminal value					\$2,500	175/
Cumulated COE	1.2400	1.5376	1.7529	1.9983	2.2780	(.09-.02)
PV	\$80.65	\$81.30	\$85.57	\$82.57	\$1,172.07	2.4830

Value of firm	\$1,502	(Correct value, using changing costs of equity)
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Growth rate
2% forever
after year 5

Value of firm	\$1,221	(using 24% as cost of equity forever. You will undervalue firm)
---------------	---------	---

Value of firm	\$2,165	(Using 9% as cost of equity forever. You will overvalue firm)
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IMPLICATIONS

- **Proposition 1:** The value of a private business that is expected to transition to a publicly traded company will be higher than the value of an otherwise similar private business that does not expect to make this transition.
 - Private businesses in sectors that are “**hot**” in terms of going public (social media in 2014) will be worth more than private businesses in less sexy sectors.
 - As **IPOs boom (bust)**, private company valuations will increase (decrease).
 - Private companies in countries that have **easy access to public markets will have higher value than companies in countries without that access.**
- **Proposition 2:** The value of a private business that **expects to make the transition to a public company sooner will be higher** than the value of an otherwise similar company that will take longer.
 - Private businesses will be worth more if companies are able to go public earlier in their life cycle.

PRIVATE COMPANY VALUATION: CLOSING THOUGHTS

- The value of a private business will depend on the potential buyer.
- If you are the seller of a private business, you will maximize value, if you can sell to
 - An investor who has a long-time horizon
 - Who is well diversified (or whose investors are)
 - And does not think too highly of you (as a person)
- If you are valuing a private business for legal purposes (tax or divorce court), the assumptions you use and the value you arrive at will depend on which side of the legal divide you are on.
- As a final proposition, always keep in mind that the owner of a private business has the option of investing his wealth in publicly traded stocks. There has to be a relationship between what you can earn on those investments and what you demand as a return on your business.