IMF Seeks Larger Credit Line,
Higher Reserves to Avert Crisis
By JACOB M. SCHLESINGER
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON -- Two years after Mexico's financial crisis jolted the world
financial system, the International Monetary Fund is completing a new
safety net designed to better contain such emergencies in the future.
As early as the end of January, the IMF says it plans to formally reach
an agreement with two dozen countries that would allow the fund to borrow
as much as $28 billion to lend the next time there's a run by private
investors on a cash-strapped country. Broadening its reach beyond
traditional sources of IMF funds in the U.S., Japan and Europe, the new
credit line will allow the IMF to tap the huge reserves of rapidly
developing Asian economies such as Malaysia and Thailand.
MEXICO LESSONS
Steps being taken by the IMF to avoid future developing-country debt
emergencies:
- Creating a $28 billion credit line for
emergency lending.
- Seeking a sharp increase of regular lending
reserves.
- Launching global standards for national economic
data.
- Increasing surveillance of developing countries' financial
conditions.
The IMF says it will also seek in 1997 a sharp increase in the money
that member countries contribute, invoking the Mexican crisis as a
justification for expanding the fund's reserves. The request will likely
run into strong political opposition, especially in the U.S. At the same
time, the IMF is stepping up surveillance, which officials admit has been
lax, of possible trouble spots. And the fund is creating standards for
reporting financial data by all countries, to make it easier for investors
to monitor risk.
As a result, "the world is a safer place," Stanley Fischer, the fund's
deputy managing director, said in a recent interview. "It is absolutely
impossible to prevent crises. But these changes are an improvement."
To the IMF's many critics, such claims are overstated. They say the
changes are cosmetic, and consider the IMF an anachronism incapable of
dealing with the dramatic changes in the global economy.
Not 'Under Control'
"The IMF is an extremely mediocre institution," said Harvard University
economist Jeffrey Sachs. "Its staff is very small and they don't have the
technical training. There has been some improvement, but this is not an
improvement that should give ready comfort to markets. Nobody should be
fooled that this is under control."
The reforms are aimed at retooling an agency created in the wake of the
Great Depression to help ensure global financial stability. The Mexican
meltdown of December 1994 demonstrated how much developing countries have
come to depend on private capital, and how badly the fund had kept up with
that transformation. The IMF failed to detect Mexico's troubles as they
developed, and had no clear procedures to respond once the problems
surfaced. After Mexico revealed it was near default on its short-term
borrowings, investors yanked billions of dollars out of the country,
creating a cash crunch.
Until the Mexican crisis, the IMF made a point of nagging countries that
ran large trade and government-budget deficits. But it failed to pay enough
attention to how countries financed their trade deficits or to the risks of
weak banking systems. Another reason the IMF failed to notice Mexico's
frailties was that the fund reviewed closely only those nations that had
IMF loans outstanding. Mexico had none.
The IMF now thoroughly monitors more countries, and it pays more
attention to financial markets. Only in 1996 were financial news-wire
screens installed in IMF officials' offices to flash market developments.
"There's a great deal more attention to the possibility of crises
emerging," Mr. Fischer said. Armed with that information, "we've decided to
take a more active role" in informally badgering countries, Mr. Fischer
added. "Countries are more likely to get letters from us than they used
to."
The IMF is also becoming the world's unofficial financial-markets
regulator, creating disclosure standards for countries seeking foreign
capital. In hindsight, the lack of internationally accepted benchmarks for
disclosing economic data helps explain how Mexico went so quickly from
being the darling of Wall Street to confessing that its finances were so
precarious that it might default.
Data on Internet
The fund recently defined what data countries should disclose -- such as
inflation rates and government -- debt obligations -- and how frequently.
Soon governments will begin posting those figures on the Internet. The IMF
cannot require compliance, but officials hope that vigilant investors will
force adherence.
Though seemingly mundane, better data dissemination could help integrate
emerging markets into the world economy, advocates say. "In the history of
U.S. capital finance, the spread of generally accepted accounting
principles has had a greater impact than the bailout of Chrysler or
Lockheed," said Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers.
Greater scrutiny and disclosure have limits. The fund has expanded its
mission without significantly boosting its annual $400 million budget or
its staff of 2,600. Even in the best of worlds, Mr. Fischer said, "no
amount of data is going to prevent us and capital markets from making
mistakes."
So the IMF is trying to enhance its ability to cope, should another
Mexican-style crisis emerge. That means raising more cash and developing
procedures to dispense it more quickly. One lesson from Mexico was that
financial crises can spread faster and farther than in the past. When the
world's major creditors were government organizations such as the IMF or
private banks, debtor countries could renegotiate loans over a number of
years, working with a handful of experienced bankers and bureaucrats.
But Mexico relied heavily on an incalculable number of anonymous,
short-term bondholders, who could withdraw their money instantly. More
frightening, Mexico's travails threatened to drag down emerging markets
around the world. An emergency loan package assembled by the U.S. and the
IMF staved off default. But the effort had no precedent and ruffled
feathers among some IMF members. And while the roughly $50 billion package
proved sufficient, "everybody was shocked at the scale of the problem,"
said Mr. Fischer. It raised the specter that "in an extreme crisis, IMF
financing could turn out to be inadequate."
Besides, the U.S. pressure that was instrumental in rescuing Mexico may
be lacking in the next debt crisis. "Mexico was a special case," said Mr.
Sachs. "It is the only developing country in the world that has a
2,000-mile border with the U.S. That means no other developing country in
the world will get this kind of treatment."
'Spare Fuel Tank'
The IMF has since drafted formal procedures for directing such bailouts,
and will soon have a new "spare fuel tank," as Mr. Summers calls the
$28-billion credit line. The so-called New Arrangements to Borrow won't
consist of a standing fund, but of lending commitments from participating
countries who will have to give consent before money is used.
The trick to making the bailout fund successful will be to use it
sparingly. Analysts say the very presence of the credit line could
encourage recklessness among countries and investors, much as government
deposit insurance allowed savings-and-loan associations in the U.S. to make
risky investments. Mr. Fischer argued that the Mexican workout was
sufficiently painful to the Mexicans that other countries are unlikely to
follow suit. But he said that many investors may have escaped with more
money than they should have. A guiding principle of future bailouts, he
said, would be make sure creditors suffer some pain.
"You're not going to let a country go down the tubes in order to make a
point about creditors misbehaving," he said. "But it's important for
lenders to know that there's an impulse in the official sector not to bail
them out."
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