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~~ADVANCED~~ VALUATION

Aswath Damodaran

Some Initial Thoughts

" One hundred thousand lemmings cannot be wrong"

Graffiti



Theme 1: Characterizing Valuation as a discipline

- In a science, if you get the inputs right, you should get the output right. The laws of physics and mathematics are universal and there are no exceptions. **Valuation is not a science**.
- In an art, there are elements that can be taught but there is also a magic that you either have or you do not. The essence of an art is that you are either a great artist or you are not. **Valuation is not an art.**
- A craft is a skill that you learn by doing. The more you do it, the better you get at it. **Valuation is a craft.**

Theme 2: Valuing an asset is not the same as pricing that asset

Drivers of intrinsic value
- Cashflows from existing assets
- Growth in cash flows
- Quality of Growth

Drivers of price
- Market moods & momentum
- Surface stories about fundamentals

Accounting Estimates

Valuation Estimates

INTRINSIC VALUE

Value

THE GAP
Is there one?
If so, will it close?
If it will close, what will cause it to close?

Price

PRICE



Theme 3: Good valuation = Story + Numbers



- A valuation that is all numbers, with no narrative holding it together is just a spreadsheet/model. It is not a valuation.
- A story about a company, no matter how compelling, is just a story unless you can connect it to the numbers.

Theme 4: If you value something, you should be willing to act on it..

- No place for academics: There is very little theory in valuation and I am not sure what an academic valuation would like like and am not sure that I want to find out.
- Pragmatism, not purity: The end game is to estimate a value for an asset. I plan to get there, even if it means taking short cuts and making assumptions that would make purists blanch.
- All about faith: To act on your valuations, you have to have faith in
  - In your own valuation judgments.
  - In markets: that prices will move towards your value estimates.

  You have to earn that faith, not be endowed with it.

Misconceptions about Valuation

- Myth 1: A valuation is an objective search for "true" value
  - Truth 1.1: All valuations are biased. The only questions are how much and in which direction.
  - Truth 1.2: The direction and magnitude of the bias in your valuation is directly proportional to who pays you and how much you are paid.
- Myth 2.: A good valuation provides a precise estimate of value
  - Truth 2.1: There are no precise valuations
  - Truth 2.2: The payoff to valuation is greatest when valuation is least precise.
- Myth 3: . The more quantitative a model, the better the valuation
  - Truth 3.1: One's understanding of a valuation model is inversely proportional to the number of inputs required for the model.
  - Truth 3.2: Simpler valuation models do much better than complex ones.

Approaches to Valuation

- **Intrinsic valuation**, relates the value of an asset to the present value of expected future cashflows on that asset. In its most common form, this takes the form of a discounted cash flow valuation.
- **Relative valuation**, estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing of 'comparable' assets relative to a common variable like earnings, cash flows, book value or sales.
- **Contingent claim valuation**, uses option pricing models to measure the value of assets that share option characteristics.



INTRINSIC VALUE

The Holy Grail of Investing

Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

- What is it: In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of an asset is the present value of the expected cash flows on the asset.
- Philosophical Basis: Every asset has an intrinsic value that can be estimated, based upon its characteristics in terms of cash flows, growth and risk.
- Information Needed: To use discounted cash flow valuation, you need
  - to estimate the life of the asset
  - to estimate the cash flows during the life of the asset
  - to estimate the discount rate to apply to these cash flows to get present value
- Market Inefficiency: Markets are assumed to make mistakes in pricing assets across time, and are assumed to correct themselves over time, as new information comes out about assets.

Risk Adjusted Value: Three Basic Propositions

- The value of a risky asset can be estimated by discounting the expected cash flows on the asset over its life at a risk-adjusted discount rate:

$$\text{Value of asset} = \frac{E(CF_1)}{(1+r)} + \frac{E(CF_2)}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{E(CF_3)}{(1+r)^3} \ldots\ldots + \frac{E(CF_n)}{(1+r)^n}$$

1. *The IT Proposition*: If "it" does not affect the cash flows or alter risk (thus changing discount rates), "it" cannot affect value.
2. *The DUH Proposition*: For an asset to have value, the expected cash flows have to be positive some time over the life of the asset.
3. *The DON'T FREAK OUT Proposition*: Assets that generate cash flows early in their life will be worth more than assets that generate cash flows later; the latter may however have greater growth and higher cash flows to compensate.

DCF Choices: Equity Valuation versus Firm Valuation

Firm Valuation: Value the entire business



Equity valuation: Value just the equity claim in the business

The Drivers of Value…



DISCOUNTED CASHFLOW VALUATION



Amgen: Status Quo

Cap Ex = Acc net Cap Ex(255) + Acquisitions (3975) + R&D (2216)

Current Cashflow to Firm
EBIT(1-t)= :7336(1-**.28**)= 6058
- Nt CpX= 6443
- Chg WC 37
= FCFF - 423
Reinvestment Rate = 6480/6058 =106.98%
Return on capital = 16.71%

Reinvestment Rate 60%

Return on Capital 16%

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)
.60*.16=.096
9.6%

Stable Growth
g = 4%; Beta = 1.10;
Debt Ratio= 20%; Tax rate=35%
Cost of capital = 8.08%
ROC= 10.00%;
Reinvestment Rate=4/10=40%

Terminal Value$_{10}$= 7300/(.0808-.04) = 179,099

First 5 years

Growth decreases gradually to 4%

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term Yr
EBIT	$9,221	$10,106	$11,076	$12,140	$13,305	$14,433	$15,496	$16,463	$17,306	$17,998	18718
EBIT (1-t)	$6,639	$7,276	$7,975	$8,741	$9,580	$10,392	$11,157	$11,853	$12,460	$12,958	12167
- Reinvestment	$3,983	$4,366	$4,785	$5,244	$5,748	$5,820	$5,802	$5,690	$5,482	$5,183	4867
= FCFF	$2,656	$2,911	$3,190	$3,496	$3,832	$4,573	$5,355	$6,164	$6,978	$7,775	7300

Op. Assets 94214
+ Cash: 1283
- Debt 8272
=Equity 87226
-Options 479
Value/Share $ 74.33

Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.7% (0.90) + 3.66% (0.10) = 10.90%

Debt ratio increases to 20%
Beta decreases to 1.10

On May 1,2007, Amgen was trading at $ 55/share

Cost of Equity
11.70%

Cost of Debt
(4.78%+..85%)(1-.35)
= 3.66%

Weights
E = 90% D = 10%

Riskfree Rate:
Riskfree rate = 4.78%

+

Beta
1.73

x

Risk Premium
4%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.59

D/E=11.06%

Tata Motors: April 2010

Average reinvestment rate from 2005-09: 179.59%; without acquisitions: 70%

Current Cashflow to Firm
EBIT(1-t) : Rs 20,116
- Nt CpX Rs 31,590
- Chg WC Rs 2,732
= FCFF - Rs 14,205
Reinv Rate = (31590+2732)/20116 = 170.61%; Tax rate = 21.00%
Return on capital = 17.16%

Reinvestment Rate 70%

Return on Capital 17.16%

Expected Growth from new inv.
.70*.1716=0.1201

Stable Growth
g = 5%; Beta = 1.00
Country Premium= 3%
Cost of capital = 10.39%
Tax rate = 33.99%
ROC= 10.39%;
Reinvestment Rate=g/ROC =5/ 10.39= 48.11%

Terminal Value5= 23493/(.1039-.05) = Rs 435,686

Rs Cashflows

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EBIT (1-t)	22533	25240	28272	31668	35472	39236	42848	46192	49150	51607
- Reinvestment	15773	17668	19790	22168	24830	25242	25138	24482	23264	21503
FCFF	6760	7572	8482	9500	10642	13994	17711	21710	25886	30104

45278
21785
23493

Op. Assets Rs210,813
+ Cash: 11418
+ Other NO 140576
- Debt 109198
=Equity 253,628

Value/Share Rs 614

Discount at Cost of Capital (WACC) = 14.00% (.747) + 8.09% (0.253) = 12.50%

Growth declines to 5% and cost of capital moves to stable period level.

Cost of Equity 14.00%

Cost of Debt
(5%+ 4.25%+3)(1-.3399)
= 8.09%

Weights
E = 74.7% D = 25.3%

On April 1, 2010
Tata Motors price = Rs 781

Riskfree Rate:
Rs Riskfree Rate= 5%

+ **Beta** 1.20 X **Mature market premium** 4.5% + **Lambda** 0.80 X Country Equity Risk Premium 4.50%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.04

Firm's D/E Ratio: 33%

Country Default Spread 3% X Rel Equity Mkt Vol 1.50

Severstal: Valuation (April 2017)

	1997-2003	2004-2011	2012-2016	2016	Global Steel
Revenue Growth	4.26%	22.12%	-17.85%	-7.50%	-5.04%
Operating Margin	17.51%	19.13%	17.68%	25.81%	3.19%
ROIC	17.07%	19.31%	17.87%	32.58%	2.79%
Sales/Inv Capital	1.22	1.20	1.22	1.52	0.99

Revenue growth of **3% a year** for 5 years, moving back up to 2.5% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin decreases to **19.13%** over time.

Sales to capital ratio of **1.20**

Stable Growth
g = 2.5%
Cost of capital = 8.5%
ROC= 8.5%;
Reinvestment Rate=2.5%/8.5% = 29.41%

Terminal Value$_{10}$= 868/(.085-.025) = $14.460

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenue growth rate		3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	2.90%	2.80%	2.70%	2.60%	2.50%
Revenues	$ 5,916	$6,093	$6,276	$6,465	$6,659	$6,858	$7,057	$7,255	$7,451	$7,644	$7,835
EBIT (Operating) margin	25.81%	25.14%	24.48%	23.81%	23.14%	22.47%	21.80%	21.13%	20.47%	19.80%	19.13%
EBIT (Operating income)	$ 1,527	$1,532	$1,536	$1,539	$1,541	$1,541	$1,539	$1,533	$1,525	$1,513	$1,499
Tax rate	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.20%	17.76%	18.32%	18.88%	19.44%	20.00%
EBIT(1-t)	$ 1,264	$1,269	$1,272	$1,274	$1,276	$1,276	$1,265	$1,252	$1,237	$1,219	$1,199
- Reinvestment		$ 148	$ 152	$ 157	$ 162	$ 166	$ 166	$ 165	$ 163	$ 161	$ 159
FCFF		$1,121	$1,120	$1,117	$1,114	$1,110	$1,100	$1,088	$1,074	$1,058	$1,040

	Terminal year
Revenues	$ 8,031.35
EBIT (Operating) margin	19.13%
EBIT (Operating income)	$ 1,536.40
Tax rate	20.00%
EBIT(1-t)	$ 1,229.12
- Reinvestment	$ 361.51
FCFF	$ 867.61

PV(Terminal value)	$ 6,066.96
PV (CF over next 10 years)	$ 6,987.62
Value of operating assets =	$13,054.58
- Debt	$ 2,013.00
- Minority interests	$ 15.00
+ Cash	$ 1,173.00
+ Non-operating assets	$ 266.00
Value of equity	$12,465.58
Number of shares	837.72
Estimated value /share	$ 14.88
Price	$ 13.84
Price as % of value	93.01%

Cost of capital = 10.34% (.852) + 4.00% (.148) = 9.32%

Cost of capital decreases to 8.5% from years 6-10

Cost of Equity
10.24%

Cost of Debt
Bond rating: BB+
(2.5%+2.5%)(1-.20) = 4.00%

Weights
E = 85.2% D = 14.8%

In April 2017, the stock was trading at $13.84/share.

Riskfree Rate:
Riskfree rate = 2.5%

+ **Beta**
0.89

x **ERP**
8.70%

D/E= 17.36%

Business	Weights	Unlevered Beta
Steel	74.83%	0.7355
Metals & Mining	25.17%	0.9178
Severstal	**100%**	**0.7814**

Region	Weight	ERP
Russia	64.52%	9.24%
Western Europe	19.91%	6.81%
Middle East	5.70%	7.03%
Africa	5.07%	12.00%
Asia	2.36%	7.12%
Latin America	1.49%	10.21%
North America	0.95%	5.69%
Severstal	**100.00%**	**8.70%**

Aswa

DCF Inputs

"Garbage in, garbage out"

I. Measure earnings right..



Operating Leases at Amgen in 2007

- Amgen has lease commitments and its cost of debt (based on it's A rating) is 5.63%.

Year	Commitment	Present Value
1	$96.00	$90.88
2	$95.00	$85.14
3	$102.00	$86.54
4	$98.00	$78.72
5	$87.00	$66.16
6-12	$107.43	$462.10 ($752 million prorated)

- Debt Value of leases = $869.55
- Debt outstanding at Amgen = $7,402 + $ 870 = $8,272 million
- Adjusted Operating Income = Stated OI + Lease expense this year – Depreciation
  = 5,071 m + 69 m - 870/12 = $5,068 million (12 year life for assets)
- Approximate Operating income= stated OI + PV of Lease commitment * Pre-tax cost of debt
  = $5,071 m + 870 m (.0563) = $ 5,120 million

Collateral Effects of Treating Operating Leases as Debt for a lease-rich company: The Gap

Conventional Accounting	*Operating Leases Treated as Debt*
Income Statement EBIT& Leases = 1,990 - Op Leases = 978 EBIT = 1,012	*Income Statement* EBIT& Leases = 1,990 - Deprecn: OL= 628 EBIT = 1,362 Interest expense will rise to reflect the conversion of operating leases as debt. Net income should not change.
Balance Sheet Off balance sheet (Not shown as debt or as an asset). Only the conventional debt of $1,970 million shows up on balance sheet	*Balance Sheet* Asset Liability OL Asset 4397 OL Debt 4397 Total debt = 4397 + 1970 = $6,367 million
Cost of capital = 8.20%(7350/9320) + 4% (1970/9320) = 7.31% Cost of equity for The Gap = 8.20% After-tax cost of debt = 4% Market value of equity = 7350	Cost of capital = 8.20%(7350/13717) + 4% (6367/13717) = 6.25%
Return on capital = 1012 (1-.35)/(3130+1970) = 12.90%	Return on capital = 1362 (1-.35)/(3130+6367) = 9.30%

Capitalizing R&D Expenses: Amgen

- R & D was assumed to have a 10-year life.

Year	R&D Expense	Unamortized portion		Amortization this year
Current	3366.00	1.00	3366.00	
-1	2314.00	0.90	2082.60	$231.40
-2	2028.00	0.80	1622.40	$202.80
-3	1655.00	0.70	1158.50	$165.50
-4	1117.00	0.60	670.20	$111.70
-5	865.00	0.50	432.50	$86.50
-6	845.00	0.40	338.00	$84.50
-7	823.00	0.30	246.90	$82.30
-8	663.00	0.20	132.60	$66.30
-9	631.00	0.10	63.10	$63.10
-10	558.00		0.00	$55.80
Value of Research Asset =			$10,112.80	$1,149.90

- Adjusted Operating Income = $5,120 + 3,366 - 1,150 = $7,336 million

The Effect of Capitalizing R&D at Amgen

Conventional Accounting	*R&D treated as capital expenditure*
Income Statement EBIT& R&D = 8,486 - R&D = 3,366 EBIT = 5,120 EBIT (1-t) = 3,686	*Income Statement* EBIT& R&D = 8,486 - Amort: R&D = 1,150 EBIT = 7,336 (Increase 2,216 m) EBIT (1-t) = 5,282 m Ignored tax benefit = (3366-1150)(.28) = 621 Adjusted EBIT (1-t) = 5,282 +621 = 5,902 million Net Income will also increase by 2,216 million
Balance Sheet Off balance sheet asset. Book value of equity at $18,964 million is understated because biggest asset is off the books.	*Balance Sheet* Asset Liability R&D Asset 10,112 Book Equity +10,112 Book Equity = 18,964+ 10,112= 29,076 mil
Capital Expenditures Conventional net cap ex of $4,227 million	*Capital Expenditures* Net Cap ex = 4,227 + 2216 = $6,493 mil
Cash Flows EBIT (1-t) = 3686 - Net Cap Ex & WC = 4279 FCFF = -578	*Cash Flows* EBIT (1-t) = 5902 - Net Cap Ex = 6443 FCFF = - 678 m
Return on capital = 3686/22753 = 14.00%	Return on capital = 5902/36432 = 16.71%

Severstal: Reading the (historical) tea leaves

Severstal: Revenues, Operating Income and Margins

	1997-2003	2004-2011	2012-2016
Revenue Growth	4.26%	22.12%	-17.85%
Operating Margin	17.51%	19.13%	17.68%



II. Get the big picture (not the accounting one) when it comes to cap ex and working capital

- Capital expenditures should include
  - Research and development expenses, once they have been re-categorized as capital expenses.
  - Acquisitions of other firms, whether paid for with cash or stock.
- Working capital should be defined not as the difference between current assets and current liabilities but as the difference between non-cash current assets and non-debt current liabilities.
- On both items, start with what the company did in the most recent year but do look at the company's history and at industry averages.

Amgen's Net Capital Expenditures

- The accounting net cap ex at Amgen is small:
  - Accounting Capital Expenditures = $1,218 million
  - - Accounting Depreciation = $ 963 million
  - Accounting Net Cap Ex = $ 255 million
- We define capital expenditures broadly to include R&D and acquisitions:
  - Accounting Net Cap Ex = $ 255 million
  - Net R&D Cap Ex = (3366-1150) = $2,216 million
  - Acquisitions in 2006 = $3,975 million
  - Total Net Capital Expenditures = $ 6,443 million
- Acquisitions have been a volatile item. Amgen was quiet on the acquisition front in 2004 and 2005 and had a significant acquisition in 2003.

III. The government bond rate is not always the risk free rate

- When valuing Amgen in US dollars, the US$ ten-year bond rate of 4.78% was used as the risk free rate. We assumed that the US treasury was default free.
- When valuing Tata Motors in Indian rupees in 2010, the Indian government bond rate of 8% was not default free. Using the Indian government's local currency rating of Ba2 yielded a default spread of 3% for India and a riskfree rate of 5% in Indian rupees.

  Risk free rate in Indian Rupees = 8% - 3% = 5%

- If I had chosen to value Severstal in rubles, I would have needed a Russian ruble risk freee rate. Starting with the Russian government bond rate (in rubles) of 8.38% in January 2017 and subtracting out the default spread of 2.89% at the start of the year (based on the bond rating), the riskfree rate in rubles is 5.49%:

  Risk free rate in Rubles = 8.38% - 2.89% = 5.49%

Sovereign Default Spread: Three paths to the same destination…

1. Sovereign dollar or euro denominated bonds: Find sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars, issued by an emerging sovereign.
    1. Default spread = Emerging Govt Bond Rate (in US $) – US Treasury Bond rate with same maturity.
2. CDS spreads: Obtain the traded value for a sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) for the emerging government.
    1. Default spread = Sovereign CDS spread (with perhaps an adjustment for CDS market frictions).
3. Sovereign-rating based spread: For countries which don't issue dollar denominated bonds or have a CDS spread, you have to use the average spread for other countries with the same sovereign rating.

Caveat: These spreads will generally all be in US dollars and your risk free rate is in the local currency. That can create a mismatch issue. If it bothers you, there is a solution.

Getting to a risk free rate in a currency: Brazil on January 1, 2017

- The Brazilian government bond rate in nominal reais on January 1, 2017 was 11.37%. To get to a riskfree rate in nominal reais, we can use one of three approaches.
  - Approach 1: Government Bond spread
    - The 2018 Brazil bond, denominated in US dollars, has a spread of 3.64% over the US treasury bond rate.
    - Riskfree rate in $R = 11.37% - 3.64% = 7.73%
  - Approach 2: The CDS Spread
    - The CDS spread for Brazil, adjusted for the US CDS spread was 3.21%.
    - Riskfree rate in $R = 11.37% - 3.21% = 8.16%
  - Approach 3: The Rating based spread
    - Brazil has a Ba2 local currency rating from Moody's. The default spread for that rating is 3.47%
    - Riskfree rate in $R = 11.37% - 3.47% = 7.90%

Risk free Rates in Currencies without a Government Bond Rate or when you don't trust the bond rate

- There are three scenarios where you might not want to use this approach:
  1. There is no local currency government bond
  2. You don't trust the government bond rate (not traded, illiquid)
  3. You don't like mixing up local currency & US $ numbers.
- One simple technique is to use differential inflation and the US dollar risk free rate. Using this technique on the Egyptian pound, here is what you get:
  - Risk free rate in US dollars on 12/31/15 = 2.27%
  - Expected inflation rate in the US = 1.50%
  - Expected inflation rate in Egypt = 9.70% (last year's estimate)
  - Risk free rate in EGP = (1.0227) * (1.097/1.015) -1 =10.53%

Risk free rates will vary across currencies!



Some perspective on risk free rates



Negative Interest Rates?

- In 2016, there were at least three currencies (Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, Euro) with negative interest rates.
  - Using the fundamentals (inflation and real growth) approach, how would you explain negative interest rates?
  - How negative can rates get? (Is there a bound?)
- Would you use these negative interest rates as risk free rates?
  - If no, why not and what would you do instead?
  - If yes, what else would you have to do in your valuation to be internally consistent?

But valuations should not!

	In Indian Rupees	In US $
Risk free Rate	5.00%	2.00%
Expected inflation rate	4.00%	1.00%
Cost of capital - High Growth - Stable Growth	 12.50% 10.39%	 9.25% 7.21%
Expected growth rate - High Growth - Stable Growth	 12.01% 5.00%	 8.78% 2.00%
Return on Capital - High Growth - Stable Growth	 17.16% 10.39%	 13.78% 7.21%
Value per share	Rs 614	$12.79/share (roughly Rs 614 at current exchange rate)

IV. Betas do not come from regressions… and are noisy…



And can be meaningless if run against narrow indices..



Or when it looks good..



One slice of history..

During this time period, Valeant was a stock under siege, without a CEO, under legal pressure & lacking financials.



And subject to game playing





Determinants of Betas



Bottom-up Betas



Three examples…

- Amgen
  - The unlevered beta for pharmaceutical firms is 1.59. Using Amgen's debt to equity ratio of 11%, the bottom up beta for Amgen is
  - Bottom-up Beta = 1.59 (1+ (1-.35)(.11)) = 1.73
- Tata Motors
  - The unlevered beta for automobile firms is 0.98. Using Tata Motor's debt to equity ratio of 33.87%, the bottom up beta for Tata Motors is
  - Bottom-up Beta = 0.98 (1+ (1-.3399)(.3387)) = 1.20
- Severstal

Business	*Revenues*	*EV/Sales*	*Estimated Value*	*Unlevered Beta*
Steel	$5,462.00	1.0645	$5,814.36	0.7355
Metals & Mining	$1,154.00	1.6943	$1,955.23	0.9178
Severstal	$6,616.00		$7,769.59	0.7814

Levered Beta = 0.7814 (1+(1-.20)(.2597)) = 0.94

V. And the past is not always a good indicator of the future.

	Arithmetic Average		*Geometric Average*	
	Stocks - T. Bills	*Stocks - T. Bonds*	*Stocks - T. Bills*	*Stocks - T. Bonds*
1928-2016	7.96%	6.24%	6.11%	4.62%
Std Error	2.13%	2.28%		
1967-2016	6.57%	4.37%	5.26%	3.42%
Std Error	2.42%	2.74%		
2007-2016	7.91%	3.62%	6.15%	2.30%
Std Error	6.06%	8.66%		

- If you are going to use a historical risk premium, make it
  - Long term (because of the standard error)
  - Consistent with your risk free rate
  - A "compounded" average
- No matter which estimate you use, recognize that it is backward looking, is noisy and may reflect selection bias

But in the future..

Base year cash flow (last 12 mths)
Dividends (TTM): 45.39
+ Buybacks (TTM): 63.28
= Cash to investors (TTM): **108.67**

Payout ratio assumed to stay stable. 108.67 growing @ 5.54% a year

Expected growth in next 5 years
Top down analyst estimate of earnings growth for S&P 500: **5.54%**

	Last 12 months	1	2	3	4	5
Dividends + Buybacks	$108.67	$114.69	$121.04	$127.75	$134.82	$142.28

Earnings and Cash flows grow @2.45% (set equal to risk free rate) a year forever.

S&P 500 on 1/1/17= **2238.83**

$$2238.83 = \frac{114.69}{(1+r)} + \frac{121.04}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{127.75}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{134.82}{(1+r)^4} + \frac{142.28}{(1+r)^5} + \frac{142.28(1.0245)}{(r-.0245)(1+r)^5}$$

You have to solve for the discount rate (r). I used the solver or Goal seek function in Excel

r = Implied Expected Return on Stocks = 8.14%

Minus

Risk free rate = T.Bond rate on 1/1/17= 2.45%

Equals

Implied Equity Risk Premium (1/1/17) = 8.14% - 2.45% = 5.69%

Implied Premiums in the US: 1960-2016



The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from September 12, 2008 to January 1, 2009



Equity Risk Premiums and Bond Default Spreads



Equity Risk Premiums and Cap Rates (Real Estate)



Implied Premium for India using the Sensex: April 2010

- Level of the Index = 17559
- FCFE on the Index = 3.5% (Estimated FCFE for companies in index as % of market value of equity)
- Other parameters
  - Riskfree Rate = 5% (Rupee)
  - Expected Growth (in Rupee)
    - Next 5 years = 20% (Used expected growth rate in Earnings)
    - After year 5 = 5%
- Solving for the expected return:
  - Expected return on Equity = 11.72%
  - Implied Equity premium for India =11.72% - 5% = 6.72%

Emerging versus Developed Markets: Implied Equity Risk Premiums

$$PBV = \frac{(Return\ on\ equity - Expected\ growth\ rate)}{(Cost\ of\ equity - Expected\ growth\ rate)}$$

$$Cost\ of\ Equity = \frac{(ROE - Expected\ growth\ rate)}{PBV} + Expected\ growth\ rate$$

Start of year	PBV Developed	PBV Emerging	ROE Developed	ROE Emerging	US T.Bond rate	Growth Rate Developed	Growth Rate Emerging	Cost of Equity (Developed)	Cost of Equity (Emerging)	**Differential ERP**
2004	2.00	1.19	10.81%	11.65%	4.25%	3.75%	5.25%	7.28%	10.63%	**3.35%**
2005	2.09	1.27	11.12%	11.93%	4.22%	3.72%	5.22%	7.26%	10.50%	**3.24%**
2006	2.03	1.44	11.32%	12.18%	4.39%	3.89%	5.39%	7.55%	10.11%	**2.56%**
2007	1.67	1.67	10.87%	12.88%	4.70%	4.20%	5.70%	8.19%	10.00%	**1.81%**
2008	0.87	0.83	9.42%	11.12%	4.02%	3.52%	5.02%	10.30%	12.37%	**2.07%**
2009	1.20	1.34	8.48%	11.02%	2.21%	1.71%	3.21%	7.35%	9.04%	**1.69%**
2010	1.39	1.43	9.14%	11.22%	3.84%	3.34%	4.84%	7.51%	9.30%	**1.79%**
2011	1.12	1.08	9.21%	10.04%	3.29%	2.79%	4.29%	8.52%	9.61%	**1.09%**
2012	1.17	1.18	9.10%	9.33%	1.88%	1.38%	2.88%	7.98%	8.35%	**0.37%**
2013	1.56	1.63	8.67%	10.48%	1.76%	1.26%	2.76%	6.02%	7.50%	**1.48%**
2014	1.95	1.50	9.27%	9.64%	3.04%	2.54%	4.04%	6.00%	7.77%	**1.77%**
2015	1.88	1.56	9.69%	9.75%	2.17%	1.67%	3.17%	5.94%	7.39%	**1.45%**
2016	1.89	1.59	9.24%	10.16%	2.27%	1.77%	3.27%	5.72%	7.60%	**1.88%**

Measuring Relative Risk: You don't like betas or modern portfolio theory? No problem.



Don't like the diversified investor focus, but okay with price-based measures

1. Relative Standard Deviation
   - Relative Volatility = Std dev of Stock/ Average Std dev across all stocks
   - Captures all risk, rather than just market risk
2. Proxy Models
   - Look at historical returns on all stocks and look for variables that explain differences in returns.
   - You are, in effect, running multiple regressions with returns on individual stocks as the dependent variable and fundamentals about these stocks as independent variables.
   - This approach started with market cap (the small cap effect) and over the last two decades has added other variables (momentum, liquidity etc.)
3. CAPM Plus Models
   - Start with the traditional CAPM (Rf + Beta (ERP)) and then add other premiums for proxies.

Don't like the price-based approach..

1. Accounting risk measures: To the extent that you don't trust market-priced based measures of risk, you could compute relative risk measures based on
   - Accounting earnings volatility: Compute an accounting beta or relative volatility
   - Balance sheet ratios: You could compute a risk score based upon accounting ratios like debt ratios or cash holdings (akin to default risk scores like the Z score)
2. Qualitative Risk Models: In these models, risk assessments are based at least partially on qualitative factors (quality of management).
3. Debt based measures: You can estimate a cost of equity, based upon an observable costs of debt for the company.
   - Cost of equity = Cost of debt * Scaling factor
   - The scaling factor can be computed from implied volatilities.

VI. There is a downside to globalization…

- Emerging markets offer growth opportunities but they are also riskier. If we want to count the growth, we have to also consider the risk.
- Two ways of estimating the country risk premium:
  - Sovereign Default Spread: In this approach, the country equity risk premium is set equal to the default spread of the bond issued by the country.
    - Equity Risk Premium for mature market = 6.00%
    - Default Spread for India = 200% (based on rating)
    - Equity Risk Premium for India = 6.00% + 2.00% = 8.00%
  - Adjusted for equity risk: The country equity risk premium is based upon the volatility of the equity market relative to the government bond rate.
    - Country risk premium= Default Spread* $\text{Std Deviation}_{\text{Country Equity}} / \text{Std Deviation}_{\text{Country Bond}}$
    - Standard Deviation in Sensex = 21%
    - Standard Deviation in Indian government bond= 14%
    - Default spread on Indian Bond= 2%
    - Additional country risk premium for India = 2% (21/14) = 3.00%
    - Total equity risk premium = US equity risk premium + CRP for India
      = 6.00% + 3.00% = 9.00%

A Template for Estimating the ERP



ERP : Jan 2017

Andorra	8.81%	3.12%	Jersey	6.26%	0.57%
Austria	6.26%	0.57%	Liechtenstein	5.69%	0.00%
Belgium	6.55%	0.86%	Luxembourg	5.69%	0.00%
Cyprus	12.09%	6.40%	Malta	7.40%	1.71%
Denmark	5.69%	0.00%	Netherlands	5.69%	0.00%
Finland	6.26%	0.57%	Norway	5.69%	0.00%
France	6.39%	0.70%	Portugal	9.24%	3.55%
Germany	5.69%	0.00%	Spain	8.40%	2.71%
Greece	19.89%	14.20%	Sweden	5.69%	0.00%
Guernsey	6.26%	0.57%	Switzerland	5.69%	0.00%
Iceland	7.40%	1.71%	Turkey	9.24%	3.55%
Ireland	7.40%	1.71%	UK	6.26%	0.57%
Isle of Man	6.26%	0.57%	**W.Europe**	**6.81%**	**1.12%**
Italy	8.40%	2.71%			

Albania	12.09%	6.40%
Armenia	12.09%	6.40%
Azerbaijan	9.24%	3.55%
Belarus	16.34%	10.65%
Bosnia and Her	14.93%	9.24%
Bulgaria	8.40%	2.71%
Croatia	9.96%	4.27%
Czech Republic	6.69%	1.00%
Estonia	6.69%	1.00%
Georgia	10.81%	5.12%
Hungary	8.81%	3.12%
Kazakhstan	8.81%	3.12%
Kyrgyzstan	13.51%	7.82%
Latvia	7.40%	1.71%
Lithuania	7.40%	1.71%
Macedonia	10.81%	5.12%
Moldova	14.93%	9.24%
Montenegro	12.09%	6.40%
Poland	6.90%	1.21%
Romania	8.81%	3.12%
Russia	9.24%	3.55%
Serbia	12.09%	6.40%
Slovakia	6.90%	1.21%
Slovenia	8.81%	3.12%
Ukraine	19.89%	14.20%
E.Europe	**9.09%**	**3.40%**

Country	ERP	CRP	Country	ERP	CRP
Algeria	13.72%	7.47%	Malawi	17.24%	10.99%
Brunei	9.75%	3.50%	Mali	13.90%	7.65%
Gambia	13.72%	7.47%	Myanmar	13.72%	7.47%
Guinea	20.00%	13.75%	Niger	17.24%	10.99%
Guinea-Bissau	12.48%	6.23%	Sierra Leone	16.61%	10.36%
Guyana	12.48%	6.23%	Somalia	20.00%	13.75%
Haiti	16.61%	10.36%	Sudan	20.00%	13.75%
Iran	11.22%	4.97%	Syria	20.00%	13.75%
Korea, D.P.R.	17.24%	10.99%	Tanzania	13.90%	7.65%
Liberia	17.24%	10.99%	Togo	13.72%	7.47%
Libya	20.00%	13.75%	Yemen, Republic	17.24%	10.99%
Madagascar	12.48%	6.23%	Zimbabwe	17.24%	10.99%

Canada	5.69%	0.00%
USA	5.69%	0.00%
North America	**5.69%**	**0.00%**

Caribbean	**13.81%**	**8.12%**

Argentina	14.93%	9.24%
Belize	18.48%	12.79%
Bolivia	10.81%	5.12%
Brazil	9.96%	4.27%
Chile	6.55%	0.86%
Colombia	8.40%	2.71%
Costa Rica	9.24%	3.55%
Ecuador	14.93%	9.24%
El Salvador	14.93%	9.24%
Guatemala	9.24%	3.55%
Honduras	13.51%	7.82%
Mexico	7.40%	1.71%
Nicaragua	13.51%	7.82%
Panama	8.40%	2.71%
Paraguay	9.24%	3.55%
Peru	7.40%	1.71%
Suriname	12.09%	6.40%
Uruguay	8.40%	2.71%
Venezuela	19.89%	14.20%
Latin America	**10.11%**	**4.42%**

Angola	12.09%	6.40%
Botswana	6.90%	1.21%
Burkina Faso	14.93%	9.24%
Cameroon	13.51%	7.82%
Cape Verde	13.51%	7.82%
Congo (DR)	14.93%	9.24%
Congo (Rep)	14.93%	9.24%
Côte d'Ivoire	10.81%	5.12%
Egypt	14.93%	9.24%
Ethiopia	12.09%	6.40%
Gabon	12.09%	6.40%
Ghana	14.93%	9.24%
Kenya	12.09%	6.40%
Morocco	9.24%	3.55%
Mozambique	19.89%	14.20%
Namibia	8.81%	3.12%
Nigeria	12.09%	6.40%
Rwanda	13.51%	7.82%
Senegal	12.09%	6.40%
South Africa	8.40%	2.71%
Tunisia	10.81%	5.12%
Uganda	13.51%	7.82%
Zambia	14.93%	9.24%
Africa	**11.98%**	**6.29%**

Bahrain	9.96%	4.27%
Iraq	14.94%	9.25%
Israel	6.69%	1.00%
Jordan	12.09%	6.40%
Kuwait	6.40%	0.71%
Lebanon	13.51%	7.82%
Oman	7.96%	2.27%
Qatar	6.40%	0.71%
Ras Al Khaimah	6.90%	1.21%
Saudi Arabia	6.69%	1.00%
Sharjah	7.40%	1.71%
United Arab Emirates	6.40%	0.71%
Middle East	**7.50%**	**1.81%**

Bangladesh	10.81%	5.12%
Cambodia	13.51%	7.82%
China	6.55%	0.86%
Fiji	12.09%	6.40%
Hong Kong	6.26%	0.57%
India	8.81%	3.12%
Indonesia	8.81%	3.12%
Japan	6.69%	1.00%
Korea	6.39%	0.70%
Macao	6.55%	0.86%
Malaysia	7.40%	1.71%
Mauritius	7.95%	2.26%
Mongolia	16.34%	10.65%
Pakistan	14.93%	9.24%
Papua New Guinea	13.51%	7.82%
Philippines	8.40%	2.71%
Singapore	5.69%	0.00%
Sri Lanka	12.09%	6.40%
Taiwan	6.55%	0.86%
Thailand	7.95%	2.26%
Vietnam	12.09%	6.40%
Asia	**7.12%**	**1.43%**

Australia	5.69%	0.00%
Cook Islands	12.09%	6.40%
New Zealand	5.69%	0.00%
Australia & NZ	**5.70%**	**0.01%**

Black #: Total ERP
Red #: Country risk premium
AVG: GDP weighted average

VII. And it is not just emerging market companies that are exposed to this risk..

- The "default" approach in valuation has been to assign country risk based upon your country of incorporation. Thus, if you are incorporated in a developed market, the assumption has been that you are not exposed to emerging market risks. If you are incorporated in an emerging market, you are saddled with the entire country risk.
- As companies globalize and look for revenues in foreign markets, this practice will under estimate the costs of equity of developed market companies with significant emerging market risk exposure and over estimate the costs of equity of emerging market companies with significant developed market risk exposure.

One way of dealing with this: Revenue Weighted ERP

For Severstal in 2016

Region	Revenues	Weight	ERP
Russia	$3,805	64.52%	9.24%
Western Europe	$1,174	19.91%	6.81%
Middle East	$336	5.70%	7.03%
Africa	$299	5.07%	12.00%
Asia	$139	2.36%	7.12%
Central and South America	$88	1.49%	10.21%
North America	$56	0.95%	5.69%
Severstal	**$5,897**	**100.00%**	**8.70%**

For Coca Cola in 2012

Region	*Revenues*	*Total ERP*	*CRP*
Western Europe	19%	6.67%	0.67%
Eastern Europe & Russia	5%	8.60%	2.60%
Asia	15%	7.63%	1.63%
Latin America	15%	9.42%	3.42%
Australia	4%	6.00%	0.00%
Africa	4%	9.82%	3.82%
North America	40%	6.00%	0.00%
Coca Cola	100%	7.14%	1.14%

Natural Resource Twists? Royal Dutch

Country	*Oil & Gas Production*	*% of Total*	*ERP*
Denmark	17396	3.83%	6.20%
Italy	11179	2.46%	9.14%
Norway	14337	3.16%	6.20%
UK	20762	4.57%	6.81%
Rest of Europe	*874*	*0.19%*	*7.40%*
Brunei	823	0.18%	9.04%
Iraq	20009	4.40%	11.37%
Malaysia	22980	5.06%	8.05%
Oman	78404	17.26%	7.29%
Russia	22016	4.85%	10.06%
Rest of Asia & ME	*24480*	*5.39%*	*7.74%*
Oceania	*7858*	*1.73%*	*6.20%*
Gabon	12472	2.75%	11.76%
Nigeria	67832	14.93%	11.76%
Rest of Africa	6159	1.36%	12.17%
USA	104263	22.95%	6.20%
Canada	8599	1.89%	6.20%
Brazil	13307	2.93%	9.60%
Rest of Latin America	*576*	*0.13%*	*10.78%*
Royal Dutch Shell	**454326**	**100.00%**	**8.26%**

An alternate way: Estimating a company's exposure to country risk (Lambda)

- **Just as beta measures exposure to macro economic risk, lambda measures exposure just to country risk. Like beta, it is scaled around one.**
- The easiest and most accessible data is on revenues. Most companies break their revenues down by region. One simplistic solution would be to do the following:

  $$\text{Lambda} = \%\text{ of revenues domestically}_{\text{firm}} / \%\text{ of revenues domestically}_{\text{average firm}}$$

- In 2008-09, Tata Motors got about 91.37% of its revenues in India and TCS got 7.62%. The average Indian firm gets about 80% of its revenues in India:
  - $\text{Lambda}_{\text{Tata Motors}} = 91\%/80\% = 1.14$
  - The danger of focusing just on revenues is that it misses other exposures to risk (production and operations).

	Tata Motors	*TCS*
% of production/operations in India	High	High
% of revenues in India	91.37% (in 2009) Estimated 70% (in 2010)	7.62%
Lambda	0.80	0.20
Flexibility in moving operations	Low. Significant physical assets.	High. Human capital is mobile.

VIII. Growth has to be earned (not endowed or estimated): Sustainable Growth



1. No free growth: In the long term, to grow, you have to reinvest.
2. Growth Quality: For a given reinvestment, the higher the return you generate on your reinvestment, the faster you can grow.
3. Bulk up, slow down: Scaling up is hard to do.

Measuring Returns: The Quandary



Operating income, Reinvestment & Return on Capital -



Earn at least your cost of capital! But companies seem to have trouble in practice



A Regional Breakdown

Sub Group	Number of firms	Cost of Capital	ROIC	ROIC - Cost of Capital	% of firms with ROIC>WACC
Africa and Middle East	1,742	9.38%	7.08%	-2.29%	36.02%
Australia & NZ	1,527	7.67%	4.98%	-2.69%	28.35%
Canada	2,601	7.89%	3.14%	-4.76%	15.88%
China	4,793	8.05%	5.74%	-2.31%	38.84%
EU & Environs	4,812	8.07%	8.88%	0.81%	42.92%
Eastern Europe & Russia	491	9.90%	7.70%	-2.19%	33.98%
India	2,966	9.55%	13.56%	4.01%	39.84%
Japan	3,487	7.83%	7.37%	-0.46%	51.73%
Latin America & Caribbean	748	9.28%	7.90%	-1.38%	42.92%
Small Asia	7,500	9.06%	7.55%	-1.50%	35.18%
UK	1,193	8.04%	8.06%	0.02%	44.42%
United States	6,125	7.54%	10.23%	2.69%	42.40%

A More General Way to Estimate Growth: Top Down Growth

- All of the fundamental growth equations assume that the firm has a return on equity or return on capital it can sustain in the long term.
- When operating income is negative or margins are expected to change over time, we use a three step process to estimate growth:
  - Estimate growth rates in revenues over time
    - Determine the total market (given your business model) and estimate the market share that you think your company will earn.
    - Decrease the growth rate as the firm becomes larger
    - Keep track of absolute revenues to make sure that the growth is feasible
  - Estimate expected operating margins each year
    - Set a target margin that the firm will move towards
    - Adjust the current margin towards the target margin
  - Estimate the capital that needs to be invested to generate revenue growth and expected margins
    - Estimate a sales to capital ratio that you will use to generate reinvestment needs each year.

Tesla in July 2015: Growth and Profitability

Year	Revenues	Revenue Growth	Operating Income	Operating Margin
Base year	$2,013.50		$(21.81)	-1.08%
1	$3,322.28	65.00%	$7.48	0.23%
2	$5,481.75	65.00%	$84.06	1.53%
3	$9,044.89	65.00%	$257.03	2.84%
4	$14,924.07	65.00%	$619.36	4.15%
5	$24,624.72	65.00%	$1,344.12	5.46%
6	$37,565.02	52.55%	$2,541.92	6.77%
7	$52,628.59	40.10%	$4,249.78	8.08%
8	$67,180.39	27.65%	$6,303.78	9.38%
9	$77,391.81	15.20%	$8,274.48	10.69%
10	$79,520.08	2.75%	$9,542.41	12.00%

Revenues in year 10 reflect successful "high end auto" company revenues (Volvo, Audi, BMW etc.)

Pre-tax operating margin in year 10 is at the 75th pecentile of high end auto companies.

Tesla: Reinvestment and Profitability

Operating losses carried forward save taxes in years 3 & 4

Sales/Capital measures revenues generated for every dollar of investment

Reinvestment = Change in Revenue/ Sales to capital

Year	Revenues	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)	Change in Revenues	Sales/Capital	Reinvestment	FCFF	Invested Capital	ROIC	Cost of Capital
Base	$ 2,013.50	$ (21.81)	$ (21.81)					$ 1,045.00	-2.09%	8.74%
1	$ 3,322.28	$ 7.48	$ 7.48	$ 1,308.78	1.55	$ 844.37	$ (836.89)	$ 1,889.37	0.40%	8.74%
2	$ 5,481.75	$ 84.06	$ 84.06	$ 2,159.48	1.55	$ 1,393.21	$(1,309.15)	$ 3,282.58	2.56%	8.74%
3	$ 9,044.89	$ 257.03	$ 254.44	$ 3,563.14	1.55	$ 2,298.80	$(2,044.36)	$ 5,581.38	4.56%	8.74%
4	$ 14,924.07	$ 619.36	$ 402.58	$ 5,879.18	1.55	$ 3,793.02	$(3,390.44)	$ 9,374.40	4.29%	8.74%
5	$ 24,624.72	$ 1,344.12	$ 873.68	$ 9,700.65	1.55	$ 6,258.48	$(5,384.81)	$ 15,632.89	5.59%	8.59%
6	$ 37,565.02	$ 2,541.92	$ 1,652.25	$ 12,940.29	1.55	$ 8,348.58	$(6,696.33)	$ 23,981.46	6.89%	8.44%
7	$ 52,628.59	$ 4,249.78	$ 2,762.36	$ 15,063.57	1.55	$ 9,718.43	$(6,956.08)	$ 33,699.89	8.20%	8.29%
8	$ 67,180.39	$ 6,303.78	$ 4,097.46	$ 14,551.80	1.55	$ 9,388.26	$(5,290.81)	$ 43,088.15	9.51%	8.15%
9	$ 77,391.81	$ 8,274.48	$ 5,378.41	$ 10,211.42	1.55	$ 6,588.01	$(1,209.60)	$ 49,676.17	10.83%	8.00%
10	$ 79,520.08	$ 9,542.41	$ 6,202.57	$ 2,128.27	1.55	$ 1,373.08	$ 4,829.49	$ 51,049.25	12.15%	8.00%

Tesla Story: Tesla will be able to grow efficiently (sales to capital ratio) and continue to generate excess returns as it gets bigger.

Invested Capital in year t = Invested Capital in year t-1 + Reinvestment in year t

Cost of capital decreases as company gets larger and more profitable.

IX. All good things come to an end..And the terminal value is not an ATM…



Risk free Rates and Nominal GDP Growth

- **Risk free Rate** = Expected Inflation + Expected Real Interest Rate
- The real interest rate is what borrowers agree to return to lenders in real goods/services.

- **Nominal GDP Growth** = Expected Inflation + Expected Real Growth
- The real growth rate in the economy measures the expected growth in the production of goods and services.

The argument for Risk free rate = Nominal GDP growth

1. *In the long term, the real growth rate cannot be lower than the real interest rate, since you have the growth in goods/services has to be enough to cover the promised rate.*
2. *In the long term, the real growth rate can be higher than the real interest rate, to compensate risk taking. However, as economies mature, the difference should get smaller and since there will be growth companies in the economy, it is prudent to assume that the extra growth comes from these companies*

Period	*10-Year T.Bond Rate*	*Inflation Rate*	*Real GDP Growth*	*Nominal GDP growth rate*	*Nominal GDP - T.Bond Rate*
1954-2015	5.93%	3.61%	3.06%	6.67%	0.74%
1954-1980	5.83%	4.49%	3.50%	7.98%	2.15%
1981-2008	6.88%	3.26%	3.04%	6.30%	-0.58%
2009-2015	2.57%	1.66%	1.47%	3.14%	0.57%

A Practical Reason for using the Risk free Rate Cap – Preserve Consistency

- You are implicitly making assumptions about nominal growth in the economy, with your risk free rate. Thus, with a low risk free rate, you are assuming low nominal growth in the economy (with low inflation and low real growth) and with a high risk free rate, a high nominal growth rate in the economy.
- If you make an explicit assumption about nominal growth in cash flows that is at odds with your implicit growth assumption in the denominator, you are being inconsistent and bias your valuations:
  - If you assume high nominal growth in the economy, with a low risk free rate, you will over value businesses.
  - If you assume low nominal growth rate in the economy, with a high risk free rate, you will under value businesses.

Terminal Value and Growth

Stable Growth Rate	*Amgen*	*Tata Motors*	*Severstal*
0%	$150,652	₹ 435,686	$489.513
1%	$154,479	₹ 435,686	$489.513
2%	$160,194	₹ 435,686	$489.513
3%	$167,784	₹ 435,686	
4%	$179,099	₹ 435,686	
5%		₹ 435,686	
6%			
Risk free Rate	4.78%	5.00%	2.50%
ROIC	10.00%	10.39%	8.50%
Cost of capital	8.08%	10.39%	8.50%

The loose ends in valuation…

Aswath Damodaran

Getting from DCF to value per share: The Loose Ends



1. The Value of Cash
An Exercise in Cash Valuation

	Company A	Company B	Company C
Enterprise Value	$ 1 billion	$ 1 billion	$ 1 billion
Cash	$ 100 mil	$ 100 mil	$ 100 mil
Return on Capital	10%	5%	22%
Cost of Capital	10%	10%	12%
Trades in	US	US	Argentina

- In which of these companies is cash most likely to trade at face value, at a discount and at a premium?

Cash: Discount or Premium?



2. Dealing with Holdings in Other firms

- Holdings in other firms can be categorized into
  - Minority passive holdings, in which case only the dividend from the holdings is shown in the balance sheet
  - Minority active holdings, in which case the share of equity income is shown in the income statements
  - Majority active holdings, in which case the financial statements are consolidated.
- We tend to be sloppy in practice in dealing with cross holdings. After valuing the operating assets of a firm, using consolidated statements, it is common to add on the balance sheet value of minority holdings (which are in book value terms) and subtract out the minority interests (again in book value terms), representing the portion of the consolidated company that does not belong to the parent company.

How to value holdings in other firms.. In a perfect world..

- In a perfect world, we would strip the parent company from its subsidiaries and value each one separately. The value of the combined firm will be
  - Value of parent company + Proportion of value of each subsidiary
- To do this right, you will need to be provided detailed information on each subsidiary to estimate cash flows and discount rates.

Valuing Yahoo as the sum of its intrinsic pieces: June 2015



Two compromise solutions…

- The market value solution: When the subsidiaries are publicly traded, you could use their traded market capitalizations to estimate the values of the cross holdings. You do risk carrying into your valuation any mistakes that the market may be making in valuation.
- The relative value solution: When there are too many cross holdings to value separately or when there is insufficient information provided on cross holdings, you can convert the book values of holdings that you have on the balance sheet (for both minority holdings and minority interests in majority holdings) by using the average price to book value ratio of the sector in which the subsidiaries operate.

Tata Motor's Cross Holdings



3. Other Assets that have not been counted yet..

- Unutilized assets: If you have assets or property that are not being utilized (vacant land, for example), you have not valued it yet. You can assess a market value for these assets and add them on to the value of the firm.
- Overfunded pension plans: If you have a defined benefit plan and your assets exceed your expected liabilities, you could consider the over funding with two caveats:
  - Collective bargaining agreements may prevent you from laying claim to these excess assets.
  - There are tax consequences. Often, withdrawals from pension plans get taxed at much higher rates.
- **Do not double count an asset**. If you count the income from an asset in your cash flows, you cannot count the market value of the asset in your value.

The “real estate” play

- Assume that you are valuing a retail firm that has real estate investments underlying its operations. Assume that you estimate a real estate value of $1.5 billion for the real estate. Can you add this value on to your DCF value?

a. Yes.

b. No.

c. Depends

- What would you do if the value of the land exceeds the present value that you have estimated for them as operating assets?

a. Nothing

b. Use the higher of the two values

c. Use the lower of the two values

d. Use a weighted average of the two values

An Uncounted Asset?

Price tag: $200 million

The longtime home of Playboy magazine founder Hugh Hefner is to be sold to Daren Metropoulos, a principal at private-equity firm Metropoulos & Co. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

4. A Discount for Complexity: An Experiment

	Company A	Company B
Operating Income	$ 1 billion	$ 1 billion
Tax rate	40%	40%
ROIC	10%	10%
Expected Growth	5%	5%
Cost of capital	8%	8%
Business Mix	Single	Multiple Businesses
Holdings	Simple	Complex
Accounting	Transparent	Opaque

- Which firm would you value more highly?

Measuring Complexity: Volume of Data in Financial Statements

Company	*Number of pages in last 10Q*	*Number of pages in last 10K*
General Electric	65	410
Microsoft	63	218
Wal-mart	38	244
Exxon Mobil	86	332
Pfizer	171	460
Citigroup	252	1026
Intel	69	215
AIG	164	720
Johnson & Johnson	63	218
IBM	85	353

Measuring Complexity: A Complexity Score

Item	Factors	Follow-up Question	Answer	Weighting factor	Gerdau Score	GE Score
Operating Income	1. Multiple Businesses	Number of businesses (with more than 10% of revenues) =	1	2.00	2	30
	2. One-time income and expenses	Percent of operating income =	10%	10.00	1	0.8
	3. Income from unspecified sources	Percent of operating income =	0%	10.00	0	1.2
	4. Items in income statement that are volatile	Percent of operating income =	15%	5.00	0.75	1
Tax Rate	1. Income from multiple locales	Percent of revenues from non-domestic locales =	70%	3.00	2.1	1.8
	2. Different tax and reporting books	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Headquarters in tax havens	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
	4. Volatile effective tax rate	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	0
Capital Expenditures	1. Volatile capital expenditures	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
	2. Frequent and large acquisitions	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=4	4	4
	3. Stock payment for acquisitions and investments	Yes or No	No	Yes=4	0	4
Working capital	1. Unspecified current assets and current liabilities	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	0
	2. Volatile working capital items	Yes or No	Yes	Yes=2	2	2
Expected Growth rate	1. Off-balance sheet assets and liabilities (operating leases and R&D)	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	2. Substantial stock buybacks	Yes or No	No	Yes=3	0	3
	3. Changing return on capital over time	Is your return on capital volatile?	Yes	Yes=5	5	5
	4. Unsustainably high return	Is your firm's ROC much higher than industry average?	No	Yes=5	0	0
Cost of capital	1. Multiple businesses	Number of businesses (more than 10% of revenues) =	1	1.00	1	20
	2. Operations in emerging markets	Percent of revenues=	50%	5.00	2.5	2.5
	3. Is the debt market traded?	Yes or No	No	No=2	2	0
	4. Does the company have a rating?	Yes or No	Yes	No=2	0	0
	5. Does the company have off-balance sheet debt?	Yes or No	No	Yes=5	0	5
No-operating assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	Minority holdings as percent of book assets	0%	20.00	0	0.8
Firm to Equity value	Consolidation of subsidiaries	Minority interest as percent of book value of equity	63%	20.00	12.6	1.2
Per-share value	Shares with different voting rights	Does the firm have shares with different voting rights?	Yes	Yes = 10	10	0
	Equity options outstanding	Options outstanding as percent of shares	0%	10.00	0	0.2
		Complexity Score =			48.95	90.55

Dealing with Complexity

- In Discounted Cashflow Valuation
  - The Aggressive Analyst: Trust the firm to tell the truth and value the firm based upon the firm's statements about their value.
  - The Conservative Analyst: Don't value what you cannot see.
  - The Compromise: Adjust the value for complexity
    - Adjust cash flows for complexity
    - Adjust the discount rate for complexity
    - Adjust the expected growth rate/ length of growth period
    - Value the firm and then discount value for complexity
- In relative valuation
  - In a relative valuation, you may be able to assess the price that the market is charging for complexity:
  - With the hundred largest market cap firms, for instance:

PBV = 0.65 + 15.31 ROE – 0.55 Beta + 3.04 Expected growth rate – 0.003 # Pages in 10K

5. Brand name, great management, superb product …Are we short changing intangibles?

- There is often a temptation to add on premiums for intangibles. Here are a few examples.
  - Brand name
  - Great management
  - Loyal workforce
  - Technological prowess
- There are two potential dangers:
  - For some assets, the value may already be in your value and adding a premium will be double counting.
  - For other assets, the value may be ignored but incorporating it will not be easy.

Valuing Brand Name

	Coca Cola	With Cott Margins
Current Revenues =	$21,962.00	$21,962.00
Length of high-growth period	10	10
Reinvestment Rate =	50%	50%
Operating Margin (after-tax)	15.57%	5.28%
Sales/Capital (Turnover ratio)	1.34	1.34
Return on capital (after-tax)	20.84%	7.06%
Growth rate during period (g) =	10.42%	3.53%
Cost of Capital during period =	7.65%	7.65%
Stable Growth Period		
Growth rate in steady state =	4.00%	4.00%
Return on capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Reinvestment Rate =	52.28%	52.28%
Cost of Capital =	7.65%	7.65%
Value of Firm =	$79,611.25	$15,371.24

Valuing a Franchise: Star Wars

	Add-on $ per Box Office $
Streaming/Video	$1.20
Toys & Merchandise	$2.00
Books/eBooks	$0.20
Gaming	$0.50
Other	$0.50

Add on $ per box office $

Star Wars Franchise Valuation: December 2015

Main Movies
World Box office of $1.5 billion, adjusted for 2% inflation.

Spin Off Movies
World Box office is 50% of main movies.

	Main Star Wars Movies			*Star Wars Spin offs*		
	Star Wars VII	*Star Wars VIII*	*Star Wars IX*	*Rogue One*	*Hans Solo?*	*Boba Fett?*
Years from now	0.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	5.0
Movies - Revenues	$2,000	$2,081	$2,165	$1,020	$1,061	$1,104
Streaming/Video - Revenues	$2,400	$2,497	$2,598	$1,224	$1,273	$1,325
Toys & Merchandise - Revenues	$4,000	$4,162	$4,330	$2,040	$2,122	$2,208
Books/eBooks - Revenues	$400	$416	$433	$204	$212	$221
Gaming - Revenues	$1,000	$1,040	$1,082	$510	$531	$552
Other - Revenues	$1,000	$1,040	$1,082	$510	$531	$552
Total - Revenues	$10,800	$11,236	$11,690	$5,508	$5,731	$5,962
After-tax Operating Income (movies)	$ 282	$ 293	$ 305	$ 144	$ 150	$ 156
After-tax Operating Income (non-movies)	$ 924	$ 961	$ 1,000	$ 471	$ 490	$ 510
Present Value	$ 1,206	$ 1,083	$ 973	$ 572	$ 514	$ 461
Value of new Star Wars movies =	$4,809					
Value of continuing income =	$5,163					
Value of Star Wars =	$9,972					

Operating Margin
20.14% for movies
15% for non-movies
30% tax rate

Discounted back @ 7.61% cost of capital of entertainment companies

Assumes that revenues from add ons continue after 2020, growing at 2% a year, with 15% operating margin

6. Be circumspect about defining debt for cost of capital purposes…

- General Rule: Debt generally has the following characteristics:
  - Commitment to make fixed payments in the future
  - The fixed payments are tax deductible
  - Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the firm to the party to whom payments are due.
- Defined as such, debt should include
  - All interest bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term
  - All leases, operating as well as capital
- Debt should not include
  - Accounts payable or supplier credit

But should consider other potential liabilities when getting to equity value…

- If you have under funded pension fund or health care plans, you should consider the under funding at this stage in getting to the value of equity.
  - If you do so, you should not double count by also including a cash flow line item reflecting cash you would need to set aside to meet the unfunded obligation.
  - You should not be counting these items as debt in your cost of capital calculations….
- If you have contingent liabilities - for example, a potential liability from a lawsuit that has not been decided - you should consider the expected value of these contingent liabilities
  - Value of contingent liability = Probability that the liability will occur * Expected value of liability

7. Equity to Employees: Effect on Value

- In recent years, firms have turned to giving employees (and especially top managers) equity option packages as part of compensation. These options are usually
  - Long term
  - At-the-money when issued
  - On volatile stocks
- Are they worth money? And if yes, who is paying for them?
- Two key issues with employee options:
  - How do options granted in the past affect equity value per share today?
  - How do expected future option grants affect equity value today?

Equity Options and Value

- Options outstanding
  - Step 1: List all options outstanding, with maturity, exercise price and vesting status.
  - Step 2: Value the options, taking into account dilution, vesting and early exercise considerations
  - Step 3: Subtract from the value of equity and divide by the actual number of shares outstanding (not diluted or partially diluted).
- Expected future option and restricted stock issues
  - Step 1: Forecast value of options that will be granted each year as percent of revenues that year. (As firm gets larger, this should decrease)
  - Step 2: Treat as operating expense and reduce operating income and cash flows
  - Step 3: Take present value of cashflows to value operations or equity.

8. The Value of Control

- The value of the control premium that will be paid to acquire a block of equity will depend upon two factors -
  - Probability that control of firm will change: This refers to the probability that incumbent management will be replaced. this can be either through acquisition or through existing stockholders exercising their muscle.
  - Value of Gaining Control of the Company: The value of gaining control of a company arises from two sources - the increase in value that can be wrought by changes in the way the company is managed and run, and the side benefits and perquisites of being in control
  - Value of Gaining Control = Present Value (Value of Company with change in control - Value of company without change in control) + Side Benefits of Control



Aswath Damodaran

The Paths to Value Creation.. Back to the determinants of value..



Adris Grupa (Status Quo): 4/2010




Adris Grupa: 4/2010 (Restructured)
Current Cashflow to Firm
EBIT(1-t) : 436 HRK
- Nt CpX 3 HRK
- Chg WC -118 HRK
= FCFF 551 HRK
Reinv Rate= (3-118)/436=-26.35%;
Tax rate = 17.35%
Return on capital = 8.72%
Reinvestment Rate 70.83%
Expected Growth from new inv. .7083*.01054=0.0747 or 7.47%
Increased ROIC to cost of capital
Return on Capital 10.54%
Stable Growth
g = 4%; Beta = 0.80
Country Premium= 2%
Cost of capital = 9.65%
Tax rate = 20.00%
ROC=9.65%;
Reinvestment Rate=g/ROC =4/9.65%= 41.47%
Terminal Value5= 367/(.0965-.04) =6508 HRK
HKR Cashflows
Year 1 2 3 4 5
EBIT (1-t) HRK 469 HRK 503 HRK 541 HRK 581 HRK 623
- Reinvestment HRK 332 HRK 356 HRK 383 HRK 411 HRK 442
FCFF HRK 137 HRK 147 HRK 158 HRK 169 HRK 182
628
246
367
Op. Assets 4545
+ Cash: 1787
- Debt 141
- Minority int 465
=Equity 5,735
Value/non-voting 334
Value/voting 362
Discount at $ Cost of Capital (WACC) = 11.12% (.90) + 8.20% (0.10) = 10.54%
Changed mix of debt and equity to optimal
On May 1, 2010
AG Pfd price = 279 HRK
AG Common = 345 HRK
Cost of Equity 11.12%
Cost of Debt (4.25%+ 4%+2%)(1-.20) = 8.20%
Weights E = 90 % D = 10 %
Riskfree Rate: HRK Riskfree Rate= 4.25%
+
Beta 0.75
X
Mature market premium 4.5%
+
Lambda 0.68
X
CRP for Croatia (3%)
Lambda 0.42
CRP for Central Europe (3%)
Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 0.68
Firm's D/E Ratio: 11.1%
Country Default Spread 2%
X
Rel Equity Mkt Vol 1.50

Value of Control and the Value of Voting Rights

- Adris Grupa has two classes of shares outstanding: 9.616 million voting shares and 6.748 million non-voting shares.
- To value a non-voting share, we assume that all non-voting shares essentially have to settle for status quo value. All shareholders, common and preferred, get an equal share of the status quo value.

  Status Quo Value of Equity = 5,484 million HKR

  Value for a non-voting share = 5484/(9.616+6.748) = 334 HKR/share
- To value a voting share, we first value control in Adris Grup as the difference between the optimal and the status quo value:

  Value of control at Adris Grupa = 5,735 – 5484 = 249 million HKR

  Value per voting share =334 HKR + 249/9.616 = 362 HKR

Aswath Damodaran

THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING DIFFICULT-TO-VALUE COMPANIES

The fundamental determinants of value…



The Dark Side of Valuation…

- Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.
- The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value "difficult" companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:
  - Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses
  - Companies that don't fit the accounting mold
  - Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or nationalization risk)

Difficult to value companies…

- Across the life cycle:
  - Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.
  - Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change, history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.
  - Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.
- Across sectors
  - Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what's going on.
  - Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.
  - Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.
- Across the ownership cycle
  - Privately owned businesses: Exposure to firm specific risk and illiquidity bedevil valuations.
  - Venture Capital (VC) and private equity: Different equity investors, with different perceptions of risk.
  - Closely held public firms: Part private and part public, sharing the troubles of both.

I. The challenge with young companies…

Figure 5.2: Estimation Issues - Young and Start-up Companies



Upping the ante.. Young companies in young businesses…

- When valuing a business, we generally draw on three sources of information
  - The firm's current financial statement
    - How much did the firm sell?
    - How much did it earn?
  - The firm's financial history, usually summarized in its financial statements.
    - How fast have the firm's revenues and earnings grown over time?
    - What can we learn about cost structure and profitability from these trends?
    - Susceptibility to macro-economic factors (recessions and cyclical firms)
  - The industry and comparable firm data
    - What happens to firms as they mature? (Margins.. Revenue growth… Reinvestment needs… Risk)
- It is when valuing these companies that you find yourself tempted by the dark side, where
  - "Paradigm shifts" happen…
  - New metrics are invented …
  - The story dominates and the numbers lag…

Amazon in January 2000

Current Revenue $ 1,117

Current Margin: -36.71%

EBIT -410m

From previous years

NOL: 500 m

Sales to capital ratio and expected margin are retail industry average numbers

Sales Turnover Ratio: 3.00

Revenue Growth: 42%

Competitive Advantages

Expected Margin: -> 10.00%

Stable Growth

Stable Revenue Growth: 6%

Stable Operating Margin: 10.00%

Stable ROC=20% Reinvest 30% of EBIT(1-t)

Terminal Value= 1881/(.0961-.06) =52,148

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Term. Year
Revenue Growth	150.00%	100.00%	75.00%	50.00%	30.00%	25.20%	20.40%	15.60%	10.80%	6.00%	6%
Revenues	$ 2,793	$ 5,585	$ 9,774	$ 14,661	$ 19,059	$ 23,862	$ 28,729	$ 33,211	$ 36,798	$ 39,006	$ 41,346
Operating Margin	-13.35%	-1.68%	4.16%	7.08%	8.54%	9.27%	9.64%	9.82%	9.91%	9.95%	10.00%
EBIT	-$373	-$94	$407	$1,038	$1,628	$2,212	$2,768	$3,261	$3,646	$3,883	$4,135
EBIT(1-t)	-$373	-$94	$407	$871	$1,058	$1,438	$1,799	$2,119	$2,370	$2,524	$2,688
- Reinvestment	$600	$967	$1,420	$1,663	$1,543	$1,688	$1,721	$1,619	$1,363	$961	$155
FCFF	-$931	-$1,024	-$989	-$758	-$408	-$163	$177	$625	$1,174	$1,788	$1,881

Forever

Cost of Equity	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.90%	12.42%	11.94%	11.46%	10.98%	10.50%
Cost of Debt	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	7.80%	7.75%	7.67%	7.50%	7.00%
After-tax cost of debt	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	6.71%	5.20%	5.07%	5.04%	4.98%	4.88%	4.55%
Cost of Capital	12.84%	12.84%	12.84%	12.83%	12.81%	12.13%	11.62%	11.08%	10.49%	9.61%

Value of Op Assets	$ 15,170
+ Cash	$ 26
= Value of Firm	$15,196
- Value of Debt	$ 349
= Value of Equity	$14,847
- Equity Options	$ 2,892
Value per share	$ 35.08

All existing options valued as options, using current stock price of $84.

Amazon was trading at $84 in January 2000.

Cost of Equity
12.90%

Used average interest coverage ratio over next 5 years to get BBB rating.

Cost of Debt
6.5%+1.5%=8.0%
Tax rate = 0% -> 35%

Weights
Debt= 1.2% -> 15%

Pushed debt ratio to retail industry average of 15%.

Dot.com retailers for firrst 5 years
Convetional retailers after year 5

Riskfree Rate:
T. Bond rate = 6.5%

+ **Beta**
1.60 -> 1.00

X **Risk Premium**
4%

Internet/ Retail

Operating Leverage

Current D/ E: 1.21%

Base Equity Premium

Country Risk Premium

Lesson 1: Don't trust regression betas….



Lesson 2: Work backwards and keep it simple…

Year	Revenue Growth	Sales	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)
Tr 12 mths		$1,117	-36.71%	-$410	-$410
1	150.00%	$2,793	-13.35%	-$373	-$373
2	100.00%	$5,585	-1.68%	-$94	-$94
3	75.00%	$9,774	4.16%	$407	$407
4	50.00%	$14,661	7.08%	$1,038	$871
5	30.00%	$19,059	8.54%	$1,628	$1,058
6	25.20%	$23,862	9.27%	$2,212	$1,438
7	20.40%	$28,729	9.64%	$2,768	$1,799
8	15.60%	$33,211	9.82%	$3,261	$2,119
9	10.80%	$36,798	9.91%	$3,646	$2,370
10	6.00%	$39,006	9.95%	$3,883	$2,524
TY	6.00%	$41,346	10.00%	$4,135	$2,688

Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do…



Lesson 4: Don't forget to pay for growth…

Year	Revenues	Δ Revenue	Sales/Cap	Δ Investment	Invested Capital	EBIT (1-t)	Imputed ROC
Tr 12 mths	$1,117				$ 487	-$410	
1	$2,793	$1,676	3.00	$559	$ 1,045	-$373	-76.62%
2	$5,585	$2,793	3.00	$931	$ 1,976	-$94	-8.96%
3	$9,774	$4,189	3.00	$1,396	$ 3,372	$407	20.59%
4	$14,661	$4,887	3.00	$1,629	$ 5,001	$871	25.82%
5	$19,059	$4,398	3.00	$1,466	$ 6,467	$1,058	21.16%
6	$23,862	$4,803	3.00	$1,601	$ 8,068	$1,438	22.23%
7	$28,729	$4,868	3.00	$1,623	$ 9,691	$1,799	22.30%
8	$33,211	$4,482	3.00	$1,494	$ 11,185	$2,119	21.87%
9	$36,798	$3,587	3.00	$1,196	$ 12,380	$2,370	21.19%
10	$39,006	$2,208	3.00	$736	$ 13,116	$2,524	20.39%
TY	$41,346	$2,340	NA		Assumed to be =		20.00%

Lesson 5: If you are worried about failure, incorporate into value



1. *Don't try to adjust the discount rate for survival risk.*
2. *Incorporate the survival risk into expected value*

Expected Value = DCF Value of equity (Probability of going concern) + Failure value of equity (1 – Probability of going concern)

Lesson 6: The dilution is taken care off..

- With young growth companies, it is almost a given that the number of shares outstanding will increase over time for two reasons:
  - To grow, the company will have to issue new shares either to raise cash to take projects or to offer to target company stockholders in acquisitions
  - Many young, growth companies also offer options to managers as compensation and these options will get exercised, if the company is successful.
- In DCF valuation, both effects are already incorporated into the value per share, even though we use the current number of shares in estimating value per share
  - The need for new equity issues is captured in negative cash flows in the earlier years. The present value of these negative cash flows will drag down the current value of equity and this is the effect of future dilution.
  - The options are valued and netted out against the current value. Using an option pricing model allows you to incorporate the expected likelihood that they will be exercised and the price at which they will be exercised.

Lesson 7: There are always scenarios where the market price can be justified…

Compounded annual Revenue Growth rate	Target pre-tax Operating Margin				
	6%	8%	10%	12%	14%
30%	$ (1.94)	$ 2.95	$ 7.84	$ 12.71	$ 17.57
35%	$ 1.41	$ 8.37	$ 15.33	$ 22.27	$ 29.21
40%	$ 6.10	$ 15.93	$ 25.74	$ 35.54	$ 45.34
45%	$ 12.59	$ 26.34	$ 40.05	$ 53.77	$ 67.48
50%	$ 21.47	$ 40.50	$ 59.52	$ 78.53	$ 97.54
55%	$ 33.47	$ 59.60	$ 85.72	$ 111.84	$ 137.95
60%	$ 49.53	$ 85.10	$ 120.66	$ 156.22	$ 191.77

Lesson 8: Don't forget to mop up…

- Watch out for "other" equity claims: If you buy equity in a young, growth company, watch out for other (often hidden) claims on the equity that don't take the form of common shares. In particular, watch for options granted to managers, employees, venture capitalists and others (you will be surprised…).
  - Value these options as options (not at exercise value)
  - Take into consideration expectations of future option grants when computing expected future earnings/cash flows.
- Not all shares are equal: If there are differences in cash flow claims (dividends or liquidation) or voting rights across shares, value these differences.
  - Voting rights matter even at well run companies

Lesson 9: You will be wrong 100% of the time… and it really is not (always) your fault…

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- A test: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least over time).

Assessing my 2000 forecasts, in 2014

	Revenues		Operating Income		Operating Margin	
Year	My forecast (2000)	Actual	My forecast (2000)	Actual	My forecast (2000)	Actual
2000	$2,793	$2,762	-$ 373	-$ 664.00	-13.35%	-24.04%
2001	$5,585	$3,122	-$ 94	-$ 231.00	-1.68%	-7.40%
2002	$9,774	$3,932	$ 407	$ 106.00	4.16%	2.70%
2003	$14,661	$5,264	$ 1,038	$ 271.00	7.08%	5.15%
2004	$19,059	$6,921	$ 1,628	$ 440.00	8.54%	6.36%
2005	$23,862	$8,490	$ 2,212	$ 432.00	9.27%	5.09%
2006	$28,729	$10,711	$ 2,768	$ 389.00	9.63%	3.63%
2007	$33,211	$14,835	$ 3,261	$ 655.00	9.82%	4.42%
2008	$36,798	$19,166	$ 3,646	$ 842.00	9.91%	4.39%
2009	$39,006	$24,509	$ 3,883	$ 1,129.00	9.95%	4.61%
2010	$41,346	$34,204	$ 4,135	$ 1,406.00	10.00%	4.11%
2011	$43,827	$48,077	$ 4,383	$ 862.00	10.00%	1.79%
2012	$46,457	$61,093	$ 4,646	$ 676.00	10.00%	1.11%
2013	$49,244	$74,452	$ 4,925	$ 745.00	10.00%	1.00%
2014 (LTM)	$51,460	$85,247	$ 5,146.35	$ 97.00	10.00%	0.11%

And the market is often "more wrong"….



An "option premium": The option to add a product or enter a market..



An Example of an Expansion Option

- You have complete a DCF valuation of a small anti-virus software company, Secure Mail, and estimated a value of $115 million.
- Assume that there is the possibility that the company could use the customer base that it develops for the anti-virus software and the technology on which the software is based to create a database software program sometime in the next 5 years.
  - It will cost Secure Mail about $500 million to develop a new database program, if they decided to do it today.
  - Based upon the information you have now on the potential for a database program, the company can expect to generate about $ 40 million a year in after-tax cashflows for ten years. The cost of capital for private companies that provide database software is 12%.
  - The annualized standard deviation in firm value at publicly traded database companies is 50%.
  - The five-year treasury bond rate is 3%.

Valuing the Expansion Option

S = Value of entering the database software market
= PV of $40 million for 10 years @12% = $226 million
K = Cost of entering the database software market = $ 500 mil
t = Period over which you have the right to enter the market
= 5 years
σ = Standard deviation of stock prices of database firms = 50%
r = Riskless rate = 3%

Call Value= $ 56 Million

DCF valuation of the firm	= $ 115 million
Value of Option to Expand to Database market	= $ 56 million
Value of the company with option to expand	= $ 171 million

A note of caution: Opportunities are not options…



Valuing an IPO

- Valuation issues:
  - Use of the proceeds from the offering: The proceeds from the offering can be held as cash by the firm to cover future investment needs, paid to existing equity investors who want to cash out or used to pay down debt.
  - Warrants/ Special deals with prior equity investors: If venture capitalists and other equity investors from earlier iterations of fund raising have rights to buy or sell their equity at pre-specified prices, it can affect the value per share offered to the public.
- Pricing issues:
  - Institutional set-up: Most IPOs are backed by investment banking guarantees on the price, which can affect how they are priced.
  - Follow-up offerings: The proportion of equity being offered at initial offering and subsequent offering plans can affect pricing.

Alibaba: Pre-IPO valuation - September 2, 2014 (in US $)

	T12M	2012-13
Revenues	$9,268	$4,821
Operating Income	$4,702	$1,777
Effective tax rate	11.92%	
Operating Margin	50.73%	

Revenue growth of **25%** a year for 5 years, tapering down to 2.63% in year 10

Pre-tax operating margin decreases to 40% over time & tax rate rises to 25%

Sales to capital ratio maintained at 2.00

Stable Growth
g = 2.41%
Cost of capital = 8%
ROC= 8%;
Reinvestment Rate= 2.41%/8% = 30.125%

Terminal Value$_{10}$= 10,353/(.08-0241) = $185,198

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Revenue growth rate	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	20.48%	15.96%	11.45%	6.93%	2.41%
Revenues	$ 11,585	$ 14,481	$ 18,101	$ 22,626	$ 28,283	$ 34,075	$ 39,515	$ 44,038	$ 47,089	$ 48,224
EBIT (Operating margi	49.66%	48.59%	47.51%	46.44%	45.37%	44.29%	43.22%	42.15%	41.07%	40.00%
EBIT (Operating incom	$ 5,753	$ 7,035	$ 8,600	$ 10,507	$ 12,831	$ 15,093	$ 17,078	$ 18,560	$ 19,341	$ 19,290
Tax rate	11.92%	11.92%	11.92%	11.92%	11.92%	14.54%	17.15%	19.77%	22.38%	25.00%
EBIT(1-t)	$ 5,067	$ 6,197	$ 7,575	$ 9,255	$ 11,301	$ 12,899	$ 14,149	$ 14,891	$ 15,012	$ 14,467
- Reinvestment	$ 1,158	$ 1,448	$ 1,810	$ 2,263	$ 2,828	$ 2,896	$ 2,720	$ 2,261	$ 1,525	$ 567
FCFF	$ 3,908	$ 4,749	$ 5,765	$ 6,992	$ 8,473	$ 10,002	$ 11,429	$ 12,630	$ 13,486	$ 13,900

Term yr	
EBIT (1-t)	$14,816
- Reinv	4,463
FCFF	10,353

Operating assets	$137,386
+ Cash	9330
- Debt	10068
+ Equity investments	2,087
+ Alipay provision	3,000
+ IPO Proceeds (est)	20,000
- Options	696
Value of equity	161,039
Value per share	$65.98

Cost of capital = 8.90% (.943) + 3.00% (.057) = 8.56%

Cost of capital decreases to 8% from years 6-10

Cost of Equity
8.90%

Cost of Debt
4% (1-.25) = 3.00%

Weights
E = 94.3% D = 5.7%

Riskfree Rate:
Riskfree rate = 2.41%

+

Beta
1.092

Unlevered Beta: 1.044 (70% advertising, 30% online retailing)

D/E = 6.07%

X

ERP
5.94%

China	90.29%	5.90%
Global	9.71%	6.35%
Alibaba	100.00%	5.94%

Two days after this valuation, the company (and its bankers) valued itself at about $155 billion and the shares at $63 apiece. The offering price was raised to $69 and the opening price was $93/share.

Aswath Damodaran

II. Mature Companies in transition..

- Mature companies are generally the easiest group to value. They have long, established histories that can be mined for inputs. They have investment policies that are set and capital structures that are stable, thus making valuation more grounded in past data.
- However, this stability in the numbers can mask real problems at the company. The company may be set in a process, where it invests more or less than it should and does not have the right financing mix. In effect, the policies are consistent, stable and bad.
- If you expect these companies to change or as is more often the case to have change thrust upon them,

The perils of valuing mature companies…

Figure 7.1: Estimation Issues - Mature Companies



Hormel Foods: The Value of Control Changing

Hormel Foods sells packaged meat and other food products and has been in existence as a publicly traded company for almost 80 years. In 2008, the firm reported after-tax operating income of $315 million, reflecting a compounded growth of 5% over the previous 5 years.

The Status Quo

Run by existing management, with conservative reinvestment policies (reinvestment rate = 14.34% and debt ratio = 10.4%.

Anemic growth rate and short growth period, due to reinvestment policy

Low debt ratio affects cost of capital

Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	$315							
1	$324	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	$62	$262	6.79%	$245
2	$333	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	$64	$269	6.79%	$236
3	$342	2.75%	14.34%	19.14%	$65	$276	6.79%	$227
Beyond	$350	2.35%	7.23%	32.52%	$114	$4,840	7.23%	$3,974
Value of operating assets								$4,682
(Add) Cash								$155
(Subtract) Debt								$491
(Subtract) Management Options								$53
Value of equity in common stock								$4,293
Value per share								$31.91

New and better management

More aggressive reinvestment which increases the reinvestment rate (to 40%) and tlength of growth (to 5 years), and higher debt ratio (20%).

Operating Restructuring (1)
Expected growth rate = ROC * Reinvestment Rate
Expected growth rae (status quo) = 14.34% * 19.14% = 2.75%
Expected growth rate (optimal) = 14.00% * 40% = 5.60%
ROC drops, reinvestment rises and growth goes up.

Financial restructuring (2)
Cost of capital = Cost of equity (1-Debt ratio) + Cost of debt (Debt ratio)
Status quo = 7.33% (1-.104) + 3.60% (1-.40) (.104) = 6.79%
Optimal = 7.75% (1-.20) + 3.60% (1-.40) (.20) = 6.63%
Cost of equity rises but cost of capital drops.

Year	Operating income after taxes	Expected growth rate	ROC	Reinvestment Rate	Reinvestment	FCFF	Cost of capital	Present Value
Trailing 12 months	$315							
1	$333	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	$133	$200	6.63%	$187
2	$351	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	$141	$211	6.63%	$185
3	$371	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	$148	$223	6.63%	$184
4	$392	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	$260	$235	6.63%	$182
5	$414	5.60%	14.00%	40.00%	$223	$248	6.63%	$180
Beyond	$423	2.35%	6.74%	34.87%	$148	$6,282	6.74%	$4,557
Value of operating assets								$5,475
(Add) Cash								$155
(Subtract) Debt								$491
(Subtract) Management Options								$53
Value of equity in common stock								$5,085
Value per share								$37.80

Probability of management change = 10% (3)
Expected value =$31.91 (.90) + $37.80 (.10) = $32.50 (4)

Lesson 1: Cost cutting & increased efficiency are easier accomplished on paper than in practice…

Cost-synergy estimation is better, but there are patterns emerging in the errors

Mergers achieving stated percentage of expected cost savings, percent $N = 92$



Typical sources of estimation error

- Underestimating one-time costs
- Using benchmarks from noncomparable situations
- Not sanity-checking management estimates against precedent transactions
- Failing to ground estimates in bottom-up analysis (e.g., location-by-location review of overlaps

Source: McKinsey (2002) Postmerger Management Practice client survey; client case studies

Lesson 2: Increasing growth is not always an option (or at least not a good option)

Modes of organic growth vary in value creation intensity—consumer goods industry



Lesson 3: Financial leverage is a double-edged sword..

Exhibit 7.1: Optimal Financing Mix: Hormel Foods in January 2009

As debt ratio increases, equity becomes riskier.(higher beta) and cost of equity goes up. (1)

As firm borrows more money, its ratings drop and cost of debt rises (2)

Debt Ratio	Beta	Cost of Equity	Bond Rating	Interest rate on debt	Tax Rate	Cost of Debt (after-tax)	WACC	Firm Value (G)
0%	0.78	7.00%	AAA	3.60%	40.00%	2.16%	7.00%	$4,523
10%	0.83	7.31%	AAA	3.60%	40.00%	2.16%	6.80%	$4,665
10.39%	**0.83**	**7.33%**	**AAA**	**3.60%**	**40.00%**	**2.16%**	**6.79%**	**$4,680**
20%	0.89	7.70%	AAA	3.60%	40.00%	2.16%	6.59%	$4,815
30%	0.97	8.20%	A+	4.60%	40.00%	2.76%	6.57%	$4,834
40%	1.09	8.86%	A-	5.35%	40.00%	3.21%	6.60%	$4,808
50%	1.24	9.79%	B+	8.35%	40.00%	5.01%	7.40%	$4,271
60%	1.47	11.19%	B-	10.85%	40.00%	6.51%	8.38%	$3,757
70%	1.86	13.52%	CCC	12.35%	40.00%	7.41%	9.24%	$3,398
80%	2.70	18.53%	CC	14.35%	38.07%	8.89%	10.81%	$2,892
90%	5.39	34.70%	CC	14.35%	33.84%	9.49%	12.01%	$2,597

Current Cost of Capital

Optimal: Cost of capital lowest between 20 and 30%.

Debt ratio is percent of overall market value of firm that comes from debt financing.

At debt ratios > 80%, firm does not have enough operating income to cover interest expenses. Tax rate goes down to reflect lost tax benefits. (3)

As cost of capital drops, firm value rises (as operating cash flows remain unchanged)

III. Dealing with decline and distress…

Historial data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.

Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity

What is the value of equity in the firm?

Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestuture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can change.

There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.

Dealing with the "downside" of Distress

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will understate the value of the firm.
- Value of Equity= DCF value of equity (1 - Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
  - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
  - Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
  - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).


Current Revenue $ 4,390
Current Margin: 4.76%
EBIT $ 209m
Reinvestment: Capital expenditures include cost of new casinos and working capital
Extended reinvestment break, due ot investment in past
Industry average
Expected Margin: -> 17%
Stable Growth
Stable Revenue Growth: 3%
Stable Operating Margin: 17%
Stable ROC=10% Reinvest 30% of EBIT(1-t)
Terminal Value= 758(.0743-.03) =$ 17,129
Term. Year
Revenues $4,434 $4,523 $5,427 $6,513 $7,815 $8,206 $8,616 $9,047 $9,499 $9,974 $10,273
Oper margin 5.81% 6.86% 7.90% 8.95% 10% 11.40% 12.80% 14.20% 15.60% 17% 17%
EBIT $258 $310 $429 $583 $782 $935 $1,103 $1,285 $1,482 $1,696 $ 1,746
Tax rate 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 28.4% 30.8% 33.2% 35.6% 38.00% 38%
EBIT * (1 - t) $191 $229 $317 $431 $578 $670 $763 $858 $954 $1,051 $1,083
- Reinvestment -$19 -$11 $0 $22 $58 $67 $153 $215 $286 $350 $ 325
FCFF $210 $241 $317 $410 $520 $603 $611 $644 $668 $701 $758
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Forever
Value of Op Assets $ 9,793
+ Cash & Non-op $ 3,040
= Value of Firm $12,833
- Value of Debt $ 7,565
= Value of Equity $ 5,268
Value per share $ 8.12
Beta 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 2.75 2.36 1.97 1.59 1.20
Cost of equity 21.82% 21.82% 21.82% 21.82% 21.82% 19.50% 17.17% 14.85% 12.52% 10.20%
Cost of debt 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8.70% 8.40% 8.10% 7.80% 7.50%
Debtl ratio 73.50% 73.50% 73.50% 73.50% 73.50% 68.80% 64.10% 59.40% 54.70% 50.00%
Cost of capital 9.88% 9.88% 9.88% 9.88% 9.88% 9.79% 9.50% 9.01% 8.32% 7.43%
Cost of Equity 21.82%
Cost of Debt 3%+6%= 9% 9% (1-.38)=5.58%
Weights Debt= 73.5% ->50%
Riskfree Rate: T. Bond rate = 3%
+
Beta 3.14-> 1.20
X
Risk Premium 6%
Casino 1.15
Current D/E: 277%
Base Equity Premium
Country Risk Premium
Aswath Damodaran
Las Vegas Sands
Feburary 2009
Trading @ $4.25

Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..

- In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at $529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:

$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1-\Pi_{Distress})^t}{(1.03)^t} + \frac{1000(1-\Pi_{Distress})^7}{(1.03)^7}$$

- Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:
- $\pi_{Distress}$ = Annual probability of default = 13.54%
  - Cumulative probability of surviving 10 years = $(1 - .1354)^{10}$ = 23.34%
  - Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years = 1 - .2334 = .7666 or 76.66%
- If LVS is becomes distressed:
  - Expected distress sale proceeds = $2,769 million < Face value of debt
  - Expected equity value/share = $0.00
- Expected value per share = $8.12 (1 - .7666) + $0.00 (.7666) = $1.92

The "sunny" side of distress: Equity as a call option to liquidate the firm



Application to valuation: A simple example

- Assume that you have a firm whose assets are currently valued at $100 million and that the standard deviation in this asset value is 40%.
- Further, assume that the face value of debt is $80 million (It is zero coupon debt with 10 years left to maturity).
- If the ten-year treasury bond rate is 10%,
  - how much is the equity worth?
  - What should the interest rate on debt be?

Model Parameters & Valuation

- The inputs
  - Value of the underlying asset = S = Value of the firm = $ 100 million
  - Exercise price = K = Face Value of outstanding debt = $ 80 million
  - Life of the option = t = Life of zero-coupon debt = 10 years
  - Variance in the value of the underlying asset = σ^2 = Variance in firm value = 0.16
  - Riskless rate = r = Treasury bond rate corresponding to option life = 10%
- The output
  - The Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
    - d1 = 1.5994 N(d1) = 0.9451
    - d2 = 0.3345 N(d2) = 0.6310
  - Value of the call = 100 (0.9451) - 80 $\exp^{(-0.10)(10)}$ (0.6310) = $75.94 million
  - Value of the outstanding debt = $100 - $75.94 = $24.06 million
  - Interest rate on debt = ($ 80 / $24.06)$^{1/10}$ -1 = 12.77%

Firm value drops..

- Assume now that a catastrophe wipes out half the value of this firm (the value drops to $ 50 million), while the face value of the debt remains at $ 80 million.
- The inputs
  - Value of the underlying asset = S = Value of the firm = $ 50 million
  - All the other inputs remain unchanged
- The output
  - Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
    - d1 = 1.0515 N(d1) = 0.8534
    - d2 = -0.2135 N(d2) = 0.4155
  - Value of the call = 50 (0.8534) - 80 $\exp^{(-0.10)(10)}$ (0.4155) = $30.44 million
  - Value of the bond= $50 - $30.44 = $19.56 million

Equity value persists .. As firm value declines..



IV. Valuing Financial Service Companies

Existing assets are usually financial assets or loans, often marked to market. Earnings do not provide much information on underlying risk.

Defining capital expenditures and working capital is a challenge.Growth can be strongly influenced by regulatory limits and constraints. Both the amount of new investments and the returns on these investments can change with regulatory changes.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Preferred stock is a significant source of capital.

What is the value of equity in the firm?

For financial service firms, debt is raw material rather than a source of capital. It is not only tough to define but if defined broadly can result in high financial leverage, magnifying the impact of small operating risk changes on equity risk.

In addition to all the normal constraints, financial service firms also have to worry about maintaining capital ratios that are acceptable ot regulators. If they do not, they can be taken over and shut down.

CIB Egypt in December 2015
Valuation in Egyptian Pounds



	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Expected Growth Rate	31.96%	31.96%	31.96%	31.96%	31.96%	27.57%	23.18%	18.79%	14.39%	10.00%
Earnings per share	5.33 ج.م	7.04 ج.م	9.28 ج.م	12.25 ج.م	16.17 ج.م	20.63 ج.م	25.41 ج.م	30.18 ج.م	34.52 ج.م	37.97 ج.م
Payout ratio	24.75%	24.75%	24.75%	24.75%	24.75%	31.80%	38.85%	45.90%	52.95%	60.00%
Dividends per share	1.32 ج.م	1.74 ج.م	2.30 ج.م	3.03 ج.م	4.00 ج.م	6.56 ج.م	9.87 ج.م	13.85 ج.م	18.28 ج.م	22.78 ج.م
Cost of Equity	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%	23.25%
Cumulative Cost of Equity	123.25%	151.90%	187.21%	230.73%	284.37%	350.48%	431.95%	532.37%	656.13%	808.66%
Present Value	1.07 ج.م	1.15 ج.م	1.23 ج.م	1.31 ج.م	1.41 ج.م	1.87 ج.م	2.29 ج.م	2.60 ج.م	2.79 ج.م	2.82 ج.م

Lesson 1: Financial service companies are opaque…

- With financial service firms, we enter into a Faustian bargain. They tell us very little about the quality of their assets (loans, for a bank, for instance are not broken down by default risk status) but we accept that in return for assets being marked to market (by accountants who presumably have access to the information that we don't have).
- In addition, estimating cash flows for a financial service firm is difficult to do. So, we trust financial service firms to pay out their cash flows as dividends. Hence, the use of the dividend discount model.

Lesson 2: For financial service companies, book value matters…

- The book value of assets and equity is mostly irrelevant when valuing non-financial service companies. After all, the book value of equity is a historical figure and can be nonsensical. (The book value of equity can be negative and is so for more than a 1000 publicly traded US companies)
- With financial service firms, book value of equity is relevant for two reasons:
  - Since financial service firms mark to market, the book value is more likely to reflect what the firms own right now (rather than a historical value)
  - The regulatory capital ratios are based on book equity. Thus, a bank with negative or even low book equity will be shut down by the regulators.
- From a valuation perspective, it therefore makes sense to pay heed to book value. In fact, you can argue that reinvestment for a bank is the amount that it needs to add to book equity to sustain its growth ambitions and safety requirements:
  - FCFE = Net Income – Reinvestment in regulatory capital (book equity)

Deutsche Bank: A Crisis Valuation (October 2016)

Risk adjusted assets grows at inflation rate of 1% a year forever.

Tier 1 capital ratio increases to 15.67%, the 75th percentile for all banks

Expected DOJ fine of $10 billions lower Tier 1 capital today

Common Equity increases in tandem with Tier 1 capital

Cost of equity starts at 10.2% (75th percentile of banks) & decreases after year 5 to 9.44% (median across banks).

	Current	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Risk Adjusted Assets	$ 445,570	$ 450,026	$ 454,526	$ 459,071	$ 463,662	$ 468,299	$ 472,982	$ 477,711	$ 482,488	$ 487,313	$ 492,186
Tier 1 Capital Ratio	12.41%	13.74%	13.95%	14.17%	14.38%	14.60%	14.81%	15.03%	15.24%	15.46%	15.67%
Tier 1 Capital (Risk Adjusted Assets * T	$55,282	$61,834	$63,427	$65,045	$66,690	$68,361	$70,059	$71,784	$73,537	$75,317	$77,126
Change in regulatory capital (Tier 1)		$6,552	$1,593	$1,619	$1,645	$1,671	$1,698	$1,725	$1,753	$1,780	$1,809
Book Equity	$64,609	$71,161	$72,754	$74,372	$76,017	$77,688	$79,386	$81,111	$82,864	$84,644	$86,453
Expected ROE	-13.70%	-7.18%	-2.84%	0.06%	1.99%	5.85%	6.568%	7.286%	8.004%	8.722%	9.440%
Net Income (Book Equity * ROE)	$ (8,851)	$ (5,111)	$ (2,065)	$ 43	$ 1,512	$ 4,545	$ 5,214	$ 5,910	$ 6,632	$ 7,383	$ 8,161
- Investment in Regulatory Capital		$ 6,552	$ 1,593	$ 1,619	$ 1,645	$ 1,671	$ 1,698	$ 1,725	$ 1,753	$ 1,780	$ 1,809
FCFE		$ (11,663)	$ (3,658)	$ (1,576)	$ (133)	$ 2,874	$ 3,516	$ 4,185	$ 4,880	$ 5,602	$ 6,352
Terminal value of equity											$87,317
Present value		$ (10,583)	$ (3,012)	$ (1,178)	$ (90)	$ 1,768	$ 1,966	$ 2,129	$ 2,262	$ 2,370	$ 36,207
Cost of equity	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.048%	9.896%	9.744%	9.592%	9.440%
Cumulative Cost of equity		1.1020	1.2144	1.3383	1.4748	1.6252	1.7885	1.9655	2.1570	2.3639	2.5871
Value of equity today =	$31,838.74										
Number of shares outstanding =	1386.00										
DCF Value per share =	**$ 22.97**										
Probability of equity wipeout	10.00%										
Adjusted value per share =	**$ 20.67**										
Stock price on October 3, 2016=	**$ 13.33**										

Value per share adjusted for probability of catastrophic failure (bailout) resulting in complete loss of equity.

Return on equity increases to 5.85% (25th percentile of banks) in year 5 and 9.44% (cost of equity) in year 10

Aswath Damodaran

V. Valuing cyclical and commodity companies

Company growth often comes from movements in the economic cycle, for cyclical firms, or commodity prices, for commodity companies.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Historial revenue and earnings data are volatile, as the economic cycle and commodity prices change.

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Primary risk is from the economy for cyclical firms and from commodity price movements for commodity companies. These risks can stay dormant for long periods of apparent prosperity.

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

For commodity companies, the fact that there are only finite amounts of the commodity may put a limit on growth forever. For cyclical firms, there is the peril that the next recession may put an end to the firm.

Valuing a Cyclical Company - Toyota in Early 2009

Year	Revenues	Operating Incor	EBITDA	Operating Marg
FY1 1992	¥10,163,380	¥218,511	¥218,511	2.15%
FY1 1993	¥10,210,750	¥181,897	¥181,897	1.78%
FY1 1994	¥9,362,732	¥136,226	¥136,226	1.45%
FY1 1995	¥8,120,975	¥255,719	¥255,719	3.15%
FY1 1996	¥10,718,740	¥348,069	¥348,069	3.25%
FY1 1997	¥12,243,830	¥665,110	¥665,110	5.43%
FY1 1998	¥11,678,400	¥779,800	¥1,382,950	6.68%
FY1 1999	¥12,749,010	¥774,947	¥1,415,997	6.08%
FY1 2000	¥12,879,560	¥775,982	¥1,430,982	6.02%
FY1 2001	¥13,424,420	¥870,131	¥1,542,631	6.48%
FY1 2002	¥15,106,300	¥1,123,475	¥1,822,975	7.44%
FY1 2003	¥16,054,290	¥1,363,680	¥2,101,780	8.49%
FY1 2004	¥17,294,760	¥1,666,894	¥2,454,994	9.64%
FY1 2005	¥18,551,530	¥1,672,187	¥2,447,987	9.01%
FY1 2006	¥21,036,910	¥1,878,342	¥2,769,742	8.93%
FY1 2007	¥23,948,090	¥2,238,683	¥3,185,683	9.35%
FY1 2008	¥26,289,240	¥2,270,375	¥3,312,775	8.64%
FY 2009 (Estin	¥22,661,325	¥267,904	¥1,310,304	1.18%
		¥1,306,867		7.33%

Normalized Earnings (1)

As a cyclical company, Toyota's earnings have been volatile and 2009 earnings reflect the troubled global economy. We will assume that when economic growth returns, the operating margin for Toyota will revert back to the historical average.

Normalized Operating Income = Revenues in 2009 * Average Operating Margin (98--09)
= 22661 * .0733 =1660.7 billion yen

In early 2009, Toyota Motors had the highest market share in the sector. However, the global economic recession in 2008-09 had pulled earnings down.

Normalized Return on capital and Reinvestment (2)

Once earnings bounce back to normal, we assume that Toyota will be able to earn a return on capital equal to its cost of capital (5.09%). This is a sector, where earning excess returns has proved to be difficult even for the best of firms.

To sustain a 1.5% growth rate, the reinvestment rate has to be:

Reinvestment rate = 1.5%/5.09%
= 29.46%

Operating Assets	19,640
+ Cash	2,288
+ Non-operating assets	6,845
- Debt	11,862
- Minority Interests	583
Value of Equity	
/ No of shares	/3,448
Value per share	¥4735

$$\text{Value of operating assets} = \frac{1660.7\ (1.015)\ (1-\ .407)\ (1-\ .2946)}{(.0509\ -\ .015)} = 19{,}640 \text{ billion}$$

Normalized Cost of capital (3)

The cost of capital is computed using the average beta of automobile companies (1.10), and Toyota's cost of debt (3.25%) and debt ratio (52.9% debt ratio. We use the Japanese marginal tax rate of 40.7% for computing both the after-tax cost of debt and the after-tax operating income

Cost of capital = 8.52% (.471) + 3.25% (1-.407) (.529) = 5.09%

Stable Growth (4)

Once earnings are normalized, we assume that Toyota, as the largest market-share company, will be able to maintain only stable growth (1.5% in Yen terms)

Lesson 1: With “macro” companies, it is easy to get lost in “macro” assumptions…

- With cyclical and commodity companies, it is undeniable that the value you arrive at will be affected by your views on the economy or the price of the commodity.
- Consequently, you will feel the urge to take a stand on these macro variables and build them into your valuation. Doing so, though, will create valuations that are jointly impacted by your views on macro variables and your views on the company, and it is difficult to separate the two.
- The best (though not easiest) thing to do is to separate your macro views from your micro views. Use current market based numbers for your valuation, but then provide a separate assessment of what you think about those market numbers.

Shell's Revenues & Oil Prices



Shell: A "Oil Price" Neutral Valuation: March 2016

Revenue calculated from prevailing oil price of $40/barrel in March 2016
Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*$40 = $201,569

Compounded revenue growth of 3.91% a year, based on Shell's historical revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2015

	Base Year	1	2	3	4	5	Terminal Year
Revenues	$ 201,569	$ 209,450	$ 217,639	$ 226,149	$ 234,991	$ 244,180	$ 249,063
Operating Margin	3.01%	6.18%	7.76%	8.56%	8.95%	9.35%	9.35%
Operating Income	$ 6,065.00	$ 12,942.85	$ 16,899.10	$ 19,352.39	$ 21,040.39	$ 22,830.80	$ 23,287.41
Effective tax rate	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%	30.00%
AT Operating Income	$ 4,245.50	$ 9,060.00	$ 11,829.37	$ 13,546.68	$ 14,728.27	$ 15,981.56	$ 16,301.19
+ Depreciation	$ 26,714.00	$ 27,759	$ 28,844	$ 29,972	$ 31,144	$ 32,361	
- Cap Ex	$ 31,854.00	$ 33,099	$ 34,394	$ 35,738	$ 37,136	$ 38,588	
- Chg in WC		$ 472.88	$ 491.37	$ 510.58	$ 530.55	$ 551.29	
FCFF		$ 3,246.14	$ 5,788.19	$ 7,269.29	$ 8,205.44	$ 9,203.68	$ 13,011.34
Terminal Value						$ 216,855.71	
Return on capital							12.37%
Cost of Capital		9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	9.91%	8.00%
Cumulated Discount Factor		1.0991	1.2080	1.3277	1.4593	1.6039	
Present Value		$ 2,953.45	$ 4,791.47	$ 5,474.95	$ 5,622.81	$ 140,940.73	
Value of Operating Assets	$ 159,783.41						
+ Cash	$ 31,752.00						
+ Cross Holdings	$ 33,566.00						
- Debt	$ 58,379.00						
- Minority Interets	$ 1,245.00						
Value of Equity	$ 165,477.41						
Number of shares	4209.7						
Value per share	$ 39.31						

Operating margin converges on Shell's historical average margin of 9.35% from 200-2015

Return on capital reverts and stays at Shell's historic average of 12.37% from 200-2015

Added long term investments in joint ventures and subtracted out minority interest in consolidated holdings.

Lesson 2: Use probabilistic tools to assess value as a function of macro variables…

- If there is a key macro variable affecting the value of your company that you are uncertain about (and who is not), why not quantify the uncertainty in a distribution (rather than a single price) and use that distribution in your valuation.
- That is exactly what you do in a Monte Carlo simulation, where you allow one or more variables to be distributions and compute a distribution of values for the company.
- With a simulation, you get not only everything you would get in a standard valuation (an estimated value for your company) but you will get additional output (on the variation in that value and the likelihood that your firm is under or over valued)



Revenue calculated from the oil price drawn from distribution
Revenue = 39992.77+4039.40*Oil Price/Barrel

Pre-tax Operating Income based on revenue & selected margin
Pre-tax Operating Income = Revenues * Operating Margin

Value Shell based on operating income, assuming other assumptions (tax rate, revenue growth, cost of capital

Percentiles:	Forecast values
0%	$6.55
10%	$23.90
20%	$27.73
30%	$30.89
40%	$33.88
50%	$36.99
60%	$40.28
70%	$44.22
80%	$49.24
90%	$57.49
100%	$197.11



The optionality in commodities: Undeveloped reserves as an option



Valuing Gulf Oil

- Gulf Oil was the target of a takeover in early 1984 at $70 per share (It had 165.30 million shares outstanding, and total debt of $9.9 billion).
  - It had estimated reserves of 3038 million barrels of oil and the average cost of developing these reserves was estimated to be $10 a barrel in present value dollars (The development lag is approximately two years).
  - The average relinquishment life of the reserves is 12 years.
  - The price of oil was $22.38 per barrel, and the production cost, taxes and royalties were estimated at $7 per barrel.
  - The bond rate at the time of the analysis was 9.00%.
  - Gulf was expected to have net production revenues each year of approximately 5% of the value of the developed reserves. The variance in oil prices is 0.03.

Valuing Undeveloped Reserves

- Inputs for valuing undeveloped reserves
  - Value of underlying asset = Value of estimated reserves discounted back for period of development lag= 3038 * ($ 22.38 - $7) / 1.05^2 = $42,380.44
  - Exercise price = Estimated development cost of reserves = 3038 * $10 = $30,380 million
  - Time to expiration = Average length of relinquishment option = 12 years
  - Variance in value of asset = Variance in oil prices = 0.03
  - Riskless interest rate = 9%
  - Dividend yield = Net production revenue/ Value of developed reserves = 5%
- Based upon these inputs, the Black-Scholes model provides the following value for the call:
  - d1 = 1.6548 N(d1) = 0.9510
  - d2 = 1.0548 N(d2) = 0.8542
- Call Value= 42,380.44 $\exp^{(-0.05)(12)}$ (0.9510) -30,380 ($\exp^{(-0.09)(12)}$ (0.8542) = $ 13,306 million

The composite value…

- In addition, Gulf Oil had free cashflows to the firm from its oil and gas production of $915 million from already developed reserves and these cashflows are likely to continue for ten years (the remaining lifetime of developed reserves).
- The present value of these developed reserves, discounted at the weighted average cost of capital of 12.5%, yields:
  - Value of already developed reserves = 915 (1 - 1.125^{-10})/.125 = $5065.83
- Adding the value of the developed and undeveloped reserves
  - Value of undeveloped reserves = $ 13,306 million
  - Value of production in place = $ 5,066 million
  - Total value of firm = $ 18,372 million
  - Less Outstanding Debt = $ 9,900 million
  - Value of Equity = $ 8,472 million
  - Value per share = $ 8,472/165.3 = $51.25

VI. Valuing Multi-business companies

Figure 1.12: Estimation Issues - Multi -business and Global Businesses

Growth rates can vary widely across busineses and across countries. Trying to estimate "one" growth rate fro a firm can be difficult to do.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

The firm reports aggregate earnings from its investments in many businesses and many countries as well as in many currencies. Breakdown of earnings and operating variables in either incomplete or misleading.

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Since risk can vary widely depending upon the cash flow stream, estimating one cost of equity and capital for a multi-business, global company that can be maintained over time is an exercise in futility.

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

Different parts of the company will reach stable growth at different points in time.

Lesson 1: Value is additive

- We can value a company as a composite entity, with a collective cash flow and single set of fundamentals (growth rates, costs of capital etc.). In doing so, here are some of the issues that we will run into
  - Changing mix of businesses and geographies will translate into changing costs of capital, growth rates, ROIC etc. over time.
  - All cash flows have to be converted into one currency to do the valuation.
- If we have access to enough unit level information, we can value a company as the sum of its parts, preserving our flexibility to value each part in a different currency and with different fundamentals.

United Technologies: Raw Data - 2009

Division	*Business*	*Revenues*	*EBITDA*	*Pre-tax Operating Income*	*Capital Expenditures*	*Depreciation*	*Total Assets*
Carrier	Refrigeration systems	$14,944	$1,510	$1,316	$191	$194	$10,810
Pratt & Whitney	Defense	$12,965	$2,490	$2,122	$412	$368	$9,650
Otis	Construction	$12,949	$2,680	$2,477	$150	$203	$7,731
UTC Fire & Security	Security	$6,462	$780	$542	$95	$238	$10,022
Hamilton Sundstrand	Manufacturing	$6,207	$1,277	$1,099	$141	$178	$8,648
Sikorsky	Aircraft	$5,368	$540	$478	$165	$62	$3,985

The company also had corporate expenses, unallocated to the divisions of $408 million in the most recent year.

United Technologies: DCF parts valuation
Cost of capital, by business

Division	Unlevered Beta	Debt/Equity Ratio	Levered beta	Cost of equity	After-tax cost of debt	Debt to Capital	Cost of capital
Carrier	0.83	30.44%	0.97	9.32%	2.95%	23.33%	7.84%
Pratt & Whitney	0.81	30.44%	0.95	9.17%	2.95%	23.33%	7.72%
Otis	1.19	30.44%	1.39	12.07%	2.95%	23.33%	9.94%
UTC Fire & Security	0.65	30.44%	0.76	7.95%	2.95%	23.33%	6.78%
Hamilton Sundstrand	1.04	30.44%	1.22	10.93%	2.95%	23.33%	9.06%
Sikorsky	1.17	30.44%	1.37	11.92%	2.95%	23.33%	9.82%

UT has $12,919 million in debt outstanding at the company level but does not provide a divisional breakdown. I could have allocated the debt based on capital expenditure or total assets, but have chosen to leave the debt ratio for all divisions = debt ratio for UT (23.33%).

United Technologies: DCF valuation Fundamentals, by business

Division	*Total Assets*	*Capital Invested*	*Cap Ex*	*Allocated Reinvestment*	*Operating income after taxes*	*Return on capital*	*Reinvestment Rate*
Carrier	$10,810	$6,014	$191	$353	$816	13.57%	43.28%
Pratt & Whitney	$9,650	$5,369	$412	$762	$1,316	24.51%	57.90%
Otis	$7,731	$4,301	$150	$277	$1,536	35.71%	18.06%
UTC Fire & Security	$10,022	$5,575	$95	$176	$336	6.03%	52.27%
Hamilton Sundstrand	$8,648	$4,811	$141	$261	$681	14.16%	38.26%
Sikorsky	$3,985	$2,217	$165	$305	$296	13.37%	102.95%

Estimated total reinvestment for UT as a company to be $2,134 million and have allocated that expense across divisions, based upon the cap ex in each division.

United Technologies, DCF valuation Growth Choices

Division	Cost of capital	*Return on capital*	*Reinvestment Rate*	*Expected growth*	*Length of growth period*	*Stable growth rate*	*Stable ROC*
Carrier	7.84%	13.57%	43.28%	5.87%	5	3%	7.84%
Pratt & Whitney	7.72%	24.51%	57.90%	14.19%	5	3%	12.00%
Otis	9.94%	35.71%	18.06%	6.45%	5	3%	14.00%
UTC Fire & Security	6.78%	6.03%	52.27%	3.15%	0	3%	6.78%
Hamilton Sundstrand	9.06%	14.16%	38.26%	5.42%	5	3%	9.06%
Sikorsky	9.82%	13.37%	102.95%	13.76%	5	3%	9.82%

United Technologies, DCF valuation
Values of the parts

Business	*Cost of capital*	*PV of FCFF*	*PV of Terminal Value*	*Value of Operating Assets*
Carrier	7.84%	$2,190	$9,498	$11,688
Pratt & Whitney	7.72%	$3,310	$27,989	$31,299
Otis	9.94%	$5,717	$14,798	$20,515
UTC Fire & Security	6.78%	$0	$4,953	$4,953
Hamilton Sundstrand	9.06%	$1,902	$6,343	$8,245
Sikorsky	9.82%	-$49	$3,598	$3,550
Sum				*$80,250*

Lesson 2: When you sum the part, take care of the loose ends

- Unallocated expenses: The operating income reported at the divisions/businesses of a company are based upon accounting allocation of corporate expenses. In addition to the allocations being arbitrary, you have to also take care of any unallocated expenses.
- Double counting: If there are intra corporate transactions that show up as revenues in one business and expenses in another or as borrowed money in one and lent money in the other, make sure that you are not double counting.
- Cash, Debt & Cross holdings: To the extent that the cash, debt or cross holdings are held at the parent level, you have to adjust for this before you estimate the value of equity in the business.

United Technologies: From DCF to value of equity

Value of the parts = $80,250

Value of corporate expenses

$$= \frac{\text{Corporate Expenses}_{\text{Current}}(1-t)(1+g)}{(\text{Cost of capital}_{\text{Company}} - g)} = \frac{408(1-.38)(1.03)}{(.0868-.03)} = \$\ 4{,}587$$

Value of operating assets (sum of parts DCF) = $75,663

+ Cash held in United Technologies = $ 4,327

- Debt in United Technologies = $12,919

- Value of equity options (employees) = $ 544

Value of equity in common stock = $66,527

Value of equity per share (942.29 m shares) = $70.60

Lesson 3: The conglomerate discount will take care of itself

- If you use a discounted cash flow approach, valuing the pieces and adding up to an aggregate value, you do not have to apply a conglomerate discount to the value, since your inputs should reflect the "inefficiencies" that lead to the discount.
- If you use a relative valuation (apply a peer-group multiple to each division's earnings, revenues or book value) to get to a sum of the parts valuation, you have to grapple with the question of how much of a discount to apply.

VII. Valuing Companies across the ownership cycle

Reported income and balance sheet are heavily affected by tax considerations rather than information disclosure requirements. The line between the personal and business expenses is a fine one.

What is the **value added** by growth assets?
Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflows
Firm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows

What are the **cashflows from existing assets**?
- Equity: Cashflows after debt payments
- Firm: Cashflows before debt payments

When will the firm become a **mature fiirm**, and what are the potential roadblocks?

How **risky are the cash flows** from both existing assets and growth assets?
Equity: Risk in equity in the company
Firm: Risk in the firm's operations

Reversing investment mistakes is difficult to do. The need for and the cost of illiquidity has to be incorporated into current

Different buyers can perceive risk differently in the same private business, largely because what they see as risk will be a function of how diversified they are. The fall back positions of using market prices to extract risk measures does not

Many private businesses are finite life enterprises, not expected to last into perpetuity

Kristin's Kandy: Valuation in March 2006



Lesson 1: In private businesses, risk in the eyes of the "beholder" (buyer)

Private business owner with entire wealth invested in the business	Venture capitalist, with multiple holdings in the sector.	Public company investor with diversified portfolio
Exposed to all risk in the company. Total beta measures exposure to total risk. Total Beta = Market Beta/ Correlation of firm with market	Partially diversified. Diversify away some firm specific risk but not all. Beta will fall berbetween total and market beta.	Firm-specific risk is diversified away. Market or macro risk exposure captured in a market beta or betas.

Private Owner versus Publicly Traded Company Perceptions of Risk in an Investment



Total Risk versus Market Risk

- Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is a relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the proportion of the risk that is market risk.
  - Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market
- To estimate the beta for Kristin Kandy, we begin with the bottom-up unlevered beta of food processing companies:
  - Unlevered beta for publicly traded food processing companies = 0.78
  - Average correlation of food processing companies with market = 0.333
  - Unlevered total beta for Kristin Kandy = 0.78/0.333 = 2.34
  - Debt to equity ratio for Kristin Kandy = 0.3/0.7 (assumed industry average)
  - Total Beta = 2.34 (1- (1-.40)(30/70)) = 2.94
  - Total Cost of Equity = 4.50% + 2.94 (4%) = 16.26%

Three assessment tools when the buyer falls in the middle…

- Build up: Start with cost of equity for a "diversified" investor and add premiums (based upon historical data) for other variables that capture the additional risk borne by "typical" buyer of a private business.
  - Strength: Numbers seem strong because they are backed up by data
  - Weakness: (1) Premiums are all from public markets (2) Double counting
- Total Beta plus: Look at potential buyer (what else the buyer has in his or her portfolio), assess the correlation of that portfolio with the market and estimate a "customized" total beta.
  - Strength: Ties the cost of equity to the buyer, as it should.
  - Weaknesses: (1) Buyers are under no obligation to give you this information (2) Treats private markets as extensions of public ones
- Survey: Find out what buyers of private businesses are demanding as a rate of return when they value private businesses.
  - Strength: Agnostic on risk and return models
  - Weakness: (1) Wide differences in what "required" means across survey respondents (2) Circular logic (3) Works if private capital markets are separate and unconnected to public markets.

Lesson 2: With financials, trust but verify..

- Different Accounting Standards: The accounting statements for private firms are often based upon different accounting standards than public firms, which operate under much tighter constraints on what to report and when to report.
- Intermingling of personal and business expenses: In the case of private firms, some personal expenses may be reported as business expenses.
- Separating "Salaries" from "Dividends": It is difficult to tell where salaries end and dividends begin in a private firm, since they both end up with the owner.
- The Key person issue: In some private businesses, with a personal component, the cashflows may be intertwined with the owner being part of the business.

Lesson 3: Illiquidity is a clear and present danger..

- In private company valuation, illiquidity is a constant theme. All the talk, though, seems to lead to a rule of thumb. The illiquidity discount for a private firm is between 20-30% and does not vary across private firms.
- But illiquidity should vary across:
  - Companies: Healthier and larger companies, with more liquid assets, should have smaller discounts than money-losing smaller businesses with more illiquid assets.
  - Time: Liquidity is worth more when the economy is doing badly and credit is tough to come by than when markets are booming.
  - Buyers: Liquidity is worth more to buyers who have shorter time horizons and greater cash needs than for longer term investors who don't need the cash and are willing to hold the investment.

The "standard" approaches to estimating illiquidity discounts…

- Restricted stock: These are stock issued by publicly traded companies to the market that bypass the SEC registration process but the stock cannot be traded for one year after the issue.
- Pre-IPO transactions: These are transactions prior to initial public offerings where equity investors in the private firm buy (sell) each other's stakes.
- In both cases, the discount is estimated the be the difference between the market price of the liquid asset and the observed transaction price of the illiquid asset.
  - Discount Restricted stock = Stock price – Price on restricted stock offering
  - DiscountIPO = IPO offering price – Price on pre-IPO transaction

The “alternative” approaches

- Bid-ask spreads: All traded assets are illiquid. The bid ask spread, measuring the difference between the price at which you can buy and sell the asset at the same point in time is the illiquidity measure. I few can extrapolate what we know about bid ask spreads with public companies into the private company space, we could have a more dynamic, complete measure of illiquidity.
  - Spread = 0.145 – 0.0022 ln (Annual Revenues) -0.015 (DERN) – 0.016 (Cash/Firm Value) – 0.11 ($ Monthly trading volume/ Firm Value)
- Option pricing: Liquidity can be viewed as a put option, where you get the right to sell at the prevailing market price. Illiquidity can therefore be viewed as the loss of this put option.

And it is not just in private businesses..

- With many Asian companies, the float (the shares that are traded) is a small percentage of the outstanding shares. Assume that you are doing intrinsic valuation of one such company. How, if at all, will you incorporate this low float in your valuation?

a) Lower expected cash flows
b) Raise the discount rate
c) Attach an illiquidity discount to value
d) Let the bid ask spread take care of it

Acquirers' Anonymous

A dangerous addiction?

Value, Acquisitions and Divestitures

- An acquisition is just a large-scale project. All of the rules that apply to individual investments apply to acquisitions, as well. For an acquisition to create value, it has to
  - Generate a higher return on capital, after allowing for synergy and control factors, than the cost of capital.
  - Put another way, an acquisition will create value only if the present value of the cash flows on the acquired firm, inclusive of synergy and control benefits, exceeds the cost of the acquisitons
- A divestiture is the reverse of an acquisition, with a cash inflow now (from divesting the assets) followed by cash outflows (i.e., cash flows foregone on the divested asset) in the future. If the present value of the future cash outflows is less than the cash inflow today, the divestiture will increase value.
- A fair-price acquisition or divestiture is value neutral.

The winners and losers from the acquisition game..



And the long-term follow up is not positive either..

- Managers often argue that the market is unable to see the long term benefits of mergers that they can see at the time of the deal. If they are right, mergers should create long term benefits to acquiring firms.
- The evidence does not support this hypothesis:
  - McKinsey and Co. has examined acquisition programs at companies on
    - Did the return on capital invested in acquisitions exceed the cost of capital?
    - Did the acquisitions help the parent companies outperform the competition?
    - Half of all programs failed one test, and a quarter failed both.
  - Synergy is elusive. KPMG in a more recent study of global acquisitions concludes that most mergers (>80%) fail - the merged companies do worse than their peer group.
  - A large number of acquisitions that are reversed within fairly short time periods. About 20% of the acquisitions made between 1982 and 1986 were divested by 1988. In studies that have tracked acquisitions for longer time periods (ten years or more) the divestiture rate of acquisitions rises to almost 50%.

The Loser's Game

- Firms that grow through acquisitions have generally had far more trouble creating value than firms that grow through internal investments.
- In general, acquiring firms tend to
  - Pay too much for target firms
  - Over estimate the value of "synergy" and "control"
  - Have a difficult time delivering the promised benefits
- Worse, there seems to be very little learning built into the process. The same mistakes are made over and over again, often by the same firms with the same advisors.
- Conclusion: There is something structurally wrong with the process for acquisitions which is feeding into the mistakes.

Seven reasons why acquisitions fail…

1. Risk Transference: Attributing acquiring company risk characteristics to the target firm. Just because you are a safe firm and operate in a secure market, does not mean that you can transfer these characteristics to a target firm.
2. Debt subsidies: Subsiding target firm stockholders for the strengths of the acquiring firm is providing them with a benefit they did not earn.
3. Auto-pilot Control: Adding 20% or some arbitrary number to the market price just because other people do it is a recipe for overpayment. Using silly rules such as EPS accretion just makes the problem worse.
4. Elusive Synergy: While there is much talk about synergy in mergers, it is seldom valued realistically or appropriately.
5. Its all relative: The use of transaction multiples (multiples paid by other acquirers in acquisitions) perpetuates over payment.
6. Verdict first, trial afterwards: Deciding you want to do an acquisition first and then looking for justification for the price paid does not make sense.
7. It's not my fault: Holding no one responsible for delivering results is a sure-fire way not to get results…

Lets start with a target firm

- The target firm has the following income statement:

Revenues	100
Operating Expenses	80
= Operating Income	20
Taxes	8
= After-tax OI	12

- Assume that this firm will generate this operating income forever (with no growth) and that the cost of equity for this firm is 20%. The firm has no debt outstanding. What is the value of this firm?

1. Risk Transference

- Test 1: Assume that as an acquiring firm, you are in a much safer business and have a cost of equity of 10%. What is the value of the target firm to you?
- Lesson 1: The cost of equity used for an investment should reflect the risk of the investment and not the risk characteristics of the investor who raised the funds.
- Implication 1: If you ignore this lesson, risky companies will always look cheap to you, and over time you will not only over pay for them but you will become a riskier firm yourself.

2. The Debt Subsidy

- Test 2: Assume as an acquirer that you have access to cheap debt (at 4%) and that you plan to fund half the acquisition with debt. How much would you be willing to pay for the target firm?
- Lesson 2: When valuing a target firm, use a cost of capital that reflects the debt capacity and the cost of debt that would apply to the firm, not your cost of debt or your capacity to borrow money.
- Implication 2: If you build these characteristics into the valuation of the target firm, you are essentially transferring wealth from your firm's stockholder to the target firm's stockholders for something (your capacity to borrow money at a low rate) that they had no role in creating.

3. Control Premiums

- Test 3: Assume that you are now told that it is conventional to pay a 20% premium for control in acquisitions (backed up by Mergerstat). How much would you be willing to pay for the target firm?
- Lesson 3: There is no value to control, per se. The value comes from what you plan to do with that control in terms of changing the way the target company operates.
  - Value of Control = Value of target company with you in control – Value of target company with status quo
- Implication 3: If you pay a control premium of any magnitude for a company that is already perfectly managed, you are over paying. There can be no rule of thumb that works for the value of control.

4. The Value of Synergy

- Test 4: Assume now that you are told that there are potential growth and cost savings synergies in the acquisition. Would that increase what you would be willing to pay for the target firm? And by how much?
- Lesson 4: The value of synergy comes from combining the acquiring and target firm. To value synergy, you have to value the combined firm. As the acquiring firm, you will have to negotiate for a share of this synergy.
- Implication 4: If you (as the acquiring firm) pay, as a premium, the entire value of the synergy created, your stockholders will gain nothing from the transaction.

The Value of Synergy



Valuing Synergy

(1) the firms involved in the merger are valued independently, by discounting expected cash flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm.

(2) the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, is obtained by adding the values obtained for each firm in the first step.

(3) The effects of synergy are built into expected growth rates and cashflows, and the combined firm is re-valued with synergy.

- Value of Synergy = Value of the combined firm, with synergy - Value of the combined firm, without synergy

Synergy – Example
Higher growth and cost savings

	P&G	Gillette	Piglet: No Synergy	Piglet: Synergy	
Free Cashflow to Equity	$5,864.74	$1,547.50	$7,412.24	$7,569.73	Annual operating expenses reduced by $250 million
Growth rate for first 5 years	12%	10%	11.58%	12.50%	Slighly higher growth rate
Growth rate after five years	4%	4%	4.00%	4.00%	
Beta	0.90	0.80	0.88	0.88	
Cost of Equity	7.90%	7.50%	7.81%	7.81%	Value of synergy
Value of Equity	$221,292	$59,878	$281,170	$298,355	**$17,185**

5. The Herd Behavior Instinct

- Test 5: Now assume that you are told that an analysis of other acquisitions reveals that acquirers have been willing to pay 5 times EBIT. Given that your target firm has EBIT of $ 20 million, would you be willing to pay $ 100 million for the acquisition?
- Lesson 5: Transaction multiples are flawed at two levels. First, they represent pricing, rather than valuation. Second, the sample for the pricing is a biased one, since acquisitions are usually done at premiums.
- Implication 5: All too often, acquisitions are justified by using one of the following two arguments.
  1. Every one else in your sector is doing acquisitions & you have to do the same to survive.
  2. The value of a target firm is based upon what others have paid on acquisitions, which may be much higher than what your estimate of value for the firm i

6. The Ego Factor and Conflicts of Interest

- Test 6: Assume that you know that the CEO of the acquiring firm really, really wants to do this acquisition and that the investment bankers on both sides have produced fairness opinions that indicate that the firm is worth $ 100 million. Would you be willing to go along?
- Lesson 6: If you, as a top manager, decide on doing an acquisition at any cost, you will succeed. Beware the winner's curse!
- Implication 6: Strong, over confident CEOs with big egos are often the drivers of acquisition binges and there is ecosystem that eggs them along.

To illustrate: A bad deal is made, and justified by accountants & bankers



The CEO steps in… and digs a hole…

- Leo Apotheker was the CEO of HP at the time of the deal, brought in to replace Mark Hurd, the previous CEO who was forced to resign because of a "sex" scandal.
- In the face of almost universal feeling that HP had paid too much for Autonomy, Mr. Apotheker addressing a conference at the time of the deal: "We have a **pretty rigorous process inside H.P.** that we follow for **all our acquisitions**, which is a **D.C.F.-based model**," he said, in a reference to discounted cash flow, a standard valuation methodology. "And we try to take a **very conservative view**."
- Apotheker added, "Just to make sure everybody understands, Autonomy will be, on Day 1, **accretive to H.P**….. "**Just take it from us**. We did that analysis at **great length, in great detail**, and we feel that we paid a **very fair price** for Autonomy. And it will give a **great return to our shareholders**.

7. It’s not my fault..



Acquisition-driven Value Creation: Is it hopeless?

- The odds seem to be clearly weighted against success in acquisitions.
- If you were to create a strategy to grow, based upon acquisitions, which of the following offers your best chance of success?

This	Or this
Sole Bidder	Bidding War
Public target	Private target
Pay with cash	Pay with stock
Small target	Large target
Cost synergies	Growth synergies

Better to lose a bidding war than to win one…



(a) Market-adjusted CARs

Returns in the 40 months before & after bidding war
Source: Malmendier, Moretti & Peters (2011)

You are better off buying small rather than large targets… with cash rather than stock



And focusing on private firms and subsidiaries, rather than public firms…



Growth vs Cost Synergies

Top-line trouble: 70 percent of mergers failed to achieve expected revenue synergies

Mergers achieving stated percentage of expected revenue synergies, percent $N = 77$



Typical sources of estimation error

- Ignoring or underestimating customer losses (typically 2% to 5%) that result from the integration
- Assuming growth or share targets out of line with overall market growth and competitive dynamics (no "outside view" calibration)

Source: McKinsey (2002) Postmerger Management Practice client survey; client case studies

Cost-synergy estimation is better, but there are patterns emerging in the errors

Mergers achieving stated percentage of expected cost savings, percent $N = 92$



Typical sources of estimation error

- Underestimating one-time costs
- Using benchmarks from noncomparable situations
- Not sanity-checking management estimates against precedent transactions
- Failing to ground estimates in bottom-up analysis (e.g., location-by-location review of overlaps

Source: McKinsey (2002) Postmerger Management Practice client survey; client case studies

Synergy: Odds of success

- Studies that have focused on synergies have concluded that you are far more likely to deliver cost synergies than growth synergies.
- Synergies that are concrete and planned for at the time of the merger are more likely to be delivered than fuzzy synergies.
- Synergy is much more likely to show up when someone is held responsible for delivering the synergy.
- You are more likely to get a share of the synergy gains in an acquisition when you are a single bidder than if you are one of multiple bidders.

Bottom line: For acquisitions to create value, you have to stay disciplined..

- If you have a successful acquisition strategy, stay focused on that strategy. Don't let size or hubris drive you to "expand" the strategy.
- Realistic plans for delivering synergy and control have to be put in place before the merger is completed. By realistic, we have to mean that the magnitude of the benefits have to be reachable and not pipe dreams and that the time frame should reflect the reality that it takes a while for two organizations to work as one.
- The best thing to do in a bidding war is to drop out.
- Someone (preferably the person pushing hardest for the merger) should be held to account for delivering the benefits.
- The compensation for investment bankers and others involved in the deal should be tied to how well the deal works rather than for getting the deal done.

NARRATIVE AND NUMBERS: VALUATION AS A BRIDGE

Valuation as a bridge



Step 1a: Survey the landscape

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of
  - Your company (its products, its management and its history.
  - The market or markets that you see it growing in.
  - The competition it faces and will face.
  - The macro environment in which it operates.


Higher income for drivers, relative to traditional taxis.
The drivers
Anyone with a car in one of Uber's covered cities can apply to be a Uber driver. If you pass the Uber screens, you are given a Uber iPhone and are in the system.
Uber App
The customers
Uber subscribers download its app to their phones and when they need a ride, use the app. They can track the car as it approaches them on their devices.
Convenience, comfort and /or cost savings, relative to traditional cab
Fare quotes, based on distance, car type & demand period
Pricing & payment
Uber set the prices for rides, with premium prices for rides during peak demand times. Customers pay Uber for the rides, using their credit cards and don't pay Uber drivers.
Safety & Secure transactions
Even with Uber's 20% cut, drivers make more than they do from status quo.
Splitting the proceeds
Uber splits the ride receipts with the driver, keeping a percentage of the receipts for itself (revenues to Uber). While this percentage has historically been 20%, Uber had reduced it in some cities, when faced with competition from Lyft and Hailo.
Stronger competition from Lyft, Hailo & others will reduce Uber's split
Uber has a low-cost model that should allow it to keep a large percent of its revenues as profits.
From revenues to profits
From these revenues, Uber covers its expenses.These include R&D, technology development, customer acquisition costs (including rebates to new customers), marketing and the employees/infrastructure it needs in each of the cities that it operates in.
Regulatory & legal issues with offering service will increase costs.
Should be kept low because Uber does not invest in cars or other expensive infrastructure.
Reinvest to grow
While Uber does not own the cars that its drivers operate, it still has to invest in technology (R&D) and acquisitions to grow. That reinvestment is likely to be modest initially, but will scale up as the company grows.
Local companies may need to be acquired to gain foothold in some markets

The Auto Business

Low Growth

Year	Revenues ($)	% Growth Rate
2005	1,274,716.60	
2006	1,421,804.20	11.54%
2007	1,854,576.40	30.44%
2008	1,818,533.00	-1.94%
2009	1,572,890.10	-13.51%
2010	1,816,269.40	15.47%
2011	1,962,630.40	8.06%
2012	2,110,572.20	7.54%
2013	2,158,603.00	2.28%
2014	2,086,124.80	-3.36%
ounded Average =		5.63%

+

Low Margins



High & Increasing Reinvestment



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Bad Business

	ROIC	Cost of capital	ROiC - Cost of capital
2004	6.82%	7.93%	-1.11%
2005	10.47%	7.02%	3.45%
2006	4.60%	7.97%	-3.37%
2007	7.62%	8.50%	-0.88%
2008	3.48%	8.03%	-4.55%
2009	-4.97%	8.58%	-13.55%
2010	5.16%	8.03%	-2.87%
2011	7.55%	8.15%	-0.60%
2012	7.80%	8.55%	-0.75%
2013	7.83%	8.47%	-0.64%
2014	6.47%	7.53%	-1.06%

Only once in the last 10 years have auto companies collectively earned more than their cost of capital

What makes Ferrari different?

Ferrari sold only 7,255 cars in all of 2014

Ferrari sales (in units) have grown very little in the last decade & have been stable



Ferrari had a profit margin of 18.2%, in the 95th percentile, partly because of its high prices and partly because it spends little on advertising.

Ferrari has not invested in new plants.

Step 1b: Create a narrative for the future

- Every valuation starts with a narrative, a story that you see unfolding for your company in the future.
- In developing this narrative, you will be making assessments of your company (its products, its management), the market or markets that you see it growing in, the competition it faces and will face and the macro environment in which it operates.
  - Rule 1: Keep it simple.
  - Rule 2: Keep it focused.

The Uber Narrative

In June 2014, my initial narrative for Uber was that it would be

1. An urban car service business: I saw Uber primarily as a force in urban areas and only in the car service business.
2. Which would expand the business moderately (about 40% over ten years) by bringing in new users.
3. With local networking benefits: If Uber becomes large enough in any city, it will quickly become larger, but that will be of little help when it enters a new city.
4. Maintain its revenue sharing (20%) system due to strong competitive advantages (from being a first mover).
5. And its existing low-capital business model, with drivers as contractors and very little investment in infrastructure.

The Ferrari Narrative

- Ferrari will stay an exclusive auto club, deriving its allure from its scarcity and the fact that only a few own Ferraris.
- By staying exclusive, the company gets three benefits:
  - It can continue to charge nose bleed prices for its cars and sell them with little or no advertising.
  - It does not need to invest in new assembly plants, since it does not plan to ramp up production.
  - It sells only to the super rich, who are unaffected by overall economic conditions or market crises.

Step 2: Check the narrative against history, economic first principles & common sense



The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable

The Impossible

Bigger than the economy
Assuming Growth rate for company in perpetuity> Growth rate for economy

Bigger than the total market
Allowing a company's revenues to grow so much that it has more than a 100% market share of whatever business it is in.

Profit margin > 100%
Assuming earnings growth will exceeds revenue growth for a long enough period, and pushing margins above 100%

Depreciation without cap ex
Assuming that depreciation will exceed cap ex in perpetuity.

The Implausible

Growth without reinvestment
Assuming growth forever without reinvestment.

Profits without competition
Assuming that your company will grow and earn higher profits, with no competition.

Returns without risk
Assuming that you can generate high returns in a business with no risk.

The Improbable



Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



The Impossible: The Runaway Story

The Story

+

The Checks (?)

Board Member	Designation	Age
Henry Kissinger	Former Secretary of State	92
Bill Perry	Former Secretary of Defense	88
George Schultz	Former Secretary of State	94
Bill Frist	Former Senate Majority Leader	63
Sam Nunn	Former Senator	77
Gary Roughead	Former Navy Admiral	64
James Mattis	Former Marine Corps General	65
Dick Kovocovich	Former CEO of Wells Fargo	72
Riley Bechtel	Former CEO of Bechtel	63
William Foege	Epidemologist	79
Elizabeth Holmes	Founder & CEO, Theranos	31
Sunny Balwani	President & COO, Theranos	NA

+ Money



Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)

	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 2028
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,780
% Growth		*52%*	*75%*	*34%*	*73%*	*43%*	*36%*	*32%*	*21%*	*18%*	*17%*	*13%*	*13%*	*12%*	*12%*	*10%*
Automotive Revenue Per Unit ($)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,554
% Growth		*-9%*	*-2%*	*-5%*	*-17%*	*-11%*	*-3%*	*-2%*	*1%*	*1%*	*1%*	*1%*	*1%*	*1%*	*1%*	*1%*
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	79
Total Sales	**2,478**	**3,361**	**5,655**	**7,095**	**10,072**	**12,768**	**16,736**	**21,648**	**26,403**	**31,416**	**36,959**	**42,087**	**48,017**	**54,355**	**61,296**	**68,059**
% Growth		*36%*	*68%*	*25%*	*42%*	*27%*	*31%*	*29%*	*22%*	*19%*	*18%*	*14%*	*14%*	*13%*	*13%*	*11%*
EBITDA	**148**	**417**	**920**	**1,042**	**1,586**	**2,150**	**3,138**	**4,066**	**4,857**	**5,723**	**6,328**	**7,182**	**8,144**	**9,688**	**10,874**	**12,099**
% Margin	*6.0%*	*12.4%*	*16.3%*	*14.7%*	*15.7%*	*16.8%*	*18.7%*	*18.8%*	*18.4%*	*18.2%*	*17.1%*	*17.1%*	*17.0%*	*17.8%*	*17.7%*	*17.8%*
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	*41%*	*79%*	*55%*	*65%*	*62%*	*69%*	*78%*	*86%*	*79%*	*77%*	*75%*	*76%*	*76%*	*76%*	*76%*	*77%*
EBIT	**45**	**259**	**748**	**839**	**1,285**	**1,796**	**2,749**	**3,529**	**4,252**	**5,027**	**5,517**	**6,244**	**7,056**	**8,429**	**9,423**	**10,439**
% Margin	*1.8%*	*7.7%*	*13.2%*	*11.8%*	*12.8%*	*14.1%*	*16.4%*	*16.3%*	*16.1%*	*16.0%*	*14.9%*	*14.8%*	*14.7%*	*15.5%*	*15.4%*	*15.3%*
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pretax Income	**46**	**258**	**758**	**872**	**1,332**	**1,886**	**2,857**	**3,684**	**4,451**	**5,305**	**5,875**	**6,688**	**7,598**	**9,080**	**10,207**	**11,373**
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,323
% Effective Rate	*6%*	*1%*	*2%*	*4%*	*6%*	*14%*	*16%*	*17%*	*18%*	*19%*	*19%*	*20%*	*19%*	*19%*	*20%*	*20%*
Net Income	**44**	**256**	**744**	**839**	**1,246**	**1,624**	**2,395**	**3,043**	**3,644**	**4,303**	**4,741**	**5,372**	**6,128**	**7,319**	**8,179**	**9,050**
Plus																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932)
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Less																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376)
% of Change in Sales		*-2%*	*-7%*	*-12%*	*-6%*	*-12%*	*-4%*	*-2%*	*-1%*	*-6%*	*-6%*	*-6%*	*-4%*	*-5%*	*-5%*	*-6%*
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,149
% of Sales	*10%*	*6%*	*6%*	*4%*	*5%*	*4%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*	*3%*
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unlevered Free Cash Flow	**78**	**229**	**750**	**863**	**1,186**	**1,702**	**2,343**	**2,884**	**3,314**	**4,113**	**4,472**	**4,959**	**5,456**	**6,597**	**7,315**	**8,005**

EBITDA	12,099
Sales	68,059
Net Debt (Cash)	(260)
Tesla Diluted Shares	142

Exit EBITDA High	12.0 x	Exit PPG High	5.0%	Exit P/Sales High	180%
Exit EBITDA Low	8.0 x	Exit PPG Low	3.0%	Exit P/Sales Low	130%

Discount Rate High	13.0%	FY Month of Valuation	1.0 (Beginning of this Month)
Discount Rage Low	9.0%	Month of FY End	12.0 (End of this Month)

Step 3: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value



Ferrari: From story to numbers



Step 4: Value the company (Uber)



	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Overall market	$106,000	$112,360	$119,102	$126,248	$133,823	$141,852	$150,363	$159,385	$168,948	$179,085
Share of market (gross)	3.63%	5.22%	6.41%	7.31%	7.98%	8.49%	8.87%	9.15%	9.36%	10.00%
Revenues as percent of gross	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%
Annual Revenue	$769	$1,173	$1,528	$1,846	$2,137	$2,408	$2,666	$2,916	$3,163	$3,582
Operating margin	7.00%	10.67%	14.33%	18.00%	21.67%	25.33%	29.00%	32.67%	36.33%	40.00%
Operating Income	$54	$125	$219	$332	$463	$610	$773	$953	$1,149	$1,433
Effective tax rate	31%	32%	33%	34%	35%	36%	37%	38%	39%	40%
- Taxes	$17	$40	$72	$113	$162	$220	$286	$362	$448	$573
After-tax operating income	$37	$85	$147	$219	$301	$390	$487	$591	$701	$860
Sales/Capital Ratio	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
- Reinvestment	$94	$81	$71	$64	$58	$54	$52	$50	$49	$84
Free Cash Flow to the Firm	-$57	$4	$76	$156	$243	$336	$435	$541	$652	$776

Ferrari: The "Exclusive Club" Value

Stay Super Exclusive: Revenue growth is low

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.34%	2.68%	2.02%	1.36%	0.70%	0.70%
Revenues	€ 2,763	€ 2,874	€ 2,988	€ 3,108	€ 3,232	€ 3,362	€ 3,474	€ 3,567	€ 3,639	€ 3,689	€ 3,714	€ 3,740
EBIT (Operating) margin	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%	18.20%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 503	€ 523	€ 544	€ 566	€ 588	€ 612	€ 632	€ 649	€ 662	€ 671	€ 676	€ 681
Tax rate	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%
EBIT(1-t)	€ 334	€ 348	€ 361	€ 376	€ 391	€ 407	€ 420	€ 431	€ 440	€ 446	€ 449	€ 452
- Reinvestment		€ 78	€ 81	€ 84	€ 87	€ 91	€ 79	€ 66	€ 51	€ 35	€ 18	€ 22
FCFF		€ 270	€ 281	€ 292	€ 303	€ 316	€ 341	€ 366	€ 389	€ 411	€ 431	€ 431
Cost of capital		6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.96%	6.97%	6.98%	6.99%	7.00%	7.00%
PV(FCFF)		€ 252	€ 245	€ 238	€ 232	€ 225	€ 228	€ 228	€ 227	€ 224	€ 220	

Terminal value	€ 6,835
PV(Terminal value)	€ 3,485
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 2,321
Value of operating assets =	€ 5,806
- Debt	€ 623
- Minority interests	€ 13
+ Cash	€ 1,141
Value of equity	€ 6,311

High Prices + No selling cost = Preserve current operating margin

Minimal Reinvestment due to low growth

The super rich are not sensitive to economic downturns

Step 5: Keep the feedback loop

1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	Uber (Gurley)	*Uber (Gurley Mod)*	*Uber (Damodaran)*
Narrative	Uber will expand the car service market substantially, bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its networking advantage to gain a dominant market share, while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will expand the car service market substantially, bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its networking advantage to gain a dominant market share, while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its competitive advantages to get a significant but not dominant market share and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market ($10 billion+)	$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market ($6 billion+)	$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market ($2-3 billion)

Different narratives, Different Numbers

Total Market	*Growth Effect*	*Network Effect*	*Competitive Advantages*	*Value of Uber*
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	$799

The Ferrari Counter Narrative



Ferrari: The "Rev-it-up" Alternative

Get less exclusive: Double number of cars sold over next decade

	Base year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Terminal year
Revenue growth rate		12.00%	12.00%	12.00%	12.00%	12.00%	9.74%	7.48%	5.22%	2.96%	0.70%	0.70%
Revenues	€ 2,763	€ 3,095	€ 3,466	€ 3,882	€ 4,348	€ 4,869	€ 5,344	€ 5,743	€ 6,043	€ 6,222	€ 6,266	€ 6,309
EBIT (Operating) margin	18.20%	17.81%	17.42%	17.04%	16.65%	16.26%	15.87%	15.48%	15.10%	14.71%	14.32%	14.32%
EBIT (Operating income)	€ 503	€ 551	€ 604	€ 661	€ 724	€ 792	€ 848	€ 889	€ 912	€ 915	€ 897	€ 904
Tax rate	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%	33.54%
EBIT(1-t)	€ 334	€ 366	€ 401	€ 439	€ 481	€ 526	€ 564	€ 591	€ 606	€ 608	€ 596	€ 600
- Reinvestment		€ 233	€ 261	€ 293	€ 328	€ 367	€ 334	€ 281	€ 211	€ 126	€ 31	€ 35
FCFF		€ 133	€ 140	€ 147	€ 153	€ 159	€ 230	€ 310	€ 395	€ 482	€ 566	€ 565
Cost of capital		8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	7.90%	7.80%	7.70%	7.60%	7.50%	7.50%
PV(FCFF)		€ 123	€ 120	€ 117	€ 113	€ 108	€ 145	€ 181	€ 215	€ 244	€ 266	

Terminal value	€ 8,315
PV(Terminal value)	€ 3,906
PV (CF over next 10 years)	€ 1,631
Value of operating assets =	€ 5,537
- Debt	€ 623
- Minority interests	€ 13
+ Cash	€ 1,141
Value of equity	€ 6,042

Lower Prices + Some selling cost = Lower operating margin

Reinvestment reflects higher sales

The very rich are more sensitive to economic conditions

And the world is full of feedback.. My Ferrari afterthought!

Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options

Uber: The September 2015 Update

Input	*June 2014*	*September 2015*	*Rationale*
Total Market	$100 billion; Urban car service	$230 billion; Logistics	Market is broader, bigger & more global than I thought it would be. Uber's entry into delivery & moving businesses is now plausible, perhaps even probable.
Growth in market	Increase market size by 34%; CAGR of 6%.	Double market size; CAGR of 10.39%.	New customers being drawn to car sharing, with more diverse offerings.
Market Share	10% (Local Networking)	25% (Weak Global Networking)	Higher cost of entry will reduce competitors, but remaining competitors have access to capital & in Asia, the hometown advantage.
Slice of gross receipts	20% (Left at status quo)	15%	Increased competition will reduce car service company slice.
Operating margin	40% (Low cost model)	25% (Partial employee model)	Drivers will become partial employees, higher insurance and regulatory costs.
Cost of capital	12% (Ninth decile of US companies)	10% (75th percentile of US companies)	Business model in place and substantial revenues.
Probability of failure	10%	0%	Enough cash on hand to find off threats to survival.
Value of equity	**$5.9 billion**	**$23.4 billion**	**Value increased more than four fold.**

Potential Market	Market size (in millions)
A1. Urban car service	$100,000
A2. All car service	$175,000
A3. Logistics	$230,000
A4. Mobility Services	$310,000

Increases overall market to $618 billion in year 10

Growth Effect	CAGR (next 10 years)
B1. None	3.00%
B2. Increase market by 25%	5.32%
B3. Increase market size by 50%	7.26%
B4: Double market size	10.39%

Network Effects	Market Share
C1. No network effects	5%
C2. Weak local network effects	10%
C3. Strong local network effects	15%
C4. Weak global network effects	25%
C5. Strong global network effects	40%

	Base	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Assumptions
Overall market	$230,000	$253,897	$280,277	$309,398	$341,544	$377,031	$416,204	$459,448	$507,184	$559,881	$618,052	A3 & B4
Share of market (gross)	4.71%	6.74%	8.77%	10.80%	12.83%	14.86%	16.89%	18.91%	20.94%	22.97%	25.00%	C4
Gross Billings	$10,840	$17,117	$24,582	$33,412	$43,813	$56,014	$70,277	$86,900	$106,218	$128,612	$154,513	
Revenues as percent of gross	20.00%	19.50%	19.00%	18.50%	18.00%	17.50%	17.00%	16.50%	16.00%	15.50%	15.00%	D3
Annual Revenue	$2,168	$3,338	$4,670	$6,181	$7,886	$9,802	$11,947	$14,338	$16,995	$19,935	$23,177	
Operating margin	-23.06%	-18.26%	-13.45%	-8.64%	-3.84%	0.97%	5.77%	10.58%	15.39%	20.19%	25.00%	E2
Operating Income	-$500	-$609	-$628	-$534	-$303	$95	$690	$1,517	$2,615	$4,026	$5,794	
Effective tax rate	30.00%	31.00%	32.00%	33.00%	34.00%	35.00%	36.00%	37.00%	38.00%	39.00%	40.00%	
- Taxes	-$150	-$189	-$201	-$176	-$103	$33	$248	$561	$994	$1,570	$2,318	
After-tax operating income	-$350	-$420	-$427	-$358	-$200	$62	$442	$956	$1,621	$2,456	$3,477	
Sales/Capital Ratio		5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	F
- Reinvestment		$234	$267	$302	$341	$383	$429	$478	$531	$588	$648	
Free Cash Flow to the Firm		-$654	-$694	-$660	-$541	-$322	$13	$478	$1,090	$1,868	$2,828	
Terminal value											$56,258	
Present value of FCFF		-$595	-$573	-$496	-$369	-$200	$7	$248	$520	$822	$1,152	
Present value of terminal value											$22,914	
Cost of capital	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	9.60%	9.20%	8.80%	8.40%	8.00%	G1

PV of cash flows during next 10 years =	$515	
PV of terminal value =	$22,914	
Value of operating assets	$23,429	
Probability of failure	0.00%	G2
Adjusted value of operating assets	$23,429	
Less Debt	$0	
Value of Equity	$23,429	

Capital Intensity
F: Status Quo: Sales/Capital = 5

Expense Profile	Operating Margin
E1: Independent contractor	40%
E2: Partial employee	25%
E3: Full employee	15%

Competitive Advantages	Slice of Gross Receipts
D1. None	5%
D2. Weak	10%
D3. Semi-strong	15%
D4. Strong & Sustainable	20%

Risk Estimates
G1. Cost of capital at 75th percentile of US companies = 10%
G2. Probability of failure in next 10 years= 0%

Uber Valuation: September 2015

My Severstal Story

Severstal

The Reality-based Steel Company

Severstal is a company in a bad business (shrinking revenues, margin pressures) that has worked at divesting the portions of its business that have the lowest margins (North America), reducing its debt load and focusing on its high margin domestic business. The company will continue to emphasize high margins over growth and while country and commodity price risk lurk, it will be able to weather the storms with its domestic profits.

The Assumptions

	Base year	*Years 1-5*	*Years 6-10*		*After year 10*	*Link to story*
Revenues (a)	$ 5,916	3.00% →	2.50%		2.50%	Return to low growth after consolidation
Operating margin (b)	25.81%	25.81% →	19.13%		19.13%	Current margins are at all-time high. Will drop to peak 2004-11 margins with Russian operations
Tax rate	17.20%	17.20% →	20.00%		20.00%	Russian tax rate
Reinvestment (c)		Sales to capital ratio =	1.20	RIR =	29.41%	Low growth reduces reinvestment needs
Return on capital	32.58%	Marginal ROIC =	-1.76%		8.50%	Earn cost of capital in stable growth
Cost of capital (d)		9.32% →	8.50%		8.50%	Cost of capital higher due to country risk

The Cash Flows

	Revenues	*Operating Margin*	*EBIT*	*EBIT (1-t)*	*Reinvestment*	*FCFF*
1	$ 6,093	25.14%	$ 1,532	$ 1,269	$ 148	$ 1,121
2	$ 6,276	24.48%	$ 1,536	$ 1,272	$ 152	$ 1,120
3	$ 6,465	23.81%	$ 1,539	$ 1,274	$ 157	$ 1,117
4	$ 6,659	23.14%	$ 1,541	$ 1,276	$ 162	$ 1,114
5	$ 6,858	22.47%	$ 1,541	$ 1,276	$ 166	$ 1,110
6	$ 7,057	21.80%	$ 1,539	$ 1,265	$ 166	$ 1,100
7	$ 7,255	21.13%	$ 1,533	$ 1,252	$ 165	$ 1,088
8	$ 7,451	20.47%	$ 1,525	$ 1,237	$ 163	$ 1,074
9	$ 7,644	19.80%	$ 1,513	$ 1,219	$ 161	$ 1,058
10	$ 7,835	19.13%	$ 1,499	$ 1,199	$ 159	$ 1,040
Terminal year	$ 8,031	19.13%	$ 1,536	$ 1,229	$ 362	$ 868

The Value

Terminal value	$ 14,460		
PV(Terminal value)	$ 6,067		
PV (CF over next 10 years)	$ 6,988		
Value of operating assets =	$ 13,055		
Adjustment for distress	$ -	Probability of failure =	0.00%
- Debt & Mnority Interests	$ 2,028		
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets	$ 1,439		
Value of equity	$ 12,466		
- Value of equity options	$ -		
Number of shares	837.72		
Value per share	$ 14.88	Stock was trading at =	$13.84

RELATIVE VALUATION (PRICING)

Aswath Damodaran

Relative valuation is pervasive…

- Most asset valuations are relative.
- Most equity valuations on Wall Street are relative valuations.
  - Almost 85% of equity research reports are based upon a multiple and comparables.
  - More than 50% of all acquisition valuations are based upon multiples
  - Rules of thumb based on multiples are not only common but are often the basis for final valuation judgments.
- While there are more discounted cashflow valuations in consulting and corporate finance, they are often relative valuations masquerading as discounted cash flow valuations.
  - The objective in many discounted cashflow valuations is to back into a number that has been obtained by using a multiple.
  - The terminal value in a significant number of discounted cashflow valuations is estimated using a multiple.

The Reasons for the allure…

- "If you think I'm crazy, you should see the guy who lives across the hall"

  Jerry Seinfeld talking about Kramer in a Seinfeld episode

- " A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation"

  H.H. Munro

- " If you are going to screw up, make sure that you have lots of company"

  Ex-portfolio manager

Pricing versus Valuation

Drivers of intrinsic value
- Cashflows from existing assets
- Growth in cash flows
- Quality of Growth

Drivers of price
- Market moods & momentum
- Surface stories about fundamentals

Accounting Estimates

Valuation Estimates

INTRINSIC VALUE

Value

THE GAP
Is there one?
If so, will it close?
If it will close, what will cause it to close?

Price

PRICE



Test 1: Are you pricing or valuing?



Test 2: Are you pricing or valuing?

Europe
Switzerland

Biotechnology
Biotechnology

Reuters	Bloomberg	Exchange	Ticker
BION.S	BION SW	SWX	BION

Price at 12 Aug 2013 (CHF)	124.00
Price Target (CHF)	164.50
52-week range (CHF)	128.40 - 84.90

Strong sector and stock-picking continue

Impressive performance

Over the past two years, BB Biotech shares have roughly tripled, which could tempt investors to take profits. However, this performance has been well backed by a deserved revival of the biotech industry, encouraging fundamental news, M&A, and increased money flow into health care stocks. In addition, BBB returned to index outperformance by modifying its stock-picking approach. Hence, despite excellent performance, the shares still trade at a 23% discount to the net asset value of the portfolio. Hence, the shares are an attractive value vehicle to capture growth opportunities in an attractive sector.

Biotech industry remains attractive

With the re-rating of the pharma sector, investors have also showed increased interest in biotech stocks. Established biotech stocks have delivered encouraging financial results and approvals, while there has also been substantial industry consolidation, which is not surprising in times of "cheap" money and high liquidity. BB Biotech remains an attractive vehicle to capture the future potential of the biotech sector. In addition, investors benefit from a 23% discount to NAV and attractive cash distribution policy of 5% yield p.a. Hence, we reiterate our Buy on BB Biotech shares

Key changes

Target Price	106.50 to 164.50	↑	54.5%

Source: Deutsche Bank

Price/price relative



Performance (%)	1m	3m	12m
Absolute	-1.4	5.4	37.4

Test 3: Are you pricing or valuing?

	1	2	3	4	5
EBITDA	$100.00	$120.00	$144.00	$172.80	$207.36
- Depreciation	$20.00	$24.00	$28.80	$34.56	$41.47
EBIT	$80.00	$96.00	$115.20	$138.24	$165.89
- Taxes	$24.00	$28.80	$34.56	$41.47	$49.77
EBIT (1-t)	$56.00	$67.20	$80.64	$96.77	$116.12
+ Depreciation	$20.00	$24.00	$28.80	$34.56	$41.47
- Cap Ex	$50.00	$60.00	$72.00	$86.40	$103.68
- Chg in WC	$10.00	$12.00	$14.40	$17.28	$20.74
FCFF	$16.00	$19.20	$23.04	$27.65	$33.18
Terminal Value					$1,658.88
Cost of capital	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%	8.25%
Present Value	$14.78	$16.38	$18.16	$20.14	$1,138.35

Value of operating assets today	$1,207.81
+ Cash	$125.00
- Debt	$200.00
Value of equity	**$1,132.81**

The tool for pricing: A multiple



The Four Steps to Deconstructing Multiples

- Define the multiple
  - In use, the same multiple can be defined in different ways by different users. When comparing and using multiples, estimated by someone else, it is critical that we understand how the multiples have been estimated
- Describe the multiple
  - Too many people who use a multiple have no idea what its cross sectional distribution is. If you do not know what the cross sectional distribution of a multiple is, it is difficult to look at a number and pass judgment on whether it is too high or low.
- Analyze the multiple
  - It is critical that we understand the fundamentals that drive each multiple, and the nature of the relationship between the multiple and each variable.
- Apply the multiple
  - Defining the comparable universe and controlling for differences is far more difficult in practice than it is in theory.

Definitional Tests

- Is the multiple consistently defined?
  - Proposition 1: Both the value (the numerator) and the standardizing variable (the denominator) should be to the same claimholders in the firm. In other words, the value of equity should be divided by equity earnings or equity book value, and firm value should be divided by firm earnings or book value.
- Is the multiple uniformly estimated?
  - The variables used in defining the multiple should be estimated uniformly across assets in the "comparable firm" list.
  - If earnings-based multiples are used, the accounting rules to measure earnings should be applied consistently across assets. The same rule applies with book-value based multiples.

Example 1: Price Earnings Ratio: Definition

PE = Market Price per Share / Earnings per Share

- There are a number of variants on the basic PE ratio in use. They are based upon how the price and the earnings are defined.

Price: is usually the current price

is sometimes the average price for the year

EPS: EPS in most recent financial year

EPS in trailing 12 months (Trailing PE)

Forecasted EPSnnext year (Forward PE)

Forecasted EPS in future year

Example 2: Enterprise Value /EBITDA Multiple

- The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple is obtained by netting cash out against debt to arrive at enterprise value and dividing by EBITDA.

$$\frac{\text{Enterprise Value}}{\text{EBITDA}} = \frac{\text{Market Value of Equity} + \text{Market Value of Debt} - \text{Cash}}{\text{Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation}}$$

- Why do we net out cash from firm value?
- What happens if a firm has cross holdings which are categorized as:
  - Minority interests?
  - Majority active interests?

To analyze a steel company on a pricing basis

- In order to pick a multiple to price a steel company, it is worth remembering that in 2017,
  - Steel companies are going through a depressed phase, with declining revenues and negative earnings (for many companies)
  - Leverage varies widely across steel companies.
- Since leverage varies widely across companies, I am going to choose to go with an enterprise value multiple
- Given the operating losses at many of the companies, I scaled EV to Sales. (The alternative is EBITDA but I lost about 20% of my sample, which had negative EBITDA).

Descriptive Tests

- What is the average and standard deviation for this multiple, across the universe (market)?
- What is the median for this multiple?
  - The median for this multiple is often a more reliable comparison point.
- How large are the outliers to the distribution, and how do we deal with the outliers?
  - Throwing out the outliers may seem like an obvious solution, but if the outliers all lie on one side of the distribution (they usually are large positive numbers), this can lead to a biased estimate.
- Are there cases where the multiple cannot be estimated? Will ignoring these cases lead to a biased estimate of the multiple?
- How has this multiple changed over time?

1. Multiples have skewed distributions…



2. Making statistics "dicey"

	Current PE	Trailing PE	Forward PE
Number of firms	7330	7330	7330
Number with PE	3,076.	3,081.	2,553.
Average	114.15	77.30	46.11
Median	21.57	21.15	19.25
Minimum	0.05	0.07	0.3
Maximum	134,400.00	62,228.00	28,210.00
Standard deviation	1603.68	769.28	337.16
Standard error	18.73	8.98	3.94
Skewness	80.51	73.51	80.08
25th percentile	14.33	14.40	15.04
75th percentile	33.33	32.39	26.63

3. Markets have a lot in common : Comparing Global PEs

PE Ratios by Region

Broad Group	25h Perc.	Median	75th Perc.
Australia, NZ and Canada	9.91	16.67	29.18
Developed Europe	9.63	15.91	26.45
Emerging Markets	10.05	17.29	38.55
Japan	9.15	13.86	22.20
United States	14.40	21.15	32.39



4. Simplistic rules almost always break down…6 times EBITDA was not cheap in 2010



But it may be in 2017, unless you are in Japan!

EV/EBITDA Multiples in January 2017



Broad Group	*25h Perc.*	*Median*	*75th Perc.*
Australia, NZ and Canada	6.73	10.64	18.97
Developed Europe	6.64	9.94	16.72
Emerging Markets	6.79	11.75	26.80
Japan	4.10	6.47	10.25
United States	9.12	13.62	35.91

Steel Companies in April 2017

EV Multiples across steel companies: April 2017

Broad Group	Number of firms	EV/EBITDA	EV/Invested Capital	EV/Sales
Australia, NZ and Canada	48	33.62	8.43	21.81
Developed Europe	46	35.05	5.05	3.84
Emerging Markets	438	53.97	6.01	5.64
Japan	47	39.20	4.44	3.33
United States	27	34.82	6.28	4.51
Global	606	48.92	6.02	6.56
Severstal	1	27.87	13.48	8.87
% under or over Global		-43.03%	124.02%	35.25%
% under or over Emerging		-48.36%	124.39%	57.13%

Analytical Tests

- What are the fundamentals that determine and drive these multiples?
  - Proposition 2: Embedded in every multiple are all of the variables that drive every discounted cash flow valuation - growth, risk and cash flow patterns.
  - In fact, using a simple discounted cash flow model and basic algebra should yield the fundamentals that drive a multiple
- How do changes in these fundamentals change the multiple?
  - The relationship between a fundamental (like growth) and a multiple (such as PE) is seldom linear. For example, if firm A has twice the growth rate of firm B, it will generally not trade at twice its PE ratio
  - Proposition 3: It is impossible to properly compare firms on a multiple, if we do not know the nature of the relationship between fundamentals and the multiple.

A Simple Analytical device



PE Ratio: Understanding the Fundamentals

- To understand the fundamentals, start with a basic equity discounted cash flow model.
- With the dividend discount model,

$$P_0 = \frac{DPS_1}{r - g_n}$$

- Dividing both sides by the current earnings per share,

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{\text{Payout Ratio} * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

- If this had been a FCFE Model,

$$P_0 = \frac{FCFE_1}{r - g_n}$$

$$\frac{P_0}{EPS_0} = PE = \frac{(FCFE/Earnings) * (1 + g_n)}{r - g_n}$$

The Determinants of Multiples…



Application Tests

- Given the firm that we are valuing, what is a "comparable" firm?
  - While traditional analysis is built on the premise that firms in the same sector are comparable firms, valuation theory would suggest that a comparable firm is one which is similar to the one being analyzed in terms of fundamentals.
  - Proposition 4: There is no reason why a firm cannot be compared with another firm in a very different business, if the two firms have the same risk, growth and cash flow characteristics.
- Given the comparable firms, how do we adjust for differences across firms on the fundamentals?
  - Proposition 5: It is impossible to find an exactly identical firm to the one you are valuing.

An Example: Comparing PE Ratios across a Sector: PE

Company Name	PE	Growth
PT Indosat ADR	7.8	0.06
Telebras ADR	8.9	0.075
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ADR	11.2	0.11
Telecom Argentina Stet - France Telecom SA ADR B	12.5	0.08
Hellenic Telecommunication Organization SA ADR	12.8	0.12
Telecomunicaciones de Chile ADR	16.6	0.08
Swisscom AG ADR	18.3	0.11
Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings ADR	19.6	0.16
Portugal Telecom SA ADR	20.8	0.13
Telefonos de Mexico ADR L	21.1	0.14
Matav RT ADR	21.5	0.22
Telstra ADR	21.7	0.12
Gilat Communications	22.7	0.31
Deutsche Telekom AG ADR	24.6	0.11
British Telecommunications PLC ADR	25.7	0.07
Tele Danmark AS ADR	27	0.09
Telekomunikasi Indonesia ADR	28.4	0.32
Cable & Wireless PLC ADR	29.8	0.14
APT Satellite Holdings ADR	31	0.33
Telefonica SA ADR	32.5	0.18
Royal KPN NV ADR	35.7	0.13
Telecom Italia SPA ADR	42.2	0.14
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone ADR	44.3	0.2
France Telecom SA ADR	45.2	0.19
Korea Telecom ADR	71.3	0.44

PE, Growth and Risk

- Dependent variable is: PE
- R squared = 66.2% R squared (adjusted) = 63.1%

Variable		*Coefficient*	*SE*	*t-ratio*	*Probability*
Constant	13.1151	3.471	3.78	0.0010	
Growth rate		121.223	19.27	6.29	≤ 0.0001
Emerging Market	-13.853	1	3.606	-3.84	0.0009

Emerging Market is a dummy: 1 if emerging market
0 if not

- Is Indosat cheap?

PE = 13.13 + 121.22 (.06) -13.85 (1) = 6.55

At 7.8 times earnings, Indosat is over valued.

Fundamentals: Steel Companies in April 2017

Broad Group	*EV/Sales*	*Historical growth in Revenues - Last 3 years*	*Expected growth in revenues - Next 2 years*	*Return on Capital (ROC or ROIC)*	*Pre-tax Operating Margin*	*Effective Tax Rate*	*Cost of capital in US$*
Emerging Markets	5.64	-3.34%	9.51%	4.70%	5.35%	14.58%	7.78%
Global	6.56	-2.96%	8.03%	3.65%	4.56%	15.17%	7.54%
Severstal	8.87	-14.40%	5.61%	47.64%	25.81%	5.65%	9.13%
% under or over Global	35.25%	386.85%	-30.11%	1203.75%	466.30%	-62.75%	21.14%
% under or over Emerging	57.13%	331.78%	-41.01%	913.57%	382.24%	-61.25%	17.28%
Analysis	Higher priced	Lower Growth		Significantly more profitable		Lower taxes	More risky

The Steel Business: Global Top 25 (in market cap)



Is Severstal cheap or expensive?

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.845[a]	.713	.682	3.76185

a. Predictors: (Constant), Expected growth in revenues – Next 2 years, Pre-tax Operating Margin

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	633.972	2	316.986	22.399	.000[b]
	Residual	254.727	18	14.151		
	Total	888.699	20			

a. Dependent Variable: EV/Sales

b. Predictors: (Constant), Expected growth in revenues – Next 2 years, Pre-tax Operating Margin

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-1.911	1.439		-1.327	.201
	Pre-tax Operating Margin	.358	.070	.672	5.125	.000
	Expected growth in revenues – Next 2 years	.363	.132	.360	2.744	.013

a. Dependent Variable: EV/Sales

Predicted EV/Sales ratio for Severstal = -1.911 + 0.358 (25.61) + .363 (5.81) = 9.36

Actual EV/Sales ratio for Severstal = 8.87

Severstal is under valued (priced) by about 5.2% (=1- 8.87/9.36)

Comparisons to the entire market: Why not?

- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

PE Ratio: Standard Regression for US stocks - January 2017

Model Summary[a]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.653[b]	.427	.426	2275.70504

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Predictors: (Constant), Payout Ratio, Beta, Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years

The regression is run with growth and payout entered as decimals, i.e., 25% is entered as 0.25)

Coefficients[a,b,c]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-3.945	1.838		-2.146	.032
	Beta	3.527	1.607	.043	2.194	.028
	Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years	174.025	5.490	.633	31.699	.000
	Payout Ratio	20.584	1.045	.399	19.692	.000

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE

c. Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Market Cap (in US $)

I. PE ratio regressions across markets – January 2017

Region	Regression – January 2017	R^2
US	PE = 170.55 g_{EPS} + 19.43 Payout – 0.62 Beta	42.6%
Europe	PE = 13.89 + 21.42g_{EPS} + 14.90 Payout – 2.44 Beta	25.1%
Japan	PE = 5.82+ 46.38 g_{EPS} + 28.73 Payout – 1.52 Beta	32.7%
Emerging Markets	PE = 14.59 + 20.23 g_{EPS} + 10.88 Payout – 1.07 Beta	12.2%
Australia, NZ, Canada	PE = 8.85 + 52.08 g_{EPS} + 14.64 Payout (Beta not significant)	17.1%
Global	PE = 15.21 + 48.98 g_{EPS} + 14.01 Payout – 2.52 Beta	18.2%

g_{EPS}=Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS or Net Income: Next 5 years
Beta: Regression or Bottom up Beta
Payout ratio: Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0

II. Price to Book Ratio: Fundamentals hold in every market

Region	Regression – January 2017	R^2
US	PBV= -1.59 + 7.32 g_{EPS} – 0.64 Beta + 0.24 Payout + 9.69 ROE	43.6%
Europe	PBV = 1.60 + 0.85 g_{EPS} – 1.40 Beta + 0.79 Payout + 12.49 ROE	58.6%
Japan	PBV= 1.03 + 3.11 g_{EPS} – 0.64 Beta + 0.77 Payout + 6.33 ROE	33.9%
Emerging Markets	PBV= -0.44 + 1.27 g_{EPS} - 0.20 Beta + 0.31 Payout + 11.90 ROE	41.8%
Australia, NZ, Canada	PBV= 1.08 + 2.03 g_{EPS} - 0.66 Beta + 0.15 Payout + 9.75 ROE	49.0%
Global	PBV= 1.43 + 1.90 g_{EPS} - 0.57 Beta + 0.42 Payout +10.95 ROE	45.2%

g_{EPS}=Expected Growth: Expected growth in EPS/ Net Income: Next 5 years
Beta: Regression or Bottom up Beta
Payout ratio: Dividends/ Net income from most recent year. Set to zero, if net income < 0
ROE: Net Income/ Book value of equity in most recent year.

III. EV/EBITDA – January 2017

Region	Regression – January 2017	R squared
United States	EV/EBITDA= 32.54 + 6.30 g - 27.76 ROIC – 30.10 DFR – 18.10 Tax Rate	10.2%
Europe	EV/EBITDA= 17.53 +6.40 g - 5.65 ROIC – 10.40 DFR – 64.00 Tax Rate	3.3%
Japan	EV/EBITDA= 5.75 + 2.34 g - 1.47 ROIC – 38.00 DFR – 13.40 Tax Rate	13.8%
Emerging Markets	EV/EBITDA= 37.27 + 9.04 g -55.58 ROIC – 22.30 DFR – 19.40 Tax Rate	6.0%
Australia, NZ & Canada	EV/EBITDA= 12.63+ 11.94 g - 7.14 ROIC – 6.9 DFR – 4.20 Tax Rate	5.5%
Global	EV/EBITDA= 26.58 + 4.98 g - 25.01 ROIC – 12.80 DFR – 14.40 Tax Rate	4.5%

g = Expected Revenue Growth: Expected growth in revenues: Near term (2 or 5 years)
DFR = Debt Ratio : Total Debt/ (Total Debt + Market value of equity)
Tax Rate: Effective tax rate in most recent year ROIC = Return on Capital

IV. EV/Sales Regressions across markets…

Region	Regression – January 2017	R Squared
United States	EV/Sales = 5.05 + 26.70 g+ 1.85 Operating Margin – 6.80 DFR	34.9%
Europe	EV/Sales = 4.46 -10.90 g+ 0.47 Operating Margin - 5.20 DFR	36.1%
Japan	EV/Sales = 2.13 + 39.3 g+ 4.12 Operating Margin – 2.40 DFR	34.7%
Emerging Markets	EV/Sales = 3.38 + 9.61 g+ 1.08 Operating Margin -4.70 DFR	39.3%
Australia, NZ & Canada	EV/Sales = -0.35 + 12.03 g+ 5.34 Operating Margin + 13.95 DFR	36.3%
Global	EV/Sales =4.09+ 16.80 g+ 1.86 Op. Margin - 5.10 DFR	33.5%

g =Expected Revenue Growth: Expected growth in revenues: Near term (2 or 5 years)
ERP: ERP for country in which company is incorporated
Tax Rate: Effective tax rate in most recent year; Operating Margin: Operating Income/ Sales

The Pricing Game: Choices

Measure	Choices	Considerations/ Questions
Value	Enterprise, Equity or Firm Value?	1. Is this a financial service business? 2. Are there big differences in leverage?
Scalar	Revenues, Earnings, Cash Flows or Book Value?	1. How are you measuring value? 2. Is the scaling number positive? 3. How (and how much) do accounting choices affect the scaling measure?
Timing & Normalizing	Current, Trailing, Forward or Really Forward?	1. Where are you in the life cycle? 2. How much cyclicality is there in the number? 3. Can you get forecasted values?
Comparable	What is your peer group? (Global or local? Similar size or all firms? …)	1. How much do companies share in common globally? 2. Does company size affect business economics? 3. How big a sample of firms do you need? 4. How do you plan to control for differences?

Reviewing: The Four Steps to Understanding Multiples

- Define the multiple
  - Check for consistency
  - Make sure that they are estimated uniformly
- Describe the multiple
  - Multiples have skewed distributions: The averages are seldom good indicators of typical multiples
  - Check for bias, if the multiple cannot be estimated
- Analyze the multiple
  - Identify the companion variable that drives the multiple
  - Examine the nature of the relationship
- Apply the multiple

PRICE OR VALUE? PICK YOUR POISON!

What's your game?

- The transactors
  - Traders: Oscar Wilde's definition of a cynic: "knows the price of everything, the value of nothing".
  - Salespeople: Caveat emptor!
  - Deal intermediaries: Get the deal done (even if it is not a good deal)!
- The muddled middle
  - Academic value: The cognitive dissonance of the "efficient market"
  - Accounting value: Rule maker, rule maker, make up your mind!
  - Legal value: The bane of the expert witness!
- The investors
  - Owners of businesses: Except if you want to run it for the long term.
  - Investors in companies: With faith and patience, you can take advantage of Mr. Market.
  - Long term consultants: You have to live with the consequences of the advice that you mete out to your clients.

Sometimes, you don't have a choice..

At $142.4 Million, Triptych Is the Most Expensive Artwork Ever Sold at an Auction

2013 Estate of Francis Bacon/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York/DACS, London

A fair price for gold? How about value?



And for Bitcoins?



In the muddled middle, what you get is neither price nor value, but mush..

- The "fair value accounting" oxymoron: Fair value accounting requires accountants to value assets based upon what "market participants" will pay for those assets in arms length transactions today.
- Legal Valuation: In courts, experts witnesses are generally asked to opine on the values of assets, often in the abstract. It is unclear whether they are being asked to price assets or value assets, and that allows them to stake extreme positions (depending on which side is paying them).
- Academic valuation: Much of what passes for valuation in financial theory is just pricing.

In the investing world, there are three views of "the gap"

	View of the gap	Investment Strategies
The Efficient Marketer	The gaps between price and value, if they do occur, are random.	Index funds
The "value" extremist	You view pricers as dilettantes who will move on to fad and fad. Eventually, the price will converge on value.	Buy and hold stocks where value > price
The pricing extremist	Value is only in the heads of the "eggheads". Even if it exists (and it is questionable), price may never converge on value.	(1) Look for mispriced securities. (2) Get ahead of shifts in demand/momentum.

The pricer's dilemma..

- No anchor: If you do not believe in intrinsic value and make no attempt to estimate it, you have no moorings when you invest. You will therefore be pushed back and forth as the price moves from high to low. In other words, everything becomes relative and you can lose perspective.
- Reactive: Without a core measure of value, your investment strategy will often be reactive rather than proactive.
- Crowds are fickle and tough to get a read on: The key to being successful as a pricer is to be able to read the crowd mood and to detect shifts in that mood early in the process. By their nature, crowds are tough to read and almost impossible to model systematically.

The valuer's dilemma

- Uncertainty about the magnitude of the gap:
  - Margin of safety: Many value investors swear by the notion of the "margin of safety" as protection against risk/uncertainty.
  - Collect more information: Collecting more information about the company is viewed as one way to make your investment less risky.
  - Ask what if questions: Doing scenario analysis or what if analysis gives you a sense of whether you should invest.
  - Confront uncertainty: Face up to the uncertainty, bring it into the analysis and deal with the consequences.
- Uncertainty about gap closing: This is tougher and you can reduce your exposure to it by
  - Lengthening your time horizon
  - Providing or looking for a catalyst that will cause the gap to close.

An Investor's Dream: When it works..



An Investor's Nightmare: When it does not



The choice is yours (and there is no right one)

1. Do your job: There is no right or wrong way to put a number on an asset. If your job is to price it, that is exactly what you should do. If it is to value it, go for an intrinsic value approach.
2. Don't be delusional: If you are pricing an asset, don't get distracted too much by fundamentals and intrinsic value concerns. If you are valuing an asset, don't let the pricing process (mood & momentum) feed back into your valuation.
3. Play to your strengths: To be a successful investor, you have to know what makes you tick and pick the approach that best fits you.

A closing thought…