

# The Impossible, The Implausible and the Improbable

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## The Impossible

### Bigger than the economy

Assuming Growth rate for company in perpetuity > Growth rate for economy

### Bigger than the total market

Allowing a company's revenues to grow so much that it has more than a 100% market share of whatever business it is in.

### Profit margin > 100%

Assuming earnings growth will exceed revenue growth for a long enough period, and pushing margins above 100%

### Depreciation without cap ex

Assuming that depreciation will exceed cap ex in perpetuity.

## The Implausible

### Growth without reinvestment

Assuming growth forever without reinvestment.


### Profits without competition

Assuming that your company will grow and earn higher profits, with no competition.


### Returns without risk

Assuming that you can generate high returns in a business with no risk.

## The Improbable



# Uber: Possible, Plausible and Probable



# The Runaway Story: When you want a story to be true...

- With a runaway business story, you usually have three ingredients:
  1. Charismatic, likeable Narrator: The narrator of the business story is someone that you want to see succeed, either because you like the narrator or because he/she will be a good role model.
  2. Telling a story about disrupting a much business, where you dislike the status quo: The status quo in the business that the story is disrupting is dissatisfying (to everyone involved)>
  3. With a societal benefit as bonus: And if the story holds, society and humanity will benefit.
- Since you want this story to work out, you stop asking questions, because the answers may put the story at risk.

# The Impossible: The Runaway Story

The Story




The Checks (?)

Board Member	Designation	Age
Henry Kissinger	Former Secretary of State	92
Bill Perry	Former Secretary of Defense	88
George Schultz	Former Secretary of State	94
Bill Frist	Former Senate Majority Leader	63
Sam Nunn	Former Senator	77
Gary Roughead	Former Navy Admiral	64
James Mattis	Former Marine Corps General	65
Dick Kovocovich	Former CEO of Wells Fargo	72
Riley Bechtel	Former CEO of Bechtel	63
William Foege	Epidemiologist	79
Elizabeth Holmes	Founder & CEO, Theranos	31
Sunny Balwani	President & COO, Theranos	NA

+ Money


Companies valued at \$1 billion or more by venture-capital firms



# When runaway stories melt down..



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## The Meltdown Story





# The Implausible: The Big Market Delusion



Company	Market Cap	Enterprise Value	Current Revenues	Breakeven Revenues (2025)	% from Online Advertising	Imputed Online Ad Revenue (2025)
Google	\$441,572.00	\$386,954.00	\$69,611.00	\$224,923.20	89.50%	\$201,306.26
Facebook	\$245,662.00	\$234,696.00	\$14,640.00	\$129,375.54	92.20%	\$119,284.25
Yahoo!	\$30,614.00	\$23,836.10	\$4,871.00	\$25,413.13	100.00%	\$25,413.13
LinkedIn	\$23,265.00	\$20,904.00	\$2,561.00	\$22,371.44	80.30%	\$17,964.26
Twitter	\$16,927.90	\$14,912.90	\$1,779.00	\$23,128.68	89.50%	\$20,700.17
Pandora	\$3,643.00	\$3,271.00	\$1,024.00	\$2,915.67	79.50%	\$2,317.96
Yelp	\$1,765.00	\$0.00	\$465.00	\$1,144.26	93.60%	\$1,071.02
Zillow	\$4,496.00	\$4,101.00	\$480.00	\$4,156.21	18.00%	\$748.12
Zynga	\$2,241.00	\$1,142.00	\$752.00	\$757.86	22.10%	\$167.49
<b>Total US</b>	<b>\$770,185.90</b>	<b>\$689,817.00</b>	<b>\$96,183.00</b>	<b>\$434,185.98</b>		<b>\$388,972.66</b>
Alibaba	\$184,362.00	\$173,871.00	\$12,598.00	\$111,414.06	60.00%	\$66,848.43
Tencent	\$154,366.00	\$151,554.00	\$13,969.00	\$63,730.36	10.50%	\$6,691.69
Baidu	\$49,991.00	\$44,864.00	\$9,172.00	\$30,999.49	98.90%	\$30,658.50
Sohu.com	\$18,240.00	\$17,411.00	\$1,857.00	\$16,973.01	53.70%	\$9,114.51
Naver	\$13,699.00	\$12,686.00	\$2,755.00	\$12,139.34	76.60%	\$9,298.74
Yandex	\$3,454.00	\$3,449.00	\$972.00	\$2,082.52	98.80%	\$2,057.52
Yahoo! Japan	\$23,188.00	\$18,988.00	\$3,591.00	\$5,707.61	69.40%	\$3,961.08
Sina	\$2,113.00	\$746.00	\$808.00	\$505.09	48.90%	\$246.99
Netease	\$14,566.00	\$11,257.00	\$2,388.00	\$840.00	11.90%	\$3,013.71
Mail.ru	\$3,492.00	\$3,768.00	\$636.00	\$1,676.47	35.00%	\$586.76
Mixi	\$3,095.00	\$2,661.00	\$1,229.00	\$777.02	96.00%	\$745.94
Kakaku	\$3,565.00	\$3,358.00	\$404.00	\$1,650.49	11.60%	\$191.46
<b>Total non-US</b>	<b>\$474,131.00</b>	<b>\$444,613.00</b>	<b>\$50,379.00</b>	<b>\$248,495.46</b>		<b>\$133,415.32</b>
<b>Global Total</b>	<b>\$1,244,316.90</b>	<b>\$1,134,430.00</b>	<b>\$146,562.00</b>	<b>\$682,681.44</b>		<b>\$522,387.98</b>

# The Improbable: Willy Wonkitis

## Tesla: Summary 15-year DCF Analysis (DCF valuation as of mid-year 2013)


	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FY 2027	FY 2028
Unit Volume	24,298	36,883	64,684	86,713	149,869	214,841	291,861	384,747	466,559	550,398	643,850	726,655	820,645	922,481	1,034,215	1,137,780
% Growth		52%	75%	34%	73%	43%	36%	32%	21%	18%	17%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10%
Automotive Revenue Per Unit (\$)	93,403	85,342	83,432	78,932	65,465	58,258	56,407	55,553	55,991	56,586	56,969	57,540	58,138	58,603	59,002	59,554
% Growth		-9%	-2%	-5%	-17%	-11%	-3%	-2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Automotive Sales	2,462	3,321	5,613	7,051	10,025	12,720	16,685	21,595	26,347	31,357	36,897	42,022	47,949	54,283	61,221	67,980
Development Service Sales	16	40	42	44	46	49	51	54	56	59	62	65	68	72	75	79
<b>Total Sales</b>	<b>2,478</b>	<b>3,361</b>	<b>5,655</b>	<b>7,095</b>	<b>10,072</b>	<b>12,768</b>	<b>16,736</b>	<b>21,648</b>	<b>26,403</b>	<b>31,416</b>	<b>36,959</b>	<b>42,087</b>	<b>48,017</b>	<b>54,355</b>	<b>61,296</b>	<b>68,059</b>
% Growth		36%	68%	25%	42%	27%	31%	29%	22%	19%	18%	14%	14%	13%	13%	11%
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>920</b>	<b>1,042</b>	<b>1,586</b>	<b>2,150</b>	<b>3,138</b>	<b>4,066</b>	<b>4,857</b>	<b>5,723</b>	<b>6,328</b>	<b>7,182</b>	<b>8,144</b>	<b>9,688</b>	<b>10,874</b>	<b>12,099</b>
% Margin	6.0%	12.4%	16.3%	14.7%	15.7%	16.8%	18.7%	18.8%	18.4%	18.2%	17.1%	17.1%	17.0%	17.8%	17.7%	17.8%
D&A	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
% of Capex	41%	79%	55%	65%	62%	69%	78%	86%	79%	77%	75%	76%	76%	76%	76%	77%
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>1,285</b>	<b>1,796</b>	<b>2,749</b>	<b>3,529</b>	<b>4,252</b>	<b>5,027</b>	<b>5,517</b>	<b>6,244</b>	<b>7,056</b>	<b>8,429</b>	<b>9,423</b>	<b>10,439</b>
% Margin	1.8%	7.7%	13.2%	11.8%	12.8%	14.1%	16.4%	16.3%	16.1%	16.0%	14.9%	14.8%	14.7%	15.5%	15.4%	15.3%
Net Interest Income (Expense)	(27)	(1)	9	33	47	90	108	155	199	278	358	445	542	651	784	934
Other Income	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Pretax Income</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>758</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>1,332</b>	<b>1,886</b>	<b>2,857</b>	<b>3,684</b>	<b>4,451</b>	<b>5,305</b>	<b>5,875</b>	<b>6,688</b>	<b>7,598</b>	<b>9,080</b>	<b>10,207</b>	<b>11,373</b>
Income Taxes	3	2	14	34	86	262	462	641	807	1,003	1,134	1,317	1,470	1,761	2,028	2,323
% Effective Rate	6%	1%	2%	4%	6%	14%	16%	17%	18%	19%	19%	20%	19%	19%	20%	20%
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>744</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>1,246</b>	<b>1,624</b>	<b>2,395</b>	<b>3,043</b>	<b>3,644</b>	<b>4,303</b>	<b>4,741</b>	<b>5,372</b>	<b>6,128</b>	<b>7,319</b>	<b>8,179</b>	<b>9,050</b>
<b>Plus</b>																
After-tax Interest Expense (Income)	27	1	(9)	(33)	(47)	(90)	(108)	(154)	(199)	(278)	(357)	(444)	(541)	(650)	(782)	(932)
Depreciation of PP&E	103	158	172	203	301	353	389	537	606	696	811	938	1,088	1,260	1,451	1,661
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Less</b>																
Change in Working Capital	(155)	(14)	(157)	(167)	(172)	(325)	(163)	(81)	(28)	(299)	(356)	(328)	(219)	(329)	(365)	(376)
% of Change in Sales		-2%	-7%	-12%	-6%	-12%	-4%	-2%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-6%
Capital Expenditures	250	200	312	312	486	510	497	623	765	906	1,078	1,236	1,437	1,660	1,898	2,149
% of Sales	10%	6%	6%	4%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Unlevered Free Cash Flow</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>863</b>	<b>1,186</b>	<b>1,702</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,884</b>	<b>3,314</b>	<b>4,113</b>	<b>4,472</b>	<b>4,959</b>	<b>5,456</b>	<b>6,597</b>	<b>7,315</b>	<b>8,005</b>

EBITDA 12,099  
 Sales 68,059  
 Net Debt (Cash) (260)  
 Tesla Diluted Shares 142

Exit EBITDA High	12.0 x	Exit PPG High	5.0%	Exit P/Sales High	180%
Exit EBITDA Low	8.0 x	Exit PPG Low	3.0%	Exit P/Sales Low	130%

Discount Rate High 13.0%      FY Month of Valuation 1.0 (Beginning of this Month)  
 Discount Rate Low 9.0%      Month of FY End 12.0 (End of this Month)


# Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value





# Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

## Uber: Intrinsic valuation - June 8, 2014 (in US \$)



# Step 5: Keep the feedback loop open...

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1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.
2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).
3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

# Valuing Bill Gurley's Uber narrative

	<i>Uber (Gurley)</i>	<i>Uber (Gurley Mod)</i>	<i>Uber (Damodaran)</i>
Narrative	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while maintaining its revenue slice at 20%.	Uber will <u>expand the car service market substantially</u> , bringing in mass transit users & non-users from the suburbs into the market, and use its <u>networking advantage</u> to gain a <u>dominant market share</u> , while cutting prices and margins (to 10%).	Uber will expand the car service market moderately, primarily in urban environments, and use its <u>competitive advantages</u> to get a <u>significant but not dominant market share</u> and maintain its revenue slice at 20%.
Total Market	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$300 billion, growing at 3% a year	\$100 billion, growing at 6% a year
Market Share	40%	40%	10%
Uber's revenue slice	20%	10%	20%
Value for Uber	\$53.4 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$10 billion+)	\$28.7 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$6 billion+)	\$5.9 billion + Option value of entering car ownership market (\$2-3 billion)

# Different narratives, Different Numbers

<i>Total Market</i>	<i>Growth Effect</i>	<i>Network Effect</i>	<i>Competitive Advantages</i>	<i>Value of Uber</i>
A4. Mobility Services	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$90,457
A3. Logistics	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$65,158
A4. Mobility Services	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$52,346
A2. All car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$47,764
A1. Urban car service	B4. Double market size	C5. Strong global network effects	D4. Strong & Sustainable	\$31,952
A3. Logistics	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$14,321
A1. Urban car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$7,127
A2. All car service	B3. Increase market by 50%	C3. Strong local network effects	D3. Semi-strong	\$4,764
A4. Mobility Services	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,888
A3. Logistics	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,417
A2. All car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$1,094
A1. Urban car service	B1. None	C1. No network effects	D1. None	\$799

# Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfold

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Narrative Break/End	Narrative Shift	Narrative Change (Expansion or Contraction)
Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.	Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.	Unexpected entry/success in a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.
Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative	Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.	Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.
Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences	Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis	Real Options





Let the games begin... Time to  
value companies..

Let's have some fun!

# Equity Risk Premiums in Valuation

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- The equity risk premiums that I have used in the valuations that follow reflect my thinking (and how it has evolved) on the issue.
  - Pre-1998 valuations: In the valuations prior to 1998, I use a risk premium of 5.5% for mature markets (close to both the historical and the implied premiums then)
  - Between 1998 and Sept 2008: In the valuations between 1998 and September 2008, I used a risk premium of 4% for mature markets, reflecting my belief that risk premiums in mature markets do not change much and revert back to historical norms (at least for implied premiums).
  - Valuations done in 2009: After the 2008 crisis and the jump in equity risk premiums to 6.43% in January 2008, I have used a higher equity risk premium (5-6%) for the next 5 years and will assume a reversion back to historical norms (4%) only after year 5.
  - After 2009: I have used updated equity risk premiums, as of the time that I did the valuations.

# The Valuation Set up

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- With each company that I value in this next section, I will try to start with a story about the company and use that story to construct a valuation.
- With each valuation, rather than focus on all of the details (which will follow the blueprint already laid out), I will focus on a specific component of the valuation that is unique or different.

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# Training Wheels On?

Stocks that look like Bonds, Things Change and  
Market Valuations

**Test 1: Is the firm paying dividends like a stable growth firm?**

Dividend payout ratio is 73%  
In trailing 12 months, through June 2008  
Earnings per share = \$3.17  
Dividends per share = \$2.32

*Training Wheels valuation:  
Con Ed in August 2008*

**Test 2: Is the stable growth rate consistent with fundamentals?**

Retention Ratio = 27%  
ROE = Cost of equity = 7.7%  
Expected growth = 2.1%

*Growth rate forever = 2.1%*

Value per share today = Expected Dividends per share next year / (Cost of equity - Growth rate)  
= 2.32 (1.021) / (.077 - .021) = \$42.30

Cost of Equity = 4.1% + 0.8 (4.5%) = 7.70%

Riskfree rate  
4.10%  
10-year T.Bond rate

Beta  
0.80  
Beta for regulated power utilities

Equity Risk Premium  
4.5%  
Implied Equity Risk Premium - US market in 8/2008

**On August 12, 2008  
Con Ed was trading at \$  
40.76.**

**Test 3: Is the firm's risk and cost of equity consistent with a stable growth firm?**

Beta of 0.80 is at lower end of the range of stable company betas: 0.8 -1.2

**Why a stable growth dividend discount model?**

- Why stable growth: Company is a regulated utility, restricted from investing in new growth markets. Growth is constrained by the fact that the population (and power needs) of its customers in New York are growing at very low rates.  
Growth rate forever = 2%
- Why equity: Company's debt ratio has been stable at about 70% equity, 30% debt for decades.
- Why dividends: Company has paid out about 97% of its FCFE as dividends over the last five years.



## From DCF value to target price and returns...

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- Assume that you believe that your valuation of Con Ed (\$42.30) is a fair estimate of the value, 7.70% is a reasonable estimate of Con Ed's cost of equity and that your expected dividends for next year ( $2.32 \times 1.021$ ) is a fair estimate, what is the expected stock price a year from now (assuming that the market corrects its mistake?)
  
- If you bought the stock today at \$40.76, what return can you expect to make over the next year (assuming again that the market corrects its mistake)?

### 3M: A Pre-crisis valuation

**Current Cashflow to Firm**  
 EBIT(1-t)= 5344 (1-.35)= 3474  
 - Nt CpX= 350  
 - Chg WC 691  
 = FCFF 2433  
 Reinvestment Rate = 1041/3474  
 =29.97%  
 Return on capital = 25.19%

Reinvestment Rate  
30%

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
 $.30 \times .25 = .075$   
**7.5%**

Return on Capital  
25%

**Stable Growth**  
 g = 3%; Beta = 1.10;  
 Debt Ratio= 20%; Tax rate=35%  
 Cost of capital = 6.76%  
 ROC= 6.76%;  
 Reinvestment Rate=3/6.76=44%

First 5 years

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> = 2645 / (.0676 - .03) = 70,409

Op. Assets 60607  
 + Cash: 3253  
 - Debt 4920  
 =Equity 58400  
 Value/Share \$ 83.55

Year	1	2	3	4	5	Term Yr
EBIT (1-t)	\$3,734	\$4,014	\$4,279	\$4,485	\$4,619	\$4,758
- Reinvestment	\$1,120	\$1,204	\$1,312	\$1,435	\$1,540	\$2,113
= FCFF	\$2,614	\$2,810	\$2,967	\$3,049	\$3,079	\$2,645


Cost of capital = 8.32% (0.92) + 2.91% (0.08) = 7.88%

**Cost of Equity**  
8.32%

**Cost of Debt**  
 $(3.72\% + .75\%)(1 - .35)$   
 = 2.91%

**Weights**  
 E = 92% D = 8%

On September 12, 2008, 3M was trading at \$70/share



*Lowered base operating income by 10%* **3M: Post-crisis valuation**

**Current Cashflow to Firm**

EBIT(1-t)= 4810 (1-.35)=	3,180
- Nt CpX=	350
- Chg WC	691
= FCFF	2139
Reinvestment Rate = 1041/3180	
=33%	
Return on capital = 23.06%	

Reinvestment Rate  
25%

*Reduced growth rate to 5%*

**Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t)**  
.25\*.20=.05  
**5%**

Return on Capital  
20%

*Did not increase debt ratio in stable growth to 20%*

**Stable Growth**  
g = 3%; Beta = 1.00;; ERP =4%  
Debt Ratio= 8%; Tax rate=35%  
Cost of capital = 7.55%  
ROC= 7.55%;  
Reinvestment Rate=3/7.55=40%

First 5 years

Terminal Value<sub>5</sub> = 2434 / (.0755 - .03) = 53,481

Op. Assets	43,975
+ Cash:	3253
- Debt	4920
=Equity	42308
Value/Share	\$ 60.53

Year	1	2	3	4	5	Term Yr
EBIT (1-t)	\$3,339	\$3,506	\$3,667	\$3,807	\$3,921	\$4,038
- Reinvestment	\$835	\$877	\$1,025	\$1,288	\$1,558	\$1,604
= FCFF	\$2,504	\$2,630	\$2,642	\$2,519	\$2,363	\$2,434

Cost of capital = 10.86% (0.92) + 3.55% (0.08) = 10.27%

**Cost of Equity**  
10.86%

**Cost of Debt**  
(3.96% + .1.5%)(1-.35)  
= 3.55%

**Weights**  
E = 92% D = 8%

On October 16, 2008, MMM was trading at \$57/share.

**Riskfree Rate:**  
Riskfree rate = 3.96%

*Increased risk premium to 6% for next 5 years*

Beta 1.15 x Risk Premium 6%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.09      D/E=8.8%