## Do firms mitigate climate impact on employment? Evidence from US heat shocks

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"Heat stress is projected to reduce total working hours worldwide by 2.2 per cent and global GDP by US\$2,400 billion in 2030. For workers and businesses to be able to cope with heat stress, appropriate policies, technological investments and behavioural change are required."

- International Labor Organization Report (2019)

## Heat waves are likely to cause large economic damages

Figure: Estimated climate change damages in the U.S.



Source: Hsiang et al. (2017) and own calculations, Hallegate et al. (2013)

1. Do firms adapt to heat shocks by reorganizing their workforce geographically?

2. What factors (firm-specific, region-specific, industry-specific) affect mitigation activity? What are the underlying mechanisms?

3. What are the implications for local economies?

- 1. Firms experiencing heat shocks:
  - Increase employment in unaffected peer locations, open establishments in new locations

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- 2. Mitigation response is stronger in:
  - Firms with fewer financial constraints ( $\uparrow$  size,  $\downarrow$  leverage) & more ESG-oriented investors
  - Industries where workers have higher outdoor exposure

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3. After facing heat shocks, firms shift workforce:

From: Counties experiencing more acute, chronic, and compound heat stress

To: Counties with less projected heat-damage & better economic conditions (↑ GDP growth) Takeaway: Mitigation is important as climate shocks become more extreme

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- 4. After heat shocks materialize, employment growth
  - Decreases in affected county, increases in peer counties (i.e., connected by firm networks)
    Takeaway: Positive employment spillover across counties through firm networks

## Related literature

- $1. \ \mbox{Extreme}$  heat and firm performance
  - Addoum et al. (2020), Jin et al. (2021), Addoum et al. (2023), Pankratz et al. (2023), Ponticelli et al. (2023)
  - Extreme heat adversely impacts establishment revenue and costs
- 2. Firm response to climate shocks
  - Lin et al. (2020), Pankratz and Schiller (2021), Bartram et al. (2022), Castro-Vincenzi (2023)
  - Firms terminate supplier relationships and increase investments in flexible production technologies in response to climate shocks
- 3. Firms' establishment networks
  - Gabaix (2011), Tate and Yang (2015), Giroud and Mueller (2015, 2019), Gumpert et al. (2022)
  - Establishment networks can propagate economic shock across distant regions

This paper: Firms respond to heat-related profitability shocks by relocating operations

## Overview

#### 1. Data

- 2. Results
  - 2.1 Impact of heat shocks: Single vs. multi-location firms
  - 2.2 Firm mitigation: Reallocation to unaffected counties
    - 2.2.1 Mitigation across firms
    - 2.2.2 Mitigation across regions
    - 2.2.3 Mitigation across industries
  - 2.3 Does mitigation vary by type of shock (acute, spells, chronic)?
  - 2.4 Other and compound climate hazards
  - 2.5 Impact of heat shocks on county-level outcomes
  - 2.6 Does employee-level mitigation and migration explain our results?

## Data: Sources

#### Data Sources:

- 1. Establishment-level data: Dun & Bradstreet Global Archive Files (2009 to 2020)
  - Detailed employment data for 50,000 multi-establishment firms across 3,000 counties
- 2. Heat shocks: Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for United States (SHELDUS)
  - County-level data on heat and other climate hazards
- 3. Other datasets: Current Population Survey (for migration), Compustat (for firm financials), PRISM (for daily temperature data), CRA Analytics (for bank presence), etc.

## Data: Realized heat shocks across the U.S.

Figure: Highlighted counties experienced  $\geq 1$  hot days



**Definition**: Hot Days are days when a loss (property, crop, injury, or fatality) occurred from a heat hazard according to SHELDUS

Relation with Temperature-Based Hot Days

## **Definiting Heat Shocks**

**Establishment-Level**: For firm *f*, county *c*, and year *t*, we define:

 $\begin{aligned} & \text{Own Shock}_{c,t} = \text{Log}(1 + \text{\#Hot Days}_{c,t}) \\ & \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} = \text{Log}(1 + \text{\#Hot Days, Other}_{f,c,t}) \\ & \text{where, \#Hot Days, Other}_{f,c,t} = \sum_{c' \neq c} \frac{\text{Employment}_{f,c',t-2}}{\text{Employment}_{f,c,t-2}} \times \text{\#Hot Days}_{c',t} \end{aligned}$ 

**Firm-Level**: For firm *f* and year *t*, we define:

## **Summary Statistics**

#### Summary Statistics (Firm-County-Year Panel):

	Mean	SD	5%tile	Median	95%tile
Employment	106	644	2	20	350
# Establishments	2.2	5.5	1	1	6
# Hot Days	.47	3	0	0	2
# Hot Days, Other	1,095	14,730	0	.75	2,787
Own Shock	.12	.47	0	0	1.1
Peer Shock	2.4	2.9	0	.56	7.9

#### Summary Statistics (Firm-Year Panel):

	Mean	SD	5%tile	Median	95%tile
Single Location	.3	.46	0	0	1
Employment	1,074	8,481	93	233	3,038
# Establishments	21	195	1	5	50
# Hot Days, Firm	.6	3	0	0	3
Firm Shock	.19	.52	0	0	1.4
Entry In New County	.12	.32	0	0	1

## Impact of heat shocks: single vs. multi-location firms

 $\Delta \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{Employment})_{f,t-1 \to t+k} = \gamma^k \times \mathsf{Firm} \ \mathsf{Shock}_{f,t} \times \mathsf{Single} \ \mathsf{Location}_f + \delta^k \times \mathsf{Firm} \ \mathsf{Shock}_{f,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{f,t}$ 



Key Result: One SD increase in firm-shock:

- 0.47% decline in 3-year employment growth for single-location firms
- No significant decline in multi-location firms



**Key Result**: Consider a firm with equal employment in two counties (c and c'). Over a 3-year horizon,

Horizon k (in vears)

Robustness - Number of Establishments

- **1** hot day in  $c' \implies 0.7\% \uparrow$  in employment growth in c

Robustness - Alternative FE

- Mean employment growth in the sample is 2.4%

## 2.2. Firm mitigation: Reallocation to new counties

Entry In New County<sub>*f*,*t*</sub> =  $\gamma \times \text{Firm Shock}_{f,t-1} + \alpha_f + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{f,t}$ 

		Entry In New County $ imes 100$								
	Overall	Low Heat damage/GDP	Low Energy damage/GDP	Low Labor damage/GDP (high-risk)	Low Labor damage/GDP (low-risk)	Low Chronic Heat Stress				
Firm Shock	0.177* (0.092)	0.252*** (0.077)	0.241*** (0.077)	0.201** (0.079)	0.284*** (0.075)	0.169* (0.086)				
Firm FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
Observations	540,874	540,874	540,874	540,874	540,874	540,874				
$\bar{y}$	8.833	6.411	6.329	6.415	5.873	7.328				
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.270	0.244	0.245	0.243	0.236	0.251				

Key Result: One SD increase in firm-shock:

- 0.09 pp increase in the probability of entering a new county
- Effect is stronger when the new county has lower projected heat-related damages (according to SEAGLAS)

## Hypotheses (heterogeneity of mitigation)

- 1. Understanding the mechanisms:
  - $\,$  Is the mitigating response stronger in the case of
    - Heat-exposed firms?
    - (Towards) Counties less exposed to heat stress?
    - Industries with workers at risk of injuries or fatalities due to heat stress?
  - Primary alternative candidate: Employee-, rather than Employer-, level mitigation
    - Is mitigation stronger for larger firms vis-à-vis smaller firms, within-county vs across-counties?
    - Is there inward migration of workers to benefiting counties?

## Hypotheses (heterogeneity of mitigation)

- 2 Understanding costs and benefits to firms from mitigation:
  - Is the mitigating response stronger in the case of
    - Firms with management/shareholders keen/incentivized to address climate change?
    - Less-leveraged firms as they focus on long-term resilience rather than short-term gains?
    - (Towards) Counties with more competitive rather than concentrated labor markets?
    - (Towards) Nearby counties due to the cost of breaking firm relationships with clients and customers?
    - Economic times when resilience costs easier to incur?
- 3 Descriptive inquiries:
  - Acute, chronic heat stress; Other physical climate risks; Compound physical climate risks

## 2.2.1. Mitigation across firms

Mitigation is higher when:

- Exposure, Risk, and Sentiment towards climate change is higher

Definitions: Following Sautner et al. (2023),

- Exposure is the overall frequency of climate change bi-grams in earnings call transcript
- Risk corresponds to bi-grams associated with risk-related words
- Sentiment corresponds to bi-grams associated with positive/negative tone words



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is higher in firms more exposed and sensitive to climate change factors

## 2.2.1. Mitigation across firms (contd.)

Mitigation is higher when:

- Shareholding of ESG-classified mutual funds is higher
- Definition: We follow ESG classification of Cohen et al. (2021)



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is higher if firm's mutual fund investors are ESG-oriented

## 2.2.1. Heterogeneity across firms: Firm financials

		∆Log(Em	$ployment)_{t-1}$	$_{t+k} \times 100$	
	k=+2	k=+2	k=+2	k=+2	k=+2
Peer Shock	0.263*** (0.066)	2.016*** (0.083)	1.972*** (0.087)	2.002*** (0.095)	0.672 (0.856)
Large Firm	-11.377*** (0.295)				-12.162*** (0.830)
Large Firm $ imes$ Peer Shock	1.091*** (0.066)				1.401* (0.849)
Low Leverage		-0.275 (0.565)			-0.701 (0.586)
Low Leverage $\times$ Peer Shock		0.533*** (0.091)			0.534*** (0.094)
High Z-Score			0.525 (0.506)		-0.467 (0.558)
High Z-Score $\times$ Peer Shock			0.305*** (0.070)		0.117 (0.082)
High Profitability				6.645*** (0.563)	7.461*** (0.595)
High Profitability $\times$ Peer Shock				0.176** (0.080)	0.047 (0.091)
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	~
County $\times$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Sample	Full D&B	Compustat	Compustat	Compustat	Compustat
Observations	4,015,976	463,256	463,256	463,256	463,256
ÿ .	2.424	4.206	4.206	4.206	4.206
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.035	0.035	0.036	0.036

## 2.2.2. Mitigation across regions

 $\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{County Characteristic}_{c,t} + \gamma^k \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$ 



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is higher if their labor markets are competitive

## 2.2.2. Mitigation across regions (contd.)

 $\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{County Characteristic}_{c,t} + \gamma^k \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$ 

Definitions: Exposure measures from SEAGLAS (Hsiang et al., 2017)



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is higher if they have lower exposure to heat-related damage

## 2.2.2. Mitigation across regions (contd.)

$$\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \to t+k} = \delta^{k} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{High Economic Stress}_{c,t} \\ + \gamma^{k} \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} + \alpha_{f} + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$$

#### Definitions:

 $-\,$  High economic stress: Negative growth in real GDP during t-1



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is higher if they have lower economic stress



## 2.2.3. Mitigation across industries



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is higher if workers are more exposed to physical heat

## 2.2.3. Mitigation across industries

$$\begin{split} \Delta \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{Employment})_{\!f(i),c,t-1\to t+k} &= \delta^k \times \mathsf{Peer} \ \mathsf{Shock}_{\!f(i),c,t} \times \mathsf{Industry} \ \mathsf{Characteristic}_{i,t-1} \\ &+ \gamma^k \mathsf{Peer} \ \mathsf{Shock}_{\!f(i),c,t} + \alpha_{\!f(i)} + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{\!f(i),c,t} \end{split}$$

#### Definitions:

- Teleworking: Dingel and Neiman (2020) classification based on feasibility of remote work
- Tradable: geographical concentration-based classification of Mian and Sufi (2014)

		ΔLo	og(Employme	$ent)_{t-1,t+k}  imes$	100	
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5
Peer Shock	0.453***	0.783***	1.099***	1.436***	1.760***	2.002***
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Telework $\times$ Peer Shock	0.222***	-0.078***	-0.116***	-0.119***	-0.164***	-0.271***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Peer Shock	0.624***	0.710***	1.004***	1.333***	1.620***	1.779***
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.069)
Non-Tradable $\times$ Peer Shock	-0.077***	0.122***	0.088**	0.130***	0.148***	0.174***
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.059)
Observations $\bar{y}$ Firm FE	5,556,578 0.770 ✓	4,727,432 1.785 √	4,015,976 2.424 √	3,379,161 3.213 √	2,797,759 3.899 √	2,267,637 4.748 √
County $\times$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$

## 2.3. Does mitigation vary by type of shock (acute)?

 $\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock } (\text{Type})_{f,c,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$ 

#### Definitions:

- Acute stress: peer shock calculated using hot days with non-zero property damage

		$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$							
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5			
	Panel (a): Heat stress (baseline)								
Peer Shock	0.612*** (0.018)	0.728*** (0.027)	1.017*** (0.038)	1.352*** (0.049)	1.640*** (0.060)	1.803*** (0.069)			
	Pa	nel (b): Acı	ute heat str	ess					
Peer Shock (Damages)	0.708*** (0.021)	0.920*** (0.031)	1.546*** (0.049)	1.822*** (0.057)	2.113*** (0.063)	2.014*** (0.068)			
Observations ŷ Firm FE	5,556,578 0.770	4,727,432 1.785	4,015,976 2.424	3,379,161 3.213	2,797,759 3.899	2,267,637 4.748			
$County \times Year \; FE$	<i>`</i>	<b>v</b>	<b>v</b>	<b>v</b>	<b>v</b>	<b>√</b>			

## 2.3. Does mitigation vary by type of shock (spells)?

$$\Delta \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \to t+k} = \delta^k \times \mathsf{Peer Shock} \ (\mathsf{Type})_{f,c,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$$

#### Definitions:

 Heat spells: peer shock calculated using hot days that occurred in a consecutive spell of three or more days

		$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$						
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5		
	Pan	el (a): Hea	t stress (ba	seline)				
Peer Shock	0.612*** (0.018)	0.728*** (0.027)	1.017*** (0.038)	1.352*** (0.049)	1.640*** (0.060)	1.803*** (0.069)		
		Panel (c)	: Heat spell	s				
Peer Shock (Spells)	0.594*** (0.017)	0.675*** (0.025)	0.937*** (0.035)	1.257*** (0.045)	1.540*** (0.054)	1.674*** (0.062)		
Observations $\bar{y}$ Firm FE County $\times$ Year FE	5,556,578 0.770 ✓	4,727,432 1.785 ✓	4,015,976 2.424 ✓	3,379,161 3.213 ✓	2,797,759 3.899 ✓	2,267,637 4.748 ✓ ✓		

## 2.3. Does mitigation vary by type of shock (chronic)?

$$\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock } (\text{Type})_{f,c,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$$

#### Definitions:

 Chronic stress: peer shock calculated using hot days occurring in counties s in the top quintile of the distribution of the number of hot days during the 1960-2008 period

		$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$							
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5			
	Pane	el (a): Heat	stress (bas	eline)					
Peer Shock	0.612*** (0.018)	0.728*** (0.027)	1.017*** (0.038)	1.352*** (0.049)	1.640*** (0.060)	1.803*** (0.069)			
	Panel (d): Chronic heat stress								
Peer Shock (Chronic)	0.771*** (0.021)	0.885*** (0.030)	1.196*** (0.041)	1.555*** (0.053)	1.824*** (0.063)	2.012*** (0.074)			
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Observations} \\ \bar{y} \\ \text{Firm FE} \\ \text{County} \times \text{Year FE} \end{array}$	5,556,578 0.770 ✓	4,727,432 1.785 ✓	4,015,976 2.424 ✓ ✓	3,379,161 3.213 ✓ ✓	2,797,759 3.899 ✓ ✓	2,267,637 4.748 √ √			

## 2.4. Other and compound climate hazards

$$\Delta Log(Employment)_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \delta^k imes Peer Shock (Type)_{f,c,t} + lpha_f + lpha_{c,t} + arepsilon_{f,c,t}$$



**Key Result**: Employment reallocation is stronger in response to compound shocks. Firms handle all forms of climate risks.

## 2.5. Impact of heat shocks on county-level outcomes (Own Shock)



#### Economic Magnitudes (3 year period):

- − 1% ↑ in Own Shock  $\implies$  0.7% ↓ in employment growth, 0.3% ↓ in establishment growth, 0.13% ↑ in HHI growth
- − 1% ↑ in Peer Shock  $\implies$  6.9% ↑ in employment growth, 1.2% ↑ in establishment growth, 0.4% ↑ in HHI growth

## **Key Result**: Heat shocks lead to lower employment and establishment growth, higher concentration

Reallocation across firms

## 2.5. Impact of heat shocks on county-level outcomes (Peer Shock)

 $\Delta Y_{c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \beta \times \text{Peer Shock}_{c,t} + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$ 



#### Economic Magnitudes (3 year period):

- − 1% ↑ in Own Shock  $\implies$  0.7% ↓ in employment growth, 0.3% ↓ in establishment growth, 0.13% ↑ in HHI growth
- − 1% ↑ in Peer Shock  $\implies$  6.9% ↑ in employment growth, 1.2% ↑ in establishment growth, 0.4% ↑ in HHI growth

**Key Result**: Heat shocks lead to higher employment and establishment growth in peer counties Census Results

## 2.6. Does employee-level mitigation and migration explain our results?

 $\text{In-Migration}_{h,c,t} = \gamma^k \times \text{Shock}_{c,t-k} + \alpha_D + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{w,c,t}$ 

**Definition**: In-Migration<sub>w,c,t</sub> is an indicator that equals one if any member of the household h residing in county c in year t migrated into their current location for a work-related reason during the previous year</sub>





## Conclusion

- Evidence suggests that
  - Heat shocks impact local counties and small firms

#### BUT

- Multi-establishment firms relocate workers away from impacted locations to their unaffected, less exposed, locations
- In a manner consistent with firm-level costs and benefits of mitigation
- Particularly for acute, chronic and compound climate stress
- Open questions
  - Are mitigating firms more resilient to FUTURE stress?
  - How much does mitigation help in the aggregate to insulate economy against climate change?
- Next steps
  - Further disentangle worker-driven and firm-driven reallocation (job postings)
  - Within-firm mitigation across occupational groups

#### Heat Is Costing the U.S. Economy Billions in Lost Productivity

From meatpackers to home health aides, workers are struggling in sweltering temperatures and productivity is taking a hit.

NYT (7/31/2023)



Infrastructure holds up but risk of failure rises as hot weather persists

WSJ (7/15/2023)

## Heat Wave Intensifies Energy Crisis in Europe

Natural-gas prices surge to a record, and electricity prices rally as high temperatures spur bidding war for the fuel

WSJ (8/16/2022)

# China's worst heatwave in 60 years is forcing factories to close

CNN (8/16/2022)

We ask: do firms respond to these heat-related profitability shocks by relocating?

## Determinants of SHELDUS Heat Shock

		# Ho	t Days	
# Days(T≥99Pctile)	0.116*** (0.003)	0.117*** (0.005)	0.109*** (0.006)	0.066*** (0.006)
# Days(T≥99Pctile) × High Social Vulnerability/Low Resilience				0.076*** (0.009)
County FE		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Year FE			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Observations	113,763	113,763	113,763	113,763
Ψ.	0.728	0.728	0.728	0.728
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.022	0.082	0.083

# Hot  $Days_{c,t} = # Days(T \ge 99Pctile)_{c,t} + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$ 

#### Key Result:

- Positive correlation between temperature-based hot days and SHELDUS hot days
- Association is stronger when the county has high social risk according to FEMA

## Robustness: Alternative measures of Peer Shock

#### Definitions:

- Peer Shock,  $Alt_{f,c,t}$  is the lagged-employment-weighted number of hot days across all the peer counties of c where firm f has employment in year t
- Peer Shock,  $(Est-Wt)_{f,c,t}$  is the total number of peer hot days weighted by the number of establishments in the peer county (relative to those in county *c*)
- Peer Shock,  $(Eq-Wt)_{f,c,t}$  is the equal-weighted average of hot days in peer counties.
- Peer Shock, (Top Tercile)<sub>*f.c.t*</sub> indicates that the peer shock lies in the top tercile of the distribution.

		ΔL	.og(Employm	ent) $_{t-1,t+k} \times$	100	
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5
Peer Shock, Alt	0.701***	0.449***	0.322***	0.731***	1.123***	1.092***
	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.110)	(0.136)	(0.150)
Peer Shock, (Est-Wt)	0.304***	0.031*	0.080***	0.229***	0.378***	0.388***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Peer Shock, (Eq-Wt)	0.154**	0.518***	0.903***	0.899***	0.947***	0.645***
	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.131)	(0.146)	(0.136)
Peer Shock (Top Tercile)	1.718***	1.895***	2.747***	3.823***	4.642***	5.317***
	(0.087)	(0.136)	(0.187)	(0.245)	(0.307)	(0.359)
Firm FE	√	√	√	√	√	√
County $\times$ Year FE	√	√	√	√	√	√
Observations	5,521,381	4,697,477	3,990,510	3,357,697	2,779,954	2,253,138
$\tilde{y}$	0.769	1.782	2.420	3.208	3.892	4.740
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.026	0.040	0.055	0.072	0.090

## Robustness: Alternative fixed effects and clustering

		$\Delta Log(Employment)_{i=1,i+k} \times 100$								
	1 . 0	1	56(2pioyint		100	1				
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5				
		Pa	nel (a)							
	Fi	rm imesYear and	d County $ imes$ Ye	ear FE						
Peer Shock	1.171***	2.093***	2.893***	3.598***	4.172***	4.785***				
	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.092)	(0.112)	(0.129)				
Firm and County×Industry×Year FE										
Peer Shock	0.807***	1.069***	1.494***	1.995***	2.360***	2.640***				
	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.105)				
		County	$_{\prime}  imes$ Year FE							
Peer Shock	0.277***	0.394***	0.486***	0.602***	0.741***	0.890***				
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.040)				
	Double	clustering a	t County and	l Firm level						
Peer Shock	0.612***	0.728***	1.017***	1.352***	1.640***	1.803***				
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.104)				
Firm  imes Year FE	√	~	√	~	~	~				
$County \times Year \; FE$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
Observations	5,514,632	4,688,481	3,980,139	3,346,619	2,768,822	2,242,546				
$\bar{y}$	0.763	1.777	2.413	3.199	3.880	4.724				
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.087	0.091	0.093	0.095	0.099	0.101				

## Robustness: Alternative outcome

		$\Delta Log(\# Establishments)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$							
	k = +0	k = +1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5			
Peer Shock	0.133***	0.022***	0.039***	0.110***	0.178***	0.198***			
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.018)			
Firm FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			
County $ imes$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			
Observations	5,556,578	4,727,432	4,015,976	3,379,161	2,797,759	2,267,637			
$\bar{y}$	0.554	1.211	1.520	1.918	2.305	2.759			
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.044	0.064	0.086	0.114	0.144			

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## Reallocation with Temperature-Based Shocks

$$\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock } (\mathsf{T} \geq 99\text{Pctile})_{f,c,t} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$$

**Definition**: # Days(T $\geq$ 99Pctile)<sub>*c*,*t*</sub>: Number of days in year *t* when the average temperature in county *c* was above its 99th percentile value from 1982 to 2020

		$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$						
	k=+0	k = +1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5		
Peer Shock (T≥99Pctile)	0.452***	0.779***	$1.115^{***}$	1.448***	1.825***	2.053***		
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.057)		
Firm FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
County $ imes$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
Observations	5,093,577	4,293,786	3,605,427	2,985,655	2,422,352	1,908,354		
$\bar{y}$	0.807	1.238	1.731	2.287	2.796	3.379		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.026	0.043	0.061	0.081	0.098		

#### Key Result:

 $-\,$  Response to temperature-based shocks is similar as that to SHELDUS-based shocks

## 2.2.1. Heterogeneity across firms: Firm size

 $\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1\to t+k} = \gamma^k \times \text{Own Shock}_{c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \beta^k \times \text{Own Shock}_f \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ \text{Definition: Small firm: Average employment} < 250 \text{ (sample median)} \end{cases}$ 



Key Result: Consider a firm with equal employment in two counties – c and c'. Over 3-year horizon, 1 hot day in  $c' \implies$  Employment growth

− in c': 0.9%  $\downarrow$  in small firms and 0.2%  $\uparrow$  in large firms

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 Mean employment growth in the sample is 2.4%
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## 2.2.1. Heterogeneity across firms: Firm size

 $\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \to t+k} = \gamma^k \times \text{Own Shock}_{c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \beta^k \times \text{Own Shock}_f \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Small Firm}_f + \nu^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_f + \alpha_f + \alpha_c + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \\ + \delta^k \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t} \times \text{Peer$ 

**Definition**: Small firm: Average employment  $\leq$  250 (sample median)



Key Result: Consider a firm with equal employment in two counties – c and c'. Over 3-year horizon, 1 hot day in  $c' \implies$  Employment growth

- − in c': 0.9%  $\downarrow$  in small firms and 0.2%  $\uparrow$  in large firms
- in c: 0.5%  $\uparrow$  in small firms and 0.7%  $\uparrow$  in large firms
- Mean employment growth in the sample is 2.4%

## Heterogeneity across firms: Firm size

$$\begin{split} \Delta \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \to t+k} &= \gamma^k \times \mathsf{Own} \; \mathsf{Shock}_{c,t} \times \mathsf{Small} \; \mathsf{Firm}_f + \delta^k \times \mathsf{Own} \; \mathsf{Shock}_{c,t} \times \mathsf{Single} \; \mathsf{Location}_f \\ &+ \beta^k \times \mathsf{Own} \; \mathsf{Shock}_{c,t} + \mathsf{FE} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t} \end{split}$$

	$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$					
	k=+2	k=+2	k=+2	k=+2		
Own Shock	-0.005 (0.126)	0.355** (0.173)				
Small Firm $\times$ Own Shock		-1.745*** (0.375)	-1.737*** (0.379)	-1.686*** (0.357)		
Single Location $\times$ Own Shock				-0.801 (0.607)		
Firm FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
County FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
County $ imes$ Year FE			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
Observations	4,106,771	4,106,771	4,106,632	4,106,632		
ÿ	2.618	2.618	2.618			
Ădj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.052	0.052	0.050	0.050		

## County-level results using QCEW data

 $\Delta Y_{c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \beta \times \mathsf{Shock}_{c,t} + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$ 

	k=+0	k = +1	k = +2	k = +3	k=+4	k=+5
Own Shock	0.136*	0.167	0.169	0.068	0.220	0.239
	(0.073)	(0.121)	(0.153)	(0.175)	(0.179)	(0.152)
Peer Shock	0.602***	0.931**	1.422**	1.716**	1.685**	1.129*
	(0.188)	(0.442)	(0.669)	(0.874)	(0.854)	(0.585)

Panel (A):  $\Delta$ Log(Employment)<sub>t-1,t+k</sub> × 100

	Pa	Panel (B): $\Delta Log(Establishments)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$						
	k = +0	k=+1	k = +2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5		
Own Shock	-0.002 (0.060)	0.036 (0.106)	0.009 (0.141)	0.171 (0.158)	0.088 (0.150)	0.148 (0.133)		
Peer Shock	0.325** (0.128)	0.688*** (0.227)	0.741** (0.299)	0.897*** (0.344)	0.898** (0.350)	1.138*** (0.367)		
County FE	~	~	~	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
Observations	30,412	27,339	24,276	21,212	18,153	15,087		
ÿ	0.585	1.191	1.748	2.262	2.886	3.465		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.071	0.184	0.305	0.441	0.588	0.708		

## 2.2.2. Mitigation across varying distance from the shock

$$\Delta \mathsf{Log}(\mathsf{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \to t+k} = \sum_{(d_1,d_2)} \delta^k_{(d_1,d_2)} \times \mathsf{Peer} \; \mathsf{Shock}_{f,c,t,(d_1,d_2)} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$$

	$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$						
k = +0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k = +5		
0.485***	0.682***	0.911***	1.075***	1.186***	1.332***		
(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.108)		
0.361***	0.451***	0.588***	0.738***	0.832***	0.842***		
(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.074)	(0.087)		
0.253***	0.261***	0.368***	0.480***	0.537***	0.545***		
(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.065)		
0.385***	0.430***	0.592***	0.784***	0.903***	0.970***		
(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.071)		
√	√	√	√	√	√		
√	√	√	√	√	√		
5,527,471	4,698,487	3,988,344	3,353,575	2,774,744	2,247,523		
0.763	1.776	2.413	3.200	3.882	4.731		
	k=+0        0.485***        (0.038)        0.361***        (0.027)        0.253***        (0.018)        0.385***        (0.018)        ✓	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c } \hline & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & $	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c } \hline & \Delta Log(Employmed \\ \hline $k = +0$ & $k = +1$ & $k = +2$ \\ \hline $0.485^{***}$ & $0.682^{***}$ & $0.911^{***}$ \\ \hline $(0.038)$ & $(0.054)$ & $(0.669)$ \\ \hline $0.361^{***}$ & $0.451^{***}$ & $0.588^{***}$ \\ \hline $(0.027)$ & $(0.037)$ & $(0.047)$ \\ \hline $0.253^{***}$ & $0.261^{***}$ & $0.368^{***}$ \\ \hline $(0.018)$ & $(0.026)$ & $(0.035)$ \\ \hline $0.385^{***}$ & $0.430^{***}$ & $0.592^{***}$ \\ \hline $(0.018)$ & $(0.027)$ & $(0.037)$ \\ \hline $v$ & $v$ & $v$ & $v$ \\ \hline $5,527,471$ & $4,698,487$ & $3,988,344$ \\ $0.763$ & $1.776$ & $2.413$ \\ \hline $0.211$ & $0.227$ & $0.000$ \\ \hline $0.111$ & $0.027$ & $0.000$ \\ \hline $0.011$ & $0.021$ & $0.000$ \\ \hline $0.011$ & $0.011$ & $0.011$ & $0.011$ \\ \hline $0.011$ & $0.021$ & $0$	$\label{eq:linear_state} \begin{split} \frac{\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{l=1,l+k} \times \\ \hline k=+0 & k=+1 & k=+2 & k=+3 \\ \hline 0.485^{***} & 0.682^{***} & 0.911^{***} & 1.075^{***} \\ (0.038) & (0.054) & (0.069) & (0.085) \\ \hline 0.361^{***} & 0.451^{***} & 0.588^{***} & 0.738^{***} \\ (0.027) & (0.037) & (0.047) & (0.060) \\ 0.253^{***} & 0.261^{***} & 0.368^{***} & 0.480^{***} \\ (0.018) & (0.026) & (0.035) & (0.046) \\ \hline 0.385^{***} & 0.430^{***} & 0.592^{***} & 0.784^{***} \\ (0.018) & (0.027) & (0.037) & (0.051) \\ \hline \checkmark & \checkmark & \checkmark & \checkmark & \checkmark \\ \hline 5,527,471 & 4,698,487 & 3,988,344 & 3,353,575 \\ 0.763 & 1.776 & 2.413 & 3.200 \\ 0.018 & 0.027 & 0.040 & 0.055 \\ \hline 0.018 & 0.027 & 0.040 & 0.055 \\ \hline 0.021 & 0.027 & 0.040 & 0.$	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c } \hline & \Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k} \times 100 \\ \hline \hline k=+0 & k=+1 & k=+2 & k=+3 & k=+4 \\ \hline 0.485^{***} & 0.682^{***} & 0.911^{***} & 1.075^{***} & 1.186^{***} \\ \hline (0.038) & (0.054) & (0.069) & (0.085) & (0.094) \\ \hline 0.361^{***} & 0.451^{***} & 0.588^{***} & 0.738^{***} & 0.832^{***} \\ \hline (0.027) & (0.037) & (0.047) & (0.060) & (0.074) \\ \hline 0.253^{***} & 0.261^{***} & 0.368^{***} & 0.480^{***} & 0.537^{***} \\ \hline (0.018) & (0.026) & (0.035) & (0.046) & (0.055) \\ \hline 0.385^{***} & 0.430^{***} & 0.592^{***} & 0.784^{***} & 0.903^{***} \\ \hline (0.018) & (0.027) & (0.037) & (0.051) & (0.061) \\ \hline \hline & \checkmark & \checkmark$		

## Impact of county characteristics (affected county)

$$\Delta \text{Log}(\text{Employment})_{f,c,t-1 \rightarrow t+k} = \sum_{\text{Type}} \delta^{k,\text{Type}} \times \text{Peer Shock}_{f,c,t}^{\text{Type}} + \alpha_f + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{f,c,t}$$

	$\Delta Log(Employment)_{t-1,t+k}  imes 100$								
	k=+0	k=+1	k=+2	k=+3	k=+4	k=+5			
Panel (A): Community Risk									
Peer Shock	0.111***	0.299***	0.416***	0.728***	0.771***	0.782***			
	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.078)			
Peer Shock (High	0.592***	0.509***	0.706***	0.723***	1.011***	1.184***			
Vulnerability/Low Resilience)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.087)			
Panel (B): Unionization									
Peer Shock	0.306***	0.477***	0.679***	1.093***	1.301***	1.620***			
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.092)			
Peer Shock (High	0.383***	0.315***	0.419***	0.312***	0.411***	0.216**			
Union Membership)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.086)			
Firm FE	√	√	√	√	√	√			
County-Year FE	√	√	√	√	√	√			
Observations	5,556,578	4,727,432	4,015,976	3,379,161	2,797,759	2,267,637			
J	0.770	1.785	2.424	3.213	3.899	4.748			
Adi. R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.027	0.042	0.057	0.075	0.093			

## 2.2.2. Mitigation across regions

 $\Delta$ Log(Employment)<sub>*f*,*c*,*t*-1 $\rightarrow$ *t*+*k*</sub> =  $\delta^{k}$  × Peer Shock<sub>*f*,*c*,*t*</sub> × Low bank presence<sub>*c*,*t*</sub> +  $\gamma^{k}$ Peer Shock<sub>*f*,*c*,*t*</sub> +  $\alpha_{f}$  +  $\alpha_{c,t}$  +  $\varepsilon_{f,c,t}$ **Definitions**:

- Low bank presence: Below median credit availability



#### Low bank presence

**Key Result**: Employment reallocation to unaffected counties is lower if they have weaker credit availability

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