Case Study
Houston Exploration
Acquisition or Share Buyback?
Prof. Ian Giddy, New
York University
The Proposal
In May
2006, the Board of Directors of Houston Exploration (THX) was
presented with a choice. With even higher prices of energy on the
horizon, expansion of the company's natural gas business seemed
logical. On the other hand, a vocal minority of shareholders was
calling for a share repurchase instead of a growth strategy. The
activist shareholders, represented by the
hedge fund Jana Partners, made the following points:
- An approximately $650
million share repurchase will create
significantly more shareholder value than using these proceeds to
pursue long-lived onshore acquisitions in today's highly competitive
M&A environment. As set forth in the attached analysis, we believe
that the Company could repurchase approximately 37% of the outstanding
shares (slightly less than 11 million shares) paying a 15% premium to
the recent market price. This would be achieved by using estimated net
cash proceeds of approximately $520MM from the recent Louisiana Gulf of
Mexico sale in addition to $130 million of debt (leaving the Company
with the
same leverage ratio of approximately 1.0x estimated 2007 EBITDA that it
had prior to paying down debt with the proceeds of the Texas Gulf of
Mexico sale).
- The acquisition
scenario yields significantly less EPS accretion -- only
14% compared to 45% in the buyback scenario.
- The Company should
also implement a comprehensive hedging strategy. By
doing so, the Company can place a "collar" on a significant portion of
2007 and 2008 natural gas volumes, which would be beneficial given that
our projections are based upon the lower-end of what the Company would
likely be able to secure as a floor on such a "collar" transaction. In
other words, implementing a hedging program such as this would preserve
significant commodity price upside while locking-in cash flows that
already translate into a deeply discounted relative and absolute
valuation.
- Given the Company's
historical underperformance that the Board should explore
possible strategic transactions to maximize value, including a
potential sale. We believe there are numerous interested acquirers.
- A Board of Directors
that "plays possum" in response to shareholder
initiatives represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the
relationship of a board to their shareholders. Shareholder demands for
value maximization are not a threat to be avoided. Instead they are an
opportunity to work collaboratively to achieve the best possible
returns for the company's true owners, which is a board's highest duty.
The Analysis
Share Repurchase Scenario
2007E EPS Impact assuming share Pro repurchase Current Buyback Forma Cash (including LA GOM proceeds after tax & hedge buyback) $520 ($520) $0 Total Debt $424 $130 $554 Net Debt (Cash) ($96) $650 $554
assume 15% premium Share Price $52.75 $61 $52.75 Shares Outstanding 29.3 (11) 18.6 Equity Market Capitalization $1,546 $981
Total Enterprise Value $1,451 $1,535
2007E EBITDAX $522 $522 EV/2007E EBITDAX 2.8x 2.9x
Proved Reserves (Bcfe pro forma for divestitures & acquisitions) 632 632 Proved Reserve Multiple ($EV/Mcfe) $2.29 $2.43
2007E EPS $6.67 $9.64 P/E Ratio 7.9x 5.5x EPS Accretion 45%
Acquisition Scenario Pro Capitalization Current Acquisition* Forma Cash held in 1031 Account $590 ($590) $0 Cash (excluding LA GOM proceeds) $20 $0 $20 Total Debt $424 $0 $424 Net Debt (Cash) - calculated using after tax LA GOM proceeds ($96) $590 $404
Share Price $52.75 $52.75 Shares Outstanding 29.3 29.3 Equity Market Capitalization $1,546 $1,546
Total Enterprise Value $1,451 $1,951
2007E EBITDAX $522 $92 $614 EV/2007E EBITDAX 2.8x 6.4x 3.2x
Proved Reserves (Bcfe pro forma for divestitures & acquisitions) 632.2 214.5 846.7 Proved Reserve Multiple ($EV/Mcfe) $2.29 $2.75 $2.30
2007E EPS $6.67 $7.62 P/E Ratio 7.9x 6.9x EPS Accretion 14%
Source: JANA Partners LLC
Notes
and assumptions:
- We have assumed for purposes of this
analysis that the Company would have to pay close to $2.75/Mcfe (which
is in fact below recent comparable transactions) for long-lived onshore
assets.
- We have also assumed an R/P ratio of 13
years for the acquired assets and a cost structure similar to the
Company's existing onshore assets - so the EBITDAX multiple would also
be at a substantial premium tothe existing multiple.
- Much of the accretion generated in the
acquisition scenario is actually attributable to the removal of the
large cash position from the balance sheet (which we assume would earn
only a 2% return if it remained on the balance sheet).
- The actual
acquisition accretion would in fact likely be even lower given that
such a transaction would carry much higher integration and execution
risk, which is not fully discounted in our analysis.
Questions:
1. Do you
agree with all the recommendations? Why or why not?
2. What
other choices should the Board of Houston Exploration consider?
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