

Equity Valuation Report

Arjun Amladi, Shaunak Bhattacharyya, Irene Do, Krish Doshi, Sujay Maddela, Sanders Zhang

	Current Price (5/5/23)	DCF Valuation	Relative Valuation	Market Valuation	Recommendation
Garmin Ltd.	\$103.78	\$70.02	\$132.48	\$114.33	Sell
Boston Beer Co.	\$310.31	\$287.12	\$348.05	\$267.05	Sell
Samsung Electronics Co.	₩ 65,100.00	₩ 79,736.30	₩ 162,913.84	₩ 218,270.85	Buy
Netflix	\$322.76	\$259.81	\$274.27	\$271.83	Sell
C3 AI	\$18.70	\$25.09	\$20.87		Buy
Chegg	\$10.14	\$11.79	\$10.37	\$20.85	Buy













Garmin Ltd.

I. Company Overview

Garmin Ltd. is a consumer technology company headquartered in Kansas, U.S., and domiciled in Switzerland. They are a designer and manufacturer of wireless positioning devices that are designed for outdoor usage. The company operates in five main segments: fitness, outdoor, aviation, marine, and automotive. Products include wearable devices, hand-held navigation tools, and other sensor-based electronics. They sell their products through diverse channels, including independent retailers, distributors, repair shops, and OEMs. Garmin does most of its business in the U.S. and also has a large commercial presence in Asia and Europe. The stock is trading at \$103.78 as of May 5th, 2023, down from \$106.03 a year prior.

II. DCF Valuation

We implemented a 2-stage DCF model as follows:

Carmin Ltd. manufactures GP\$-enabled technology for outdoor, without, marine, and sport applications. They are an active player in the wearable device market, which is expected to grow at a CAGR of 14.6% from 2023-2030. This growth is based on favorable tall livinds like increased health conclusioness, changing lifetyle patterns, and increased spending on personal care. However, in ill equipped to capitalize on this growth, given their weak economic most (vertical integration, manufacturing expertise). Furthermore, their largest competitors, Apple, Samuray and Huwevil, benefit from their phone-ammarated ecosystems which promote increased connectivity, Listly, agreement of the competition of the promote increased connectivity. Listly, agreement of the competition of the promote increased connectivity agreement of the promote increased connectivity. Listly, agreement of the promote increased connectivity is agreement of the promote increased and agreement of the promote increased in pursuing auto OBM contracts, which are a less profitable business that discrease consolidated margins. This is based on a misguided attempt to pursue growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, because their auto CBM business (infortalisment systems, analygation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufacturers will want to developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become acide. In short, Gammin is mature company associated and growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend agrees selvely to create new products and enter new markets. Base year Next year Year 2-5 Year 6-10 After year 10 Feffect management Sociation Socia	The impremented a 2 stage Ber model as follows.							
In the wearable device market, which is expected to grow at a CASR of 14.6% from 2033-2000. This growth is based on favorable tallwinds illincreased penalth conclosuress, changing lifetyle peaterns, and increased spending on personal care. However, familityle peaterns, and increased spending on personal care. However, and in ill equipped to capitalize on this growth, given their weak economic most (vertical integration, manufacturing expertise). Furthermore, their largest competitors, Apple, Samuring and Huaweil, benefit from their phone-marketuch ecosystems which promote increase connectivity. Listly, Starlink and other LEO satellites may render Garmin's GPS-technology obsolete. Garmin will invest heavily in producing more products and aggresively marketing said products (RBD and marketing) to be market share loss, which will result in margin erosion. Furthermore, management is interested in pursuing auto OEM contracts, which are a less profitable business that will decrease consolidated margins. This is based on a misquided attempt to pursue growth, Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, because their auto OEM business (infortalment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufacturers will want to develop / have developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is false and aggresively to create new products and enter new markets. **The Assumptions** **The Assumptions** **Revenues (a) \$4,860,286.00 2.9% 6.00% 9.60% 9.60% 9.33								
Increased health conclousness, changing lifestyle patterns, and increased spending on personal care. However, Garmin III equipped to capitalize on this growth, given their weak economic most (vertical integration, manufacturing expensies), given their weak economic most (vertical integration, manufacturing expensies) which promote increased connectivity, Lastity, Starlink and other LEO satellities may render dramin's GPS-technology obsolete. Garmin will invest heavily in livest heavily have been a captally a livest heavily have been a live heavily have been a live heavily livest heavily have been a live heavily have been a live heavily livest heavily have been a live heavily livest heavily l	Garmin Ltd. manufactures GPS-enabled technology for oudoor, aviation, automotive, marine, and sport applications. They are an active player							
Capitalize on this growth, given their weak economic moat (vertical Integration, manufacturing expertise). Furthermore, their largest competitors, Apple, Samsung and Huaweii, benefit from their phone-smartwarch ecosystems which promote increased connectivity. Lastly, Starlink and other LEO satellites may render Garmin's GPS-technology obsolete. Garmin will invest heavily in producting more products and agressively marketing said products (R8D and marketing) to prevent investible market share loss, which will promote investion to the provided of the p	in the wearable d	evice market, whi	ch is expected to	grow at a CAGR	of 14.6% from 202	3-2030. This growth is I	based on favorable tailwinds like	
Competitors, Apple, Samsung and Huaweil, benefit from their phone-smartwatch ecosystems which promive increased connectivity, Lastly, Starlink and other LEO satellities may render dramming GPS-technology obsolete. Garmin will invest heavily in invest heavily in invest heavily in invest heavily in invest heavily invested him and agreement invested in purpose growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, because their auto OEM business (infortalisment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most sut on amufacturers will want to deep on him and the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature and projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature and projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature and projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature and projection period. The company managements are also projection period. The company management is continue to spend aggressively to create new products and enter new markets.	increased healt	th conciousness,	changing lifestyle	e patterns, and	increased spendi	ng on personal care. H	owever, Garmin ill equipped to	
Startink and other LEO satellites may render Garmin's GPS-technology obsolete. Garmin will invest heavily in producting more products and aggresively marketing sail products (RBO and marketing) to prevent investible market share loss, which were less profitable business that will decrease consolidated margins. This is based on a misguided attempt to pursue growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, becuse their auto CBM business (Infotal ment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufacturers will want to develop! have developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity mode! relative to the sector, and will become sightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature company masquerading as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets.	capitalize on	this growth, giver	their weak econ	nomic moat (ver	tical integration, r	nanufacturing expertis	e). Furthermore, their largest	
Agressively marketing said products (R&D and marketing) to prevent investrable market share loss, which will result in margin erosion. Furthermore, management is interested in prussing auto OEM contracts, which are a less profitable business that will decrease consolidated margins. This is based on a misguided attempt to pursue growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, becuse their auto OEM business (infortalment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufactures will want to eveloped these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is marce company magnerating as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggressively to create new products and enter new markets.	competitors, App	le, Samsung and	Huaweii, benefit	from their pho	ne-smartwatch ec	osystems which promo	te increased connectivity. Lastly,	
Furthermore, management is interested in pursuing auto DEM contracts, which are a less profitable business that will decrease consolidated margins. This is based on a misguided attempt to pursue growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, becuse their auto DEM business (infotalment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufacturers will want to develop / have developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature company masquerading as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets.	Starlink and other	er LEO satellites n	nay render Garmi	n's GPS-technol	ogy obsolete. Gar	min will invest heavily	in producing more products and	
Furthermore, management is interested in pursuing auto DEM contracts, which are a less profitable business that will decrease consolidated margins. This is based on a misguided attempt to pursue growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, becuse their auto DEM business (infotalment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufacturers will want to develop / have developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature company masquerading as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets.		aggresively marketing said products (R&D and marketing) to prevent invevitable market share loss, which will result in margin erosion.						
margins This is based on a misguided attempt to pursue growth. Unfortunately, this growth will not materialize, because their auto OEM business (infortainment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufactures will want to develop of have developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is manuce company manuerading as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets.								
Dusiness (infotainment systems, navigation, etc.) is redundant, and most auto manufacturers will want to develop A have developed these capabilities in-house. They have a high repital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become sightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature company masquerading as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggressively to create new products and enter new markets.								
Capabilities in-house. They have a high capital intensity model relative to the sector, and will become slightly less efficient over the projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Carmin is s								
projection period. The company is fairly mature, and will continue to become safer. In short, Garmin is mature company masquerading as a growth company. Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets. The Assumptions								
Second company Their focus should be on scaling down reinvestment and instead management has expressed an intention to continue to spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets. The Assumptions								
Spend aggresively to create new products and enter new markets. The Assumptions								
Bose year Next year Year 2-5 Years 6-10 After year 10 Link to story	growth company.	ineir tocus snou					ssed an intention to continue to	
Revenues (a) S4,860,286.00 2.9% 6.00% 3.37% Results in a 15% loss in market share by year 10 Results in a 15% loss in market share by year 10 Margins decline, to reflect management's focus on growing lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower margin business lines and increased RRED spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking lower results in products/projects that cannot compete compete compete compete particles weak competitive advantage and spending on bad (NPV negative) projects Return on capital 18.13% Marginal ROIC = 8.55% 9.31% Decreases to reflect maturation			spend aggresi			nter new markets.		
Revenues (a) \$4,860,286.00 2.9% 6.00% 3.37% Share by year 10 Share by year								
S4,860,286.00 2.9% 6.00% 3.37% share by year 10		Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10		
Margins decline, to reflect management's focus on growing lower margin business lines and increased R&D spend, neither of which will result in the growth they are seeking which will result in the growth they are seeking in products/projects that cannot company will continue to invest in products/projects that cannot competent in products/projects that cannot competent in products/projects that cannot competent weak competitive advantage and spending on bad (NPV negative) projects Revenues								
Management's focus on growing lower margin business lines and lower law lines lower law law lines lower law law lines lower law	Revenues (a)	\$4,860,286.00	2.9%	6.00%		3.37%		
Departing margin 26.54% 20.1% 9.66% 19.00% 19								
Departing margin 26.54% 20.1% 19.00% 1								
Departing margin 26.54% 20.1% 9.66% 9.66% 19.00% 19.00% Swiss median tax rate								
Operating margin 26.54% 20.1% 9.66% 19.00% Swiss median tax rate 9.66% 9.66% 18.00% Swiss median tax rate Company will continue to invest in products/projects that cannot compete Lower return on capital reflects weak competitive advantage and spending on bad (NPV negative) 9.77% 9.31% projects to reflect maturation Spending on bad (NPV negative) Py.77% 9.31% Decreases to reflect maturation Decreases to reflect maturation The Cash Flows FCFF Sp.01,234.29 20.10% Sl.005,248.09 S99,737.13 S107,594.12 S802,143.02 2 S5,301,308.35 19.88% S1,033,900.10 S952,116.60 S232,615.55 S719,501.05 3 S5,619,386.85 19.77% S1,110,952.78 S1,003,659.25 S246,572.48 S775,086.76 4 S5,956,550.06 19.66% S1,171,057.74 S1,057,959.39 S261,366.83 S796,592.56 5 S6,313,943.07 19.55% S1,234,375.87 S1,115,162.39 S281,411.81 S833,750.57 6 S96,596.83 12.20% S1,486,022.97 S1,292,919.09 S259,460.98 S1,033,458.12 S8,3750.57 S6,989,083.75 21.26% S1,486,022.97 S1,292,919.09 S259,460.98 S1,033,458.12 S8,572,286.14 S7,288,476.60 19.75% S1,497,843.87 S1,253,222.62 S223,886.28 S1,023,986.35 S1,023,963.44 S7,838,006.07 19.00% S1,489,221.15 S1,223,122.64 S243,352.19 S1,033,889.65 S1,023,945.34								
Tax rate							which will result in the growth	
Reinvestment (c) 1.31 1.29 1.27 36.20% Company will continue to invest in products/projects that cannot compete Lower return on capital reflects weak competitive advantage and spending on bad (NPV negative) projects The Cash Flows FBIT EBIT 1.57 1 \$5,001,234.29 20.10% 51,005,248.09 \$909,737.13 \$107,594.12 \$802,143.02 2 \$5,301,308.35 19.88% \$1,053,900.10 \$952,116.60 \$232,615.55 \$719,501.05 3 \$5,613,986.85 19.77% \$1,110,597.74 \$1,057,799.39 \$261,366.83 \$796,592.56 4 \$5,956,550.06 19.66% \$1,171,057.74 \$1,057,799.39 \$261,366.83 \$796,592.56 5 \$6,139,440.07 19.55% \$1,249,775.62 \$1,300,113.12 \$277,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 6 \$6,659,568.31 22.02% \$1,466,715.62 \$1,300,113.12 \$277,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 7 \$6,989,083.75 21.26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,292,919.09 \$259,460.98 \$1,033,458.12 8 \$77,283,476.61 19.75% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,724.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 9 \$75,832,476.61 19.75% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,227,214.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 10 \$78,838,006.07 19.00% \$1,499,211.55 \$1,227,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 Terminal value \$13,558,687.79 PV (Cr over next 10 years) \$55,447,304.37 PV(Terminal value) \$55,447,804.30 PV (Cr over next 10 years) \$55,447,304.37 PV(Terminal value) \$55,447,804.30 PV (Cr over next 10 years) \$55,447,304.37 PV(Terminal value) \$55,447,804.37 PV(Terminal value) \$55,447,804.37 PV(Terminal value) \$55,447,804.37 PV(Terminal value) \$55,447,804.37 PV (Cr over next 10 years) \$55,447,304.37 PV (C	Operating margin		20.1%					
Reinvestment (c)	Tax rate	9.66%		9.66%		18.00%		
Return on capital 18.13% Marginal ROIC = 8.55% 9.31% projects pending on bad (NPV negative) portions of capital (d) 9.77% 9.31% projects pending on bad (NPV negative) portions of capital (d) 9.77% 9.31% projects pending on bad (NPV negative) portions pending on bad (NPV negative) projects pending on bad (NPV negative) portions pending on bad (NPV negative) projects projects pending on bad (NPV negative) projects pending negative projects pending on bad (NPV negative) projects pending negative p							Company will continue to invest	
Return on capital 18.13% Marginal ROIC = 8.55% 9.31% Decreases to reflect maturation spending on bad (NPV negative) projects 9.77% 9.31% Decreases to reflect maturation The Cash Flows FCFF S5,001,234.29 20.10% S1,005,248.09 S909,737.13 S107,594.12 S802,143.02 S5,301,308.35 19.88% S1,053,900.10 S952,116.60 S232,615.55 S719,501.05 S1,005,959.00 S1,005,950.00 S952,116.60 S232,615.55 S719,501.05 S1,005,950.00 S1,005,95							in products/projects that cannot	
Return on capital 18.13% Marginal ROIC = 8.55% 9.31% projects Decreases to reflect maturation The Cash Flows EBIT EBIT LT BIT (1.1) Reinvestment FCFF 1 \$5,001,234.29 20.10% \$1,005,248.09 \$999,737.13 \$107,594.12 \$802,143.02 2 \$5,301,308.35 19.88% \$1,005,248.09 \$999,737.13 \$107,594.12 \$802,143.02 3 \$5,619,386.85 19.77% \$1,109,522.78 \$1,003,659.25 \$224,572.48 \$577,986.76 4 \$5,956,550.06 19.66% \$1,171,057.74 \$1,003,659.25 \$246,572.48 \$577,986.76 5 \$6,313,943.07 19.55% \$1,224,375.87 \$1,115,162.39 \$281,411.81 \$833,750.57 6 \$6,589,568.31 22.02% \$1,466,175.62 \$1,300,1131.2 \$272,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 7 \$6,989,083.75 21.26% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 9 \$7,582,476.61 19.75% \$1,499,795.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$243,352.19 <td< td=""><td>Reinvestment (c)</td><td></td><td>1.31</td><td>1.29</td><td>1.27</td><td>36.20%</td><td>compete</td></td<>	Reinvestment (c)		1.31	1.29	1.27	36.20%	compete	
Return on capital (d)							Lower return on capital reflects	
Return on capital 18.13%							weak competitive advantage and	
Section Cost of capital							spending on bad (NPV negative)	
Revenues	Return on capital	18.13%	Marginal ROIC =	8.	.55%	9.31%	projects	
Revenues	Cost of capital (d)			9.77%		9.31%	Decreases to reflect maturation	
1				The	Cash Flows			
2 S5,301,308.35 19.88% S1,053,900.10 S952,116.60 S232,615.55 S719,501.05 3 S5,619,386.85 19.77% S1,110,952.78 S1,003,659.25 S246,572.48 S757,086.76 4 S5,956,550.06 19.66% S1,171,057.74 S1,057,959.39 S261,366.83 S796,592.56 5 S6,313,943.07 19.55% S1,234,375.87 S1,115,162.39 S281,411.81 S833,750.57 6 S6,659,568.31 22.02% S1,466,075.62 S1,300,113.12 S272,145.86 S1,027,967.26 7 S6,989,083.75 21.26% S1,466,022.97 S1,292,919.09 S259,460.98 S1,033,458.12 8 S7,298,141.03 20.51% S1,496,705.54 S1,277,241.84 S243,352.19 S1,033,889.65 9 S7,582,476.61 19.75% S1,497,843.87 S1,253,222.62 S223,886.28 S1,029,336.34 10 S7,838,006.07 19.00% S1,489,221.15 S1,221,161.35 S201,204.90 S1,019,957.05 Terminal year S8,102,146.88 19.00% S1,539,407.91 S1,262,314.48 S456,928.01 S805,386.47 Terminal value S13,558,694.77 PV(Terminal value) S5,404,863.09 PV (CF over next 10 years) S5,447,304.37 Value of operating assets S0,000 Probability of failure - 0.00% Value of operating assets S2,660,842.00 Value of equity S13,398,468.46 - Value of equity options S0,000 Number of shares 191,3559.48		Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF	
3 S5,619,386.85 19.77% \$1,110,952.78 \$1,003,659.25 \$246,572.48 \$757,086.76 4 \$5,956,550.06 19.66% \$1,171,057.74 \$1,057,795.39 \$261,366.83 \$796,592.56 5 \$6,313,943.07 19.55% \$1,234,375.87 \$1,115,162.39 \$281,411.81 \$833,750.57 6 \$6,659,568.31 22.02% \$1,466,175.62 \$1,300,113.12 \$272,148.86 \$1,027,967.26 7 \$6,989,083.75 21.26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,292,919.09 \$259,460.98 \$1,033,458.12 8 \$77,298,141.03 20.51% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,486.12 9 \$7,582,476.61 19.75% \$1,497,843.87 \$1,253,222.62 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 10 \$7,838,006.07 19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 Terminal year \$8,102,146.88 19.00% \$1,539,407.91 \$1,262,314.88 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 Terminal value \$13,558,694.77 PV(Terminal value) \$5,404,863.09 PV(CF over next 10 years) \$5,404,7304.37 Value of operating assets \$10,852,167.46 Adjustment for distress \$0.000 Probability of failure = 0.00% **Potability of failure = 0.00% **Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 - Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 - Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares	1	\$5,001,234.29	20.10%	\$1,005,248.09	\$909,737.13	\$107,594.12	\$802,143.02	
4 \$5,956,550.06 19.66% \$1,171,057.74 \$1,057,959.39 \$261,366.83 \$796,592.56 \$5 \$6,313,943.07 19.55% \$1,234,975.87 \$1,115,162.39 \$281,411.81 \$833,750.57 \$6 \$6,565,956.831 22.02% \$1,466,175.62 \$1,300,113.12 \$272,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 \$7 \$6,989,083.75 \$21.26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,300,113.12 \$272,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 \$8 \$7,298,141.03 \$20.51% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,458.12 \$9 \$7,582,476.61 \$19.75% \$1,497,843.87 \$1,253,222.62 \$223,886.28 \$10,029,336.34 \$10 \$57,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 \$\$ \$1,996,405.40 \$1,339,407.91 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 \$\$ \$1,396,407.91 \$1,246,234.48 \$456,928.01 \$\$ \$805,386.47 \$\$\$ \$1,000,400,400,400,400,400,400,400,400,40	2	\$5,301,308.35	19.88%	\$1,053,900.10	\$952,116.60	\$232,615.55	\$719,501.05	
5 \$6,313,943.07 19.55% \$1,234,375.87 \$1,115,162.39 \$281,411.81 \$833,750.57 6 \$6,659,568.31 \$2.02% \$1,466,175.62 \$1,300,113.12 \$272,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 7 \$6,989,083.75 \$21,26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,292,919.09 \$259,460.98 \$1,033,458.12 8 \$7,298,141.03 \$20,51% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,227,241.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 9 \$7,582,476.61 \$19,75% \$1,497,843.87 \$1,223,222.62 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 10 \$7,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.93 \$1,019,957.05 Terminal year \$8,102,146.88 \$19.00% \$1,539,407.91 \$1,226,314.48 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 Treminal value FV(Crown rext 10 years) \$54,04,863.09 \$54,04,863.09 \$7,447,304.37 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 \$1,247,447.34 <	3	\$5,619,386.85	19.77%	\$1,110,952.78	\$1,003,659.25	\$246,572.48	\$757,086.76	
6 \$6,659,568.31 22.02% \$1,466,175.62 \$1,300,113.12 \$272,145.86 \$1,027,967.26 \$7 \$6,989,083.75 21.26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,292,919.09 \$259,460,98 \$1,033,458.12 \$8 \$77,298,141.03 20.51% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$243,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 \$9 \$7,582,476.61 19.75% \$1,497,843.87 \$1,253,222.62 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 \$10 \$7,838,006.07 19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 \$\$\$ Terminal year \$8,102,146.88 19.00% \$1,539,407.91 \$51,262,314.48 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 \$\$\$\$ The Value \$\$\$\$\$\$\$ \$1,033,458.09 \$	4	\$5,956,550.06	19.66%	\$1,171,057.74	\$1,057,959.39	\$261,366.83	\$796,592.56	
7 \$6,989,083.75 21.26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,292,919.09 \$259,460.98 \$1,033,458.12 \$8 \$7,298,141.03 20.51% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$2343,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 \$9 \$7,582,476.61 \$19.75% \$1,497,843.87 \$1,253,222.6 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 \$10 \$7,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,253,222.6 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 \$10 \$7,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 \$1,497,241.84 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 \$10 \$1,000 \$	5	\$6,313,943.07	19.55%	\$1,234,375.87	\$1,115,162.39	\$281,411.81	\$833,750.57	
7 \$6,989,083.75 21.26% \$1,486,022.97 \$1,292,919.09 \$259,460.98 \$1,033,458.12 \$8 \$7,298,141.03 20.51% \$1,496,705.54 \$1,277,241.84 \$2343,352.19 \$1,033,889.65 \$9 \$7,582,476.61 \$19.75% \$1,497,843.87 \$1,253,222.6 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 \$10 \$7,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,253,222.6 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 \$10 \$7,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 \$1,497,241.84 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 \$10 \$1,000 \$	6	\$6,659,568,31	22.02%	\$1,466,175,62	\$1.300.113.12	\$272.145.86	\$1.027.967.26	
8								
9 \$7,582,476.61 19.75% \$1,497,843.87 \$51,253,222.62 \$223,886.28 \$1,029,336.34 10 \$7,838,006.07 19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$1,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$51,019,957.05 Terminal year \$8,102,146.88 19.00% \$1,539,407.91 \$1,262,314.48 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 The Value Terminal value \$133,558,694.77 PV(Terminal value) \$5,404,863.09 PV(CF over next 10 years) \$5,404,304.37 Value of operating assets = \$10,852,167.46 Adjustment for distress \$0.00 Probability of failure = 0.00% - Debt & Minority Interests \$11,541.00 + Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$2,660,842.00 Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 - Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares \$193,559.48								
10 \$7,838,006.07 \$19.00% \$1,489,221.15 \$51,221,161.35 \$201,204.30 \$1,019,957.05 \$ Terminal year \$8,102,146.88 \$19.00% \$1,539,407.91 \$1,262,314.48 \$456,928.01 \$805,386.47 \$ The Value S13,558,694.77 \$ PV(Terminal value) \$514,048,863.09 \$ PV(CF over next 10 years) \$55,447,304.37 \$ Value of operating assets = \$10,852,167.46 \$ Adjustment for distress \$0.00 \$ - Debt & Minority Interests \$514,41.00 \$ + Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$52,660,842.00 \$ Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 \$ - Value of equity options \$0.00 \$ Number of shares \$193,559.48 \$ 19,359.48 \$ Shipper of shares \$193,559.48 \$ Shipper of shares \$19								
Terminal year S8,102,146.88 19.00% S1,539,407.91 S1,262,314.48 S456,928.01 S805,386.47								
### The Value S13,558,694,77								
Terminal value	Terminal year	\$6,102,140.00	19.00%			3430,926.01	\$803,380.47	
PV(Terminal value) \$5,404,863.09 PV (CF over next 10 years) \$5,447,304.37 Value of operating assets = \$10,852,167.46 Adjustment for distress \$0,00 Probability of failure = 0.00% - Debt & Minority Interests \$11,541.00 - + Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$2,660,842.00 - Value of equity \$13,398,488.46 - - Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares 191,359.48	Terminal value				ne value			
PV (CF over next 10 years) \$5,447,304.37 Value of operating assets = \$10,852,167.46 Adjustment for distress \$0.00 Probability of failure = - Debt & Minority Interests \$114,541.00 + Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$2,660,842.00 Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 - Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares 191,359.48				. , ,				
Value of operating assets = \$10,852,167.46 Adjustment for distress \$0.00 Probability of failure = 0.00% - Debt & Minority Interests \$11,454.100 + Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$2,660,842.00 Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 - Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares \$191,359.48								
Adjustment for distress \$0.00 Probability of failure = 0.00% - Debt & Minority Interests \$114,541.00								
- Debt & Minority Interests								
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets								
Value of equity \$13,398,468.46 - Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares 191,359.48								
- Value of equity options \$0.00 Number of shares \$191,359.48								
Number of shares 191,359.48				. , ,				
Value per share \$70.02 Stock was trading at = \$103.78								
	Value per share			\$70.02		Stock was trading at =	\$103.78	

The DCF output indicates that Garmin should be trading at \$70.02, suggesting that the stock is **overvalued** by 48%.

III. Relative Valuation

For Garmin's relative valuation, 15 companies were used as comparables. Examples include Apple, Samsung, Casio, Fortive, and Sonos. We screened by market capitalization (small to mega cap), industry (consumer electronics, sensor-technology, wearable devices) and region (Americas, APAC, Europe). The EV/Sales multiple was used to avoid needing to resolve differences in calculating non-GAAP metrics like EBITDA or EBIT across the sample pool. We regressed EV/Sales against EBITDA Margin. After-tax operating margin (NOPAT) is a direct driver of EV/Sales, with increased profitability resulting in a higher multiple. We used EBITDA margin as a proxy, which allowed me to avoid different tax rates across countries. Additionally, due to the limited sample size, single-regression was used.

Regression Statistics				
Multiple R	0.842872366			
R Square	0.710433825			
Adjusted R Square	0.688159504			
Standard Error	1.488642791			
Observations	15			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	-0.956194472	0.711712354	-1.34351254	0.202088769
X Variable 1	23.054483	4.082214398	5.647543404	7.96249E-05

EV/Sales = -0.956194472 + 23.054483 * EBITDA Margin

Implied Price/Share	\$ 132.48
Equity Value	\$25,351,510.73
+ Cash	\$ 2,660,842.00
- Debt	\$ (114,541.00)
Implied EV	\$22,805,209.73
Implied EV/Sales	4.69
EBITDA Margin	24.5%

Based on the single-regression, Garmin should trade at 4.69x EV/Sales, resulting in a relative share price of \$132.48. The stock is **undervalued** and has 27% upside potential.

IV. Market Valuation

The Market-wide Regressions of Multiples – Global companies in January 2023 model was used with the figures below:

Market Valuation	Regression Used: Glo	obal Firms in Jan of 2023
Inputs		
Expected Revenue	Growth (2-5)	6.00%
Operating Margin		20.10%
DFR		0.005734554
Tax Rate		9.66%
Implied EV/Sales		3.98
Implied EV		\$19,331,702.82
- Debt		\$ (114,541.00)
+ Cash		\$ 2,660,842.00
Implied Equity Val		\$21,878,003.82
Implied Share Pric	e	\$ 114.33

EV / Sales =
$$2.69 + (2.50 * g) + (8.10 * Oper Margin) + (2.10 * DFR) - (5.10 * Tax Rate)$$

The market valuation model resulted in a 3.98x EV/Sales multiple, implying a share price of \$114.33. This indicates that Garmin is **undervalued** with an upside of 10.2%.

V. Analysis & Recommendation

Company	Price as of 5/5/2023						Recommendation
Garmin Ltd.	\$	103.78	\$	70.02	\$ 132.48	\$ 114.33	SELL

The intrinsic valuation suggests that Garmin is overvalued, while the relative and market valuation suggest it is undervalued. The market valuation is the least informative, since it is based on a regression of all global companies and is not tailored to Garmin's characteristics. The relative valuation is slightly more valid, although it still lacks specificity. Most of Garmin's competitors are private, and those that are public are larger consumer electronics companies with different product mixes. The DCF allows us to account for different stages of revenue growth, reinvestment, and capital efficiency over time. The discrepancy between intrinsic valuation and relative and market valuation is likely due to differences in opinion over Garmin's staying power, which we feel is weak given their lack of a meaningful moat, and management's strategy with regards to growing the auto OEM business line, which we think will be unfruitful and erode margins. Therefore, we assign a <u>SELL</u> recommendation.

May-23

The Boston Beer Company, Inc.

I. Company Overview

The Boston Beer Company (NYSE: SAM) is a high-end alcoholic beverage company and one of the largest craft brewers in the United States. The company's brands include Truly Hard Seltzers, Twisted Tea, Samuel Adams, Angry Orchards Hard Cider and Dogfish Head Craft Brewery, and other local craft beer brands. The company has four primary breweries located in Boston, MA, Cincinnati, OH, Milton, DE, and Breinigsville, PA. The brewery in Delaware also produces a small number of distilled spirits and all the breweries except the one in Pennsylvania have on-site tap rooms. Additionally, the company owns five smaller breweries focused on brewing and packaging beers for retail sales, an apple orchard and cidery in Walden, NY, a restaurant in Rehoboth, DE, and a boutique inn in Lewes, DE.

II. DCF Valuation

+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets

Value of equity

- Value of equity options Number of shares

A two-stage Discounted Cash Flow valuation was implemented as follows:

		rtuvigo	rang boston beer ed	impuny s southey into	agn competition and chan	gc
Boston Beer Company is	one of the oldest alco	holic beverage manufac	turers and distribute	ors in the US. The comp	any primarily operates in th	e "High End" beer category but is shifting gradually to the
"Beyond Beer" category	(hard seltzer, flavored r	malt beverages, ciders, e	etc.) given the stiff co	ompetition in the beer n	narket and the decrease in o	verall demand for beer. Over 84% of the company's 2022 volume
is in the Beyond Beer cat	egory and the compan	y has 25% market share	in that category. The	e company has a health	y balance sheet, with a stro	ng cash balance and low debt. The company expects the Beyond
Beer category to grow go	ing forward, with the s	hift in consumers' pref	erences towards hea	Ithier, low-calorie alcoh-	olic beverages. One of the n	najor risks that the company faces is competition, not just in the
beer category but also in	the Beyond Beer categ	ory, from domestic and	d international name	s such as AB InBev, Mol	lson Coors, Constellation B	ands, and Mark Anthony Brands. Furthermore, the company's
growth prospects are sha	aken by the decelating	growth trends in the ma	arket for hard seltzer	s in 2021-2022 which	impacted the company's vo	lume of production and shipment and increased supply chain
costs in the form of dest	ruction of inventory, v	vrite-offs of third-party	production prepayr	nent, and termination o	of various third-party contra	cts.
				The Assumptions		
	Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
Revenues (a)	\$2,090.33	-2.0%	8.00%		2.50%	Decrease in revenue next year due to anticipated decline in shipping and volume, reduction in discretionary spending, and stringent monetary policy. Future growth driven by growth in Beyond Beer category, increases in demand, and favoravle macroeconomic condiations.
` ,	. ,					Margins initially decrease due to increased costs, supply chin
						issues, and stiff competition. Gradually increase later aided by
Operating margin (b)	6.03%	5.0%			15.00%	improving revenues and reversal of supply chain issues.
Tax rate	26.40%		26.40%		25.00%	US marginal tax rate over time
						Slight decrease assuming company will take on leverage to
Reinvestment (c)		2.20	1.80	1.80	32.72%	spurt growth
Return on capital	9.83%	Marginal ROIC =	49	9.40%	7.64%	Low company debt with steady invested capital base leading to high marginal ROIC
						Mature company that has long-term cost of capital equal to
						ROIC. Driven by interest rate decreses in the future to further
						macroeconomic recovery and expected increases in capital
Cost of capital (d)			7.58% —		7.64%	investment.
				The Cash Flows		
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$2,048.53	5.00%	\$102.43	\$75.39	\$0.00	\$75.39
2	\$2,212.41	7.00%	\$154.87	\$113.98	\$91.05	\$22.94
3	\$2,389.40	8.00%	\$191.15	\$140.69	\$98.33	\$42.36
4	\$2,580.55	9.00%	\$232.25	\$170.94	\$106.20	\$64.74
5	\$2,787.00	10.00%	\$278.70	\$205.12	\$114.69	\$90.43
6	\$2,979.30	11.41%	\$340.00	\$251.19	\$106.83	\$144.36
7	\$3,152.10	12.31%	\$387.99	\$287.74	\$96.00	\$191.74
8	\$3,300.25	13.21%	\$435.83	\$324.43	\$82.30	\$242.13
9	\$3,419.06	14.10%	\$482.19	\$360.29	\$66.00	\$294.29
10	\$3,504.54	15.00%	\$525.68	\$394.26	\$47.49	\$346.77
Terminal year	\$3,592.15	15.00%	\$538.82	\$404.12	\$132.24	\$271.88
				The Value		
Terminal value			\$5,289.49			
PV(Terminal value)			\$2,542.53			
PV (CF over next 10 years	•		\$896.76			
Value of operating assets	5 =		\$3,439.29			
Adjustment for distress	-4-		\$0.00		Probability of failure	= 0.00%
- Debt & Minority Intere	sts		\$55.60			

Stock was trading at = \$310.31

\$3,564.25

Navigating Boston Beer Company's Journey Through Competition and Change

The DCF valuation yielded an implied stock price of \$287.12, which is 7.47% lower than the current trading price of \$310.31.

III. Relative Valuation

The Relative Valuation used a set of 57 comparable companies in the breweries industry. Although it would be preferable to have a set of publicly traded companies in the US ast most of the operations of the Boston Beer Company is in the US, there are only a couple of publicly traded breweries in the US. The dataset was cleaned to remove the companies for which the metrics under consideration were not available. EV/Sales was used as earnings were not constant.

Regression Equation:

TEV/Sales = 0.36 + 0.96*(5-Year Beta) + 0.07*(EBITDA Margin)

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.5371
R Square	0.2885
Adjusted R Square	0.2621
Standard Error	1.1645
Observations	57

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%
Intercept	0.3604	0.3616	0.9966	0.3234	-0.3646	1.0854
5 Year Beta	0.9625	0.4398	2.1886	0.0330	0.0808	1.8443
EBITDA Margin %	0.0681	0.0166	4.1126	0.0001	0.0349	0.1013

TEV / Sales	2.05
Sales	\$ 2,070.22
TEV	\$ 4,243.95
- Debt	\$ 51.94
+ Cash	\$ 122.56
Equity Value	\$ 4,314.57
- Value of Options	\$ 28.88
Value of Common Stock	\$ 4,285.69
# Shares	12.31
Implied Share Price	\$ 348.05

The R-square of this regression is 28.85%. The Boston Beer Company's TEV/Sales was calculated to be 2.05x which led to a predicted share price of \$348.05, implying that the current share price is undervalued by 12.16%. The average TEV/EBITDA of the comparables was 1.89x which led to a predicted share price of \$321.15, implying that the current share price is undervalued by 3.49%.

IV. Market Valuation

The Market Valuation used Prof. Damodaran's market-wide regression of multiples for US companies as of January 2023. The regression equation is as follows:

EV/EBITDA= 23.93 + 25.40 g - 8.20 DFR - 34.40Tax Rate

g		8.00%
Debt	\$	51.94
MV of Equity	\$	3,820.95
DFR		0.013
Tax Rate		26.40%
Market TEV/EBITDA	16	.77042825
Market TEV	\$	3,246.59
- Debt	\$	51.94
+ Cash	\$	122.56
Market Value of Equity	\$	3,317.21
- Value of Options	\$	28.88
Market Value of Common Stock	\$	3,288.33
# Shares		12.31
Implied Share Price	\$	267.05

Using the above equation, the share price was calculated to be \$267.05, implying that the current share price is overvalued by 13.94%.

V. Analysis & Recommendation

Method	<u>Value/Share</u>
DCF	\$287.12
TEV/EBITDA Regression	\$348.05
Avg. TEV/EBITDA of comparables	\$321.15
Market TEV/EBITDA Regression	\$267.05
Current Price	\$310.31

All methods except for Relative Valuation conclude that the Boston Beer Company stock is overvalued. The DCF value is believed to be the most precise, as it accurately captures the firm's idiosyncratic risks and opportunities. The company's current market in US is saturated and has a lot of competition from other international breweries. Furthermore, the consumers are shifting away from the traditional beer industry due to health reasons, which defeats Boston Beer Company's moat.

Hence, a **SELL** recommendation is applied on the stock of Boston Beer Company.

Samsung Electronics Co.

I. Company Overview

Samsung Electronics Co. is an international electronics company based in South Korea. Their products are primarily within the Technology Hardware, Storage, and Peripherals Industry and they have 4 main streams of revenue: Electronics, Auto Parts, Software (System & Application), and Electronics (Consumer & Office). Their largest market resides in the Americas, and their other consumer groups are located in Korea, China, Asia & Africa (excluding Korea & China), and Europe.

Samsung is known for its innovation and it is the market share leader in the TV Market and holds a strong market share of 20.3% in the smartphone market. Competitors of Samsung include Apple, LG Electronics, and Nokia. While it may be difficult for Samsung to sustain growth in the industry due to the market saturation and company maturity, they are in a dominant market position and continue to release innovative products.

As of May 5, 2023, Samsung's share price was \\\ 65,100.00

II. DCF Valuation

We implemented a 2-stage DCF model as follows:

The Assumptions							
	Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story	
						Samsung's innovation will continue to	
						progress and dominate the market.	
						Competitors cater to different consumer	
						groups and market share is unlikely to	
						change signficantly. However, high growth is	
						limited given Samsung's maturity and the	
Revenues (a)	₩ 302,231,360,000,000.00	22.4%	4.00%		2.66%	crowded industry.	
nevenues (u)	302,231,300,000,000.00	22.470	4.50%		2.00%	ciowaca maasay.	
						Manufact to the second divides 60MB to an	
						Margins before and during COVID have	
						hovered around 20% with the recent year	
						having a lower margin due to higher	
						operating expenses, specifically in SG&A and	
						R&D expenses. After year 10, expect margin	
Operating margin (b)	14.35%	15.0%			21.00%	to converges to industry averages Samsung is present in (electronics, auto parts, etc.).	
	25.20%	15.0%	25.20%		25.20%	Global/US marginal tax rate over time	
Tax rate	25.20%		25.20%	1	25.20%		
						Similar to past and current years but slowly	
						increasing due to the need for	
						innovation/high R&D investment to stay	
Reinvestment (c)		0.80	0.81	0.85	30.95%	competitive in the electronics/tech sector.	
						Samsung wil continue to have strong	
						innovation and presence in the market, past	
						innovations have clearly paid off, for	
						example Samsung has been the lead TV	
Return on capital	10.32%	Marginal ROIC =	25.3	19%	8.60%	company for 17 consecutive years.	
						Cost of capital in the long term similar to	
						firms in the same industries. Currently	
						higher due to large amount of equity over	
Cost of capital (d)			13.23%		8.60%	relatively risk free debt.	
			The Cash i			T	
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF	
1	₩ 370,052,077,184,000.00	15.00%	₩ 55,507,811,577,600.00	₩ 41,519,843,060,044.80	₩ 84,775,896,480,000.00	-₩ 43,256,053,419,955.20	
2	₩ 384,854,160,271,360.00	21.00%	₩ 80,819,373,656,985.60	₩ 60,452,891,495,425.20	₩ 18,274,176,651,061.70	₩ 42,178,714,844,363.50	
3	₩ 400,248,326,682,214.00	21.00%	₩ 84,052,148,603,265.00		₩ 19,005,143,717,104.20	₩ 43,865,863,438,138.00	
4	₩ 416,258,259,749,503.00	21.00%	₩ 87,414,234,547,395.60	₩ 65,385,847,441,451.90	₩ 19,765,349,465,788.30	₩ 45,620,497,975,663.60	
5	₩ 432,908,590,139,483.00	21.00%	₩ 90,910,803,929,291.50	₩ 68,001,281,339,110.00	₩ 19,588,623,988,211.90	₩ 48,412,657,350,898.10	
- 6	₩ 449,066,470,357,849.00	21.00%	₩ 94,303,958,775,148.30	₩ 70,539,361,163,810.90	₩ 19,009,270,845,136.50	₩ 51,530,090,318,674.50	
7	₩ 464,625,725,422,808.00	21.00%	₩ 97,571,402,338,789.70	₩ 72,983,408,949,414.70	₩ 18,305,005,958,775.00	₩ 54,678,402,990,639.70	
- 8	₩ 479,480,739,116,026.00	21.00%	₩ 100,690,955,214,365.00	₩ 75,316,834,500,345.30	₩ 17,476,486,697,903.60	₩ 57,840,347,802,441.70	
9	₩ 493,527,606,849,169.00	21.00%	₩ 103,640,797,438,325.00	₩ 77,523,316,483,867.50	₩ 16,525,726,744,874.20	₩ 60,997,589,738,993.30	
10	₩ 506,665,311,743,494.00	21.00%	₩ 106,399,715,466,134.00	₩ 79,586,987,168,668.00	₩ 15,456,123,405,088.20	₩ 64,130,863,763,579.90	
Terminal year	₩ 520,152,742,342,106.00	21.00%	₩ 109,232,075,891,842.00	₩ 81,705,592,767,098.00	₩ 25,284,850,958,616.00	₩ 56,420,741,808,482.00	
			The Val	l e			
Terminal value			₩ 949,844,138,189,932.00				
PV(Terminal value)			₩ 310,441,760,382,564.00				
PV (CF over next 10 years			₩ 191,885,574,695,744.00				
Value of operating assets	=		₩ 502,327,335,078,307.00		Book of the office	0.00%	
Adjustment for distress					Probability of failure =	0.00%	
- Debt & Minority Interes			₩ 10,383,282,000,000.00				
+ Cash & Other Non-ope	erating assets		₩ 49,680,710,000,000.00				
Value of equity			₩ 541,624,763,078,307.00				
- Value of equity options	5		W -				
Number of shares			₩ 6,792,700,000.00		- 1		
Value per share			₩ 79,736.30	l .	Stock was trading at =	₩65,100.00	

According to the DCF Valuation above, Samsung's stock should be priced at ₩ 79,736.30, indicating that the stock is <u>undervalued</u>.

III. Relative Valuation

For Samsung's relative valuation, 50 companies were used as comparables. Since Samsung primarily operates in the Technology Hardware, Storage, and Peripherals Industry and is a large company with a latest Market Capitalization of approximately \$326.8 billion, comparables that primarily operate in the same industry with a Market Capitalization of at least \$10 billion were used. Some of the comparables used were Apple Inc., Cisco Systems Inc., and the Xiaomi Corporation.

The EV/EBITDA multiple was used since Samsung's earnings are stable and because it encompasses more factors than other multiples like the P/E ratio. The regression ran EV/EBITDA against Market Cap/Forward Total Revenues since it had a high t Stat.

	Regression Statistics
Multiple R	0.646203637
R Square	0.41757914
Adjusted R Square	0.405693
Standard Error	7.640161671
Observations	51

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	9.307607244	1.50080394	6.20174761	1.1429E-07
Market Cap/Forward Total Revenues	2.291744317	0.38664926	5.92719175	3.0295E-07

The single variable regression yielded the equation:

Using this equation, Samsung's EV/EBITDA multiple was 12.93 and the Relative Price per Share was **₩ 162,913.84**, indicating that the stock is underpriced with an upside of 161.50%.

IV. Market Valuation

The Market-wide Regressions of Multiples –Global companies in January 2023 model was used with the figures below:

Market Valuation	Regression	used: Global Firms in January 2023
g		4%
Total Debt	₩	10,333,242,000,000.00
MV of Equity	₩	442,204,770,000,000.00
DFR		0.022833976
Effective Tax Rate		25.20%

EV/EBITDA =
$$25.62 + 9.20*g - 11.40*DFR - 32.70*Tax$$
 Rate (0.04) (0.024) (0.252)

This model yielded a multiple of 17.48 and a price per share of \ 218,270.85, indicating that the stock is very undervalued with an upside of 235.29%. Hence, the market valuation points to the same recommendation as the DCF Valuation and the Relative Valuation, to buy, however the higher number from this model is likely due to the fact that we predict Samsung to have positive long term growth higher than Capital IQ's estimate of -5.48% and because they have a low leverage ratio of 2.8% compared to Capital IQ's calculated industry average leverage ratio of 4%.

V. Analysis & Recommendation

	Price on 3/23/2023	DCF Valuation	Relative Valuation	Market Valuation	Recommendation
Samsung Electronics Co.	₩ 65,100.00	₩ 79,736.30	₩ 162,913.84	₩ 218,270.85	Buy

All 3 valuations indicate that Samsung is currently underpriced, however we believe that the DCF Valuation is the most accurate indicator of Samsung's true value since it is more thorough in terms of growth stages (having multiple) and it analyzes key financial figures in the model like capitalizing R&D expenses. Thus, we believe Samsung Electronics Co. is very underpriced and give a **BUY** recommendation. The tech market has had substantial growth and is likely to expand further, given the modernization of school, work, and more.

Netflix

I. Company Overview

Netflix Inc. is a global entertainment company headquartered in Los Gatos, California. Since its establishment in 1997, Netflix has transformed the way people consume television shows and movies through its subscription-based streaming service. With a focus on innovation and technology, Netflix offers a diverse range of content, including original series, documentaries, and feature films. Operating in over 190 countries, Netflix's success stems from its commitment to quality content creation, personalized user experience, and strategic international expansion. With millions of subscribers worldwide, Netflix continues to lead the digital streaming industry by delivering captivating entertainment experiences. As of 5th May, 2023, the company had a closing stock price of \$322.76, as compared to \$180.87 a year prior.

II. DCF Valuation

We implemented a 2-stage DCF with the following assumptions:

Netflix

"A mature firm failing to show it's moat against rising competition"

Netflix is a subscription based streaming service that allows its members to watch TV shows and movies without commercials on an internet-connected device. It is a mature market company that is facing problems with retaining market share because of emerging completion when the production houses like Disney and HBO launch their streaming platforms. After two excellent years of the pandemic, Netflix saw a drop in subscribers and market share from 49% to 44%. Currently, the company struggles to differentiate itself from competition through a tangible MOAT and are shifting their focus towards investing heavily in their original content. My expectations for the company are that while their revenue will grow, it is inevitable that they will lose some more market share till they stabilise at 35% in year 10. This is mainly because in the coming years, consumers will be put in a position where they have to pick between a few streaming services instead of having all. Some services offer the original shows of 2000s and 2010s that attract a set of consumers while the other services offer live sports and streams that attract another set. Netflix will primarily focus on creation of content for the millennial population.

Netflix will lose market share also because it has been unable to mitigate a few problems:

- 1. Ads advertisements are a great cash source and Netflix is the only streaming service that doesn't have ads every time this has been proposed, Netflix has faced severe backlash
- 2. Cheaper subscriptions or price bundles while some companies have tie-ups to push their brand like Hulu and Spotify, others offer a much cheaper subscription plan than Netflix and this is not the best position in a recessionary cash-tied environment
- 3. Password sharing this is a very big struggle for Netflix. If they find a way around this issue, they could sincerely multiply their subscriber base very fast.

Operating margin is currently at 17% and Netflix aims to enhance this and reach 25% in the next decade. This will be possible through being more selective while selecting which Originals they want to produce to reduce costs. Compounded annual growth is an average of the Industry Growth US (around 30%) which is 45% of the Netflix subscriber base and Global Average (10%0 which is 55%. Sales to Capital ratio starts at 1.20 and reduces to 0.90. This is because they want to differentiate through original content in the future and so will reinvest more money into the company instead of returning money to share holders. Hence, since Netflix has not seen a significant subscriber growth since exactly one year ago in 2022, and seen a decline as well, it is hard for me to justify their share price at \$323. My valuation is in line with what their price was around \$200 one year ago. So now, I have a sell recommendation for an overvalued stock.

				The Assumptions		
	Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
Revenues (a)	\$3,16,15,550.00	8.5%	20.00%		2.00%	Based on growth current rate + g(future years)
			Margins improve as they aim to beocme mor			
						in the projects they decide to produce and thereby
Operating margin (b)	22.21%	17.8%			25.00%	acheively higher profitability
						Found in the 10k based on what the company
Tax rate	15.00%		15.00%		25.00%	expectations are
						Reinvestment increases as Netflix shifts it's MOAT to
Reinvestment (c)		#REF!	1.20	0.90	25.19%	original content and that requires more reinvestment
						Reduces since after year 10, Netflix is very mature and
Return on capital	15.82%	Marginal ROIC =	19.21%		7.94%	has significant invested capital over time
						Reduces as Netflix gets a more global horizon and
Cost of capital (d)			11.61%		7.94%	benefits from economies of scale

	The Cash Flows							
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF		
1	\$3,42,89,400.78	17.82%	\$61,09,221.56	\$51,92,838.33	\$57,14,900.13	-\$5,22,061.80		
2	\$4,11,47,280.94	20.21%	\$83,16,317.33	\$70,68,869.73	\$68,57,880.16	\$2,10,989.57		
3	\$4,93,76,737.12	21.41%	\$1,05,70,731.66	\$89,85,121.91	\$82,29,456.19	\$7,55,665.73		
4	\$5,92,52,084.55	22.61%	\$1,33,94,259.04	\$1,13,85,120.19	\$98,75,347.42	\$15,09,772.76		
5	\$7,11,02,501.46	23.80%	\$1,69,24,368.11	\$1,43,85,712.89	\$1,29,56,455.82	\$14,29,257.07		
6	\$8,27,63,311.70	25.00%	\$2,06,90,827.92	\$1,71,73,387.18	\$1,17,70,782.11	\$54,02,605.07		
7	\$9,33,57,015.60	25.00%	\$2,33,39,253.90	\$1,89,04,795.66	\$95,43,161.59	\$93,61,634.06		
8	\$10,19,45,861.03	25.00%	\$2,54,86,465.26	\$2,01,34,307.55	\$63,43,298.02	\$1,37,91,009.53		
9	\$10,76,54,829.25	25.00%	\$2,69,13,707.31	\$2,07,23,554.63	\$23,92,329.54	\$1,83,31,225.09		
10	\$10,98,07,925.83	25.00%	\$2,74,51,981.46	\$2,05,88,986.09	\$24,40,176.13	\$1,81,48,809.96		
Terminal year	\$11,20,04,084.35	25.00%	\$2,80,01,021.09	\$2,10,00,765.82	\$52,89,865.44	\$1,57,10,900.37		

The Value						
Terminal value	\$26,44,93,272.24					
PV(Terminal value)	\$9,74,21,652.77					
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$2,92,13,114.58					
Value of operating assets =	\$12,66,34,767.35					
Adjustment for distress	\$0.00	Probability of failure =	0.00%			
- Debt & Minority Interests	\$1,43,53,076.00					
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets	\$51,47,176.00					
Value of equity	\$11,74,28,867.35					
- Value of equity options	\$17,62,647.06					
Number of shares	4,45,200.00					
Value per share	\$259.81	Stock was trading at =	\$322.76			

The DCF output indicates that Netflix should be trading at \$259.81, suggesting that the stock is **overvalued** by 24.23%. Therefore, on the DCF front, I propose a **sell** recommendation.

III. Relative Valuation

Next, for Netflix's relative valuation, 16 companies were used as comparables which included Disney, Baidu, Discovery, Alphabet, Meta, and Tencent Holdings. They were screened by industry (Media and Entertainment), region (Global), and Market Capitalisation of over \$30 billion. The Total Enterprise Value/ EBITDA multiple was used for relative valuation because it normalizes for differences in capital structure, taxation, and fixed asset accounting for companies. This would provide us with a cleared insight on understanding the relative valuation and minimizing the discrepancies between comparables. Hence, I regressed EV/EBITDA against EBITDA Margin and Market Capitalization/ Forward Total Revenues.

Regression Statistics				
Multiple R	0.96083129			
R Square	0.92319677			
Adjusted R Square	0.91138089			
Standard Error	2.60715126			
Observations	16			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	16.2632788	1.878769501	8.656345978	9.3353E-07
EBITDA Margin % [LTM]	-0.40417931	0.06198777	-6.520307323	1.9412E-05
Market Cap / Forward Total Revenues -				
Capital IQ [NTM] (x)	1.72759779	0.193470963	8.929493932	6.5816E-07

Relative Valuation							
TEV/EBITDA = = 16.26 - 0.404(EBITDA margin) + 1.76(Market Cap/FT Revenues)							
So Relative EV/EBITDA Netflix =	23.3118778						
EBITDA of Netflix =	56,32,831						
Relative EV of Netflix =	131311868						
Cash	5147176						
Debt	14353076						
Relative Equity Value	122105968						
Number of Shares	445200						
Relative Price per Share	274.2721652						
Actual Price per Share	322.76						
% Overvalued or Undervalued	17.68%	Overvalued	Sell				

The Regression yielded the equation:

EV/EBITDA = = 16.26 - 0.404 (EBITDA margin) + 1.76 (Market Cap/FT Revenues)

Using this equation, Netflix's EV/EBITDA was 23.31, Relative Price per Share of \$274.27, indicating that the stock is overvalued by 17.68%.

IV. Market Valuation

The Market-wide Regressions of Multiples – Global companies in January 2023 model was used with the figures below:

Market Valuation		
TEV/EBITDA = = 23.93 + 25.40 (grov	vth) + 8.20(DFR) -34.40 (tax rate	e)
g	20%	
Total Debt	14120930	
MV of Equity	144178020	
DFR	8.92%	
Effective Tax Rate	15%	
Market EV/EBITDA Netflix	23.11852562	
Market EV of Netflix	130222747.8	
Cash	5147176	
Debt	14353076	
Market Equity Value Netflix	121016847.8	
Number of Shares	445200	
Market Price per Share	271.8258037	
Actual Price per Share	322.76	
% Overvalued or Undervalued	18.74% Overvalued	Sell

The market valuation model resulted in a 23.11 EV/EBITDA multiple, implying a share price of \$271.82. This indicates that Netflix is **overvalued** by 18.74%.

V. Analysis & Recommendation

			Relative	Market	
Company	Price on 5/5/23	DCF Valuation	Valuation	Valuation	Recommendation
Netflix. INC	\$322.76	\$259.81	\$274.27	\$271.82	SELL

Based on the three different valuation models that I have used, I conclude that Netflix stock is overvalued as of May 5th, 2023. I believe my DCF value is the closest to the true price since it incorporates future expectations, major assumptions and fundamentals while focusing on the company itself without including the competitors. The coming future for Netflix is full of challenges that include problems with password sharing, increasing competition from production houses, dropping subscribers, the lack of a user-facing MOAT, and backlash to potentially having advertisements on the platform. Unless Netflix mitigates these issues in the near future, I see a fall in the market share of the company that peaked during the pandemic. All things considered, I conclude with a **SELL** recommendation.

C3 AI

I. Company Overview

C3 AI is a provider of enterprise AI solutions that are scalable and reduces consolidations costs to a minimum. Typically, enterprise software applications are scattered and difficult to deploy as a single, functional unit. C3 has broken this industry standard through its model-driven architecture that eliminates the need to stitch together multiple cloud or enterprise solutions. Where competitors have failed to implement the insights of artificial intelligence as a feature of their services, C3's robust platform places it as a trailblazer in this emerging AI-as-a-service industry. C3's debt-free capital structure provides breathing room for the company's financing needs, and its unique, scalable solutions will garner a first-mover advantage in this emerging AI-as-a-service industry.

II. DCF Valuation

We implemented a 2-stage DCF with the following assumptions:

			C3 AI			May-23
			The Disrupti	on Platform Rolls on		
company has broken dow application by 100 times of revenues have staggered	on the industry standard or or more. The future-proof I due to macroeconomic h	of stitching together mu nature of C3's application neadwinds in the tech in	Itiple cloud or enterpris ions ensure a long-terr dustry and overall inv	se software solutions to p n relationship with its clie estor disapointment in C3	rovide a unique model-driven a nts even with the advent of ne	mplify their application deployment. The architecture that reduces the complexities of an w innovations in the computing space. Its 's' debt-free capital structure provides breathing
			The .	Assumptions		
	Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
Revenues (a)	\$266,702.00	30.0%	25.00%		3.37%	Consumption-based model that will heighten client retention
Operating margin (b)	32.45%	35.0%			35.00%	Sustained margins from C3's uniqe position as an of Al-as-a-service company within a broader market of Enterprise Software companies
Tax rate	25.00%		25.00% —	\longrightarrow	25.00%	Global/US marginal tax rate over time
Reinvestment (c)		0.30	0.80	1.20	36.21%	With greater experience in the industry, expected R&D expenses will slowly diminish resulting in more efficient growth as well
Return on capital	6.65%	w	32	.00%	9.31%	First-mover advantage within industry
Cost of capital (d)			11.63% —	\longrightarrow	9.31%	Cost of capital close to median company
			The	Cash Flows		
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$346,712.60	35.00%	\$121,349.41	\$121,349.41	\$266,702.00	-\$145,352.59
2	\$433,390.75	35.00%	\$151,686.76	\$151,686.76	\$108,347.69	\$43,339.08
3	\$541,738.44	35.00%	\$189,608.45	\$189,608.45	\$135,434.61	\$54,173.84
4	\$677,173.05	35.00%	\$237,010.57	\$183,646.77	\$169,293.26	\$14,353.51
5	\$846,466.31	35.00%	\$296,263.21	\$222,197.41	\$141,077.72	\$81,119.69
6	\$1,021,468.14	34.36%	\$351,001.94	\$263,251.46	\$145,834.86	\$117,416.60
7	\$1,188,465.92	34.68%	\$412,174.81	\$309,131.11	\$139,164.82	\$169,966.29
8	\$1,331,357.56	35.00%	\$465,975.14	\$349,481.36	\$119,076.36	\$230,405.00
9	\$1,433,840.14	35.00%	\$501,844.05	\$376,383.04	\$85,402.15	\$290,980.89
10 Terminal year	\$1,482,189.23 \$1,532,168.65	35.00% 35.00%	\$518,766.23 \$536,259.03	\$389,074.67 \$402,194.27	\$40,290.91 \$145,639.94	\$348,783.76 \$256,554.33
reminaryear	\$1,332,106.03	33.00%	,	he Value	3143,033.54	\$230,334.33
Terminal value			\$4,319,096.54	ne vanc		
PV(Terminal value)			\$1,530,109.69			
PV (CF over next 10 years	:)		\$474,310.28			
Value of operating assets	-		\$2,004,419.97			
Adjustment for distress			\$0.00		Probability of failure =	0.00%
- Debt & Minority Interes	its		\$49,387.00		,	
+ Cash & Other Non-oper			\$772,440.00			
Value of equity			\$2,727,472.97			
- Value of equity options			\$90.15			
Number of shares			108,710.00			
Value per share			\$25.09		Stock was trading at a	\$18.70

III. Relative Valuation

For C3 AI's relative valuation, 16 comparable companies in the Enterprise Software Services industry were used. Given C3's majority presence in the United States and parts of Europe, public companies in the U.S. and Europe were selected. Given the recency of the Enterprise Software Services industry, there were few public companies in the space with a majority being private startups. Additionally, C3 stands alone as the largest AI provider in this field, explaining the lack of close comparables. The EV/Sales multiple was chosen since companies typically have negative EBIT or EBITDA within this industry, and this multiple would normalize earnings discrepancies. Forward looking metrics for sales were used since C3 does not have stable, predictable historical sales numbers.

Regression S	tatistics
Multiple R	0.563572343
R Square	0.317613785
Adjusted R Square	0.268871913
Standard Error	2.292274858
Observations	16

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	2.251283645	0.85526631	2.6322604	0.01969941
Est. Annual Revenue Growth - 1 Yr	0.106667579	0.0417863	2.55269288	0.02299696

EV/Sales = 2.251283645 + .0.106667579 * g

Relative EV/Sales of C3 =	2.283283919
Relative Equity Value	\$ 2,269,231.33
Relative Price per Share	20.87417283
Upside	12%

Given the small sample size of companies used in the comparables analysis, simple regression was used with one variable (Estimated Annual Revenue Growth). Since the revenue growth rate is a direct driver of the EV/Sales multiple, and the regression equation indicates a higher multiple from a higher growth percentage. Based on the regression, C3 should trade at 2.28x EV/Sales, resulting in a relative share price of \$20.87. The stock is undervalued and has a 12% upside potential.

IV. Market Valuation

We used the US Companies Market Regression in January 2023:

EV/Sales = 2.32 + 2.60 g + 10.60 Oper Margin - 1.40 DFR - 3.50 Tax rate

Market Valuation	
g	25%
Total Debt	\$ 49,387.00
MV of Equity	\$ 2,032,877.00
DFR	0.023717934
Effective Tax Rate	25.00%
Market EV/Sales	5.771794892
Market EV of C3	\$ 3,908,503.93
Market Equity Value	\$ 4,631,556.93
Market Price per Share	\$ 42.60
Upside	56.11%

The market valuation model resulted in a 5.77x EV/Sales multiple, which implies a share price of \$42.60. This method indicates that C3 AI is undervalued with an upside of 56.11%.

V. Analysis & Recommendation

The implied share prices from intrinsic valuation, relative valuation, and market valuation suggest that C3 AI is undervalued. Although we agree with this conclusion, the DCF is the method of valuation that is most robust of all. The market valuation fails to consider the complexities of the Enterprise Software market due to its broad scope. The relative valuation's comparable companies are similar, yet too distinct to be considered viable competitors given C3's unique service offerings. The DCF accounts for efficiencies in capital investment, different revenue and operating margin assumptions, and focuses in on company fundamentals. C3 AI is positioned to dominate this emerging Enterprise AI solutions market as a company with no direct competitors on the horizon. If the company manages to focus on client retention and establishing credibility as a new product offering, it has a sizeable competitive moat on its hands. C3 AI is underpriced, and we give it a **BUY** recommendation.

Chegg

I. Company Overview

Chegg is an online education platform that primarily provides subscription services to students in the U.S. These subscription services include Chegg Study, Chegg Math, and Chegg Writing. Students will receive step-by-step solutions and reasonings for various subjects when paying for the membership. In addition to its online subscription service, Chegg also has a smaller product offering of printed and electronic textbooks. Chegg has also recently begun expanding into language classes through an acquisition of Busuu in 2022. Finally, it is important to note that Chegg recently announced that AI was materially impacting the company's ability to attract new customers. As of 5/5/23, the stock is trading at \$10.14, down from \$16.23 one month ago.

II. DCF Valuation

We implemented a 2-stage DCF with the following assumptions:

		Cl	hegg			May-23
Character and the state of the		tab II t-		Education Platform Un		desired and the court of the court
		-				ear, despite negative revenue growth. The ending of the COVID
				-	year over year. Chegg is expect from new competitors like Ch	ted to continue growing after 2023, but at a rate more similar to that
or a startup beginning to	mature. Chegg has a s	trong noid on the educa	ation services marke	t but will lace pressure	from new competitors like cr	latGPT.
The Assumptions						
	Base year	Next year	Years 2-5	Years 6-10	After year 10	Link to story
			_	\longrightarrow		Expecting the company to return to positive revenue growth starting
						after 2023. Chegg faces significant competition from the introduction
						of Chat-GPT and AI, decreasing ability to increase revenues from new
						customers. Thus, growth rates are positive again, but lower than
Revenues (a)	\$766,897.00	-1.8%	12.00%		2.50%	historical ones.
						Margins have hit around 24% over the past few years, with 2022
						being an anomaly since operating expenses increased. However,
Operating margin (b)	17.72%	16.0%			20.00%	margins will decline as a result of AI eating into Chegg's market
			_			Low effective tax rate due to significant deferred tax assets. Expected
Tax rate	5.84%		5.84%		25.00%	to reach Global/US marginal tax rate over time
						Chegg and other companies in the space have low sales/capital ratios
						of around 0.5. They are growth companies heavily investing in R&D
						with debt and are not yet or barely profitable. As Chegg's R&D pays
						off over the forecast period, it will reach a sales/capital ratio in
Reinvestment (c)		0.57	0.87	1.51	29.59%	between that of a tech and education company
						Return to revenue growth after 2023 without much change in
Return on capital	7.83%	Marginal ROIC =	25	.97%	8.44%	reinvestment rate
			_			Cost of capital close nearing industry average but reflects a growth
Cost of capital (d)			11.42%		8.44%	firm's risk
				The Cash Flov	vs	
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$753,250.00	16.00%	\$120,520.00	\$120,520.00	\$0.00	\$120,520.00
2	\$843,640.00	17.00%	\$143,418.80	\$136,616.73	\$103,896.55	\$32,720.18
3	\$944,876.80	17.50%	\$165,353.44	\$155,696.80	\$116,364.14	\$39,332.66
4	\$1,058,262.02	18.00%	\$190,487.16	\$179,362.71	\$130,327.83	\$49,034.88
5	\$1,185,253.46	18.50%	\$219,271.89	\$206,466.41	\$84,100.29	\$122,366.12
6	\$1,304,955.17	19.43%	\$253,567.19	\$229,042.17	\$79,272.66	\$149,769.52
7	\$1,411,941.92	19.72%	\$278,372.14	\$240,780.77	\$70,852.15	\$169,928.61
8	\$1,500,862.49	20.00%	\$300,172.50	\$248,134.59	\$58,887.80	\$189,246.80
9	\$1,566,855.41	20.00% 20.00%	\$313,371.08 \$321,193.61	\$247,036.69	\$43,703.92	\$203,332.77
Terminal year	\$1,605,968.04 \$1,646,057.02	20.00%	\$329,211.40	\$240,895.21 \$246,908.55	\$25,902.40 \$73,059.18	\$214,992.80 \$173,849.38
Terminal year	\$1,040,037.02	20.00%	\$529,211.40	The Value	\$75,059.16	\$175,645.56
Terminal value			\$2,926,757.18	THE VUIUE		
PV(Terminal value)			\$1,076,623.33			
PV (CF over next 10 year	s)		\$668,285.26			
Value of operating assets			\$1,744,908.59			
Adjustment for distress	-		\$0.00		Probability of failure =	0.00%
- Debt & Minority Intere	ests		\$1,201,968.00			
+ Cash & Other Non-ope			\$1,057,650.00			
Value of equity			\$1,600,590.59			
- Value of equity options	5		\$1,394.52			
Number of shares			135,629.51			
Value per share			\$11.79		Stock was trading at =	\$10.14

The DCF indicates Chegg's price per share is \$11.79, indicating the stock is 16.27% undervalued. Some important assumptions to note from above include the expectation that the revenue growth rate will return to positive in the next two years. However, the recent entry of AI into the market will cause

downward pressure on the revenue growth rate and operating margins, meaning these metrics will be below that of historical years.

III. Relative Valuation

For Chegg's relative valuation, 13 comparable companies in the Online Education sector were used. There are only a few comparable companies in the sector that are public and U.S. based. The majority of companies in the sector are start-ups with no positive EBIT and revenues below 100 million. The multiple we chose to use was EV/Sales, since we lose fewer firms in our relative valuation because revenues cannot be negative even if EBIT is. Furthermore, equity value and net income based multiples will not be helpful since Chegg does not issue dividends. We used LTM Sales metrics, since the company has stable and predictable historical sales.

Regression Statistics				
Multiple R	0.688876515			
R Square	0.474550853			
Adjusted R Square	0.426782748			
Standard Error	2.253712332			
Observations	13			

	Coefficients	Standard Erroi	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	0.381053487	0.88112489	0.43246252	0.67376151
Annual Revenue Growth - 2 yr %	0.243505308	0.07725668	3.1518996	0.00921095

EV/Sales = 0.381053487 + 0.243505308 * g

Implied EV/Sales		1.84
Implied EV	\$1,41	2,689.72
Implied Equity Value	\$1,40	06,274.46
Implied Price per share	\$	10.37

Since there are few comparable companies, the regression uses one variable, the projected Annual Revenue Growth for the next 2 years. The annual revenue growth rate is a direct driver of EV/Sales. The growth rate anticipates the rate at which the market expects sales to grow, with a higher growth rate correlating with a higher multiple.

The median EV/Sales multiple is 1.3x, while the average is 2.3x. Chegg's implied EV/Sales of 1.84 is above the median but below the average. The median is a better metric since outliers like Duolingo have much higher multiples. The regression indicates Chegg's price per share is \$10.37, indicating the company is 2.27% undervalued.

IV. Market Valuation

We used the US Companies Market Regression in January 2023:

Oper Margin - 1.4	O DFR - 3.50	Tax Rate
12.00%		
17.72%		
0.44		
5.84%		
3.70		
\$ 2,834,478.11		
\$ 2,828,062.85		
\$ 20.85		
	12.00% 17.72% 0.44 5.84% 3.70 \$ 2,834,478.11 \$ 2,828,062.85	17.72% 0.44 5.84% 3.70 \$ 2,834,478.11 \$ 2,828,062.85

The market regression found a share price of \$20.85, indicating Chegg is 105.62% undervalued. Compared to the overall market, Chegg is greatly overvalued. This market valuation is not particularly useful since it is incorporating all companies with different levels of risk.

V. Analysis & Recommendation

Company	Price as of 5/5/23	DCF Valuation	Relative Valuation	Market Valuation	Recommendation
Chegg	\$10.14	\$11.79	\$10.37	\$20.85	Buy

Based off of the intrinsic valuation and sector relative valuation, Chegg is a **BUY**. The market regression should be ignored since it incorporates all U.S. companies and is not tailored to Chegg's specific characteristics. Towards the end of June, Chegg made a public press report stating that AI and Chat-GPT was eating into its revenue growth, since it was difficult to attract new customers. Our DCF already reflects the impact of AI in our assumptions, finding a price per share of \$11.79. Meanwhile, the sector relative valuation finds Chegg slightly less undervalued. This can be explained by the fact that the Chegg press report is very new and the market has overreacted Thus, all online education company multiples are currently lower and have not been recorrected. Despite this impact on the multiple, Chegg is still relative priced at \$10.37, slightly above the current share price of \$10.14. The fact that both the relative and intrinsic valuation provide proof Chegg is undervalued makes the stock a safe **BUY**.