Application Test: Who's on board?

- Look at the board of directors for your firm.
 - How many of the directors are inside directors (Employees of the firm, ex-managers)?
 - Is there any information on how independent the directors in the firm are from the managers?
- Are there any external measures of the quality of corporate governance of your firm?
 - Yahoo! Finance now reports on a corporate governance score for firms, where it ranks firms against the rest of the market and against their sectors.
- Is there tangible evidence that your board acts independently of management?
 - Check news stories to see if there are actions that the CEO has wanted to take that the board has stopped him or her from taking or at least slowed him or her down.

So, what next? When the cat is idle, the mice will play

- □ When managers do not fear stockholders, they will often put their interests over stockholder interests
 - **Greenmail**: The (managers of) target of a hostile takeover buy out the potential acquirer's existing stake, at a price much greater than the price paid by the raider, in return for the signing of a 'standstill' agreement.
 - **Golden Parachutes**: Provisions in employment contracts, that allows for the payment of a lump-sum or cash flows over a period, if managers covered by these contracts lose their jobs in a takeover.
 - Poison Pills: A security, the rights or cashflows on which are triggered by an outside event, generally a hostile takeover, is called a poison pill.
- Stockholder Approval needed Aswath Damodaran **Shark Repellents**: Anti-takeover amendments are also aimed at dissuading hostile takeovers but differ on one very important count. They require the assent of stockholders to be instituted.
 - Overpaying on takeovers: Acquisitions often are driven by management interests rather than stockholder interests.


Managerial Self Interest or Stockholder Wealth? Overpaying on takeovers!

- The quickest and perhaps the most decisive way to impoverish stockholders is to overpay on a takeover.
- The stockholders in acquiring firms do not seem to share the enthusiasm of the managers in these firms. Stock prices of bidding firms decline on the takeover announcements a significant proportion of the time.
- Many mergers do not work, as evidenced by a number of measures:
 - The profitability of merged firms relative to their peer groups, does not increase after mergers.
 - An even more damning indictment is that a large number of mergers are reversed within a few years, which is a clear admission that the acquisitions did not work.

A case study in value destruction: Eastman Kodak & Sterling Drugs


Kodak enters bidding war

- In late 1987, Eastman Kodak entered into a bidding war with Hoffman La Roche for Sterling Drugs, a pharmaceutical company.
- The bidding war started with Sterling Drugs trading at about \$40/share.
- At \$72/share, Hoffman dropped out of the bidding war, but Kodak kept bidding.
- At \$89.50/share, Kodak won and claimed potential synergies explained the premium.



Earnings and Revenues at Sterling Drugs





Sterling Drug under Eastman Kodak: Where is the synergy?


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Kodak Says Drug Unit Is Not for Sale ... but...

- An article in the NY Times in August of 1993 suggested that Kodak was eager to shed its drug unit.
 - In response, Eastman Kodak officials say they have no plans to sell Kodak's Sterling Winthrop drug unit.
 - Louis Mattis, Chairman of Sterling Winthrop, dismissed the rumors as "massive speculation, which flies in the face of the stated intent of Kodak that it is committed to be in the health business."
- A few months later...Taking a stride out of the drug business, Eastman Kodak said that the Sanofi Group, a French pharmaceutical company, agreed to buy the prescription drug business of Sterling Winthrop for \$1.68 billion.
 - Shares of Eastman Kodak rose 75 cents yesterday, closing at \$47.50 on the New York Stock Exchange.
 - Samuel D. Isaly an analyst , said the announcement was "very good for Sanofi and very good for Kodak."
 - "When the divestitures are complete, Kodak will be entirely focused on imaging," said George M. C. Fisher, the company's chief executive.
 - The rest of the Sterling Winthrop was sold to Smithkline for \$2.9 billion.

Application Test: Who owns/runs your firm?

- Look at: Bloomberg printout HDS for your firm
- □ Who are the top stockholders in your firm?
- What are the potential conflicts of interests that you see emerging from this stockholding structure?



Case 1: Splintering of Stockholders Disney's top stockholders in 2003


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4STATE STREET	STATE STREET CORPORA	13F	54,635M	2,675	2,2391	09/
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Bloomberg

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Case 2: Voting versus Non-voting Shares & Golden Shares: Vale



Vale has eleven members on its board of directors, ten of whom were nominated by Valespar and the board was chaired by Don Conrado, the CEO of Valepar.

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Case 3: Cross and Pyramid Holdings Tata Motor's top stockholders in 2013


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1. TATA SONS LTD	n/a	Co File		702,333,345	26.07	00	09/30/13	
2. CITIBANK NA	n/a	20F		446,246.135	16.56	00	06/30/12	
3. LIFE INSURANCE CORP OF I	n/a	Co File		168,754.477	6.26	-119,728,333 0	9/30/13	
4. TATA STEEL LTD	n/a	Co File		147,810.695	5.49		09/30/13	
5. MCAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES	n/a	ULT-AGG		97,689,911	3.63	-877,871 0	9/30/13	
6. TATA INDUSTRIES LTD	n/a	Co File		68,436.485	2.54	00	09/30/13	
7. WANGUARD GROUP INC	n/a	ULT-AGG		41,285.983	1.53	4.535,434 0	9/30/13	
8. MPRUDENTIAL PLC	n/a	ULT-AGG		34,080,063	1.26	147,814 0)9/30/13	
9. MGIC PRIVATE LIMITED	n/a	ULT-AGG		30,428,428	1.13	00	09/30/13	
10. WWILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY	WILLIAM BLAIR & COMP	13F		30,093.943	1.12	3,997,149 0	06/30/13	
11. MJPMORGAN CHASE & CO	n/a	ULT-AGG		24,918,852	0.92	-2.157,750 0)8/31/13	
12. SCHRODER INVESTMENT MGM	Multiple Portfolios	MF-AGG		19,136.665	0.71	2,578,904 0)6/30/13	
13. MBLACKROCK	n/a	ULT-AGG		14,100,725	0.52	-265,173 1	10/31/13	
14. MNORGES BANK	Multiple Portfolios	MF-AGG		10,762.579	0.40	0 1	12/31/12	
15. MIT ROWE PRICE ASSOCIATES	Multiple Portfolios	MF-AGG		10,056.366	0.37	324,353 0)9/30/13	
16. TATA INVESTMENT COPP LT	Dn/a	Co File		10,025.000	0.37	0 0	09/30/13	
17. MISBI LIFE INSURANCE CO LTU	Multiple Portfolios	MF-AGG		9,256.170	0.34	-151,323 0)9/30/13	
13. MALLIANZ ASSET MANAGEMEN	n/a	ULT-AGG		8,129.923	0.30	2.071,551 0	09/30/13	

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But it is a benevolent family!



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Case 4: Legal rights and Corporate Structures: Baidu

- <u>The Board</u>: The company has six directors, one of whom is Robin Li, who is the founder/CEO of Baidu. Mr. Li also owns a majority stake of Class B shares, which have ten times the voting rights of Class A shares, granting him effective control of the company.
- <u>The structure</u>: Baidu is a Chinese company, but it is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, its primary stock listing is on the NASDAQ and the listed company is structured as a shell company, to get around Chinese government restrictions of foreign investors holding shares in Chinese corporations.
- <u>The legal system</u>: Baidu's operating counterpart in China is structured as a Variable Interest Entity (VIE), and it is unclear how much legal power the shareholders in the shell company have to enforce changes at the VIE.

Things change.. Disney's top stockholders in 2009

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1) JOBS STEVEN PAUL	n/a	Form 4	3.34BLN	7.46	0	5/5/
2) FIDELITY MANAGEMENT &	FIDELITY MANAGEMEN	13F	2.05BLN	4,58	-36.12MLN	9/30/
 STATE STREET CORP 	STATE STREET CORPO	13F	1.7BLN	3.79	-18.6MLN	9/30/
4) BARCLAYS GLOBAL INVES	BARCLAYS GLOBAL IN	13F	1.66BLN	3,70	-160.12MLN	9/30/
5) VANGUARD GROUP INC	VANGUARD GROUP IN	13F	1.38BLN	3.08	-6.82MLN	9/30/
6) SOUTHEASTERN ASSET M	SOUTHEASTERN ASSE	13F	1.12BLN	2,50	-14.03MLN	9/30/
7) STATE FARM MUTUAL AU	STATE FARM MUTUAL	13F	1.02BLN	2.28	0	9/30/
8) WELLINGTON MANAGEMEN	WELLINGTON MANAGE	13F	939.38MLN	2.09	110.6MLN	9/30/
9) CLEARBRIDGE ADVISORS	CLEARBRIDGE ADVISO	13F	815.91MLN	1.82	-47.04MLN	9/30/
10) JP MORGAN CHASE & CO	JP MORGAN CHASE &	13F	693.31MLN	1.55	-18.89MLN	9/30/
11) MASSACHUSETTS FINANCI	MASSACHUSETTS FINA	13F	682.16MLN	1.52	112.29MLN	9/30/
12) BANK OF NEW YORK MELL	BANK OF NEW YORK	13F	681.68MLN	1.52	-57.13MLN	9/30/
13) NORTHERN TRUST CORP	NORTHERN TRUST CO	13F	610.26MLN	1.36	-4.81MLN	9/30/
14) AXA	AXA	13F	486.28MLN	1.08	47.05MLN	9/30/
15) BLACKROCK INVESTMENT	BLACKROCK INVESTME	13F	476.12MLN	1.06	-47.11MLN	9/30/
16) JENNISON ASSOCIATES L	JENNISON ASSOCIATE	13F	428.85MLN	0.96	-102.77MLN	9/30,
17) T ROWE PRICE ASSOCIAT	T ROWE PRICE ASSOC	13F	351.61MLN	0.78	-9.94MLN	9/30
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
II. Stockholders' objectives vs. Bondholders' objectives

- In theory: there is no conflict of interests between stockholders and bondholders.
- In practice: Stockholder and bondholders have different objectives. Bondholders are concerned most about safety and ensuring that they get paid their claims. Stockholders are more likely to think about upside potential

Examples of the conflict..

- 34
- A dividend/buyback surge: When firms pay cash out as dividends, lenders to the firm are hurt and stockholders may be helped. This is because the firm becomes riskier without the cash.
- <u>Risk shifting</u>: When a firm takes riskier projects than those agreed to at the outset, lenders are hurt. Lenders base interest rates on their perceptions of how risky a firm's investments are. If stockholders then take on riskier investments, lenders will be hurt.
- Borrowing more on the same assets: If lenders do not protect themselves, a firm can borrow more money and make all existing lenders worse off.

An Extreme Example: Unprotected Lenders?




III. Firms and Financial Markets

- 36
- In theory: Financial markets are efficient. Managers convey information honestly and and in a timely manner to financial markets, and financial markets make reasoned judgments of the effects of this information on 'true value'. As a consequence-
 - A company that invests in good long-term projects will be rewarded.
 - Short term accounting gimmicks will not lead to increases in market value.
 - Stock price performance is a good measure of company performance.
- <u>In practice</u>: There are some holes in the 'Efficient Markets' assumption.

Managers control the release of information to the general public

- Information management (timing and spin): Information (especially negative) is sometimes suppressed or delayed by managers seeking a better time to release it. When the information is released, firms find ways to "spin" or "frame" it to put themselves in the best possible light.
- <u>Outright fraud</u>: In some cases, firms release intentionally misleading information about their current conditions and future prospects to financial markets.

Evidence that managers delay bad news?



Some critiques of market efficiency..

- 39
- Investor irrationality: The base argument is that investors are irrational, and prices often move for no reason at all. As a consequence, prices are much more volatile than justified by the underlying fundamentals. Earnings and dividends are much less volatile than stock prices.
- Manifestations of irrationality
 - Reaction to news: Some believe that investors overreact to news, both good and bad. Others believe that investors sometimes under react to big news stories.
 - An insider conspiracy: Financial markets are manipulated by insiders; Prices do not have any relationship to value.
 - Short termism: Investors are short-sighted, and do not consider the long-term implications of actions taken by the firm


Are markets short sighted and too focused on the near term? What do you think?

- 40
- Focusing on market prices will lead companies towards short term decisions at the expense of long-term value.
 - a. I agree with the statement
 - b. I do not agree with this statement
- Allowing managers to make decisions without having to worry about the effect on market prices will lead to better long term decisions.
 - a. I agree with this statement
 - b. I do not agree with this statement
- Neither managers nor markets are trustworthy. Regulations/laws should be written that force firms to make long term decisions.
 - a. I agree with this statement
 - b. I do not agree with this statement

Are markets short term? Some counter (albeit not conclusive) evidence that they are not..

- Value of young firms: There are hundreds of start-up and small firms, with no earnings expected in the near future, that raise money on financial markets. Why would a myopic market that cares only about short-term earnings attach high prices to these firms?
- Current earnings vs Future growth: If the evidence suggests anything, it is that markets do not value current earnings and cashflows enough and value future earnings and cashflows too much. After all, studies suggest that low PE stocks are under priced relative to high PE stocks
- <u>Market reaction to investments</u>: The market response to research and development and investment expenditures is generally positive.

If markets are so short term, why do they react to big investments (that potentially lower short term earnings) so positively?



Market Reaction to Investment Announcements

Aswath Damodaran

But what about market crises?

- 43
- Markets are the problem: Many critics of markets point to market bubbles and crises as evidence that markets do not work. For instance, the market turmoil between September and December 2008 is pointed to as backing for the statement that free markets are the source of the problem and not the solution.
- □ <u>The counter</u>: There are two counter arguments that can be offered:
 - The 2008 crisis illustrates that we are more dependent on functioning, liquid markets, with risk taking investors, than ever before in history. As we saw, no government or other entity (bank, Buffett) was big enough to step in and save the day.
 - The firms that caused the market collapse (banks, investment banks) were among the most regulated businesses in the marketplace. If anything, their failures can be traced to their attempts to take advantage of regulatory loopholes (badly designed insurance programs... capital measurements that miss risky assets, especially derivatives)

IV. Firms and Society

- 44
- In theory: All costs and benefits associated with a firm's decisions can be traced back to the firm.
- In practice: Financial decisions can create social costs and benefits.
 - A social cost or benefit is a cost or benefit that accrues to society as a whole and not to the firm making the decision.
 - Environmental costs (pollution, health costs, etc..)
 - Quality of Life' costs (traffic, housing, safety, etc.)
 - Examples of social benefits include:
 - creating employment in areas with high unemployment
 - supporting development in inner cities
 - creating access to goods in areas where such access does not exist

Social Costs and Benefits are difficult to quantify because ...

- Cannot know the unknown: They might not be known at the time of the decision. In other words, a firm may think that it is delivering a product that enhances society, at the time it delivers the product but discover afterwards that there are very large costs. (Asbestos was a wonderful product, when it was devised, light and easy to work with... It is only after decades that the health consequences came to light)
- Eyes of the beholder: They are 'person-specific', since different decision makers can look at the same social cost and weight them very differently.
- <u>Decision paralysis</u>: They can be paralyzing if carried to extremes.