The Sensitivity of Cash Savings to the Cost of Capital^{*}

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Abstract

We show theoretically and empirically that in the presence of a time-varying cost of capital (COC), firms have a hedging motive to reduce their overall COC over time by saving cash when the COC is relatively low. The sensitivity of cash savings to the COC is especially pronounced with respect to the cost of equity and for firms with a greater correlation between their COC and their financing needs for future investments. Both financially constrained and unconstrained firms respond to a low COC by saving cash out of external capital issuance in excess of current financial needs.

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Abstract

We show theoretically and empirically that in the presence of a time-varying cost of capital (COC), firms have a hedging motive to reduce their overall COC over time by saving cash when the COC is relatively low. The sensitivity of cash savings to the COC is especially pronounced with respect to the cost of equity and for firms with a greater correlation between their COC and their financing needs for future investments. Both financially constrained and unconstrained firms respond to a low COC by saving cash out of external capital issuance in excess of current financial needs.

Key Words: Hedging, Precautionary motive, Market timing, Financial Constraint. JEL Classification: G32 G35.

1. Introduction

Capital market frictions make external capital costlier than internally generated funds, which may lead to suboptimal investment decisions (Myers (1984)). While the literature has suggested that firms mitigate such external financing constraints by saving cash from internal cash flows, cash savings from external capital are underexplored.¹ However, we find that firms in the United States save 35 cents from each dollar of equity capital raised compared to 20 cents from each dollar of internal cash flows. Moreover, external equity issuance alone explains 16% of corporate cash savings, while internal cash flows explain only 4%. Intuitively, with a time-varying cost of capital (COC), firms are likely to benefit from issuing external capital and saving cash when the COC is relatively low. However, how the COC affects firms' cash savings behavior is not well understood.

In this paper, we show that a firm's cash savings are sensitive to the COC and that this sensitivity is driven by the firm's need to hedge against raising external capital at a higher cost for future investments (hedging motive). Firms save to lower the *overall* COC in the presence of a time-varying COC. Our theoretical model suggests that firms respond to a low COC by issuing excess external capital and hoarding cash if they anticipate external financing needs for future investments. Saving cash by raising external capital is costly. Nonetheless, firms choose their optimal savings to balance the current COC and the expected COC for future investments. In particular, firms save more when (i) the current COC is low and (ii) they face a high correlation between the COC and financing needs for future investments.

To test these predictions, we estimate the COC by the weighted average cost of capital.

¹See, among others, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Acharya et al. (2007), Han and Qiu (2007), Bates et al. (2009), Chang et al. (2014), and Qiu and Wan (2015).

The cost of equity (COE) is estimated by the implied cost of capital, which is the internal rate of return obtained by equating the stock price to the present value of future cash flow forecasts by analysts, and the cost of debt (COD), which is the actual yield on the debt carried by the firm.² We show that the average cash holdings of firms are negatively associated with the average COC over the 35-year sample period (Figure 1). Moreover, firms save significantly more when the COC is lower relative to its historical average (Figure 2) and when they expect greater future investments (Figure 3). The empirical results also show that firms save significantly more from external capital when their COC decreases.

We measure a firm's hedging motive as the correlation coefficient between the COC and the firm's dependence on external finance based on the standard proxies used in the literature. A high correlation indicates that the firm faces higher COC when it needs more external capital. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that firms' cash savings from external capital are more sensitive to the COC when their hedging needs are greater. Firms with greater hedging needs issue significantly more external capital in excess of current financial needs when the COC is relatively low. Future investment needs also influence the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC, especially for firms with strong hedging motives. These findings support our perspective on corporate hedging: firms save to hedge their future investments against a high COC.

When comparing the relative importance of equity and debt as sources of external capital, we find that firms save significantly more cash from equity issues (35 cents from each dollar

²Claus and Thomas (2001) and Fama and French (2002) use the implied cost of capital (ICC) to measure the equity premium; Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) and Lee, So, and Wang (2020) use the ICC to predict stock market return; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2009) Frank and Shen (2016), Xu (2020), and Byoun and Wu (2020) use the ICC to estimate the COE. The COD is estimated using the same measure applied in Frank and Shen (2016) and Xu (2020).

of equity raised) than from debt issues (6 cents from each dollar of debt raised). Moreover, firms' cash savings are much more sensitive to the COE than to the COD.

Our results are robust to alternative COC measures and to adjustments for potential measurement errors. To address the endogeneity concern that cash savings may affect the COC, we adopt an identification strategy that uses Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), effective in 2000, as an exogenous shock to the COC and conduct a difference-in-difference analysis. Reg FD reduces COC by leveling the information playing field, especially for firms that are more prone to selective disclosure prior to the regulation, as shown in Chen et al. (2010). By exploiting the cross-sectional variation in the impact of Reg FD on the COC, we show that firms experiencing a larger decline in the COC exhibit an increased sensitivity of cash savings to external capital compared to firms with a smaller decline in the COC following Reg FD. We also conduct placebo tests to minimize the possibility that our results are driven by some omitted factors.

We then investigate whether financial constraints explain the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC. We find that financially constrained and unconstrained firms both save more in response to a low COC and they both save more from external capital than from internal cash flows. Almeida et al. (2004) suggest that financially constrained firms save from cash flows to mitigate underinvestment due to financial constraints. Our findings suggest that firms save not only from cash flows to mitigate the effect of financial constraints, but also from external capital to hedge against higher financing costs for future investments. Saving from external capital when the COC is relatively low reduces underinvestment due to a higher future COC.

We also explore alternative motives that might explain the sensitivity of cash savings to

the COC. The most plausible alternative is the market-timing motive, which suggests that firms save from equity issue proceeds to take advantage of overvalued stock (Alti (2006), Kim and Weisbach (2008), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Hertzel and Li (2010)). External finance dependent firms are known to be particularly sensitive to market timing for their equity issuance decisions (Lamont et al. (2001) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)). According to the market timing hypothesis, external finance dependent firms are more likely to save from equity issue proceeds when the COC is lower. Using several proxies for external finance dependence, we do not find support for this prediction.

Keynes (1936) suggests that the main purpose of precautionary cash savings is to insulate the firm from external finance by saving from internal cash flows. Thus, the precautionary motive of Keynes does not predict that firms save cash out of external capital issuance when the COC is low as we document. However, McLean (2011) shows that the precautionary motive—measured as R&D, cash flow volatility, dividend payout, and their principal component—explains cash savings from equity issue proceeds. Accordingly, we examine whether firms with greater precautionary motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low. Although the precautionary motive has a positive effect on cash savings, it does not account for the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC. The effects of the hedging motive remain significant for both high and low precautionary motive firms.

2. Related Literature

Given that existing theories on cash savings mainly focus on firm's cash savings from internal cash flows, it is not apparent how these theories apply to cash savings from external capital. Previous studies offer market timing (Kim and Weisbach (2008)) and precautionary motive (McLean (2007)) as explanations for cash savings from equity issuance. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010), however, raise challenges for both motives. They find that the vast majority of firms with attractive market timing opportunities fail to issue stocks and many mature firms issue stocks without apparent financial difficulties. Moreover, Dittmar et al. (2019) maintain that the existing theories fail to explain the bulk of the within-firm variation in cash savings. Adding to this literature, we show that firms save to reduce the overall COC by transferring financial resources to future states with a higher COC. Accordingly, the market timing (to take advantage of overvalued stock) and the precautionary motive (to prepare for uncertain contingencies) are not sufficient conditions for firms to save from external capital because firms will not issue external capital to save if they have no expected capital needs or if they can meet their future capital needs at a low COC. Our findings suggest that the COC has a significant and independent impact on corporate cash savings decisions and that external capital is an important source of cash savings for firms with greater hedging needs.

We also extend the literature on the effects of financial constraints on cash savings. Almeida et al. (2004) suggest that the cash flow sensitivity of cash captures the effect of financial constraints. Riddick and Whited (2009) challenge this interpretation by showing that financially constrained firms' cash savings and cash flows can be negatively related because firms reduce cash to increase investment after receiving positive cash flow shocks. In the financial constraint models, constrained firms trade off between current and future investments to save from cash flows. In our model, firms trade off not only between current and future investments but also between the current COC and the future COC to hedge against higher financing costs for future investments. The hedging motive drives the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Our empirical results also show that the cash savings of *both* financially constrained and unconstrained firms increase by approximately 9% relative to the mean with a one percentage point decrease in the COC. With the hedging motive, firms save not only from internal cash flows but also (and especially) from external capital to lower the overall COC, which in turn improves their overall investment efficiency.

Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) show that financially constrained firms' preference for cash savings over preserving debt capacity by using internal funds depends on their need to hedge investment opportunities against income shortfalls. Our hedging motive distinguishes itself from their study in that we deal with cash savings from *both* internal cash flows and external capital (especially equity) in response to the COC. More importantly, both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save from external capital obtained with a relatively low COC to lower the overall COC for future investments.

Our study also complements Azar, Kagy, and Schmalz (2016) who suggest that the cost of carry for cash holdings, which depends on the risk-free interest rate, is an important factor explaining the trend in corporate cash holdings over time. Gao, Whited, and Zhang (2020), however, find a hump-shaped relationship between cash holdings and interest rates. They rationalize this relationship in a model where firms' precautionary cash demand correlates with interest rates nonmonotonically. They suggest that interest rates are unlikely to explain the recent rise in corporate cash holdings. We add to the literature by explaining that the hedging motive is an important determinant of corporate cash savings and that corporate cash savings are closely related to COC, particularly to the COE.

3. Hypothesis Development

3.1 A Model for Cash Savings with External Financing Costs

We develop a two-period model to illustrate how cash savings are affected by the time-varying cost of external finance. The intuition from the analytical solution to the two-period model can also apply to a dynamic model, as shown in Appendix 4.

We consider a firm, endowed initially with W_t , that faces a two-period investment and financing decisions with zero discount rate. The cash flow from investment at t is given by

$$\Pi(I_t) = \pi(I_t) + z_t,\tag{1}$$

where I_t is investment at the beginning of t which depreciates by the end of the period, $\pi(I_t)$ is the expected cash flows with $\pi_I > 0$ and $\pi_{II} < 0$, and z is i.i.d. with zero mean.³

The firm maximizes current shareholder wealth which is given as

$$V_{t} = \max_{(I_{t},C_{t},X_{t})} \{ W_{t} - C_{t} - I_{t} - \mathbb{1}_{(X_{t}>0)}\lambda_{t}(X_{t}) + E_{t}V_{t+1} \}$$
(2)
subject to $X_{t} = I_{t} + \mathbb{1}_{(X_{t}>0)}\lambda_{t}(X_{t}) + C_{t} - W_{t} \text{ and } C_{t} \ge 0,$
where $V_{t+1} = \max_{(I_{t+1},X_{t+1})} \{ \Pi(I_{t+1}) - I_{t+1} - \mathbb{1}_{(X_{t+1}>0)}\lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \},$

where C_t is cash savings at t which returns the same amount at t+1, E_t is expectations given information at t, and X_t is external finance. The external financing decision is made at the beginning of each period, and there are external finance costs arising from market frictions such as agency and asymmetric information problems. The net proceeds from external finance are the gross proceeds reduced by the cost of external finance. The external finance

 $^{{}^{3}}f_{x}$ and f_{xx} denote the first and second derivatives, respectively, of f(x) with respect to x, and "*i.i.d*" stands for independent and identically distributed across firms and over time.

cost is represented by $\mathbb{1}_{(X_t>0)}\lambda_t(X_t)$ where $\mathbb{1}_{(X_t>0)}$ is an indicator that is 1 when X > 0with $0 < \lambda'_t(X_t) < 1$ and zero otherwise. The external finance cost function implies that the marginal external finance cost increases with the amount of external capital raised and cannot be greater than its proceeds. The firm's needs for external capital at t is determined by the sum of investment, cash saving, and external financing costs minus initial endowment. The firm pays out funds without costs if X_t is negative.

To explore the optimal cash savings, financing, and investment decisions in (2), we solve the model backwards, starting with the second-period decisions.

$$V_{t+1} = \max_{(I_{t+1}, X_{t+1})} \{ \Pi(I_{t+1}) - I_{t+1} - \mathbb{1}_{(X_{t+1} > 0)} \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \}$$
(3)
subject to $X_{t+1} = I_{t+1} + \mathbb{1}_{(X_{t+1} > 0)} \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) - \Pi(I_t) - C_t.$

The external capital raised by the firm at t + 1 depends on the cash flow generated from investment and cash saved at t. The first-order conditions with respect to the firm's optimal decisions on I_{t+1} and X_{t+1} are

$$\pi_I(I_{t+1}) = 1 + \mu_{t+1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mu_{t+1} = \frac{\lambda'_{t+1}(X_{t+1})}{1 - \lambda'_{t+1}(X_{t+1})},$$
(4)

where μ_{t+1} is the Lagrangian for the constraint on X_{t+1} . These conditions imply that the optimal level of investment is below the first-best level (I_{t+1}^*) , satisfying $\pi_I(I_{t+1}^*) = 1$ if the firm raises external capital and pays the financing cost. The first-best level of investment can be achieved if the firm generates a sufficiently large cash flow from its initial investment in addition to cash savings at t $(I_{t+1}^* \leq \Pi(I_t) + C_t)$. If the cash flow and cash savings are insufficient to cover the investment, the firm must rely on external capital, and its investment will be determined to satisfy $\pi_I(\hat{I}_{t+1}) = 1/[1 - \lambda'_{t+1}(\hat{I}_{t+1})] > 1$. Thus, the firm will invest

below the first-best level in the presence of the cost of external capital $(\hat{I} \leq I_{t+1}^*)$. In the presence of a fixed cost component of external finance, the firm may invest using its internal cash flow and cash savings from t without raising external capital at t+1 for some realization of $\Pi(I_t)$ $(\hat{I}_{t+1} < I_{t+1} < I_{t+1}^*)$.

Based on the above observations we now have

$$E_{t}V_{t+1} = \int_{I_{t+1}^{*}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})}^{\infty} \left\{ \pi(I_{t+1}^{*}) + \pi(I_{t}) + z + C_{t} - I_{t+1}^{*} \right\} g(z)dz$$

$$I_{t+1}^{*}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} + \int_{\hat{I}_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})}^{I_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} \left\{ \pi(C_{t} + \pi(I_{t}) + z) \right\} g(z)dz$$

$$I_{t+1}^{*}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} + \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{I}_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} \left\{ \pi(\hat{I}_{t+1}) - \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \right\} g(z)dz,$$
(5)

where g(z) is the probability density function (PDF) of z. Note also that $\hat{I}_{t+1} = \pi(I_t) + z + C_t + X_{t+1} - \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1})$.

Moving back to the first period, the first order conditions (FOCs) for the firm's maximization problem with respect to I_t , C_t , and X_t are

$$[1+H]\pi_I(I_t) - 1 - \mu_t = 0, (6)$$

$$(1+H) - 1 - \mu_t - \psi_t = 0, \tag{7}$$

$$-\lambda'_t(X_t) + \mu_t [1 - \lambda'_t(X_t)] = 0,$$
(8)

where μ_t and ψ_t is the Lagrangian for constraints on X_t and C_t , respectively, and

$$H = \int_{-\infty}^{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)} \{\pi_I(C_t + \pi(I_t) + z) - 1\} g(z) dz$$

+
$$\int_{-\infty}^{\hat{I}_{t+1} - C_t - \pi(I_t)} \{\pi_I(\hat{I}_{t+1}) + \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) - 1\} g(z) dz$$

Appendix 1 provides the details of the derivation of these FOCs. Given $\hat{I}_{t+1} < I_{t+1} < I_{t+1}^*$, we have $\pi_I(\hat{I}_{t+1}) > \pi_I(I_{t+1}) > \pi_I(I_{t+1}^*) = 1$ and hence H > 0. H represents the expected loss from underinvestment due to the cost of external finance and lower cash flow at t + 1. The FOCs suggest that H is an important consideration for investment and cash savings decisions at t. In particular, when the firm relies on external finance, it will choose the optimal investment where the marginal benefit of investment $[1 + H]\pi_I(I_t)$ is equal to its marginal cost $1 + \mu_t = \frac{1}{1 - \lambda_t'(X_t)}$. Similarly, the optimal cash savings decision with external finance is made where the marginal benefit of cash savings $((1 + H) - \psi_t)$ is equal to the marginal cost $(1 + \mu_t) = \frac{1}{1 - \lambda_t'(X_t)})$. These conditions also imply that a lower cost of external capital at t increases both investment and cash savings at t.

If the firm is unconstrained at t in that it has a sufficient initial endowment to make initial investment and cash savings ($\lambda_t(X_t) = 0$ and $\mu_t = 0$), the optimal cash savings will be set where its marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost ($(1 + H) - \psi_t = 1$). In this case, the firm's optimal investment is set at $(1 + H)\pi_I(I_t) = 1$.

Proposition 1 The optimal investment, \hat{I}_t , external finance, \hat{X}_t , and cash saving, \hat{C}_t , at t exhibit the following properties:

For $\hat{X}_t > 0$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \hat{X}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} > \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} > 0.$$
(9)

For $\hat{X}_t \leq 0$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = 0, \text{ and } \frac{\partial \hat{X}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} > 0.$$

Proof: See Appendix 2.

Proposition 1 suggests that when the firm expects a higher COC at t + 1, it will raise additional external capital to increase its savings at t. Even when the firm is not constrained in that it has enough cash at hand to make its investment at t, it will increase cash when expecting a higher cost of external capital. If the firm does not save at t, low internal cash flow at t + 1 will result in an increase in the amount of external capital at a higher cost and a reduction in the amount of investment at t + 1. Thus, whether constrained or not, the firm's cash savings will be sensitive to the relative cost of external capital.

The optimal investment at t, however, is not affected by the expected COC at t + 1because the marginal return on cash remains constant while that on investment is decreasing. Consequently, when the firm expects a higher cost of external finance at t + 1, it is more beneficial to save cash than to increase investment at t, since cash savings help the firm hedge against the higher future cost of external finance at a lower cost. Thus, firms expecting higher external finance costs are likely to increase cash savings by raising external capital beyond current investment, i.e., they issue excess capital. Together with the FOCs at t, the proposition also suggests that the firm will save more when it faces a lower COC at t relative to the COC at t + 1. Cash saved at the lower COC at t reduces the amount of external capital that must be raised under the higher COC at t + 1, which reduces the overall COC for the firm.

3.2 Hedging Motive

In the discussion above, we assume that the marginal cost of external capital (λ'_{t+1}) is insensitive to the risks affecting cash flows. A firm may face higher COC, however, if lower cash flows make it more difficult for the firm to raise money from outside investors. A hedging motive arises when it is costlier for the firm to raise external capital for future investment. In such a case, the firm will save more than it otherwise would so as to finance its future investment while making less use of external finance in bad times. We formalize the hedging motive for cash savings by generalizing the external finance cost function as $\Lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}, \gamma) = (1+\gamma)\lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1})$, where γ measures the strength of the correlation between the COC and external capital needs $(I_{t+1} - \Pi(I_t))$. We now make the following assumptions about the nature of $\Lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}, \gamma)$ to reflect the effects of γ on the marginal cost of external finance:

Assumption 1 The external finance cost function, Λ , satisfies:

for $\hat{X} > 0$,

(i)
$$\frac{\partial \Lambda(\hat{X},\gamma)}{\partial X} = \Lambda'(\hat{X},\gamma) \in (0,1);$$

(ii)
$$\frac{\partial^2 \Lambda(\hat{X},\gamma)}{\partial X \partial \gamma} = \Lambda'_{\gamma}(\hat{X},\gamma) > 0; \quad and$$

(*iii*)
$$\frac{\partial^2 \Lambda(\hat{X}, \gamma)}{\partial \Lambda \partial \gamma} > 0;$$
 (10)

for $\hat{X} \leq 0$,

$$\Lambda(\hat{X},\gamma) = \Lambda'(\hat{X},\gamma) = \frac{\partial^2 \Lambda(\hat{X},\gamma)}{\partial \Lambda \partial \gamma} = 0.$$

(i) implies that the marginal cost of external finance increases with \hat{X} , whereas (ii) and (iii) imply that the firm faces a higher marginal cost of external finance when the correlation between external capital needs and the COC is greater. The assumption for $\hat{X} \leq 0$ implies that there is no cost when the firm does not raise external capital.

Proposition 2 establishes the properties for the effects of the correlation between external capital needs and external finance cost on the optimal decisions at t.

Proposition 2 The optimal levels of cash savings, \hat{C}_t , external finance, \hat{X}_t , and investment, \hat{I}_t , exhibit the following properties:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \hat{C}_t}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} > 0; \quad \frac{\partial^2 \hat{X}_t}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} > 0; \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \hat{I}_t}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} = 0;.$$

Proof: See Appendix 3.

Proposition 2 suggests that the sensitivities of the optimal cash savings and external finance decisions to the COC are magnified by the correlation between external capital needs and external finance cost as measured by γ . Thus, firms with high γ face greater hedging needs. When expecting a higher COC at t + 1, without cash savings the firm with greater hedging needs may have to reduce future investments due to higher external finance costs. Alternatively, the firm can issue external capital at time t at a lower cost and save for future investment, thereby reducing the overall cost of external finance. Consequently, the amount of cash savings and excess capital issuance should be larger when firm expects

greater investment and a higher COC in the future.

Propositions 1 and 2 lead to the following hedging motive hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1a** Firms with a high correlation between external capital needs and COC will save more when the COC is relatively low.
- **Hypothesis 1b** Firms with a high correlation between external capital needs and COC will issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low.
- **Hypothesis 1c** Firms with greater future expected investments will save more when the COC is relatively low.

4. The Data and Variables

4.1 The Sample

The initial sample consists of all U.S. firms from the annual Compustat files for the period of 1981–2015. We require that firms have positive values for assets, equity, cash holdings and net sales. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6799) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Observations with missing net income and stock issuance proceeds are also excluded. Stock price information is from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the nominal GDP growth rates are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the interest rates are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

To estimate the ICC, we obtain analysts' earnings and growth forecasts from I/B/E/S. We require non-missing data for the prior year's book value, earnings, and dividends. When explicit forecasts are unavailable, we obtain forecasts by applying the long-term growth rate to the prior year's earnings forecast.

4.2 Cost of Capital

We estimate the COE using the ICC approach with three different models proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), and Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013). The ICC is the discount rate, which equates a stock's present value of expected cash flows to its current price. Detailed procedures for this estimation are provided in Appendix 6. Given that firms are required to file their financial statements within 90 days of the fiscal year end, we estimate the COE using the earliest forecasts available after three months of the prior fiscal year end. The reported results are based on the Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) approach and are robust to alternative COE estimates.

We estimate the COC as follows:

$$COC_{i,t} = \frac{Debt_{i,t}}{MVA_{i,t}}COD_{i,t}(1 - TaxRate) + (1 - \frac{Debt_{i,t}}{MVA_{i,t}})COE_{i,t},$$
(11)

where $COC_{i,t}$ is the weighted average cost of capital for firm *i* in year *t*. $\frac{Debt_{it}}{MVA_{it}}$ is the market leverage ratio. $COD_{i,t}$ is the COD for firm *i* in year *t*, measured as the actual yield on the debt carried by the firm, as in Frank and Shen (2016).

4.3 Hedging Motive Measures

We measure the hedging motive by the correlation coefficient between external capital needs and the COC. Three proxies are used to capture firms' needs for external capital: KZ index, external finance dependence, and financial deficit. Following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), we use the KZ index to measure external finance dependence as follows:

$$KZ = -1.002CF - 39.368DIV - 1.315CASH + 3.139LEV,$$
(12)

where CF is the operating cash flow divided by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the period (PPE); DIV is cash dividend divided by PPE; CASH is cash and equivalents divided by PPE; and LEV is long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus total equity.

Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), external finance is measured by:

$$External = (CapEx - OCF)/CapEx,$$
(13)

where CapEx is capital expenditures; and OCF is operating cash flow.

We also follow Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Byoun (2008) to define financial deficit as follows:

$$Deficit = (Div + Acq + Inv - ICF1)/TA,$$
(14)

where Div is cash dividend; Acq is acquisitions; Inv is net investments; ICF1 is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization; and TA is total assets at the beginning of the period.

We use the industry median *External* and *Deficit* based on the 2-digit SIC code and the firm-level KZ as proxies for external capital needs. To measure hedging needs, we obtain annual external capital needs measures and compute their correlation coefficients with individual firms' COCs. Based on the correlation coefficients, we define firms in the top 30 percent as high hedging-needs firms and those in the bottom 30 percent as low hedging-needs firms, dropping the middle 40 percent. Hedging motives 1-3 below are based on *External*, *Deficit*, and KZ, respectively.

5. Empirical Analysis

5.1 Univariate Analysis

The summary statistics for the firm characteristic variables and the COC are reported in Table 1 Panel A. The average cash holding is 14% of total assets and the cash savings rate is approximately 1.75% of total assets. The average COC is 9.41%, with an average COE of 9.89% and an average COD of 8.43%. Panel B shows the decomposition of the standard deviation of the COC across firms and over time. As expected, the COD exhibits less variation than the COE cross-sectionally and over time.

Table 1

Figure 1 plots the average annual cash holdings relative to the average COC, COE, and COD over the sample period. The striking symmetry of the two series suggests that firms increase (decrease) cash when the COC is low (high). Thus, the COC appears to be an important driver of corporate cash holding behavior over time. Notably, the COC declined significantly until the early 2000s, which may help explain the increasing trend in cash holdings over the same period documented by Bates et al. (2009).

Figure1

To further examine how a relatively low COC drives corporate cash savings, we obtain a firm's COC minus its historical average for firms with a minimum of 3 years of data. Figure 2 plots cash savings across deciles of the deviation of COC from the historical average for the sample period of 1981-2015 and the subsample periods of 1981-1998 and 1999-2015. The downward-sloping graphs indicate that firms save more when COC is below the historical average.

Figure 2

Figure 3 plots current year cash savings across future investment deciles. The figure shows that firms with greater future investment save more cash in the current year, which is consistent with the prediction of the hedging motive for cash savings that firms will save cash for future investments.

Figure 3

5.2 Sensitivities of Cash Savings to Cash Sources

Firms may save cash from internal or external capital. To examine how cash savings are associated with cash sources in a multivariate setting, we run the following regression:

$$\Delta Cash_{it} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 ExCapital_{it} + \lambda_2 ICF_{it} + \lambda_3 X_{it-1} + f_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$
⁽¹⁵⁾

where $\Delta Cash_{it}$ is the change in cash and equivalents for firm *i* in year *t*; ICF_{it} is internal cash flow; $ExCapital_{it}$ is the sum of the net equity issue and net debt issue. Each variable is divided by total assets at the beginning of the period. X_{it-1} is a vector of control variables and f_i is firm fixed effects. Following Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009), we include the following control variables: M/B_{it-1} , market-to-book asset ratio; $Cash_{it-1}$, lagged cashto-asset ratio; Vol, cash flow volatility; $Leverage_{it-1}$, leverage ratio; $Size_{it-1}$, the logarithm of total assets; NWC_{it} , net working capital excluding cash and equivalents divided by total assets at t-1; $CapEx_{it}$, capital expenditures divided by total assets at t-1; $Acquisitions_{it}$, acquisitions divided by total assets at t-1; $Divdend_{it}$, cash dividend divided by total assets at t-1; $Tbill_t$, the one-year treasury bill rate; $Spread_t$, the credit spread between the 10-year BBB bond yield and the maturity-matched treasury bond yield.⁴ We also include indicator

⁴The T-bill rate and the bond yields are published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

variables, D90 and D00, allowing the intercept to change in the 1990s and the 2000s (2000-2014). We winsorize all variables except for *Tbill*, *Spread*, and dummy variables, at 2 and 98 percentiles to mitigate the effects of outliers.

We first estimate the model without firm fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 2. The coefficient estimate of external capital (ExCapital) is 0.2897 and significant, whereas that of internal cash flows (ICF) is 0.2340 and significant. To evaluate the relative importance of external capital to internal cash flows, we estimate the standardized beta coefficients. Column 3 of Table 2 shows that the standardized beta coefficient of external capital is much larger than that of internal cash flow (0.5502 vs. 0.2476), which indicates that external capital is a major source of firms' cash savings.

Table 2

When we include firm fixed effects (column 2), the coefficient estimates of the cash sources remain positive and significant. The estimates also show that M/B, T-bill rate and credit spread have positive effects, while lagged cash, dividend, leverage, firm size, net working capital, capital expenditures, and acquisitions have negative effects. The positive coefficients on D00 indicate that the later years (2000s) are associated with more cash savings.

5.3 Cost of Capital and Cash Savings

To test whether firms' cash savings are sensitive to the COC, we include the COC and its interactions with external capital (ExCapital) and internal cash flows (ICF) in equation 15. The estimation results are reported in Table 3. For brevity, we do not report estimates on control variables. The negative and significant coefficient estimates of the COC suggest that firms save more when the COC is low. The economic magnitude of the impact is also

significant. A one percentage point decrease in the COC is associated with an approximately 9% increase in cash savings relative to the mean. The negative coefficient estimates of its interaction with external capital indicate that firms save significantly more from external capital when the COC is lower. The coefficient estimates of the interaction between the COC and *ICF* are also negative but marginally significant, which indicates that firms may also save more from internal cash flows when the COC is relatively low.

Table 3

6. Hedging Motive

Our model suggests that in the presence of the time-varying COC, cash savings enable firms to transfer resources from a low-cost state to a high-cost state. Moreover, firms with a high correlation between their COC and external financing needs (high hedging motive) have more incentives to do so. We test these predictions in this section.

6.1 Hedging Needs and Cash Savings

To test hypothesis 1a that firms with high hedging motives will save more when the COC is relatively low, we examine whether the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC is more pronounced for firms with high hedging needs. We split the sample into high and low hedging needs firms based on the hedging motive measures and report the results in Table 4. Hedging Motives 1 to 3 represent the correlation coefficients between the COC and each of the three measures of external capital needs (*External*, *Deficit*, and *KZ*), respectively.

The coefficient estimates of the interaction terms between external finance proceeds and the COC ($ExCapital \times COC$) are significant and negative only for high hedging needs firms, indicating that firms with greater hedging motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low. The results are consistent with hypothesis 1a.

Table 4

6.2 Hedging Needs and Excess Capital Issuance

Hypothesis 1b predicts that firms with greater hedging needs issue excess capital when the COC is relatively low. To test this prediction, we define excess capital issuance as net external capital issue proceeds minus financial deficit, which represents the portion of external capital that is saved as cash. Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for firms with high and low hedging needs based on three hedging motive measures. The coefficient estimates of the COC are negative and significant only for firms with high hedging needs. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1b, indicating that firms with high hedging needs issue excess external capital to save as cash when the COC is lower.

Table 5

6.3 Future Investment and Cash Savings

We now test hypothesis 1c, which predicts that firms save cash to fund future investments, with the following regression:

$$\Delta Cash_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 FInvest_{it} + \alpha_2 ICC_{it} + \alpha_3 FInvest_{it} \times ICC_{it} + \alpha_4 X_{it-1} + f_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(16)

where $FInvest_{it}$ is future investment at time t for firm i, defined as the average of investments in the subsequent two years scaled by lagged total assets.⁵ The same set of control variables used in equation 15 are included. We expect firms to save more when they expect

⁵The use of realized future investment is in line with the use of future stock returns in previous studies (Baker et al. (2003) and DeAngelo et al. (2010)).

greater future investment ($\alpha_1 > 0$) because their realized future investment will be positively correlated with managers' ex ante expected investment. We estimate model 16 separately for firms with low and high hedging needs. Since the incentive to save cash for future expected investment will be greater when facing a relatively low COC, we expect a negative sign for α_3 , especially for firms with greater hedging needs.

Panel B in Table 5 reports the results for high and low hedging needs firms based on three hedging motive measures. The coefficient estimates of future investment are positive and significant only for firms with high hedging needs. Moreover, the coefficient estimates of the interaction term between future investment and the COC are all negative and significant only for high hedging needs firms. These findings provide support for hypothesis 1c that firms with hedging needs save cash at a low cost for future investments.

6.4 Debt vs Equity

Thus far, our results show that firms save cash from external capital and that this saving behavior is affected by the COC. As equity and debt are two main sources of external capital, we investigate their relative importance for firms' cash savings. We first run a simple regression for each of the cash sources and report the results in Table 6 Panel A. The coefficient estimate of net equity issues (*EIssue*) is 0.3462 and significant, with an adjusted R^2 of 16.19%. The coefficient estimate of debt issues (*DIssue*) is a mere 0.0567, and the adjusted R^2 is 0.6%. The estimated coefficient of internal cash flows (*ICF*) is 0.2030 and statistically significant, with an adjusted R^2 of 4.37%. When we include all cash sources along with control variables (column 4) and firm fixed effects (column 5), the coefficient estimates of all the cash sources remain positive and significant. Overall, equity is the most important source for cash savings.

We then examine the relative importance of the COE and the COD for firms' cash savings by including the interaction terms of COE (COD) with net equity issue proceeds (net debt issue proceeds) and internal cash flows into our regression model. As shown in Table 6 Panel B, the coefficient estimates of COE are mostly negative and significant, while the coefficient estimates of COD are mostly insignificant. For all firms in Column (1), the coefficient estimates of both $Eissue \times COE$ and $ICF \times COE$ are negative and significant. The coefficient estimate of $Dissue \times COD$ is also negative and significant but that of $ICF \times COD$ is insignificant. These results suggest that firms' cash savings from equity issuance and internal cash flows are both sensitive to the COE, whereas cash savings from internal cash flows show little sensitivity to the COD.

When the sample is split into high and low hedging needs firms in the remaining columns, we find that the coefficient estimates of both $Eissue \times COE$ and $ICF \times COE$ are significant and negative only for high hedging needs firms. Thus, COE appears to be an important consideration in firms' cash savings decisions, particularly for firms with high hedging needs.

6.5 Exogenous Shock to the Cost of Capital

An endogeneity concern may arise if firms' cash savings affect their COC or if other confounding factors drive the observed relationship. To ease this concern and buttress our results for the causal effects of the COC on cash savings, we exploit an exogenous event that affects firms' COC. In particular, we use Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as a shock to the COC and investigate whether firms experiencing a greater reduction in their COC in the post-Reg FD period save more from external capital than firms experiencing a smaller reduction in COC. Reg FD, effective on October 23, 2000, prohibits the selective disclosure of material information to a subset of market participants, such as analysts and institutional investors, without simultaneously disclosing it to the public. By curtailing selective disclosure, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) believed that Reg FD would encourage continued widespread investor participation in capital markets, enhancing market efficiency and liquidity, and more effective capital raising. As a result, Reg FD lowered the COC for those firms with selective disclosure before Reg FD (Chen et al. (2010)).

Following Chen et al. (2010), we use market-to-book ratios (M/B) and R&D as firm characteristics indicative of selective disclosure and classify firms into treated and control groups. Specifically, treatment and control firms are defined as the top and bottom 30% ranked by the M/B ratio or as the top 50% ranked by the R&D-to-sales ratio among positive R&D firms and zero-R&D firms, respectively. We set the *Post* dummy as one for 2000-2002 and zero for 1997-1999.

Columns (1) and (2) in Table 7 show the results for the M/B- and R&D-based measures of selective disclosure, respectively. For both measures, the coefficient estimates of the triple interaction term $Treated \times ExCapital \times Post$ are positive and significant, which suggests that cash savings from external capital have significantly increased for firms with a larger reduction in the COC relative to firms with a smaller reduction in the COC following the legislation.

To ease the concern that the results may be driven by some omitted variables that affect both the COC and cash savings, we also conduct placebo tests based on the fictitious event years of 2006 and 2011. The sample period is 3 years before and 3 years since the fictitious event year. The results of the placebo tests reported in Columns (3)-(6) show that none of the coefficient estimates of $Treated \times ExCapital \times Post$ are significant. Thus, the results appear to be unique around the Reg FD and are less likely due to other confounding factors. These findings boost our confidence that the COC has a causal impact on corporate cash savings from external capital.

6.6 Robustness

Although we have shown that the COC has a significant impact on cash savings in the natural experimental setting, there can be an endogeneity concern due to measurement errors in the COC. As a remedy for measurement errors in the COC, we estimate the model using high-order cumulants as suggested by Erickson et al. (2014). Table A1 in Appendix 7 reports the estimation results. The coefficient estimates of the interaction of external capital and COC in Columns (1) and (2) are negative and significant for high hedging motive firms, whereas they are insignificant for lower hedging motive firms. The results are consistent with our main estimations. We also examine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of the COC using the Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) approaches as specified in Appendix 6. The results in Columns (3)-(6) remain robust to these alternative COC measures.

7. Financial Constraints and Alternative Measure

7.1 Financial Constraints

Since financial constraints are an important consideration for firms' cash savings decisions (Almeida et al. (2004)), it is possible that our results simply reflect financial constraints. To investigate this possibility, we examine whether financial constraints explain the cash savings

behavior observed in Table 3. Following previous studies, we use credit rating, the WW (Whited and Wu (2006)) index, and the HP (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)) index to define financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms are defined as those without (with) credit ratings or in the top (bottom) 30 percent of the WW index or the HP index.

Table 8

The results in Table 8 Panel A show that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save more when the COC is relatively low. In terms of economic magnitude, one percentage point decrease in the COC is associated with an approximately 9% increase in cash savings relative to the mean for both constrained and unconstrained firms.⁶ Moreover, the results suggest that external capital is a more important source of cash savings than internal cash flows for both constrained and unconstrained firms.

The estimated coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms. Firms' cash savings from external capital in response to the COC are also economically significant for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. When $ExCapital \times COC$ decreases by one standard deviation, the cash savings of financially unconstrained (constrained) firms increase by 17% (12%). The estimated coefficients of $ICF \times COC$ are also negative and significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms based on bond ratings, but significant only for financially constrained firms based on the WW and HP indexes. The results indicate that cash savings from internal cash flows are more sensitive to the COC for financially constrained firms.

We further test whether financial constraints help explain firms' excess capital issuance $\overline{}^{6}$ The average cash savings ratio of constrained and unconstrained firms is 2.06% and 0.83%, respectively.

in response to a low COC and the effects of future investments on cash savings. To this end, we partition firms with high (low) hedging motives into financially constrained and unconstrained firms. The unreported tables show that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms with high hedging motives raise external capital in excess of current financial needs when the COC is relatively low.⁷ The estimated coefficients of $FInvest \times COC$ are negative and significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms with high hedging motives, while the coefficients are insignificant for both constrained and unconstrained firms with low hedging motives. Overall, these results suggest that financial constraints cannot fully explain the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC.

7.2 Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) Hedging Measure

Acharya et al. (2007) (AAC, henceforth) suggest that financially constrained firms save cash to hedge investment opportunities against income shortfalls, while unconstrained firms do not have a propensity to save cash out of cash flows. They measure a firm's hedging needs by the correlation between the firm's cash flow from current operations and its industry-level median R&D expenditures. We investigate whether their hedging needs measure explains the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC.

We conduct tests based on our hedging motive and AAC hedging needs measures for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We report the results for high hedging motive firms in Panel B of Table 8. The coefficient estimates of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms when our hedging motive measure is used. These results are consistent with the finding in Panel A that

⁷The tables are available upon request.

both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save from external capital when the COC is relatively low. When the AAC measure is used, however, the coefficient estimates of $ExCapital \times COC$ are insignificant for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, whereas the coefficient estimate of $ICF \times COC$ is negative and significant for constrained firms. The results are consistent with the finding of Acharya et al. (2007) that financially constrained firms save from internal funds when they have high hedging needs against a cash flow shortage.

8. Alternative Explanations

8.1 Market Timing Motive

The market timing hypothesis suggests that firms may time the market and issue equity when it is overvalued. Mispricing in the stock market may be driven by nonfundamental components of the stock price such as investor sentiment, which affects the COC directly but not cash flows (Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2010). When such mispricing drives current COC below the expected COC, the firm may see an opportunity to issue external capital and save. Such cash savings, however, are not motivated by future investments (Bolton, Chen, and Wang, 2013). If market timing is the motive for firms' cash savings behavior, the effect should be captured by the sensitivity of excess capital to the COC for firms that depend more on external finance (Baker et al., 2003). These arguments lead to the following market timing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a External finance dependent firms save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low than do less external finance dependent firms.

Hypothesis 2b External finance dependent firms issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low than do less external finance dependent firms.

We conduct a series of tests to investigate whether the marketing timing motive can explain our results. To test market timing hypothesis 2a, we estimate the regression models for firms with high and low external finance dependence based on three external finance dependence measures. As shown in Table 9 Panel A, the coefficient estimates of $ExCapital \times$ COC are negative and significant for low external finance dependent firms, but insignificant for high external finance dependent firms. The results are inconsistent with market timing hypothesis 2a. Thus, the market timing motive does not fully explain the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC.

Table 9

In Panel C, we test market timing hypothesis 2b on excess external capital. The results show that the coefficient estimates of the COC are negative and significant for both low and high external finance dependence, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that excess capital issues are mainly driven by the market timing motive.

We also investigate whether the market timing motive explains the effects of future investment on cash savings by estimating model (16) separately for high and low market timing firms. In Panel D, the coefficient estimate of $FInvest \times COC$ is insignificant for firms with high market timing motives, but significant for firms with low market timing motives. Thus, the market timing motive does not explain the sensitivity of firms' cash savings to the COC when expecting future investments.

8.2 Precautionary Motive

The precautionary motive argues that firms can avoid external financing by saving cash from internal cash flows (Fazzari et al. (1998), Almeida et al. (2004), Opler et al. (1999), and Bates et al. (2009)). Taking advantage of a relatively low COC is not considered as the main reason for precautionary cash savings. In particular, Keynes (1936) argues that the quantity of cash demanded for precautionary purposes is not sensitive to changes in the COC because it is mainly determined by the general activity of the economic system and the level of income. Nevertheless, given the recent finding that the precautionary motive drives firms to save from equity issuance (McLean, 2011), we examine whether the cash savings of firms with stronger precautionary motives are more sensitive to the COC. Specifically, we test the following precautionary motive hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 3a** Firms with greater precautionary motives save more when the COC is relatively low than do firms with lesser precautionary motives.
- **Hypothesis 3b** Firms with greater precautionary motives issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with lesser precautionary motives.

We then test whether the precautionary motive explains the sensitivity of cash savings to the COC. Following previous studies, we use R&D spending, cash flow volatility, and nondividend payout as measures of precautionary motives that represent unforeseen opportunities and contingencies requiring sudden expenditures. Cash flow volatility is the 10-year standard deviation of average industry cash flow based on the 2-digit SIC code. We pay particular attention to the precautionary measure of McLean (2011) based on the first principal component of R&D spending and cash flow volatility. For R&D spending, cash flow volatility and their first principal component, we define the top 30% of firms as high precautionary firms and the bottom 30% as low precautionary firms. We also treat nondividend-paying firms as high precautionary firms and dividend-paying firms as low precautionary firms. Table 9 Panel B shows that the estimated coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are all negative and significant for both low and high precautionary firms. The results provide no support for precautionary hypothesis 3a.

We test precautionary hypothesis 3b on excess external capital and find that the coefficient estimates of the COC are negative and significant for both low and high precautionary motive firms (Panel C). The results are inconsistent with hypothesis 3b, indicating that the issuance of capital in excess of current financial needs is not mainly driven by the precautionary motive.

We also examine whether the precautionary motive explains the effects of future investment on cash savings. As shown in Panel D, the coefficient estimates of $FInvest \times COC$ are both insignificant for firms with high or low precautionary motives. Thus, there is no supporting evidence that the precautionary motive explains the effects of future investments on the sensitivity of firms' cash savings to the COC.

9. Conclusions

We develop a theoretical model showing that in the presence of a time-varying COC, firms channel funds into future states with a high COC by saving cash from external capital when the current COC is relatively low. In particular, when a firm expects a higher COC for future investments, it will increase cash savings from external capital at a low cost to lower the *overall* cost of capital. Cash savings and excess external financing show greater sensitivity to the COC among firms with greater hedging needs.

Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save more cash from external capital than they save from internal cash flows. The cash saving of firms with greater hedging needs is particularly sensitive to their COC. Moreover, firms with greater hedging needs tend to issue excess external capital when the COC is relatively low. Our findings cannot be fully explained either by the precautionary motive or by the market timing motive. Our study illustrates that firms' hedging motive to transfer funds from a low COC state to a higher COC state through cash savings is an important consideration for corporate cash savings policies.

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Figure 1: Cash Holdings versus Cost of Capital

This figure plots firms' average cash holdings relative to the level of the cost of capital (COC, COE, COD) from 1981 to 2015. Cash is cash and equivalents divided by total assets.







Figure 2: Cost of Capital and Cash Savings

The figure presents firms' cash savings across deciles of the deviation of cost of capital (COC) from its historical average for firms with a minimum of three-year observations for the sample period of 1981-2015 and the subsample periods of 1981-1998 and 1999-2015. Cash savings is the changes in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.



Figure 3: Cash Savings versus Future Investment

This figure plots firms' cash savings relative to future investment deciles. Future investment is defined as the two subsequent year average of capital expenditures plus acquisitions and R&D divided by lagged total assets. Cash saving is the current year change in cash and equivalents divided by lagged total assets.



Table 1: Summary Statistics

This table reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics (Panel A) and standard deviation of cost of capital cross firms and over time (Panel B). Δ Cash is the change in cash and equivalents (Cash) divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively. NWC is net working capital excluding cash and equivalents. M/B is market-to-book asset ratio. Vol is cash flow volatility. CapEx is capital expenditures. COE is cost of equity. COD is cost of debt. COC is weighted average of cost of capital. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.

		Panel A: Summa	ry Statistics
	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation
$\Delta Cash$	0.0175	0.0027	0.0912
Cash	0.1394	0.0793	0.1547
ExCapital	0.0423	0.0011	0.1761
ICF	0.0655	0.0623	0.0940
Size	6.4990	6.3408	1.8776
M/B	1.8535	1.4849	1.1855
Vol	0.0180	0.0153	0.0103
Dividend	0.0145	0.0042	0.0239
Leverage	0.2118	0.1974	0.1710
NWC	0.1079	0.0925	0.1709
CapEx	0.0709	0.0514	0.0976
Acquisitions	0.0433	0.0000	0.1190
R&D	0.0334	0.0000	0.0610
COE	0.0989	0.0939	0.0330
COD	0.0843	0.0762	0.0315
COC	0.0941	0.0904	0.0283
	Danal D	Decomposition	f Standard Deviation
		etien	
COE	0.026	27	0.0254
COE	0.026) (0.0204
COD	0.026	0U	0.0229
COC	0.023	51	0.0217

Table 2: Sensitivities of Cash Savings to Cash Sources

This table reports the sensitivities of cash savings to external capital and internal cash flows. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively. Control variables include Leverage, leverage ratio; Size; NWC, net working capital excluding cash and equivalents; M/B, market-to-book asset ratio; Vol, cash flow volatility, CapEx, capital expenditures; Acquisitions; Divdend; Cash; Tbill, the one-year treasury bill rate; Spread, the credit spread; and D90 and D00, dummy variables for 1990s and 2000s. Standardized beta coefficients are reported in Column (3). Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ExCapital	0.2897^{***}	0.2959^{***}	0.5502
	[0.0064]	[0.0071]	
ICF	0.2340^{***}	0.2277^{***}	0.2476
	[0.0082]	[0.0095]	
Cash	-0.0651***	-0.1937***	-0.1159
	[0.0037]	[0.0067]	
M/B	0.0051^{***}	0.0048^{***}	0.0741
	[0.0006]	[0.0007]	
Vol	0.2667^{***}	0.3529^{***}	0.0312
	[0.0346]	[0.0590]	
Dividend	-0.3706***	-0.3902***	-0.1006
	[0.0169]	[0.0303]	
Leverage	-0.0239***	0.0006	-0.0457
	[0.0022]	[0.0042]	
Size	-0.0017^{***}	-0.0115***	-0.0361
	[0.0002]	[0.0008]	
NWC	-0.0280***	0.0582^{***}	-0.0522
	[0.0026]	[0.0063]	
CapEx	-0.1722***	-0.1959^{***}	-0.1849
	[0.0068]	[0.0089]	
Acquisitions	-0.2717***	-0.2764***	-0.362
	[0.0072]	[0.0080]	
R&D	0.1142^{***}	0.0166	0.0791
	[0.0082]	[0.0274]	
Tbill	0.1479^{***}	0.0252	0.0536
	[0.0188]	[0.0219]	
Spread	0.8222***	0.5981^{***}	0.0607
	[0.0605]	[0.0624]	
D90	0.0052***	0.0107***	0.0278
	[0.0012]	[0.0014]	
D00	0.0143***	0.0309***	0.0814
	[0.0016]	[0.0021]	
Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No
Observations	60,003	59,353	60,003
$Adj. R^2$	0.2669	0.3196	0.2669

Table 3: The Cost of Capital and Cash Savings

This table reports the sensitivities of cash savings to the cost of capital and sources of cash. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. COC is weighted average cost of capital. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
COC	-0.1257***	-0.1454***	-0.1192***	-0.1790***	-0.1860***	-0.1611***
	[0.0141]	[0.0157]	[0.0157]	[0.0177]	[0.0191]	[0.0193]
ExCapital	0.3407^{***}	0.2898^{***}	0.3407^{***}	0.3513^{***}	0.2942^{***}	0.3509^{***}
	[0.0149]	[0.0064]	[0.0150]	[0.0155]	[0.0070]	[0.0155]
ICF	0.2342^{***}	0.2490^{***}	0.2492^{***}	0.2270^{***}	0.2699^{***}	0.2678^{***}
	[0.0082]	[0.0259]	[0.0260]	[0.0095]	[0.0269]	[0.0271]
ExCapital×COC	-0.5630***		-0.5630***	-0.6378***		-0.6330***
	[0.1520]		[0.1521]	[0.1546]		[0.1541]
ICF×COC		-0.1528	-0.1528		-0.4336*	-0.4155^{*}
		[0.2206]	[0.2224]		[0.2278]	[0.2302]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	60,003	60,003	60,003	$59,\!353$	59,353	$59,\!353$
$Adj. R^2$	0.2695	0.2686	0.2695	0.3229	0.322	0.323

Table 4: Hedging Motive

This table compares the impacts of the cost of capital on the sensitivities of cash savings to external capital between firms with high and low hedging motives. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. High and low hedging-need firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent, respectively based on the correlation between industry-level external finance and the COC (Hedging Motive 1), the correlation between financial deficit and the COC (Hedging Motive 2), and the correlation between KZ index and the COC (Hedging Motive 3). Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Firm fixed effects are controlled. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

	Hedging	Motive 1	Hedging	Motive 2	Hedging	Motive 3
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
COC	-0.1092***	-0.1969***	-0.1109***	-0.1872***	-0.3948***	0.0397
	[0.0361]	[0.0376]	[0.0349]	[0.0375]	[0.0417]	[0.0330]
ExCapital	0.3798^{***}	0.2990^{***}	0.3559^{***}	0.3169^{***}	0.3902^{***}	0.2647^{***}
	[0.0257]	[0.0284]	[0.0261]	[0.0299]	[0.0271]	[0.0274]
ICF	0.2834^{***}	0.2096^{***}	0.2538^{***}	0.2555^{***}	0.2637^{***}	0.1836^{***}
	[0.0546]	[0.0405]	[0.0502]	[0.0416]	[0.0572]	[0.0394]
ExCapital×COC	-0.8291***	-0.2064	-0.7168***	-0.1893	-0.9471^{***}	-0.0296
	[0.2484]	[0.2938]	[0.2503]	[0.3070]	[0.2665]	[0.2633]
ICF×COC	-0.5681	0.1698	-0.4671	-0.0515	-0.7487^{*}	0.319
	[0.4535]	[0.3672]	[0.4079]	[0.3803]	[0.4471]	[0.3477]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$17,\!410$	17,418	$17,\!379$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!494$
$Adj. R^2$	0.3405	0.3205	0.3293	0.3365	0.3596	0.2995

Table 5: Excess Capital Issuance and Future Investment

This table compares the sensitivities of excess capital issuance to cost of capital (Panel A) and the sensitivities of cash savings to future investment (Panel B) between firms with high and low hedging motives. The dependent variable in Panel A is excess capital issues. COC is weighted average cost of capital. The dependent variable in Panel B is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *FInvest* is future investment defined as the average of two subsequent years of capital expenditures plus acquisitions plus R&D divided by lagged total assets. High and low hedging-need firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent, respectively based on the correlation between industry-level external finance and the COC (Hedging Motive 1), the correlation between financial deficit and the COC (Hedging Motive 2), and the correlation between KZ index and the COC (Hedging Motive 3). Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

			Panel A: Exce	ess Issuanc	e	
	Hedging I	Motive 1	Hedging I	Motive 2	Hedging	Motive 3
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
COC	-0.7991***	0.0277	-0.9412***	-0.0404	-1.3122***	0.2517***
	[0.0633]	[0.0639]	[0.0698]	[0.0610]	[0.0800]	[0.0566]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$17,\!379$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!410$	17,418	$17,\!430$	$17,\!494$
$Adj. R^2$	0.2709	0.2442	0.2610	0.2457	0.2793	0.2537

		Pa	anel B: Futu	re Investmer	nt	
	Hedging	Motive 1	Hedging	Motive 2	Hedging I	Motive 3
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FInvest	0.0935^{***}	0.0163	0.0769^{***}	0.0327	0.1025^{***}	0.0074
	[0.0278]	[0.0265]	[0.0267]	[0.0269]	[0.0288]	[0.0266]
$\mathrm{FInvest} \times \mathrm{COC}$	-0.8049***	0.1511	-0.5442^{*}	0.1088	-0.8223***	0.2661
	[0.2942]	[0.2727]	[0.2834]	[0.2834]	[0.3047]	[0.2758]
COC	-0.2794^{***}	-0.2262***	-0.2479^{***}	-0.2328***	-0.6819***	0.0900^{**}
	[0.0507]	[0.0498]	[0.0465]	[0.0516]	[0.0553]	[0.0456]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17,410	17,418	$17,\!379$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!494$
$Adj. R^2$	0.1558	0.1466	0.1583	0.143	0.1761	0.1486

Table 6: Cash Savings: Equity vs Debt

This table compares cash savings from equity issues versus debt issues versus internal cash flows (Panel A) and the sensitivities of cash savings to sources of cash and cost of capital between firms with high and low hedging motives (Panel B). The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. High and low hedging-need firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent, respectively based on the correlation between industry-level external finance and the COC (Hedging Motive 1), the correlation between financial deficit and the COC (Hedging Motive 2), and the correlation between KZ index and the COC (Hedging Motive 3). Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

		Pane	el A: Equity vs	Debt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Eissue	0.3462^{***}			0.3967^{***}	0.4039^{***}
	[0.0076]			[0.0085]	[0.0096]
Dissue		0.0567^{***}		0.1985^{***}	0.2091***
		[0.0051]		[0.0075]	[0.0081]
ICF			0.2030^{***}	0.2246***	0.2145^{***}
			[0.0076]	[0.0079]	[0.0092]
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Firm Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	64,405	64,405	64,405	60,003	59,353
$Adj. R^2$	0.1619	0.0060	0.0437	0.2791	0.3289

		Pε	anel B: Cost	of Equity v	s Cost of De	ebt	
		Hedging	Motive 1	Hedging	Motive 2	Hedging	Motive 3
	All	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
COE	-0.1207***	-0.0775***	-0.1362***	-0.0737***	-0.1439***	-0.2688***	0.0133
	[0.0143]	[0.0275]	[0.0273]	[0.0245]	[0.0280]	[0.0314]	[0.0242]
COD	-0.0453*	0.0102	-0.1626^{***}	-0.0419	-0.0746^{*}	-0.0433	-0.0374
	[0.0231]	[0.0413]	[0.0428]	[0.0385]	[0.0435]	[0.0447]	[0.0402]
Eissue	0.4452^{***}	0.5161^{***}	0.4072^{***}	0.4695^{***}	0.4229^{***}	0.5278^{***}	0.3339^{***}
	[0.0253]	[0.0428]	[0.0465]	[0.0197]	[0.0455]	[0.0421]	[0.0462]
Dissue	0.2635^{***}	0.2686^{***}	0.2341^{***}	0.2100^{***}	0.3015^{***}	0.2534^{***}	0.2635^{***}
	[0.0149]	[0.0280]	[0.0260]	[0.0158]	[0.0266]	[0.0275]	[0.0262]
ICF	0.2884^{***}	0.3285^{***}	0.2018^{***}	0.3154^{***}	0.2766^{***}	0.3150^{***}	0.1874^{***}
	[0.0281]	[0.0574]	[0.0423]	[0.0261]	[0.0423]	[0.0582]	[0.0453]
$Eissue \times COE$	-0.4789^{*}	-1.1845^{***}	0.0021	-0.8090***	-0.0402	-1.2565^{***}	0.4166
	[0.2560]	[0.4246]	[0.4764]	[0.2040]	[0.4644]	[0.4327]	[0.4437]
$Dissue \times COD$	-0.6275^{***}	-0.6317^{**}	-0.5259^{**}	-0.0818	-1.0319^{***}	-0.4384	-0.8728***
	[0.1500]	[0.2694]	[0.2593]	[0.1656]	[0.2591]	[0.2784]	[0.2396]
$ICF \times COE$	-0.5976^{***}	-0.8045**	-0.1334	-0.6262^{***}	-0.3149	-0.9764^{***}	0.0469
	[0.1863]	[0.3664]	[0.2935]	[0.1718]	[0.3116]	[0.3614]	[0.2898]
$ICF \times COD$	-0.1728	-0.2947	0.1952	-0.5977^{**}	-0.173	-0.3566	0.0789
	[0.1972]	[0.3628]	[0.3245]	[0.2353]	[0.3273]	[0.3513]	[0.3449]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	59,353	$17,\!410$	17,418	$17,\!379$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!430$	$17,\!494$
$Adj. R^2$	0.3322	0.347	0.3392	0.3388	0.3492	0.3722	0.3143

Table 7: The Effect of Exogenous Shocks to the Cost of Capital on Cash Savings This table reports the effects of exogenous shocks to the cost of capital on cash savings for firms with high hedging motive. We use Regulation Fair Disclosure of 2000 (Reg FD) (Columns 1 and 2) as a shock to the cost of capital. We set the *Post* dummy as zero for 1997-1999 and one for 2000-2002. The remaining columns report placebo tests based on fictitious event years of 2006 (Columns 3 and 4) and 2011 (Columns 5 and 6). In columns 1, 3, and 5, treated firms are the top 50% of R&D-to-Sales ratio among positive R&D firms and control firms are zero-R&D firms. In columns 2, 4, and 6, treated and control firms are defined as top and bottom 30% of book-to-market ratio, respectively, measured in the event year. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

	Reg	FD	Pla	cebo 1	Place	ebo 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post	0.0227	0.0215^{*}	-0.0173	-0.0071	-0.0121*	-0.0180
	[0.0162]	[0.0126]	[0.0128]	[0.0095]	[0.0062]	[0.0142]
$Treated \times Post$	-0.0422*	0.0212	0.0001	0.0024	-0.0006	-0.0013
	[0.0251]	[0.0136]	[0.0148]	[0.0127]	[0.0135]	[0.0112]
$ExCapital \times Post$	-0.0703	0.0689^{*}	0.1919	0.0533	0.0680	0.0304
	[0.0623]	[0.0409]	[0.1566]	[0.0389]	[0.0490]	[0.0373]
ICF×Post	-0.5139^{**}	0.0817	0.0357	-0.0140	0.2382^{**}	0.1041^{**}
	[0.2361]	[0.0856]	[0.2758]	[0.0933]	[0.0962]	[0.0522]
${\rm Treated} \times {\rm ExCapital} \times {\rm Post}$	0.2748^{**}	0.2236^{***}	-0.1430	-0.0254	-0.1241	-0.0145
	[0.1116]	[0.0750]	[0.1655]	[0.0864]	[0.0902]	[0.0861]
$Treated \times ICF \times Post$	0.6021^{*}	-0.1281	0.0441	0.0534	-0.2385*	-0.0915
	[0.3209]	[0.1249]	[0.2879]	[0.1328]	[0.1356]	[0.1223]
$Treated \times ExCapital$	0.0741	0.0756	0.2064^{*}	0.1066	0.0704	0.1489^{**}
	[0.0864]	[0.0583]	[0.1213]	[0.0769]	[0.0813]	[0.0620]
$Treated \times ICF$	-0.0275	0.0932	-0.0631	-0.0730	0.1927^{*}	0.1505^{*}
	[0.1747]	[0.1212]	[0.2072]	[0.1223]	[0.0991]	[0.0832]
ExCapital	0.2388^{***}	0.2059^{***}	0.1355	0.2835^{***}	0.3440^{***}	0.2967^{***}
	[0.0753]	[0.0327]	[0.0993]	[0.0510]	[0.0467]	[0.0424]
ICF	0.2741^{*}	0.2025^{**}	0.1694	0.3079^{***}	0.0374	0.1483^{***}
	[0.1466]	[0.0822]	[0.2040]	[0.0828]	[0.0595]	[0.0455]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,161	2,169	$1,\!614$	$2,\!603$	$1,\!540$	2,426
$Adj. R^2$	0.4966	0.4119	0.2954	0.3031	0.4017	0.3717

Firms
Unconstrained
SV
Constrained
ö
Table

This table compares the sensitivities of cash savings to cost of capital and sources of cash between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (Panel A). Constrained and unconstrained firms are defined as firms that do not have a credit rating and firms that have a credit rating (Columns 1 and 2), top and bottom 30% of WW index (Whited and Wu (2006)) (Columns 3 and 4), top and bottom 30% of HP index (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)) (Columns 5 and 6), respectively. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Panel B compares cash savings from external capital and internal capital for financially constrained and unconstrained firms with high hedging motive using our hedging measure and using the Acharya et al. (2007) measure. The reported results are based on WW index and Hedging Motive 1 measure. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates on the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

		Pane	el A: Cash Savings	and Cost of Cap	bital	
	Rati	ing	WW II	ndex	HP In	dex
	Unconstrained	Constrained	Unconstrained	Constrained	Unconstrained	Constrained
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
COC	-0.0826***	-0.1889***	-0.0750***	-0.1822***	-0.1377***	-0.1754^{***}
	[0.0227]	[0.0262]	[0.0246]	[0.0382]	[0.0251]	[0.0422]
$\operatorname{ExCapital}$	0.2883^{***}	0.3683^{***}	0.2685^{***}	0.3748^{***}	0.2652^{***}	0.3794^{***}
	[0.0311]	[0.0180]	[0.0316]	[0.0292]	[0.0345]	[0.0235]
ICF	0.2270^{***}	0.2860^{***}	0.2313^{***}	0.3421^{***}	0.1730^{***}	0.3168^{***}
	[0.0423]	[0.0326]	[0.0388]	[0.0402]	[0.0476]	[0.0439]
$ExCapital \times COC$	-0.9598***	-0.5716^{***}	-0.8544^{***}	-0.6891^{**}	-0.7893^{**}	-0.4032^{*}
	[0.2951]	[0.1791]	[0.3058]	[0.2728]	[0.3091]	[0.2330]
ICF×COC	-0.8359^{**}	-0.4532^{*}	-0.5761	-1.0025^{***}	0.0104	-0.7275^{**}
	[0.3831]	[0.2697]	[0.3857]	[0.3528]	[0.4455]	[0.3476]
Controls	Yes	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}
Observations	19,386	39,560	17,479	16,920	17,738	16,894
$Adj. R^2$	0.2307	0.3393	0.1997	0.3379	0.193	0.3865

	Pa	anel B: Compare	with AAC Measure	
	High Hedgin	ng Motive	High AAC	Measure
	Unconstrained	Constrained	Unconstrained	Constrained
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
COC	-0.0443	-0.1465**	-0.0512	-0.1741***
	[0.0511]	[0.0602]	[0.0444]	[0.0533]
ExCapital	0.3039***	0.3911***	0.2435***	0.3482***
-	[0.0532]	[0.0504]	[0.0494]	[0.0366]
ICF	0.0994	0.3435***	0.2512***	0.3626***
	[0.0855]	[0.0604]	[0.0611]	[0.0635]
$ExCapital \times COC$	-0.7974*	-1.1449**	-0.6358	-0.4136
	[0.4689]	[0.4723]	[0.4872]	[0.3427]
ICF×COC	0.2981	-1.3072**	-0.8785	-1.1528**
	[0.8058]	[0.5080]	[0.6448]	[0.5497]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,033	$5,\!276$	$7,\!933$	8,715
$Adj. R^2$	0.2371	0.3293	0.1956	0.3463

Table 9: Alternative Motives

This table reports the test results of alternative motives for cash saving: market timing and precautionary Motive. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Panel A compares the impacts of cost of capital on the sensitivities of cash savings to external capital between high and low external finance dependent firms. We use Financial Deficit (EFD 1), External Finance (EFD 2), and KZ Index (EFD 3) to measure external finance dependence. For each measure, we define firms in the top 30 percent as high external finance dependent firms and those in the bottom 30 percent as low external finance dependence firms, dropping the middle 40 percent. Panel B compares the impacts of cost of capital on sensitivities of cash savings to equity issues between firms with high and low precautionary motives. Firms with high (low) precautionary motives are defined as those without (with) dividend payments, those in the top 30 percent (bottom 30 percent) based on R&D expenditures, the industry-level median cash flow volatility (CF Risk), and a precautionary motive measure (*Precaution*), respectively. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Panel C and D test whether market timing or precautionary motive explains the sensitivities of excess capital issuance to cost of capital and the sensitivities of cash savings to future investment. Firm fixed effects are controlled. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

	Panel A: Market Timing Motive						
	EFD 1		EF	EFD 2		EFD 3	
	High Low		High	Low	High	Low	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
COC	-0.1686***	-0.3399***	-0.1503***	-0.3098***	-0.0740***	-0.2304***	
	[0.0374]	[0.0664]	[0.0267]	[0.0707]	[0.0228]	[0.0478]	
ExCapital	0.2723^{***}	0.4533^{***}	0.2832^{***}	0.4374^{***}	0.2250^{***}	0.3996^{***}	
	[0.0230]	[0.0364]	[0.0260]	[0.0301]	[0.0252]	[0.0294]	
ICF	0.0972^{**}	0.4190***	0.0202	0.4373^{***}	0.2206^{***}	0.2337***	
	[0.0381]	[0.0579]	[0.0359]	[0.0619]	[0.0376]	[0.0472]	
$ExCapital \times COC$	-0.2593	-1.2515^{***}	-0.3331	-1.0502***	-0.0616	-0.5948*	
	[0.2137]	[0.3687]	[0.2365]	[0.3164]	[0.2351]	[0.3163]	
ICF×COC	-0.0318	-0.1128	0.3196	0.0252	-0.2502	-0.0542	
	[0.3092]	[0.5629]	[0.2928]	[0.5819]	[0.3702]	[0.3970]	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	$15,\!966$	$16,\!651$	$16,\!042$	$17,\!520$	$17,\!021$	$17,\!010$	
$Adj.$ R^2	0.3421	0.3792	0.2935	0.3955	0.3172	0.3399	

	Panel B: Precautionary Motive							
	Dividend		R&D		CFSD		Precaution	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
COC	-0.1296***	-0.2281***	-0.1898***	*-0.1328***	-0.1667***	-0.1125***	-0.1608***	-0.1479***
	[0.0222]	[0.0341]	[0.0293]	[0.0238]	[0.0333]	[0.0435]	[0.0337]	[0.0423]
ExCapital	0.2579^{***}	0.3876***	0.3932***	0.2688***	0.4045^{***}	0.2964^{***}	0.3981***	0.2971^{***}
	[0.0213]	[0.0202]	[0.0225]	[0.0199]	[0.0258]	[0.0294]	[0.0272]	[0.0306]
ICF	0.2312***	0.2897***	0.2416***	0.3087***	0.3390***	0.2939***	0.3532^{***}	0.2827***
	[0.0301]	[0.0376]	[0.0371]	[0.0389]	[0.0354]	[0.0608]	[0.0328]	[0.0608]
ExCapital×COC	2-0.5456***	-0.5720***	·-0.4763**	-0.5133***	-0.5195**	-0.5752**	-0.4959**	-0.6242**
	[0.1898]	[0.2107]	[0.2333]	[0.1797]	[0.2451]	[0.2869]	[0.2515]	[0.2940]
ICF×COC	-0.1545	-0.6961**	-0.1377	-0.8652***	-0.6259*	-0.8060	-0.7711**	-0.5483
	[0.2689]	[0.3170]	[0.3135]	[0.3279]	[0.3274]	[0.5392]	[0.3002]	[0.5546]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$33,\!016$	$25,\!676$	$29,\!336$	$29,\!837$	$17,\!433$	$16,\!980$	$17,\!293$	$16,\!619$
Adj. R^2	0.2173	0.3588	0.3692	0.2608	0.3616	0.3223	0.3472	0.3293

	Panel C: Excess Issuance				
	Market	Timing	Precautionary		
	High	High Low		Low	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
COC	-0.4578***	-0.5428***	-0.2746***	-0.3855***	
	[0.0598]	[0.0710]	[0.0560]	[0.0704]	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	$15,\!966$	$16,\!651$	$17,\!293$	$16,\!619$	
$Adj. R^2$	0.2152	0.3626	0.2493	0.3049	

	Panel D: Future Investment					
	Market	Timing	Precautionary			
	High Low		High	Low		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
FInvest	0.0297	0.1249***	0.0579**	0.0536		
	[0.0249]	[0.0318]	[0.0247]	[0.0326]		
$FInvest \times COC$	-0.1944	-0.8801**	-0.2982	-0.1924		
	[0.2633]	[0.3501]	[0.2579]	[0.3320]		
COC	-0.2582***	-0.3851^{***}	-0.2156***	-0.2462***		
	[0.0503]	[0.0627]	[0.0480]	[0.0511]		
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	$15,\!966$	$16,\!651$	$17,\!293$	$16,\!619$		
$Adj. R^2$	0.1901	0.2026	0.1364	0.188		

Appendix 1: The first-order conditions

For $X_t > 0$, the Lagrangian for the maximization problem (2) at t can be written as follows:

$$\begin{split} L_t(I_t,C_t,X_t) &= \left[W_t - C_t - I_t - \lambda_t(X_t) \right] + \mu_t [X_t - I_t - \lambda_t(X_t) - C_t + W_t] + \psi_t C_t \\ &+ \int_{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)}^{\infty} \left\{ \pi(I_{t+1}^*) + \pi(I_t) + z + C_t - I_{t+1}^* \right\} g(z) dz \\ &+ \int_{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)}^{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)} \left\{ \pi(C_t + \pi(I_t) + z) \right\} g(z) dz. \\ &+ \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{I}_{t+1} - C_t - \pi(I_t)} \left\{ \pi(\hat{I}_{t+1}) - \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \right\} g(z) dz. \end{split}$$

where μ_t and ψ are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in (2). Applying Leibnitz integral rule, the first order conditions for I_t , C_t , X_t , and μ_t , respectively, are

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L_{t}}{\partial I_{t}} &= -1 - \mu_{t} + \pi_{I}(I_{t}) \left(\int_{l_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})}^{\infty} g(z)dz + \pi(I_{t+1}^{*}) \right) \\ &+ \pi_{I}(I_{t}) \left(\int_{\hat{l}_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})}^{I_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} \{\pi_{I}(C_{t}+\pi(I_{t})+z)\} g(z)dz - \pi(I_{t+1}^{*}) + \pi(\hat{I}_{t+1}) \right) \\ &+ \pi_{I}(I_{t}) \left(\int_{-\infty}^{\hat{l}_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} \pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t+1})g(z)dz - \{\pi(\hat{I}_{t+1}) - \mathbb{1}_{(X_{t+1}>0)}\lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}))\} \right) \\ &= -1 - \mu_{t} + \pi_{I}(I_{t}) \left(1 + \int_{\hat{l}_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})}^{I_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} \{\pi_{I}(C_{t}+\pi(I_{t})+z) - 1\} g(z)dz \\ &+ \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{l}_{t+1}-C_{t}-\pi(I_{t})} \{\pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t+1}) + \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) - 1\} g(z)dz \\ &= [1 + H]\pi_{I}(I_{t}) - 1 - \mu_{t} = 0 \end{aligned}$$
(A.1)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial C_t} &= H - \mu_t - \psi_t = 0\\ \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial X_t} &= -\lambda'_t(X_t) + \mu_t [1 - \lambda'_t(X_t)] = 0\\ \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial \mu_t} &= X_t - I_t - \lambda_t(X_t) - C_t + W_t = 0 \end{aligned}$$

If the firm is financially unconstrained with sufficient initial endowment to make the initial investment and cash savings decisions $(W_t \ge C_t + I_t \text{ or } X_t \le 0)$, we have $\lambda_t(X_t) = 0$ and the Lagrangian for the maximization problem (2) at t can be written as follows:

$$\begin{split} L_t(I_t,C_t,X_t) &= [W_t - C_t - I_t] + \mu_t [X_t - I_t - C_t + W_t] \\ &+ \int_{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)}^{\infty} \left\{ \pi(I_{t+1}^*) + \pi(I_t) + z + C_t - I_{t+1}^* \right\} g(z) dz \\ &+ \int_{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)}^{I_{t+1}^* - C_t - \pi(I_t)} \left\{ \pi(C_t + \pi(I_t) + z) \right\} g(z) dz. \\ &+ \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{I}_{t+1} - C_t - \pi(I_t)} \left\{ \pi(\hat{I}_{t+1}) - \lambda_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \right\} g(z) dz. \end{split}$$

and the first order conditions for I_t , C_t , X_t , and μ_t , respectively, are

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial I_t} &= [1+H]\pi_I(I_t) - 1 = 0\\ \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial C_t} &= H - \psi_t = 0\\ \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial X_t} &= \mu_t = 0\\ \frac{\partial L_t}{\partial \mu_t} &= X_t - I_t - C_t + W_t = 0 \end{split}$$

Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1

From the first order conditions of the optimization problem at t for $X_t > 0$ satisfying $\hat{X}_t = \hat{I}_t + \lambda_t(\hat{X}_t) + \hat{C}_t - W_t$, we differentiate each condition with respect to λ_{t+1} .

$$\{H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t)\} \frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_C \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) = 0$$

$$H_I \frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_C \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_{\lambda_{t+1}} = 0$$

$$- \frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} - \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + [1 - \lambda_t'(X_t)] \frac{\partial \hat{X}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = 0$$

where

$$H_{C} = \int_{\hat{I}_{t+1}-\hat{C}_{t}-\pi(\hat{I}_{t})}^{I_{t+1}-\hat{C}_{t}-\pi(\hat{I}_{t})} \pi_{II}(\hat{C}_{t}+\pi(\hat{I}_{t})+z)g(z)dz < 0, \text{ and}$$

$$H_{I} = \pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t})H_{C} < 0,$$

$$H_{\lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\partial\lambda_{t+1}(\hat{X}_{t+1})}{\partial\lambda_{t+1}} \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{I}_{t+1}-\hat{C}_{t}-\pi(\hat{I}_{t})} g(z)dz > 0.$$

 H_I and H_C represent the marginal reduction in underinvestment at t + 1 due to increased investment and cash savings at time t, respectively, whereas $H_{\lambda_{t+1}}$ represents the effects of external finance cost on underinvestment, *ceteris paribus*.

The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the derivatives is

$$D = \begin{vmatrix} H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t) & H_C \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & 0 \\ H_I & H_C & 0 \\ -1 & -1 & 1 - \lambda'_t(X_t) \end{vmatrix}$$
$$= [1 - \lambda'(X_t)]H_C(1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t),$$

By the implicit function theorem and Crammer's rule we get

$$\frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} -H_{\lambda_{t+1}}\pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & H_C\pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & 0\\ -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} & H_C & 0\\ 0 & -1 & 1 - \lambda_t'(X_t) \end{vmatrix}}{D} = 0.$$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H) \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t) & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & 0 \\ H_I & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 - \lambda_t'(X_t) \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{-H_{\lambda_{t+1}}}{H_C} > 0,$$

and

$$\frac{\partial \hat{X}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t) & H_C \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) \\ H_I & H_C & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \\ -1 & -1 & 0 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{-H_{\lambda_{t+1}}}{[1-\lambda'_t(X_t)]H_C} > 0,$$

For $X_t \leq 0$, $\hat{X}_t = \hat{I}_t + \hat{C}_t - W_t$ and differentiating each FOC with respect to λ_{t+1} yields

$$\{H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t)\} \frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_C \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) = 0$$

$$H_I \frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_C \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + H_{\lambda_{t+1}} = 0$$

$$- \frac{\partial \hat{I}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} - \frac{\partial \hat{C}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} + \frac{\partial \hat{X}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = 0$$

The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the derivatives is

$$D = \begin{vmatrix} H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t) & H_C \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & 0 \\ H_I & H_C & 0 \\ -1 & -1 & 1 \end{vmatrix}$$
$$= H_C(1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t),$$

By the implicit function theorem and Crammer's rule we get

$$\frac{\partial \hat{I}_{t}}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t}) & H_{C} \pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t}) & 0 \\ -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} & H_{C} & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = 0,$$
$$\frac{\partial \hat{C}_{t}}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} H_{I} \pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t}) + (1+H) \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_{t}) & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_{I}(\hat{I}_{t}) & 0 \\ H_{I} & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{-H_{\lambda_{t+1}}}{H_{C}} > 0,$$

and

$$\frac{\partial \hat{X}_t}{\partial \lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} H_I \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) + (1+H)\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_t) & H_C \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \pi_I(\hat{I}_t) \\ H_I & H_C & -H_{\lambda_{t+1}} \\ -1 & -1 & 0 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{-H_{\lambda_{t+1}}}{H_C} > 0.$$

Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2

For $X_t > 0$, with $\lambda_{t+1}(\hat{X}_{t+1})$ replaced by $\Lambda_{t+1}(\hat{X}_{t+1}, \gamma)$ and using the results from Appendix 2, we have the following:

$$\begin{split} &\frac{\partial^2 \hat{I}_t}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} &= 0, \\ &\frac{\partial^2 \hat{C}_t}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} &= -\frac{H_{\gamma \Lambda_{t+1}}}{H_C} > 0 \\ &\frac{\partial^2 \hat{X}_t}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} &= -\frac{-H_{\gamma \Lambda_{t+1}} [1 - \Lambda_t'(X_t, \gamma)] - H_{\Lambda_{t+1}} \Lambda_{\gamma t}'(X_t, \gamma)}{[1 - \Lambda_t'(X_t, \gamma)]^2 H_C} > 0, \end{split}$$

where

$$H_{\gamma\Lambda_{t+1}} = \frac{\partial^2 \Lambda_{t+1}(\hat{X}_{t+1}, \gamma)}{\partial \Lambda_{t+1} \partial \gamma} \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{t}_{t+1} - \hat{C}_t - \pi(\hat{t}_t)} g(z) dz > 0, \text{ and}$$
$$\Lambda_{\gamma t}'(X_t) = \frac{\partial^2 \Lambda_{t+1}(\hat{X}_{t+1}, \gamma)}{\partial X_{t+1} \partial \gamma} > 0.$$

Appendix 4: A Dynamic Model

We build upon the models of Whited (1992), Whited and Wu (2006) and Gomes et al. (2006) to consider the effects of the time-varying cost of external capital on cash savings in a dynamic setting. The firm maximizes the expected discounted value of future cash flows:

$$V_t = \max_{(I_t, K_{t+j}, C_{t+j})_{j=0}^{\infty}} E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \left\{ d_{t+j} - \lambda_t(X_t, \gamma) \right\},$$
(A.2)

where E_t is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t, $M_{t,t+j}$ is the discount factor at time t for cash flows at t+j, and d_{t+j} is cash flow at time t+j given as:

$$d_t = \pi(K_t, S_t) - \phi(K_t, I_t) - I_t + X_t + C_t - C_{t+1},$$
(A.3)

where K_t is the capital stock at time t; I_t is investment between t and t + 1; X_t is the amount of external finance at t; $\pi(K_t, S_t)$ is the cash flow at time t from production with the first partial derivative with regard to K given as $\pi_K > 0$; S_t is an exogenous state variable; $\phi(K_t, I_t)$ is the cost of adjustment, with the partial derivatives satisfying $\phi_I > 0$, $\phi_{II} > 0$ and $\phi_K < 0$;⁸ C_t is the liquid asset called "cash" at time t.

Thus, the model allows firms to invest in two distinctive assets with possibly different returns: capital stock K_t and cash C_t . The external finance cost function, $\lambda_t(X_t, \gamma)$, varies with time, which may be due to market frictions such as asymmetric information. γ is a measure of the strength of the correlation between the external capital needs and the cost of external capital. We also assume $\lambda_t(X_t) > 0$ and $\lambda'_t(X_t) > 0$ for $X_t > 0$ whereas $\lambda_t(X_t) = 0$ for $X_t \leq 0$, which implies that the marginal external financing cost increases with the amount of external capital raised (see Gomes (2001)).

Capital accumulation follows the rule:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t, \tag{A.4}$$

where δ is the depreciation rate, $\delta \in (0, 1)$. The dividend constraint is

$$d_t \ge d^*,\tag{A.5}$$

This constraint on d has the same effect as a restriction on external capital as seen in financial

⁸These conditions imply a convex adjustment cost with economies of scale.

constraint models.

The Lagrangian function conditional on the information set at time t is

$$V_{t} = \max_{(I_{t+j}, K_{t+j}, C_{t+j}, X_{t+j})_{j=0}^{\infty}} E_{t} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \left\{ (1 + \mu_{t+j}) d_{t+j} - \lambda_{t+j} (X_{t+j}, \gamma) - q_{t+j} [K_{t+1+j} - (1 - \delta) K_{t+j} - I_{t+j}] \right\}$$
(A.6)

where q_t and μ_t are the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (A.4) and (A.5), respectively. The first-order conditions for maximizing the firm value at t with respect to I_t , K_{t+1} , C_{t+1} , and X_{t+1} , respectively, are given as follows:

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial I_t} = -(1+\mu_t) \left[\phi_I(K_t, I_t) + 1 \right] + q_t = 0;$$
(A.7)

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial K_{t+1}} = E_t \left(M_{t,t+1} \left\{ (1+\mu_{t+1}) \left[\pi_K(K_{t+1}, S_{t+1}) - \phi_K(K_{t+1}, I_{t+1}) \right] + (1-\delta) q_{t+1} \right\} \right) - q_t = 0;$$
(A.8)

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial C_{t+1}} = E_t \{ M_{t,t+1} (1 + \mu_{t+1}) \} - (1 + \mu_t) = 0; \text{ and}$$
(A.9)

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial X_t} = 1 + \mu_t - \lambda'_t(X_t, \gamma) = 0.$$
(A.10)

Equation (A.7) suggests that a firm's optimal investment is determined to be where the product of the opportunity cost of external financing and the marginal cost of adjustment is equal to the marginal rate of return on the investment at t. Clearly, the firm's investment in the presence of external financing costs will be less than optimal.

Without time-varying external financing costs ($\lambda'_t = \lambda'_{t+1}$), condition (A.9) also implies that saving cash today does not affect firm value. In the presence of the time-varying costs of external capital, however, the firm's investment and cash savings decisions depend on the relative (in an intertemporal sense) costs of external capital. To see this, note that we obtain the following equations from equations (A.7) - (A.9):

$$\phi_I(K_t, I_t) + 1 = E_t \left\{ M_{t,t+1} \left(\frac{1 + \lambda'_{t+1}(X_t, \gamma)}{1 + \lambda'_t(X_t, \gamma)} \right) \left[1 + \pi_K(K_{t+1}, S_{t+1}) \right] \right\}$$
(A.11)

$$-\phi_{K}(K_{t+1}, I_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta) \left[\phi_{I}(K_{t+1}, I_{t+1}) + 1 \right] \right] \left\}; \text{ and} \\ E_{t} \left\{ M_{t,t+1} \left(\frac{1 + \lambda'_{t+1}(X_{t}, \gamma)}{1 + \lambda'_{t}(X_{t}, \gamma)} \right) \right\} = 1.$$
(A.12)

The relative costs of external finance, $\Lambda_t(\gamma) = (1 + \lambda'_{t+1}(X_t, \gamma))/(1 + \lambda'_t(X_t, \gamma))$, in equations (A.11) and (A.12) represent the effect on the investment and savings decisions from the intertemporal variation in the costs of external finance and the correlation between the expected cost of external capital and future capital needs.

Given Assumption 1 for the two-period model regarding the external finance cost function, it is straightforward to see that $\Lambda_t(\gamma)$ is an increasing function of γ for $\lambda'_t < \lambda'_{t+1}$; i.e., the effect of the intertemporal costs of external capital is magnified for firms with a greater correlation between the expected COC and future external capital needs.

Appendix 5: Definitions of Variables

The following are variable definitions used in this study. Items in parentheses are variable names as used in the Compustat annual database.

Acquisitions = acquisitions (aqc) / lagged total assets (at)

- **Cash Flow** (CF) = operating income before depreciation (oibdp)/lagged plant and equipment (ppent)
- Cash = cash and cash Equivalents (che) / total assets (at)
- Cost of Capital (COC) = weighted average cost of capital
- $\Delta Cash = change in cash and cash Equivalents (chech) / lagged total assets (at)$
- Cost of Debt (COD) = whichever is the greater: interest expense (xint) divided by the average of total debt at the beginning and the end of the year; or AAA-rated bond yield
- Cost of Equity (ICC) = Implied Cost of capital
- **Credit Spread** (*Spread*) = difference in yield between maturity matched Treasury yield and AAA-rated corporate bonds
- **Dividend** = cash dividend (dv) / lagged total assets (at)
- D90 = 1 if fiscal year between 1991 and 2000; 0 otherwise
- D00 = 1 if fiscal year after 2000; 0 otherwise
- **External Capital** (ExCapital) =Net Equity Issuance (EIssue) + Net Debt Issuance (DIssue)
- **External Finance** (*External*) = [capital expenditures (capx) internal cash flow (ibc+dp)]/capx
- External Finance Dependence (KZ) = -1.002CF 39.368DIV 1.315CASH + 3.139LEV
- **Excess Issuance** = Net Equity Issuance (EIssue) + Net Debt Issuance (DIssue) Financial Deficit (Deficit)
- Financial Deficit (Deficit) = [dividends + acquisitions + net investment internal cash flow]/ lagged total assets (at)⁹
- Future Investment (FInvest) = the average of two subsequent years of [capital expenditures (capx) + acquisitions (acq) + R&D]/ lagged total assets (at)
- **HP index** = $-0.737Size + 0.043Size^2 0.04Age$, where Size is the natural logarithm of total assets capped by \$4.65 billion and Age is the number of years since the firm's initial offering capped by 37
- **Internal Cash Flow** (ICF) = [income before extraordinary items (ibc) + depreciation and amortization (dpc)] /lagged total assets (at)

⁹We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) to include the change in the non-financial components of net working capital as part of funds from operations in defining the financial deficit and external finance dependence.

Leverage = [short-term debt (dlc) + long-term debt (dltt)] / total assets (at)

- M/B = market value of assets / total assets (at), where market value of assets is given by total assets (at) common equity (ceq) + market value of common equity (common shares outstanding (csho) × share price (prcc))
- Net Debt Issuance (DIssue) = [long-term debt issues (dltis) long-term debt reduction (dltr) + change in current debt (dlcch)] / lagged total assets (at)
- **Net Equity Issuance** (*EIssue*) = [sale of common and preferred stock (sstk) purchase of common and preferred stock (prstkc)] / lagged total assets (at)
- Net Investment (*INV*) = [increase in investment (invch) + capital expenditures (capx) + other use of funds (fuseo)- sales of property and plants (sppe) sales of investment (siv) short-term investment change (ivstch) -other investment activities (ivaco)]/lagged total assets (at)
- Net Working Capital NWC = [current assets (act) Current Liabilities (lct) Cash (che)] / total assets
- **Operating Cash Flow** (OCF) = operating income before depreciation (oibdp)
- **Precaution** = the first principal component of firm-level R&D and 2-digit industry cash flow volatility (CFRisk).
- $\mathbf{R} \mathbf{\&} \mathbf{D}$ = research and development expense (xrdq) / Sales
- Size = logarithm of total assets (at)
- Tax Rate (Taxr) =whichever is the lower: tax payment (txt) divided by pretax income (pi) or the statutory maximum tax rate
- Vol (Cash Flow Volatility)] = standard deviation of 2-digit SIC industry average cash flow (ICF) for the prior ten years
- **Tbill** = 3-month T-bill rate (annual average of monthly observations)
- WW index = -0.091ICF-0.062 Div+0.021LTD-0.044Size+0.102ISG-0.035SG, where Div is an indicator for dividend; LTD is long-term debt ratio; ISG is industry sales growth rate; and SG is the firm's sales growth rate
- **Yield Spread** (*Spread*) = BBB-bond yield AAA-bond yield (annual average of monthly observations)

Appendix 6: Estimation procedure for the COE

The Claus and Thomas (2001) model is based on the economic profit for shareholders as in the following equation:

$$P_t = BE_t + \sum_{k=1}^{5} \frac{FE_{t+k} - ICC_t \times BE_{t+k-1}}{(1 + ICC_t)^k} + \frac{(FE_{t+5} - ICC_t \times BE_{t+4})(1 + g_t)}{(ICC_t - g_t)(1 + ICC_t)^5}$$
(A.13)

where P_t is the current stock price and the growth rate after 5 years, g_t , is estimated by inflation rate. We obtain the initial forecast value of equity as $BE_{t+1} = BE_t + FE_{t+1} \times b_{t+1}$, where BE_t is the book equity value per share at t; FE_{t+1} is forecasted earnings per share at t + 1; and b_{t+1} is the retention ratio at t + 1.

The Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) model is based on the following equation:

$$P_t = BE_t + \sum_{k=1}^{12} \frac{(ROE_{t+k} - ICC_t)BE_{t+k-1}}{(1 + ICC_t)^k} + \frac{(ROE_{t+12} - ICC_t)BE_{t+11}}{ICC_t(1 + ICC_t)^{12}}$$
(A.14)

where ROE_{t+k} is the return on equity at t + k which is assumed to revert linearly to the median industry ROE by year t + 12. The industry median ROE is for 48 Fama and French industries based on past 10-year data, excluding firms with losses. The book value of equity is estimated by $BE_{t+k} = BE_{t+k-1} + FE_{t+k} \times b_{t+k}$.

The Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) model is as follows:

$$P_t = \sum_{k=1}^{15} \frac{FE_{t+k} \times [1 - b_{t+1} + \frac{(b_{t+1} - \frac{TC}{ICC_t})}{15} \times (k-1)]}{(1 + ICC_t)^k} + \frac{FE_{t+15} \times (1 - b_t)}{(ICC_t - g_t)(1 + ICC_t)^{15}}.$$
 (A.15)

The model has two parts: 1) the present value of cash flows up to year (t + 15); and 2) the present value of cash flows beyond year t + 15. For the first two years' earnings, we use the median forecasts by analysts and forecast earnings FE_{t+k} from year t + 3 to year t + T + 1 as $FE_{t+k} = FE_{t+2} \times (1 + g_{t+3} \exp\{g_t^g \times (k-2)\})$. We assume that the earnings growth rate g_{t+3} will mean-revert exponentially to steady-state values by year t + T + 2. The assumption implies that $g_{t+3} \exp\{g_t^g \times 15\} = g_t$ with g_t^g being the growth rate of growth rate g_{t+2} , which yields $g_t^g = \ln\left(\frac{g_t}{g_{t+2}}\right)/15$. For g_{t+3} , we use the median long-term growth rate forecast of analysts. If the long-term growth rate forecast is not available, we estimate it using the first two years' forecast earnings: $g_{t+3} = \frac{FE_{t+2}}{FE_{t+1}} - 1$. The steady-state earning growth rate (g_t) is

assumed to be a rolling average of annual GDP growth rate.

We construct the stream of dividends as $D_{t+k} = FE_{t+k} \times (1 - b_{t+k})$ for $1 \le k \le 15$. The initial retention ratio is estimated as $b_{t+1} = [1$ - Cash Dividend_t /Net Income_t]. For years t + 2 to t + T + 1, we estimate the retention rate as $b_{t+k} = b_{t+1} - \frac{(b_{t+1} - \frac{g_t}{ICC_t})}{15} \times (k - 1)$. The retention rate is assumed to revert linearly to a steady-state rate $b_t = \frac{g_t}{ICC_t}$ by year t + T + 1. After terminal year, we estimate the terminal value of remaining cash flows using the Gordon growth model: $FE_{t+15} \times (1 - b_t)/(ICC_t - g_t)$.

Appendix 7: Robustness Check

Table A1: Hedging Motive: Robustness

This table reports the robustness of the impacts of cost of capital on the sensitivities of cash savings to external capital between firms with high and low hedging motives. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. ExCapital and ICF are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. High and low hedging-need firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent, respectively based on the correlation between industry-level external finance and COC. We use high order linear cumulants (Erickson et al. (2014)) to account for measurement errors in the cost of capital measure (Columns 1 and 2). Claus and Thomas (2001) (Columns 3 and 4) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) (Columns 5 and 6) are used as alternative COE measures. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Firm fixed effects are controlled. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

	High-Order Cumulants		Gebhardt et al. (2001)		Claus and Thomas (2001)	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
COC	0.0431	0.0536	-0.0284	-0.0293	0.0293	-0.0286
	[0.0766]	[0.0774]	[0.0398]	[0.0367]	[0.0263]	[0.0283]
ExCapital	0.3453^{***}	0.2484^{***}	0.2825^{***}	0.2140^{***}	0.2892^{***}	0.2232^{***}
	[0.0217]	[0.0211]	[0.0231]	[0.0229]	[0.0197]	[0.0181]
ICF	0.3834^{***}	0.4321^{***}	0.5026^{***}	0.1743^{***}	0.2478^{***}	0.1810^{***}
	[0.0351]	[0.0422]	[0.0388]	[0.0384]	[0.0299]	[0.0283]
$ExCapital \times COC$	-0.3646*	0.1681	-0.9373***	-0.1174	-0.4317^{***}	-0.1074
	[0.2042]	[0.1764]	[0.2467]	[0.2419]	[0.1609]	[0.1464]
ICF×COC	-1.1091^{***}	-1.7002^{***}	-2.4779^{***}	0.8630^{**}	-0.5021^{**}	0.2562
	[0.2910]	[0.4078]	[0.3536]	[0.3759]	[0.2085]	[0.1869]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17,766	$17,\!803$	$14,\!240$	14,468	$17,\!236$	$17,\!529$
$Adj. R^2$			0.2720	0.2476	0.2581	0.2453