#### From a Company to the Market: Valuing the S&P 500: Dividend Discount Model in January 2015

#### **Rationale for model**

Why dividends? Because it is the only tangible cash flow, right?

Why 2-stage? Because the expected growth rate in near term is higher than stable growth rate.



#### From a Company to the Market: Valuing the S&P 500: Augmented Dividend Discount Model in January 2015

#### **Rationale for model**

Why augmented dividends? Because companies are increasing returning cash in the form of stock buybacks Why 2-stage? Because the expected growth rate in near term is higher than stable growth rate.



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#### Valuing the S&P 500: Augmented Dividends and Fundamental Growth January 2015

#### **Rationale for model**

Why augmented dividends? Because companies are increasing returning cash in the form of stock buybacks Why 2-stage? Why not?



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# Evaluating the Effect of Tax Reform on January 1, 2018

		Pre-tax reform	Post-tax reform		Marginal Tax Data
Bet	ta	1.07	1.07		Marginal lax Rate
Pre	e-tax cost of debt	3.91%	3.91%		The drop in the rederal corporate tax i
Ma	rginal Tax Rate	38.00%	24.00%		(with state & local taxes) from 38% t
De	bt to Capital Ratio	23.51%	23.51%		
Rev	venues	\$12,254.10	\$12,254.10	T I	
Op	erating Income (EBIT)	\$1,438.22	\$1,438.22		Effective tax rate
Eff	ective tax rate	25.19%	20.00%		change in corporate tax rate on US inc
Aft	er-tax return on capital	12.76%	13.65%		lower effective tax rate from 25 19% to
Rei	investment Rate =	59.27%	65.00%		
Ler	ngth of growth period =	5	5		
Co	mputed Values	Pre-tax reform	Post-tax reform		
Cos	st of Equity =	7.85%	7.85%		Tax effect on debt
Aft	er-tax cost of debt =	2.42%	2.97%		Lower marginal tax rate increases after
Co	st of capital =	6.57%	6.70%	_	of debt and capital (holding debt ratio
Aft	er-tax return on capital =	12.76%	13.65%		Higher BOIC/Beinvestment
Rei	investment Rate =	59.27%	65.00%	_◄	BOIC rises proportionatelby with dron
E×	pected growth rate=	7.56%	8.87%		effective tax rate. Capital expensing ru
Val	lue of firm				to marginally more reinvestmen Expected Growth = ROIC * Reinvestm
PV	of FCFF in high growth =	\$2,253.08	\$2,139.72		
Ter	rminal value =	\$30,926.29	\$34,590.66		
1/2	lue of firm today =	\$24,750.46	\$27,151.37		

## <sup>281</sup> The Dark Side of Valuation

Anyone can value a company that is stable, makes money and has an established business model!

Aswath Damodaran

## The fundamental determinants of value...



### The Dark Side of Valuation...

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- Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.
- The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value "difficult" companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:
  - Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses
  - Companies that don't fit the accounting mold
  - Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or nationalization risk)

## Difficult to value companies...

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- □ Across the life cycle:
  - Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.
  - Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change, history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.
  - Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.
- Across markets
  - Emerging market companies are often difficult to value because of the way they are structured, their exposure to country risk and poor corporate governance.
- Across sectors
  - Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what's going on.
  - Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.
  - Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.

## I. The challenge with young companies...

Making judgments of you cannot draw on l service, it is difficult t profitability. The com growth but you have	n revenues/ profits diffic history. If you have no p o gauge market potentia pany;s entire value lies little to base your estima	ult becaue product/ al or in future ate on.	
Cash flows from existing assets non-existent or negative.	e added by growth		
What are the cashflows from existing assets? Different claims or cash flows can affect value of equity at each stage. What is the value of	e cash flows from both and growth assets? cal data on earnings, t prices for securities ult to assess risk.	Will the through demand Even if i	When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks? firm will make it the gauntlet of market and competition.
equity in the firm?		when it difficult little to d	will become mature is because there is so to on.

## Upping the ante.. Young companies in young businesses...

- □ When valuing a business, we generally draw on three sources of information
  - The firm's current financial statement
    - How much did the firm sell?
    - How much did it earn?
  - **•** The firm's financial history, usually summarized in its financial statements.
    - How fast have the firm's revenues and earnings grown over time?
    - What can we learn about cost structure and profitability from these trends?
    - Susceptibility to macro-economic factors (recessions and cyclical firms)
  - The industry and comparable firm data
    - What happens to firms as they mature? (Margins.. Revenue growth... Reinvestment needs... Risk)
- It is when valuing these companies that you find yourself tempted by the dark side, where
  - "Paradigm shifts" happen...
  - New metrics are invented ...
  - The story dominates and the numbers lag...



### Lesson 1: Don't sweat the small stuff



#### Bloomberg

- Spotlight the business the company is in & use the beta of that business.
- Don't try to incorporate failure risk into the discount rate.
- Let the cost of capital change over time, as the company changes.
- If you are desperate, use the cross section of costs of capital to get your estimation going (use the 90<sup>th</sup> or 95<sup>th</sup> percentile across all companies).

### Lesson 2: Work backwards and keep it simple...

Year	<b>Revenue Growth</b>	Sales	<b>Operating Margin</b>	EBIT	EBIT (1-t)
Tr 12 mths		\$1,117	-36.71%	-\$410	-\$410
1	150.00%	\$2,793	-13.35%	-\$373	-\$373
2	100.00%	\$5,585	-1.68%	-\$94	-\$94
3	75.00%	\$9,774	4.16%	\$407	\$407
4	50.00%	\$14,661	7.08%	\$1,038	\$871
5	30.00%	\$19,059	8.54%	\$1,628	\$1,058
6	25.20%	\$23,862	9.27%	\$2,212	\$1,438
7	20.40%	\$28,729	9.64%	\$2,768	\$1,799
8	15.60%	\$33,211	9.82%	\$3,261	\$2,119
9	10.80%	\$36,798	9.91%	\$3,646	\$2,370
10	6.00%	\$39,006	9.95%	\$3,883	\$2,524
TY	6.00%	\$41,346	10.00%	\$4,135	\$2,688

## Lesson 3: Scaling up is hard to do & failure is common



 Lower revenue growth rates, as revenues scale up.
 Koop track of dollar

 Keep track of dollar revenues, as you go through time, measuring against market size.

## Lesson 4: Don't forget to pay for growth...

Year	Revenues	$\Delta$ Revenue	Sales/Cap	$\Delta$ Investment	Inve	sted Capital	EBIT (1-t)	Imputed ROC
Tr 12 mths	\$1,117				\$	487	-\$410	
1	\$2,793	\$1,676	3.00	\$559	\$	1,045	-\$373	-76.62%
2	\$5,585	\$2,793	3.00	\$931	\$	1,976	-\$94	-8.96%
3	\$9,774	\$4,189	3.00	\$1,396	\$	3,372	\$407	20.59%
4	\$14,661	\$4,887	3.00	\$1,629	\$	5,001	\$871	25.82%
5	\$19,059	\$4,398	3.00	\$1,466	\$	6,467	\$1,058	21.16%
6	\$23,862	\$4,803	3.00	\$1,601	\$	8,068	\$1,438	22.23%
7	\$28,729	\$4,868	3.00	\$1,623	\$	9,691	\$1,799	22.30%
8	\$33,211	\$4,482	3.00	\$1,494	\$	11,185	\$2,119	21.87%
9	\$36,798	\$3,587	3.00	\$1,196	\$	12,380	\$2,370	21.19%
10	\$39,006	\$2,208	3.00	\$736	\$	13,116	\$2,524	20.39%
TY	\$41,346	\$2,340	NA			Assumed to	be =	20.00%

### Lesson 5: The dilution is taken care off..

- With young growth companies, it is almost a given that the number of shares outstanding will increase over time for two reasons:
  - To grow, the company will have to issue new shares either to raise cash to take projects or to offer to target company stockholders in acquisitions
  - Many young, growth companies also offer options to managers as compensation and these options will get exercised, if the company is successful.
- In DCF valuation, both effects are already incorporated into the value per share, even though we use the current number of shares in estimating value per share
  - The need for new equity issues is captured in negative cash flows in the earlier years. The present value of these negative cash flows will drag down the current value of equity and this is the effect of future dilution.
  - The options are valued and netted out against the current value. Using an option pricing model allows you to incorporate the expected likelihood that they will be exercised and the price at which they will be exercised.

## Lesson 6: If you are worried about failure, incorporate into value



## Lesson 7: There are always scenarios where the market price can be justified...

	6% 8% 10%		8%		8%		10%	12%		14%	
30%	\$ (1.94)	\$	2.95	\$	7.84	\$	12.71	\$	17.57		
35%	\$ 1.41	\$	8.37	\$	15.33	\$	22.27	\$	29.21		
40%	\$ 6.10	\$	15.93	\$	25.74	\$	35.54	\$	45.34		
45%	\$ 12.59	\$	26.34	\$	40.05	\$	53.77	\$	67.48		
50%	\$ 21.47	\$	40.50	\$	59.52	\$	78.53	\$	97.54		
55%	\$ 33.47	\$	59.60	\$	85.72	\$	111.84	\$	137.95		
60%	\$ 49.53	\$	85.10	\$	120.66	\$	156.22	\$	191.77		

## Lesson 8: You will be wrong 100% of the tim and it really is not your fault...

- No matter how careful you are in getting your inputs and how well structured your model is, your estimate of value will change both as new information comes out about the company, the business and the economy.
- As information comes out, you will have to adjust and adapt your model to reflect the information. Rather than be defensive about the resulting changes in value, recognize that this is the essence of risk.
- <u>A test</u>: If your valuations are unbiased, you should find yourself increasing estimated values as often as you are decreasing values. In other words, there should be equal doses of good and bad news affecting valuations (at least over time).

## And the market is often "more wrong"....

\$90.00 \$80.00 \$70.00-\$60.00-\$50.00-■ Value per share Price per share \$40.00-\$30.00 \$20.00-\$10.00 \$0.00-2000 2002 2001 2003

**Amazon: Value and Price** 

Time of analysis

## Assessing my 2000 forecasts, in 2014

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	Revenue	5	Operating Income			ome	Operating N	/largin
Year	My forecast (2000)	Actual	My f	orecast (2000)		Actual	My forecast (2000)	Actual
2000	\$2,793	\$2,762	-\$	373	-\$	664.00	-13.35%	-24.04%
2001	\$5,585	\$3,122	-\$	94	-\$	231.00	-1.68%	-7.40%
2002	\$9,774	\$3,932	\$	407	\$	106.00	4.16%	2.70%
2003	\$14,661	\$5,264	\$	1,038	\$	271.00	7.08%	5.15%
2004	\$19,059	\$6,921	\$	1,628	\$	440.00	8.54%	6.36%
2005	\$23,862	\$8,490	\$	2,212	\$	432.00	9.27%	5.09%
2006	\$28,729	\$10,711	\$	2,768	\$	389.00	9.63%	3.63%
2007	\$33,211	\$14,835	\$	3,261	\$	655.00	9.82%	4.42%
2008	\$36,798	\$19,166	\$	3,646	\$	842.00	9.91%	4.39%
2009	\$39,006	\$24,509	\$	3,883	\$	1,129.00	9.95%	4.61%
2010	\$41,346	\$34,204	\$	4,135	\$	1,406.00	10.00%	4.11%
2011	\$43,827	\$48,077	\$	4,383	\$	862.00	10.00%	1.79%
2012	\$46,457	\$61,093	\$	4,646	\$	676.00	10.00%	1.11%
2013	\$49,244	\$74,452	\$	4,925	\$	745.00	10.00%	1.00%
2014 (LTM)	\$51,460	\$85,247	\$	5,146.35	\$	97.00	10.00%	0.11%

#### Amazon

#### The Greatest (and most Feared) Disruptive Platform in History

Amazon will complete its metaphorsis from being a retail company to one that can take its competitive advantages - access to capital & willingness to lose money for long periods, while disrupting and changing the status quo - to any business that it targets, giving it the potential for high revenue growth on top of already-large revenues. It will be able to use the pricing power it accumulates in each business it is in, to increase profit margins, partly through economies of scale and partly through higher prices. Its low debt ratio and divergent business mix give it a low cost of capital.

			The	Assumpt	tions		
	Base year	Years 1-5	Years 6-10			After year 10	Link to story
Revenues (a)	\$ 208,125	15.00%	→ 3.00%			3.00%	Expanding into new businessses
							Economies of scale and pricing power
Operating margin (b)	7.71%	7.71%	12.50%			12.50%	increase margins
Tax rate	20.20%	20.20%	>24.00%			24.00%	Converging on a global tax rate of 25%
							Big payoffs from investing in technology
Reinvestment (c)		Sales to capital ratio	5.95		RIR =	30.00%	and content
Return on capital	15.24%	Marginal ROIC =	89.16%			10.00%	The last man standing
Cost of capital (d)		7.97%	7.50%			7.50%	Low debt & diverse business mix
			The	Cash Flo	ows		
	Revenues	Operating Margin	EBIT	EBIT (1-	-t)	Reinvestment	FCFF
1	\$ 239,344	8.67%	\$ 20,753	\$	16,560	\$ 5,249	\$ 11,311
2	\$ 275,245	9.63%	\$ 26,501	\$	21,147	\$ 6,037	\$ 15,110
3	\$ 316,532	10.59%	\$ 33,506	\$	26,736	\$ 6,942	\$ 19,794
4	\$ 364,012	11.54%	\$ 42,017	\$	33,527	\$ 7,983	\$ 25,544
5	\$ 418,614	12.50%	\$ 52,327	\$	41,754	\$ 9,181	\$ 32,573
6	\$ 471,359	12.50%	\$ 58,920	\$	46,568	\$ 8,869	\$ 37,699
7	\$ 519,438	12.50%	\$ 64,930	\$	50,825	\$ 8,084	\$ 42,741
8	\$ 559,954	12.50%	\$ 69,994	\$	54,258	\$ 6,813	\$ 47,446
9	\$ 590,191	12.50%	\$ 73,774	\$	56,628	\$ 5,084	\$ 51,544
10	\$ 607,897	12.50%	\$ 75,987	\$	57,750	\$ 2,977	\$ 54,773
Terminal year	\$ 626,134	12.50%	\$ 78,267	\$	59,483	\$ 17,845	\$ 41,638
			1	The Valu	e		
Terminal value			\$ 925,287				
PV(Terminal value)			\$ 435,438				
PV (CF over next 10 year	irs)		\$ 206,707				
Value of operating asse	ts =		\$ 642,144				
Adjustment for distress	S		\$ -			Probability of failure =	0.00%
- Debt & Mnority Interests			\$ 45,435				
+ Cash & Other Non-operating assets \$			\$ 27,050				
Value of equity			\$ 623,759				
<ul> <li>Value of equity optio</li> </ul>	ns		\$ -				
Number of shares			497.00				
Value per share			\$ 1,255.05			Stock was trading at =	\$1,970.19

