

**MORAL JUDGMENT, AFFECT, AND CULTURE,
OR, IS IT WRONG TO EAT YOUR DOG?**

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ABSTRACT

MORAL JUDGMENT, AFFECT, AND CULTURE, OR, IS IT WRONG TO EAT YOUR DOG?

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Supervised by Jonathan Baron and Alan Fiske

Are disgusting or disrespectful actions considered to be moral violations, even when they are harmless? Stories about victimless yet offensive actions (such as eating one's dead pet dog) were presented to Brazilian and U.S. adults and children, of high and low socio-economic status. Results show that college students at elite universities judged these stories to be matters of social convention, or of personal preference. Most other subjects, especially in Brazil, judged the offensive actions to be universally wrong moral violations. Moral judgments were better predicted by affective reactions than by appraisals of harmfulness. These results support Shweder (1990), and Miller, Bersoff and Harwood (1990), and suggest that cultural norms and culturally shaped emotions have a substantial impact on the domain of morality and the process of moral judgment. Efforts to build cross-culturally valid models of moral judgment are discussed.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

What sorts of issues do people treat as moral issues? This question is currently being debated in the literature on moral judgment. On one side, the "cognitive developmentalists" (e.g., Turiel, Killen & Helwig, 1987) argue that particular rules may vary from culture to culture, but that in all cultures moral issues involve questions of harm, rights, or justice. On the other side, a group of cross-cultural psychologists and anthropologists (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987; Miller, Bersoff & Harwood, 1990) argue that the domain of morality is culturally constructed, and can extend beyond harm rights and justice in many cultures. The present research contributes to this debate by investigating a class of issues that has not previously been studied: harmless yet offensive violations of strong social norms. Brazilians and North Americans of high and low social class were interviewed about harmless acts that are disgusting (e.g., a man who has sex with a chicken carcass, and then eats it) or disrespectful (e.g., a woman who cleans her toilet with a flag). Cognitive developmental theory predicts that these harmless events should be judged to be matters of personal preference, or of social convention, while the "cultural constructionist" approach predicts that, outside of educated Western groups, these violations may be judged to be moral violations. While exploring this debate, attention will be focused on the comparatively neglected role of affect in moral judgment.

Western philosophers since Mill (1859/1972) have debated the moral status of "harmless offenses". In a thorough modern treatment, Feinberg (1973) specifically

considers the issues of flag desecration, sexual perversion, and the mistreatment of corpses. He points out that these actions are harmless in the narrow sense that they violate no interests of others, beyond the interest of not being offended. This interest in not being offended is sometimes a legitimate interest, and preventing such offense may at times justify limiting people's liberty to engage in offensive actions in public. However, some legislation aims to prevent harmless acts in private (e.g., oral and anal sex), between consenting adults. Feinberg calls this "legal moralism," since its goal is to prevent the mere existence of "sinful" acts. He argues that legal moralism is neither legitimate nor practical in Western societies. The harmless offenses used in the present research are all private and consensual, and on Feinberg's analysis, people should be free to engage in them. The principal dependent measure of this study is whether people adopt a "moral" stance towards these acts, or a "permissive" stance. If people view these acts as moral transgressions, they will endorse two beliefs, which we all share about such prototypical moral violations as murder. First, people should not be at liberty to perform these acts; they should be stopped, and/or punished. And second, the wrongness of these acts is universal, not contingent on local custom or convention. Philosophers (e.g., Hare, 1981; Kant, 1785/1959) as well as psychologists (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Shweder, Turiel & Much, 1981) have generally used one or both of these principles -- especially universality -- as the hallmark of a moral judgment.

The question at hand, then, must be settled empirically: will harmless-offensive acts be judged to fall within the domain of moral violations? Cognitive developmental theory says either a clear "no" (Turiel), or else a developmental "maybe" (Piaget and Kohlberg), since children often confuse moral rules with other kinds of rules. The cognitive-developmental approach to the study of morality began with Piaget (1932/1965). Piaget defined morality as "a system of rules", and said that

"the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules" (p. 13). Piaget noted that the kind of respect children show for rules varies greatly between early childhood and adolescence, and he studied these changes through participant-observation of boys playing marbles and girls playing a form of hop-scotch. He observed three stages of rule-consciousness, which correspond roughly to his three stages of cognitive development (i.e. pre-operational, concrete operational, formal operational). At the first stage, in early childhood, rules are not yet coercive or binding. They are simply interesting regularities, guiding young children in their imitation of older children. When children at this stage play together, they engage in what Piaget calls "parallel play", each one playing at marbles separately, without any strong concern for rules.

In middle and late childhood, cognitive development has advanced to the point where the child understands the mental operation of reversibility, and its analog in the social domain, reciprocity. At this stage, children understand and care about rules and fairness, and they enjoy truly interactive social play. However, when Piaget questioned children about where rules come from, and how they can be changed, he discovered what he called a "heteronomous" orientation, in which rules are regarded as "sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and lasting forever" (p. 28). At this second stage, rules have an authority and an existence of their own, like laws of physics which are external to people and cannot be changed by consensus. Piaget calls this reification of social rules "moral realism", which he defines as "the tendency which the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself" (p. 111).

When cognitive development reaches the stage of formal operations, a new, more flexible level of rule consciousness is possible, which Piaget calls "autonomous".

Moral realism fades away at the autonomous level, and rules are seen as laws "due to mutual consent, which you must respect if you want to be loyal but which it is permissible to alter" if everyone agrees (p. 283).

With regard to the present study of harmless-offensive actions, then, Piagetian theory predicts an age-shift occurring around the ages of twelve or thirteen. Children below this age should hold a heteronomous view of social rules, and should endorse them regardless of the presence or absence of a victim, and regardless of the social context. But adolescents who have reached the autonomous stage of rule consciousness should think more flexibly about social rules. They should recognize that rules are made by societies for the mutual benefit of their members, and that these rules can be changed, especially if they do not protect people from harm.

The age of this transition, however, can be retarded by authoritarian parenting. Piaget (1932/1965) makes repeated pleas to spare the rod and save the child, since harsh physical punishment and rigid endorsement of rules perpetuates the child's heteronomous respect for adult authority. Childrearing studies have borne out Piaget's warnings: physical discipline produces children who obey out of fear, while milder discipline, coupled with explanations and "induction" produces the greatest internalization (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1979; Hoffman, 1977). Since parents of low social class tend to be more authoritarian, and use more physical punishment than parents of higher social class (Adorno et al., 1950), Piaget's theory predicts that lower-class children should on average reach the autonomous phase later than upper-class children.

For Piaget, then, moral development is a form of cognitive development. The child attempts to process the data of his social interactions, assimilating information into his existing cognitive structures, until forced by "disequilibrium" to accommodate cognitive structures to new data. The child figures out morality for

himself, just as he figures out the rules of conservation of mass and volume. It must be stressed that in Piagetian theory, adults and other socializers play very little role in moral development. Morality, especially at the autonomous level, is self-constructed in the course of social interaction with one's peers; it is not internalized or received from one's culture. It must also be stressed that a Piagetian account of moral development does not discuss the role of emotion.

Kohlberg's (1969, 1971) theory of moral development builds directly upon Piaget's, and continues its exclusively cognitive emphasis. Kohlberg studied responses to hypothetical justice dilemmas, and found a three level progression in the development of justice thinking (i.e., preconventional, conventional, and postconventional). These three levels are said to be isomorphic with Piagetian developmental stages, since cognitive development is held to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral development. Each of these levels is subdivided into two stages, yielding a total of six stages in the process of moral development. But for present purposes, the theoretically relevant boundary is between conventional and post-conventional thinking (i.e., between stages 4 and 5), so only this boundary will be discussed. At the conventional level (stages 3 and 4), "maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences" (1971, p. 164). This stage maps directly onto Piaget's second stage of rule consciousness, including a heteronomous orientation. The origin and utility of rules are not questioned. People at this stage value tradition, conformity, and the maintenance of the natural and social order. With regard to the harmless-offensive stories of the present study, conventional thinkers should be unresponsive to the presence or absence of a victim. These stories violate strong and widespread norms of behavior, and the violators should be condemned and punished.

Post-conventional thinkers, however, should be different. Post-conventional thinking attempts to ground moral rules in first principles, and does not accept tradition or authority as a sufficient justification for condemning or punishing people. Almost all post-conventional thinking is carried out at stage 5, which takes as its first principles the rights and welfare of people. Rules which protect rights and maximize welfare will be endorsed. Rules which infringe upon rights without any strong benefit to welfare will be opposed. Thus post-conventional thinkers should be highly responsive to the presence or absence of a victim in the harmless-offensive stories. If a woman wants to clean her own toilet with her own flag, and no harm is done to anyone else, a post-conventional thinker will endorse the woman's right to act as she pleases.

Following Piaget, Kohlberg argued that moral development was a cognitive process of self-construction. Direct attempts by adults to transmit moral norms are ineffective. Adults can aid a child's moral development only by providing frequent opportunities to engage in role-taking, especially in attempting to resolve the competing claims of two or more parties. This self-construction principle was embodied in the "just society" experimental schools founded by Kohlberg in the 1970's, in which the students created and enforced their own rules, and acted as a judicial body to resolve all disputes between students. Students in these schools, who were given extensive participation in democratic institutions, were more likely to advance to post-conventional reasoning than were students in more traditional schools (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hower, 1983).

Conversely, Kohlberg shared Piaget's belief in the power of punishment and authoritarianism to retard moral development. Authoritarian parents and cultures instill in their children a greater respect for power and tradition, and they provide fewer opportunities to participate in democratic institutions and rule-making

processes. Kohlberg verified these claims by conducting moral judgment interviews across cultures and social classes. His basic finding (Kohlberg, 1971) is that post-conventional thinking (stage 5) is the modal level for middle-class North Americans by the age of 16, but that 16 year-olds in rural villages in Turkey and the Yucatan show essentially no post-conventional thinking. Middle-class teenagers in less developed countries (Mexico, Taiwan) are intermediate, as are lower-class teenagers in North America. Kohlberg's (1971) interpretation is that post-conventional thinking is not a product of Western values per se, but that middle-class culture in general and democratic culture in particular encourage post-conventionality by providing greater opportunities for role-taking, and less authoritarian discipline practices.

As a result of his cross-cultural work, Kohlberg (1971) claimed to have demonstrated that there is a universal domain of morality, centered on issues of justice. He staked out an aggressively universalist position, quoting Socrates: "First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture. Second, the name of this ideal form is justice." Kohlberg argued that moral relativism is based on philosophical confusion, and that empirical data show surprisingly little cultural variation in moral reasoning. "[A]lmost all individuals in all cultures use the same thirty basic moral categories, concepts, or principles" (1971, p.176). Cultural differences arise primarily from the fact that non-democratic cultures and lower social classes have not yet achieved wide-spread post-conventional thinking, although they would achieve it "if the conditions for socio-moral development were optimal for all individuals in all cultures" (1971, p.178). So cultures may disagree about what is just, but they all agree that the central issue in morality is justice, and the proper treatment of persons.

In a major review of 44 studies done in 27 different cultures, Snarey (1985) offers mixed support for Kohlberg's claims. Snarey concludes that Kohlberg's dilemmas are

not culture-biased, when minor adaptations are made to fit local circumstances. However Snarey questions the criteria Kohlberg uses to define post-conventional judgment. Snarey suggests that Kohlberg's criteria, which focus on justice, fail to capture alternative modes of advanced thinking, such as the Hindu emphasis on the value of all forms of life. This idea, that advanced moral thinking in different cultures can focus on differing sets of issues, will be one of the major claims of this paper.

The third major figure in the cognitive-developmental tradition, Eliot Turiel, builds upon both Kohlberg and Piaget. Turiel (1983, p. 3) defines the domain of morality as "prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other." As for Kohlberg's post-conventional thinkers, moral issues are intrinsically interpersonal issues, and human actions are judged by their consequences for other humans (and perhaps animals). Turiel's major innovation was to challenge Kohlberg's developmental findings by demonstrating that children at the conventional and pre-conventional levels did not necessarily confuse social and moral rules. Part of what Kohlberg's interviews measure is the ability to talk like a moral philosopher, explaining difficult concepts such as the utilitarian basis of social regulation. Since older and more educated children can talk better, they score higher on Kohlberg's six stages. But when Turiel relaxed the verbal production demands of the Kohlberg interview and asked simple "yes/no" questions, he found that children as young as five were able to distinguish social rules from moral rules.

Turiel (1983) and Nucci (1981; Nucci & Turiel, 1978) have developed a "domain" theory of moral development, in which children sort social events into three domains of knowledge -- moral, conventional, and personal -- based on the interpersonal consequences of the events. Acts that have "intrinsically harmful" consequences, such as violence and theft, are understood even by young children to be moral

violations, which means that these acts are said to be universally and unalterably wrong. In contrast, actions whose consequences fall primarily upon the actor are said to be within the personal domain. Issues such as one's choice of recreational activities, or other actions that do not adversely affect others, are judged to be "outside the realm of societal regulation and moral concern" (Nucci, 1981). Finally, events that have consequences for others that are not intrinsically harmful, yet are meaningful in the context of a specific social system, are said to fall within the domain of conventional knowledge. For example, it is not intrinsically harmful for a boy to wear bluejeans, but in the context of a school that requires all pupils to wear a school uniform, the boy commits a violation of a local social convention. Children will say that the boy's action is wrong, but not universally and unalterably wrong; that is, it would be alright in a different school with a different set of rules.

Turiel and his colleagues have collected a great deal of evidence that North Americans will distinguish among "prototypical" exemplars of these three domains, based on the perceived harmfulness of the consequences (see Turiel, Killen & Helwig, 1987). And they have replicated these findings in religious and non-western cultures. Nucci (1985) found that adolescents in Amish-Mennonite religious communities treated many of their customs (e.g., women covering their heads) as alterable and non-universal. Other research has demonstrated some understanding of prototypical social conventions among children in Korea (Smetana & Kim, 1987), Nigeria (Hollos, Leis & Turiel, 1986), and the Virgin Islands (Nucci, Turiel & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983).

With respect to the harmless-offensive issues of the present study, Turiel's domain theory predicts that children as well as adults should be sensitive to the presence or absence of a victim. When these issues are judged to be victimless, they should by definition fall outside the domain of morality. They will be treated as personal issues,

which people should be at liberty to pursue, or as conventional issues, which are arbitrary and can legitimately vary between cultures.

Chapter 2

Cultural Construction vs. Cognitive Development

Turiel's domain theory has not gone unchallenged. Several recent cross-cultural studies have suggested that the distinctions made by North Americans are not universal, and that the domain of morality varies cross-culturally, often encompassing issues beyond harm, rights and justice. Joan Miller (in press) has argued that beneficence and a broad range of interpersonal responsibilities fall within the moral domain for Indians, but not for North Americans. Specifically, Miller, Bersoff & Harwood (1990) found that the decision to help friends and strangers in a variety of situations was perceived to be a matter of personal choice for North Americans, while in India almost all subjects perceived a moral obligation to offer help. A consistent finding in Miller's research (see also Miller & Luthar, 1989) has been that the personal realm is much smaller in India than in the United States. Indian subjects frequently endorse social regulation, interference, or punishment in situations where North Americans perceive a right to choose one's own actions, free from outside interference. It thus appears that Indians and North Americans carve up their social worlds differently, with Indians constructing a broader and more encompassing moral domain.

A second challenge to the domain theory of morality comes from Shweder (1990), who argues that there are three realms, or "codes" of moral thought and discourse, which all cultures elaborate and rely upon to different degrees. The first moral code focuses on harm, rights, and justice, and it is the most elaborated of the three codes in Western secular societies. This code corresponds to the moral domain described by

Turiel and Kohlberg, and Shweder grants that this code may be somewhat elaborated in all societies. But the anthropological literature suggests to Shweder that there are two other moral codes that have nothing to do with harm, rights, or justice. The second moral code focuses on the person as a member of a community, with a position in a social hierarchy. This code requires duty, respect, and obedience, regardless of consequences for welfare. Kohlberg recognizes the existence of moral discourse about duty and community, and he classifies it as conventional morality, which is an immature form of reasoning about justice. The third code focuses on the self as a spiritual entity striving to avoid pollution and attain spiritual purity and sanctity. Acts that are disgusting or degrading to one's spiritual nature are condemned in this moral discourse, even if they involve no harm to others. This moral code is highly elaborated in the Hindu concept of Dharma (Moore, 1990), and it is evident in the food and sex taboos of the Old Testament (cf. Leviticus 12-20), although notions of purity and pollution are unelaborated and unfamiliar in modern Western societies. In sum, Shweder argues that the domain of morality has been restricted to Code 1 (harm, rights, and justice) in the West, but that it is broader in many other cultures.

In a large study that predated the "three-codes" formulation, Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987) demonstrated that a broad range of social practices are treated as moral issues in the Indian town of Bhubaneswar. They elicited judgments about food, sex-role, and clothing violations, as well as about matters of harm and injustice. They compared Brahmin and low-caste adults and children to a sample of North American adults and children. The major finding of the study was that all Indian groups treated all of these social practices as universal moral obligations, while Americans judged some of the practices to be social conventions. Shweder et al. conclude that morality and moral discourse in Bhubaneswar made little or no use of the idea of a social convention. The social order was seen as a moral order, whose practices were

universalizable and unalterable, even when they did not prevent harmful consequences. This suggests that the "domain distinction" between moral and conventional knowledge may be a sociological fact (about the ideologies of particular societies) rather than a psychological fact (about universal principles of moral development). The domain of morality in Bhubaneswar included more than just harm, rights, and justice, and Shweder et al. found no sign of a separate domain of conventional knowledge.

Turiel, Killen & Helwig (1987), however, have made some important criticisms of Shweder's conclusions. First, Shweder et al. used stories that had vastly different meanings in India and the U.S. For example, Americans think it an arbitrary convention that widows in Bhubaneswar are not allowed to eat fish. Yet in Bhubaneswar it is believed that eating fish stimulates a woman's sexual appetite. A widow who eats fish will act on her urges, and offend the spirit of the deceased husband. Indians perceived the widow's actions as harmful, while Americans did not. Shweder et. al. chose these examples to demonstrate that food, dress, and other "conventions" are often invested with a moral force, and therefore moral and conventional issues can not be distinguished on substantive grounds. But in the process of making this important point, they violated the sensible demand (Duncker, 1939) that acts compared across cultures should be equated at a deep level of cultural meaning. Since both cultures would presumably agree that "insulting one's spouse" is morally wrong, it may still be the case that both cultures have the same domain of moral issues, centered on harm.

A second problem is that Shweder et al. found very low levels of social conventional judgment among North Americans. Yet Turiel and his colleagues have repeatedly found high levels of conventional judgment among Americans, suggesting that Shweder's methods may have differed in important ways from Turiel's. Shweder

et al.'s failure to find any social conventional thinking in Bhubaneswar may therefore result from a floor effect: Indians may indeed engage in less social conventional thinking than North Americans, but perhaps a different set of probe questions would have revealed high levels of conventional judgment in both cultures. As Turiel, Killen & Helwig (1987) point out, it can not yet be concluded that Indians in Bhubaneswar lack a concept of social convention.

Chapter 3

Testing Competing Theories

We are intrigued by the claim that the domain of morality may vary cross-culturally. If this claim is true, then it should be possible to find evidence of a broader morality, especially outside of the North American upper-middle class. Harmful consequences may well be important in the moral judgment of all cultures. The question at hand is whether harm alone defines the moral domain for all cultures, or whether some cultures have a "multi-dimensional" morality, in which issues independent of harm are treated as moral issues. This research project attempts to search for multi-dimensional morality in the U.S. and Brazil, while respecting Turiel, Killen & Helwig's objections to the Shweder et al. study, outlined above.

Disgust and disrespect were chosen as two candidate "dimensions" of morality. Both have been cited as central to the morality of many cultures, and both seem able to produce an affective response in victimless situations. Many cultures consider obedience and deference to legitimate authority to be moral virtues. Actions that are disrespectful towards revered authorities (e.g., God, the King), or revered symbols (e.g., the Bible, the flag), can provoke moral outrage, or righteous indignation. Triandis et al. (1988) cite respect and dignity as central values of the collectivist cultures of Latin America and the Mediterranean. It is an empirical question, however, whether disrespect is considered immoral because of its socially-constructed harmful consequences for people (e.g., war veterans insulted by flag burning), or whether disrespect is considered intrinsically immoral, regardless of its consequences. Only in this latter case would it qualify as an additional dimension of

morality. Disgust may be another common dimension of morality. All human cultures have food and sexual taboos (e.g., bestiality, cannibalism, incest), which are generally among the strongest of moral prohibitions (Douglas, 1966; Meigs, 1984). Rozin (1990) surveys the anthropological literature on food and eating, and concludes that disgust is a moral emotion in many cultures, acting as a guardian of the purity of the soul. But once again, it is an empirical question whether disgusting acts such as incest are moralized because of their potential for harm, or whether they are considered intrinsically wrong, regardless of their consequences.

This research project was begun in 1989, before Shweder (1990) published his account of the "three codes" of moral discourse. The themes of disrespect and disgust were chosen independent of Shweder's formulation, yet they map closely to Shweder's code 2 (hierarchy/respect) and code 3 (pollution/purity), respectively. In addition to addressing the debate over the cultural construction of the moral domain, the present study therefore also provides a preliminary test of the utility of Shweder's (1990) three codes as an explanation of cultural variation.

The basic research strategy is to present subjects with stories that are affectively loaded -- disrespectful and disgusting actions that "feel" wrong -- yet which are completely harmless. These stories will be referred to as "harmless-offensive" stories. The cognitive-developmentalists and the cultural-constructionists make opposing predictions about how these stories will be judged. Cognitive-developmental theory states that moral issues require interpersonal consequences, so any subject who perceives these stories to be truly harmless will not judge them to be moral violations (see Turiel, Hildebrandt and Wainryb, in press). Cross-cultural differences result from the differential perception of harmful consequences, not from differences in the domain of morality (Turiel, Killen & Helwig, 1987). Cultural constructionists, on the other hand, predict that judgment is not necessarily linked to the perception of harm,

but rather to one's culture's construction of morality. Highly educated Westerners may limit morality to harm, rights and justice, and therefore treat the harmless-offensive stories as non-moral issues. But in a culture with a multi-dimensional morality, people will judge the harmless-offensive stories to be universally wrong and subject to social regulation or prohibition.

This research strategy has not been used before. There have been studies of disrespectful actions (e.g., Pool, 1989), but these have always involved some form of public offensiveness. As Turiel (1989) point outs, burning a flag in public and wearing a bikini to a funeral are not merely conventional violations; they have "second-order" moral implications. Given the social significance of these acts, other people will be emotionally harmed, so these actions should be condemned by anyone with a harm-based morality. The stimulus materials of the present study were designed to minimize second-order moral implications.

Chapter 4

Research Design and Predictions

The present study amounts to a search for multi-dimensional morality in six groups that vary on two cultural variables: level of industrial development, and socio-economic status. Many authors have claimed that there are psychologically important differences between modern industrial democracies and less industrialized societies. This difference has been described as "individualism versus collectivism" (Triandis et al., 1988), as "independent versus interdependent" construal of the self (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), and as an emphasis on the "Market Pricing" model versus other models of social relationships (Fiske, 1991). A substantial body of cross-cultural research finds that North Americans are more individualistic than Latin Americans (Hofstede, 1980), including Brazilians (Bontempo, Lobel & Triandis, 1990). Individualism is not simply a measure of industrial development, or of Westernization, for many hunting and gathering societies stress individualism and self-reliance (Mead, 1937/1961; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). Nonetheless, among societies with some degree of industrialization, there appears to be a very high correlation between affluence and individualism (Hofstede, 1980). Considering a contrast between the U.S., where yearly household income averages \$36,000, and Brazil, where household income is less than \$3,000 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1991), the following prediction can be made: North Americans should on average place greater emphasis on individual rights and freedoms, and they should be less likely to condemn disgusting or disrespectful acts, as long as these acts do not interfere with the rights or freedoms of others. Individualistic societies stress the freedom to "do

one's own thing", so a multi-dimensional morality, which prohibits certain victimless acts, should be more common in Brazil than in the U.S. Furthermore, within Brazil, multi-dimensional morality should be more common in the north east, which is the most under-developed region of the country, than in the south, which is the most industrially developed region. The three cities used in this study can thus be ranked in descending order of industrial development as Philadelphia (USA), Porto Alegre (southern Brazil), and Recife (northeastern Brazil).

Within each city, people of high and low socio-economic status (SES) were sampled. The U.S. and Brazil both contain great extremes of wealth and poverty, and SES has been found to affect moral judgment (Miller, Bersoff & Harwood, 1990), perhaps through its relationship to authoritarianism (Brown, 1965). Triandis et al. (1990) note that affluent social classes are more individualistic than lower social classes, and they suggest that authoritarian child-rearing practices may contribute to this difference. Whatever the cause, affluent social classes, like affluent countries, are more likely to value individualism and freedom of individual choice. They should be less likely to moralize harmless instances of disgust and disrespect.

The present study therefore involved six cultural groups: two social classes in each of three cities. Adults and children in each group were asked about a series of harmless-offensive stories, and probed to determine whether or not they moralized the stories. The cognitive-developmental position predicts that all cultural groups should judge the harmless-offensive stories to be non-moral issues (that is, matters of social convention, or of personal choice). The cultural constructionist position, however, makes the following predictions: 1) A majority of the high-SES Philadelphia subjects will judge the harmless-offensive stories to be non-moral issues, since this group has a harm-based morality. (On this prediction, both sides agree). 2) There will be a main effect of city, such that the harmless-offensive stories

will be moralized most in Recife, and least in Philadelphia. 3) There will be a main effect of SES, such that, within each city, the harmless-offensive stories will be moralized more by low-SES subjects than by high-SES subjects. 4) A majority of the low-SES Recife subjects will judge the harmless-offensive stories to be moral violations, since this group is likely to have a multi-dimensional morality.

The main focus of this study will be the responses to the harmless-offensive stories. However, the cross-cultural design of this study allows an additional question to be addressed: do all groups differentiate equally between "prototypical" moral and conventional stories? Cognitive-developmental researchers have shown that children in Korea (Smetana & Kim, 1987) and Nigeria (Hollis, Leis & Turiel, 1986) will distinguish a clear moral violation (involving harm) from a clear conventional violation (involving dress codes), but they have not yet made a direct comparison between North American and other children within a single study. Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987) made such a comparison, but as already noted, few of their children showed any social conventional judgment. Their arguments, however, lead to the following additional hypothesis: 5) The "domain distinction" between prototypical moral and conventional events should be large among Philadelphia high-SES subjects, but it should shrink as SES and level of industrial development decrease.

Some researchers have found developmental trends in moral judgment, especially in the verbal justifications of judgments (Kohlberg, 1969; Damon, 1975). Yet Turiel (1983) and Shweder et. al. (1987) have both found that the criterion judgments of 10-year old children are similar to those of adults within their own culture. For this reason, no age effects were predicted. No gender differences were predicted either, due to the general lack of such findings in empirical research (Walker, 1984; Ernst, 1990; Brabeck, 1983; but see Gilligan and Wiggins, 1987).

Chapter 5

Method

The basic method employed was the structured interview, described by Turiel (1983). The standard probe questions and stories were modified to search for multi-dimensional morality, while being sensitive to Turiel's criticisms of Shweder et al.

Locations and Subjects

Porto Alegre is a city of 1.37 million people, located in the southern-most region of Brazil. This part of the country, near Argentina and Uruguay, is among the wealthiest and most developed regions of Brazil. Its people are mostly of European descent (Portuguese, Italian, German, and Spanish). Recife is a city of 1.35 million in the north east corner of Brazil. This region, including Recife, is poorer and more tropical than Porto Alegre. Its people are of mixed African and European origin. These two cities represent the economic, cultural, and geographic extremes of Brazil. Recife is below the national average on nearly all indicators of industrial development (e.g., economic activity, income, health, education, and suicide) while Porto Alegre is above the national average on all of these measures (Fundacao Instituto, 1989). Philadelphia is a city of 1.59 million in the north east of the United States. Its population, according to the 1990 census, was 53% White, 40% Black, and 7% other. In each of the three cities, four groups of 30 subjects were interviewed. The four groups crossed age (adult vs. child) with socio-economic status (high vs. low). Thus there were a total of 12 groups, comprising 360 subjects in a 3x2x2 design (city x SES x age). All groups were approximately balanced for gender. The racial

composition of the twelve groups reflected the demographics of race and class in each of the three cities. In Porto Alegre, all subjects were White. In Philadelphia, all high-SES subjects were White, and all low-SES subjects were Black¹. In Recife, where most people are of mixed race, high-SES subjects were of primarily European ancestry, while low-SES subjects were of primarily African ancestry.

The age range on the six children's groups was set at ages 10-12, inclusive, and all groups had a mean age between 10.7 and 11.0 years. In all three cities, children of low SES attend free public schools, while children of high SES commonly attend expensive private schools. The three low-SES child groups were obtained from public school classes, mostly fourth and fifth grades. The three high-SES child groups were obtained from private school classes, mostly fifth and sixth grades. The difference in grades reflects the fact that low-SES children generally begin school later and repeat grades more often than high-SES children. For the six adult groups, the age limits were set at 19-26 years, inclusive, and all groups had an average age between 21.3 and 22.6 years. The three high-SES adult groups were sampled from the student populations of the three universities to which the principal investigators belong. No single technique of subject recruitment was available for all six adult samples. In Philadelphia, where opinion sampling and marketing research are common practices, both adult groups were collected by standing in public walkways, asking passersby to participate in a psychology survey in exchange for three dollars. The high-SES adult group (mean years of school: 15.6) was obtained from the central walkway of the University of Pennsylvania. The low-SES adult group (mean years of school: 11.5) was obtained in front of a McDonald's restaurant in West Philadelphia,

¹ Philadelphia contains many poor Whites and Hispanics, and Porto Alegre contains many poor people of African or mixed heritage. But for cross-cultural comparisons, homogeneous samples reflecting the dominant race were deemed more informative than mixed samples.

a predominantly black and poor area around the University. Potential subjects were excluded if they were raised outside the United States. Low-SES subjects were excluded if they were currently enrolled in any school, or if they had spent more than one year at any school after high school. (Five subjects had spent one year or less at trade schools or community colleges, and then dropped out.)

In Brazil, the practice of soliciting strangers in public and paying them to answer questions is rare, so different methods were used. No Brazilian subjects were paid. In Recife, the low-SES group was obtained from a night-school class for adults who had dropped out of school after 8th grade (years of school: 9.2). The high-SES group (years of school: 15.0) was obtained from among the classmates of the research assistants who conducted the interviews. In Porto Alegre, the high-SES group (years of school: 15.0) was also obtained from among the classmates of the research assistants. The low-SES group (years of school: 7.8) was obtained from among the maids, gardeners, and other manual laborers in the homes of these classmates. It is thus a potential problem that adult subjects were recruited in different ways in the different cities, especially since the U.S. adults had a greater degree of anonymity. Such problems are almost unavoidable, however, in cross-cultural research outside of college populations. They are the norm rather than the exception.

Materials and Procedures

Three "prototypical" stories were paraphrased from Davidson, Turiel and Black (1983). In the "Swings" story, a girl wants to use a swing, so she pushes a boy off and hurts him. This is a prototypical moral violation, since it involves direct physical harm to an innocent victim. In the "Uniform" story, a boy wears regular clothes to school, even though the school requires students to wear a uniform. In the "Hands" story, a man eats all his food with his hands, in public and in private, after washing

them. These last two stories are prototypical social conventions, according to Turiel (1983), since they involve no intrinsic harm to others. The novel stimuli, created for this study, were five "harmless-offensive" stories. In these stories an actor violates a rule or custom in such a way that something "feels" wrong, yet there is no harmful intention, and no harmful consequence. Two of these stories involved disrespect or disobedience:

Flag: A woman is cleaning out her closet, and she finds her old [American/Brazilian] flag. She doesn't want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean her bathroom.

Promise: A woman was dying, and on her deathbed she asked her son to PROMISE that he would visit her grave every week. The son loved his mother very much, so he promised to visit her grave every week. But after the mother died, the son didn't keep his promise, because he was very busy.

Three additional stories involved unconventional food and sexual practices, designed to trigger the emotion of disgust:

Dog: A family's dog was killed by a car in front of their house. They had heard that dog meat was delicious, so they cut up the dog's body and cooked it and ate it for dinner.

Kissing: A brother and sister like to kiss each other on the mouth. When nobody is around, they find a secret hiding place and kiss each other on the mouth, passionately.

Chicken: A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken. But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it.

Then he cooks it and eats it. [This story was given to adults only.]

The Philadelphia Board of Education gave an unwanted confirmation of the offensiveness of these stories when it refused to permit the incestuous Kissing story to be read to public school children. This refusal came after all eleven other subject groups had been tested with the Kissing story, so there was no alternative but to substitute a different disgust story. For Philadelphia low-SES children the Kissing story was replaced by the "Candy" story, in which a twelve year old boy "eats so much candy that he is full. But he still wants to eat more candy, so he makes himself throw up in the bathroom, then he returns to his room to eat more candy. Nobody sees him do this, and it does not make him feel bad."

A final story, given only to children, described a girl who goes out for a walk wearing entirely blue clothing. This was given to detect subjects who were not paying attention, and to prevent the formation of a response set by forcing all children to say that at least one action was not wrong. Any child who did not say that this action was "perfectly OK" was removed from the study and replaced by another child².

After each story, six probe questions were asked. 1)Evaluation: "What do you think about this? Is it very wrong, a little wrong, or is it perfectly OK for ... [act specified]?" 2)Justification: "Can you tell me why?" 3)Harm: "Is anyone hurt by what [the actor] did? Who? How?" 4)Bother: "Imagine that you actually saw someone [doing that act]. Would it bother you, or would you not care?" 5)Interference: Should [the actor] be stopped or punished in any way?" 6)Universal: "Suppose you learn about two different foreign countries. In country A, people [do that act] very often, and in country B, they never [do that act]. Are both of these customs OK, or is one of

² Six children were removed in Recife and two in Philadelphia.

them bad or wrong?"

A few comments must be made about these probe questions. The Harm probe was included in response to Turiel's claim that Shweder et al.'s 39 stories may have been perceived as harmful in India, but not in the U.S. The Harm probe determines whether there are cultural differences in the perception of harm. The Bother probe serves a similar function as a check on the offensiveness of the stories. These two probes work together to determine whether the harmless-offensive stories are perceived to be equally harmless and offensive in all groups. The two most important probe questions are the Interference and Universal probes, which are used to determine when a story is moralized. The Interference probe was copied from Miller, Bersoff and Harwood (1990). This question establishes whether the action is seen as the actor's own business, or whether outside interference would be legitimate and appropriate. According to Nucci (1981), if subjects view the harmless-offensive actions as personal issues, they should say "no, the actor should not be stopped or punished." The Universal probe establishes whether the action is treated as a moral violation that is universally wrong, regardless of local customs and consensus, or whether it is seen as a social convention that can be different in different places. A subject who says that "both countries are OK" indicates that the practice is perceived to be a social convention, while a subject who states that "one of those countries has a bad custom" indicates a moral stance, since the subject is stating that the practice is wrong universally.

The interview script was developed simultaneously in English and Portuguese. All three principal researchers are bilingual. The final scripts were back-translated in both directions by professional translators, and compared with the originals by monolingual judges, who determined that there were no differences of meaning between the two scripts. All interviews were conducted individually by trained

interviewers who recorded responses on the interview script. All interviews began with the Swings story, followed by the Uniform story, to allow subjects to become accustomed to the probe questions on the uncontroversial "prototypical" stories before they encountered the more unusual harmless-offensive stories. All children received the "catch" story, about the girl who wears blue, as the third story. The Flag, Promise, Kissing/Candy, and Dog stories were presented next, in randomized order. The Chicken story was presented last, to adults only.

An earlier study of 30 orphans in Recife (Haidt, Dias & Koller, 1989) found that prototypical social conventions were judged by nearly all subjects to be universally and unalterably wrong. It was thought that some children may have been afraid to appear "soft on crime", that is, these children seemed motivated to condemn all violations in the strongest possible terms. To minimize this problem in the present study, all children were provided with a "warm-up" to teach them that customs can vary in different places, and that this variation is "OK". The interviewer began by talking about "customs", giving a simple definition of the word, with examples. The child was told that "sometimes, people do things differently in different countries, and this is perfectly OK." The child was then given an example of a country that eats a goose instead of a turkey for Thanksgiving (in the U.S.) or Christmas (in Brazil), and asked if that was OK. The child was then told that some other customs are bad, like the South African custom of treating people like slaves because of their skin color. The interview proceeded only after the child had stated that the first custom was OK, and the second custom was bad. Thus all children were "coached" in how to make a social-conventional judgment, as well as a moral judgment. Almost all children passed this pseudo pre-test on the first try. Those few who failed were given more coaching, and another set of examples. No child failed a second time.

Chapter 6

Results

Results of the probe questions are presented in a series of 8x12 tables, showing the mean responses of the twelve groups to the eight stories. To facilitate statistical comparisons among the groups, an average score on the harmless-offensive stories was calculated for each subject, and the group averages of these individual averages are reported at the bottom of each table. Three-way analyses of variance were run on these scores. Where relevant, analyses of variance were also performed on the average of the two convention stories³. Unless otherwise stated, all F values result from a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (City x SES x age-group). Planned and post hoc comparisons of group means employed the Scheffe procedure. To check for gender differences, a 2x3x2x2 ANOVA (gender x CITY x SES x age-group) was performed on the harmless-offensive scores, for each of five probe questions. Results showed no significant main effects of gender, and only three marginally significant interactions ($p=.03$ or $.04$) involving gender, out of 35 interactions examined. Two significant interactions would be expected by chance. In contrast to the enormous effects of City, SES and age-group, there appear to be no effects of gender, and gender was dropped from subsequent analyses.

³ It should be noted that the ANOVA assumptions are not met for the average of the two convention stories. The data from a single story consists mostly of binary (1/0) responses. The average of two stories yields three possible values of 1/.5/0. With so few possible values, the residuals are not normally distributed. Thus the F and p values reported for the convention stories should be interpreted with some caution. However the effects discussed are in general quite large, and the reader is encouraged to verify these effects by direct inspection of the tables.

Harmlessness and Offensiveness

To test for the existence of multi-dimensional morality, it was essential that subjects perceive the harmless-offensive stories to be harmless and offensive. The Harm probe asked if anyone was harmed in the story, and all references to a victim or potential victim of any kind were recorded. Responses were later divided into those that mentioned some person or entity other than the actor of the story, and those that cited harmful consequences only to the actor (e.g., guilt feelings). Table 1 shows the percentage of subjects who cited harm of any kind. The disrespect stories were judged to be the least harmful class of stories. In the Flag story, 9% of subjects said the woman might be harmed, mostly through later guilt feelings, and 14% cited another victim, mostly "the country." In some cases subjects personified the flag, and said that the flag was harmed. In the Promise story, 19% said the son might be harmed, mostly from subsequent guilt feelings, and 19% said that another person might be harmed, mostly the mother's spirit. In the Disgust stories, 24% said that the family that ate their pet dog might be harmed, mostly through potential health consequences, and 13% cited other potential victims, mostly neighbors who would be bothered to find out about the action. The Kissing story was the only harmless-offensive story in which a majority of subjects cited some harm. Thirty-four percent said that the siblings themselves might be harmed, either from guilt feelings or from interference in their normal sexual development, and 19% cited other victims, mostly the parents, if they were to discover their children's actions. For the Philadelphia low-SES children, who got the Candy story instead of the Kissing story, 30% said that the boy who vomits after eating candy might be harmed, and 7% cited another victim. This 37% total was identical to the 37% rating on the Dog story, whereas the other 11 groups rated the Kissing story on average 13% higher than the Dog story. It thus appears that the Candy story was slightly more likely than the Kissing story to be

perceived as harmless. On the Chicken story, 37% of the adults said that the man was harming himself, typically that he might get sick. Eight percent of the adults cited another victim.

Insert Table 1 about here

The last line of Table 1 shows the average of the Flag, Promise, Dog, and Kissing/Candy stories. A three-way ANOVA on these data revealed a main effect of city, $F(2,348) = 3.43$, $p < .05$, and post-hoc analysis revealed that fewer victims ($p < .05$) were found in Philadelphia than in Recife, which was similar to Porto Alegre. Also, low-SES groups cited more victims than high-SES groups, $F(1,348) = 4.77$, $p < .05$. These effects will be taken into account in subsequent analyses, although it should be noted that they are quite small. All 12 groups fell within a range of 21 percentage points. Thus it appears that there are no large cross-cultural differences in the perceived harmfulness of the harmless-offensive stories.

Table 2 gives the results of the Bother probe, which served as a check on the affective content of the harmless-offensive stories. The disrespect stories (Flag and Promise) bothered about half of all subjects. The three college groups (high-SES adults) were particularly unaffected by disrespectful actions. The disgust stories were more affectively laden (73% bothered), and showed less variability across groups. The Chicken story, which violates two taboos, was the most offensive of the stories. When the Flag, Promise, Dog, and Kissing/Candy stories are averaged, low-SES groups were more bothered than high-SES, $F(1,348) = 18.20$, $p < .001$; children were more bothered than adults, $F(1,348) = 20.41$, $p < .001$; and there was a main effect of city, $F(2,348) = 14.16$, $p < .001$, reflecting the fact that ratings were higher in Philadelphia ($p < .001$ post hoc) than in Porto Alegre or Recife, which were equal.

There was also an interaction of age-group and SES, $F(1,348) = 4.25, p < .05$, reflecting the fact that age had a slightly larger effect among the high-SES groups. These group differences will be taken into account in subsequent analyses, however it is important to note that Philadelphians were the most bothered by these stories. If, as hypothesized, they moralize these stories less than Brazilians, it is not because of a weaker affective response.

Insert Table 2 about here

In sum, the harmless-offensive stories were generally perceived to be harmless (except for the Kissing story) and offensive (although the disrespect stories were mild). Only 15% of all cases were perceived to entail a victim other than the actor; thus 85% of all cases meet Nucci's (1981) criterion for the "personal domain", in which the effects of actions are perceived to be "primarily upon the actor." However there was a surprisingly large number of cases (24%) in which the subject stated that the actor himself or herself might be harmed, even when this contradicted the facts of the story. This puzzle will be addressed in a later section. Tisak and Turiel (1984) showed that children often universalize "prudential" issues, involving harm to oneself (e.g., they say it is wrong to do dangerous things, even in a country where it is customary to do so). Thus, to ensure that prudential issues were not mistaken for moral issues, Table 1 included all references to a victim of any kind, self or other. This left a total of 62% of all cases in which subjects explicitly stated that nobody was harmed. Subsequent analyses will be done in two ways: including all data, and including only this 62% of victim-free cases. The two analyses will be seen to yield the same conclusions.

Moral Judgments

Overall Evaluation. The first probe question, "Evaluation," asked whether the action in question was wrong in any way. This question does not reveal whether the action is perceived to be moral (universal) or conventional (local) in nature, thus it does not bear directly on the research hypotheses of this study. But it does serve as an initial measure of tolerance, for it offers subjects the choice of condemning or not condemning the act in question. Subjects answered on a three point scale, which, to match other tables, is coded as 0 for "perfectly OK," 50 for "a little wrong" and 100 for "very wrong." Table 3 gives the mean responses to this question. All groups strongly condemned the Swings story, in which a girl pushes a boy off of a swing. The convention stories were judged "a little wrong" on average, although there were big effects of city, $F(2,348) = 23.6, p < .001$; SES, $F(2,348) = 32.5, p < .001$; and age-group, $F(1,348) = 17.2, p < .001$. Also, age-group interacted with city, $F(2,348) = 4.9, p < .01$; with SES, $F(1,348) = 9.7, p < .01$; and with city and SES $F(2,348) = 4.2, p < .05$. This analysis says that on the convention stories, subjects in Philadelphia were more tolerant than those in Porto Alegre ($p < .01$), who were more tolerant than those in Recife ($p < .05$). Also, high-SES groups were more tolerant than low-SES groups, and adults were more tolerant than children, although the effect of age-group varied across cities and SES levels.

The disrespect stories were judged to be the least wrong class of stories, overall, due to the extremely tolerant stance taken by the three college groups. The disgust stories were judged to be the most wrong, after the Swings story. An ANOVA on the average of the Flag, Promise, Dog, and Kissing/Candy stories showed a main effect of city, $F(2,348) = 16.6, p < .001$; SES, $F(1,348) = 101.6, p < .001$; and age-group, $F(1,348) = 51.7, p < .001$. There were also interactions of SES with age-group, $F(1,348) = 17.0, p < .001$; SES with city, $F(2,348) = 3.3, p < .01$; and age-group with

city, $F(1,348) = 5.1, p < .01$. This analysis says that, on the harmless-offensive stories, adults were more tolerant than children, especially in high-SES groups; high-SES groups were more tolerant than low-SES groups, especially in Philadelphia; and Recife was less tolerant ($p < .001$) than the other two cities, which did not differ significantly. In each city, the college students stand out as the most tolerant group.

Insert Table 3 about here

Could these group differences be due to the cultural differences observed on the Harm and Bother probes? The last line of Table 3 shows the mean ratings on the harmless-offensive stories (excluding Chicken) when cases that failed either the Harm or the Bother checks are filtered out. Cases were retained only when subjects explicitly stated that the story was victimless, and that it would bother them to observe it. The recomputed mean ratings are on average slightly higher, but the overall pattern among the groups is unchanged. An important feature of this pattern is that the four most tolerant groups were the three college groups (high-SES adults), joined by the high-SES Philadelphia children. These four groups, it will be seen, showed a general reluctance to criticize or condemn other people and cultures. In subsequent analyses, they will be seen to resemble each other, and to stand in sharp contrast to the other eight groups. As a shorthand notation, these four groups will henceforth be referred to as the four "narrow-morality" groups, since their moral domain will be seen to be more circumscribed than that of the other groups.

Interference: Table 4 gives the results of the Interference probe, in which subjects were asked if the actor should be "stopped or punished in any way." Subjects often distinguished between stopping and punishing, but this distinction is ignored since either response indicates that some form of interference is considered appropriate; the

action is not seen to be a matter of the actor's "own personal business." Large majorities of all groups agreed that the girl in the Swings story should be stopped or punished. On the Uniform story, most groups agreed that the school rule should be enforced, although the Hands story produced widely varying responses. Averaging across the two social conventions, low-SES groups endorsed more interference, $F(1,348) = 12.3, p < .001$; children endorsed more interference, $F(1,348) = 30.2, p < .001$; and there was a main effect of city $F(2,348) = 10.4, p < .001$, reflecting the fact that Recife groups were most likely to endorse interference ($p < .05$) and Porto Alegre groups least likely, although Philadelphia and Porto Alegre did not differ significantly. There was also an interaction of age-group with city, $F(1,348) = 17.2, p < .001$; and age-group with SES, $F(1,348) = 7.6, p < .01$. The basic pattern in this data is that the three college groups were the least likely to endorse interference in conventional violations, while the two Recife children's groups were the most likely.

The disrespect stories were the most likely of the eight stories to be judged as the person's own business, especially by the three college groups. As in previous tables, the disgust stories were regarded as more serious than the disrespect stories, and most subjects did not regard them as matters of the person's own business. Averaging across the Flag, Promise, Dog, and Kissing/Candy stories, an ANOVA reveals that low-SES groups endorsed more interference than high-SES groups, $F(1,348) = 73.9, p < .001$; children endorsed more interference than adults, $F(1,348) = 60.3, p < .001$; and there was a main effect of city, $F(1,348) = 28.0, p < .001$, reflecting the fact that Recifeans endorsed more interference ($p < .001$) than subjects in the other two cities, which did not differ. There were also interactions of city with SES, $F(2,348) = 4.28, p < .05$; and city with age-group, $F(1,348) = 13.1, p < .001$. The basic pattern in this data is that the two Recife children's groups stand out as the most likely to endorse interference, and the four narrow-morality groups (three college groups, plus

Philadelphia high-SES children) stand out as least likely. Post-hoc tests confirm that the four narrow-morality groups endorsed less interference than the other groups ($p < .001$).

Insert Table 4 about here

These results support the first four research predictions. High-SES Philadelphia subjects judged the harmless-offensive stories to be matters of the actor's own business (prediction 1), low-SES Recife subjects did not (prediction 4), and there were separate effects of city (prediction 2) and SES (prediction 3) in the predicted directions. When cases that failed either the Harm or Bother check are filtered out (penultimate line of Table 4), the pattern changes only slightly: a larger percentage of Recife college students endorse interference, leaving only three narrow-morality groups in which a large majority opposed interference. In all other groups, a majority of subjects said that actions that would bother them should be stopped, even when these actions were perceived to involved no harmful consequences to anyone.

An additional filter was applied to these data to take into account the cultural differences found on the Evaluation probe. Since the four narrow-morality groups gave the least negative evaluations of the harmless-offensive stories, it stands to reason that they should be least likely to endorse interference. It would be inconsistent for a subject to endorse interference after having stated that an action was "perfectly OK." It is therefore of theoretical interest to know if the four narrow-morality groups continue to oppose interference even when they have stated that an act is wrong in some way. The last line of Table 4 shows the results of applying the Evaluation probe as an additional filter. That is, the analysis was limited to cases where subjects stated that the action was wrong, that nobody was harmed, and that it

would bother them to witness the act. Applying this third filter does not change the pattern of responses. The two Philadelphia high-SES groups and the Porto Alegre college students continue to oppose interference in these cases, while the other nine groups endorse interference even more strongly.

In sum, a robust pattern of cultural differences has been found regarding the endorsement of interference in harmless actions. North Americans of high SES treated the harmless-offensive stories as "personal" issues. Even when they evaluated the acts negatively, they believed that the actor had a right to perform them, and that nobody should interfere. In Brazil, this pattern of judgments was found primarily among high-SES adults in the most industrialized region of the country. Most other subjects said that disgusting and disrespectful actions should be stopped or punished, even when these actions entailed no harmful consequences to anyone else. These results offer strong support for Miller's (in press) claim that Western culture places an unusually strong emphasis on rights and autonomy. However this claim should be qualified by noting that SES had an enormous effect on judgments, especially in Philadelphia. One cannot speak of "Western Culture" without specifying social class first.

Universalizing: The last probe question asked whether it would be "OK" for countries to differ on the custom in question. Subjects who reply "no" to this question are, by definition, universalizing their judgment, and are therefore treating the story as a moral rather than conventional issue. Table 5 shows the proportion of subjects in each group who universalized their judgment of each story. The far right column of Table 5 shows that the Swings story was indeed treated as a moral violation by a large majority of subjects. The convention stories were generally treated as social conventions, and the disrespect and disgust stories were all approximately evenly split. There were, however, large and consistent group differences, which can be

summarized by saying that the four narrow-morality groups showed the highest levels of conventional judgment on all stories. In their comments and their criterion judgments, these subjects showed a high degree of tolerance and cultural relativity; they were reluctant to criticize the customs of other countries. Large minorities in these four groups refused to universalize even the Swings story, which involves unambiguous harm to an innocent person.

Insert Table 5 about here

The convention stories showed a unique pattern, in that the four narrow-morality groups were joined by the two low-SES Philadelphia groups in showing low levels of universalizing on both stories. Thus all North American groups, plus the two Brazilian college groups, provided a clear replication of Davidson, Turiel & Black (1983), who found that North Americans judged the Hands and Uniform stories as social conventional. The other Brazilian groups showed higher levels of universalizing; in three of the Brazilian child groups, a majority judged one or both of the conventional stories to be universally wrong. Combining the two convention stories, high-SES groups were less likely to universalize than low, $F(1,348) = 40.9$, $p < .001$; adults were less likely to universalize than children, $F(1,348) = 69.7$, $p < .001$; and there was a main effect of city, $F(2,348) = 48.1$, $p < .001$, in which Philadelphia was less likely to universalize than Porto Alegre ($p < .001$), while Recife showed the highest level of universalizing ($p < .01$). There was also an interaction of city and age-group, $F(2,348) = 20.1$, $p < .001$, since age had no effect in Philadelphia. These findings give preliminary support to research prediction #5, since conventional judgment was most common among high-SES Philadelphians, and less common as SES and industrialization decreased.

The most theoretically central data in this study are the Universal ratings of the harmless-offensive stories. Combining the Flag, Promise, Dog, and Kissing/Candy stories, high-SES groups universalized less than low, $F(1,348) = 132.96, p < .001$; adults universalized less than children, $F(1,348) = 94.33, p < .001$; and there was a main effect of city, $F(2,348) = 21.26, p < .001$, in which Philadelphians universalized less than subjects in Porto Alegre ($p < .05$), and Recife ($p < .001$), while the Brazilian cities did not differ significantly. There were also interactions of SES with age-group, $F(1,348) = 4.7, p < .05$; SES with city, $F(2,348) = 3.2, p < .04$; and age-group with city, $F(1,348) = 7.6, p < .01$. The basic picture in this data is that the four narrow-morality groups treated these stories as social conventions, while the other eight groups generally universalized them. The difference between the average of the narrow-morality groups and the average of the other eight groups is enormous (51 percentage points) and significant ($p < .001$, post hoc).

These results strongly support the first four research predictions. High-SES Philadelphia subjects judged the harmless-offensive stories to be social conventional (prediction 1), low-SES Recife subjects moralized them (prediction 4), and there were separate effects of city (prediction 2) and SES (prediction 3) in the predicted directions. Limiting the analysis to harmless and bothersome cases (penultimate line of Table 5) does not change these results, except that the Philadelphia college students stand out even further as the most relativistic single group. It was thought that the high level of relativity in the narrow-morality groups might result from the tolerance these groups displayed on the Evaluation probe. It would be logically inconsistent to condemn dog-eating in a far off country if one had just stated that it is perfectly OK for a family to eat their dog. Thus once again, a third filter was applied, and all cases were removed in which the subject stated that the act was "perfectly OK." The last line of Table 5 shows that this filter had little effect on the pattern of

judgments. The Philadelphia high-SES children rose to a 50% level of universalizing, but the other three narrow-morality groups continued to judge the stories as social conventional.

In sum, a robust pattern of cultural differences has been found regarding the universalizing of actions that are harmless but offensive. College students in all three cities judged these issues to be matters of social convention, even when they evaluated the acts negatively. Most other groups judged these actions to be universally wrong. Combined with the data from the Interference probe, a consistent verdict can now be rendered on the debate between the cognitive developmentalists and the cultural constructionists: the domain of morality appears to vary cross-culturally. High-SES Philadelphians have a harm-based morality (Shweder's code 1), in which offensive actions that lack harmful consequences are regarded as social conventional, and/or as falling within the realm of personal preference. If a man wants to have sex with a chicken and then eat it, that is his prerogative, as long as it is done in private (with a dead chicken). However, in Brazil, and in lower social classes, the domain of morality is more multi-dimensional, including issues of disrespect and disgust (Shweder's codes 2 and 3). It is morally wrong to have sex with a chicken (because it is disgusting) just as it is morally wrong to push someone off a swing (because it causes harm).

Distinctions among the story types

The above conclusions are based on the overall responses to the Interference and Universal probes. However a possible confound arises in that the four narrow-morality groups were less likely than others to universalize the Swings story, which involves unambiguous harm. It might therefore be the case that all groups make the same distinctions between story-types, although the four narrow-morality groups are

simply less likely to universalize everything. (Note that this confound does not arise on the Interference probe, where the four narrow-morality groups strongly endorsed interference on the Swings story, while opposing interference on harmless-offensive stories.) To remove this possible confound, two distinction scores were calculated for each group from the data in Table 5. The "moral-conventional" distinction score measures the difference between a group's response to the Swings story, and the average of the two convention stories. Thus a score near 100 indicates that a group made a large distinction between prototypical moral and conventional stories, while a score of zero indicates that no distinction was made. Likewise, the "moral-harmless distinction" is calculated by subtracting the group average on the four harmless-offensive stories from the group average on the Swings story. It too runs from zero to 100, with 100 indicating that the Swings story was sharply distinguished from the harmless-offensive stories. These two distinction scores are presented in Table 6.

Insert Table 6 about here

Table 6 shows that the distinction between the moral (Swings) story and the two conventional stories was large in Philadelphia and small in Recife. Among the Recife low-SES children, the distinction was not significant (by Friedman test, for $p < .05$). This supports the cultural-constructionist prediction (#5) that the size of the domain distinction will vary cross-culturally. However in these distinction scores, there is no longer any effect of SES (since high-SES groups were so relativistic on the Swings story). An ANOVA finds only a main effect of city, $F(2,345) = 18.6, p < .001$, in which distinctions were larger in Philadelphia than in Porto Alegre ($p < .05$), and larger in Porto Alegre than in Recife ($p < .01$).

An analysis of the moral-harmless distinctions is consistent with the earlier

analysis of Table 5. There were main effects of city, $F(2,345) = 7.5, p < .01$; SES, $F(2,345) = 12.1, p < .001$; and age-group, $F(2,345) = 8.7, p < .001$; and there were no interactions. Philadelphians made larger distinctions than did Recifeans ($p < .01$); and Porto Alegre fell between these two cities, without differing significantly from either one. Adults made larger distinctions than children, and high-SES groups made larger distinctions than low-SES groups. Friedman tests on each group revealed that the moral-harmless distinction was not significant for four Brazilian groups (both low-SES Recife groups, Recife high-SES children, plus Porto Alegre low-SES children. All other groups significant at $p < .05$).

In sum, this analysis confirms the conclusions of the previous section, and supports all five hypotheses derived from the cultural-constructionist position. The Philadelphia high-SES subjects demonstrated a harm-based morality by making large distinctions between the harmful story (Swings) and the harmless stories; the low-SES Recife subjects demonstrated a less harm-based morality by making small distinctions; and the moral-harmless distinction was affected by city and SES in the predicted ways. Social conventional understanding was not limited to the North American upper-middle class, but it was found to be far more robust in Philadelphia than in Porto Alegre, and it was extremely weak in Recife, especially among children.

Do People Fabricate Victims?

An unexpectedly large number of victims was found in the harmless-offensive stories. In 38% of the 1,620 times that a harmless-offensive story was presented, a victim of some sort was cited. Many of these instances are of the sort discussed by Turiel, Hildebrandt & Wainryb (in press), in which factual beliefs about the world, or about the natural order, may lead one subject to perceive harm where another subject

does not. For example, a subject who believes that a dead person's soul keeps watch over the living would also believe that the mother in the Promise story might be insulted by her son's broken promise. In a case such as this the perception of a victim may lead to the condemnation of the act. Yet there are two reasons for supposing that, in many cases, the opposite process occurs: the condemnation of an act leads to the perception of a victim. That is, the victims are often found or fabricated after a judgment is made, in order to justify the judgment. The first reason for postulating this process is impressionistic. Subjects were often quick to say that a story was wrong, but when asked to explain why, or to explain who was harmed, even the most articulate subjects seemed to struggle. Often victims were proposed in a tone that suggested a low degree of confidence, like one subject who said "well, I don't know, maybe the woman will feel guilty afterwards about throwing out her flag." In many instances the victims seemed even more contrived, as when a subject said that the woman in the Flag story might be harmed because the flag could clog her sink.

Insert Table 7 about here

The second reason for questioning the value of victim citations is statistical: the Bother probe was more powerful than the Harm probe as a predictor of judgments. Table 7 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the five probe questions, for the Flag, Promise, Dog, and Kissing/Candy stories combined. The three judgment probes (Evaluation, Interference, and Universal) are all highly intercorrelated, suggesting that they may be three measures of a single stance (e.g., moralistic versus permissive) that each subject took towards each story. But the question can now be asked: was this stance based on the perception of harm, or on one's emotional reaction to the story? Table 7 suggests that emotional reactions were more important, since the

Bother probe was a better predictor of all three judgments than the Harm probe ($t(1430)=2.13$, $p<.05$, for Evaluation; $t(1430)=2.74$, $p<.01$, for Interference; and $t(1430)=2.96$, $p<.01$, for Universal, based on 2-tailed tests for dependent correlations using the method of Steiger, 1980). Thus it appears that, for the class of stories studied, it is more informative to ask "would it bother you to see this?" than to ask "is anyone harmed?"

When this analysis was done separately for each group, there were five groups in which Bother was significantly superior ($p<.05$) to Harm as a predictor of at least one of the three judgment probes. There were no groups in which Harm was significantly superior. Only one group -- the Philadelphia college students -- showed a trend in which Harm was superior to Bother, as a predictor of Evaluation ($t=0.79$, n.s.), Interference ($t=1.59$, n.s.) and Universal ($t=0.99$, n.s.). This trend, while not significant, reinforces the finding in tables 3, 4, 5 & 6 that the Philadelphia college students conform more closely than any other group to cognitive-developmental predictions. By all indications, this group has a harm-based morality, while the other eleven groups, to varying degrees, appear to be somewhat more multi-dimensional.

Chapter 7

Discussion

The domain of morality appears to vary cross-culturally. Philadelphians of high SES demonstrated a harm-based morality, in which disgusting and disrespectful actions were not morally wrong, as long as these actions were perceived to have no interpersonal consequences. But in low SES groups, and especially in Brazil, morality appeared to be more multi-dimensional, encompassing disgust and disrespect, as well as harm. These data therefore strongly support the cultural constructionist position of Shweder (1990), Miller (in press), and Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987). In particular, the data can be described succinctly by reference to Shweder's (1990) three codes of moral discourse: the four narrow-morality groups (three college groups, plus Philadelphia high-SES children) used primarily Code 1 (harm, rights and justice), such that issues of disgust and disrespect fell outside of the domain of morality. The other groups relied more heavily upon Code 2 (respect and hierarchy) and Code 3 (pollution and purity), demonstrating a broader construction of morality.

Two artifactual explanations of these cultural differences can be eliminated. First, the differences are not due to differences in factual beliefs about harmful interpersonal consequences, since they persisted just as strongly when the "Harm" filter was applied. Second, these differences are not due to differentially strong affective reactions, since they persisted when the "Bother" filter was applied. Furthermore, Philadelphians reported the highest affective reactions on the Bother probe, yet were more tolerant than Brazilians on the three judgment probes.

There were several surprises in the data. First, SES was an extremely powerful determinant of judgment. Among adults, the differences across the three cities were quite small compared to differences across social class. College students in Philadelphia had far more in common with college students in Brazil than they did with their own low-SES neighbors.

A second surprise was that a significant effect of age-group was found on all three judgment probes (Evaluation, Interference, and Universal). This effect was in the same direction as SES and industrial development, meaning that adults were generally more tolerant and relativistic than children. This finding is not predicted by Turiel (1983), who has generally found no age trends in responses to the criterion judgments used here. Nor is this finding predicted by Shweder et al. (1987). The psychologist who explicitly predicts this age trend is Kohlberg (1971), who argued that in all cultures, adults will be closer than children to a post-conventional morality based on harm, rights, and justice. A Kohlbergian explanation of these data, however, faces certain problems. In Kohlberg's (1968) data, North American middle-class adolescents do not begin to make significant use of post-conventional thinking until the age range of 14-16, consistent with the claim that post-conventional thinking requires the cognitive advances that come with puberty. It would therefore seem hard to explain in purely cognitive terms how pre-pubescent upper-SES 10-12 year olds in Philadelphia can be consistently post-conventional, while lower-class Philadelphia adults, with an average of six additional years of schooling, treat the harmless-offensive stories as moral violations. If a Kohlbergian were to explain the Philadelphia data in terms of moral stages, he would commit himself to the claim that the upper-SES children were truly post-conventional, while the lower-SES adults were conventional. It would then be difficult to explain why all Philadelphia groups judged the prototypical social conventions (Uniform and Hands) to be social

conventions, while splitting along class lines on the harmless-offensive stories.

A cultural explanation seems more plausible. There is a particular ethos on elite college campuses, in the U.S. as well as Brazil, emphasizing freedom, tolerance, and respect for differing customs. At such schools, a student who does not quickly become a relativist runs the risk of being branded a racist. In Brazil, upper-SES children are not immersed in this ethos until they reach college; hence the upper-SES Brazilian children acted like their lower-SES peers. In Philadelphia, however, the upper-SES private school was unusually progressive. The school fostered understanding and tolerance between races, religions, and genders. These children were already immersed in the college ethos of tolerance and respect for diversity, so they judged the harmless-offensive stories in the same way as their college peers.

Implications for a model of moral judgment

The present study has found cross-cultural differences in the domain of morality. Cross-cultural differences, however, do not rule out cross-cultural universals. There may well be a "universal grammar" of morality, analogous to the universal grammar underlying the surface diversity of human languages. Shweder's (1990) three codes of morality may provide the beginning of such a theory. A more detailed and comprehensive theory can be found in Fiske (1990, 1991), in which people are said to use four and only four "relational models" to construct, understand, and judge social interactions. Fiske (1991) presents extensive data on the cultural and historical universality of these models, and has begun to amass experimental evidence (Fiske, Haslam & Fiske, 1991) that these four models drive social-cognitive phenomena such as speech errors in addressing people.

The works of Fiske and Shweder offer great promise that cross-culturally valid models of moral judgment can be developed. Such models must specify what is

universal, and how culture builds upon this universal base to produce the differing moralities of the world. Towards that end, the present study offers three suggestions for future research.

1) Place less emphasis on the role of harm.

Harm may turn out to be an important factor in the moral judgment of all cultures, but the present research suggests that other factors have not been sufficiently researched. Disgust and disrespect may fall within the domain of morality for most cultures. Furthermore, the present research suggests that harm references in moral judgment interviews may at times be red herrings. Moral judgments were better predicted by affective responses ("would this bother you to witness?") than by judgments about harmfulness. As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have argued, we often "tell more than we can know." That is, a subject may not know what caused her to condemn a story about incest between consenting adults, but when asked to explain her judgment, she can easily produce a story about the genetic dangers of inbreeding. It may therefore be misleading to suppose that a subject who justifies her judgment by talking about harm came to that judgment by perceiving harm.

Rozin and Nemeroff (1990; also Rozin, Millman & Nemeroff, 1986) have repeatedly found this sort of ex-post facto rationalization in explanations of disgust-based attitudes. In a typical experiment, they ask subjects why they refuse to drink a glass of juice, into which they have just dipped a cockroach. Subjects typically say that cockroaches carry germs, and they do not want to get sick. When subjects are informed that the cockroach has been completely sterilized, and is safe, nobody's mind changes. Subjects are often unable to give reasons for their continued revulsion. The disgusting stories of the present research seem similar to Rozin and Nemeroff's cockroaches: incest, bestiality and dog-eating were repulsive to most subjects, and

their condemnation of these acts was not grounded in the potential health risks that some subjects cited. This view is supported by Edwards (1990), and Zajonc (1980), who have both suggested that affect-based attitudes are often impervious to reason-based persuasion.

The importance of harm may also have been overstated in developmental models. The cognitive-developmentalists are undoubtedly right that children "self-construct", or figure out some of their moral knowledge in the course of their interactions with peers. Children do not simply internalize all rules that adults tell them. Yet the present study suggests that harm can not be the "brute fact" (Turiel, 1983, p. 43) that children seize upon as a sort of bootstrap in the construction of the moral domain. For a child growing up in a society with a multi-dimensional morality, harm is not a reliable guide to the local morality. Acts considered to be unambiguous moral violations might involve harm (as in the Swings story), or no harm (as in the Flag or Dog stories). And acts considered to be morally correct might involve harm (as in justified punishment) or no harm (as in giving to charity). Harm is thus neither necessary nor sufficient as a marker of moral issues. An account in which children are "assisted" by adults in their interpretation of the moral world seems more plausible (e.g., Shweder, 1982).

2) Place more emphasis on the role of the emotions.

Ekman (1975) and Tomkins (1963) have long discussed the importance of emotions in moral judgment, especially the emotions of anger and contempt (which they state is related to disgust). But the real explosion of interest in emotions and social action has come in the 1980's. Anthropologists (Levy, 1984; Lutz, 1988; Rosaldo, 1984; Shweder, 1985), psychologists (Kagan, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Hoffman, 1982; Fiske 1991), an economist (Frank, 1988), and a philosopher

(Gibbard, 1990) have all argued that the emotions help us and guide us in making certain decisions. Several of these authors (Frank, Gibbard, and Hoffman) have shown how such emotion-based thinking may have been shaped by natural selection: emotions such as guilt, shame and anger encourage us to act in ways that gain the trust, cooperation, and respect of others, and they enable us to resist the short-sighted temptations of acting otherwise (see also Trivers, 1971). In this broad literature, the distinction between emotions and cognitions is fading. An emerging picture seems to be that emotions are cognitions invested with a motivating force (Sabini & Silver, 1987). Emotions are part of the decision and judgment apparatus, and an adequate model of moral judgment should include emotions such as anger, contempt, disgust, sympathy, guilt, and shame.

The ideas of Kagan (1984) are particularly instructive. Kagan proposes that there are two processes underlying the human attachment to moral standards. One process is described by the rationalist tradition in philosophy (e.g., Rawls, 1971) and psychology (e.g., Piaget, Kohlberg, and Turiel), which holds that the moral prohibition on harm is self-evident, and children discover it through the process of role-taking (e.g., "I would not want to be harmed if I were in his position"). But Kagan, drawing on Hume (1751/1957), believes that there is a second and more powerful process in which "a set of emotional states [form] the bases for a limited number of universal moral categories that transcend time and locality" (1984, p. 119). That is, all humans share a set of emotions that, at some level of abstraction, tell us what is right and wrong. Kagan proposes that the rationalist and emotional processes work together to produce moral discourse: morality draws its force from sentiment, not logic, but "because humans prefer -- or demand, as some psychologists would say -- a reason for holding a standard, they invent the arguments that rationalists regard as essential" (p. 122).

3) Place more emphasis on the role of culture.

Turiel (1989) makes the important point that neither individuals nor cultures have monolithic, homogeneous world-views. North Americans will endorse individualist positions on some issues, and collectivist positions on others. Indeed, the present study found high levels of variance within most groups on most questions. Nonetheless, global contrasts of cultural groups yield strong and consistent cultural differences. A number of recent studies have shown that educated Westerners perceive the domain of morality to be much narrower than do other groups. Miller, Bersoff and Harwood (1990), Nisan (1987), Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987) and the present study have used a total of 64 stimulus stories in the U.S., India, Israel, and Brazil. All four studies found the same pattern: in traditional and/or low-SES cultural groups, if a story was seen as embodying a violation, that violation was nearly always treated as a violation of an objective or universal obligation, which required punishment or interference. Comparison groups with more Western culture and education showed a far more restricted conception of the moral domain, often judging these actions to be matters of social convention or of personal preference. Even when actions were wrong in some sense, subjects often opposed interference unless these actions caused harm to someone.

The present study suggests that these cultural differences may be due in part to the interaction of affect and culture. All twelve groups reported high levels of affective response (Bother), especially to the disgust stories. However, some groups seemed to "decouple" (Shweder, in press) their affective reaction from their moral judgment, while others did not. The clearest form of separation occurred when subjects reported that an action would bother them, but was not wrong, should not be stopped, and could vary between cultures. Among the Philadelphia college students, this was the

second-most common response pattern on harmless-offensive stories (26% of responses, out of 16 possible response patterns). In the other three narrow-morality groups, this pattern accounted for an average of 7% of all responses. In the remaining eight groups, this pattern essentially never occurred (0.6% of all responses).

We suggest that these differences reflect cultural variation in the moral discourse rules governing how to relate affective reactions to moral judgments. If something disgusts you, does that make it wrong? In groups with a harm-based morality it does not, for moral condemnation requires a victim. Just as murder charges cannot be filed until a body is found, moral condemnation cannot be declared until harmful consequences are found, or plausibly invented. The mere fact that one is bothered by something (e.g., heterosexuals bothered by homosexuality) does not give one the right to condemn it. The Philadelphia college students, therefore, frequently decoupled their affective responses from their moral condemnation, and relied more heavily than other groups on their perceptions of harmfulness. In cultural groups with a multi-dimensional morality, however, moral condemnation requires no victim; discourse rules allow moral judgments to be backed up by assertions such as "because that's disgusting" or "because that's disrespectful." Affective reactions may therefore play a larger role in moral judgment than they do among North Americans of high SES.

A final note on the cultural construction of morality. It has been assumed in this paper that harm is a universal dimension of morality. Whatever disagreements there may be about bestiality and flag desecration, all cultures should condemn the unjustified murder of innocent people. At very least, when killings are performed, some justification of "deservingness" should be offered. Yet this is not always the case. Michelle Rosaldo (1980) worked among the Ilongot, a head-hunting tribe in the Philippines. When she asked her closest friend and informant why the Ilongot

thought it reasonable to chop off the heads of complete strangers, his only answer was: "It is our custom."

Conclusion

Some cultures, including educated Western elites, may limit the domain of morality to issues of harm, rights and justice, but a growing body of empirical research demonstrates that other cultures construct a broader domain of moral issues. This cross-cultural research project points to the need for an expanded model of moral judgment, which can integrate cognitive-developmental findings with research on culture and the emotions.

Tables

Table 1

Percentage of Subjects Who Cited Harm of Any Kind

	Recife				Porto Alegre				Philadelphia				Total
	SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		
	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	

Moral													
1) Swings	97	100	100	97	100	97	97	100	97	100	100	97	98
Convention													
2) Uniform	57	67	70	67	70	67	57	60	27	33	37	50	55
3) Hands	43	20	27	60	50	63	50	53	13	27	40	20	39
Disrespect													
4) Flag	27	20	27	20	33	37	17	23	17	10	30	10	23
5) Promise	53	43	40	30	37	27	27	33	47	33	43	37	37
Disgust													
6) Dog	53	33	63	37	53	50	27	27	37	33	17	17	37
7) Kissing (a)	63	47	47	67	63	67	57	43	37	63	20	63	53
8) Chicken		57		50		73		47		30		13	45

Avg of 4,5,6 & 7	49	36	44	38	47	45	32	32	34	35	28	32	38

^aFor Philadelphia low-SES Children, Kissing was replaced by Candy in this and subsequent tables.

Table 2

Percentage of Subjects Who Said the Action Would Bother Them

	Recife				Porto Alegre				Philadelphia				Total
	SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		
	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	hi	

Moral													
1) Swings	97	93	93	87	97	90	90	90	93	90	93	100	93
Convention													
2) Uniform	33	17	27	33	47	48	17	23	57	27	33	07	31
3) Hands	60	20	33	60	70	59	63	40	57	60	67	23	51
Disrespect													
4) Flag	43	57	53	23	80	63	50	23	60	47	60	27	49
5) Promise	40	60	60	17	63	37	60	17	93	57	86	37	52
Disgust													
6) Dog	70	60	83	67	87	70	73	57	87	97	93	80	77
7) Kissing	63	73	50	63	70	57	37	47	93	87	67	83	66
8) Chicken		57		80		87		77		80		97	80

Avg of 4,5,6 & 7	54	63	62	43	75	57	55	36	83	72	76	57	61

Table 3

Mean evaluations, 0 = "Perfectly OK", 100 = "Very Wrong"

	Recife				Porto Alegre				Philadelphia				Total	
	SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:			
	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	hi	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl		

Moral														
1) Swings	100	97	98	75	100	85	98	83	98	93	92	93		93
Convention														
2) Uniform	77	82	85	43	65	62	50	58	67	85	47	37		63
3) Hands	83	57	82	53	77	63	60	45	42	45	45	15		56
Disrespect														
4) Flag	70	63	83	27	68	62	45	27	53	48	38	07		49
5) Promise	82	62	77	27	63	53	67	38	87	58	58	28		58
Disgust														
6) Dog	97	85	83	53	85	77	67	43	80	87	50	22		69
7) Kissing	98	87	88	57	85	68	55	57	62	93	50	57		71
8) Chicken		97		70		97		75		92		35		78

Avg of 4,5,6 & 7	87	74	83	41	75	65	58	41	70	72	49	28		62
Avg When Harmless														
and Offensive	95	70	75	56	77	79	72	57	75	86	49	24		68

Table 4

Percentage of Subjects Who Say the Actor Should Be Stopped or Punished.

	Recife				Porto Alegre				Philadelphia				Total	
	SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:			
	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	hi	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH		Chl
Moral														
1) Swings	100	77	97	80	83	87	83	93	100	100	100	100	92	
Convention														
2) Uniform	97	77	100	36	60	60	57	40	73	83	63	62	68	
3) Hands	90	30	87	30	53	47	40	33	37	53	47	13	47	
Disrespect														
4) Flag	90	63	80	23	57	53	27	17	53	50	27	00	45	
5) Promise	97	57	87	07	47	23	33	07	77	20	33	03	41	
Disgust														
6) Dog	100	57	87	40	57	50	47	33	67	80	43	10	56	
7) Kissing	100	68	87	53	70	70	60	50	80	87	33	57	68	
8) Chicken		79		50		87		63		80		27	64	
Avg of 4,5,6 & 7	97	60	85	31	58	49	42	27	69	59	34	18	52	
Avg When Harmless and Offensive	100	65	91	51	51	65	52	32	79	75	31	10	58	
Avg When Harmless, Offensive, and Not OK	100	74	95	65	55	73	61	45	79	77	43	18	65	

Table 5

Percentage of Subjects Who Universalize Their Judgment

	Recife				Porto Alegre				Philadelphia				Total
	SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		SES:		Age-group:		
	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	LOW	HIGH	Chl	Adl	
Moral													
1) Swings	100	83	93	50	97	87	90	60	93	87	63	67	81
Convention													
2) Uniform	87	40	80	14	37	20	17	13	17	10	03	07	29
3) Hands	80	37	57	07	77	50	50	03	27	23	10	03	35
Disrespect													
4) Flag	77	50	73	24	87	67	53	13	53	50	20	03	48
5) Promise	100	87	90	28	90	53	73	23	80	40	47	20	61
Disgust													
6) Dog	97	60	80	13	80	60	53	17	80	57	27	07	53
7) Kissing	97	67	83	20	87	53	50	33	73	80	07	17	56
8) Chicken		87		43		87		57		87		23	64
Avg of 4,5,6 & 7	93	66	82	22	86	58	58	22	72	57	25	12	54
Avg when Harmless and Offensive	100	76	85	29	89	65	72	19	79	53	35	04	59
Avg When Harmless, Offensive, and Not OK	100	67	95	38	88	77	74	25	82	57	50	06	63

Table 6

Distinctions Between Moral and Other Story Types on Universal Probe

	Recife				Porto Alegre				Philadelphia			
	-----		-----		-----		-----		-----		-----	
SES:	LOW	HIGH			LOW	HIGH			LOW	HIGH		
	-----		-----		-----		-----		-----		-----	
Age-group:	Chl	Adl	Chl	Adl	Chl	Adl	Chl	Adl	Chl	Adl	Chl	Adl

Moral - Convention	17	45	25	40	40	52	57	52	72	70	57	61
Moral - Harmless	08	18	12	28	11	28	33	38	22	30	38	54

Table 7

Pearson Correlations of Five Probe Questions on Four Harmless-Offensive Stories.

	Harm	Bother	Evaluation	Interference	Universal
Harm	1.00				
Bother	.27	1.00			
Evaluation	.37	.43	1.00		
Interference	.30	.38	.59	1.00	
Universal	.21	.30	.53	.47	1.00

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