Example 3: An Eyeballing Exercise with P/BV Ratios European Banks in 2010

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Name	PBV Ratio	Return on Equity	Standard Deviation
BAYERISCHE HYPO-UND VEREINSB	0.80	-1.66%	49.06%
COMMERZBANK AG	1.09	-6.72%	36.21%
DEUTSCHE BANK AG -REG	1.23	1.32%	35.79%
BANCA INTESA SPA	1.66	1.56%	34.14%
BNP PARIBAS	1.72	12.46%	31.03%
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISP	1.86	11.06%	28.36%
SANPAOLO IMI SPA	1.96	8.55%	26.64%
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA	1.98	11.17%	18.62%
SOCIETE GENERALE	2.04	9.71%	22.55%
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP	2.09	20.22%	18.35%
HBOS PLC	2.15	22.45%	21.95%
BARCLAYS PLC	2.23	21.16%	20.73%
UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA	2.30	14.86%	13.79%
KREDIETBANK SA LUXEMBOURGEOI	2.46	17.74%	12.38%
ERSTE BANK DER OESTER SPARK	2.53	10.28%	21.91%
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC	2.59	20.18%	19.93%
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC	2.94	18.50%	19.66%
LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC	3.33	32.84%	18.66%
Average	2.05	12.54%	24.99%
Median	2.07	11.82%	21.93%

- We are looking for stocks that trade at low price to book ratios, while generating high returns on equity, with low risk.
 But what is a low price to book ratio? Or a high return on equity? Or a low risk
- One simple measure of what is par for the sector are the median values for each of the variables. A simplistic decision rule on under and over valued stocks would therefore be:
 - Undervalued stocks: Trade at price to book ratios below the median for the sector, (2.07), generate returns on equity higher than the sector median (11.82%) and have standard deviations lower than the median (21.93%).
 - Overvalued stocks: Trade at price to book ratios above the median for the sector and generate returns on equity lower than the sector median.

How about this mechanism?

- We are looking for stocks that trade at low price to book ratios, while generating high returns on equity. But what is a low price to book ratio? Or a high return on equity?
- Taking the sample of 18 banks, we ran a regression of PBV against ROE and standard deviation in stock prices (as a proxy for risk).


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PBV = 2.27 + 3.63 \text{ ROE} - 2.68 \text{ Std dev}
(5.56) (3.32) (2.33)
```

R squared of regression = 79%

And these predictions?

Name	PBV Ratio	Return on Equity	Standard Deviation	Predicted PBV	Under/Over (%)
BAYERISCHE HYPO-UND VEREINSB	0.80	-1.66%	49.06%	0.89	-10.60%
COMMERZBANK AG	1.09	-6.72%	36.21%	1.05	3.25%
DEUTSCHE BANK AG -REG	1.23	1.32%	35.79%	1.36	-9.26%
BANCA INTESA SPA	1.66	1.56%	34.14%	1.41	17.83%
BNP PARIBAS	1.72	12.46%	31.03%	1.89	-8.75%
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISP	1.86	11.06%	28.36%	1.91	-2.66%
SANPAOLO IMI SPA	1.96	8.55%	26.64%	1.86	5.23%
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA	1.98	11.17%	18.62%	2.17	-9.12%
SOCIETE GENERALE	2.04	9.71%	22.55%	2.02	1.37%
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP	2.09	20.22%	18.35%	2.51	-16.65%
HBOS PLC	2.15	22.45%	21.95%	2.49	-13.71%
BARCLAYS PLC	2.23	21.16%	20.73%	2.48	-9.96%
UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA	2.30	14.86%	13.79%	2.44	-5.72%
KREDIETBANK SA LUXEMBOURGEOI	2.46	17.74%	12.38%	2.58	-4.79%
ERSTE BANK DER OESTER SPARK	2.53	10.28%	21.91%	2.05	23.11%
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC	2.59	20.18%	19.93%	2.47	5.00%
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC	2.94	18.50%	19.66%	2.41	21.91%
LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC	3.33	32.84%	18.66%	2.96	12.40%


A follow up on US Banks




Example 4: A larger sample

Price to Book versus ROE: Largest firms in the US: January 2010


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Missing growth?



PBV, ROE and Risk: Large Cap US firms



Bringing it all together... Largest US stocks in January 2010

Model Summary


Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.819ª	.670	.661	1.19253

a. Predictors: (Constant), ROE, Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years, Regression Beta

Coefficientsa

Model		Unstandardize	d Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients		
		В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.406	.424		.958	.340
	Regression Beta	065	.253	015	256	.799
	Expected Growth in EPS: next 5 years	9.340	2.366	.228	3.947	.000
	ROE	10.546	.771	.777	13.672	.000

a. Dependent Variable: PBV Ratio



Example 5: Overlooked fundamentals? EV/EBITDA Multiple for Trucking Companies


Company Name	Value	EBITDA	Value/EBITDA
KLLM Trans. Svcs.	\$ 114.32	\$ 48.81	2.34
Ryder System	\$5,158.04	\$1,838.26	2.81
Rollins Truck Leasing	\$1,368.35	\$ 447.67	3.06
Cannon Express Inc.	\$ 83.57	\$ 27.05	3.09
Hunt (J.B.)	\$ 982.67	\$ 310.22	3.17
Yellow Corp.	\$ 931.47	\$ 292.82	3.18
Roadway Express	\$ 554.96	\$ 169.38	3.28
Marten Transport Ltd.	\$ 116.93	\$ 35.62	3.28
Kenan Transport Co.	\$ 67.66	\$ 19.44	3.48
M.S. Carriers	\$ 344.93	\$ 97.85	3.53
Old Dominion Freight	\$ 170.42	\$ 45.13	3.78
Trimac Ltd	\$ 661.18	\$ 174.28	3.79
Matlack Systems	\$ 112.42	\$ 28.94	3.88
XTRA Corp.	\$1.708.57	\$ 427.30	4.00
Covenant Transport Inc	\$ 259.16	\$ 64.35	4.03
Builders Transport	\$ 221.09	\$ 51.44	4.30
Werner Enterprises	\$ 844.39	\$ 196.15	4.30
Landstar Sys.	\$ 422.79	\$ 95.20	4.44
AMERCO	\$1,632.30	\$ 345.78	4.72
USA Truck	\$ 141.77	\$ 29.93	4.74
Frozen Food Express	\$ 164.17	\$ 34.10	4.81
Arnold Inds.	\$ 472.27	\$ 96.88	4.87
Greyhound Lines Inc.	\$ 437.71		4.88
	\$ 983.86	\$ 89.61 \$ 198.91	4.00
USFreightways			
Golden Eagle Group Inc.	\$ 12.50 \$ 578.78	\$ 2.33 \$ 107.15	5.37 5.40
Arkansas Best			
Airlease Ltd.	\$ 73.64 \$ 182.30	\$ 13.48	5.46
Celadon Group		\$ 32.72	5.57
Amer. Freightways	\$ 716.15	\$ 120.94	5.92
Transfinancial Holdings	\$ 56.92	\$ 8.79	6.47
Vitran Corp. 'A'	\$ 140.68	\$ 21.51	6.54
Interpool Inc.	\$1,002.20	\$ 151.18	6.63
Intrenet Inc.	\$ 70.23	\$ 10.38	6.77
Swift Transportation	\$ 835.58	\$ 121.34	6.89
Landair Services	\$ 212.95	\$ 30.38	7.01
CNF Transportation	\$2,700.69	\$ 366.99	7.36
Budget Group Inc	\$1,247.30	\$ 166.71	7.48
Caliber System	\$2,514.99	\$ 333.13	7.55
Knight Transportation Inc	\$ 269.01	\$ 28.20	9.54
Heartland Express	\$ 727.50	\$ 64.62	11.26
Greyhound CDA Transn Corp	\$ 83.25	\$ 6.99	11.91
Mark VII	\$ 160.45	\$ 12.96	12.38
Coach USA Inc	\$ 678.38	\$ 51.76	13.11
US 1 Inds Inc.	\$ 5.60	\$ (0.17)	NA
Average			5.61

A Test on EBITDA

Ryder System looks very cheap on a Value/EBITDA multiple basis, relative to the rest of the sector.
 What explanation (other than misvaluation) might there be for this difference?


What general lessons would you draw from this on the EV/EBITDA multiples for infrastructure companies as their infrastructure ages?

Example 6: Relative valuation across time Price to Sales Multiples: Grocery Stores - US in January 2007



Whole Foods: In 2007: Net Margin was 3.41% and Price/ Sales ratio was 1.41 Predicted Price to Sales = 0.07 + 10.49 (0.0341) = 0.43


Reversion to normalcy: Grocery Stores - US in January 2009




Whole Foods: In 2009, Net Margin had dropped to 2.77% and Price to Sales ratio was down to 0.31.

Predicted Price to Sales = 0.07 + 10.49 (.0277) = 0.36

And again in 2010...




Whole Foods: In 2010, Net Margin had dropped to 1.44% and Price to Sales ratio increased to 0.50. Predicted Price to Sales = 0.06 + 11.43 (.0144) = 0.22



Aswath Damodaran


PS Ratio = -0.585 + 55.50 (Net Margin) $R^2 = 48.2\%$ PS Ratio for WFMI = -0.585 + 55.50 (.0273) = 0.93 At a PS ratio of 0.98, WFMI is slightly over valued.



There is a new star in town (Sprouts)

PS = 0.557 + 0.085 Net Margin Whole Foods = 0.557 + 8.50 (0.0408) = 0.90 At 1.35 times sales, Whole Foods is overvalued (again)

Example 7: Desperation Time Nothing's working!!! Internet Stocks in early 2000...



PS Ratios and Margins are not highly correlated

 Regressing PS ratios against current margins yields the following

$$PS = 81.36 - 7.54$$
(Net Margin) $R2 = 0.04$ (0.49)

This is not surprising. These firms are priced based upon expected margins, rather than current margins.

Solution 1: Use proxies for survival and growth: Amazon in early 2000

 Hypothesizing that firms with higher revenue growth and higher cash balances should have a greater chance of surviving and becoming profitable, we ran the following regression: (The level of revenues was used to control for size)

$$PS = 30.61 - 2.77 \ln(Rev) + 6.42 (Rev Growth) + 5.11 (Cash/Rev)$$


(0.66) (2.63) (3.49)

R squared = 31.8%

- □ Predicted PS = 30.61 2.77(7.1039) + 6.42(1.9946) + 5.11 (. 3069) = 30.42
- □ Actual PS = 25.63

Stock is undervalued, relative to other internet stocks.


Solution 2: Use forward multiples Watch out for bumps in the road (Tesla)



Relative valuation across the entire market: Why not?

- In contrast to the 'comparable firm' approach, the information in the entire cross-section of firms can be used to predict PE ratios.
- The simplest way of summarizing this information is with a multiple regression, with the PE ratio as the dependent variable, and proxies for risk, growth and payout forming the independent variables.

I. PE Ratio versus the market PE versus Expected EPS Growth: January 2015



PE Ratio: Standard Regression for US stocks -January 2015

Model Summary^a

				Std. Error of
		R	Adjusted R	the
Model	R	Square	Square	Estimate
1	.597 ^b	.356	.355	1002.538

a. Broad Group = United States

b. Predictors: (Constant), Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years, Beta, Payout ratio

The regression is run with growth and payout entered as decimals, i.e., 25% is entered as 0.25)

Coefficients^{a,b,c}

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients		
Model		В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	6.479	1.204		5.380	.000
	Beta	-3.248	.840	108	-3.866	.000
	Payout ratio	16.772	1.290	.365	12.998	.000
	Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years	98.579	4.428	.588	22.260	.000

- a. Broad Group = United States
- b. Dependent Variable: Trailing PE
- c. Weighted Least Squares Regression Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

Problems with the regression methodology

- The basic regression assumes a linear relationship between PE ratios and the financial proxies, and that might not be appropriate.
- The basic relationship between PE ratios and financial variables itself might not be stable, and if it shifts from year to year, the predictions from the model may not be reliable.
- The independent variables are correlated with each other. For example, high growth firms tend to have high risk. This multi-collinearity makes the coefficients of the regressions unreliable and may explain the large changes in these coefficients from period to period.

The Multicollinearity Problem

	Correlations ^a							
		Trailing PE	Beta	Payout ratio	Expected growth rate in EPS- Next 5 years			
Trailing PE	Pearson Correlation	1	.038*	.187**	.225 ^{**}			
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.031	.000	.000			
	N	3307	3168	1628	1980			
Beta	Pearson Correlation	.038*	1	200**	.085**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.031		.000	.000			
	N	3168	6841	1601	2447			
Payout ratio	Pearson Correlation	.187**	200 ^{**}	1	099 ^{**}			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.001			
	N	1628	1601	1629	1081			
Expected growth rate in	Pearson Correlation	.225**	.085**	099**	1			
EPS- Next 5	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.001				
years	N	1980	2447	1081	2574			

^{*.} Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

^{**.} Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

a. Broad Group = United States

Using the PE ratio regression

- Assume that you were given the following information for Disney. The firm has an expected growth rate of 15%, a beta of 1.25 and a 20% dividend payout ratio. Based upon the regression, estimate the predicted PE ratio for Disney.
 - Predicted PE = 6.48 -3.25 Beta + 95.58 Growth + 16.77 (Payout)
- Disney is actually trading at 20 times earnings. What does the predicted PE tell you?


Assume now that you value Disney against just its peer group. Will you come to the same valuation judgment as you did when you looked at it relative to the market? Why or why not?

The value of growth


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Date	Market price of extra % growth	Implied ERP
Jan-15	0.99	5.78%
Jan-14	1.49	4.96%
Jan-13	0.577	5.78%
Jan-12	0.408	6.04%
Jan-11	0.836	5.20%
Jan-10	0.55	4.36%
Jan-09	0.78	6.43%
Jan-08	1.427	4.37%
Jan-07	1.178	4.16%
Jan-06	1.131	4.07%
Jan-05	0.914	3.65%
Jan-04	0.812	3.69%
Jan-03	2.621	4.10%
Jan-02	1.003	3.62%
Jan-01	1.457	2.75%
Jan-00	2.105	2.05%
Damodaran		

Aswath Damodaran



PEG versus In(Expected Growth) – January 2014



PEG Ratio Regression - US stocks January 2015

_									
					Std. Error of				
			R	Adjusted R	the				
	Model	R	Square	Square	Estimate				
	1	.694 ^b	.482	.480	120.2276				

Model Summary^a

- a. Broad Group = United States
- b. Predictors: (Constant), InGrowth, Beta, Payout ratio

Coefficients^{a,b,c}

				Standardize		
		Unstand	dardized	d		
		Coefficients		Coefficients		
Model		В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-1.169	.217		-5.397	.000
	Beta	227	.103	057	-2.206	.028
	Payout ratio	2.178	.160	.361	13.590	.000
	InGrowth	-1.204	.070	434	-17.099	.000

- a. Broad Group = United States
- b. Dependent Variable: PEG Ratio
- c. Weighted Least Squares Regression Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)

Negative intercepts...and problem forecasts...

When the intercept in a multiples regression is negative, there is the possibility that forecasted values can be negative as well. One way (albeit imperfect) is to re-run the regression without an intercept.

Coefficients a,b,c,d

٠.							
				Standardize			
		Unstandardized		d			
		Coefficients		Coefficients			
	Model	В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	
	1 Beta	625	.073	243	-8.550	.000	
	Payout ratio	1.981	.158	.334	12.519	.000	
	InGrowth	911	.045	834	-20.082	.000	

- a. Broad Group = United States
- b. Dependent Variable: PEG Ratio
- c. Linear Regression through the Origin
- d. Weighted Least Squares Regression Weighted by Market Cap (in US \$)