III. Dealing with decline and distress...

306

Historial data often reflects flat or declining revenues and falling margins. Investments often earn less than the cost of capital.

Growth can be negative, as firm sheds assets and shrinks. As less profitable assets are shed, the firm's remaining assets may improve in quality.

What is the value added by growth assets?

What are the cashflows from existing assets?

Underfunded pension obligations and litigation claims can lower value of equity. Liquidation preferences can affect value of equity

What is the value of equity in the firm?

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?

Depending upon the risk of the assets being divested and the use of the proceeds from the divestuture (to pay dividends or retire debt), the risk in both the firm and its equity can change. When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

There is a real chance, especially with high financial leverage, that the firm will not make it. If it is expected to survive as a going concern, it will be as a much smaller entity.

a. Dealing with Decline

- In decline, firms often see declining revenues and lower margins, translating in negative expected growth over time.
- If these firms are run by good managers, they will not fight decline. Instead, they will adapt to it and shut down or sell investments that do not generate the cost of capital. This can translate into negative net capital expenditures (depreciation exceeds cap ex), declining working capital and an overall negative reinvestment rate. The best case scenario is that the firm can shed its bad assets, make itself a much smaller and healthier firm and then settle into long-term stable growth.
- As an investor, your worst case scenario is that these firms are run by managers in denial who continue to expand the firm by making bad investments (that generate lower returns than the cost of capital). These firms may be able to grow revenues and operating income but will destroy value along the way.


	Declining business: Revenues expected to drop by 3% a year fo next 5 years															Margins improve gradually to							
	Ba	ase year		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	median for
Revenue growth rate			-3	.00%	-3	.00%	-3	.00%	-3	.00%	-3	.00%	-2.	00%	-1	.00%	0.0	00%	1	.00%	2.	00%	US retail
Revenues	\$	12,522	\$1	2,146	\$1	1,782	\$1	1,428	\$1	1,086	\$1	0,753	\$10),538	\$1	0,433	\$10	0,433	\$1	0,537	\$10	0,748	sector (6.25%)
EBIT (Operating) margin		1.32%	1.	.82%	2.	31%	2.	80%	3.	29%	3	.79%	4.	28%	4.	77%	5.	26%	5	.76%	6.	25%	(0.25 %)
EBIT (Operating income)	\$	166	\$	221	\$	272	\$	320	\$	365	\$	407	\$	451	\$	498	\$	549	\$	607	\$	672	As stores
Tax rate		35.00%	35	0.00%	35	.00%	35	.00%	35	.00%	35	5.00%	36	.00%	37	.00%	38	.00%	39	.00%	40	.00%	shut down,
EBIT(1-t)	\$	108	\$	143	\$	177	\$	208	\$	237	\$	265	\$	289	\$	314	\$	341	\$	370	\$	403	cash
- Reinvestment			\$	(188)	\$	(182)	\$	(177)	\$	(171)	\$	(166)	\$	(108)	\$	(53)	\$	-	\$	52	\$	105	released from
FCFF			\$	331	\$	359	\$	385	\$	409	\$	431	\$	396	\$	366	\$	341	\$	318	\$	298	real estate.
Cost of capital			9.	9.00%	9.00%	00%	9.00%		9.00%		9.00%		8.80%		8.	60%	8.4	8.40%	8.20%	8.00%	00%	The cost of	
PV(FCFF)			\$	304	\$	302	\$	297	\$	290	\$	280	\$	237	\$	201	\$	173	\$	149	\$	129	capital is at
Terminal value	\$	5,710																					9%, higher
PV(Terminal value)	\$	2,479																					because of
PV (CF over next 10 years)	\$	2,362																					high cost of
Sum of PV	\$	4,841																					debt.
Probability of failure =		20.00%	.00% High debt load and poor earnings put																				
Proceeds if firm fails =		\$2,421		survival at risk. Based on bond rating,																			
Value of operating assets =		\$4,357		20% chance of failure and liquidation will																			
		bring in 50% of book value																					

Figure 14.5: A Valuation of JC Penney

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b. Dealing with the "downside" of Distress

- A DCF valuation values a firm as a going concern. If there is a significant likelihood of the firm failing before it reaches stable growth and if the assets will then be sold for a value less than the present value of the expected cashflows (a distress sale value), DCF valuations will overstate the value of the firm.
- Value of Equity= DCF value of equity (1 Probability of distress) + Distress sale value of equity (Probability of distress)
- There are three ways in which we can estimate the probability of distress:
 - Use the bond rating to estimate the cumulative probability of distress over 10 years
 - Estimate the probability of distress with a probit
 - Estimate the probability of distress by looking at market value of bonds..
- The distress sale value of equity is usually best estimated as a percent of book value (and this value will be lower if the economy is doing badly and there are other firms in the same business also in distress).



Adjusting the value of LVS for distress..

311


In February 2009, LVS was rated B+ by S&P. Historically, 28.25% of B+ rated bonds default within 10 years. LVS has a 6.375% bond, maturing in February 2015 (7 years), trading at \$529. If we discount the expected cash flows on the bond at the riskfree rate, we can back out the probability of distress from the bond price:

$$529 = \sum_{t=1}^{t=7} \frac{63.75(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^{t}}{(1.03)^{t}} + \frac{1000(1 - \Pi_{\text{Distress}})^{7}}{(1.03)^{7}}$$

- □ Solving for the probability of bankruptcy, we get:
 - \Box $\pi_{istress}$ = Annual probability of default = 13.54%
 - **C**umulative probability of surviving 10 years = $(1 .1354)^{10} = 23.34\%$
 - Cumulative probability of distress over 10 years = 1 .2334 = .7666 or 76.66%
- If LVS is becomes distressed:
 - Expected distress sale proceeds = \$2,769 million < Face value of debt</p>
 - Expected equity value/share = \$0.00
- □ Expected value per share = \$8.12 (1 .7666) + \$0.00 (.7666) = \$1.92

IV. Emerging Market Companies


Estimation Issues - Emerging Market Companies



Aswath Damodaran

Lesson 1: Country risk has to be incorporated... but with a scalpel, not a bludgeon

- Emerging market companies are undoubtedly exposed to additional country risk because they are incorporated in countries that are more exposed to political and economic risk.
- Not all emerging market companies are equally exposed to country risk and many developed markets have emerging market risk exposure because of their operations.
- You can use either the "weighted country risk premium", with the weights reflecting the countries you get your revenues from or the lambda approach (which may incorporate more than revenues) to capture country risk exposure.



Lesson 2: Currency should not matter

- You can value any company in any currency. Thus, you can value a Brazilian company in nominal reais, US dollars or Swiss Francs.
- For your valuation to stay invariant and consistent, your cash flows and discount rates have to be in the same currency. Thus, if you are using a high inflation currency, both your growth rates and discount rates will be much higher.
 - For your cash flows to be consistent, you have to use expected exchange rates that reflect purchasing power parity (the higher inflation currency has to depreciate by the inflation differential each year).

Lesson 3: The "corporate governance" drag

- Stockholders in Asian, Latin American and many European companies have little or no power over the managers of the firm. In many cases, insiders own voting shares and control the firm and the potential for conflict of interests is huge.
- This weak corporate governance is often a reason for given for using higher discount rates or discounting the estimated value for these companies.
- Would you discount the value that you estimate for an emerging market company to allow for this absence of stockholder power?
- a. Yes
- b. No.

