Capital Flows & Demography

Dave Backus Based on work by Tom Cooley, Espen Henriksen, and Jan Möller

> Canadian Macroeconomic Study Group Montreal | November 2, 2012



Outline

Capital flows: thoughts

Capital flows: evidence

Demography

Model (work in progress)

Saving and investment in China

Capital Flows: Thoughts

Michael Bordo, "Globalization in historical perspective," 2002


The fifty years before World War I saw massive flows of capital from Western Europe to (mainly) the Americas and Australasia. At its peak, the outflow from Britain reached nine percent of GNP and was almost as high in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Private capital moved essentially without restriction ... into bonds that financed railroads and other infrastructure — and into government debt.

Link: http://econweb.rutgers.edu/bordo/nabe.pdf

Lars Jonung, "Sweden under the gold standard," 1984

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Sweden began a process of industrialization financed by considerable capital imports which transformed a basically agrarian country into an industrialized society.

From Bordo & Schwartz, Retrospective on the Gold Standard



Michael Bordo, "Globalization in historical perspective," 2002

A striking feature is the size and **persistence** of current account deficits in this period, esp in Australia, Canada, Argentina, and the Nordic countries, as well as the surpluses of the UK and France.

This globalization of finance had its dark side — in **periodic** crises when capital flows abruptly reversed themselves.

Link: http://econweb.rutgers.edu/bordo/nabe.pdf

John Maynard Keynes, 1941-42

I disagree most strongly that the control of capital movements may be unnecessary. ... I see no reason to feel confidence that the more stable conditions [of the post-war era] will remove the more dangerous movements [of capital].

Central control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature of the post-war system.

Quoted by Crotty, JEL, 1983

Daniel Gross, New York Times, May 8, 2005

[US] imbalances are eerily reminiscent of recent economic crises. Could we see a perfect storm [for the US economy]? If so, what would it look like?

- * Nouriel Roubini estimates that long-term interest rates in the US could rise sharply and the dollar fall.
- ★ Jeffrey Frankel adds: "some of us have been warning of this hard-landing scenario for more than 20 years."

Group of 20, Communique, April 15-16, 2011

We agreed on a set of indicative guidelines ... to address persistently large imbalances. We now launch ... an in-depth assessment of the nature of these imbalances and the root causes of impediments to adjustment. ... We will ascertain for our next meeting the corrective and preventive measures.

Øystein Olsen, Norges Bank, March 2011

Global trade imbalances have been reduced somewhat over the past two years, but there is a considerable risk that they will persist. They must be corrected.

Dick Caves and Ron Jones, World Trade and Payments, 1973

By accounting rule, credits (or receipts) make the balance positive or "favorable." Debits are "unfavorable." Notice the gravitational pull of semantics! The receipts side owns all the good words, and has done so since the eighteenth-century mercantilists made a virtue of "storing up treasure."

(first edition, page 87, lightly edited)

Thoughts: summary

Long history of ambivalence over capital flows

- Facilitator of economic growth?
- Or source of instability?

Suggestion: don't let the words decide

► Find and replace: "global imbalances" ⇒ "international capital flows"


Our focus


- ▶ Where do capital flows come from?
- Why are they so persistent?

Capital Flows: Evidence


| Largest inflows | Amount (b\$US) | Largest outflows | Amount (b\$US) |
|-----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|
| United States | -470 | China | 306 |
| Italy | -72 | Japan | 195 |
| Spain | -63 | Germany | 176 |
| United Kingdom | -56 | Mideast oil | 150 |
| France | -53 | Switzerland | 75 |
| India | -49 | Russia | 71 |
| Turkey | -49 | Netherlands | 56 |
| Canada | -49 | Norway | 53 |
| Brazil | -47 | Taiwan | 41 |
| Greece | -32 | Sweden | 30 |
| Australia | -32 | Korea | 28 |
| Portugal | -23 | Malaysia | 28 |
| Total inflows | -1183 | Total outflows | 1466 |

Source: IMF, WEO, April 2011 version, data for 2010







Backus (NYU)





Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators





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

























Evidence: capital flows and stocks


Capital flow variation is low-frequency (so much for HP filtering)


Ditto net foreign assets


No evident tendency for either to move toward zero (where's the "external balance condition"?)


Demography














Model (a progress report)

Model: motivation

Capital flows and stocks are persistent

Demography inherently persistent — and different across countries

Worth exploring a connection?

[Apparently yes: Attanasio-Kitao-Violante, Bloom-Canning, Boersch-Supan-Winter, Brooks, Domeij-Floden, Feroli, Ferrero, Henriksen, Krueger-Ludwig, and others all had the same idea]

Model: structure

One-good world

Overlapping generations, realistic mortality rates


Key ages: start working/consuming at 21, retire at 65

Preferences: power utility over consumption, fixed labor supply


Technology: CES production, country-specific productivity

Today: explore impact of changes in life expectancy

Model: mortality



Model: age distribution



Model: net foreign assets

Capital allocated to equate marginal products

- Connected to age distribution via effective labor input
- ightharpoonup Equates K/Y across countries

Net worth follows from life-cycle saving

- Saving and net worth depend on life expectancy
- Also age distribution

NFA is difference between net worth and capital stock


Model: steady state calculations

Impact of life expectancy


Two versions

- Closed economy: capital stock and interest rate adjust
- Open economy: interest rate fixed, NFA adjusts


Model: closed economy net asset profile




Model: closed economy capital and wealth




Model: closed economy interest rate






Model: open economy capital and wealth




China

Why are China's saving and investment rates so high?




Source: IMF, WEO, April 2011, data for 2010


Does China have too much capital?



Does China have too much capital?



Does China have too much capital?



Why is saving so high?

Demography?

Precautionary saving?

High "business saving"?

Other?

Last thoughts

Capital flows

- A fact of life for more than a century
- Persistent
- A role for demography?
- ▶ What else would you suggest?

Open questions

- Why are capital-output ratios so different across countries?
- Why are saving rates so different across countries?
- Why is China's so high?